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Category: Gujarat High Court

  • Gujarat High Court: Customs Refund Limitation Cannot Run Until Final Assessment Is Communicated to Importer; Mere ICEGATE Upload Not Enough

    Gujarat High Court: Customs Refund Limitation Cannot Run Until Final Assessment Is Communicated to Importer; Mere ICEGATE Upload Not Enough

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 19.09.2026

    Gujarat High Court: Customs Refund Limitation Cannot Run Until Final Assessment Is Communicated to Importer; Mere ICEGATE Upload Not Enough

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    The Gujarat High Court has held that merely uploading an order finalising provisional assessment on the Customs electronic portal is not sufficient to start the limitation period for claiming refund under Section 27(1B)(c) of the Customs Act, 1962. The final assessment must be communicated to the assessee before the statutory one-year period can operate against it.

    The Division Bench of Justice Bhargav D. Karia and Justice Niral R. Mehta, in Principal Commissioner, Customs, Ahmedabad Commissionerate v. M/s GAIL (India) Ltd., R/Tax Appeal No. 211 of 2024, dismissed the Revenue’s appeal on 13 June 2024, finding no infirmity in CESTAT’s decision in favour of GAIL. The judgment carries neutral citation 2024:GUJHC:30963-DB.

    Dispute Over Refund of Excess Customs Duty on Imported LNG

    • GAIL (India) Ltd. was engaged in the import of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). It filed 16 Bills of Entry, which were initially assessed provisionally under Section 18 of the Customs Act upon execution of a bond. After production of the original documents, the Bills of Entry were subsequently finalised.
    • The table reproduced by the High Court on pages 3 and 4 of the judgment records the provisional and finally assessed quantities, Customs duty paid and the refund claimed for each Bill of Entry. The aggregate excess duty claimed as refund was β‚Ή7,78,98,646.
    • GAIL eventually filed its refund application on 26 October 2016. It also submitted a Chartered Accountant’s certificate dated 7 September 2016 concerning unjust enrichment, stating that the excess Customs duty had been reflected as a receivable in its books and had not been passed on to customers.

    Customs Department Rejected Refund as Time-Barred

    • The adjudicating authority rejected GAIL’s refund claim on limitation.
    • According to Customs, the 16 Bills of Entry had been finally assessed between 7 October 2015 and 20 October 2015. Since the refund application was filed on 26 October 2016, the Department treated it as having been filed beyond the one-year limitation prescribed under Section 27(1B)(c).
    • The Department’s case was essentially that Section 27(1B)(c), where duty has been provisionally paid under Section 18, computes the limitation period from the date of adjustment of duty after final assessment or, in the case of reassessment, from the date of reassessment.

    CESTAT Allowed GAIL’s Appeal

    • GAIL challenged the rejection before CESTAT.
    • The Tribunal allowed the appeal by relying upon Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., 2014 (308) E.L.T. 169, holding that the relevant point for limitation was the date of service of the finalisation of provisional assessment.
    • The precedent emphasised that where an order gives rise to a remedial right, the date on which the order is served upon the person concerned assumes significance for exercising that remedy.
    • CESTAT consequently rejected the Department’s contention that the importer should simply have discovered the finalisation through ICEGATE.

    Revenue Approaches Gujarat High Court

    • The Principal Commissioner of Customs challenged the Tribunal’s order before the Gujarat High Court under Section 130 of the Customs Act.
    • The principal question proposed by Revenue was whether CESTAT was correct in treating the date of service of the finalisation order as the relevant date for limitation when Section 27(1B)(c) refers to the date of adjustment of duty after final assessment or the date of reassessment.
    • Revenue argued that the final assessments had already been uploaded on the ICEGATE system and that GAIL was required to take notice of the assessments made available on the portal. On this basis, Customs contended that the refund application was beyond limitation.

    Section 27(1B)(c): One-Year Limitation After Finalisation

    • The High Court examined Sections 18 and 27 of the Customs Act, 1962.
    • Section 27(1B)(c) provides that where duty has been paid provisionally under Section 18, the one-year limitation is computed from the date of adjustment of duty after final assessment, or, in the case of reassessment, from the date of reassessment.
    • The High Court accepted that once provisional assessment is completed and an assessee becomes entitled to refund, the refund application has to be made within the period prescribed under Section 27 read with Section 27(1B).
    • The crucial question, however, was whether limitation could operate against an assessee before the final assessment had actually been communicated to it.

    GAIL’s August 2016 Letter Became Crucial

    • A significant factual circumstance was GAIL’s letter dated 19 August 2016.
    • The adjudicating authority itself had recorded that this letter requested the Department to finalise the Customs duty/final assessment. Customs rejected GAIL’s argument that this letter itself should be treated as a refund claim, observing that it was merely a request for early finalisation and was unrelated to a refund application.
    • But that finding had another consequence.
    • The Gujarat High Court observed that the very fact that GAIL was requesting finalisation on 19 August 2016 indicated that, until then, the assessee was not aware that the final assessments had already been completed.
    • This became an important factual basis for rejecting Revenue’s limitation argument.

    Mere Upload on Customs Portal Is Not Sufficient Communication

    The most important part of the judgment is the High Court’s finding concerning electronic uploading of the assessment order.

    The Court held:

    • β€œMerely because the Custom Department has uploaded the final assessment orders on portal is not sufficient compliance of intimation to the assessee…”
    • The Court treated communication of the final assessment as a condition sine qua non for the assessee to exercise the statutory right of seeking refund within one year under Section 27(1B)(c).
    • It further held that CESTAT had correctly considered the documents showing when the finalisation of provisional assessments was actually communicated to GAIL.
    • The decision therefore draws an important distinction between an order merely being available electronically on a departmental portal and the order being communicated to the person whose statutory remedy depends upon knowledge of that order.

    Gujarat High Court Dismisses Revenue’s Appeal

    • The High Court found no infirmity in CESTAT’s order and held that no question of law, much less any substantial question of law, arose for consideration.
    • The Revenue’s appeal was therefore dismissed as being devoid of merit.
    • Thus, GAIL (India) Ltd. succeeded before the Gujarat High Court on the limitation dispute concerning its Customs refund claim.

    Why the Judgment Is Important for Importers

    • The decision has considerable practical importance for importers whose Bills of Entry have been provisionally assessed under Section 18 and who subsequently become entitled to refund following finalisation.
    • The judgment establishes that the Department cannot necessarily rely only upon the internal date of final assessment or the fact that the assessment was uploaded on ICEGATE when the importer was not shown to have been duly informed of the finalisation.
    • For refund disputes under Section 27(1B)(c), evidence relating to communication or service of the final assessment can therefore become critical in determining whether the refund application is within limitation.
    • The judgment is particularly relevant where Customs argues that the importer should have independently monitored the portal even though no effective communication of the final assessment was established.

    Key Legal Principle

    The principle emerging from the judgment can be stated succinctly:

    Where refund arises following finalisation of provisional assessment under Section 18 of the Customs Act, the statutory limitation under Section 27(1B)(c) cannot effectively be invoked against the assessee merely on the basis that the final assessment was uploaded on the Customs portal. Communication of the final assessment to the assessee is essential before limitation can operate against the refund claim.

    The ruling therefore reinforces the procedural importance of actual communication of Customs assessment orders, particularly where commencement of a limitation period affects an importer’s substantive right to claim refund.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Gujarat High Court

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  • Gujarat HC Quashes Copyright FIR Over Alleged Counterfeit Apple Accessories; Says Trademark Dispute Cannot Be Camouflaged as Copyright Offence to Bypass Statutory Safeguards

    Gujarat HC Quashes Copyright FIR Over Alleged Counterfeit Apple Accessories; Says Trademark Dispute Cannot Be Camouflaged as Copyright Offence to Bypass Statutory Safeguards

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 18.09.2026

    Gujarat HC Quashes Copyright FIR Over Alleged Counterfeit Apple Accessories; Says Trademark Dispute Cannot Be Camouflaged as Copyright Offence to Bypass Statutory Safeguards

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    In an important ruling concerning the overlap between copyright and trademark enforcement in counterfeit-goods cases, the Gujarat High Court has quashed an FIR registered against a shopkeeper following the seizure of alleged counterfeit Apple-branded electronic accessories worth approximately β‚Ή15.11 lakh.

    Justice P. M. Raval held that commercial hardware such as AirPods, cables, power adapters and smartwatches does not, merely by being counterfeit or bearing a registered brand, constitute a literary or artistic work for the purpose of attracting criminal liability under Section 63 of the Copyright Act.

    The Court further held that the authorities could not subsequently sustain the case under the Trade Marks Act because the raid itself had been conducted without complying with the mandatory safeguards under Section 115(4)β€”including obtaining the prior opinion of the Registrar of Trade Marks and having the search and seizure conducted by an officer of the statutorily prescribed rank.

    FIR Registered Under Copyright Act Following Raid on Ahmedabad Shop

    • The petitioner, Jitendrabhai Mohanbhai Kriplani, approached the High Court under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of FIR C.R. No. 11191026220492 of 2022, registered on October 19, 2022 at Kalupur Police Station, Ahmedabad City.
    • The FIR invoked Sections 51, 63 and 64 of the Copyright Act, 1957.
    • The complainant was a manager of Griffin Intellectual Property Service Pvt. Ltd., which, according to the FIR, had been authorised by Apple Inc. to take legal action against persons allegedly infringing Apple’s rights or selling counterfeit iPhones, iPads, MacBooks, mobile phones and accessories.
    • Acting on information concerning alleged counterfeit Apple products being sold in shops in the Kalupur area, the complainant approached the police. A raid was subsequently conducted at β€œRaj Cover House”, where the petitioner was present.

    β‚Ή15.11 Lakh Worth of Alleged Counterfeit Apple Products Seized

    • According to the FIR, the authorities recovered several categories of allegedly counterfeit Apple-branded products, including AirPods, USB cables, power adapters, a smartwatch and different kinds of Apple-branded stickers and barcode/MRP labels.
    • The FIR placed the aggregate value of the seized items at β‚Ή15,11,193.
    • The key question before the High Court was whether allegations concerning the possession or sale of such duplicate commercial products could legally sustain criminal proceedings for copyright infringement.

    Petitioner: Counterfeit Hardware Is Not a Copyrightable β€œWork”

    • The petitioner argued that the seized goods did not fall within the categories of works protected under Section 13 of the Copyright Act.
    • His case was that AirPods, cables, adapters, smartwatches and similar electronic products were commercial articles rather than literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works.
    • Accordingly, the ingredients necessary for invoking Sections 63 and 64 of the Copyright Act were absent.
    • The petitioner further argued that if the allegation was actually one of misuse of Apple’s trademark on counterfeit goods, the case would fall under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, rather than being converted into a copyright prosecution.

    Gujarat HC: Commercial Hardware Is Not Literary or Artistic Work

    • The High Court accepted the central distinction advanced by the petitioner.
    • It held that copyright protection under Section 13 read with Section 2(c) is confined to protected categories of works, whereas hardware components, cables, power adapters and electronic devices are commercial industrial products.
    • The Court observed that misuse of a brand name or manufacture of duplicate hardware bearing a trademark would ordinarily constitute trademark falsification punishable under Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act, rather than an offence under the Copyright Act.
    • It consequently held that mere possession or sale of counterfeit commercial goods or accessories bearing brand labels does not, by itself, satisfy the requirements of Sections 13 and 63 of the Copyright Act.

    FIR Failed to Identify Any Specific Copyrighted Literary or Artistic Work

    • The Court then examined whether the stickers, seals, packaging labels and other material allegedly recovered could independently support the copyright prosecution.
    • It noted that the FIR merely described the seized articles as goods infringing Apple’s copyright and bearing Apple’s trademark.
    • Crucially, however, the FIR did not identify any specific copyrighted literary workβ€”such as an instruction sheet or user manualβ€”or any specific artistic work such as an original graphical layout or packaging design whose copyright had allegedly been infringed.
    • The Court stressed that copyright is a statutory right, and an FIR invoking Section 63 must set out how the material allegedly infringed satisfies the statutory definition of a protected work under Sections 2 and 13.

    No User Manuals or Instruction Manuals Were Actually Seized

    • The complainant argued that product literature, packaging, labels and instruction manuals constituted original literary or artistic works belonging to Apple.
    • The High Court, however, examined the investigation papers and found that no instruction manual or user leaflet had actually been recovered or seized from the petitioner’s shop.
    • The Court said a new factual foundation could not be introduced during oral arguments when it was absent from the police recovery memo.
    • The recovery panchnama was also silent regarding any user or instruction manual. Photographs produced later through an affidavit-in-reply, which were not part of the investigation papers, could not be relied upon to cure that deficiency.

    MRP Tags and Barcodes Are Functional Data, Not Automatically Literary Works

    • The Court also addressed the argument that stickers, MRP labels and barcodes constituted literary works.
    • It held that an inclusive definition of β€œliterary work” cannot be stretched so far as to convert every commercial label or container into a literary work.
    • An MRP price tag, standard barcode or technical model sticker contains essentially functional and factual information, the Court observed, and cannot automatically be treated as an original literary work of authorship.
    • This distinction was central to the Court’s conclusion that the alleged counterfeit hardware and functional labels could not sustain the criminal copyright case as framed in the FIR.

    β€œCannot Camouflage a Trademark Dispute as a Copyright Offence”

    • One of the most significant observations in the judgment concerns attempts to invoke copyright law where the substance of the allegation is trademark counterfeiting.
    • The Court found that the primary allegation was the sale of counterfeit Apple hardware and accessories, a subject that fell within Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act.
    • It held that the complainant could not camouflage a trademark dispute as a copyright offence in a manner that bypassed the procedural safeguards prescribed for trademark searches and seizures under Section 115 of the Trade Marks Act.

    Could the Case Continue Under the Trade Marks Act?

    • Having found Section 63 of the Copyright Act unsustainable, the High Court considered the respondents’ alternative submission.
    • The complainant and State argued that even if the Copyright Act provisions were incorrectly invoked, the allegations nevertheless disclosed offences under Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
    • In other words, it was argued that incorrect labelling of the statutory provision in the FIR should not prevent the investigation from proceeding under the appropriate law.
    • The High Court rejected this argument because the Trade Marks Act contains its own mandatory safeguards governing search and seizure.

    Prior Opinion of Registrar Under Section 115(4) Is a Statutory Condition Precedent

    • Section 115(4) of the Trade Marks Act requires the police officer, before conducting search and seizure, to obtain the opinion of the Registrar on the facts involved in the offence relating to the trademark and abide by that opinion.
    • The High Court found from the FIR and police record that no prior written opinion had been sought or obtained from the Registrar of Trade Marks before the raid on Raj Cover House.
    • Justice Raval described this requirement as a β€œstatutory condition precedent” rather than a technical formality.
    • The Court viewed the safeguard as designed to prevent arbitrary police raids on commercial establishments at the instance of private corporate entities.
    • The Court consequently held that a search and seizure conducted in total defiance of Section 115(4) was vitiated.

    Raid Conducted by Officers Below Statutorily Required Rank

    • There was another fundamental procedural defect.
    • The Court noted that Section 115(4) provides that no police officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police or equivalent shall search and seize without warrant in such cases.
    • Although the initial application had been forwarded by the DCP Zone-03 to Kalupur Police Station, the actual raid, search and seizure were carried out under a Police Inspector along with head constables and police constables.
    • The High Court found these officers to be below the statutorily prescribed rank of DSP/ACP and consequently held that they lacked the requisite authority to conduct the search and seizure under the Trade Marks Act.

    Court Finds β€œColourable Exercise of Power”

    • The High Court went further and described the record as demonstrating a β€œclear pattern of colourable exercise of power.”
    • According to the Court, the complainant-company was aware that proceeding under the Trade Marks Act required the Registrar’s prior opinion and execution of the raid by an appropriately ranked police officer.
    • The Court found that what was essentially a trademark dispute had instead been presented as copyright infringement, thereby enabling an immediate raid through local police officers without satisfying those statutory safeguards.
    • The Court held that permitting the prosecution subsequently to fall back upon trademark charges would effectively sanction an evasion of the statutory mandate.
    • It reiterated that the FIR and seizure memo did not disclose recovery of original literary works or user manuals and that the controversy essentially concerned alleged falsification of a registered trademark on commercial accessories.

    Complainant’s Authority to Lodge FIR Was Upheld

    • Importantly, the High Court did not accept every contention raised by the petitioner.
    • The petitioner had challenged the complainant’s locus and authority to institute the proceedings.
    • On examining the authorisation documents, however, the Court found that authority had been given to the agency and, in turn, to its authorised person to lodge the FIR.
    • The petitioner’s objection regarding the complainant’s lack of locus was therefore rejected.
    • Thus, the FIR was not quashed because the complainant lacked authority. It was quashed because the Copyright Act provisions were found inapplicable to the allegations as framed and the statutory requirements necessary for a Trade Marks Act prosecution had not been followed.

    Gujarat HC Quashes FIR and All Consequential Proceedings

    • Summarising its conclusions, the Gujarat High Court held that the allegations did not satisfy the statutory ingredients of Sections 13 and 63 of the Copyright Act, since the commercial hardware in question did not constitute literary or artistic works for the purposes of the prosecution as framed.
    • It further held that Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act could not simply be substituted to save the proceedings because the search, raid and seizure had been conducted in breach of Section 115(4)β€”both because the Registrar’s prior opinion had not been obtained and because the operation was carried out by officers below the prescribed rank.
    • Continuation of the proceedings, the Court concluded, would amount to an abuse of the process of Court and cause grave miscarriage of justice.
    • Accordingly, the High Court allowed Jitendrabhai Kriplani’s petition and quashed FIR C.R. No. 11191026220492 of 2022 dated October 19, 2022 and all consequential proceedings insofar as the petitioner was concerned.

    Why This Judgment Matters

    • The ruling draws an important boundary between copyright enforcement and trademark counterfeiting.
    • The judgment does not hold that counterfeit branded electronic goods are lawful. Rather, it holds that allegations of counterfeiting must be prosecuted under the correct statutory framework, and the procedural safeguards attached to that legislation cannot be avoided by characterising a trademark dispute as copyright infringement.
    • The decision is especially significant for intellectual-property enforcement agencies, brand-protection companies, police authorities, retailers and businesses because it stresses that the choice of statute directly affects the legality of search, seizure and prosecution.
    • Where the substance of an allegation concerns falsification of trademarks on commercial products, authorities cannot use the Copyright Act merely to circumvent the safeguards specifically prescribed by Section 115(4) of the Trade Marks Act.

    Key Takeaway

    Counterfeit commercial hardware bearing a registered brand does not automatically constitute copyright infringement. Where the allegations essentially concern trademark falsification, the Trade Marks Act must be followedβ€”including its mandatory search-and-seizure safeguards. A trademark dispute cannot be dressed up as a copyright case merely to bypass those statutory requirements.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Gujarat High Court

    Disclaimer

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    Write to us at office@aadrikaalaw.com

    Tel: +91-11-4999 2707

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Gujarat HC: Dissenting Members Cannot Override Majority Decision on Redevelopment Without Showing Illegality

    Gujarat HC: Dissenting Members Cannot Override Majority Decision on Redevelopment Without Showing Illegality

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 17.09.2026

    Gujarat HC: Dissenting Members Cannot Override Majority Decision on Redevelopment Without Showing Illegality

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id amitnaren@outlook.com .  

    The Gujarat High Court has upheld the redevelopment of a 96-unit cooperative housing society, holding that 15 dissenting members cannot be permitted to stall a redevelopment process supported by more than 75% of the members merely on the basis of their suspicions and apprehensions, particularly when no fraud or violation of the prescribed redevelopment procedure has been established.

    A Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Sunita Agarwal and Justice Aniruddha P. Mayee, in Rabari Tejmalbhai Gagabhai & Ors. v. Ratnamani Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. & Ors., Letters Patent Appeal No. 1427 of 2023, dismissed the appeal against the Single Judge’s order permitting the society to proceed with redevelopment subject to compliance with Section 41A of the Gujarat Ownership Flats Act, 1973 and the applicable Rules.

    The ruling is significant for redevelopment disputes involving a small group of dissenting members after the statutory majority has approved redevelopment.

    96-Unit Society Decided to Undertake Redevelopment

    • Ratnamani Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. consisted of 96 residential units, for which development permission had originally been granted on May 21, 1981.
    • The redevelopment process began with a society meeting held on February 25, 2019, where members considered the condition of the structure and modern requirements and resolved that redevelopment was necessary.
    • The society subsequently resolved to invite offers from developers and published an advertisement on May 5, 2019.
    • An offer from Suryam Developers was initially finalised in August 2019. The society thereafter considered another offer from Respondent No. 3, which was considered more favourable.
    • Following discussions and modifications, the final offer of Respondent No. 3 was accepted on March 30, 2021.

    81 Out of 96 Members Ultimately Supported Redevelopment

    • At an Annual General Meeting held on October 19, 2021, the majority decided to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding with the selected developer and consent to redevelopment. Seventy-six members attended and signed the resolution.
    • By December 20, 2021, 72 members had entered into the MOU with the developer. With the passage of time, the number of consenting members increased to 81 out of 96, representing approximately 84.37% of the total membership.
    • This figure was important because Section 41A requires consent of not less than 75% of the flat owners for redevelopment.

    15 Dissenting Members Challenged the Redevelopment

    • The appellants were 15 members of the society who opposed the redevelopment.
    • They contended, among other things, that the building was not actually dilapidated and relied upon an alternative structural engineer’s report. They also questioned the financial capacity of the selected developer and alleged that the redevelopment procedure prescribed under the Gujarat Ownership Flats Act and Rules had not been properly followed.
    • According to them, the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation had only required repairs and had not specifically directed redevelopment.
    • The society, on the other hand, submitted that the formal Development Agreement had not yet been executed and that any concerns regarding its terms or the developer’s obligations could be addressed at the appropriate stage. It also pointed out that construction would have to comply with applicable laws, including the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016.

    Section 41A Permits Redevelopment With 75% Consent

    • The Division Bench examined Section 41A of the Gujarat Ownership Flats Act, 1973, which governs redevelopment of flats and apartments.
    • Under Section 41A, redevelopment can be undertaken after obtaining consent from not less than 75% of the flat owners, provided the statutory conditions are satisfied.
    • The provision applies where either 25 years have elapsed from the date on which development permission was issued by the concerned authority, or the concerned authority has declared the building ruinous, likely to fall or otherwise dangerous.
    • The Court also examined Rules 18 to 25 of the Gujarat Ownership Flats Rules, 1974, as amended by the December 26, 2019 notification, which prescribe the procedure for carrying out redevelopment.

    Gujarat HC Identifies Three Statutory Conditions for Redevelopment

    • After examining Section 41A and the Rules, the Division Bench identified the relevant conditions governing redevelopment: completion of 25 years from development permission, or the building being declared ruinous/dilapidated or dangerous by the competent authority, together with consent of not less than 75% of the members.
    • On the facts of the case, the Court found that the relevant statutory requirements had been satisfied.
    • The Court specifically recorded that more than 75% of the members had agreed to redevelopment and that there was no dispute regarding the date on which the original development permission had been granted.

    Court Declines to Reassess Competing Structural Reports

    • One of the dissenting members’ principal objections concerned the physical condition of the building.
    • The Single Judge had considered a Civil Engineer’s report dated August 28, 2019 stating that the structure was fragmented and dilapidated. The dissenting members produced another structural engineer’s report to contest that conclusion.
    • The High Court held that it was not appropriate for the Court to enter into the technical domain and function as an appellate authority over competing structural-engineering opinions.
    • The Division Bench agreed with that approach.
    • It further noted that the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation had issued a notice dated May 19, 2022 directing major repairs after noticing that the building was in a ruinous condition.

    Court Examines Detailed Redevelopment Procedure Under Rules 19–25

    • The judgment also explains the statutory procedure societies must follow before and during redevelopment.
    • Under Rule 19, the Managing Committee must convene a special general meeting and follow the society’s applicable rules and bye-laws concerning notices, agenda circulation, quorum, decision-making and supply of minutes.
    • The special general body must take the redevelopment decision with consent of at least 75% of the total members and select an Architect/Project Management Consultant.
    • Rule 20 requires the Architect or Project Management Consultant to prepare a project report covering matters such as carpet area, alternative accommodation, rent, parking, amenities, corpus fund, bank guarantee, project-completion period and statutory approvals.
    • Rules 21 and 22 govern the processing of offers and selection of the developer.

    No Procedural Illegality Shown by Dissenting Members

    • After considering the redevelopment process undertaken by Ratnamani Society, the Division Bench found that counsel for the appellants was unable to point out illegality in the procedure relating to the policy decision and selection process.
    • The Court noted that the developer’s offer had been discussed by the society on December 31, 2020, modifications were suggested, and the final offer was accepted on March 30, 2021.
    • Importantly, only an MOU had been entered into with the developer at that stage; the final Development Agreement had not yet been executed.
    • This meant that concerns about the final contractual safeguards could still be addressed when the Development Agreement was formulated.

    Rule 23 Protects Members Through Development Agreement

    • The High Court highlighted Rule 23, which prescribes safeguards to be incorporated in a redevelopment agreement.
    • Among other things, the agreement may deal with the project-completion period, bank guarantee as agreed between the parties, alternative accommodation or monetary compensation, registration of the agreement, carpet area to be provided to existing members, allotment procedure, termination for default, corpus fund, shifting charges, common infrastructure and penalties for delay.
    • Rule 24 further prevents the developer from changing the building plan without the written permission of the Managing Committee.
    • The Court therefore found that the statutory framework itself contained safeguards addressing several of the concerns expressed by the dissenting members.

    Minority Members Have Right to Participate, But Cannot Block Redevelopment

    • The most significant observation came while dealing with the rights of the 15 dissenting members.
    • The Division Bench held that the dissenters were entitled to raise concerns regarding the terms of the Development Agreement and could participate constructively in the redevelopment process.
    • However, that participatory right did not translate into a power to indefinitely obstruct a redevelopment approved by the statutory majority.

    The Court held:

    • β€œ15 members out of total 96 members of the society cannot be permitted to stall the process of redevelopment only on their own suspicions and notions.”
    • The Bench further recorded that there were no allegations of fraud or violation of the procedures prescribed under the Rules.
    • This distinction is important: the judgment does not hold that a majority vote automatically cures every illegality. Rather, the Court found that the statutory majority existed and the appellants had failed to establish fraud or procedural violation.

    Gujarat HC Upholds Single Judge’s Redevelopment Order

    • The Letters Patent Appeal arose from the Single Judge’s judgment dated November 9, 2023 in Special Civil Application No. 11314 of 2022.
    • The Single Judge had permitted the petitioner society to proceed with redevelopment after following due procedure and satisfying the requirements of Section 41A. The private respondents were also directed to hand over possession of their flats to facilitate redevelopment.
    • The Division Bench found no error warranting interference with that decision.

    Appeal Dismissed; Dissenting Members Directed to Cooperate

    • The Gujarat High Court ultimately held that the appeal was devoid of merit and dismissed it.
    • The 15 appellants were directed to cooperate with the redevelopment and to provide constructive suggestions while the society entered into the Development Agreement with the selected developer.
    • The connected Civil Application was also disposed of, with no order as to costs.
    • Accordingly, Ratnamani Co-operative Housing Society succeeded before the Division Bench, and the redevelopment process was permitted to proceed subject to compliance with the statutory requirements.

    Key Legal Takeaway

    The judgment establishes an important balance between majority decision-making and minority-member protection in cooperative housing redevelopment.

    Where the requirements of Section 41A of the Gujarat Ownership Flats Act and Rules 18–25 are satisfied and the prescribed 75% consent has been obtained, a small group of dissenting members cannot stall redevelopment merely because they disagree with the majority or harbour apprehensions about the project.

    At the same time, dissenting members retain the right to participate constructively, question the terms of the Development Agreement and object to actual statutory or procedural violations. The decision therefore should not be read as eliminating minority rights; rather, it distinguishes legitimate objections based on legal or procedural violations from obstruction founded merely on suspicions and disagreement.

    Connected Matter

    Gujarat High Court Directs Dissenting Members to Vacate Flats for Society Redevelopment; Holds 75% Consent and Section 41A Requirements Satisfied

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    Source: Gujarat High Court

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  • Gujarat High Court: Trademark Application Cannot Be Denied Advertisement Merely Due to Section 11(1) Objection

    Gujarat High Court: Trademark Application Cannot Be Denied Advertisement Merely Due to Section 11(1) Objection

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 16.09.2026

    Gujarat High Court: Trademark Application Cannot Be Denied Advertisement Merely Due to Section 11(1) Objection

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    The Gujarat High Court has allowed an appeal filed by Lincoln Pharmaceuticals Private Limited against the rejection of its trademark application for β€œGLYPANTA”, holding that Section 20 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 permits advertisement of a trademark application despite objections under Section 11(1).

    Justice Mauna M. Bhatt, by an order dated 20 November 2025 in Lincoln Pharmaceuticals Private Limited v. Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr., R/Civil Appeal No. 7 of 2025, quashed the Trade Marks Registry’s rejection order dated 11 August 2025 and directed the Registry to proceed with advertisement of the application within three months.

    The ruling does not amount to final registration of β€œGLYPANTA.” The Court directed advertisement of the application, leaving any opposition to be considered independently on its merits.

    Lincoln Pharmaceuticals Sought Registration of β€˜GLYPANTA’

    • Lincoln Pharmaceuticals had filed an application on 22 August 2023 under Section 18(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, seeking registration of the mark β€œGLYPANTA.”
    • The application was examined by the Trade Marks Registry, which issued an examination report raising objections. Lincoln Pharmaceuticals responded through a detailed reply dated 30 October 2023, raising various grounds in support of registration.
    • According to the pharmaceutical company, however, the grounds raised in its response were not properly considered before the application was ultimately rejected on 11 August 2025.
    • The rejection prompted Lincoln Pharmaceuticals to approach the Gujarat High Court under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act.

    Section 11(1) Objection Raised Over Similar Trademark

    • The principal objection before the Registry arose under Section 11(1) of the Trade Marks Act, which deals with relative grounds for refusal of trademark registration, including situations where similarity with an earlier trademark may create a likelihood of confusion.
    • Lincoln Pharmaceuticals argued that the objection was unsustainable and that its detailed response to the examination report had not been properly considered.
    • One of the company’s key arguments was that even where competing pharmaceutical trademarks fall within the same class, differences in the composition of the respective pharmaceutical products may constitute an additional mitigating factor while assessing likelihood of confusion.

    Delhi High Court’s Elyon Pharmaceuticals Decision Cited

    • To support this argument, Lincoln Pharmaceuticals relied upon the Delhi High Court’s decision in Elyon Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. v. Registrar of Trademarks, C.A. (COMM.IPD-TM) 153/2021, decided on 23 August 2023.
    • In that case, the Delhi High Court had considered the marks β€œELEMENTAL” and β€œELMENTIN” and observed that differences in the pharmaceutical composition of products could provide an additional mitigating consideration when examining the possibility of public confusion.
    • Lincoln Pharmaceuticals relied on this reasoning to argue that the Registry’s Section 11(1) objection against β€œGLYPANTA” should not have resulted in rejection of its application in the manner adopted.

    Company Says β€˜GLYPANTA’ Was Already in Use Since 2023

    • Another argument raised before the High Court was that the Registry had relied upon trademarks that were proposed to be used, whereas Lincoln Pharmaceuticals claimed that β€œGLYPANTA” had been in use since 2023 and had acquired a substantial market for the product.
    • The company also objected to the fact that its application had been rejected before publication in the Trade Marks Journal.
    • Its contention was that publication would enable the statutory process to proceed and, if any third party wished to oppose the application, such opposition could thereafter be considered in accordance with law.

    Section 20 Permits Advertisement Despite Section 11 Objections: Lincoln Pharmaceuticals

    • Lincoln Pharmaceuticals placed particular reliance upon Section 20 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
    • It argued that even where objections under Sections 11(1) or 11(2) exist, the statutory framework permits advertisement of a trademark application.
    • The company therefore sought an opportunity for its application to be advertised rather than being rejected outright before publication.
    • The Registry’s counsel also raised an issue concerning non-joinder of the opposition party. Lincoln Pharmaceuticals responded that no private respondent was required at that stage because the challenge concerned rejection of the application before publication.
    • The High Court recorded that counsel appearing for the respondents could not dispute the provisions of Section 20.

    Gujarat High Court Relies on Section 20

    • After considering the submissions, Justice Mauna M. Bhatt noted that Section 20 permits advertisement despite objections under Section 11(1).
    • On that basis, the Court allowed Lincoln Pharmaceuticals’ appeal and quashed and set aside the Trade Marks Registry’s order dated 11 August 2025.
    • The Registry was then specifically directed to proceed with advertisement of the subject trademark application in accordance with the proviso to Section 20 of the Trade Marks Act.
    • The Court directed that the exercise be completed within three months from receipt of its order.

    Any Opposition to β€˜GLYPANTA’ Must Be Decided on Its Own Merits

    • Significantly, the High Court did not direct the Registry to grant final registration of β€œGLYPANTA.”
    • Instead, the Court restored the application to the stage of advertisement. It expressly provided that if any opposition is filed against the trademark application after advertisement, such opposition must be decided on its own merits.
    • Thus, Lincoln Pharmaceuticals succeeded in having the rejection order set aside and obtaining publication of its application, but the ultimate registrability of β€œGLYPANTA” remains subject to the statutory process, including any opposition that may be filed.

    Why the Judgment Matters for Trademark Applicants

    • The order is significant for trademark prosecution because it highlights the distinction between an examination-stage objection and the subsequent advertisement/opposition process.
    • In the circumstances before it, the Gujarat High Court relied on Section 20 to permit the application to proceed to advertisement despite the Section 11(1) objection, rather than allowing the pre-publication rejection to stand.
    • The decision is particularly relevant to pharmaceutical trademark applications, where the Registry frequently examines competing marks closely because of concerns regarding similarity and confusion. The case also demonstrates that factors such as the nature and composition of competing pharmaceutical products may be raised by an applicant while responding to relative-ground objections, though the Gujarat High Court did not finally adjudicate the merits of the β€œGLYPANTA” mark’s registrability in this order.

    Key Legal Takeaway

    The immediate principle emerging from the order is that the existence of a Section 11(1) objection does not, by itself in the circumstances considered by the Court, prevent the application from being advertised under Section 20.

    At the same time, advertisement should not be confused with registration. Publication gives third parties an opportunity to oppose the mark, and the Registry retains the responsibility to determine any such opposition on its merits.

    Connected Matter

    Delhi High Court Sets Aside Rejection of β€œELMENTIN” Trademark; Says Phonetic Similarity Must Be Assessed by Look, Sound and Surrounding Circumstances

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Gujarat High Court

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  • Gujarat High Court Directs Dissenting Members to Vacate Flats for Society Redevelopment; Holds 75% Consent and Section 41A Requirements Satisfied

    Gujarat High Court Directs Dissenting Members to Vacate Flats for Society Redevelopment; Holds 75% Consent and Section 41A Requirements Satisfied

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 16.09.2026

    Gujarat High Court Directs Dissenting Members to Vacate Flats for Society Redevelopment; Holds 75% Consent and Section 41A Requirements Satisfied

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id amitnaren@outlook.com .  

    The Gujarat High Court has directed dissenting members of Amity Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. to hand over peaceful vacant possession of their flats within eight weeks, clearing the way for redevelopment of the nearly five-decade-old residential society in Paldi, Ahmedabad.

    Justice Mauna M. Bhatt, in Amity Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. through its Secretary and Chairman & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors., R/Special Civil Application No. 10596 of 2024, held that the Society had followed the prescribed redevelopment procedure and fulfilled the conditions under Section 41A of the Gujarat Ownership of Flats Act, 1973. The judgment was delivered on 8 April 2025.

    The Court found that 72 out of 81 members had consented to redevelopment, comfortably exceeding the statutory 75% threshold, while the buildings were more than 25 years old and in a dilapidated condition.

    Nearly 50-Year-Old Housing Society Opts for Redevelopment

    • Amity Co-operative Housing Society is a registered society owning approximately 6,825 square yards (5,706.38 sq. metres) of land at Final Plot No. 9/A, Town Planning Scheme No. 6, Paldi, Ahmedabad.
    • A total of 81 flats were constructed on the property during 1974-75, making it one of the older residential societies in the Paldi area.
    • According to the Society, the buildings had deteriorated substantially over time. The record referred to corrosion in RCC slabs, beams, columns and foundations, major structural cracks and bending of balcony slabs, raising concerns over safety.
    • Considering repairs and renovation impracticable, the Society decided to pursue redevelopment. The process had commenced as early as 2016, when an advertisement was published inviting offers from builders and developers.

    Majority Members Approved Redevelopment

    • A General Body Meeting was held on 4 April 2021, followed by another meeting on 26 December 2021, to consider the redevelopment proposal.
    • The Court recorded that 72 out of 81 members consented to redevelopment and accepted the developer’s offer. The consenting members subsequently entered into an MoU with the developer in October 2022.
    • A structural engineer’s report described the buildings as more than 25 years old and unsound, unsafe and unstable.
    • The Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation had also issued a notice dated 1 April 2021 concerning the condition of the buildings. The photographs placed before the Court further supported the Society’s case regarding their dilapidated condition.

    Dissenting Members Object to Developer and MoU Terms

    • Respondent Nos. 6 to 14 opposed the redevelopment.
    • One of their objections was that the General Body meetings had contemplated redevelopment through BTI Infrastructure Developer LLP, whereas the MoU was ultimately entered into with the proprietorship concern Tameer Infrastructure.
    • They also objected to the MoU on the ground that it did not contain provisions for a security deposit and penalty, contending that this was contrary to Rule 23 of the Gujarat Ownership Flats Rules.
    • The developer responded that there had been a change in the constitution of the development entity and that the person undertaking the redevelopment remained connected with the project. It was further argued that neither a security deposit nor a penalty clause was mandatory under Rule 23.

    Section 41A Conditions Fulfilled: Gujarat High Court

    • The High Court found that the statutory requirements for redevelopment had been satisfied.
    • The Court specifically noted that the building was more than 25 years old, its condition was dilapidated, and 72 out of 81 members had consented to redevelopment, thereby satisfying the requirement of consent from not less than 75% of members.
    • The Court also examined the Society’s decision-making process and found that General Body Meetings had been held to discuss redevelopment and the developer’s offer. The majority-approved resolutions were followed by an MoU executed by the consenting members.
    • Accordingly, the Court found no defect in the procedure adopted by the Society for selecting and proceeding with the redevelopment proposal.

    Change in Developer’s Constitution Not Sufficient to Stop Redevelopment

    • The Court was also not persuaded by the dissenting members’ objection concerning the change from BTI Infrastructure Developer LLP to the proprietorship concern undertaking the redevelopment.
    • The judgment records that the Court did not find any material change sufficient to invalidate the redevelopment process and observed that the private respondents had failed to demonstrate a justifiable basis for the objection.

    Bank Guarantee and Penalty Clause Not Mandatory Under Rule 23

    • An important part of the judgment concerns the objections regarding the absence of a bank guarantee/security deposit and penalty clause.
    • The Court relied on an earlier coordinate-bench decision in Ratnamani Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. State of Gujarat and observed that providing a bank guarantee is not a mandatory requirement under Rule 23 of the Gujarat Ownership Flats Rules.
    • The MoU in the present case also provided for benefits including accommodation/transport-related arrangements, additional carpet area, gift money and rent.
    • The Court further held that a penalty payment was not mandatory in nature. Concerns relating to the project could also be addressed through project finance requirements and registration with the RERA authority, while the developer had filed an affidavit assuring compliance with the terms and conditions of the MoU.

    Minority Members Cannot Stall Redevelopment Once Statutory Conditions Are Met

    • The High Court referred extensively to the Gujarat High Court’s earlier decision in Rabari Tejmalbhai Gagabhai v. Ratnamani Cooperative Housing Society Ltd..
    • That decision identified the principal requirements under Section 41A for redevelopment, including the age of the building, its ruinous/dilapidated condition where applicable, and consent of at least 75% of members.
    • The earlier Division Bench had also observed that where statutory procedures have been followed, a relatively small group of dissenting members cannot stall redevelopment merely on their own suspicions and notions. Members nevertheless retain the ability to participate constructively and raise legitimate concerns regarding the terms of the Development Agreement.
    • This reasoning supported the Court’s conclusion that the objections of the dissenting members could not prevent redevelopment in the present case after the Society had complied with the statutory framework.

    Article 226 Can Be Used to Facilitate Redevelopment

    • The judgment also referred to Sarojben Kiritbhai Shah v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation concerning the High Court’s powers under Article 226 of the Constitution.
    • The precedent rejected the contention that a writ court could not direct non-consenting members to vacate merely because the Gujarat Ownership of Flats Act does not contain a summary eviction mechanism comparable to certain Maharashtra redevelopment laws.
    • Referring to Supreme Court decisions including Binny Ltd. v. V. Sadasivan, (2005) 6 SCC 657 and Dwarka Nath v. Income Tax Officer, 1965 3 SCR 536, the earlier decision recognised the wide remedial jurisdiction available to High Courts under Article 226.

    Dissenting Members Given Eight Weeks to Vacate

    • Having examined the redevelopment process, the Gujarat High Court concluded that the petitioners had followed due procedure and satisfied the conditions necessary to bring the redevelopment within Section 41A of the Gujarat Ownership of Flats Act, 1973.
    • Exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, the Court allowed the petition and directed Respondent Nos. 6 to 14 to hand over peaceful vacant possession within eight weeks from receipt of the order.
    • The Court also requested all private respondents to cooperate with the redevelopment of the Society.

    Why the Judgment Matters for Housing Society Redevelopment

    The ruling reinforces an important principle governing redevelopment of co-operative housing societies in Gujarat: once the requirements prescribed under Section 41A and the applicable redevelopment rules are fulfilled, a minority of dissenting members cannot ordinarily bring an otherwise valid redevelopment process to a standstill merely because they disagree with the majority decision.

    At the same time, the judgment does not eliminate the rights of minority members to challenge genuine statutory violations, fraud, procedural irregularities or deficiencies in a Development Agreement. Rather, the decision rests on the Court’s finding that the statutory conditions and redevelopment procedure had been complied with in this particular case. For housing societies, developers and flat owners, the ruling highlights the importance of maintaining a clear documentary record of General Body Meetings, member consent, structural condition, developer selection, resolutions, MoUs and compliance with the Gujarat Ownership of Flats Act and Rules.

    Connected Matter

    Gujarat HC: Dissenting Members Cannot Override Majority Decision on Redevelopment Without Showing Illegality

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Gujarat High Court

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  • Gujarat High Court Order on IGST Refunds for Exporters

    Gujarat High Court Order on IGST Refunds for Exporters

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 09.09.2026

    Gujarat High Court Order on IGST Refunds for Exporters

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    The Gujarat High Court recently delivered a significant judgment in the case of Messrs Aculife Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. vs. The Union of India & Anr., addressing the contentious issue of IGST refunds on exported goods procured under the Advance Authorization Scheme. This article provides a detailed overview of the case, the legal arguments, the court’s reasoning, and its broader implications for exporters and GST compliance.

    Background of the Case

    1. Export Transactions and IGST Refunds
      • The petitioner, Aculife Healthcare Pvt. Ltd., exported medicaments between July 2017 and April 2019, paying Integrated Goods & Services Tax (IGST) on these exports.
      • The IGST paid was refunded under Section 16 of the IGST Act, 2017.
    2. Dispute Arises
      • Authorities issued a show-cause notice in April 2023, arguing that since the petitioner procured goods duty-free under the Advance Authorization Scheme, they were not eligible to pay IGST on exports as per Sub-rule (10) of Rule 96 of the CGST Rules, 2017.
      • The Assistant Commissioner raised a demand for refund reversal, citing that the IGST payment and refund were contrary to Rule 96(10).
    3. Appellate Proceedings
      • The petitioner appealed, and the Commissioner (Appeals) reduced the demand, referencing the Gujarat High Court’s earlier decision in the Cosmo Films Ltd. case, which clarified the prospective application of Rule 96(10) from October 9, 2018.
      • The demand was reduced to Rs. 9,97,222/-.

    Legal Arguments Presented

    • Petitioner’s Stand:
      • The petitioner argued that the appeal was pending when Notification No. 20/2024 (dated October 8, 2024) omitted Rule 96(10).
      • Citing the Adwrap Packaging Ltd. case, the petitioner contended that the omission of Rule 96(10) should apply to all pending proceedings where final adjudication had not occurred.
    • Respondent’s Position:
      • The government did not dispute that the appeal was pending when the notification was issued.

    The High Court’s Decision

    • The Court held that since the proceedings were pending before the appellate authority when Notification No. 20/2024 was issued, the omission of Rule 96(10) applied to the petitioner’s case.
    • The impugned order demanding refund reversal was quashed and set aside.
    • The petition was allowed, providing relief to the exporter.

    Key Takeaways and Implications

    1. Prospective Omission of Rule 96(10):
      • The omission of Rule 96(10) by Notification No. 20/2024 applies to all cases pending final adjudication as of the notification date.
      • Exporters with similar pending disputes may benefit from this precedent.
    2. Legal Certainty for Exporters:
      • The judgment reinforces the principle that changes in tax rules, especially those affecting substantive rights, should not be applied retrospectively to the detriment of taxpayers.
    3. Reference to Precedents:
      • The Court relied on its earlier decisions (Cosmo Films Ltd. and Adwrap Packaging Ltd.), ensuring consistency in GST jurisprudence.
    4. Practical Impact:
      • Exporters who procured goods under duty-free schemes and faced IGST refund reversals can seek relief if their cases were pending as of October 8, 2024.

    Conclusion

    This Gujarat High Court order provides much-needed clarity on the application of GST rules to exporters using the Advance Authorization Scheme. It underscores the importance of timely legal recourse and highlights the judiciary’s role in protecting taxpayer rights amidst evolving tax regulations.

    Connected Matter

    CESTAT Chennai on Refund of Excess Export Duty and Limitation under Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Gujarat High Court

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  • Gujarat High Court on RERA Jurisdiction, Completed Projects, and Scope of Adjudicating Officer’s Powers

    Gujarat High Court on RERA Jurisdiction, Completed Projects, and Scope of Adjudicating Officer’s Powers

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 05.09.2026

    Gujarat High Court on RERA Jurisdiction, Completed Projects, and Scope of Adjudicating Officer’s Powers

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id amitnaren@outlook.com .  

    A recent judgment by the Gujarat High Court in the case of Hiren Sureshbhai Patel vs. State of Gujarat has clarified crucial aspects of the Real Estate (Regulation & Development) Act, 2016 (RERA), particularly regarding the jurisdiction of RERA authorities and the rights of homebuyers and promoters. This article provides a detailed analysis of the case, its background, legal arguments, and the implications for real estate stakeholders.

    Background of the Case

    • Project: Landmark Harmony, a residential complex of 120 flats developed by Landmark Probuild Pvt. Ltd. in Gandhinagar, Gujarat.
    • Parties:
      • Petitioner: Hiren Sureshbhai Patel, Director of Landmark Probuild Pvt. Ltd.
      • Respondent No. 3: Shyamsundar Ghasitasingh Karhana (homebuyer)
    • Dispute:
      • An agreement to sell (Banakhat) was entered in 2014 between the company and the respondent and his wife.
      • The respondent failed to pay the full consideration amount.
      • Initially, a consumer complaint was filed and later withdrawn; subsequently, a complaint was filed before the RERA Adjudicating Officer seeking compensation for non-delivery of the flat.

    Key Legal Issues Raised

    1. Jurisdiction of RERA Authorities:
      • Whether the RERA Adjudicating Officer had the authority to order possession of the flat and compensation, especially when the project had received a completion certificate before RERA came into force.
    2. Proper Parties to the Complaint:
      • The complaint before RERA was filed only against the Director, not the company or the co-signatory (wife), raising issues of mis-joinder and non-joinder of necessary parties.
    3. Scope of Relief under RERA:
      • Whether the Adjudicating Officer could grant relief beyond compensation, such as ordering possession, under Section 71 of the Act.

    Court’s Analysis and Findings

    1. Applicability of RERA to Completed Projects

    • Completion Certificate Pre-RERA:
      • The project received its completion certificate on 27.09.2016, before RERA’s commencement on 01.05.2017.
      • Section 3(2)(b) of RERA exempts such projects from registration and the Act’s rigors.
      • The Court cited the Bombay High Court’s Neelkamal Realtors and Supreme Court’s New Tech Promoters decisions, confirming that RERA does not apply to projects completed before its enforcement.

    2. Jurisdiction and Powers of the Adjudicating Officer

    • Limited to Compensation:
      • Section 71 of RERA restricts the Adjudicating Officer’s powers to adjudging compensation for violations under Sections 12, 14, 18, and 19.
      • Reliefs like possession or specific performance must be sought before the Regulatory Authority, not the Adjudicating Officer.
      • The complaint format (Form-B) and rules reinforce this separation of powers.

    3. Defective Complaint Due to Mis-joinder/Non-joinder

    • Necessary Parties Not Included:
      • The original agreement involved both the respondent and his wife as buyers and the company as seller.
      • The RERA complaint was filed only against the Director, omitting the company and the wife, making the complaint defective.

    4. Change in Relief Sought

    • Consumer Forum vs. RERA:
      • The respondent initially sought withdrawal and refund before the Consumer Forum, but later sought compensation and possession before RERA.
      • The Court held that the scope of relief cannot be expanded in this manner, especially when the Adjudicating Officer lacks jurisdiction for possession orders.

    Final Judgment

    • The High Court quashed the RERA Adjudicating Officer’s order, holding it was beyond jurisdiction and based on a defective complaint.
    • The petition by the Director was allowed, and the impugned order was set aside.

    Key Takeaways for Real Estate Stakeholders

    1. RERA’s Applicability:
      • Projects with completion certificates before 01.05.2017 are not subject to RERA’s registration or its dispute resolution mechanisms.
    2. Jurisdictional Clarity:
      • The Adjudicating Officer under RERA can only award compensation, not order possession or specific performance.
      • Reliefs like possession must be sought before the Regulatory Authority, following the correct procedure and forms.
    3. Proper Party Inclusion:
      • Complaints must include all necessary parties as per the original agreement to avoid dismissal on technical grounds.
    4. Consistency in Relief Sought:
      • Applicants cannot change the nature of relief sought across different forums without following due process.

    Conclusion

    This judgment reinforces the importance of understanding the scope and limitations of RERA, both for homebuyers and developers. It highlights the need for precise legal strategy, correct party inclusion, and adherence to procedural requirements when seeking remedies in real estate disputes. The decision also provides clarity on the non-applicability of RERA to completed projects and the distinct roles of the Adjudicating Officer and Regulatory Authority.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Gujarat High Court

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  • Gujarat High Court Restores 18% Contractual Interest Rate for Homebuyers in RERA Refund Dispute

    Gujarat High Court Restores 18% Contractual Interest Rate for Homebuyers in RERA Refund Dispute

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 02.09.2026

    Gujarat High Court Restores 18% Contractual Interest Rate for Homebuyers in RERA Refund Dispute

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id amitnaren@outlook.com .  

    A recent judgment by the Gujarat High Court has clarified the calculation of interest rates in real estate disputes under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act (RERA). This article explores the background, legal provisions, and implications of the case involving Ramsingh Baldharisingh Pal & Ors. versus M/s. Baghel Construction & Ors., focusing on the correct application of interest rates when promoters default on handing over possession.

    Case Background

    • Parties Involved:
      • Appellants: Ramsingh Baldharisingh Pal & others (allottees)
      • Respondents: M/s. Baghel Construction & others (promoters/builders)
    • Project: Shiv Krupa Residency
    • Issue: The promoters failed to hand over possession of flats by the agreed date (31.12.2019). The allottees sought cancellation of the contract and refund of their payments.

    Chronology of Events

    1. Complaint to RERA:
      • Allottees paid Rs. 15,25,000 to the promoters.
      • RERA ordered refund of Rs. 12,05,941 with 18% interest from the payment date, plus Rs. 30,000 as costs.
    2. Promoters’ Appeal:
      • Promoters appealed to the Gujarat Real Estate Appellate Tribunal, which reduced the interest rate from 18% to 9% but upheld the refund and costs.
    3. High Court Appeal:
      • Allottees challenged the reduction in interest rate before the Gujarat High Court.

    Legal Provisions Examined

    Rule 16 of Gujarat RERA Rules, 2017

    • Rule 16(1):
      • The interest rate for defaults is the contractual rate agreed between promoter and allottee.
      • If no rate is agreed, the rate is the State Bank of India MCLR plus 2%.
      • The rate must be equal for both parties in case of default.
    • Section 2(za) of the Act:
      • Reinforces that the interest rate for default by either party must be the same.

    High Court’s Analysis and Decision

    • The High Court found that the Tribunal erred by applying the default statutory rate (MCLR + 2%) instead of the contractual rate.
    • The agreement between the parties specified 18% interest for default by the allottee; thus, the same rate applies if the promoter defaults.
    • The Court quashed the Tribunal’s order reducing the rate to 9% and restored the RERA Authority’s order of 18% interest.

    Key Takeaways for Homebuyers and Promoters

    1. Contractual Rate Prevails:
      • If the agreement specifies an interest rate for default, that rate applies to both parties.
    2. Statutory Rate Applies Only in Absence of Agreement:
      • If no rate is agreed, the statutory rate (SBI MCLR + 2%) is used.
    3. Equality Principle:
      • The law ensures neither party is advantaged or disadvantaged by different interest rates in case of default.

    Implications

    • For Homebuyers:
      • Strengthens the position of allottees seeking refunds for delayed possession.
      • Ensures fair compensation aligned with contractual terms.
    • For Promoters:
      • Highlights the importance of clear contractual terms.
      • Promoters must be aware that the same interest rate applies to them in case of default.

    Conclusion

    This judgment reinforces the principle of parity in interest rates under RERA and provides clarity for both homebuyers and developers. It underscores the importance of adhering to contractual terms and ensures that justice is served in real estate disputes involving delayed possession and refunds.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Gujarat High Court

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  • High Court of Gujarat on Conditional Release of Seized Vehicle Under NDPS Act

    High Court of Gujarat on Conditional Release of Seized Vehicle Under NDPS Act

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 02.09.2026

    High Court of Gujarat on Conditional Release of Seized Vehicle Under NDPS Act

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    A recent order from the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad addresses the release of a vehicle seized in connection with a narcotics case. This article provides a detailed overview of the case, the legal reasoning behind the court’s decision, and the implications for similar cases involving seized property under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS Act).

    Background of the Case

    • Case Title: Anwarhusain @ Zandu Allanur Lakhara vs. State of Gujarat
    • Court: High Court of Gujarat, Ahmedabad
    • Vehicle Involved: Maruti Omni (Registration No. GJ-20-A-9287)
    • Context: The vehicle was seized by police in connection with an FIR registered under the NDPS Act, alleging its use in transporting contraband.

    Legal Arguments Presented

    1. Petitioner’s Argument:
      • Sought release of the seized vehicle by invoking the court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and Section 497 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS).
      • Emphasized the court’s wide powers to grant such relief.
    2. State’s Opposition:
      • Argued that the vehicle was used in the commission of an NDPS Act offence and should be confiscated, not released.
      • Cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Bishwajit Dey vs. State of Assam (2025 INSC 32) to support the bar on release under Section 60 of the NDPS Act.

    Court’s Analysis and Reasoning

    • The court clarified that mere use of a vehicle in an NDPS offence does not automatically bar its release.
    • Jurisdiction under Section 451 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) and Section 60 of the NDPS Act remains intact for considering release applications.
    • The court noted the absence of direct evidence that contraband was seized from the vehicle itself, relying only on statements from co-accused.
    • The court referenced the Supreme Court’s guidance in Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai vs. State of Gujarat (2002) 10 SCC 283, emphasizing the need to avoid deterioration of seized vehicles during prolonged trials.

    Order and Conditions for Release

    The High Court allowed the petition and directed the trial court to release the vehicle, subject to strict conditions:

    1. Solvent Surety: The petitioner must provide a surety equivalent to the vehicle’s value as stated in the FIR or panchnama.
    2. Undertaking: The petitioner must undertake not to transfer, change the identity, or alter the color of the vehicle until the trial concludes.
    3. Production on Demand: The vehicle must be produced before the trial court whenever required.
    4. Future Offences: If the vehicle is involved in any subsequent offence, it will be confiscated.
    5. Authority’s Rights: The order does not prevent the trial court from initiating confiscation or auction proceedings if necessary.
    6. Documentation: Police must photograph the vehicle from all sides and prepare a panchanama before release, with these documents forming part of the charge sheet.
    7. RTO Notification: The order must be sent to the relevant RTO to record the restriction on transfer until the trial’s conclusion.

    Implications and Takeaways

    • Legal Precedent: The order reinforces that courts retain discretion to release seized vehicles under the NDPS Act, especially when direct evidence of contraband recovery from the vehicle is lacking.
    • Protection of Property: The decision balances the need to preserve evidence with the rights of property owners, preventing unnecessary deterioration of vehicles during lengthy legal proceedings.
    • Stringent Safeguards: The imposed conditions ensure that the vehicle remains available for trial and is not misused or disposed of improperly.

    Conclusion

    This High Court order provides important guidance for handling seized vehicles in narcotics cases. It underscores the judiciary’s role in protecting property rights while upholding the law, and sets out clear procedures and safeguards for the conditional release of such property during ongoing trials.

    Connected Matter

    Interim Release of Seized Vehicles Under NDPS Act

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Gujarat High Court

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  • Suspension of Sentence Granted to NDPS Convict Pending Appeal: High Court of Gujarat Allows Bail Citing Procedural Lapses and Delay in Hearing

    Suspension of Sentence Granted to NDPS Convict Pending Appeal: High Court of Gujarat Allows Bail Citing Procedural Lapses and Delay in Hearing

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 29.08.2026

    Suspension of Sentence Granted to NDPS Convict Pending Appeal: High Court of Gujarat Allows Bail Citing Procedural Lapses and Delay in Hearing

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    In a significant development, the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad granted suspension of sentence to Pravinkumar Balvantram Vana (Bishnoi), who was convicted under Sections 8(c), 22(c), and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act. The conviction, delivered by the Special (NDPS) Judge & 10th Additional Sessions Judge, Surat, sentenced the applicant to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,00,000, with an additional year of imprisonment in case of default in payment.

    Grounds for Suspension of Sentence

    The applicant, through his legal counsel, sought suspension of sentence on several grounds:

    1. Substantial Sentence Already Served: The applicant had already undergone over 3 years and 4 months of incarceration out of the total 10-year sentence.
    2. Delay in Appeal Hearing: The criminal appeal was admitted recently, and there were remote chances of it being heard in the near future.
    3. Compliance with Legal Provisions: The defense argued that the mandatory provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act were not properly complied with during the investigation.
    4. Willingness to Pay Fine: The applicant expressed readiness to deposit the fine imposed by the trial court.

    Arguments Presented

    • For the Applicant: The defense emphasized the fixed-term nature of the sentence, the significant portion already served, and the lack of compliance with mandatory legal procedures. Reliance was placed on Supreme Court judgments advocating liberal consideration for suspension of sentence in fixed-term cases, especially when appeals are unlikely to be heard soon.
    • For the State: The prosecution opposed the application, citing the seriousness of the offense and the evidence establishing the applicant’s complicity. The State argued that the trial court had properly appreciated both ocular and documentary evidence before convicting the applicant.

    Court’s Observations and Reasoning

    The Court carefully reviewed the evidence and legal precedents, noting:

    • The incident occurred in 2021, and the applicant had already served a significant portion of the sentence.
    • There was a prima facie violation of Section 50 of the NDPS Act, which mandates certain procedural safeguards during search and seizure.
    • Supreme Court judgments (including Bhagwan Rama Shinde Gosai v. State of Gujarat and others) support the suspension of sentence in cases where the appeal is unlikely to be heard before the sentence is completed.
    • The applicant had no antecedents and had already undergone more than 40% of the sentence.

    Court’s Decision

    Based on the above, the Court ruled in favor of the applicant, suspending the sentence pending the final hearing of the appeal. The applicant was ordered to be released on bail upon furnishing a bond of Rs. 15,000 with one surety of the like amount, subject to several conditions:

    1. Not to misuse liberty or leave Gujarat without court permission.
    2. To provide and not change residential address without permission.
    3. To cooperate with the appeal process and mark monthly presence at the local police station.
    4. To deposit the fine within four weeks.

    Significance of the Ruling

    This judgment underscores the judiciary’s approach to balancing the rights of convicts with the practical realities of delayed appellate hearings. It reiterates the principle that fixed-term convicts should not be unduly deprived of their liberty due to systemic delays, provided there are no exceptional circumstances or statutory bars.

    The case also highlights the importance of strict compliance with procedural safeguards under the NDPS Act, as lapses can significantly impact the outcome of post-conviction relief applications.

    This decision serves as a reference point for similar cases where convicts seek suspension of sentence during the pendency of their appeals, especially in the context of lengthy sentences and delayed hearings.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Gujarat High Court

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi