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Category: RERA

  • Bombay High Court: Section 79 RERA Bars Civil Suit Where Reliefs Can Be Granted by RERA Authority

    Bombay High Court: Section 79 RERA Bars Civil Suit Where Reliefs Can Be Granted by RERA Authority

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 19.09.2026

    Bombay High Court: Section 79 RERA Bars Civil Suit Where Reliefs Can Be Granted by RERA Authority

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id amitnaren@outlook.com .  

    The Bombay High Court has held that where the relief sought by flat purchasers essentially concerns enforcement of a promoter’s statutory obligations in a RERA-registered project, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred by Section 79 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA) if the relief can be granted under the statutory mechanism created by RERA.

    In Mr. Yadavalli Venkata Gopalam & Anr. v. M/s Sai Siddhant Developers & Anr., the High Court dismissed an appeal challenging a City Civil Court order that had returned the purchasers’ plaint under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for presentation before the appropriate RERA forum.

    Justice Sandeep V. Marne pronounced the judgment on 4 November 2023, after reserving it on 23 October 2023. The decision is reported with neutral citation 2023:BHC-AS:33740.

    Flat Purchasers Approached Civil Court Against Developer and Society

    • The appellants had instituted S.C. Suit No. 964 of 2023 before the City Civil Court, Mumbai.
    • Their dispute concerned Flat No. 1105 on the 11th Floor, having a carpet area of 643 sq. ft. and built-up area of 772 sq. ft., in the building known as D.N. Nagar Shivneri CHS Ltd., Andheri West, Mumbai.
    • They sought a mandatory direction requiring the developer, M/s Sai Siddhant Developers, to adhere to the terms and conditions of the agreement concerning the flat and fulfil its statutory obligations under the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act, 1963 (MOFA).
    • They also sought an injunction restraining the defendants from selling, transferring, alienating or creating third-party rights in the flat.

    Society Invokes Section 79 of RERA

    • D.N. Nagar Shivneri Co-operative Housing Society filed a Notice of Motion seeking return of the plaint under Order VII Rule 10 CPC.
    • The Society argued that the Civil Court could not entertain the suit because its jurisdiction was barred by Section 79 of RERA.
    • The City Civil Court accepted the objection and, by an order dated 11 July 2023, returned the plaint for presentation before RERA. The purchasers challenged that decision before the Bombay High Court.

    Purchasers Argue Suit Was for Specific Performance

    • The purchasers argued before the High Court that their suit was actually one for specific performance of the Agreement for Sale dated 10 June 2015.
    • They contended that they had already paid a substantial portion of the agreed consideration but that the developer had failed to perform its contractual obligations.
    • They further alleged collusion between the developer and the Society and argued that RERA could not determine questions involving fraud and collusion.
    • The purchasers relied upon the Constitution Bench judgment in Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., AIR 1969 SC 78, to argue that exclusion of Civil Court jurisdiction should not be readily inferred.
    • They also relied upon State of A.P. v. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao & Ors., (2000) 3 SCC 689, which reiterates the general principle that Civil Courts possess jurisdiction over suits of a civil nature unless jurisdiction is expressly or impliedly excluded.

    Society: Suit Was Really About Enforcement of Promoter’s Statutory Obligations

    • The Society disputed the purchasers’ characterization of the suit.
    • It argued that the suit was not actually for specific performance of the Agreement for Sale. Instead, the purchasers were asking the developer to fulfil obligations arising under MOFA which, following registration of the project under RERA, could be enforced through the remedies available under the RERA framework.
    • The Society relied on Sections 11, 19, 34 and 79 of RERA, arguing that the Act provides an adequate mechanism for seeking completion of construction, possession and enforcement of the promoter’s statutory obligations.

    Bombay HC Examines Actual Prayers in the Plaint

    • A crucial part of the High Court’s analysis concerned the actual reliefs sought in the plaint, rather than the purchasers’ description of their case during arguments.
    • The principal prayer sought a mandatory direction requiring the developer to adhere to the agreement relating to Flat No. 1105 and fulfil its statutory obligations under MOFA.
    • The purchasers had also sought a permanent injunction against creation of third-party rights, appointment of a Court Receiver, and a direction requiring the developer to deposit β‚Ή68,78,890 with 18% interest to secure the money paid by them.

    After examining those prayers, the High Court reached an important factual conclusion:

    • β€œThus, there is no prayer for specific performance of the agreement for sale dated 10 June 2015.”
    • According to the Court, the suit instead sought adherence to the terms of the agreement and/or fulfilment of statutory obligations under MOFA.

    Court-Fee Valuation Also Showed Suit Was Not for Specific Performance

    • The High Court also examined how the purchasers themselves had valued their suit.
    • They had valued the proceeding under Section 6(iv)(j) of the Maharashtra Court Fees Act, stating that the relief was incapable of monetary valuation because what they sought was enforcement of the developer’s statutory obligations under MOFA.
    • The Court contrasted this with Section 6(xi) of the Court Fees Act, which specifically deals with suits for specific performance and, in the case of a contract of sale, requires valuation according to the amount of consideration.
    • The High Court therefore found that the purchasers’ own pleadings and court-fee valuation supported the conclusion that the suit was not a suit for specific performance.

    Mere Allegation of Fraud or Collusion Cannot Create Civil Court Jurisdiction

    • The purchasers also attempted to sustain the Civil Court’s jurisdiction by alleging fraud and collusion between the Society and the developer.
    • The High Court rejected this contention on the facts.
    • Justice Marne noted that the word β€œfraud” was not even pleaded in the suit, while references to β€œcollusion” were unsupported by material particulars.
    • The Court relied upon the Supreme Court’s ruling in C.S. Ramaswamy v. V.K. Senthil & Ors., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1330, which emphasised that a mere allegation of fraud is insufficient and that fraud must be supported by specific pleadings explaining how it was committed.
    • Accordingly, unsupported references to fraud or collusion could not be used to alter the true character of the suit or avoid the statutory jurisdictional bar.

    RERA Project Registration Was Crucial

    • The High Court noted that under the first proviso to Section 3(1) of RERA, projects for which a completion certificate had not been issued when RERA commenced are required to be registered with the Authority.
    • In this case, the project had been registered with MahaRERA under Registration No. P51800004197 on 8 August 2017.
    • The Court therefore found that the purchasers could seek enforcement of the promoter’s obligations through the remedies created by RERA.
    • Those remedies included seeking refund with interest, fulfilment of the promoter’s obligations and possession of the flat under Section 19(3).

    Section 79 RERA Bars Civil Court Jurisdiction Over Matters RERA Can Determine

    • Section 79 provides that no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain a suit or proceeding concerning any matter which the RERA Authority, adjudicating officer or Appellate Tribunal is empowered under the Act to determine.
    • It also prohibits courts or other authorities from granting injunctions concerning action taken or proposed under powers conferred by RERA.
    • Applying this provision to the particular reliefs sought by the appellants, Justice Marne held that the City Civil Court had correctly concluded that its jurisdiction was barred.
    • The High Court stated that, in the circumstances before it, the bar under Section 79 was β€œabsolute”, because an adequate mechanism existed under RERA for the purchasers to seek fulfilment of the developer/promoter’s obligations.

    Important Qualification: Court Leaves Broader Specific-Performance Question Open

    • An important qualification in the judgment should not be overlooked.
    • The Bombay High Court did not hold that every civil suit seeking specific performance of an agreement concerning a RERA-registered project is barred by Section 79.
    • During arguments, counsel for the Society fairly conceded that such an absolute proposition could not necessarily be advanced.
    • The Court expressly stated that the broader questionβ€”whether Civil Court jurisdiction is barred in every suit seeking specific performance of an agreement concerning a RERA projectβ€”was being left open for determination in an appropriate case.
    • The decision therefore turns substantially on the Court’s finding that the particular plaint before it was not actually a suit for specific performance.

    What Supreme Court’s Imperia Structures Decision Meant

    • The Society had also relied upon Imperia Structures Ltd. v. Anil Patni & Anr., (2020) 10 SCC 783.
    • The Bombay High Court observed that Imperia Structures principally concerned the relationship between remedies under RERA and those available before consumer fora.
    • The Supreme Court had recognised that Section 79 bars Civil Court jurisdiction over matters which the RERA Authority, adjudicating officer or Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine, while consumer remedies remain separately available in the circumstances considered in that case.
    • However, Justice Marne clarified that Imperia Structures did not resolve the broader issue of whether every specific-performance suit concerning a RERA agreement is barred.

    Appeal Dismissed; City Civil Court Order Upheld

    • The Bombay High Court ultimately found no patent error in the City Civil Court’s decision.
    • Accordingly, Appeal From Order No. 662 of 2023 was dismissed without costs.
    • As a consequence, the connected Interim Application No. 14511 of 2023 also did not survive and was disposed of.
    • Thus, the order returning the purchasers’ plaint for presentation before the appropriate RERA forum remained undisturbed.

    Key Takeaway

    The judgment demonstrates that the substance of the plaint and the actual reliefs claimedβ€”not merely the label given to the suitβ€”will be crucial when determining whether Section 79 RERA excludes Civil Court jurisdiction. Where a purchaser essentially seeks enforcement of obligations that the RERA Authority is empowered to enforce, the Civil Court may lack jurisdiction.

    At the same time, the Bombay High Court deliberately left open the broader question of whether a genuine suit for specific performance of an agreement for sale in a RERA-registered project is necessarily barred.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Bombay High Court

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  • Bombay HC: RERA Tribunal Cannot Grant Declaration, Permanent Injunction or Cancel Sanction Plan

    Bombay HC: RERA Tribunal Cannot Grant Declaration, Permanent Injunction or Cancel Sanction Plan

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 18.09.2026

    Bombay HC: RERA Tribunal Cannot Grant Declaration, Permanent Injunction or Cancel Sanction Plan

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id amitnaren@outlook.com .  

    In a significant ruling concerning the interface between RERA and the jurisdiction of civil courts, the Bombay High Court has dismissed a revision application filed by Macrotech Developers Limited, holding that the bar under Section 79 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 does not extend to reliefs that the RERA authorities are not empowered to grant.

    Justice Milind N. Jadhav held that a dispute involving a cooperative housing society’s substantive rights over an existing clubhouse and internal roads, coupled with prayers for declaration, permanent injunction and cancellation of a sanctioned development plan, could be adjudicated by the Civil Court because RERA does not empower its authorities to grant such reliefs.

    The High Court consequently upheld the Trial Court’s refusal to reject the suit under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure and dismissed Macrotech Developers’ Civil Revision Application.

    Dispute Relates to Lodha Belmondo Project in Pune

    • Macrotech Developers Limited was the promoter of the Lodha Belmondo development project at Village Gahunje, Taluka Maval, District Pune. The project comprised multiple towers and villas over a large parcel of land.
    • Saint Andrews Co-operative Housing Society represented flat owners in various towers and villas situated within an area described as β€œThe Reserve” in the Lodha Belmondo project.
    • According to the Society, the project had been marketed from around 2012–2013 and agreements for sale had been entered into with purchasers. Its case was that Towers B, C and D and Villas 1–28, along with other towers, were integral parts of β€œThe Reserve.”

    Multiple Sanction Plans and Clubhouse at Centre of Dispute

    • The judgment records a series of sanctioned development plans.
    • A third sanctioned plan dated April 30, 2013 showed six buildings and 28 villas as part of β€œThe Reserve”. A fifth sanctioned plan dated June 22, 2018 specifically referred to a clubhouse for members of β€œThe Reserve”. A subsequent seventh sanctioned plan dated September 20, 2021, however, showed the clubhouse near Tower No. 26 as proposed to be demolished.
    • Members of the Society had received possession of their flats in 2017 following issuance of an Occupation Certificate, while the Society itself was registered in March 2021.
    • The dispute escalated in October 2022 when Macrotech’s workers allegedly prevented Society members from entering and using the clubhouse on the ground that the existing facility was to be demolished and replaced.

    Society Approaches Civil Court

    • The Society instituted a civil suit seeking, among other things, a declaration regarding the clubhouse situated behind Tower No. 26 and an injunction restraining the developer and its representatives from preventing members from accessing the clubhouse.
    • It also sought to prevent demolition or additional construction pursuant to changes made in the layout and the seventh sanctioned plan.
    • The Trial Court rejected Macrotech Developers’ application under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC seeking rejection of the plaint as barred by law.
    • Macrotech thereafter approached the Bombay High Court by way of the present Civil Revision Application challenging that order.

    Macrotech: Section 79 RERA Bars Civil Court Jurisdiction

    • Macrotech argued that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction because Section 79 of RERA expressly bars Civil Courts from entertaining matters that fall within the jurisdiction of the authorities constituted under RERA.
    • The developer contended that once a project is registered under RERA, disputes arising out of or incidental to that project must be pursued before the competent forum under the statute.
    • Macrotech also relied upon Section 149 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act and argued that the suit was barred under that enactment as well.
    • It relied, inter alia, on the Supreme Court’s ruling in New Tech Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1044, to contend that RERA applies to ongoing projects which had not received completion certificates before the legislation came into force.
    • Macrotech also relied on Imperia Structures Ltd. v. Anil Patni & Anr., (2020) 10 SCC 783, and argued that the Society could pursue appropriate remedies before the RERA forum or Consumer Forum rather than the Civil Court.

    Society: RERA Cannot Grant the Declaratory Reliefs Sought

    • The Society opposed the revision and argued that it was itself a separate legal entity registered under the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 and was not an individual β€œallottee” within the meaning of RERA.
    • It further argued that Section 79 could not operate as a blanket exclusion of Civil Court jurisdiction in disputes between a cooperative housing society and a promoter.
    • More importantly, the Society contended that it had sought declaratory and other civil reliefs that RERA authorities could not grant.
    • According to the Society, Civil Courts retain jurisdiction over civil disputes unless expressly or impliedly barred, and the nature of the relief sought was therefore crucial in deciding jurisdiction.

    Bombay HC Explains Test Under Order VII Rule 11(d)

    • The High Court reiterated that while considering rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11, the Court must examine the averments contained in the plaint along with its annexures as a whole.
    • At this stage, material outside the plaint cannot be added or subtracted to determine whether the suit is barred by law.
    • The Court observed that rejection under Order VII Rule 11(d) is justified only when the plaint itself discloses that the action is legally barred.
    • In the present case, the Society sought a declaration that the clubhouse behind Tower No. 26 was an integral part of β€œThe Reserve”, a permanent injunction against its demolition, and a declaration challenging the September 20, 2021 sanction plan to the extent it contemplated demolition of the existing clubhouse and construction of another structure in its place.

    Section 79 RERA Is Not a Blanket Bar Against Civil Suits

    • The High Court then examined Sections 79, 88 and 89 of RERA.
    • Section 79 bars Civil Courts from entertaining suits or proceedings concerning matters that the RERA Authority, Adjudicating Officer or Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine.
    • However, Section 88 expressly provides that RERA operates β€œin addition to, and not in derogation of” other laws, while Section 89 gives RERA overriding effect where inconsistency exists.
    • Reading these provisions together, the High Court held that RERA is not the sole remedy for every dispute between allottees and promoters/developers.
    • The Section 79 bar applies only to those matters that the authorities constituted under RERA are actually empowered to determine.

    Can RERA Authority Grant the Same Relief as a Civil Court? Bombay HC Applies Supreme Court Test

    • The High Court relied upon the Supreme Court’s judgment in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, (1985) 4 SCC 10.
    • The principle applied was that even where a special statute creates a tribunal and accords finality to its decisions, exclusion of Civil Court jurisdiction depends materially upon whether the statutory tribunal is capable of granting the relief that a Civil Court would ordinarily grant.
    • Where the specialised forum does not possess the power to grant such relief, exclusion of Civil Court jurisdiction cannot readily be inferred.
    • This became the decisive principle in the case.

    RERA Tribunal Cannot Grant Declaration, Permanent Injunction and Cancellation of Sanction Plan: Bombay HC

    Applying the above principle, Justice Jadhav held that the dispute involved the Society’s substantive right to use an existing clubhouse and its challenge to a subsequent sanctioned plan allegedly validated without its approval.

    The Court specifically found an β€œapparent and glaring absence” of provisions under RERA empowering its authorities to adjudicate reliefs in the nature of:

    • declaration;
    • permanent injunction; and
    • cancellation of a sanction plan approved by the Planning Authority.

    Consequently, such a dispute could not be said to fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the authorities constituted under RERA.

    Society’s Right to Use Clubhouse Had β€œCrystallized”

    • The High Court also took note of the factual history of the clubhouse.
    • The clubhouse had appeared in the fifth sanctioned plan dated June 22, 2018, had subsequently been constructed, and was being used by members of the Society.
    • The seventh sanctioned plan dated September 20, 2021 proposed its demolition. The Court noted that the Society’s consent had admittedly not been obtained before the seventh plan was validated or proposed.
    • The Court observed that the Society members’ right to use the clubhouse had already β€œstood crystallized and in place since inception and on construction of the Clubhouse.”
    • The dispute also involved internal roads that were allegedly proposed to be constructed upon pursuant to the seventh sanctioned plan without the Society’s consent.

    Civil Court Alone Can Grant Appropriate Relief in Such Circumstances

    • The High Court concluded that the substantive rights claimed by the Society could be protected through the civil suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
    • It rejected Macrotech Developers’ contention that the Society’s remedy lay before the RERA Tribunal and held that, in the circumstances before it, the Civil Court could entertain the dispute and grant appropriate reliefs.
    • Accordingly, the Court upheld the Trial Court’s order refusing to reject the plaint and dismissed Macrotech Developers’ Civil Revision Application.

    Important Clarification: Merits of Society’s Suit Not Finally Decided

    • The ruling should not be read as a final determination that the seventh sanctioned plan is invalid or that the Society has conclusively established all of the substantive rights asserted in its suit.
    • The High Court expressly clarified that its findings were prima facie and restricted to the revision proceedings, and that they should not influence the ultimate adjudication of the underlying suit. The parties’ other contentions and remedies were kept open.
    • Thus, Saint Andrews Co-operative Housing Society succeeded on the jurisdiction/maintainability issue, while the underlying civil dispute remains to be adjudicated on merits.

    Key Legal Takeaway

    The judgment reinforces that Section 79 of RERA does not create a universal bar against Civil Court jurisdiction merely because a dispute concerns a RERA-registered real estate project.

    The decisive inquiry is whether the particular matter and relief sought are within the statutory powers of the RERA Authority, Adjudicating Officer or Appellate Tribunal. Where the dispute requires relief such as a civil declaration, permanent injunction or cancellation of a sanctioned development plan that the RERA forum is not empowered to grant, the Civil Court’s jurisdiction may remain available.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Bombay High Court

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  • Gujarat HC: Dissenting Members Cannot Override Majority Decision on Redevelopment Without Showing Illegality

    Gujarat HC: Dissenting Members Cannot Override Majority Decision on Redevelopment Without Showing Illegality

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 17.09.2026

    Gujarat HC: Dissenting Members Cannot Override Majority Decision on Redevelopment Without Showing Illegality

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id amitnaren@outlook.com .  

    The Gujarat High Court has upheld the redevelopment of a 96-unit cooperative housing society, holding that 15 dissenting members cannot be permitted to stall a redevelopment process supported by more than 75% of the members merely on the basis of their suspicions and apprehensions, particularly when no fraud or violation of the prescribed redevelopment procedure has been established.

    A Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Sunita Agarwal and Justice Aniruddha P. Mayee, in Rabari Tejmalbhai Gagabhai & Ors. v. Ratnamani Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. & Ors., Letters Patent Appeal No. 1427 of 2023, dismissed the appeal against the Single Judge’s order permitting the society to proceed with redevelopment subject to compliance with Section 41A of the Gujarat Ownership Flats Act, 1973 and the applicable Rules.

    The ruling is significant for redevelopment disputes involving a small group of dissenting members after the statutory majority has approved redevelopment.

    96-Unit Society Decided to Undertake Redevelopment

    • Ratnamani Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. consisted of 96 residential units, for which development permission had originally been granted on May 21, 1981.
    • The redevelopment process began with a society meeting held on February 25, 2019, where members considered the condition of the structure and modern requirements and resolved that redevelopment was necessary.
    • The society subsequently resolved to invite offers from developers and published an advertisement on May 5, 2019.
    • An offer from Suryam Developers was initially finalised in August 2019. The society thereafter considered another offer from Respondent No. 3, which was considered more favourable.
    • Following discussions and modifications, the final offer of Respondent No. 3 was accepted on March 30, 2021.

    81 Out of 96 Members Ultimately Supported Redevelopment

    • At an Annual General Meeting held on October 19, 2021, the majority decided to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding with the selected developer and consent to redevelopment. Seventy-six members attended and signed the resolution.
    • By December 20, 2021, 72 members had entered into the MOU with the developer. With the passage of time, the number of consenting members increased to 81 out of 96, representing approximately 84.37% of the total membership.
    • This figure was important because Section 41A requires consent of not less than 75% of the flat owners for redevelopment.

    15 Dissenting Members Challenged the Redevelopment

    • The appellants were 15 members of the society who opposed the redevelopment.
    • They contended, among other things, that the building was not actually dilapidated and relied upon an alternative structural engineer’s report. They also questioned the financial capacity of the selected developer and alleged that the redevelopment procedure prescribed under the Gujarat Ownership Flats Act and Rules had not been properly followed.
    • According to them, the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation had only required repairs and had not specifically directed redevelopment.
    • The society, on the other hand, submitted that the formal Development Agreement had not yet been executed and that any concerns regarding its terms or the developer’s obligations could be addressed at the appropriate stage. It also pointed out that construction would have to comply with applicable laws, including the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016.

    Section 41A Permits Redevelopment With 75% Consent

    • The Division Bench examined Section 41A of the Gujarat Ownership Flats Act, 1973, which governs redevelopment of flats and apartments.
    • Under Section 41A, redevelopment can be undertaken after obtaining consent from not less than 75% of the flat owners, provided the statutory conditions are satisfied.
    • The provision applies where either 25 years have elapsed from the date on which development permission was issued by the concerned authority, or the concerned authority has declared the building ruinous, likely to fall or otherwise dangerous.
    • The Court also examined Rules 18 to 25 of the Gujarat Ownership Flats Rules, 1974, as amended by the December 26, 2019 notification, which prescribe the procedure for carrying out redevelopment.

    Gujarat HC Identifies Three Statutory Conditions for Redevelopment

    • After examining Section 41A and the Rules, the Division Bench identified the relevant conditions governing redevelopment: completion of 25 years from development permission, or the building being declared ruinous/dilapidated or dangerous by the competent authority, together with consent of not less than 75% of the members.
    • On the facts of the case, the Court found that the relevant statutory requirements had been satisfied.
    • The Court specifically recorded that more than 75% of the members had agreed to redevelopment and that there was no dispute regarding the date on which the original development permission had been granted.

    Court Declines to Reassess Competing Structural Reports

    • One of the dissenting members’ principal objections concerned the physical condition of the building.
    • The Single Judge had considered a Civil Engineer’s report dated August 28, 2019 stating that the structure was fragmented and dilapidated. The dissenting members produced another structural engineer’s report to contest that conclusion.
    • The High Court held that it was not appropriate for the Court to enter into the technical domain and function as an appellate authority over competing structural-engineering opinions.
    • The Division Bench agreed with that approach.
    • It further noted that the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation had issued a notice dated May 19, 2022 directing major repairs after noticing that the building was in a ruinous condition.

    Court Examines Detailed Redevelopment Procedure Under Rules 19–25

    • The judgment also explains the statutory procedure societies must follow before and during redevelopment.
    • Under Rule 19, the Managing Committee must convene a special general meeting and follow the society’s applicable rules and bye-laws concerning notices, agenda circulation, quorum, decision-making and supply of minutes.
    • The special general body must take the redevelopment decision with consent of at least 75% of the total members and select an Architect/Project Management Consultant.
    • Rule 20 requires the Architect or Project Management Consultant to prepare a project report covering matters such as carpet area, alternative accommodation, rent, parking, amenities, corpus fund, bank guarantee, project-completion period and statutory approvals.
    • Rules 21 and 22 govern the processing of offers and selection of the developer.

    No Procedural Illegality Shown by Dissenting Members

    • After considering the redevelopment process undertaken by Ratnamani Society, the Division Bench found that counsel for the appellants was unable to point out illegality in the procedure relating to the policy decision and selection process.
    • The Court noted that the developer’s offer had been discussed by the society on December 31, 2020, modifications were suggested, and the final offer was accepted on March 30, 2021.
    • Importantly, only an MOU had been entered into with the developer at that stage; the final Development Agreement had not yet been executed.
    • This meant that concerns about the final contractual safeguards could still be addressed when the Development Agreement was formulated.

    Rule 23 Protects Members Through Development Agreement

    • The High Court highlighted Rule 23, which prescribes safeguards to be incorporated in a redevelopment agreement.
    • Among other things, the agreement may deal with the project-completion period, bank guarantee as agreed between the parties, alternative accommodation or monetary compensation, registration of the agreement, carpet area to be provided to existing members, allotment procedure, termination for default, corpus fund, shifting charges, common infrastructure and penalties for delay.
    • Rule 24 further prevents the developer from changing the building plan without the written permission of the Managing Committee.
    • The Court therefore found that the statutory framework itself contained safeguards addressing several of the concerns expressed by the dissenting members.

    Minority Members Have Right to Participate, But Cannot Block Redevelopment

    • The most significant observation came while dealing with the rights of the 15 dissenting members.
    • The Division Bench held that the dissenters were entitled to raise concerns regarding the terms of the Development Agreement and could participate constructively in the redevelopment process.
    • However, that participatory right did not translate into a power to indefinitely obstruct a redevelopment approved by the statutory majority.

    The Court held:

    • β€œ15 members out of total 96 members of the society cannot be permitted to stall the process of redevelopment only on their own suspicions and notions.”
    • The Bench further recorded that there were no allegations of fraud or violation of the procedures prescribed under the Rules.
    • This distinction is important: the judgment does not hold that a majority vote automatically cures every illegality. Rather, the Court found that the statutory majority existed and the appellants had failed to establish fraud or procedural violation.

    Gujarat HC Upholds Single Judge’s Redevelopment Order

    • The Letters Patent Appeal arose from the Single Judge’s judgment dated November 9, 2023 in Special Civil Application No. 11314 of 2022.
    • The Single Judge had permitted the petitioner society to proceed with redevelopment after following due procedure and satisfying the requirements of Section 41A. The private respondents were also directed to hand over possession of their flats to facilitate redevelopment.
    • The Division Bench found no error warranting interference with that decision.

    Appeal Dismissed; Dissenting Members Directed to Cooperate

    • The Gujarat High Court ultimately held that the appeal was devoid of merit and dismissed it.
    • The 15 appellants were directed to cooperate with the redevelopment and to provide constructive suggestions while the society entered into the Development Agreement with the selected developer.
    • The connected Civil Application was also disposed of, with no order as to costs.
    • Accordingly, Ratnamani Co-operative Housing Society succeeded before the Division Bench, and the redevelopment process was permitted to proceed subject to compliance with the statutory requirements.

    Key Legal Takeaway

    The judgment establishes an important balance between majority decision-making and minority-member protection in cooperative housing redevelopment.

    Where the requirements of Section 41A of the Gujarat Ownership Flats Act and Rules 18–25 are satisfied and the prescribed 75% consent has been obtained, a small group of dissenting members cannot stall redevelopment merely because they disagree with the majority or harbour apprehensions about the project.

    At the same time, dissenting members retain the right to participate constructively, question the terms of the Development Agreement and object to actual statutory or procedural violations. The decision therefore should not be read as eliminating minority rights; rather, it distinguishes legitimate objections based on legal or procedural violations from obstruction founded merely on suspicions and disagreement.

    Connected Matter

    Gujarat High Court Directs Dissenting Members to Vacate Flats for Society Redevelopment; Holds 75% Consent and Section 41A Requirements Satisfied

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    Source: Gujarat High Court

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  • Gujarat High Court Directs Dissenting Members to Vacate Flats for Society Redevelopment; Holds 75% Consent and Section 41A Requirements Satisfied

    Gujarat High Court Directs Dissenting Members to Vacate Flats for Society Redevelopment; Holds 75% Consent and Section 41A Requirements Satisfied

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 16.09.2026

    Gujarat High Court Directs Dissenting Members to Vacate Flats for Society Redevelopment; Holds 75% Consent and Section 41A Requirements Satisfied

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id amitnaren@outlook.com .  

    The Gujarat High Court has directed dissenting members of Amity Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. to hand over peaceful vacant possession of their flats within eight weeks, clearing the way for redevelopment of the nearly five-decade-old residential society in Paldi, Ahmedabad.

    Justice Mauna M. Bhatt, in Amity Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. through its Secretary and Chairman & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors., R/Special Civil Application No. 10596 of 2024, held that the Society had followed the prescribed redevelopment procedure and fulfilled the conditions under Section 41A of the Gujarat Ownership of Flats Act, 1973. The judgment was delivered on 8 April 2025.

    The Court found that 72 out of 81 members had consented to redevelopment, comfortably exceeding the statutory 75% threshold, while the buildings were more than 25 years old and in a dilapidated condition.

    Nearly 50-Year-Old Housing Society Opts for Redevelopment

    • Amity Co-operative Housing Society is a registered society owning approximately 6,825 square yards (5,706.38 sq. metres) of land at Final Plot No. 9/A, Town Planning Scheme No. 6, Paldi, Ahmedabad.
    • A total of 81 flats were constructed on the property during 1974-75, making it one of the older residential societies in the Paldi area.
    • According to the Society, the buildings had deteriorated substantially over time. The record referred to corrosion in RCC slabs, beams, columns and foundations, major structural cracks and bending of balcony slabs, raising concerns over safety.
    • Considering repairs and renovation impracticable, the Society decided to pursue redevelopment. The process had commenced as early as 2016, when an advertisement was published inviting offers from builders and developers.

    Majority Members Approved Redevelopment

    • A General Body Meeting was held on 4 April 2021, followed by another meeting on 26 December 2021, to consider the redevelopment proposal.
    • The Court recorded that 72 out of 81 members consented to redevelopment and accepted the developer’s offer. The consenting members subsequently entered into an MoU with the developer in October 2022.
    • A structural engineer’s report described the buildings as more than 25 years old and unsound, unsafe and unstable.
    • The Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation had also issued a notice dated 1 April 2021 concerning the condition of the buildings. The photographs placed before the Court further supported the Society’s case regarding their dilapidated condition.

    Dissenting Members Object to Developer and MoU Terms

    • Respondent Nos. 6 to 14 opposed the redevelopment.
    • One of their objections was that the General Body meetings had contemplated redevelopment through BTI Infrastructure Developer LLP, whereas the MoU was ultimately entered into with the proprietorship concern Tameer Infrastructure.
    • They also objected to the MoU on the ground that it did not contain provisions for a security deposit and penalty, contending that this was contrary to Rule 23 of the Gujarat Ownership Flats Rules.
    • The developer responded that there had been a change in the constitution of the development entity and that the person undertaking the redevelopment remained connected with the project. It was further argued that neither a security deposit nor a penalty clause was mandatory under Rule 23.

    Section 41A Conditions Fulfilled: Gujarat High Court

    • The High Court found that the statutory requirements for redevelopment had been satisfied.
    • The Court specifically noted that the building was more than 25 years old, its condition was dilapidated, and 72 out of 81 members had consented to redevelopment, thereby satisfying the requirement of consent from not less than 75% of members.
    • The Court also examined the Society’s decision-making process and found that General Body Meetings had been held to discuss redevelopment and the developer’s offer. The majority-approved resolutions were followed by an MoU executed by the consenting members.
    • Accordingly, the Court found no defect in the procedure adopted by the Society for selecting and proceeding with the redevelopment proposal.

    Change in Developer’s Constitution Not Sufficient to Stop Redevelopment

    • The Court was also not persuaded by the dissenting members’ objection concerning the change from BTI Infrastructure Developer LLP to the proprietorship concern undertaking the redevelopment.
    • The judgment records that the Court did not find any material change sufficient to invalidate the redevelopment process and observed that the private respondents had failed to demonstrate a justifiable basis for the objection.

    Bank Guarantee and Penalty Clause Not Mandatory Under Rule 23

    • An important part of the judgment concerns the objections regarding the absence of a bank guarantee/security deposit and penalty clause.
    • The Court relied on an earlier coordinate-bench decision in Ratnamani Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. State of Gujarat and observed that providing a bank guarantee is not a mandatory requirement under Rule 23 of the Gujarat Ownership Flats Rules.
    • The MoU in the present case also provided for benefits including accommodation/transport-related arrangements, additional carpet area, gift money and rent.
    • The Court further held that a penalty payment was not mandatory in nature. Concerns relating to the project could also be addressed through project finance requirements and registration with the RERA authority, while the developer had filed an affidavit assuring compliance with the terms and conditions of the MoU.

    Minority Members Cannot Stall Redevelopment Once Statutory Conditions Are Met

    • The High Court referred extensively to the Gujarat High Court’s earlier decision in Rabari Tejmalbhai Gagabhai v. Ratnamani Cooperative Housing Society Ltd..
    • That decision identified the principal requirements under Section 41A for redevelopment, including the age of the building, its ruinous/dilapidated condition where applicable, and consent of at least 75% of members.
    • The earlier Division Bench had also observed that where statutory procedures have been followed, a relatively small group of dissenting members cannot stall redevelopment merely on their own suspicions and notions. Members nevertheless retain the ability to participate constructively and raise legitimate concerns regarding the terms of the Development Agreement.
    • This reasoning supported the Court’s conclusion that the objections of the dissenting members could not prevent redevelopment in the present case after the Society had complied with the statutory framework.

    Article 226 Can Be Used to Facilitate Redevelopment

    • The judgment also referred to Sarojben Kiritbhai Shah v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation concerning the High Court’s powers under Article 226 of the Constitution.
    • The precedent rejected the contention that a writ court could not direct non-consenting members to vacate merely because the Gujarat Ownership of Flats Act does not contain a summary eviction mechanism comparable to certain Maharashtra redevelopment laws.
    • Referring to Supreme Court decisions including Binny Ltd. v. V. Sadasivan, (2005) 6 SCC 657 and Dwarka Nath v. Income Tax Officer, 1965 3 SCR 536, the earlier decision recognised the wide remedial jurisdiction available to High Courts under Article 226.

    Dissenting Members Given Eight Weeks to Vacate

    • Having examined the redevelopment process, the Gujarat High Court concluded that the petitioners had followed due procedure and satisfied the conditions necessary to bring the redevelopment within Section 41A of the Gujarat Ownership of Flats Act, 1973.
    • Exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, the Court allowed the petition and directed Respondent Nos. 6 to 14 to hand over peaceful vacant possession within eight weeks from receipt of the order.
    • The Court also requested all private respondents to cooperate with the redevelopment of the Society.

    Why the Judgment Matters for Housing Society Redevelopment

    The ruling reinforces an important principle governing redevelopment of co-operative housing societies in Gujarat: once the requirements prescribed under Section 41A and the applicable redevelopment rules are fulfilled, a minority of dissenting members cannot ordinarily bring an otherwise valid redevelopment process to a standstill merely because they disagree with the majority decision.

    At the same time, the judgment does not eliminate the rights of minority members to challenge genuine statutory violations, fraud, procedural irregularities or deficiencies in a Development Agreement. Rather, the decision rests on the Court’s finding that the statutory conditions and redevelopment procedure had been complied with in this particular case. For housing societies, developers and flat owners, the ruling highlights the importance of maintaining a clear documentary record of General Body Meetings, member consent, structural condition, developer selection, resolutions, MoUs and compliance with the Gujarat Ownership of Flats Act and Rules.

    Connected Matter

    Gujarat HC: Dissenting Members Cannot Override Majority Decision on Redevelopment Without Showing Illegality

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Gujarat High Court

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  • Supreme Court: Developer Cannot Be Penalised for NOIDA’s Failure to Provide Promised 45-Metre Access Road

    Supreme Court: Developer Cannot Be Penalised for NOIDA’s Failure to Provide Promised 45-Metre Access Road

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 15.09.2026

    Supreme Court: Developer Cannot Be Penalised for NOIDA’s Failure to Provide Promised 45-Metre Access Road

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id amitnaren@outlook.com .  

    The Supreme Court has dismissed appeals filed by the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA) and upheld the grant of β€œZero Period” benefit to M/s Sunshine Trade Tower Pvt. Ltd., holding that a development authority cannot deny contractual and policy relief to a developer when its own failure to provide adequate and legitimate access materially prevents development of the allotted commercial plot.

    In New Okhla Industrial Development Authority & Ors. v. M/s Sunshine Trade Tower Private Limited & Anr., Civil Appeal Nos. 10900-10902 of 2025, 2026 INSC 975, a Bench comprising Justices Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Alok Aradhe upheld the Allahabad High Court judgment granting Zero Period benefit to the developer. The Supreme Court delivered its judgment on 8 September 2026.

    The Court importantly held that a policy such as NOIDA’s Zero Period Policy should not be interpreted in the same manner as a statute. Its provisions must instead be construed in light of the policy’s purpose and broader objective.

    β‚Ή133.86 Crore Commercial Plot Allotted in Noida

    • The dispute arose from a scheme launched by NOIDA on 22 September 2011 for allotment of commercial plots to builders and developers.
    • Sunshine Trade Tower emerged as the successful developer, following which a lease deed dated 11 January 2012 was executed for Plot No. 5-A, Sector 94, Noida, for a total consideration of approximately β‚Ή133.86 crore. Possession was handed over on the same date.
    • Under the approved site plan, the commercial plot had a 45-metre-wide Front Road and a 24-metre-wide Side Road. The developer was to construct a commercial complex comprising facilities such as shopping malls, showrooms, retail outlets, hotels, restaurants and offices.
    • The developer, however, claimed that proper construction could not proceed because the 45-metre Front Road was encroached upon while the 24-metre Side Road was sandy, unpaved and non-motorable.

    NGT Order Also Stopped Construction Near Okhla Bird Sanctuary

    • Another obstacle emerged in September 2013 when the National Green Tribunal directed stoppage of construction within 10 kilometres of the Okhla Bird Sanctuary.
    • Since Sunshine Trade Tower’s plot was located within approximately 600 metres of the sanctuary boundary, construction was stopped.
    • The restriction continued until the Central Government issued a notification on 19 August 2015 specifying the relevant eco-sensitive limits. Even after removal of this restriction, however, the developer contended that full-fledged construction remained impossible because the 45-metre road continued to be encroached and the 24-metre road remained incomplete.

    What Is NOIDA’s β€˜Zero Period Policy’?

    • NOIDA formulated its Zero Period Policy on 28 March 2016 to deal with projects that could not progress because of circumstances beyond the developer’s control.
    • Among other situations, Clause 5 contemplated relief where possession and lease had been completed but there was no access road to the allotted land, preventing construction or development.
    • The policy also provided for rescheduling instalments falling within the Zero Period and stipulated that penal interest would not be charged for the relevant period.
    • Sunshine consequently sought Zero Period benefits both for the NGT restraint and for NOIDA’s failure to provide proper access roads.
    • NOIDA initially granted limited benefit relating to the NGT restriction but did not accept the developer’s wider claim concerning access to the plot.

    NOIDA’s Own Tehsildar Found 45-Metre Road Blocked

    • A crucial piece of evidence was a report submitted by NOIDA’s Tehsildar on 14 February 2019.
    • The report found that the land earmarked for the 45-metre road fell in Khasra No. 684, was recorded as Abadi land, had not been acquired by NOIDA and continued to be occupied by villagers.
    • The Tehsildar consequently recorded that the access road to the commercial plot was blocked.
    • Despite this report, NOIDA rejected the developer’s request for Zero Period benefit, maintaining that adequate access was available.

    UPRERA Also Recorded NOIDA’s Failure to Provide 45-Metre Road

    • The dispute subsequently reached UPRERA. Although the developer’s complaint was rejected as not maintainable and it was asked to pursue other statutory remedies, UPRERA’s technical inspection recorded important factual findings.
    • It found that the 24-metre road was completed only in 2020, nearly eight years after allotment, while the promised 45-metre road had still not been constructed because of existing habitation.
    • UPRERA recorded that NOIDA had failed to provide the 45-metre-wide approach road contemplated under the lease arrangement.

    State Government Partly Granted Relief

    • The matter thereafter went through revisional proceedings before the Uttar Pradesh Government.
    • In its second revisional order dated 14 September 2022, the State Government found that the 45-metre road was blocked by encroachment and that its non-availability affected the project’s commercial viability.
    • It granted the developer waiver of penal interest and a one-year COVID-related extension and directed NOIDA to take consequential steps.
    • The State Government specifically recognised that the commercial project had been designed on the assumption that the 45-metre road would constitute the principal access/frontage. Its absence meant that the project’s layout and commercial attractiveness would have to be reconsidered.

    NOIDA Raised β‚Ή100.39 Crore Demand

    • The dispute continued, and NOIDA ultimately issued a demand notice dated 23 February 2024 seeking payment of approximately β‚Ή100.39 crore towards principal and premium, without interest.
    • The developer challenged this demand as well as NOIDA’s refusal to sanction its revised building plan before the Allahabad High Court.
    • The High Court held that the cumulative circumstances prevented adequate access to the plot and concluded that Sunshine Trade Tower was entitled to Zero Period benefit.
    • It directed NOIDA to make a fresh calculation after granting Zero Period relief, raise a revised demand, and thereafter approve the revised building plan subject to statutory formalities.
    • NOIDA challenged that judgment before the Supreme Court.

    NOIDA: Some Access Was Available, So Zero Period Could Not Apply

    • Before the Supreme Court, NOIDA argued that Clause 5 of the Zero Period Policy should be interpreted strictly.
    • According to the Authority, relief was available only where there was absolutely no physical access to the allotted land and construction was therefore impossible.
    • NOIDA maintained that Sunshine had some access through the 24-metre road and portions of the 45-metre road and had even undertaken construction activity. It also contended that the developer’s own excavation contributed to the delay in completion of the side road.
    • The developer countered that the real issue was not whether it could somehow physically reach the property from one corner, but whether the commercial project could be developed in accordance with the sanctioned plan.
    • The promised 45-metre road was the project’s principal frontage. Its permanent non-availability required fundamental alterations to the building’s frontage, orientation, setbacks, entry and exit points and overall configuration.

    Supreme Court: Policy Cannot Be Interpreted Like a Statute

    • Rejecting NOIDA’s narrow construction, the Supreme Court laid down an important principle concerning interpretation of government and development policies.
    • The Court held that provisions of a policy such as the Zero Period Policy β€œare not to be interpreted like the provisions of a statute.”
    • Instead, courts must consider both the immediate purpose of the particular clause and the broader objective of the policy.
    • The Supreme Court found that Clause 5 was intended to ensure that a developer received easy, effective and legitimate access to the allotted property so that construction could meaningfully proceed.
    • The mere fact that the developer could somehow obtain limited access could therefore not absolve NOIDA of its obligation.
    • The Court held that where adequate access had not been provided for reasons attributable to NOIDA, Zero Period benefit could not be denied merely because β€œsome access was available.”

    Supreme Court Finds NOIDA Failed to Provide Promised 45-Metre Road

    • The Supreme Court examined five important official documents: the Tehsildar’s report, UPRERA order, Additional CEO’s inspection report, State Government’s revisional order and Deputy Collector’s report.
    • The cumulative effect of these documents, the Court said, left β€œno doubt” that the 45-metre Front Road was never made available to Sunshine by NOIDA.
    • The Court further observed that NOIDA, as the statutory development authority, possessed the means to remove encroachments and open the access road but had failed to do so.

    Frontage Is Not Merely an Architectural Issue

    • The judgment contains significant observations concerning the commercial importance of frontage, accessibility and elevation in real-estate development.
    • The Supreme Court observed that frontage and elevation are not merely architectural aesthetics; they are important determinants of a property’s commercial value and marketability.
    • For commercial developments in particular, visibility and accessibility directly affect footfall, branding and business prospects.
    • Uncertainty concerning frontage can therefore affect project viability, investor confidence and the expectations of purchasers and commercial occupants.

    Changing From 45-Metre to 24-Metre Frontage Fundamentally Affected Project

    • Applying those principles, the Court observed that Sunshine’s original sanctioned plan treated the 45-metre road as the project’s principal frontage.
    • Since that road could no longer realistically be provided, the 24-metre Side Road would have to become the new frontage.
    • This was not a minor internal modification. It required reconsideration of setbacks, building orientation, entry and exit points, permissible configuration and other planning parameters.
    • The Court held that changing the frontage from 45 metres to 24 metres directly affected the development potential and commercial attractiveness of the property.

    Developer Cannot Be Made Liable for NOIDA’s Own Failure

    • The Supreme Court ultimately held that Sunshine could neither be expected to proceed under the original site plan nor be burdened with liability arising from NOIDA’s failure to provide the promised 45-metre road.
    • It characterised NOIDA’s denial of Zero Period relief and its continuing refusal to sanction a revised site plan as β€œunreasonable and untenable in law.”

    Supreme Court Dismisses NOIDA’s Appeals

    • Finding no error in the Allahabad High Court’s judgment, the Supreme Court dismissed all three civil appeals filed by NOIDA and upheld the relief granted to Sunshine Trade Tower.
    • The Court did not find it necessary to examine the developer’s additional pleas concerning discrimination or comparison with other similarly situated developers.
    • The developer also gave a statement before the Supreme Court that the project would be completed within four years from approval of the revised site plan and that amounts due would be paid in eight instalments.
    • The Supreme Court directed NOIDA to take note of this statement and issue necessary directions for commencement of the project with revised schedules. No order as to costs was passed.

    Why the Judgment Matters

    The ruling is significant for real-estate developers dealing with government development authorities. It establishes that policy benefits cannot necessarily be denied through an excessively literal interpretation when the very purpose of the policy would thereby be defeated.

    More importantly, where a statutory authority promises infrastructure forming an essential component of an allotment and sanctioned development plan, it cannot ordinarily impose financial consequences upon the developer for delays materially attributable to the authority’s own failure.

    The judgment also recognises the commercial reality that access and frontage are integral to the viability of a commercial real-estate project.

    The existence of some physical means of reaching a plot is not necessarily equivalent to providing the effective and legitimate access contemplated by the allotment and sanctioned plan.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Supreme Court

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  • Madras High Court Directs Payment of β‚Ή3.52 Crore Land Acquisition Compensation to Purchaser

    Madras High Court Directs Payment of β‚Ή3.52 Crore Land Acquisition Compensation to Purchaser

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 14.09.2026

    Madras High Court Directs Payment of β‚Ή3.52 Crore Land Acquisition Compensation to Purchaser

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id amitnaren@outlook.com .  

    The Madras High Court has allowed a writ petition filed by M/s RK Dhayu Real Estates LLP and directed the Tamil Nadu land acquisition authorities to release the compensation payable for land acquired out of a larger property purchased from the Sahara Group.

    The petitioner had challenged the proceedings dated 1 August 2024 refusing to disburse the land acquisition compensation and sought payment of the amount assessed at β‚Ή3,52,35,674, along with interest.

    Property Purchased From Sahara Group Under Supreme Court Monitoring

    • The dispute concerned property originally belonging to M/s Sahara City Homes, measuring a total extent of 69.5025 acres.
    • The judgment records that, because the Sahara Group owed money to various investors and proceedings were pending before the Supreme Court, sale of Sahara properties was being undertaken under the supervision of the Apex Court, with sale proceeds required to be deposited into a specially designated account.
    • RK Dhayu Real Estates LLP purchased the property through five registered sale deeds dated 6 January 2023, after obtaining concurrence in the context of the Supreme Court proceedings. The petitioner deposited nearly β‚Ή45 crore into the special account, and a compliance affidavit was filed before the Supreme Court regarding the transaction.

    2.5437 Acres Had Already Been Acquired by Highways Department

    • Out of the total 69.5025 acres purchased by RK Dhayu, approximately 2.5437 acres had already been acquired by the Tamil Nadu State Highways Department.
    • As a result, although the petitioner had paid consideration for the full extent of 69.5025 acres, it could not obtain possession and enjoyment of the acquired portion.
    • The sale deed itself contained a clause enabling the petitioner to receive the compensation fixed in respect of the acquired land.

    Sahara Group Assigned Compensation Rights to RK Dhayu

    1. A significant factor before the High Court was a communication dated 7 July 2024 issued by a representative of the Sahara Group to the Special Land Acquisition Officer.
    2. The communication recorded that the entire sale consideration had been received from RK Dhayu Real Estates LLP and deposited in the SEBI-Sahara Refund Account in accordance with the Supreme Court’s directions.
    3. More importantly, Sahara expressly confirmed that it had assigned all rights, including the right to claim compensation in respect of the subject property, in favour of RK Dhayu Real Estates LLP.
    4. The Sahara representative further stated that RK Dhayu was legally entitled to receive the compensation, that Sahara had no objection to such payment, and that Sahara would not itself make any claim for the compensation. The communication also contained an undertaking to indemnify the authorities against any loss arising from disbursement to RK Dhayu.

    Land Acquisition Authorities Refused Payment

    1. Despite the authorization and no-objection from Sahara, the Deputy Tahsildar issued proceedings dated 1 August 2024 refusing to release the compensation to RK Dhayu.
    2. The State’s concern was that the petitioner was not the awardee in the original land acquisition proceedings and that the relevant revenue records continued to reflect names of several entities connected with the Sahara Group.
    3. The authorities were also apprehensive because the broader Sahara matter remained under Supreme Court monitoring and involved claims of investors across India.
    4. The respondents therefore feared that disbursing the compensation directly to RK Dhayu could expose them to future disputes and contemplated referring the matter for determination of apportionment.

    High Court Finds Sale Was Properly Conducted Under Supreme Court Supervision

    • Justice N. Anand Venkatesh rejected the apprehension of the authorities after examining the documents placed on record.
    • The Court found that the entire sale transaction had taken place under the direct monitoring of the Supreme Court. It noted that the compliance affidavit filed before the Apex Court specifically referred to the sale in favour of RK Dhayu and confirmed that the entire consideration had been deposited into the designated special account.
    • The High Court therefore held that there was no difficulty in concluding that the sale in favour of the petitioner had been validly completed with proper disclosure before the Supreme Court.

    Purchaser Cannot Be Left Without Either Land or Compensation

    • The Court also took note of the practical consequence of the acquisition.
    • RK Dhayu had paid consideration for the entire 69.5025-acre property, but approximately 2.5437 acres were unavailable to it because they had already been acquired by the Highways Department.
    • The Court therefore observed that the only meaningful way of compensating the purchaser for that portion was to permit it to receive the land acquisition compensation fixed by the Highways Department.

    Sahara’s No-Objection Removed Any Real Risk to Authorities

    • The High Court further relied on the Sahara Group’s express no-objection and assignment of compensation rights.
    • The Court observed that the same representative who was involved when the sale deed was executed had issued the subsequent communication confirming that RK Dhayu could receive the entire compensation amount.
    • In these circumstances, payment of the compensation to the petitioner would not, in the Court’s view, expose the respondents to any genuine hardship or future liability.
    • The Court also noted that the sale deed itself contained a specific clause enabling the petitioner to receive the compensation and that the transaction had been disclosed in the compliance affidavit filed before the Supreme Court.

    Authorities Directed to Pay Compensation Within Six Weeks

    • The Madras High Court accordingly allowed the writ petition and directed the respondents to hand over the entire compensation amount to RK Dhayu Real Estates LLP within six weeks from receipt of a copy of the order.
    • The petitioner’s Senior Counsel also filed a memo containing the bank account details into which the compensation was to be credited, and the Court directed the first respondent to make payment into that account.
    • The Court clarified that if any dispute arose in the future concerning the compensation, the respondents would not be held responsible and such dispute would have to be handled by the petitioner.

    Significance of the Judgment

    The ruling is important in situations where land is acquired before or around the time of a subsequent property sale and the purchaser has expressly acquired the seller’s right to receive compensation.

    The judgment demonstrates that land acquisition authorities cannot refuse payment merely because the purchaser was not the original awardee where the documentary record clearly establishes:

    • a valid sale of the larger property,
    • an express assignment of compensation rights,
    • a no-objection from the original owner,
    • payment of the full sale consideration, and
    • judicial supervision of the underlying transaction.

    The case is also notable because the property formed part of the Sahara Group’s assets under Supreme Court monitoring, yet the Madras High Court found that this circumstance did not prevent release of compensation where the sale and payment structure had been properly disclosed before the Apex Court.

    Key Takeaway

    The Madras High Court effectively held that where a purchaser has paid for the entire property, a portion of that property has already been acquired by the Government, and the original owner has expressly assigned its compensation rights and given a no-objection, the purchaser cannot be denied the corresponding land acquisition compensation merely because it was not the original awardee. Accordingly, RK Dhayu Real Estates LLP succeeded in the writ petition, and the State authorities were directed to release the entire compensation amount within six weeks.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Madras High Court

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  • Allahabad High Court: RERA Recovery Proceedings Cannot Be Challenged Directly Through Writ When Statutory Appeal Is Available

    Allahabad High Court: RERA Recovery Proceedings Cannot Be Challenged Directly Through Writ When Statutory Appeal Is Available

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 12.09.2026

    Allahabad High Court: RERA Recovery Proceedings Cannot Be Challenged Directly Through Writ When Statutory Appeal Is Available

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id amitnaren@outlook.com .  

    In an important ruling concerning the remedies available against orders and recovery proceedings initiated under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA), the Allahabad High Court has declined to interfere with a recovery certificate challenged directly under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court held that the petitioners could approach the competent Appellate Tribunal under Section 43(5) of the RERA Act against the underlying order on which the recovery proceedings were founded.

    Background of the Case

    • The writ petition was filed by M/s Singh Brothers, Kanpur Nagar, through its partner Amarpreet Singh and seven others against U.P. RERA and other respondents. The petitioners sought quashing of a recovery certificate dated 25 November 2023 issued by U.P. RERA to the District Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar. They also sought a direction restraining the authorities from taking coercive action pursuant to the recovery certificate.
    • According to the petitioners, they were owners and in legal possession of land situated at Govind Nagar, Kanpur. A builder agreement had been entered into on 30 July 2008 with M/s College Group Infrastructure Private Limited for development of the land, and a General Power of Attorney was also executed in favour of the builder for implementation of the agreement.

    Petitioners Claimed They Were Not Co-Promoters

    • The builder subsequently launched a project known as β€œViva City Square” in Kanpur and registered itself on the U.P. RERA portal. Significantly, the petitioners contended that they were never registered as co-promoters of the project.
    • Certain allottees subsequently filed a complaint before U.P. RERA regarding the conduct of the builder. After adjudication of the complaint, a recovery certificate was issued. The petitioners’ grievance was that the recovery certificate was being sought to be enforced against them even though, according to them, they were neither registered as co-promoters nor proprietors of the project.
    • They further contended that the original RERA complaintβ€”Complaint No. LKO157/07/55720/2020, Lalit Kumar Singh v. M/s College Group Infrastructure Private Limitedβ€”was not filed against them and that they had not been heard when U.P. RERA passed its order dated 1 April 2021.

    Earlier High Court Direction for Execution of Recovery Certificate

    • U.P. RERA brought to the Court’s attention an earlier order dated 18 March 2024 passed by a coordinate Bench in Lalit Kumar Singh v. State of U.P. & Others, Writ-C No. 2557 of 2024.
    • In that proceeding, the High Court had directed the District Magistrate, Kanpur, to execute the recovery certificate dated 25 November 2023 within three months from the date on which a certified copy of the order was furnished.
    • RERA therefore argued that the authorities were merely acting in compliance with the earlier direction of the High Court and that the petitioners could have sought review of that order before the concerned Division Bench.

    Alternative Remedy Under RERA

    • To overcome the objection regarding availability of an alternative statutory remedy, the petitioners relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Assistant Commissioner of State Tax & Others v. Commercial Steel Limited, Civil Appeal No. 5121 of 2021, decided on 3 September 2021.
    • The petitioners argued that existence of an alternative remedy does not automatically bar the High Court from exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226.

    The High Court examined the Supreme Court judgment and noted that an alternative remedy is indeed not an absolute bar to maintainability of a writ petition. However, interference despite availability of a statutory remedy is ordinarily justified in exceptional situations such as:

    • breach of fundamental rights;
    • violation of principles of natural justice;
    • excess of jurisdiction; or
    • challenge to the vires of a statute or delegated legislation.

    The Division Bench, however, concluded that the petitioners’ case did not fall within any of those recognised exceptional circumstances.

    High Court Directs Petitioners Towards RERA Appellate Remedy

    • The Court took note of the petitioners’ contention that they were not named as proprietors, were not parties to the original complaint and had not been heard when U.P. RERA passed the underlying order dated 1 April 2021.
    • Nevertheless, instead of adjudicating these issues in the writ proceedings, the High Court held that if the petitioners were aggrieved by the order dated 1 April 2021, which formed the basis of the subsequent recovery certificate, they could approach the Appellate Tribunal under Section 43(5) of the RERA Act.
    • The writ petition was accordingly disposed of with the above observations.

    Key Legal Takeaway

    The ruling reiterates the principle that the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is wide, and availability of an alternative remedy is not an absolute prohibition against entertaining a writ petition. However, where an effective statutory appellate mechanism exists and the case does not fall within one of the recognised exceptional categories, the High Court may decline to exercise writ jurisdiction.

    The judgment is particularly relevant in the RERA context because a person who claims to have been wrongly affected by an underlying RERA order cannot ordinarily bypass the statutory appellate mechanism merely by challenging the consequential recovery certificate through a writ petition. The appropriate course, as indicated by the Court in this case, is to challenge the foundational RERA order before the competent Appellate Tribunal under Section 43(5).

    Connected Matter

    Allahabad HC: RERA Application Pending Beyond 30 Days Results in Deemed Registration; UPRERA Cannot Insist on Landowner as Co-Promoter

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    Source: Allahabad High Court

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  • Allahabad HC: RERA Application Pending Beyond 30 Days Results in Deemed Registration; UPRERA Cannot Insist on Landowner as Co-Promoter

    Allahabad HC: RERA Application Pending Beyond 30 Days Results in Deemed Registration; UPRERA Cannot Insist on Landowner as Co-Promoter

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 11.09.2026

    Allahabad HC: RERA Application Pending Beyond 30 Days Results in Deemed Registration; UPRERA Cannot Insist on Landowner as Co-Promoter

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id amitnaren@outlook.com .  

    In a significant ruling concerning the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA), the Allahabad High Court has held that where the Real Estate Regulatory Authority neither grants nor rejects a complete project-registration application within the statutory period of 30 days, the project becomes deemed to be registered under Section 5(2) of the RERA Act.

    A Division Bench comprising Justice Mahesh Chandra Tripathi and Justice Prashant Kumar delivered the judgment in a writ petition filed by Larsen & Toubro Limited (L&T) against the State of Uttar Pradesh and U.P. RERA.

    Dispute Over Registration of L&T’s β€œGreen Reserve” Project

    • The dispute concerned L&T’s proposed β€œGreen Reserve” residential project comprising four towers in Jaypee Greens Wish Town, Noida. L&T had acquired development rights pursuant to an Assignment Agreement dated 31 July 2017 executed with Jaypee Infratech Limited (JIL)/Jaiprakash Associates Limited (JAL). The judgment records that β‚Ή487.5 crore was paid in connection with the Assignment Agreement.
    • L&T applied to UPRERA for registration of Towers 1 and 2 and subsequently Towers 3 and 4. UPRERA, however, repeatedly required L&T to include JIL as a β€œpromoter”, principally because the project land and sanctioned map were not in L&T’s ownership.
    • L&T maintained that the development, construction, marketing and sale rights had been assigned to it and that JIL was not required to be made a co-promoter.

    Landowner Need Not Necessarily Be a β€œPromoter”

    • One of the most important questions before the High Court was whether the landowner must necessarily be joined as a co-promoter for registration under RERA.
    • The Court examined the definition of β€œpromoter” under Section 2(zk) and held that a person who does not own the land but constructs/develops the project for sale can independently fall within the statutory definition of promoter.
    • The Court observed that the person who constructs and sells can be the promoter even when construction is undertaken on land belonging to another person, provided there is a valid arrangement between the owner and developer. It consequently held that JIL did not fall within the category of promoter for this particular project.
    • Accordingly, UPRERA’s insistence that JIL/JAL must sign the registration application as co-promoter was held to be unsupported by the Act.

    UPRERA Cannot Demand Documents Beyond Section 4(2)

    • The High Court also found that L&T’s application was complete and accompanied by the documents contemplated under Section 4(2) of the RERA Act.
    • The Court held that once an application is in the prescribed format and contains the documents statutorily required, UPRERA cannot engage in a β€œhair-splitting exercise” by repeatedly demanding additional documents not contemplated under Section 4(2).
    • The Court therefore found no justification for UPRERA to keep L&T’s application pending beyond the statutory period.

    Section 5(2): 30-Day Period Has a Statutory Consequence

    • The central issue in the judgment concerned the interpretation of Section 5 of the RERA Act.
    • Under Section 5(1), the Authority is required, within 30 days of receiving an application, either to grant registration or reject the application for reasons recorded in writing. Section 5(2) expressly provides that if the Authority fails to do either, the project β€œshall be deemed to have been registered.”
    • The Court emphasised that where legislation prescribes not only a time period for performance of a statutory duty but also expressly specifies the consequence of failure to act within that period, the statutory consequence must be given effect.
    • In L&T’s case, the applications remained pending despite the company having answered the objections and furnished the relevant documentation.

    Project Deemed Registered After Expiry of 30 Days

    • The High Court consequently held that UPRERA had only two options: either grant registration within 30 days or reject the application within that period.
    • Keeping the application pending was not a third option available to the Authority.
    • The Division Bench categorically concluded that once the statutory 30-day period expired without rejection, L&T’s application became deemed registered under Section 5(2). UPRERA was thereafter required to provide the registration number, Login ID and password to the developer.

    UPRERA Cannot Subsequently Reject a Deemed Registration

    • The Court went a step further and held that once deemed registration had taken effect, UPRERA no longer had jurisdiction to subsequently reject the original registration application.
    • According to the Court, once a project stands registered by operation of the deeming provision, any subsequent action against such registration would have to be taken in accordance with the mechanism contemplated under Section 7 of the RERA Act, rather than by belatedly rejecting the original application.
    • This is an important interpretation because it gives substantive effect to the statutory deeming fiction under Section 5(2).

    High Court Sets Aside UPRERA’s Rejection

    • The High Court ultimately ruled substantially in favour of Larsen & Toubro.
    • It held that the objection requiring JIL to be included as co-promoter was β€œbaseless and incorrect”, that L&T’s project-registration application acquired deemed-registration status after expiry of the mandatory period, and that UPRERA could not thereafter reject the application in the manner adopted by it.
    • The Court accordingly set aside UPRERA’s decision rejecting L&T’s applications.

    Key Takeaway

    The judgment establishes two significant principles under RERA. First, ownership of the project land is not by itself determinative of who must be treated as a promoter; a developer with valid development rights who constructs and sells the project may independently qualify as promoter under Section 2(zk).

    Second, and more importantly, Section 5(2) creates a genuine statutory deeming fiction. RERA authorities cannot indefinitely keep a complete registration application pending. If the Authority neither grants nor rejects it within the prescribed 30 days, the consequence stipulated by Parliament followsβ€”the project is deemed registered.

    Connected Matter

    Allahabad High Court: RERA Recovery Proceedings Cannot Be Challenged Directly Through Writ When Statutory Appeal Is Available

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    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Allahabad High Court

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  • Failure to Register Project Under Section 3 Does Not Oust RERA’s Adjudicatory Jurisdiction Under Section 31

    Failure to Register Project Under Section 3 Does Not Oust RERA’s Adjudicatory Jurisdiction Under Section 31

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 10.09.2026

    Failure to Register Project Under Section 3 Does Not Oust RERA’s Adjudicatory Jurisdiction Under Section 31

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id amitnaren@outlook.com .  

    In an important ruling concerning the jurisdiction of the Real Estate Regulatory Authority (RERA) and the rights of homebuyers, the Punjab & Haryana High Court has held that a promoter cannot defeat an allottee’s remedy under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 merely by contending that the concerned project was not registered with RERA.

    A Division Bench comprising Justice Sureshwar Thakur and Justice Vikas Suri rejected the jurisdictional challenge raised by M/s Ramprastha Developers Pvt. Ltd. and others against an order passed by the Haryana Real Estate Regulatory Authority, Gurugram. The Court ultimately dismissed the writ petition and held that the petitioners could pursue the statutory appellate remedy available under the RERA Act.

    Background of the Dispute

    • The writ petition challenged an order dated 26 July 2024 passed by the Haryana Real Estate Regulatory Authority, Gurugram on complaints instituted by Yuvraj Arora and Vivek Arora.
    • An important document before the Court was a receipt issued by Ramprastha Developers recording payment of β‚Ή2,49,37,500 in connection with a request for tentative registration of 6,500 square yards in its future potential projects.
    • The developers principally argued that RERA lacked jurisdiction because the subject project had not been registered under Section 3 of the RERA Act. According to them, registration of the project was a mandatory prerequisite before the provisions of the RERA Act could apply.

    Developers Challenge RERA’s Jurisdiction

    • The petitioners contended that the RERA order suffered from an inherent jurisdictional defect and was effectively coram non judice.
    • Their argument was that no requisite registration/licence existed in respect of the project and, therefore, RERA could not entertain the complaints. They also questioned whether a payment relating to a prospective or future project could confer enforceable rights upon the complainants under the RERA Act.
    • The respondents, on the other hand, raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petition because Section 43(5) of the RERA Act provides a statutory appeal before the Real Estate Appellate Tribunal against an order of the Authority or adjudicating officer.

    High Court Examines Section 3 of the RERA Act

    • The Court considered Section 3, which generally prohibits a promoter from advertising, marketing, booking, selling or offering property in a real estate project without registration with the Real Estate Regulatory Authority.
    • The High Court, however, rejected the proposition that the promoter’s failure to secure the relevant registration could itself extinguish the rights of homebuyers to approach RERA.
    • The Court observed that non-issuance or absence of the relevant registration does not restrict the right of homebuyers to access remedies contemplated under the RERA Act.
    • This distinction became central to the judgment: the promoter’s statutory obligation to register a project cannot be converted into a jurisdictional defence against an aggrieved allottee.

    Section 31 Is the Source of RERA’s Adjudicatory Jurisdiction

    • The High Court placed considerable emphasis on Section 31 of the RERA Act.
    • Section 31 permits any aggrieved person to file a complaint before the Authority or adjudicating officer for violation or contravention of the Act, rules or regulations against a promoter, allottee or real estate agent.
    • The Court held that the question of RERA’s adjudicatory jurisdiction is more directly governed by this statutory right to file a complaint than by whether every requirement relating to project registration under Section 3 had first been fulfilled.
    • The Court consequently reasoned that compliance with Section 3, or even action by the competent authority under the provisos to Section 3, is not a statutory precursor to the vesting of adjudicatory jurisdiction in RERA.

    Promoter Cannot Benefit From Non-Registration

    • The judgment has an important consumer-protection consequence.
    • If non-registration of a project were treated as sufficient to oust RERA jurisdiction, a promoter could potentially rely upon its own failure to comply with registration requirements to prevent an aggrieved purchaser or allottee from approaching the regulatory authority.
    • The High Court’s interpretation avoids such a result.
    • The Court read the provisions of the RERA Act harmoniously and concluded that the statutory framework confers adjudicatory competence upon RERA to entertain complaints concerning alleged violations by promoters.
    • It therefore held that neither the filing of the complaints nor RERA’s exercise of jurisdiction suffered from an inherent jurisdictional defect or the vice of coram non judice.

    RERA’s Powers Under Section 37

    • The Court also referred to Section 37 of the RERA Act, which authorises the Regulatory Authority to issue directions to promoters, allottees and real estate agents for the purpose of discharging its functions under the Act, Rules and Regulations.
    • The provision states that such directions are binding on all concerned.
    • This reinforced the Court’s conclusion regarding the breadth of RERA’s regulatory and adjudicatory authority.

    Prospective Allottee Can Also Have Locus to Approach RERA

    • Another significant issue concerned the complainants’ status as allottees.
    • The developers argued that the complainant had merely paid money in respect of prospective projects and that no such project had actually been floated at the relevant stage. On this basis, they questioned whether any cause of action or locus standi existed.
    • The High Court rejected this contention.
    • It reasoned that the statutory concept of an allottee could encompass potential or prospective allottees in relation to projects proposed to be undertaken in the future, and considered the receipt/documentary arrangement sufficient in the circumstances to reject the challenge to the complainants’ locus.
    • This aspect of the judgment may have particular significance in cases involving advance bookings, pre-launch payments, tentative registrations and payments made for future projects.

    Alternative Remedy Under Section 43(5)

    • Having concluded that RERA had not exercised jurisdiction that was inherently non-existent, the High Court addressed the developers’ attempt to invoke writ jurisdiction directly.
    • The Court found no merit in the argument that the statutory appellate remedy was ineffective merely because the petitioners alleged that RERA’s original order was without jurisdiction.
    • Since the jurisdiction assumed by RERA was neither non-est nor coram non judice, the developers were required to pursue the statutory remedy of appeal against the impugned order.
    • Section 43(5) is particularly significant for promoters because an appeal by a promoter is subject to the statutory pre-deposit requirement prescribed by the proviso to that provision.

    Relief Regarding Limitation for Statutory Appeal

    • While dismissing the writ petition, the High Court provided an important procedural safeguard.
    • It observed that if the statutory appeal filed by the petitioners was time-barred, they could file an application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
    • The appellate body was directed to pass a reasoned decision on such application and thereafter, where appropriate, register and decide the appeal after hearing all affected parties.

    Key Principles Emerging From the Judgment

    The judgment establishes several important propositions for RERA disputes:

    • First, non-registration of a real estate project does not, by itself, deprive an aggrieved homebuyer or allottee of the statutory remedy available under RERA.
    • Second, the promoter’s obligation to register a project under Section 3 must be distinguished from RERA’s adjudicatory jurisdiction under Section 31.
    • Third, failure to comply with project-registration requirements cannot automatically be used by the promoter to defeat a complaint brought by an aggrieved person.
    • Fourth, RERA enjoys statutory powers under Section 37 to issue binding directions to promoters, allottees and real estate agents.
    • Fifth, the Court recognised, in the factual setting before it, the standing of a person who had paid substantial consideration towards a prospective project to pursue remedies under the Act.
    • Sixth, where RERA possesses jurisdiction, a promoter challenging its order should ordinarily pursue the statutory appeal under Section 43(5) instead of bypassing that remedy through a writ petition.

    Significance for Homebuyers and Developers

    • The ruling strengthens the remedial character of the RERA framework.
    • For homebuyers, it indicates that a developer’s failure to complete statutory registration formalities does not necessarily leave purchasers without a remedy under RERA. This is especially relevant to disputes involving pre-launch bookings, tentative allotments, advance payments and projects whose regulatory status is disputed.
    • For developers, the judgment highlights that non-registration cannot safely be treated as a jurisdictional shield. The obligation to register and the jurisdiction of RERA to address grievances operate within the broader statutory framework and must be interpreted harmoniously.

    Conclusion

    In M/s Ramprastha Developers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., the Punjab & Haryana High Court rejected the developers’ contention that absence of RERA registration deprived the Authority of jurisdiction over the homebuyers’ complaints.

    The Court held that the statutory right of an aggrieved person to approach RERA under Section 31 is central to the Authority’s adjudicatory competence, while non-compliance with Section 3 does not automatically extinguish that remedy. Finding no inherent jurisdictional defect in the proceedings before Haryana RERA, the High Court dismissed the writ petition, leaving the developers to pursue their statutory appellate remedy. It also permitted them to seek the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act if limitation became an issue before the appellate forum.

    Connected Matter

    Punjab & Haryana High Court Clarifies RERA Jurisdiction: Non-Registration Does Not Defeat Homebuyers’ Remedies

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Punjab & Haryana High Court

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  • Punjab & Haryana High Court Clarifies RERA Jurisdiction: Non-Registration Does Not Defeat Homebuyers’ Remedies

    Punjab & Haryana High Court Clarifies RERA Jurisdiction: Non-Registration Does Not Defeat Homebuyers’ Remedies

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 09.09.2026

    Punjab & Haryana High Court Clarifies RERA Jurisdiction: Non-Registration Does Not Defeat Homebuyers’ Remedies

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id amitnaren@outlook.com .  

    The Punjab and Haryana High Court, in Parveen Gambhir and Others v. Union of India and Others, has delivered an important judgment examining the interface between the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (β€œRERA”), the Haryana real-estate regulatory framework, town-planning legislation and apartment-ownership law.

    The Division Bench comprising Justice Sureshwar Thakur and Justice Vikas Suri dismissed the writ petition and affirmed the impugned governmental directions and approval. The judgment is significant for three propositions: non-registration of a project under RERA does not by itself extinguish the remedies available to homebuyers; RERA authorities do not possess an independent statutory power to order demolition merely because construction deviates from sanctioned plans; and overlapping State and Central statutes can continue to operate in their respective fields unless there is a genuine inconsistency attracting Section 89 of RERA.

    Background of the Dispute

    The controversy concerned the group-housing project β€œWindchants”, situated in Sector 112, Gurugram. According to the petitioners, the project originally covered approximately 23.43 acres and was developed pursuant to licences obtained under the Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975. The petitioners had purchased flats after relying upon advertisements, marketing material and representations concerning the project.

    The dispute subsequently developed around, among other things, the treatment of the project as different phases, the applicability of RERA to portions of the development, occupation certificates, alleged deviations from sanctioned plans and the construction of additional EWS dwelling units.

    An additional 1.19 acres was subsequently purchased and a further licence was issued in September 2019. The petitioners alleged that the developer sought to avoid the consequences of RERA by treating portions of the development as separate phases even though occupation/completion certificates had not been obtained when the RERA regime became applicable.

    The controversy also had an earlier consumer-law dimension. An allottee had challenged an additional demand arising from an alleged increase in sale area before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. The NCDRC quashed that demand in August 2020, and the developer’s civil appeals were subsequently dismissed by the Supreme Court in January 2021.

    What Was Challenged Before the High Court?

    The petitioners principally sought quashing of:

    1. Directions dated 25 January 2021, issued by the State Government purportedly under Section 83 of RERA; and

    2. An in-principle approval dated 4 March 2021 relating to the fourth Occupation Certificate.

    They additionally sought directions for a fresh site inspection, compliance with sanctioned plans and quashing of amendments to the project alleged to be contrary to RERA. The judgment records that the petition was directed against the Section 83 directions as well as the in-principle approval.

    The controversy therefore went considerably beyond an ordinary builder-buyer dispute. It required the High Court to determine the respective regulatory fields occupied by RERA, the Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975, the Haryana Apartment Ownership Act, 1983, and the applicable Haryana regulatory framework.

    The Controversial Haryana Government Directions

    One of the central challenges concerned the State Government’s directions of 25 January 2021.

    • Those directions prescribed a procedure for proposed additions or alterations to sanctioned layout/building plans. Among other things, the mechanism contemplated inviting objections from existing allottees, publication of proposed revisions, availability of original and revised plans for inspection, consideration of objections and hearings before the competent authority.
    • The directions also dealt with community and commercial facilities in licensed colonies. Importantly, they stated that, where the definition of β€œcommon areas” under RERA conflicted with the Haryana Apartment Ownership Act, 1983, the definition under the State legislation would govern and contradictory provisions under RERA would be treated as redundant.

    This became one of the principal constitutional and statutory issues before the Court.

    Petitioners’ Case: RERA Must Prevail

    • The petitioners argued that the State Government had effectively accorded primacy to Haryana legislation over the Central RERA framework and thereby diluted the safeguards available under Section 14(2) of RERA.
    • They further argued that Section 83 merely empowers the appropriate Government to issue policy directions to the RERA Authority and cannot be employed to supplant the statutory authority or assume functions specifically entrusted to it.

    Reliance was also placed on the Supreme Court’s decision in Forum for People’s Collective Efforts (FPCE) v. State of West Bengal, (2021) 8 SCC 599, and on Sections 88 and 89 of RERA, read with Article 254 of the Constitution.

    Section 89 provides RERA with overriding effect where another law contains provisions inconsistent with it. The petitioners consequently argued that Haryana legislation could not be given precedence over the Parliamentary enactment.

    Section 14 RERA: Promoters Must Adhere to Sanctioned Plans

    The Court closely examined Section 14 of RERA.

    Section 14 requires a promoter to develop and complete a project in accordance with sanctioned plans, layout plans and specifications approved by the competent authority.

    For material alterations to sanctioned plans, layout plans or common areas, Section 14(2) requires the previous written consent of at least two-thirds of the allottees, excluding the promoter.

    The statutory protection is important because β€œminor additions or alterations” do not extend to significant structural modifications. The provision excludes matters such as additions to area, changes in height, removal of part of a building and specified structural changes from the concept of minor alterations.

    The High Court accordingly recognised a peremptory statutory requirement that promoters adhere to sanctioned plans, subject only to the limited alterations contemplated by Section 14.

    This is an important protection for allottees: promoters cannot treat sanctioned plans as merely indicative documents capable of unilateral alteration.

    Major Finding No. 1: Non-Registration of a Project Does Not Take Away a Homebuyer’s RERA Remedy

    • One of the most consequential portions of the judgment concerns the relationship between Section 3 and Section 31 of RERA.
    • Section 3 imposes the registration obligation upon promoters. Broadly, a promoter cannot advertise, market, book, sell or offer a real-estate project for sale without registration, subject to statutory exceptions. Ongoing projects for which completion certificates had not been issued were also brought within the registration mechanism.
    • But what happens if the promoter itself fails to register the project?
    • Can the promoter rely upon its own failure to argue that RERA has no jurisdiction over a homebuyer’s complaint?
    • The High Court’s answer is important: No.
    • Relying upon its earlier decision in Ramprastha Developers Pvt. Ltd., the Court held that the effect of non-registration under Section 3 would not be to bar homebuyers/allottees from invoking the remedy contemplated under Section 31 of RERA.
    • Section 31 grants an aggrieved person a statutory right to complain to the Authority or adjudicating officer regarding violations of RERA or the rules and regulations framed under it. The Court emphasised that adjudicatory competence is rooted more directly in this statutory remedy than in the promoter’s complianceβ€”or non-complianceβ€”with Section 3.

    Why this finding matters

    • This interpretation prevents an anomalous result.
    • If non-registration deprived RERA of jurisdiction, a promoter could potentially benefit from its own statutory default: the very failure for which RERA provides penalties could become a defence against proceedings initiated by an allottee.
    • The Court’s interpretation avoids that consequence.
    • Indeed, the judgment notes that Section 59 separately provides consequences for non-registration, including monetary penalties and further consequences for continuing violations.

    Thus:

    Failure to register is a statutory breach by the promoter; it is not ordinarily a jurisdictional shield against an aggrieved homebuyer.

    Major Finding No. 2: RERA Has Broad Adjudicatory and Direction-Giving Powers

    • The judgment also refers to Section 37 of RERA.
    • Section 37 empowers the Authority, for discharging its statutory functions, to issue directions from time to time to promoters, allottees and real-estate agents, and such directions are binding upon those concerned.
    • Read together with Section 31, this reinforces the regulatory reach of RERA over complaints concerning statutory violations.
    • The Court therefore treated the homebuyer’s remedial rights and the Authority’s adjudicatory competence as distinct from the question whether the promoter had properly fulfilled the project-registration obligation.

    Major Finding No. 3: RERA Authorities Cannot Themselves Order Demolition Under Section 14

    • This is perhaps the most practically important limitation identified in the judgment.
    • While Section 14 imposes a clear obligation upon promoters to adhere to sanctioned plans, the High Court held that the provision does not itself confer a power upon RERA authorities to order demolition of constructions that deviate from those plans.
    • The Court observed that even where gross deviations or excess construction are alleged, there must be a statutory source of authority empowering the particular regulator to order demolition. It found no such demolition power vested in the RERA authorities merely through Section 14.

    This distinction is critical:

    RERA can regulate the promoter’s obligations and adjudicate violations, but every remedial power cannot automatically be inferred merely from the existence of the underlying statutory obligation.

    Who, Then, Can Order Demolition?

    The High Court explained that the power to demolish construction deviating from sanctioned plans may lie with the Municipal Corporation, Town and Country Planning Department or another authority under the applicable functional statute, depending upon the location and statutory framework governing the construction.

    The competent authority must therefore be identified by examining the statute governing planning, construction and municipal control over the particular property.

    This creates an important jurisdictional distinction for litigants.

    A homebuyer may have a valid grievance under RERA concerning deviations from sanctioned plans, but the specific relief of physical demolition may need to be pursued before the authority statutorily empowered to order demolition.

    Major Finding No. 4: Sections 88 and 89 Must Be Read Together

    • Another important aspect of the decision is the Court’s interpretation of Sections 88 and 89 of RERA.
    • Section 88 provides that RERA operates in addition to and not in derogation of other laws.
    • Section 89 gives RERA overriding effect where there is an inconsistency with another law.
    • The Court therefore rejected an approach under which RERA would automatically displace every other statute touching upon real estate.
    • According to the judgment, overriding effect arises where there is an actual inconsistency. If another enactment operates in a separate regulatory field, both statutory regimes can coexist.
    • This is an application of the principle of harmonious statutory construction: the first task is to determine whether the statutes can operate together before resorting to the overriding provision.

    RERA and Consumer Protection Remedies

    • The Court also addressed the relationship between RERA and the Consumer Protection Act, 2019.
    • It observed that Section 88 permits homebuyers to access remedies under RERA as well as under consumer law because the statutory frameworks can operate complementarily.
    • The judgment, however, states that the remedies are to be exercised before one or the other forum and not simultaneously before both. That proposition should be read in the specific context of the Court’s reasoning and the nature of the relief pursued.
    • The broader significance remains that RERA was not interpreted as automatically extinguishing other statutory remedies available to purchasers of real estate.

    Major Finding No. 5: Different Statutes Occupy Different Regulatory Fields

    • The High Court ultimately concluded that the relevant legislative regimes did not necessarily suffer from repugnancy merely because they all touched upon aspects of real-estate development.
    • The Court identified different statutory fields: licensing and consequences of licensing breaches, regulation of land use and urban development, apartment ownership and transferability, and the separate protections and regulatory mechanisms created by RERA.
    • Accordingly, the Court reasoned that each legislation should be enforced within the field that it occupies, without one authority encroaching upon powers specifically vested in another.
    • This distinction explains why the Court simultaneously recognised strong RERA protections for homebuyers while declining to treat RERA authorities as universal authorities for every planning, licensing, demolition and ownership dispute arising from a real-estate project.

    Occupation Certificates: Separate Statutory Remedy

    The petitioners had also challenged matters relating to occupation certificates.

    The Court held that if the petitioners were aggrieved by orders granting occupation certificates to the builder, they could pursue an appeal before the competent authority.

    This again illustrates the jurisdictional approach adopted by the Court: the existence of RERA does not absorb every function of town-planning, licensing and building-control authorities.

    Final Decision

    • Ultimately, the Division Bench found no merit in the writ petition.
    • The petition was dismissed, and the impugned annexures were maintained and affirmed.
    • Thus, despite the Court’s important exposition of homebuyer remedies, Section 14 compliance, non-registration and the limits of RERA’s demolition jurisdiction, the petitioners did not succeed in obtaining the quashing relief sought.

    Key Legal Principles Emerging from the Judgment

    IssuePunjab & Haryana High Court’s finding
    Non-registration under Section 3Does not by itself deprive an aggrieved homebuyer/allottee of the remedy under Section 31.
    Promoter’s duty under Section 14Sanctioned plans must be followed; material changes are subject to statutory consent requirements.
    Two-thirds consentSection 14(2) requires previous written consent of at least two-thirds of the allottees for specified alterations/additions.
    Power of RERA to order demolitionSection 14 does not itself confer demolition powers upon RERA authorities.
    Unauthorised/deviating constructionDemolition may fall within the jurisdiction of municipal, town-planning or another statutorily empowered authority.
    Sections 88 & 89Must be harmoniously read; RERA overrides another law where there is actual inconsistency.
    State laws and RERACan coexist where they occupy distinct regulatory fields.
    Occupation Certificate challengeAppropriate statutory appellate remedy before the competent authority remains available.
    Final outcomeWrit petition dismissed; impugned annexures maintained and affirmed.

    Practical Impact on Homebuyers

    The judgment is particularly significant because it prevents the statutory registration requirement from being turned against homebuyers.

    A developer’s alleged failure to register a project cannot automatically be used to say:

    β€œBecause the project was never registered, RERA has no jurisdiction over the buyer’s grievance.”

    The Court’s approach treats registration principally as a regulatory obligation imposed upon the promoter, while Section 31 provides the aggrieved person with the statutory route for complaining about violations.

    At the same time, homebuyers must carefully identify the correct forum for the particular relief they seek. A claim for compensation, enforcement of RERA obligations or other statutory relief may properly fall within the RERA framework, whereas actual demolition of construction contrary to sanctioned plans may require proceedings before the competent municipal or town-planning authority.

    Practical Impact on Developers and Promoters

    The judgment should not be understood as diluting the obligation to register projects.

    On the contrary, non-registration remains independently punishable under the RERA framework. More importantly, the judgment indicates that a promoter cannot necessarily rely on its own non-registration to defeat an allottee’s statutory remedy.

    Developers must therefore separately ensure compliance with:

    RERA registration requirements; sanctioned plans and Section 14; consent requirements for alterations; planning and licensing legislation; occupation/completion certificate requirements; and obligations imposed by municipal and town-planning authorities.

    Compliance with one regulatory regime cannot automatically cure non-compliance with another where each statute occupies a separate field.

    Significance of the Judgment for RERA Jurisprudence

    Parveen Gambhir is significant not because it gives unlimited jurisdiction to RERA, but because it attempts to draw the boundaries of RERA jurisdiction.

    The judgment essentially establishes a two-way principle.

    On one side, the protective jurisdiction of RERA cannot easily be defeated by a promoter’s failure to register a project. On the other, RERA cannot be treated as an all-purpose planning and municipal authority merely because the dispute concerns a real-estate project.

    That distinction is important for future litigation involving unregistered projects, deviations from sanctioned plans, occupation certificates, project alterations, common areas, planning permissions and overlapping regulatory statutes.

    Conclusion

    The Punjab and Haryana High Court’s decision in Parveen Gambhir & Others v. Union of India & Others reinforces an important feature of India’s real-estate regulatory framework: RERA is a protective and remedial statute, but its authorities must operate within the powers actually conferred by Parliament.

    The judgment recognises that non-registration of a project does not automatically deprive homebuyers of their remedy under Section 31. At the same time, it distinguishes between RERA’s power to regulate and adjudicate promoter obligations and the statutory power to physically demolish unauthorised construction, which may vest in municipal or town-planning authorities.

    Connected Matter

    Failure to Register Project Under Section 3 Does Not Oust RERA’s Adjudicatory Jurisdiction Under Section 31

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    Source: Punjab & Haryana High Court

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