Tag: #Bombay High Court

  • Bombay High Court: Arbitral Tribunal’s Mandate Can Be Extended Even After Expiry if β€œSufficient Cause” Is Shown

    Bombay High Court: Arbitral Tribunal’s Mandate Can Be Extended Even After Expiry if β€œSufficient Cause” Is Shown

    Date: 18.09.2026

    The Bombay High Court has allowed a petition filed by SAP India Private Limited seeking extension of the mandate of an arbitral tribunal constituted by the Supreme Court, holding that where arbitral proceedings could not conclude for reasons beyond the control of the party or tribunal, and the delay was not attributable to wilful or deliberate default, refusing an extension despite sufficient cause could defeat the purpose of arbitration.

    Justice Arif S. Doctor, in SAP India Private Limited v. Cox and Kings Limited, Commercial Arbitration Petition No. 865 of 2026, pronounced the judgment on September 10, 2026. The Court extended the time available to the arbitral tribunal to make its award by one year from the date on which the High Court’s order was uploaded.

    Dispute Between SAP India and Cox & Kings

    • The dispute arose from a contract between SAP India and Cox & Kings for the provision of business software and related implementation services. Clause 15.7 of the General Terms and Conditions provided for arbitration.
    • SAP claimed that certain amounts remained outstanding under the contractual arrangement and moved an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
    • By an order dated January 2, 2019, the Supreme Court constituted a three-member arbitral tribunal. The tribunal was presided over by former Supreme Court judge Justice Madan B. Lokur, and was referred to in the judgment as the β€œJustice Lokur Tribunal.” SAP was the claimant before this tribunal.
    • SAP filed its Statement of Claim on March 22, 2019, seeking approximately β‚Ή17.98 crore from Cox & Kings. Cox & Kings subsequently filed its Statement of Defence and Counter-claim on July 31, 2019, claiming approximately β‚Ή45.99 crore from SAP.

    CIRP Moratorium Brought Arbitration to a Halt

    • A major turn occurred on October 22, 2019, when the National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai admitted Cox & Kings into the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP).
    • Consequently, the statutory moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) came into operation, staying legal proceedings against the company.
    • Because of the moratorium, the Justice Lokur Tribunal informed the parties on November 5, 2019 that the arbitral proceedings stood adjourned sine die.
    • Cox & Kings was subsequently ordered into liquidation by the NCLT on December 16, 2021. SAP lodged its claim with the Liquidator in February 2022, and the Liquidator admitted it at a nominal value of Re. 1, recording that the liability could not be quantified because of the ongoing arbitration proceedings.

    Second Arbitration Added Another Layer to the Dispute

    • Meanwhile, Cox & Kings had issued a fresh arbitration notice against SAP India and its parent company, SAP SE.
    • On September 9, 2024, the Supreme Court appointed former Bombay High Court Chief Justice Justice Mohit Shah as sole arbitrator to adjudicate those disputes. The High Court referred to this as the β€œJustice Shah Tribunal.”
    • Cox & Kings initially claimed β‚Ή45.99 crore before the Justice Shah Tribunal and subsequently amended its claim to β‚Ή45,99,71,097.
    • SAP argued that this amount was virtually identical to the counter-claim Cox & Kings had already raised before the Justice Lokur Tribunal. SAP consequently challenged the jurisdiction of the Justice Shah Tribunal under Section 16 of the Arbitration Act, but its objections were rejected.
    • SAP pursued the jurisdictional issue before the Bombay High Court and then the Supreme Court. Its Special Leave Petition was ultimately dismissed on January 23, 2026.

    SAP Sought Revival of Original Arbitration

    • Soon after the Supreme Court proceedings ended, SAP approached the Justice Lokur Tribunal on February 2, 2026, seeking resumption and continuation of its original arbitration.
    • Cox & Kings opposed the request, contending that the Justice Lokur Tribunal had become functus officio and no longer possessed jurisdiction to revive the proceedings. It also pointed to the existence of the Justice Shah Tribunal and SAP’s claim in the liquidation process.
    • The Justice Lokur Tribunal ultimately directed SAP to approach the Bombay High Court for an extension of time. SAP accordingly filed the present petition under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

    SAP: Delay Was Caused by Circumstances Beyond Its Control

    • SAP argued that it had diligently pursued its claims and that the original arbitration could not proceed because of circumstances outside its control.
    • It relied on the commencement of CIRP, the statutory moratorium, the COVID-19 limitation exclusion period and Cox & Kings’ subsequent pursuit of another arbitration involving substantially the same subject matter.
    • SAP therefore argued that it had established β€œsufficient cause” under Section 29A(5) for extending the Justice Lokur Tribunal’s mandate.

    Cox & Kings Opposed Extension, Alleging Unexplained Delay

    • Cox & Kings argued that Section 29A(5) does not permit extension as a matter of course and that SAP had failed to explain a substantial intervening period.
    • It contended that SAP could have sought extension much earlier and characterised SAP’s conduct as β€œfence-sitting”, alleging that SAP attempted to revive the Justice Lokur arbitration only after its challenges to the Justice Shah Tribunal had failed.
    • Cox & Kings also argued that reviving the Justice Lokur Tribunal would serve little purpose because it was already in liquidation and SAP’s claim had been admitted in the liquidation process.
    • Another concern raised was the possibility of parallel arbitrations producing inconsistent or conflicting findings, because the claims before the two tribunals arose from the same contractual framework.

    Bombay High Court: Section 29A Extension Can Be Granted Even After Mandate Expires

    • The High Court rejected the proposition that the application must fail merely because the tribunal’s mandate had already expired.
    • Relying upon Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Ltd., the Court reiterated that time for completing arbitral proceedings can be extended even after expiry of the initial 12-month period or the extended six-month period.
    • The real question was therefore not simply when the application was filed, but whether SAP had demonstrated sufficient cause under Section 29A(5).

    β€œSufficient Cause” Must Be Examined in Context of Purpose of Arbitration

    • The Court emphasised that Section 29A is intended to ensure expeditious arbitral proceedings, but the power of extension requires examination of the particular facts and circumstances.
    • Referring to C. Velusamy v. K. Indhera and Ajay Protech Pvt. Ltd. v. General Manager & Anr., the High Court observed that β€œsufficient cause” must be understood in the context of arbitration’s underlying purposeβ€”the resolution of disputes through the mechanism chosen by the parties.
    • The Court held, in substance, that where arbitration does not conclude within the prescribed timeline because of circumstances beyond the parties’ or tribunal’s control, and the delay is not caused by wilful default or a deliberate attempt to delay proceedings by the party seeking extension, it would be unjust to refuse condonation where sufficient cause is otherwise demonstrated.

    Length of Delay Alone Is Not Decisive

    • An important principle emerging from the judgment is that a long delay does not, by itself, automatically defeat a Section 29A petition.
    • The Court distinguished decisions relied upon by Cox & Kings where extensions had been refused because the intervening delay was not satisfactorily explained.
    • According to the High Court, the decisive consideration in those cases was the absence of sufficient cause, rather than merely the length of time that had passed.
    • This distinction is important for Section 29A applications because it requires courts to examine why the arbitration was delayed, rather than applying an inflexible rule based solely on the duration of the delay.

    SAP Was Justified in Pursuing Jurisdictional Challenge

    • The Court also rejected the contention that SAP had simply sat on its rights.
    • When the Supreme Court appointed the Justice Shah Tribunal in 2024, it had kept open SAP’s rights and contentions to raise its jurisdictional objections before that tribunal.
    • The Bombay High Court therefore found that SAP was justified in pursuing its challenge to the jurisdiction of the Justice Shah Tribunal.
    • After the Supreme Court dismissed SAP’s SLP on January 23, 2026, SAP approached the Justice Lokur Tribunal on February 2, 2026β€”within a short periodβ€”to seek resumption of its original arbitration.
    • The High Court considered this conduct inconsistent with any suggestion that SAP had abandoned the Justice Lokur proceedings.

    β€œFence-Sitter” Argument Rejected

    • The Court consequently rejected Cox & Kings’ characterisation of SAP as a β€œfence sitter”.
    • It noted that the original proceedings had stopped after Cox & Kings entered CIRP and the Section 14 IBC moratorium became operative. Cox & Kings subsequently initiated another arbitration involving a claim virtually identical to the counter-claim it had raised before the Justice Lokur Tribunal.
    • Against this factual background, SAP’s pursuit of jurisdictional remedies before the Justice Shah Tribunal and higher courts could not be treated simply as abandonment or negligent inactivity.

    Liquidation Does Not By Itself Defeat Section 29A Extension

    • Cox & Kings had also argued that extending the tribunal’s mandate would be futile because the company was already in liquidation.
    • The Court did not accept this as a reason to refuse the Section 29A extension.
    • It noted, among other things, SAP’s reliance on Regulation 29 of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, concerning mutual credits and set-off. The Court clarified that questions relating to the effect of liquidation and objections concerning SAP’s claim could be raised before the arbitral tribunal and did not have to be finally determined while deciding the Section 29A application.

    Court Finds β€œSufficient Cause” for Extension

    • After considering the unusual procedural history, the Bombay High Court concluded that SAP had established sufficient cause for extension of the Justice Lokur Tribunal’s mandate.
    • Crucially, the Court found that the delay in completion of the arbitration could not, in the circumstances, be attributed to any deliberate, wilful or negligent default on the part of SAP, much less to the tribunal.
    • The Court reasoned that allowing the mandate to lapse without giving SAP an opportunity to have its pending claim adjudicated would defeat rather than advance the underlying object of the arbitral process.

    Justice Lokur Tribunal Gets One-Year Extension

    • Accordingly, the Bombay High Court allowed SAP India’s petition and extended the time available to the Justice Lokur Tribunal to make its award by one year.
    • The one-year extended period will run from the date on which a copy of the High Court’s order was uploaded.
    • The Court made no order as to costs.
    • Thus, SAP India succeeded in obtaining the Section 29A extension. Importantly, however, the ruling does not decide the merits of SAP’s underlying β‚Ή17.98 crore contractual claim against Cox & Kings; it permits that pending claim to proceed before the arbitral tribunal.

    Key Legal Takeaway

    The judgment reinforces that Section 29A is not an inflexible limitation mechanism under which expiry of an arbitral tribunal’s mandate automatically forecloses an extension.

    A post-expiry application can be entertained, but the applicant must establish β€œsufficient cause”. In assessing that requirement, courts may consider the entire procedural history, whether circumstances outside the applicant’s control interrupted the arbitration, whether the applicant acted diligently once those impediments ended, and whether the delay resulted from wilful or negligent conduct.

    The ruling also demonstrates that the mere passage of a substantial period is not necessarily determinative. The central enquiry remains whether the delay has been satisfactorily explained in the factual circumstances of the particular arbitration.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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  • Bombay High Court Sets Aside β‚Ή18.95 Crore Arbitral Award; Says Ex Parte Proceedings Cannot Bypass Natural Justice

    Bombay High Court Sets Aside β‚Ή18.95 Crore Arbitral Award; Says Ex Parte Proceedings Cannot Bypass Natural Justice

    Date: 17.09.2026

    The Bombay High Court has set aside an arbitral award directing the legal heirs and guarantors of a deceased borrower to jointly and severally pay more than β‚Ή18.95 crore, holding that the arbitration proceedings suffered from serious violations of natural justice, including failure to supply relied-upon documents, absence of notices for subsequent hearings, and failure to provide notice before proceeding ex parte.

    In Manjula Dinesh Rita & Ors. v. Lokmanya Multipurpose Co-operative Society Ltd. & Anr., Commercial Arbitration Petition No. 239 of 2023, Justice Sharmila U. Deshmukh allowed a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and quashed the arbitral award dated March 7, 2022. The judgment was pronounced on September 16, 2026.

    Dispute Over β‚Ή1.5 Crore Loan and Alleged β‚Ή4.5 Crore Facility

    • The dispute originated from a credit facility obtained by the late Dinesh Shamji Rita. According to the petitioners, a cash-credit facility of β‚Ή1.5 crore had been sanctioned in 2012 for his construction business. Petitioner No. 1 and Respondent No. 2 stood as guarantors, while a Mumbai property was mortgaged as additional security.
    • A dispute subsequently arose over an additional amount of β‚Ή3 crore. The co-operative society’s case was that the total cash-credit facility was β‚Ή4.5 crore, while the petitioners disputed liability beyond the original β‚Ή1.5 crore facility.
    • The controversy ultimately went to statutory arbitration under Section 84 of the Multi State Co-operative Societies Act, 2002 (MSCS Act).
    • On March 7, 2022, the arbitrator directed the petitioners and Respondent No. 2 to jointly and severally pay β‚Ή18,95,34,034.10, along with 18% annual interest, additional penal interest of 2% per annum from October 12, 2020 until realization, and costs.

    Petitioners Challenge Ex Parte Award

    • The petitioners approached the Bombay High Court under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
    • A central grievance was that although they received the statement of claim, the documents relied upon by the co-operative society were not supplied to them.
    • The record showed that approximately 17 documents, including a promissory note concerning β‚Ή3 crore, loan agreement, registered mortgage deed and guarantee documents, were listed with the statement of claim. The petitioners immediately sought copies so that they could prepare their defence. Instead of supplying the documents, the society asked them to obtain the copies from the arbitrator on the scheduled hearing date.

    Bombay HC: Documents Relied Upon Must Be Supplied to Other Side

    • The High Court emphasised Section 24(3) of the Arbitration Act, which requires statements, documents and other information supplied by one party to the arbitral tribunal to be communicated to the other party.
    • The Court held that the duty was upon the party producing documents before the tribunal to supply them to the opposite party. Non-compliance deprived the petitioners of the full opportunity to present their case guaranteed by Section 18 of the Arbitration Act.
    • Relying upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. National Highways Authority of India, (2019) 15 SCC 131, the Court linked Sections 18 and 24(3) with the ground for setting aside an award under Section 34(2)(a)(iii) where a party was unable to present its case.

    No Notice of Subsequent Arbitration Hearings

    • The Court found another serious procedural defect.
    • The first hearing was scheduled at Belgaum during the COVID-19 pandemic, although the petitioners were residing in Mumbai. After the first hearing notice, no further notices of the arbitral meetings were issued to them.
    • The award itself recorded five adjournments, excluding the lockdown period. Yet the proceedings were adjourned from time to time without subsequent hearing notices being served upon the petitioners. The arbitrator eventually proceeded ex parte.
    • The affidavit of evidence and documents filed by the society’s witness were also not served upon the petitioners.
    • The High Court therefore held that failure to provide necessary documents, the affidavit of evidence, notices of subsequent hearings and minutes of arbitral meetings amounted to denial of a proper opportunity to present the case and vitiated the award under Section 34(2)(a)(iii).

    Arbitrator Must Give Notice Before Proceeding Ex Parte

    • The judgment also addresses an important procedural question: whether an arbitrator can simply proceed ex parte after a party fails to participate following the first notice.
    • The High Court referred to Sohan Lal Gupta v. Asha Devi Gupta and the Delhi High Court decision in M/s Lovely Benefit Chit Fund & Finance Pvt. Ltd. v. Puran Dutt Sood & Ors., AIR 1983 Delhi 413.
    • The principle discussed was that where a party fails to appear, the arbitrator should give notice of the intention to proceed ex parte on a specified date. Only after such notice, and continued non-participation, may proceedings continue in the party’s absence.
    • Applying that principle, the Bombay High Court found that only the first notice had been issued. Thereafter, there were no subsequent hearing notices, and neither the minutes nor affidavit of evidence was supplied.
    • The Court consequently found a β€œcomplete go-by to the principles of natural justice” in the manner in which the arbitration proceeded ex parte.

    β‚Ή1.5 Crore Guarantee Could Not Mechanically Become Liability for β‚Ή4.5 Crore Facility

    • Apart from procedural violations, the High Court identified serious defects in the reasoning of the award.
    • The letter of guarantee executed by Petitioner No. 1 and Respondent No. 2 was for β‚Ή1.5 crore, and the mortgage deed also referred to an overdraft facility of β‚Ή1.5 crore. Nevertheless, the arbitrator imposed joint and several liability in relation to an alleged β‚Ή4.5 crore credit facility, along with interest and penalty.
    • The Court found that the arbitrator had ignored vital evidence showing that the guarantee, loan application and mortgage security related to the β‚Ή1.5 crore facility.
    • According to the High Court, the award merely restated the contents of the society’s affidavit of evidence and referred to documents without discussing the evidence before accepting a claim exceeding β‚Ή18.95 crore. The Court held that the award suffered from perversity and patent illegality.

    Bombay HC Finds Award Failed Requirement of Reasoned Decision

    • The High Court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Dyna Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd., (2019) 20 SCC 1, concerning the requirement of a reasoned arbitral award under Section 31(3) of the Arbitration Act.
    • The Court noted that arbitral reasoning must be intelligible and adequate, though an award need not resemble an elaborate judicial judgment.
    • In the present case, however, the High Court found that the award failed the requirements of a reasoned award because there was no meaningful discussion or finding on the oral and documentary evidence before the tribunal.

    Mumbai Court Had Supervisory Jurisdiction Despite Arbitration Sittings at Belgaum

    • The judgment also contains an important discussion on the distinction between the β€œseat” and β€œvenue” of arbitration.
    • Although the arbitral sittings took place in Belgaum, Karnataka, the Court observed that the MSCS Act did not designate a statutory territorial seat or venue for the arbitration. Merely stating β€œSitting at Belgaum” in the award did not establish a conscious determination of Belgaum as the juridical seat under Section 20(2) of the Arbitration Act. The Court treated the sittings there as referable to a convenient place of meeting under Section 20(3).
    • The original borrower and guarantors were based in Mumbai, the loan was sanctioned through the Mumbai branch, the relevant loan and mortgage documents were executed in Mumbai, and the mortgaged property was situated in Mumbai. No part of the cause of action arose in Belgaum.
    • Accordingly, the High Court held that the courts in Mumbai had supervisory jurisdiction under Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act.

    Supreme Court’s BGS SGS Soma Principle Considered

    • While examining territorial jurisdiction, the Court considered BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC Ltd., (2020) 4 SCC 234, which explains when a designated venue can operate as the juridical seat of arbitration.
    • The Bombay High Court distinguished the present statutory arbitration because there was neither an express designation of Belgaum as the seat nor a determination under Section 20(1) or Section 20(2) establishing it as such.

    β‚Ή18.95 Crore Award Quashed and Set Aside

    After examining the jurisdictional issue, denial of documents, absence of subsequent hearing notices, ex parte procedure and deficiencies in the reasoning of the award, the Bombay High Court concluded that the award could not survive.

    The Court held:

    β€œThe impugned award is, unsustainable and is hereby quashed and set aside.”

    • The Commercial Arbitration Petition was accordingly allowed, while pending interim applications were disposed of.
    • Thus, Manjula Dinesh Rita and the other petitioners succeeded in their Section 34 challenge, and the β‚Ή18.95 crore arbitral award against them was set aside.

    Key Legal Takeaway

    The judgment reinforces three significant principles in arbitration law. First, an arbitral tribunal cannot treat a party’s absence as a licence to dispense with fair hearing requirements. Documents and evidence relied upon must be communicated to the opposite party, and an adequate opportunity to respond must be provided.

    Second, where an arbitrator intends to proceed ex parte, procedural fairness requires appropriate notice; an award may be vulnerable under Section 34(2)(a)(iii) where a party was effectively prevented from presenting its case. Third, merely conducting arbitral sittings at a particular location does not necessarily make that location the juridical seat, particularly in a statutory arbitration where no seat has otherwise been designated or determined.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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  • Bombay High Court Lays Down Landmark Principles for Deemed Conveyance and Proportionate Land Division Under MOFA

    Bombay High Court Lays Down Landmark Principles for Deemed Conveyance and Proportionate Land Division Under MOFA

    Date: 17.09.2026

    In a significant judgment affecting cooperative housing societies, developers and redevelopment projects across Maharashtra, the Bombay High Court has laid down detailed principles governing proportionate division and deemed conveyance of land in multi-building layouts, particularly where different buildings have consumed different amounts of base FSI, TDR or additional development potential.

    In Satellite Garden I Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. and connected petitions, Justice Sandeep V. Marne held that a housing society’s entitlement to proportionate layout land crystallises and freezes when the statutory period for conveyance under Section 11 of the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act, 1963 (MOFA), read with Rule 9 of the MOF Rules, 1964, expires. Subsequent revision of building plans cannot, by itself, reduce that crystallised entitlement.

    The 170-page judgment, pronounced on September 16, 2026, arose from three connected writ petitions concerning societies in a Goregaon, Mumbai layout.

    Bombay HC Addresses Long-Standing Problem of Land Division in Large Layouts

    • At the outset, the Court identified a recurring difficulty in real-estate development: while conveyance of land for a standalone building is relatively straightforward, disputes become considerably more complicated when several housing societies occupy different buildings within a common layout.
    • The problem becomes particularly acute where buildings are constructed at different times, revised plans are sanctioned, TDR is subsequently loaded, or different FSI regimes apply.
    • Justice Marne observed that organisations of flat purchasers in the first building need not indefinitely wait for the developer to complete the entire layout. Their right to obtain conveyance of a proportionate share in the land is recognised in law. The real difficulty is determining how much land should be conveyed to each society.
    • The Court therefore used the three petitions not merely to resolve the individual disputes, but also to formulate broader principles for proportionate land division in layout developments.

    Dispute Involved Four Constructed Buildings and One Proposed Building

    • The case concerned a larger property at A.K. Vaidya Marg, Goregaon (East), Mumbai, originally measuring approximately 55,696.70 sq. metres.
    • Development rights were granted to BPM Industries, later known as Satellite Developers Ltd. The relevant Sub-Plot A was initially approximately 16,855.47 sq. metres and was later realigned to approximately 21,807.18 sq. metres.
    • Satellite Garden I CHSL was formed in respect of the first building in October 2002. Further buildings were subsequently constructed, leading to the formation of Sadguru Complex 1 (AB) CHSL, Sadguru Complex 1 (CD) CHSL and Satellite Tower CHSL. A fifth building was contemplated but remained unconstructed.
    • The societies had significantly different built-up areas. According to the last sanctioned plan referred to in the judgment, Satellite Garden I had BUA of 11,186.41 sq. metres, Sadguru AB 3,936.31 sq. metres, Sadguru CD 3,917.76 sq. metres, and Satellite Tower 20,728.06 sq. metres.

    Competent Authority Applied Different Standards to Different Societies

    • A major reason for the litigation was the lack of a uniform approach in the deemed-conveyance orders.
    • Satellite Tower CHSL had been granted only 4,864.21 sq. metres, corresponding to its building’s plinth area. Sadguru Complex 1 (AB) CHSL was granted just 643.81 sq. metres, even though its plinth itself measured approximately 959.69 sq. metres.
    • In contrast, Sadguru Complex 1 (CD) CHSL was granted 2,134.15 sq. metres, including a proportionate share in the recreational-ground area, after applying a BUA-based calculation.
    • The High Court noted that the Competent Authority had therefore failed to apply a uniform yardstick to societies situated within the same layout.

    TDR Created an Unusual Land-Sharing Problem

    • The case became more complex because TDR had not been uniformly used across the buildings.
    • Satellite Garden I had no TDR loaded on it. Sadguru AB had 720 sq. metres of TDR, Sadguru CD had 3,086.08 sq. metres, while Satellite Tower had a massive 14,949.6 sq. metres of TDR, over its base BUA of 5,778 sq. metres.
    • The Court explained that blindly dividing land according to the final total BUA would create an anomalous result. Satellite Tower, whose base BUA represented only about 25% of the base BUA, could end up receiving more than 50% of the layout land because of the later loading of substantial TDR.
    • The Court described this as a potential windfall and noted that Satellite Garden I, where no TDR had been used, would consequently be disadvantaged.

    Society’s Right to Land Crystallises Four Months After Formation

    • The most important part of the judgment is the set of principles formulated by the High Court for future deemed-conveyance disputes.
    • Justice Marne held that the right to obtain conveyance of land and building accrues to the organisation of flat purchasers upon expiry of the statutory period prescribed by Section 11 of MOFA read with Rule 9 of the MOF Rules.
    • Accordingly, in a layout development, the proportionate land that ought to have been conveyed to a society crystallises and freezes when four months expire from the society’s formation.
    • This means that a developer cannot ordinarily reduce the society’s proportionate land entitlement simply by obtaining revised plans at a later stage.

    Subsequent Revised Plans Cannot Automatically Reduce Earlier Society’s Share

    • The Court held that proportionate land division should ordinarily be determined with reference to either the first sanctioned plan or the plan existing when the society’s right crystallised upon expiry of the Rule 9 period.
    • The Competent Authority must therefore consider the sanctioned plan existing when four months expired from formation of the organisation of flat purchasers.
    • This principle has considerable practical importance in phased developments where developers continue construction for several years and repeatedly revise the sanctioned layout.
    • An earlier society’s entitlement cannot simply continue shrinking every time another building is introduced or additional development potential is subsequently loaded onto the plot.

    Written Consent Can Alter the Position

    • The Court, however, created an important exception.
    • Where flat purchasers of an earlier building or their society have given written consent to modification or revision of the layout plan, proportionate land division may be undertaken by considering the plan carrying such consent.
    • Thus, the Court did not impose an inflexible first-plan rule. The relevant plan would ordinarily be the plan existing when the statutory right crystallised, or a subsequent plan supported by the requisite written consent, whichever is later.

    Developers Must Warn Buyers About TDR and Incentive FSI

    • The judgment also places an important disclosure responsibility on promoters and developers.
    • The Court held that developers and promoters must give adequate notice to flat purchasers where buildings are proposed to be constructed using incentive FSI or TDR, including warning purchasers of the potential risk that the land ultimately conveyed to their society may be less than the BUA consumed by their building.
    • This observation strengthens the importance of disclosures in agreements for sale and sanctioned layout plans in phased developments.

    Use of TDR Does Not Always Mean Conveyance Must Be Restricted to Plinth Area

    • The Court also examined the Maharashtra Government’s GR dated June 22, 2018, which contains guidelines for deemed conveyance.
    • The GR provides, among other things, that where TDR is utilised in a layout, conveyance may be made according to the plinth and appurtenant area.
    • However, the High Court noted that its earlier ruling in Neelkanth Mansion and Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. had already clarified that use of TDR does not mean that proportionate land division must be abandoned in every case.
    • Where difficulties arise because of unequal TDR loading during an incomplete layout development, plinth-and-appurtenant-area conveyance can operate as a transitional mechanism. It is not necessarily an immutable rule for final division of layout land.

    Deemed Conveyance Is Not Final Determination of Title

    • Another important clarification concerns the jurisdiction of the Competent Authority.
    • The High Court observed that deemed conveyance granted under Section 11 of MOFA is not finally determinative of all competing rights and title claims in the land.
    • If a developer or another society believes that it has an entitlement contrary to the land division determined by the Competent Authority, it can approach the Civil Court.
    • At the same time, a society seeking application of the crystallisation/freezing principle should not itself be forced into civil litigation merely to obtain its proportionate deemed conveyance.

    Court Rejects 2010 Plan as Basis for Land Distribution in Present Case

    • Applying these principles to the societies before it, the High Court held that the land distribution could not properly be based upon the revised sanctioned plan dated July 9, 2010, under which substantial slum TDR had been loaded on Sadguru CD and Satellite Tower.
    • The deemed conveyance granted to Sadguru CD based upon that revised plan was therefore found unsustainable. Similarly, the conveyances restricting Satellite Tower and Sadguru AB merely to plinth areas were also liable to be set aside.
    • Instead, the Court directed that the exercise should be undertaken by reference to the BUA figures reflected in the layout plan dated March 10, 2005.

    Court Identifies BUA Figures for Fresh Land-Division Exercise

    For purposes of the fresh exercise, the High Court identified the following BUA figures:

    • Satellite Garden Phase I β€” 11,186.41 sq. metres
    • Sadguru AB β€” 3,126.32 sq. metres
    • Sadguru CD β€” 830.92 sq. metres
    • Satellite Tower β€” 5,778 sq. metres

    The Court directed that these figures be used as the basis for proportionate division of the entire Sub-Plot A.

    Significantly, the Court explained that this is essentially a notional subdivision of layout land. Physical division may not always be possible because internal roads, amenities and other common spaces are spread across the layout.

    Three Deemed-Conveyance Orders Set Aside

    • The Bombay High Court ultimately set aside all three impugned orders passed by the Competent Authority:
    • the October 31, 2025 order concerning Sadguru Complex 1 (CD) CHSL; the May 16, 2024 order concerning Satellite Tower CHSL; and the March 6, 2025 order concerning Sadguru Complex 1 (AB) CHSL.
    • All three applications were remanded to the Competent Authority for fresh adjudication.
    • The Competent Authority was directed to obtain a fresh certificate from architect Aniket Mathakar showing distribution of the entire 21,807.18 sq. metres of Sub-Plot A on the basis of the BUA figures identified by the Court.
    • The authority must then freshly determine each society’s land entitlement while applying the principles laid down in the judgment.
    • All three writ petitions were accordingly disposed of, with no order as to costs.

    Seven Principles Laid Down by Bombay High Court

    For housing societies, developers and conveyancing authorities, the judgment can be distilled into seven major rules:

    • The right to conveyance accrues upon expiry of the Section 11/Rule 9 period.
    • the society’s proportionate land entitlement then crystallises and freezes
    • later plan revisions cannot ordinarily diminish that entitlement.
    • land division should generally follow the sanctioned plan existing at crystallization.
    • a later plan may be considered where the earlier purchasers or society have given written consent.
    • parties asserting contrary title rights can approach the Civil Court.
    • developers must adequately disclose the use of TDR/incentive FSI and the consequent risk to land entitlement.

    Why the Judgment Matters

    The ruling has potentially wide significance for deemed conveyance and redevelopment of multi-building housing layouts in Maharashtra.

    The central principle is that an earlier society’s land rights cannot remain indefinitely fluid while a developer repeatedly changes plans, introduces new buildings or loads additional TDR over several years.

    By fixing the relevant point at which the society’s proportionate entitlement β€œcrystallises and freezes,” the judgment provides a framework for balancing the rights of earlier flat purchasers against subsequent lawful development within the same layout.

    At the same time, the Court has preserved the jurisdiction of civil courts where complicated questions of title or competing substantive rights require a full evidentiary adjudication.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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  • Bombay HC Quashes Upa-Lokayukta Order Cancelling 1984 Mutation Entry; Holds Recommendatory Powers Cannot Replace Statutory Appellate Jurisdiction

    Bombay HC Quashes Upa-Lokayukta Order Cancelling 1984 Mutation Entry; Holds Recommendatory Powers Cannot Replace Statutory Appellate Jurisdiction

    Date: 16.09.2026

    ​​​The Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench, has set aside an order of the Upa-Lokayukta, Maharashtra, which had recommended cancellation of a decades-old mutation entry and recovery of possession of agricultural land, holding that the Upa-Lokayukta had exceeded the jurisdiction available under the Maharashtra Lokayukta and Upa-Lokayuktas Act, 1971.

    Justice Pravin S. Patil, deciding Rajendra s/o Bhagirath Bansile & Ors. v. The Up Lok-Ayukta, Maharashtra State & Anr., Writ Petition No. 5794 of 2013, 2026:BHC-NAG:11956, held that while the Upa-Lokayukta possesses recommendatory jurisdiction, such powers cannot be exercised as a substitute for the statutory powers vested in authorities under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code.

    The Court ultimately restored Mutation Entry No. 97 relating to Survey No. 84/3, Gat No. 216, in favour of the petitioners.

    Dispute Over Agricultural Land and Mutation Entry

    • The petitioners claimed to be co-owners of agricultural land bearing Gat No. 216, Old Survey No. 84/3, situated at village Pimpalgaon (Chilamkha), Tahsil Deulgaon Raja, District Buldhana.
    • According to them, Bhagirath Ramdas Bansile, father of the first two petitioners, had been cultivating and possessing approximately 5.05 hectares of land out of Survey No. 84/3, with his name appearing in the crop statement since 1973-74.
    • In March 1989, the land was partitioned between Bhagirath Bansile and his four sons, following which their names were mutated in the revenue records. Petitioners 3 to 5 subsequently purchased 3.05 hectares through a registered sale deed dated 5 February 2009 and their names were also entered in the revenue records.

    Complaint Before Upa-Lokayukta Questioned 1984 Revenue Entry

    • The controversy began when the second respondent lodged a complaint before the Upa-Lokayukta on 7 August 2009.
    • The complaint alleged, among other things, that certain lands had wrongly been reflected as Occupant Class-I instead of Class-II, and that the sale in favour of some of the petitioners had been effected without obtaining the Collector’s permission or depositing the alleged unearned income.
    • It was further alleged that Survey No. 84/3 had not been allotted to Bhagirath Bansile during consolidation proceedings in 1984 and that the Consolidation Officer had allegedly extended undue favour by causing the land to be mutated in his name.
    • Following the complaint, the Upa-Lokayukta initiated an inquiry and sought reports from revenue officers.

    SDO Had Already Ordered Regularisation in 2013

    • During the pendency of the Upa-Lokayukta proceedings, the Sub-Divisional Officer, Buldhana, by an order dated 24 May 2013, granted permission for regularisation of the land in the petitioners’ names and forwarded the matter to the Tahsildar, Deulgaon Raja for further action.
    • The revenue authorities also placed this development before the Upa-Lokayukta.
    • Nevertheless, on 7 August 2013, the Upa-Lokayukta passed the impugned order recommending cancellation of the mutation entries in favour of the petitioners and steps for recovery of possession.
    • The petitioners consequently approached the Bombay High Court.

    Three-Year Limitation Under Section 8(5)

    • One of the central issues before the High Court concerned Section 8(5) of the Maharashtra Lokayukta and Upa-Lokayuktas Act, 1971.
    • The provision distinguishes between a complaint involving a β€œgrievance” and one involving an β€œallegation.”
    • Under Section 8(5), a complaint involving an allegation cannot be investigated if it is made after three years from the date on which the complained-of action is alleged to have taken place. The statutory proviso permitting consideration of sufficient cause applies to the period concerning a β€œgrievance,” rather than providing a similar extension for an allegation beyond the prescribed three-year period.
    • The Act defines an β€œallegation” in relation to a public servant to include assertions involving abuse of position to obtain gain or favour, improper or corrupt motives, corruption or lack of integrity. A β€œgrievance,” on the other hand, concerns a claim of injustice or undue hardship resulting from maladministration.

    Complaint Was an β€œAllegation”, Not Merely a β€œGrievance”: High Court

    • After examining the complaint, the High Court held that it fell within the category of an β€œallegation.”
    • The complaint accused the authorities of extending undue favour to Bhagirath Bansile while effecting the revenue entry. Consequently, the applicable limitation period was three years from the complained-of action.
    • The impugned Mutation Entry No. 97 was dated 30 April 1984, whereas the complaint before the Upa-Lokayukta was lodged only on 7 August 2009.
    • The High Court therefore found that the complaint was prima facie barred by limitation and held that, in view of the mandate of Section 8(5), the Upa-Lokayukta could not investigate the complaint.

    Upa-Lokayukta Has Recommendatory, Not Appellate, Jurisdiction

    • The second major issue concerned the nature and extent of the Upa-Lokayukta’s powers.
    • The State relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Additional Tahsildar & Anr. v. Urmila G. & Ors., (2023) 20 SCC 642, contending that the Lokayukta/Upa-Lokayukta exercises recommendatory jurisdiction.
    • The High Court accepted the principle that the Upa-Lokayukta can make recommendations to the competent authorities. However, Justice Patil emphasised that a Lokayukta or Upa-Lokayukta cannot act as an appellate authority over decisions of competent forums created under other statutes.
    • Where a statute creates its own appeal or revision mechanism, an aggrieved party must pursue those statutory remedies.
    • The Court succinctly observed that β€œRecommendatory powers cannot take place of statutory powers.”

    Upa-Lokayukta Effectively Exercised Land Revenue Powers

    • Although the impugned order was styled as a recommendation under Section 12 of the 1971 Act, the High Court examined its substance rather than merely its title.
    • The Court found that the Upa-Lokayukta had directed the Collector, Buldhana, to cancel Mutation Entry No. 97, forfeit the land to the Government and initiate disciplinary proceedings against the concerned officers.
    • According to the High Court, this demonstrated that the Upa-Lokayukta had effectively exercised powers of an appellate authority under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code.
    • The Court consequently held that the order was unsustainable in law because the Upa-Lokayukta had exceeded the limits of its statutory jurisdiction.

    Failure to Consider SDO’s Regularisation Order

    • The High Court also took note of the fact that the SDO’s 24 May 2013 regularisation order had been brought to the notice of the Upa-Lokayukta before the impugned order was passed.
    • Despite this, the Upa-Lokayukta’s order did not consider the regularisation decision, even though the High Court regarded it as a fact capable of materially affecting the decision.
    • Thus, apart from the jurisdictional and limitation issues, the Court found that relevant factual and legal aspects had not been appropriately considered.

    Bombay High Court Restores Mutation Entry

    Allowing the writ petition, the Bombay High Court:

    1. quashed and set aside the Upa-Lokayukta’s order dated 7 August 2013 in Case No. ULA/COM/104/2010 (T-15); and
    2. directed restoration of Mutation Entry No. 97 concerning Survey No. 84/3, Gat No. 216, Mouza Pimpalgaon Chilamkha, Taluka Deulgaon Raja, District Buldhana, in favour of the petitioners.

    The Court made no order as to costs.

    Significance of the Judgment

    The judgment draws a clear institutional boundary around the powers of the Lokayukta and Upa-Lokayukta. Their statutory role may include investigation and recommendations, but that role cannot be transformed into an appellate or supervisory jurisdiction over authorities exercising powers under separate enactments.

    The ruling is also significant on limitation under Section 8(5) of the Maharashtra Lokayukta and Upa-Lokayuktas Act, 1971. Where a complaint falls within the statutory category of an β€œallegation,” the High Court’s reasoning confirms the importance of the prescribed three-year period. Accordingly, the case reinforces two distinct safeguards: statutory limitation on the investigation of stale allegations and jurisdictional limits on recommendatory authorities interfering with decisions governed by separate statutory appeal or revision mechanisms.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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  • Bombay HC Grants Regularisation to Nine ONGC Workers After 10 Years of Service; Modifies CGIT’s 240-Day Permanency Award

    Bombay HC Grants Regularisation to Nine ONGC Workers After 10 Years of Service; Modifies CGIT’s 240-Day Permanency Award

    Date: 15.09.2026

    Mumbai, 9 September 2026: The Bombay High Court has granted significant relief to nine long-serving workers of Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (ONGC), holding that they cannot be denied regularisation after having continuously served the public sector undertaking for more than two decades following a selection process through the Employment Exchange.

    Justice Sandeep V. Marne, in Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-II & Anr., Writ Petition No. 13673 of 2025, partly allowed ONGC’s petition but modified, rather than set aside, the Central Government Industrial Tribunal’s award. The judgment bears neutral citation 2026:BHC-AS:37194.

    The High Court held that the workers should be treated as being in regular service of ONGC from the date on which each completed 10 years of service, with consequential benefits to be granted within eight weeks.

    CGIT Had Granted Permanency After 240 Days

    • The dispute originated from the employment of Field Operators/Assistant Rigmen by ONGC for its offshore exploration and production operations.
    • In 2000-01, ONGC sought candidates through the Employment Exchange for fixed-tenure engagements. Candidates were required to possess prescribed technical qualifications and were subjected to a written test, interview and medical examination before appointment. Their engagement was nevertheless expressly structured as fixed-term employment.
    • In 2008, a total of 79 workmen raised an industrial dispute seeking regularisation. During the lengthy proceedings, 55 were appointed on a regular basis through recruitment exercises, while 15 dropped out due to retirement, death or resignation. The dispute eventually survived in respect of nine workers.
    • On 24 April 2025, CGIT-II, Mumbai held that the nine employees were entitled to permanency and directed ONGC to make them permanent from the date of completion of 240 days of service, together with financial benefits.
    • ONGC challenged that award before the Bombay High Court.

    ONGC: Fixed-Term Employees Cannot Claim Permanency

    • ONGC argued that the workers were consciously engaged on fixed tenure because oil exploration was uncertain and manpower requirements could not be predicted permanently.
    • It relied substantially upon the Constitution Bench judgment in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1, contending that long service by itself cannot create a right to regularisation where appointments do not conform to the constitutional requirements governing public employment under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
    • ONGC further argued that granting permanency merely after completion of 240 days effectively amounted to the Tribunal creating posts on ONGC’s establishment, which an industrial adjudicator could not do.

    ONGC Also Questioned Application of Industrial Disputes Act to Offshore Rigs

    • A significant jurisdictional argument was raised by ONGC.
    • It contended that the workers were deployed on oil rigs located beyond 12 nautical miles from the Indian coastline, and therefore the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 did not apply to them. ONGC relied upon the Supreme Court judgment in Aban Loyd Chiles Offshore Ltd. v. Union of India, (2008) 11 SCC 439.
    • The Bombay High Court firmly rejected this contention.
    • The Court noted that the workers’ appointments were made in Mumbai and that decisions concerning their service conditions were also taken in Mumbai. Disciplinary proceedings concerning employees working on the rigs were conducted within Indian territory under Indian law.
    • The High Court therefore held that ONGC’s objection to the applicability of the Industrial Disputes Act and the CGIT’s jurisdiction was baseless.

    Aban Loyd Judgment Distinguished

    • The Court specifically distinguished Aban Loyd Chiles Offshore.
    • It observed that the Supreme Court case concerned the applicability of customs duty to spare parts required for oil rigs situated outside territorial waters but within India’s Exclusive Economic Zone. In that case, the Supreme Court had held customs duty applicable by virtue of extension of Indian territory to designated areas in the EEZ.
    • The Bombay High Court held that this principle had no application to the present industrial dispute concerning workers who were merely deployed on offshore rigs while their appointments and service-related decisions were made in Mumbai.

    Workers Were Not β€˜Backdoor Entrants’: High Court

    • A crucial finding in favour of the workers was that their appointments could not be characterised as classic β€œbackdoor entries.”
    • ONGC itself admitted that the workers had been sponsored by the Employment Exchange. Eligibility requirements were prescribed, and the candidates underwent a written test, interview and medical fitness examination before being selected.
    • The High Court therefore observed that their appointments could, at the highest, be characterised as irregular rather than appointments completely dehors the constitutional scheme of public employment.
    • The Court further noted that the nine employees had continued working without any real break for over a quarter of a century. Repeated issuance of fresh fixed-tenure appointment orders did not, in the Court’s view, constitute an actual break in their service.

    25 Years of Continuous Service Showed Continuing Need for Workers

    • The High Court attached considerable importance to the factual reality of the employment relationship.
    • It observed that the nine workers had remained in continuous service for over 25 years, making it difficult to accept that their engagement was exclusively for a short-term or specific project or that ONGC had no continuing requirement for their services.
    • The evidence instead suggested that the workers had become an asset to ONGC and had continued to work in adverse conditions on offshore oil rigs for more than two decades.
    • The Court also rejected the contention that the workers had lost their right to seek regularisation merely because they had participated in subsequent regular recruitment exercises. Their participation in such selection processes did not estop them from pursuing their pending claim.

    High Court Applies Exception Under Paragraph 53 of Umadevi

    • While recognising the general rule laid down in Umadevi (3) against regularising appointments made outside the constitutional scheme, the High Court relied upon the important exception recognised in paragraph 53 of that judgment.
    • Paragraph 53 contemplates consideration of regularisation in cases involving irregular, as distinguished from illegal, appointments of duly qualified persons who have served for 10 years or more, subject to the conditions explained by the Supreme Court.
    • In the present case, the High Court noted that the workers were qualified and had undergone a selection process after sponsorship through the Employment Exchange.
    • Their continued engagement for over 25 years also gave rise, in the Court’s assessment, to an inference regarding ONGC’s continuing requirement for their services.
    • Accordingly, the Court held that the benefit of regularisation could not be denied to them.

    Industrial Tribunal Cannot Grant Permanency Merely After 240 Days

    • The High Court, however, did not fully approve the CGIT’s award.
    • It held that the Tribunal had erred in directing that the workers be made permanent merely upon completion of 240 days of service.
    • The Court reasoned that such a direction would effectively amount to creation of posts on the establishment of ONGC, a power that an industrial adjudicator does not possess in relation to a State instrumentality.
    • The Court relied upon Municipal Council Tirora v. Tulsidas Baliram Bindhade, 2016 (6) Mh.L.J. 867, where it had been held that completion of 240 days by itself cannot confer a right to permanency in the absence of the necessary legal conditions concerning posts and recruitment.
    • The High Court also referred to Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Casteribe Rajya P. Karmachari Sanghatana, (2009) 8 SCC 556 and Hari Nandan Prasad v. Employer I/R to Management of FCI, (2014) 7 SCC 190, while considering the applicability of Umadevi principles to industrial adjudication involving government entities and instrumentalities.

    Regularisation From Completion of 10 Years, Not 240 Days

    • The Court ultimately struck a balance between the constitutional restrictions governing public employment and the peculiar facts of the workers’ long-standing engagement.
    • It held that while permanency merely upon completion of 240 days was legally impermissible, the nine workers could receive the benefit of regularisation after completing 10 years of service, applying the exception recognised in Umadevi.
    • The Court also rejected ONGC’s contention that such relief necessarily amounted to impermissible retrospective regularisation. Since the industrial reference itself had been made in 2008 and the workers would complete 10 years around or after 2011, the Court observed that the relief would operate after the reference and could not, in that sense, be characterised as retrospective.

    Bombay High Court Modifies CGIT Award

    • Accordingly, the High Court partly allowed ONGC’s writ petition and modified the CGIT award dated 24 April 2025.
    • Instead of granting permanency from completion of 240 days, the Court directed that all nine workers be treated as being in regular service of ONGC with effect from the date on which they completed 10 years of service from their initial engagements.
    • ONGC was further directed to grant them all consequential benefits within eight weeks. No order as to costs was passed.

    Key Legal Principles Emerging From the Judgment

    The judgment draws an important distinction between illegal/backdoor appointments and irregular appointments. While long continuation alone does not create a right to regularisation, employees who entered service through a genuine selection mechanism and whose appointments are irregular rather than illegal may, in appropriate circumstances, fall within the Umadevi paragraph 53 framework.

    At the same time, the judgment makes clear that completion of 240 days does not automatically create a right to permanency in a State instrumentality, particularly where doing so would effectively require an industrial adjudicator to create posts.

    The decision is also significant for offshore employment disputes. Merely because employees are physically deployed on offshore installations beyond 12 nautical miles does not, on the facts of this case, displace Indian labour law where their appointments and service conditions are fundamentally administered within India.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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  • Bombay HC Holds Secured Creditor Has Priority Over Government Dues; State’s Re. 1 Auction Declared Null and Void

    Bombay HC Holds Secured Creditor Has Priority Over Government Dues; State’s Re. 1 Auction Declared Null and Void

    Date: 14.09.2026

    In a significant ruling concerning the priority of secured creditors over government dues, the Bombay High Court has ruled in favour of Indian Overseas Bank, holding that merely attaching a property for recovery of State dues, without completing the legally required proclamation and registration requirements, cannot give such government dues priority over the rights of a secured creditor under the SARFAESI Act, 2002.

    The Division Bench of Justices Manish Pitale and Shreeram V. Shirsat consequently quashed an auction conducted by State authorities on 7 April 2018, under which mortgaged land was transferred to the Government for a nominal consideration of Re. 1. The Court also directed consequential deletion of the Government’s mutation entry and restoration of the Bank’s rights over the property.

    Indian Overseas Bank Challenged State Auction of Mortgaged Land

    • Indian Overseas Bank approached the Bombay High Court as a secured creditor, seeking to quash the auction sale dated 7 April 2018 concerning land bearing Survey No. 43/1/B. It also sought restoration of rightful control and possession of the land.
    • The Bank had sanctioned financial facilities to the borrower in 2007, secured through an equitable mortgage created by deposit of the original title deeds. The charge was registered before the Registrar of Companies on 31 January 2007. Following repayment defaults, the borrower’s account was classified as a Non-Performing Asset (NPA) on 31 December 2010.
    • Indian Overseas Bank thereafter initiated proceedings under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) and issued a demand notice under Section 13(2) on 28 September 2012. It subsequently issued a possession notice under Section 13(4) on 20 December 2012.

    Bank Subsequently Sold Secured Assets Under SARFAESI

    • The Bank eventually auctioned the mortgaged property on 26 November 2021 in favour of M/s Kaushal Metal and Steel Private Limited and M/s TGK Special Steel Private Limited.
    • A sale certificate was issued on 22 February 2022 and possession was handed over. However, the Bank encountered difficulties in handing over control of the parcel corresponding to Survey No. 43/1/B.
    • Upon examining the revenue records, the Bank discovered discrepancies between the survey numbers appearing in the Talathi’s records and those contained in the original title deeds.
    • Further investigation revealed that old Survey No. 46/1/2 had been renumbered as 43/1/B, without any change in area. The Bank also discovered that the property had already been auctioned by the Tahsildar and that the State of Maharashtra’s name had been entered in the revenue records.

    Government Sought Recovery of β‚Ή2.68 Crore as Land Revenue Arrears

    • The State proceedings arose from dues of approximately β‚Ή2,68,99,000 allegedly owed by the borrower to the District Industries Centre.
    • The Collector, Raigad, had directed the Tahsildar to recover these dues as arrears of land revenue. The State authorities thereafter claimed to have seized the property and recorded an encumbrance for β‚Ή2.68 crore in the “other rights” column of the 7/12 extracts.
    • An auction was scheduled for 7 April 2018. Since there were no other bidders, State officials participated on behalf of the Government and the land was purchased for a nominal price of Re. 1. A purchase certificate was subsequently issued in the name of the Government of Maharashtra under Rule 14-B of the Maharashtra Realisation of Land Revenue Rules, 1967.
    • This ultimately created the conflict between the State’s recovery proceedings and the Bank’s pre-existing secured interest.

    Indian Overseas Bank Claimed Priority Under Section 26E of SARFAESI Act

    • Indian Overseas Bank argued that it held the first and prior charge over the mortgaged property and that the State-conducted auction was void ab initio and contrary to the SARFAESI framework.
    • The Bank specifically relied upon Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act, under which a secured creditor’s dues are accorded priority over other debts and over revenues, taxes, cesses and other rates payable to the Central Government, State Government or local authorities.
    • The Bank also produced its CERSAI registration certificate, which showed registration of the security interest on 14 February 2015, and relied heavily on the Full Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in Jalgaon Janta Sahakari Bank Limited v. Joint Commissioner of Sales Tax.

    Bombay HC Relies on Full Bench Ruling in Jalgaon Janta Sahakari Bank

    • The Division Bench extensively relied upon the Bombay High Court Full Bench ruling in Jalgaon Janta Sahakari Bank Limited v. Joint Commissioner of Sales Tax.
    • The Full Bench had explained that the expression “priority” means the right to enforce one claim in preference to others. It held that, having regard to the non-obstante provisions concerning secured creditors, their dues have priority over other dues, including revenues, taxes, cesses and rates payable to governmental authorities.
    • The judgment therefore examined whether the State had taken the necessary legal steps capable of defeating or taking precedence over the Bank’s secured interest.

    Mere Attachment Is Not Enough: Proclamation Must Follow Statutory Procedure

    1. A particularly important part of the judgment concerns the distinction between merely attaching a property and completing the statutory procedure necessary to make that attachment effective against competing secured interests.
    2. The Full Bench precedent relied upon by the Court required compliance not merely with attachment requirements but also with the prescribed proclamation procedure under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code and the Maharashtra Realisation of Land Revenue Rules.
    3. The Court reiterated that simply ordering an attachment is insufficient. Before an attached property is sold, a proclamation has to be issued in the prescribed form and publicly announced in the manner contemplated by law.
    4. This procedural requirement became decisive in Indian Overseas Bank’s case.

    State Failed to Show CERSAI Registration or Proper Proclamation

    • The Bombay High Court found that the State authorities’ affidavit did not state that the Tahsildar had registered the State’s claim with CERSAI.
    • More importantly, the State’s affidavit did not demonstrate that after attaching the property, the authorities had taken the further legally prescribed steps for proclamationβ€”such as announcement by beating of drum or other customary mode, affixing the proclamation on a conspicuous part of the property, or displaying it on the notice board of the concerned Talathi office.

    The Court therefore held that:

    Simply attaching the property, without taking the prescribed steps towards proclamation for recovery of dues, would not give those State dues priority over the dues of a secured creditor under the SARFAESI Act.

    Government Encumbrance Cannot Prevail Over Bank’s Secured Charge

    • Having applied the Full Bench decision, the Court held that there was no reason to deny Indian Overseas Bank the benefit of the principles laid down therein.
    • Since the Bank was admittedly a secured creditor seeking recovery under the SARFAESI Act, the Court concluded that the encumbrance/charge entered by the State authorities could not prevail over the Bank’s secured charge.
    • The Court expressly clarified that the State authorities were not barred from recovering their dues altogether.
    • They remained free to recover the amount in accordance with law. However, as far as priority was concerned, the Bank’s dues as secured creditor clearly ranked ahead of the dues claimed by the State respondents.

    Auction Sale to Government for Re. 1 Quashed

    • The High Court consequently allowed Indian Overseas Bank’s writ petition.
    • It quashed the 7 April 2018 auction sale relating to Survey No. 43/1/B and declared the transfer of the land to the concerned State respondent null and void.
    • The Court further directed restoration of rightful control and possession of the propertyβ€”old Survey No. 46/1/2, subsequently renumbered as Survey No. 43/1/Bβ€”in favour of Indian Overseas Bank as secured creditor.

    Government Mutation Entry to Be Deleted Within Four Weeks

    • The High Court also ordered consequential correction of the revenue records.
    • The State authorities were directed to take steps to delete Mutation Entry No. 1959 dated 16 April 2018, through which the Government of Maharashtra’s name had been entered in the occupant’s column of the 7/12 extract.
    • These consequential steps were directed to be completed within four weeks from the date of the order.

    Auction Purchasers to Get Clear Title Free From State Encumbrance

    • The ruling also has direct implications for the purchasers who acquired the secured asset through the Bank’s SARFAESI auction.
    • The High Court observed that, subject to other compliance requirements under the SARFAESI Act, the purchasers M/s Kaushal Metal and Steel Private Limited and M/s TGK Special Steel Private Limited would get clear title free from the encumbrances claimed by the State respondents.
    • This aspect of the judgment reinforces the importance of priority rules not only for banks but also for purchasers of secured assets through statutory auctions.

    State Can Recover From Surplus or Other Assets

    • The judgment does not extinguish the Government’s underlying claim against the borrower.
    • The Court directed that if any surplus remains after Indian Overseas Bank’s dues are satisfied, the Bank must notify the State authorities, which would then be entitled to the residual proceeds, if any.
    • The State and the Collector’s office were also left free to proceed against any other assets or properties belonging to the borrower in accordance with law.

    Significance of the Judgment

    • The ruling is significant for banks, financial institutions, secured creditors, insolvency and recovery professionals and purchasers of secured assets, because it reinforces the statutory priority accorded to duly registered security interests.
    • At the same time, the judgment makes an important qualification: a Government department’s claim does not disappear merely because a secured creditor has priority. Rather, the question is one of ranking and enforceability against the particular secured asset.
    • The decision also demonstrates that an entry in revenue records or a bare attachment cannot automatically defeat a secured creditor’s rights. Where the law requires attachment, public proclamation and other procedural steps, those requirements must be demonstrated before a competing claim of priority can be sustained.

    Key Takeaway

    The Bombay High Court’s ruling establishes that State Government dues cannot take priority over a secured creditor merely because the State attached the mortgaged property. Where the prescribed proclamation procedure was not completed and the State’s claim was not shown to have been registered with CERSAI, the secured creditor’s statutory priority prevails.

    Accordingly, Indian Overseas Bank succeeded in the writ petition. Its secured charge was held to have priority over the State’s dues, the State’s 2018 auction was quashed, the Re. 1 transfer was declared null and void, and consequential correction of the revenue records was ordered.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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  • Bombay High Court: Temporary Access Over Government Land Cannot Be Converted Into Exclusive Private Right by Erecting Gates

    Bombay High Court: Temporary Access Over Government Land Cannot Be Converted Into Exclusive Private Right by Erecting Gates

    Date: 11.09.2026

    The Bombay High Court has held that a housing society permitted to use Government land as an access route cannot convert such permission into an exclusive private right by erecting gates and restricting access to others. The Court upheld the State’s action directing removal of gates erected by The Deccan Co-operative Housing Society Limited, while protecting the Society’s continued right to use the access along with others.

    Justice Arun R. Pedneker partly allowed the Society’s writ petition challenging the order dated 17 March 2026 passed by the Resident Deputy Collector, Mumbai Suburban District.

    Dispute Over Gate and Access Road

    • The dispute concerned a strip of land being used as an access route by the petitioner-Society. The Society challenged the Collector’s direction to remove gates installed on Government land and the subsequent attempts by officials to remove the gate.
    • According to the Society, the gate and pathway had remained in its exclusive and uninterrupted possession and use for more than 45 years. It contended that the authorities could not remove the gate without notice, hearing or following due process of law.
    • The dispute also arose against the backdrop of Civil Suit No. 287 of 2025, instituted by the Society concerning its claimed rights over a garden/open space. The Bombay High Court had earlier granted interim protection against coercive action in relation to that suit property.

    Access Was Originally Granted Only as a Temporary Arrangement

    • Examining historical documents, the High Court found that the Society’s plot had earlier been landlocked because a proposed 44-feet-wide Development Plan road had not yet been constructed.
    • The Municipal Corporation had therefore permitted a 30-feet-wide temporary access through Government land. Importantly, the permission was subject to a specific condition that the Society would discontinue the temporary access once the Development Plan road was constructed. The Society was also required to construct and maintain the temporary access at its own cost.
    • The Court noted that the 44-feet D.P. road had subsequently been completed and was being used by the Society.

    Access Strip Belongs to Government, Not Housing Society

    • After considering the maps and communications placed on record, the High Court concluded that the disputed strip was Government-owned land and did not form part of the land allotted to the Society in 1959.
    • The Court found that the land had been maintained as an open access connecting the D.P. road on one side with the public road on the other. By installing a gate, the Society had attempted to use the access exclusively and exclude other persons.
    • The Court consequently rejected the Society’s claim to exclusive use of the access.

    Constructing Road Does Not Create Exclusive Right Over Government Land

    • The High Court made an important distinction between a right to use an access and a right to possess the land exclusively.
    • The Society could not claim exclusive control merely because it had constructed a bitumen road over the strip. The Court held that Government land kept as an open access could not be appropriated for the Society’s exclusive use.
    • Justice Pedneker observed that the Society had no right to erect a gate over the access road because the land belonged to the Government and the original permission merely enabled the Society to use it as an access.

    Removal of Gate Does Not Amount to Dispossession

    • The Society relied upon the requirement of notice and due process under Section 53 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, arguing that even an unauthorised occupant of Government land could not be summarily dispossessed.
    • The High Court distinguished the precedent relied upon by the Society. It observed that the present case did not involve taking possession of land that had been granted to the Society. Rather, the Society had only been permitted to use Government land for access.
    • By removing the gate, the Collector had not terminated the Society’s access or dispossessed it from a granted property. The Society remained entitled to use the road; removal of the gate merely prevented it from excluding others.
    • The Court therefore held that the direction to remove the gate and keep the access open to everyone did not warrant interference.

    Collector’s Finding of β€œUnauthorised Use” Corrected

    • The High Court, however, did not accept every observation made by the Collector.
    • It specifically found incorrect the Collector’s observation that the Society was unauthorisedly using the road over Government land. The Court clarified that the road had, in fact, been used with the permission of the Municipal Corporation.
    • Thus, while the Society had no right to install gates and claim exclusive access, its underlying use of the access itself was not unauthorised.

    Public Access Must Remain Open

    • The Court emphasised the importance of protecting public spaces and access routes, particularly in densely populated areas.
    • It held that the Government land should remain accessible both to the petitioner-Society and to other persons. Since the Society had never been granted exclusive possession, installation of gates could not be used to transform a limited access right into exclusive control over Government property.
    • At the same time, the High Court imposed an important safeguard: the State cannot grant exclusive use of the access road to any other party either.
    • The access must remain open to the Society as well as others. Further, if the State proposes any action interfering with the Society’s existing access, appropriate notice would have to be issued.

    Writ Petition Partly Allowed

    • The Bombay High Court ultimately declined to interfere with the State’s direction for removal of the gates. However, it protected the Society’s continued non-exclusive access and clarified that the Government could not confer exclusive use of the road upon another party.
    • Accordingly, Writ Petition No. 7981 of 2026 was partly allowed.

    Key Legal Takeaway

    The judgment draws a clear distinction between permission to use Government land as an access and possession or ownership of that land. Long-standing use, expenditure on constructing or maintaining a road, or physical installation of gates does not by itself convert a permissive access into an exclusive proprietary right.

    At the same time, the ruling protects the legitimate access originally granted to the Society: the Government may keep the road open to the public, but it cannot arbitrarily stop the Society’s access or confer exclusive use upon another private party.

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  • Bombay High Court Clarifies Scope of Arbitration Against Non-Signatories

    Bombay High Court Clarifies Scope of Arbitration Against Non-Signatories

    Date: 10.09.2026

    In an important ruling on the binding effect of arbitration agreements upon non-signatories and subsequent holders of property rights, the Bombay High Court has held that a person does not become bound by an arbitration clause contained in an earlier development agreement merely because that person subsequently acquires leasehold rights or an interest in the property.

    Justice Amit Borkar, while deciding an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, drew a clear distinction between an assignment of property rights and an assignment of contractual rights and obligations. The Court held that a subsequent lessee can be brought within an arbitration agreement only where there is sufficient material demonstrating assignment, incorporation, consent, acceptance of contractual obligations, or unequivocal conduct adopting the underlying agreement and its arbitration clause.

    At the same time, the Court held that disputes between the applicants and the original contracting Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 could proceed to arbitration. Their objection that the claims were barred by limitation was left for determination by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16 of the Arbitration Act.

    Background of the Dispute

    • The dispute arose from a registered Assignment of Development Agreement dated 12 November 2007.
    • Shree Satguru Developers and the other applicants were appointed as developers by the owners of the land. Under the agreement, development rights in the subject property were assigned to the applicants and an irrevocable Power of Attorney was also executed in their favour.
    • The consideration payable to the owners was fixed at β‚Ή5.5 crore, of which β‚Ή2.25 crore had already been paid at the relevant stage. The applicants claimed that they ultimately paid approximately β‚Ή5.21 crore to the owners.
    • The agreement also contained Clause 39, providing a dispute-resolution mechanism culminating in arbitration.
    • The controversy became complicated when the development arrangement was subsequently terminated and rights in the property underwent further transactions.

    Termination of Development Rights

    • The applicants were served with a notice dated 18 December 2015, whereby Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 purported to terminate the Assignment of Development Rights.
    • The applicants disputed the termination and replied on 16 January 2016, maintaining that the delays in redevelopment were attributable to various external issues and failures on the part of the owners.
    • According to the applicants, discussions nevertheless continued. In 2017, the applicants requested recall of the termination and subsequently paid another β‚Ή10 lakh, which was accepted by Respondent Nos. 3 and 4.
    • These later events eventually became important to the question of limitation.

    Subsequent Assignment of Leasehold Rights

    • A major issue arose after Respondent No. 1 acquired leasehold rights in the property under an Indenture of Assignment dated 13 August 2024.
    • The applicants contended that Respondent No. 1, being an assignee of Respondent Nos. 3 and 4, should also be treated as bound by the arbitration clause contained in the 2007 Development Agreement.
    • Respondent No. 1 disputed this contention.
    • His case was that he had acquired only the leasehold rights in the land and had never taken an assignment of the Development Agreement itself. It was argued that the Development Agreement created personal contractual rights and obligations between its parties and that those contractual obligations did not automatically travel with the land.

    This raised the central legal question before the Bombay High Court:

    Can a subsequent acquirer of leasehold/property rights be treated as an assignee of an earlier development agreement and thereby be compelled to arbitrate under its arbitration clause?

    Arbitration Invoked in April 2026

    • The applicants issued a notice dated 30 April 2026, invoking arbitration.
    • Respondent No. 1 replied on 7 May 2026 and denied the existence of any arbitration agreement between himself and the applicants.
    • Respondent Nos. 2 to 4, meanwhile, contended that the applicants’ appointment had already been terminated and that the claims sought to be raised were barred by limitation.
    • The applicants thereafter approached the Bombay High Court seeking appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11.

    Scope of Inquiry Under Section 11

    • The High Court first examined the extent of judicial scrutiny permissible while deciding a Section 11 application.
    • Relying upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Ajay Madhusudan Patel v. Jyotrindra S. Patel, (2025) 2 SCC 147, the Court reiterated the restricted scope of a referral court after insertion of Section 11(6-A).
    • The Court noted that the statutory enquiry is principally directed towards the existence of an arbitration agreement, rather than a full-scale adjudication of the underlying dispute.
    • The judgment also referred to the Supreme Court authorities in:
    • SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd., (2005) 8 SCC 618;
    • National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Boghara Polyfab (P) Ltd., (2009) 1 SCC 267; and
    • Duro Felguera S.A. v. Gangavaram Port Ltd., (2017) 9 SCC 729.
    • However, the Court recognised that a distinct question arises when arbitration is sought against a person who never signed the underlying agreement.

    What Did Clause 39 Provide?

    • Clause 39 of the Development Agreement referred specifically to disputes β€œbetween the parties hereto.”
    • It initially contemplated reference of disputes to a three-member committee consisting of representatives from the assignors, developers and owners/confirming parties. If the committee failed to resolve the dispute, the matter was to be referred to a sole arbitrator jointly nominated by the β€œparties hereto.”
    • The language of this clause became decisive.
    • The High Court found nothing in Clause 39 indicating that every subsequent person obtaining an interest in the property would automatically become a party to the arbitration agreement.

    Bombay High Court: Property Interest Is Not the Same as Contractual Assignment

    • The Court drew an important distinction between acquiring an interest in property and acquiring contractual rights and obligations.
    • It held that where a person is actually assigned the rights and obligations of a contracting party, that person mayβ€”depending upon the terms of the assignmentβ€”become bound by the arbitration agreement forming part of that contract.
    • But the position is different where the person merely acquires some interest in the property that formed the subject matter of the original contract.
    • The Court held that this fact, by itself, does not make the subsequent acquirer an assignee of the Development Agreement.
    • This distinction has considerable significance for property-development transactions involving multiple successive developers, lessees, assignees and transferees.

    A Lessee Does Not Automatically Become an β€œAssignee”

    The Court explained that a lease or sub-lease gives the lessee a right to occupy or use property. It does not, merely by its existence, transfer the earlier Development Agreement or the arbitration clause contained in it.

    Therefore, a person seeking to rely uponβ€”or sought to be bound byβ€”an arbitration clause as a subsequent lessee must demonstrate something more, such as:

    • contractual privity;
    • a valid assignment of the relevant agreement;
    • express incorporation of the earlier agreement;
    • written consent accepting the arbitration clause;
    • acceptance of the contractual obligations; or
    • unequivocal conduct demonstrating adoption of the Development Agreement and its arbitration clause.

    The Court therefore treated the expressions β€œlessee” and β€œassignee” as describing legally distinct relationships, even though a particular transaction may, depending upon its terms, produce both effects.

    Non-Signatories Can Still Be Bound in Appropriate Cases

    • Importantly, the Bombay High Court did not hold that a non-signatory can never be referred to arbitration.
    • The Court considered the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Cox & Kings Ltd. v. SAP India Pvt. Ltd., (2024) 4 SCC 1.
    • Cox & Kings recognises that whether a non-signatory has become a genuine party to an arbitration agreement may involve complex factual and legal questions. The referral court must examine whether there is at least a prima facie basis for treating the non-signatory as a party; complex questions may thereafter appropriately be determined by the Arbitral Tribunal.
    • Thus, the decisive consideration is not simply whether the person physically signed the original contract.
    • The real question is whether there is a legally sustainable basis for concluding that the non-signatory became a party to or accepted the arbitration agreement.

    No Prima Facie Material Against Respondent No. 1

    • On the facts before it, the Court found no such material.
    • Respondent No. 1 had obtained an assignment of lease/leasehold rights, but the applicants could not demonstrate a corresponding assignment of the Development Agreement dated 12 November 2007.
    • There was also no subsequent agreement under which Respondent No. 1 accepted Clause 39.
    • The fact that Respondent No. 1 had acquired leasehold rights and subsequently submitted a redevelopment proposal was insufficient to establish an agreement to arbitrate.
    • Similarly, knowledge of the applicants’ claimed development rights could not be equated with consent to arbitration.
    • The Court therefore declined to treat Respondent No. 1 as a party to Clause 39.

    Knowledge of an Arbitration Clause Is Not Consent to Arbitration

    • One of the judgment’s particularly useful commercial propositions is the distinction between knowledge and consent.
    • A subsequent purchaser, lessee or developer may know that another party claims rights under an earlier agreement. That knowledge does not mean that the subsequent party has accepted the arbitration clause contained in that agreement.
    • Arbitration is fundamentally consensual.
    • Accordingly, the existence of a property dispute between two persons cannot, by itself, create an arbitration agreement between them.
    • This distinction is particularly relevant in redevelopment projects where multiple layers of title, leasehold rights, development rights, assignments and tenant agreements coexist.

    Limitation: Referral Court Should Not Conduct Intricate Evidentiary Inquiry

    • The second major issue concerned limitation.
    • Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 argued that the Development Agreement had been terminated in December 2015, whereas arbitration was invoked only on 30 April 2026.
    • The applicants relied upon subsequent negotiations, the payment of β‚Ή10 lakh in 2017, redevelopment-related activities and later conduct to contend that their rights and disputes continued.
    • The Bombay High Court relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning, (2024) 12 SCC 1.
    • The Supreme Court had clarified that, at the Section 11 stage, the referral court should not undertake an intricate evidentiary enquiry into whether the substantive claims are time-barred. Such questions should ordinarily be left to the arbitrator.
    • The judgment also referred to Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. Aptech Ltd., (2024) 5 SCC 313 and In Re: Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under the Arbitration Act, 1996 & the Stamp Act, 1899, (2024) 6 SCC 1 in explaining the limited enquiry permissible at the referral stage.

    Ten-Year Gap Did Not Lead Court to Decide Claim Limitation at Section 11 Stage

    • The High Court acknowledged that there was a substantial period between the termination of the agreement and invocation of arbitration.
    • Nevertheless, the applicants relied on subsequent events and conduct, including negotiations and payment.
    • The Court therefore declined to finally determine whether those circumstances extended, revived, acknowledged or otherwise affected the applicants’ claims.
    • It held that these questions required consideration by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16.
    • This is an important distinction: the Court was not holding that the claims were within limitation. Rather, it held that the substantive limitation objection remained open for adjudication by the arbitrator.

    Arbitration Allowed Against Original Contracting Parties

    • As regards Respondent Nos. 2 to 4, there was no dispute about the existence of Clause 39 between the contracting parties.
    • The High Court therefore found that the applicants had established a case for appointment of an arbitrator against those respondents.
    • The limitation objection was expressly preserved for determination by the Arbitral Tribunal.
    • The Court accordingly partly allowed the arbitration application and referred the disputes between the applicants and Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 arising from the Assignment of Development Agreement dated 12 November 2007 to arbitration.

    Sole Arbitrator Appointed

    • The Bombay High Court appointed Mr. Amrut Joshi, Advocate, as the Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes between the applicants and Respondent Nos. 2 to 4.
    • The appointment was made subject to the statutory disclosure requirements under Section 12 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and absence of circumstances giving rise to justifiable doubts concerning the arbitrator’s independence or impartiality.
    • The Court also directed the arbitrator to forward the statutory disclosure under Section 11(8) read with Section 12(1), and directed the parties to appear before the arbitrator for further procedural directions. The arbitration costs and tribunal fees were to be borne equally in the first instance, subject to the final award on costs.

    Key Legal Principles Emerging from the Judgment

    • The Bombay High Court’s ruling provides useful guidance on three interrelated areas of arbitration law.
    • First, acquisition of property rights does not automatically amount to assignment of contractual rights. A subsequent lessee does not become an assignee of a development agreement merely because it acquires leasehold rights in the property covered by that agreement.
    • Second, arbitration remains consent-based. A non-signatory may be bound in appropriate circumstances, but there must be at least prima facie material showing assignment, incorporation, acceptance, consent or conduct sufficient to connect that person with the arbitration agreement.
    • Third, knowledge is not consent. Awareness of an earlier development agreement or of another person’s claimed rights cannot by itself make a subsequent property-holder a party to its arbitration clause.
    • Fourth, the Section 11 enquiry remains limited. The referral court should determine whether the requisite arbitration agreement exists, but ordinarily should not conduct an intricate evidentiary trial on the substantive limitation of individual claims.
    • Fifth, limitation remains fully open before the tribunal. Referral to arbitration does not amount to a judicial finding that the claims are within limitation.

    Important Supreme Court Authorities Referred to

    The judgment considers a substantial line of Supreme Court authority governing Section 11 and non-signatories, including:

    JudgmentCitationRelevance
    SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning(2024) 12 SCC 1Scope of limitation enquiry under Section 11
    Ajay Madhusudan Patel v. Jyotrindra S. Patel(2025) 2 SCC 147Limited scope of Section 11 enquiry
    Cox & Kings Ltd. v. SAP India Pvt. Ltd.(2024) 4 SCC 1Non-signatories and arbitration agreements
    Duro Felguera S.A. v. Gangavaram Port Ltd.(2017) 9 SCC 729Existence of arbitration agreement under Section 11
    SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd.(2005) 8 SCC 618Historical scope of referral-court enquiry
    National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Boghara Polyfab Pvt. Ltd.(2009) 1 SCC 267Pre-amendment Section 11 jurisprudence
    Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. Aptech Ltd.(2024) 5 SCC 313Limitation concerning Section 11 proceedings
    In Re: Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under the Arbitration Act, 1996 & the Stamp Act, 1899(2024) 6 SCC 1Referral-stage principles

    The Court specifically relied upon Cox & Kings while considering when a non-signatory can be regarded as a party to an arbitration agreement.

    Commercial Significance for Real Estate and Redevelopment Transactions

    • The ruling has implications extending beyond arbitration law.
    • Development projects frequently involve a succession of transactionsβ€”development agreements, conveyances, leases, assignments, redevelopment proposals, permanent alternate accommodation agreements and transfers of ownership or leasehold rights.
    • Parties should therefore avoid assuming that an arbitration clause automatically β€œruns with the land.”
    • If parties intend a subsequent purchaser, lessee, transferee, successor or assignee to be bound by an existing dispute-resolution mechanism, transaction documents should expressly address:
    • assignment of contractual rights and obligations, assumption of liabilities, incorporation of the original agreement, succession provisions and express adoption of the arbitration clause.
    • Clear drafting at the transactional stage can significantly reduce jurisdictional disputes when arbitration is later invoked.

    Conclusion

    The Bombay High Court’s ruling in Shree Satguru Developers & Ors. v. Chandrashekhar Champalal Hingarh & Ors., 2026:BHC-OS:19815, provides an important clarification on the relationship between property rights, contractual assignment and arbitration agreements. The case was decided by Justice Amit Borkar on 7 September 2026 in an application seeking appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11.

    The Court’s central message is that mere acquisition of leasehold rights in a property does not make the subsequent lessee an assignee of an earlier development agreement or bind it to the arbitration clause contained therein. There must be a demonstrable legal connection to the contractual rights and obligations themselves.

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  • Bombay High Court Quashes β‚Ή1.22 Crore EPFO Demand Against Corporate Debtor; PF Assessment During IBC Moratorium Held Impermissible

    Bombay High Court Quashes β‚Ή1.22 Crore EPFO Demand Against Corporate Debtor; PF Assessment During IBC Moratorium Held Impermissible

    Date: 10.09.2026

    The Bombay High Court has quashed an Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) demand of β‚Ή1,22,48,716 raised against Dolphin Offshore Enterprises (India) Limited, holding that continuation of proceedings under Section 7A of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 during the moratorium imposed under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) was impermissible.

    Justice Sharmila U. Deshmukh held that the subsequent demand and recovery proceedings could not survive after approval of the resolution plan, particularly in light of Sections 14, 31(6) and 32A of the IBC.

    Background of the Case

    • Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) against Dolphin Offshore Enterprises was initiated by the NCLT on 16 July 2020. Following a public announcement inviting claims, EPFO submitted a claim of β‚Ή2,24,98,772, which was verified and admitted in full by the Resolution Professional.
    • The Committee of Creditors subsequently approved the resolution plan submitted by Deep Industries Limited, and the NCLT approved the plan on 29 September 2022. Under the approved resolution plan, EPFO was paid β‚Ή2,250 in full and final settlement of its claim.
    • However, EPFO had separately initiated an inquiry under Section 7A of the PF Act concerning provident fund contributions for the period April 2018 to September 2019. Despite being informed about the CIRP and moratorium, the inquiry continued.
    • Eventually, on 24 February 2023, after approval of the resolution plan, EPFO passed an order assessing PF dues at β‚Ή1,22,48,716 and directed the corporate debtor to make payment.

    Can EPFO Continue Section 7A Proceedings During IBC Moratorium?

    • The principal issue before the High Court was whether EPFO could continue assessment proceedings under Section 7A of the PF Act after a moratorium had come into operation under Section 14 of the IBC.
    • The Court observed that commencement of CIRP triggers the statutory moratorium. Once the moratorium is imposed, proceedings which have the effect of creating new liabilities against the corporate debtor cannot continue.
    • In the present case, EPFO was aware that CIRP had commenced. Despite such knowledge, it continued with the Section 7A inquiry and ultimately passed the impugned order after the resolution plan had already been approved.

    EPFO Order Was Not Merely an Assessmentβ€”It Was in the Nature of Recovery

    • A significant aspect of the judgment is the Court’s distinction between mere assessment of dues and proceedings that effectively seek recovery.
    • The EPFO order not only assessed β‚Ή1.22 crore as outstanding dues but directed payment within 15 days, failing which recovery proceedings under Sections 8B to 8G of the PF Act were to follow. It also contemplated damages, interest and prosecution.
    • The High Court therefore held that the order was β€œnot merely an assessment proceeding” but a proceeding in the nature of recovery, which was impermissible during the moratorium.

    Section 31(6) of IBC Extinguishes Pre-Resolution Claims

    • The Court placed substantial reliance upon the newly introduced Section 31(6) of the IBC, inserted through the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2026, notified on 26 May 2026.
    • The provision stipulates, inter alia, that unless otherwise provided in the resolution plan, claims against the corporate debtor and its assets arising prior to approval of the plan stand extinguished, and proceedingsβ€”including assessment proceedingsβ€”cannot be continued or instituted on the basis of such claims.
    • Importantly, the Court noted that Explanation III gives retrospective operation to Section 31(6) in respect of resolution plans approved from the commencement of the IBC, except matters that have already attained finality.
    • Accordingly, the Court held that the amount recognised in the approved resolution plan was protected, but the separate amount subsequently determined through the impugned Section 7A order was not.
    • The post-resolution quantification therefore stood extinguished and could not be recovered.

    EPFO Had Filed Its Claim but Did Not Challenge the Resolution Plan

    • Another important consideration was that EPFO had actually participated in the insolvency process by lodging its claim with the Resolution Professional.
    • The resolution plan ultimately recognised EPFO’s claim at β‚Ή2,250, and EPFO was informed about approval of the plan and forwarded the amount. The Court observed that EPFO had the opportunity to challenge the resolution plan before the NCLAT and seek full payment of its provident fund dues.
    • Instead, EPFO did not challenge the approved resolution plan and continued with its Section 7A inquiry.

    Court Says 2026 IBC Amendment Reinforces β€œClean Slate” Principle

    • The High Court also considered the earlier Bombay High Court decision in Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Limited v. Central Board of Trustees, EPFO.
    • The Court distinguished that decision on the facts and observed that, following the 2026 legislative amendment to the IBC, the effect of Dalmia Cement had been β€œconsiderably watered down.” The issue in the present caseβ€”continuation of a Section 7A inquiry during the moratoriumβ€”had also not arisen for consideration in Dalmia Cement.
    • More importantly, the Court observed that the β€œclean slate” principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. has now received legislative effect through the introduction of Section 31(6) of the IBC.

    Protection Under Section 32A of IBC

    • The High Court further relied upon Section 32A of the IBC, which grants immunity in respect of offences committed prior to commencement of CIRP once the resolution plan is approved and results in the prescribed change in management or control.
    • Since the EPFO order contemplated recovery against the corporate debtor’s assets as well as prosecution, the Court found that such action was also inconsistent with the protection afforded by Section 32A.

    Four Reasons Why the EPFO Order Was Unsustainable

    The Bombay High Court crystallised its findings into four grounds: the Section 7A inquiry was impermissibly continued during the Section 14 moratorium; the resultant recovery claim stood extinguished under Section 31(6) after approval of the resolution plan; EPFO had itself lodged a claim which was dealt with under the resolution plan but never challenged that plan; and Section 32A protected the corporate debtor and its assets following the qualifying change in ownership and control.

    High Court Quashes β‚Ή1.22 Crore Demand

    On these findings, the Bombay High Court held that the EPFO order dated 24 February 2023 was clearly unsustainable and consequently quashed and set it aside, allowing Dolphin Offshore Enterprises’ writ petition.

    Key Takeaway

    The ruling is significant for companies undergoing or emerging from CIRP because it reinforces the clean-slate principle under the IBC. Statutory authorities cannot disregard an IBC moratorium, participate in the resolution process, accept treatment of their claim under an approved resolution plan, and thereafter seek to impose a separate pre-resolution liability against the revived corporate debtor.

    The judgment is particularly important after the 2026 amendment introducing Section 31(6), which the Bombay High Court has treated as giving legislative effect to the principle that pre-resolution claims, unless preserved under the approved plan, stand extinguished and cannot subsequently form the basis of fresh assessment or recovery proceedings.

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  • Bombay High Court Ruled Statutory Interest on Refund Runs from Three Months After Original Refund Application, Not from Appellate Order

    Bombay High Court Ruled Statutory Interest on Refund Runs from Three Months After Original Refund Application, Not from Appellate Order

    Date: 09.09.2026

    The Bombay High Court has delivered an important ruling on interest payable on delayed tax refunds under Section 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944, as made applicable to service tax matters through Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994. In Empire Industries Limited v. Union of India & Others, the Court held that statutory interest becomes payable after the expiry of three months from the date of the original refund application, and not from the date on which the assessee subsequently succeeds before the Appellate Tribunal.

    The Division Bench of Justice M. S. Karnik and Justice Sandesh D. Patil quashed the denial of interest by the Department and directed payment of statutory interest on the refund amount of β‚Ή53,05,173 from 20 August 2015 until the date of actual refund.

    This decision is particularly significant for assessees whose refund claims remain pending for years because of departmental rejection, appellate proceedings or litigation.

    Background of the Case

    Empire Industries Limited had filed a refund application under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 read with Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994 on 20 May 2015.

    The refund claim was not immediately granted. The dispute travelled through the appellate mechanism and was eventually decided in favour of the petitioner by the Appellate Tribunal on 8 December 2025. Thereafter, the petitioner issued a communication dated 5 January 2026, seeking implementation of the appellate order and release of the refund.

    The Department subsequently sanctioned the refund of β‚Ή53,05,173, which was actually paid on 23 June 2026. However, the Order-in-Original dated 24 March 2026 denied statutory interest for the period claimed by the petitioner.

    The petitioner therefore approached the Bombay High Court challenging the denial of interest.

    Core Issue Before the Bombay High Court

    The principal legal question was:

    From which date does interest under Section 11BB become payable when a refund application is initially rejected but ultimately succeeds before an appellate authority?

    The competing positions were straightforward.

    The petitioner argued that interest should run from the expiry of three months from the date of the original refund application, i.e. from 20 August 2015.

    The Revenue, on the other hand, treated the petitioner’s communication dated 5 January 2026 as the relevant refund claim and contended that interest did not become payable from the original 2015 application.

    The dispute therefore turned upon the correct interpretation of Sections 11B and 11BB.

    Petitioner’s Argument: Interest Follows the Original Refund Application

    Empire Industries relied upon the Supreme Court’s landmark judgment in Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. v. Union of India, 2011 (273) E.L.T. 3 (SC).

    The petitioner argued that once a refund application has been properly filed under Section 11B, the statutory clock under Section 11BB begins to run from that application itself. If the refund is not made within three months, interest becomes payable after the expiry of that period.

    The petitioner also contended that the letter dated 5 January 2026 was merely a continuation or reminder of the original refund claim of 20 May 2015 and could not be treated as a fresh refund application.

    Accordingly, the petitioner sought interest from 20 August 2015, being three months after the original application, until actual payment of the refund on 23 June 2026.

    Revenue’s Stand

    The Revenue argued that the refund became payable only as a consequence of the favourable CESTAT order dated 8 December 2025.

    According to the Department, the assessee’s letter dated 5 January 2026 should be regarded as the refund claim arising out of that appellate order.

    The Revenue further relied upon Section 11BB to contend that interest would become payable only where the refund remained unpaid beyond the applicable statutory period.

    The practical effect of the Revenue’s interpretation would have been to deny interest for the long period between 2015 and the appellate success in 2025.

    Bombay High Court Relies on Ranbaxy Laboratories

    The High Court rejected the Revenue’s interpretation.

    The Court relied squarely upon the binding Supreme Court decision in Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. and reiterated the legal position that Section 11BB becomes operational when a refund sanctioned under Section 11B is not paid within three months from the date of receipt of the refund application.

    The Court reproduced the principle that the statutory explanation deeming an appellate or court order to be an order under Section 11B(2) does not postpone the date from which interest becomes payable.

    This is the central ratio of the judgment.

    The Crucial Principle: Appellate Success Does Not Reset the Interest Clock

    The Court specifically held that interest is payable:

    from the expiry of three months from the date of filing the refund application until the date of actual refund, and not from the date of the favourable order of the Appellate Tribunal.

    This distinction is extremely important.

    Where an assessee files a valid refund claim and the Department rejects it, the subsequent appellate order merely establishes that the refund was legally due. It does not convert the appellate order into a fresh starting point for calculating interest.

    In effect, if the Department wrongly retains money for years and the assessee ultimately succeeds in appeal, the period spent in litigation cannot automatically be excluded while calculating statutory interest.

    5 January 2026 Letter Was Only a Reminder, Not a Fresh Refund Claim

    The Bombay High Court also expressly rejected the Department’s attempt to treat the petitioner’s letter dated 5 January 2026 as a new refund claim.

    The Court held that the original refund application had been filed on 20 May 2015, while the claim was ultimately allowed by the Appellate Tribunal on 8 December 2025.

    The subsequent communication of 5 January 2026 was therefore only a continuation/reminder of the original refund claim and could not be treated as a separate refund application under Section 11B.

    This finding is important for tax administration because departments sometimes treat post-appeal representations as fresh refund applications, thereby attempting to restart the statutory interest period.

    The judgment makes clear that such an approach cannot be sustained where the refund arises from an earlier valid application.

    How Section 11BB Operates

    Section 11BB is a statutory compensation mechanism for delay in granting refund.

    The Bombay High Court, following Ranbaxy Laboratories, treated the provision as creating a clear temporal rule:

    Refund application received β†’ three-month statutory period β†’ interest starts thereafter if refund remains unpaid.

    The fact that the refund claim may subsequently travel through adjudication, appeal or judicial proceedings does not alter the original date of application for the purpose of calculating interest.

    The Court’s reasoning also reflects the purpose of Section 11BB: to compensate the taxpayer for the period during which money lawfully refundable remains with the State beyond the statutory time limit.

    Why the Revenue’s Interpretation Was Rejected

    The Department’s interpretation effectively sought to shift the starting point for interest from 2015 to 2026.

    Had that argument succeeded, an assessee could theoretically wait several years for final appellate relief and still receive little or no interest for the period during which the Government retained the disputed amount.

    The High Court found this inconsistent with the interpretation already settled by the Supreme Court.

    The Court described the Department’s treatment of the 5 January 2026 communication as a refund claim as a β€œserious error.”

    Final Order of the Bombay High Court

    The Court allowed the writ petition.

    It quashed the Order-in-Original dated 24 March 2026 to the extent that it denied statutory interest on the sanctioned refund amount of β‚Ή53,05,173.

    The Assistant Commissioner was directed to pay the amount together with statutory interest:

    from 20 August 2015 until the date of actual refund, and the payment was directed to be made within eight weeks from the date of the High Court’s order.

    Key Legal Principles Emerging from the Judgment

    IssueBombay High Court’s ruling
    Original refund applicationFiled on 20 May 2015
    Statutory interest provisionSection 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944
    Service tax applicabilityThrough Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994
    When interest beginsAfter expiry of three months from receipt of original refund application
    Relevant interest date in this case20 August 2015
    CESTAT order8 December 2025
    Effect of appellate orderDoes not restart or postpone the interest period
    Letter dated 5 January 2026Merely a continuation/reminder, not a fresh refund application
    Refund amountβ‚Ή53,05,173
    High Court directionStatutory interest from 20 August 2015 till actual refund
    Time granted for complianceEight weeks
    Governing precedentRanbaxy Laboratories Ltd. v. Union of India

    Importance for Service Tax and Central Excise Refund Disputes

    Although the dispute arose in the context of the erstwhile service tax regime, the judgment remains highly relevant to legacy indirect tax litigation.

    A large number of service tax and central excise matters continue to remain in appellate proceedings even after the introduction of GST. In such cases, successful assessees frequently face a second round of dispute after winning the substantive appeal: the Department releases the principal refund but disputes the period for which interest is payable.

    The Bombay High Court’s decision reinforces that interest is not dependent upon the date on which the Department finally accepts the assessee’s legal position.

    Where the original refund application was validly filed, the statutory interest period must ordinarily be traced back to that application.

    Importance of the Ranbaxy Laboratories Principle

    The judgment is also a strong reaffirmation of the binding nature of Ranbaxy Laboratories.

    The Supreme Court had already settled that the explanation to Section 11BB, which deems an appellate or court order to be an order under Section 11B(2), does not alter the starting date for interest.

    The Bombay High Court applied that principle directly and rejected an administrative interpretation inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling.

    For taxpayers, this significantly strengthens claims in cases where refunds are ultimately granted after appellate litigation.

    Practical Takeaway for Assessees

    Businesses pursuing refunds under legacy central excise or service tax provisions should carefully preserve:

    • the original refund application;
    • proof of the date on which it was received by the Department;
    • acknowledgement or diary number;
    • adjudication and appellate orders;
    • subsequent correspondence seeking implementation; and
    • proof of the actual date on which refund was credited.

    The most critical document for Section 11BB purposes is often not the final appellate order, but the original refund application and its date of receipt.

    That date can determine several years’ worth of statutory interest.

    Practical Takeaway for Tax Authorities

    The decision also serves as a reminder to tax authorities that a post-appeal implementation letter should not automatically be treated as a fresh refund claim.

    Where the assessee had already filed a refund application and merely succeeds in getting that claim recognised through appeal, the subsequent letter ordinarily does not erase the original statutory timeline.

    The refund machinery cannot be interpreted in a way that financially disadvantages an assessee merely because the Department’s initial rejection was subsequently overturned.

    Broader Principle: The Government Cannot Benefit from Delayed Refund Adjudication

    Beyond the wording of Section 11BB, the decision embodies a broader fiscal principle.

    When money ultimately found refundable has remained with the Government beyond the statutory period, interest compensates the taxpayer for the delay.

    If interest were calculated only from the date of the final appellate order, the State could retain funds throughout prolonged litigation without compensating the assessee for that period.

    The Bombay High Court’s application of Ranbaxy Laboratories prevents that consequence and reinforces discipline in the administration of statutory refunds.

    Conclusion

    The Bombay High Court’s ruling in Empire Industries Limited v. Union of India & Others is an important reaffirmation of taxpayer rights in delayed refund cases.

    The Court has made it clear that the statutory interest clock under Section 11BB ordinarily begins after three months from the date of the original refund application and does not wait for the assessee to ultimately succeed before the Appellate Tribunal.

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