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  • Bombay HC Holds Secured Creditor Has Priority Over Government Dues; State’s Re. 1 Auction Declared Null and Void

    Bombay HC Holds Secured Creditor Has Priority Over Government Dues; State’s Re. 1 Auction Declared Null and Void

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 14.09.2026

    Bombay HC Holds Secured Creditor Has Priority Over Government Dues; State’s Re. 1 Auction Declared Null and Void

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Madhumita Jha. The views expressed are based on her interpretation of the law. She can be reached at her email id jhamadhumita27@gmail.com .  

    In a significant ruling concerning the priority of secured creditors over government dues, the Bombay High Court has ruled in favour of Indian Overseas Bank, holding that merely attaching a property for recovery of State dues, without completing the legally required proclamation and registration requirements, cannot give such government dues priority over the rights of a secured creditor under the SARFAESI Act, 2002.

    The Division Bench of Justices Manish Pitale and Shreeram V. Shirsat consequently quashed an auction conducted by State authorities on 7 April 2018, under which mortgaged land was transferred to the Government for a nominal consideration of Re. 1. The Court also directed consequential deletion of the Government’s mutation entry and restoration of the Bank’s rights over the property.

    Indian Overseas Bank Challenged State Auction of Mortgaged Land

    • Indian Overseas Bank approached the Bombay High Court as a secured creditor, seeking to quash the auction sale dated 7 April 2018 concerning land bearing Survey No. 43/1/B. It also sought restoration of rightful control and possession of the land.
    • The Bank had sanctioned financial facilities to the borrower in 2007, secured through an equitable mortgage created by deposit of the original title deeds. The charge was registered before the Registrar of Companies on 31 January 2007. Following repayment defaults, the borrower’s account was classified as a Non-Performing Asset (NPA) on 31 December 2010.
    • Indian Overseas Bank thereafter initiated proceedings under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) and issued a demand notice under Section 13(2) on 28 September 2012. It subsequently issued a possession notice under Section 13(4) on 20 December 2012.

    Bank Subsequently Sold Secured Assets Under SARFAESI

    • The Bank eventually auctioned the mortgaged property on 26 November 2021 in favour of M/s Kaushal Metal and Steel Private Limited and M/s TGK Special Steel Private Limited.
    • A sale certificate was issued on 22 February 2022 and possession was handed over. However, the Bank encountered difficulties in handing over control of the parcel corresponding to Survey No. 43/1/B.
    • Upon examining the revenue records, the Bank discovered discrepancies between the survey numbers appearing in the Talathi’s records and those contained in the original title deeds.
    • Further investigation revealed that old Survey No. 46/1/2 had been renumbered as 43/1/B, without any change in area. The Bank also discovered that the property had already been auctioned by the Tahsildar and that the State of Maharashtra’s name had been entered in the revenue records.

    Government Sought Recovery of β‚Ή2.68 Crore as Land Revenue Arrears

    • The State proceedings arose from dues of approximately β‚Ή2,68,99,000 allegedly owed by the borrower to the District Industries Centre.
    • The Collector, Raigad, had directed the Tahsildar to recover these dues as arrears of land revenue. The State authorities thereafter claimed to have seized the property and recorded an encumbrance for β‚Ή2.68 crore in the “other rights” column of the 7/12 extracts.
    • An auction was scheduled for 7 April 2018. Since there were no other bidders, State officials participated on behalf of the Government and the land was purchased for a nominal price of Re. 1. A purchase certificate was subsequently issued in the name of the Government of Maharashtra under Rule 14-B of the Maharashtra Realisation of Land Revenue Rules, 1967.
    • This ultimately created the conflict between the State’s recovery proceedings and the Bank’s pre-existing secured interest.

    Indian Overseas Bank Claimed Priority Under Section 26E of SARFAESI Act

    • Indian Overseas Bank argued that it held the first and prior charge over the mortgaged property and that the State-conducted auction was void ab initio and contrary to the SARFAESI framework.
    • The Bank specifically relied upon Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act, under which a secured creditor’s dues are accorded priority over other debts and over revenues, taxes, cesses and other rates payable to the Central Government, State Government or local authorities.
    • The Bank also produced its CERSAI registration certificate, which showed registration of the security interest on 14 February 2015, and relied heavily on the Full Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in Jalgaon Janta Sahakari Bank Limited v. Joint Commissioner of Sales Tax.

    Bombay HC Relies on Full Bench Ruling in Jalgaon Janta Sahakari Bank

    • The Division Bench extensively relied upon the Bombay High Court Full Bench ruling in Jalgaon Janta Sahakari Bank Limited v. Joint Commissioner of Sales Tax.
    • The Full Bench had explained that the expression “priority” means the right to enforce one claim in preference to others. It held that, having regard to the non-obstante provisions concerning secured creditors, their dues have priority over other dues, including revenues, taxes, cesses and rates payable to governmental authorities.
    • The judgment therefore examined whether the State had taken the necessary legal steps capable of defeating or taking precedence over the Bank’s secured interest.

    Mere Attachment Is Not Enough: Proclamation Must Follow Statutory Procedure

    1. A particularly important part of the judgment concerns the distinction between merely attaching a property and completing the statutory procedure necessary to make that attachment effective against competing secured interests.
    2. The Full Bench precedent relied upon by the Court required compliance not merely with attachment requirements but also with the prescribed proclamation procedure under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code and the Maharashtra Realisation of Land Revenue Rules.
    3. The Court reiterated that simply ordering an attachment is insufficient. Before an attached property is sold, a proclamation has to be issued in the prescribed form and publicly announced in the manner contemplated by law.
    4. This procedural requirement became decisive in Indian Overseas Bank’s case.

    State Failed to Show CERSAI Registration or Proper Proclamation

    • The Bombay High Court found that the State authorities’ affidavit did not state that the Tahsildar had registered the State’s claim with CERSAI.
    • More importantly, the State’s affidavit did not demonstrate that after attaching the property, the authorities had taken the further legally prescribed steps for proclamationβ€”such as announcement by beating of drum or other customary mode, affixing the proclamation on a conspicuous part of the property, or displaying it on the notice board of the concerned Talathi office.

    The Court therefore held that:

    Simply attaching the property, without taking the prescribed steps towards proclamation for recovery of dues, would not give those State dues priority over the dues of a secured creditor under the SARFAESI Act.

    Government Encumbrance Cannot Prevail Over Bank’s Secured Charge

    • Having applied the Full Bench decision, the Court held that there was no reason to deny Indian Overseas Bank the benefit of the principles laid down therein.
    • Since the Bank was admittedly a secured creditor seeking recovery under the SARFAESI Act, the Court concluded that the encumbrance/charge entered by the State authorities could not prevail over the Bank’s secured charge.
    • The Court expressly clarified that the State authorities were not barred from recovering their dues altogether.
    • They remained free to recover the amount in accordance with law. However, as far as priority was concerned, the Bank’s dues as secured creditor clearly ranked ahead of the dues claimed by the State respondents.

    Auction Sale to Government for Re. 1 Quashed

    • The High Court consequently allowed Indian Overseas Bank’s writ petition.
    • It quashed the 7 April 2018 auction sale relating to Survey No. 43/1/B and declared the transfer of the land to the concerned State respondent null and void.
    • The Court further directed restoration of rightful control and possession of the propertyβ€”old Survey No. 46/1/2, subsequently renumbered as Survey No. 43/1/Bβ€”in favour of Indian Overseas Bank as secured creditor.

    Government Mutation Entry to Be Deleted Within Four Weeks

    • The High Court also ordered consequential correction of the revenue records.
    • The State authorities were directed to take steps to delete Mutation Entry No. 1959 dated 16 April 2018, through which the Government of Maharashtra’s name had been entered in the occupant’s column of the 7/12 extract.
    • These consequential steps were directed to be completed within four weeks from the date of the order.

    Auction Purchasers to Get Clear Title Free From State Encumbrance

    • The ruling also has direct implications for the purchasers who acquired the secured asset through the Bank’s SARFAESI auction.
    • The High Court observed that, subject to other compliance requirements under the SARFAESI Act, the purchasers M/s Kaushal Metal and Steel Private Limited and M/s TGK Special Steel Private Limited would get clear title free from the encumbrances claimed by the State respondents.
    • This aspect of the judgment reinforces the importance of priority rules not only for banks but also for purchasers of secured assets through statutory auctions.

    State Can Recover From Surplus or Other Assets

    • The judgment does not extinguish the Government’s underlying claim against the borrower.
    • The Court directed that if any surplus remains after Indian Overseas Bank’s dues are satisfied, the Bank must notify the State authorities, which would then be entitled to the residual proceeds, if any.
    • The State and the Collector’s office were also left free to proceed against any other assets or properties belonging to the borrower in accordance with law.

    Significance of the Judgment

    • The ruling is significant for banks, financial institutions, secured creditors, insolvency and recovery professionals and purchasers of secured assets, because it reinforces the statutory priority accorded to duly registered security interests.
    • At the same time, the judgment makes an important qualification: a Government department’s claim does not disappear merely because a secured creditor has priority. Rather, the question is one of ranking and enforceability against the particular secured asset.
    • The decision also demonstrates that an entry in revenue records or a bare attachment cannot automatically defeat a secured creditor’s rights. Where the law requires attachment, public proclamation and other procedural steps, those requirements must be demonstrated before a competing claim of priority can be sustained.

    Key Takeaway

    The Bombay High Court’s ruling establishes that State Government dues cannot take priority over a secured creditor merely because the State attached the mortgaged property. Where the prescribed proclamation procedure was not completed and the State’s claim was not shown to have been registered with CERSAI, the secured creditor’s statutory priority prevails.

    Accordingly, Indian Overseas Bank succeeded in the writ petition. Its secured charge was held to have priority over the State’s dues, the State’s 2018 auction was quashed, the Re. 1 transfer was declared null and void, and consequential correction of the revenue records was ordered.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Bombay High Court

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  • Karnataka High Court Dismisses State’s Appeal Against Acquittal; Finds POCSO Victim’s Age Not Proved as Required by Law

    Karnataka High Court Dismisses State’s Appeal Against Acquittal; Finds POCSO Victim’s Age Not Proved as Required by Law

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 14.09.2026

    Karnataka High Court Dismisses State’s Appeal Against Acquittal; Finds POCSO Victim’s Age Not Proved as Required by Law

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate G Sridharamurthy. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id sriadv3@gmail.com . 

    The Karnataka High Court has dismissed an appeal filed by the State challenging the acquittal of an accused charged under Sections 376 and 450 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act), holding that an appellate court cannot interfere with an acquittal merely because another view of the evidence is possible.

    The Division Bench of Justice K.S. Mudagal and Justice M.G.S. Kamal found no perversity or illegality in the Trial Court’s appreciation of the evidence and consequently refused to overturn the acquittal.

    State Challenged Acquittal in POCSO Case

    • The State of Karnataka approached the High Court under Section 378(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, challenging the judgment dated 16 November 2016 passed by the III Additional Sessions Judge and Special Court for POCSO cases, Tumkur, in Special Case No.120/2013.
    • The Trial Court had acquitted the accused of offences punishable under Sections 450 and 376 IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act.
    • The prosecution case arose from Crime No.34/2013 registered by Madhugiri Police. The prosecution alleged that the victim was 15 years old on the date of the incident and that the accused had entered her house and committed penetrative sexual assault.

    Trial Court Acquitted Accused

    • During the trial, the prosecution examined 13 witnesses, produced Exhibits P1 to P9 and marked material objects. The accused denied the charges and did not lead separate defence evidence after his examination under Section 313 CrPC.
    • The Trial Court ultimately acquitted him, principally finding that the prosecution had failed to establish that the victim was below 18 years of age in accordance with law and had also failed to prove the allegation of forcible penetrative sexual assault.
    • The State challenged these findings before the Karnataka High Court.

    Proof of Victim’s Age Was Essential for Section 4 POCSO Charge

    • One of the central issues before the High Court was whether the prosecution had legally established the age of the victim.
    • The Court observed that, to sustain the charge under Section 4 of the POCSO Act, the prosecution was required to establish that the victim was below 18 years of age on the date of the alleged incident.
    • Similarly, to prove the charge under Section 376 IPC, the prosecution was required, in the context of the charges framed in this case, to establish the alleged forcible penetrative sexual assault. The prosecution was also required to prove the alleged criminal trespass into the house.

    Karnataka HC Relies on Supreme Court’s Mahadeo Judgment on Age Determination

    • For determining the proper method of proving age, the High Court relied upon the Supreme Court decision in Mahadeo S/o Kerba Maske v. State of Maharashtra & Another, (2013) 14 SCC 637.
    • The judgment referred to the hierarchy prescribed under Rule 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 for age determination.
    • Under that framework, the relevant evidence is to be considered in sequence: matriculation or equivalent certificate, if available; in its absence, the date-of-birth certificate from the first school attended; thereafter, a birth certificate issued by the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat; and only when such documentary evidence is unavailable may medical opinion be resorted to.
    • The High Court observed that the Supreme Court in Mahadeo had held that the same yardstick could appropriately be followed by courts while determining the age of a victim.

    Matriculation Certificate Not Produced Despite Victim Studying in SSLC

    • Applying this principle, the High Court found a significant deficiency in the prosecution evidence.
    • The complaint itself stated that the victim was studying in SSLC at the relevant time. Yet, the prosecution did not produce her matriculation certificate. Nor was it the prosecution’s case that she had dropped out of school.
    • Instead, the prosecution relied upon the evidence of the Headmaster of Mahatma Gandhi Memorial Girl’s High School, Madhugiri, and a certificate marked as Ex.P8.
    • However, the certificate had itself been prepared on the basis of a transfer certificate submitted at the time of admission to that school, and the Headmaster stated that he did not know who had written the underlying transfer certificate.
    • The High Court consequently held that this evidence did not satisfy the requirement contemplated under Rule 12(3) as explained in Mahadeo.

    No Birth Certificate or Ossification Test Produced

    • The Court further noted that the Investigating Officer had neither produced a birth certificate issued by a municipal authority or panchayat nor referred the victim for an ossification test.
    • There was also no explanation for the failure to produce the required documentary evidence.
    • The High Court therefore agreed with the Trial Court that the prosecution had failed to establish that the victim was below 18 years of age on the date of the incident.
    • This finding was crucial to the prosecution’s charge under Section 4 of the POCSO Act.

    High Court Reiterates Limited Scope of Appeal Against Acquittal

    • The Division Bench then examined whether the Trial Court’s findings concerning the IPC offences warranted interference.
    • For this purpose, the Court relied upon the Supreme Court’s judgment in Prem Singh v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 88.
    • The principle reiterated by the High Court was that where a conclusion regarding the innocence of an accused is reasonably possible on the evidence and materials on record, the appellate court should not disturb the Trial Court’s acquittal merely because it might, on re-appreciation, prefer another view.
    • The Karnataka High Court summarised the position by observing that merely because two views are possible, an acquittal cannot be interfered with unless the judgment suffers from patent illegality or perversity.

    Delay in Complaint and FIR Considered

    • The Court also considered the prosecution’s explanation regarding the timing of the complaint.
    • The alleged incident was stated to have occurred on 6 March 2013 at around 6:30 p.m., whereas the complaint was lodged on 9 March 2013 at 7:00 p.m. The FIR reached the Trial Court on 10 March 2013 at 6:50 p.m.
    • The complainant explained that he had waited for his wife to return from Bengaluru before lodging the complaint. However, the High Court observed that the evidence indicated that the complainant had already informed his wife over the phone shortly after the incident.
    • The Court therefore found the delay relevant in the overall assessment of the prosecution case, particularly as the delay in forwarding the FIR was also not explained.

    Victim’s Testimony and Medical Evidence Raised Further Doubts

    • The High Court also considered the victim’s testimony during cross-examination. The judgment records that she stated that, apart from the accused hugging her and holding her hands, he did not do anything else to her, and that she had informed her father and uncle about those acts when they returned home.
    • The Court further noted that the medical examination was conducted within four days of the alleged incident and that the medical evidence recorded no traces of recent sexual intercourse.
    • Additionally, no independent witnesses were examined regarding the incident, while the principal prosecution witnesses were members of the same family.
    • These circumstances were considered cumulatively rather than as standalone rules about how sexual-offence allegations must be proved.

    Evidence of Political Rivalry Also Considered

    • The accused had contended that he was falsely implicated because of political rivalry with the victim’s father.
    • Although the father denied belonging to a political party, the victim stated in cross-examination that her father and uncle were JDS party workers, whereas the accused belonged to the Congress party.
    • The High Court considered this inconsistency relevant in assessing the Trial Court’s conclusion that the charges had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

    Subsequent Marriage Between Accused and Victim Not Disclosed During Trial

    • The judgment also records an unusual subsequent development.
    • Documents from M.C. No.82/2022 showed that the victim later sought divorce from the accused on grounds of desertion and cruelty. According to those proceedings, she and the accused had married on 14 June 2015, had a daughter from the marriage and lived together for about two years.
    • The High Court observed that the charge sheet had been filed on 24 May 2013 and the Trial Court judgment was delivered on 16 November 2016, meaning the marriage occurred while the criminal trial was pending.
    • The fact of their marriage had not been disclosed before the Trial Court. The High Court treated this as a suppression of a material fact and as an additional circumstance supporting its decision not to interfere with the acquittal.

    No Perversity or Illegality in Trial Court’s Acquittal

    • After re-appreciating the material, the Karnataka High Court concluded that the Trial Court had reached a possible view on the evidence.
    • The Division Bench found no perversity or illegality in the acquittal and reiterated that the existence of another possible interpretation of the evidence does not by itself permit an appellate court to reverse an acquittal.
    • Accordingly, the State’s appeal was dismissed, and the acquittal of the accused remained undisturbed.

    Judgments Referred

    The Karnataka High Court principally relied upon two Supreme Court decisions:

    1. Mahadeo S/o Kerba Maske v. State of Maharashtra & Another, (2013) 14 SCC 637 β€” concerning the legally recognised hierarchy of evidence for determination of the age of a juvenile/victim.
    2. Prem Singh v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 88 β€” concerning the limited scope of appellate interference with an acquittal under Section 378 CrPC.

    Key Takeaway

    The Karnataka High Court reaffirmed two important criminal-law principles. First, where minority is an essential ingredient for application of the POCSO Act, the prosecution must prove the victim’s age through legally acceptable evidence in accordance with the prescribed hierarchy. Second, an acquittal enjoys substantial protection in appellate proceedings: where the Trial Court’s view is reasonably possible on the evidence, the High Court cannot reverse it simply because another view may also be possible.

    In the present case, the prosecution failed to satisfactorily establish the victim’s minority through the prescribed evidence, while the Trial Court’s assessment of the testimony, medical evidence and surrounding circumstances was found to be a possible view. The State therefore failed in its appeal and the accused’s acquittal was upheld.

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    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Karnataka High Court

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  • Supreme Court Sets Aside Compulsory Retirement of Indian Trade Service Officer; Awards β‚Ή15 Lakh in Costs and Compensation

    Supreme Court Sets Aside Compulsory Retirement of Indian Trade Service Officer; Awards β‚Ή15 Lakh in Costs and Compensation

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 12.09.2026

    Supreme Court Sets Aside Compulsory Retirement of Indian Trade Service Officer; Awards β‚Ή15 Lakh in Costs and Compensation

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Madhumita Jha. The views expressed are based on her interpretation of the law. She can be reached at her email id jhamadhumita27@gmail.com .  

    In a significant ruling concerning the Government’s power to compulsorily retire public servants under Fundamental Rule 56(j), the Supreme Court has set aside the premature retirement of former Indian Trade Service officer S.S. Das, holding that the action suffered from manifest contradiction and was vitiated by malice in law. The Court found the case to be one warranting judicial intervention on grounds of arbitrariness, perversity and mala fides.

    The Supreme Court not only restored all service benefits that would have accrued to Das had he not been prematurely retired, but also directed payment of β‚Ή6 lakh as costs and β‚Ή9 lakh as compensation for loss of reputation.

    Background of the Case

    • S.S. Das joined the Indian Trade Service (ITS) in 1989 and rose through the ranks, serving in senior positions including Deputy Director General of Foreign Trade, Joint Director General of Foreign Trade and Additional Director in the Directorate General of Anti-Dumping. He was placed in the Senior Administrative Grade at Joint Secretary level in November 2017 and was promoted on a regular basis on 27 February 2018.
    • However, barely a few months after his promotion, the Government passed an order dated 10 May 2018, compulsorily retiring him under FR 56(j) in public interest, before he reached his normal age of superannuation.
    • Das challenged the decision before the Central Administrative Tribunal. The CAT dismissed his application, reasoning that judicial review of an FR 56(j) decision did not extend to examining the adequacy or sufficiency of material before the competent authority. The Delhi High Court subsequently declined to interfere, leading to the appeal before the Supreme Court.

    Supreme Court Examines Entire Service Record

    • The Supreme Court framed the central issue as whether the compulsory retirement was based upon material capable of sustaining the Government’s satisfaction and whether there was a rational nexus between the material relied upon and the conclusion that premature retirement was required in public interest.
    • A crucial aspect of the Court’s examination was Das’s service record. His ACRs/APARs showed that he had consistently received high assessments over a substantial part of his career.
    • The Court noted that the officer was consistently graded β€œOutstanding” or β€œVery Good” from 1994 to 2008-09, followed by high numerical APAR gradings. Significantly, he had also been found suitable for promotion to the Senior Administrative Grade and promoted to the level of Joint Secretary shortly before the decision to compulsorily retire him.
    • This chronology assumed considerable importance because the Review Committee met on 27 November 2017, shortly after his promotion, and there was no identifiable intervening act of misconduct between his promotion and subsequent compulsory retirement that could reasonably explain the dramatic reversal in the Government’s assessment of his suitability for continued service.

    Unsubstantiated Allegations Could Not Override Service Record

    • The Government relied substantially upon a confidential note dated 30 March 2017 relating to Das’s tenure in the Directorate General of Anti-Dumping. The note referred to allegations made by representatives of domestic industry regarding demands for favours.
    • However, the note itself acknowledged that there was no evidence supporting those allegations and not even a written complaint.
    • The Review Committee also relied upon an APAR entry for 2014-15 stating that there was β€œroom for improvement” in relation to integrity and upon an earlier 1998-99 entry noting that complaints had been received.
    • The Supreme Court’s examination of the actual record, however, revealed that the 1998-99 entry itself recorded that β€œno substance” had been found in those complaints. The service records over the years otherwise contained favourable assessments regarding integrity and quality of work.

    Promotion Does Not Automatically Wipe Out Past Adverse Materialβ€”But It Matters

    • The judgment importantly clarifies the relationship between an officer’s promotion and the Government’s subsequent exercise of power under FR 56(j).
    • The Supreme Court did not hold that promotion automatically wipes out every earlier adverse entry. Instead, it held that the entire service record must be evaluated, with appropriate weight being given to the officer’s immediate past.
    • The Court observed that where the same departmental machinery had examined the officer’s record and found him fit for promotion to the higher position of Joint Secretary, a subsequent conclusion that his continuation in service was no longer in public interest required something more substantial than a general invocation of β€œquestionable integrity.”
    • Thus, a recent promotion does not grant immunity from review under FR 56(j), but it remains a highly relevant circumstance which the reviewing authority must meaningfully consider.

    Supreme Court Criticises Selective Reliance on Precedents

    • Another notable aspect of the judgment is the Court’s criticism of the Review Committee’s approach to earlier Supreme Court decisions.
    • The Committee had relied upon precedents including State of Gujarat v. Umedbhai M. Patel, S. Ramachandra Raju v. State of Orissa, K. Kandaswamy v. Union of India, Shyam Lal v. State of U.P., Baikuntha Nath Das v. District Medical Officer, Union of India v. Col. J.N. Sinha and Shivcharan Singh v. State of Mysore.
    • The Supreme Court observed that these precedents had been invoked selectively. According to the Court, the authorities concentrated upon propositions permitting consideration of past adverse material while failing to meaningfully engage with the corresponding safeguardsβ€”particularly the requirement to examine the entire service record, give due weight to recent performance, and appropriately consider subsequent promotion.

    FR 56(j) Power Cannot Be Exercised on Mere Suspicion

    • The Supreme Court reiterated that the Government undoubtedly possesses the power to compulsorily retire an officer in public interest under FR 56(j), and the scope of judicial review of such administrative satisfaction remains limited.
    • For instance, Baikuntha Nath Das v. District Medical Officer, (1992) 2 SCC 299, recognises that courts do not ordinarily act as appellate authorities over compulsory-retirement decisions. Nevertheless, judicial interference remains available where the decision is mala fide, unsupported by evidence or so arbitrary that no reasonable person could have formed the requisite opinion.
    • Applying those principles, the Supreme Court held that FR 56(j) β€œshould not be exercised lightly or in a casual manner.” The material supporting such action must be credible and cogent rather than based merely upon suspicion or conjecture.
    • The Court ultimately characterised the compulsory retirement order as suffering from a β€œmanifest contradiction” and being β€œthoroughly vitiated by malice in law.” It further held that the case disclosed arbitrariness, perversity and mala fides sufficient to warrant judicial interference.

    Delhi High Court and CAT Orders Set Aside

    • The Supreme Court held that the Delhi High Court had failed to properly exercise its constitutional power of judicial review by examining the relevant record from the correct perspective.
    • Consequently, the Court set aside three decisions: the Delhi High Court judgment, the CAT order, and the original compulsory retirement order dated 10 May 2018.
    • Since Das had already attained the age of superannuation, physical reinstatement was no longer possible. The Supreme Court therefore moulded the relief and directed that he should receive all service benefits available in law as though the compulsory retirement order had never been passed. This expressly includes notional promotion if any of his juniors had been promoted during the period he remained out of service.

    Supreme Court Directs DGFT to Give Officer a Farewell With Full Honour

    • In an unusual and significant direction, the Supreme Court ordered that the Director General of Foreign Trade must call S.S. Das back to the office and accord him a farewell β€œwith full honour”, in the manner he would have received upon normal superannuation but for his premature removal from service.
    • The direction reflects the Court’s concern not merely with the financial consequences of the unlawful compulsory retirement but also with restoring the dignity and professional standing of the officer.

    β‚Ή6 Lakh Costs and β‚Ή9 Lakh Compensation for Loss of Reputation

    • The Supreme Court allowed the appeal with β‚Ή6 lakh in costs payable by the Union of India to S.S. Das.
    • Going a step further, the Court awarded an additional β‚Ή9 lakh as compensation for the loss of reputation suffered by him, taking the total costs and compensation component to β‚Ή15 lakh.
    • The Court directed that the service benefits, emoluments, compensation and costs be released within three months.
    • Significantly, the Supreme Court also granted liberty to the Union Government to recover the compensation and costs, in accordance with law, from the officers largely responsible for acting β€œarbitrarily and in a high-handed manner.”

    Why the Judgment Is Significant

    The ruling does not dilute the Government’s statutory power to weed out unsuitable officers under FR 56(j). Rather, it reinforces an equally important limitation: β€œpublic interest” cannot operate as a formula that shields an arbitrary decision from judicial scrutiny.

    A compulsory-retirement decision must bear a rational relationship with the officer’s actual service record. Old or adverse material can be considered, but it cannot be selectively extracted while ignoring a long record of strong performance, recent assessments and promotion to higher responsibility.

    The judgment is therefore particularly important for civil-service jurisprudence because it demonstrates that although the threshold for judicial interference with an FR 56(j) order is high, constitutional courts canβ€”and shouldβ€”intervene where the record reveals arbitrariness, perversity, mala fides or absence of credible supporting material.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Supreme Court

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  • Karnataka High Court Upholds Section 138 NI Act Conviction; Says Unrebutted Statutory Presumption Supports Cheque Dishonour Liability

    Karnataka High Court Upholds Section 138 NI Act Conviction; Says Unrebutted Statutory Presumption Supports Cheque Dishonour Liability

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 12.09.2026

    Karnataka High Court Upholds Section 138 NI Act Conviction; Says Unrebutted Statutory Presumption Supports Cheque Dishonour Liability

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate G Sridharamurthy. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id sriadv3@gmail.com . 

    In an important ruling concerning cheque dishonour under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the Karnataka High Court has upheld the conviction of an accused after finding that the cheque admittedly belonged to him, his signature was undisputed, and he failed to rebut the statutory presumption available to the complainant under Section 139 of the NI Act.

    The High Court, however, partly allowed the revision by setting aside the additional β‚Ή25,000 fine imposed towards defraying the expenses of the State, while leaving the conviction and the remainder of the sentence intact.

    Background of the Case

    • The dispute arose from a complaint filed by M/s MABA Corporate Services Private Limited, a finance company, against G.B. Chandre Gowda under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
    • The trial court convicted the accused and sentenced him to pay a total fine of β‚Ή90 lakh. In default of payment, he was directed to undergo six months’ simple imprisonment. Out of the fine amount, β‚Ή89.75 lakh was directed to be paid to the complainant as compensation, while β‚Ή25,000 was ordered to go to the State.
    • The accused challenged the conviction before the First Appellate Court in Criminal Appeal No. 2149 of 2018. After re-appreciating the evidence, the appellate court dismissed his appeal and confirmed the trial court’s decision. He thereafter approached the Karnataka High Court in revision.

    Accused Contended There Was No Legally Recoverable Debt

    • Before the High Court, the accused principally argued that the cheque in question did not represent any legally recoverable debt and therefore his conviction under Section 138 suffered from legal infirmity and factual error.
    • He additionally challenged the imposition of β‚Ή25,000 towards the expenses of the State and sought interference with the sentence to that extent. The complainant, on the other hand, supported the concurrent findings of the courts below.

    Signature on Cheque Was Not Disputed

    • After examining the record, the Karnataka High Court found that the cheque marked as Ex.P2 belonged to the accused, had been dishonoured, and, importantly, the accused did not dispute his signature on the cheque.
    • According to the complainant, the cheque had been issued towards repayment arising out of loan transactions. The complainant had also produced substantial documentary material to support its claim.
    • This evidence included on-demand promissory notes marked Ex.P14 to Ex.P18, ledger account Ex.P19, statements of account Ex.P20 to Ex.P26 and acknowledgment letters Ex.P27 and Ex.P28. The High Court held that this material was sufficient for the trial magistrate to raise the statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act in favour of the complainant.

    Section 139 Presumption Is Rebuttable, But Accused Must Rebut It

    • The Court acknowledged that the presumption available under Section 139 is rebuttable. The crucial question, therefore, was whether the accused had produced sufficient material to rebut it.
    • The High Court found that he had not.
    • The accused neither entered the witness box nor produced documentary evidence to rebut the statutory presumption. Further, the cross-examination of the complainant’s witness, PW-1, did not bring out sufficient material capable of rebutting the presumption operating in favour of the complainant.
    • This aspect became central to the High Court’s decision to sustain the conviction.

    High Court Refuses to Interfere With Concurrent Conviction

    • Justice V. Srishananda held that the trial magistrate was justified in convicting the accused and directing payment of compensation. The First Appellate Court had also properly re-appreciated the material and affirmed the conviction.
    • The High Court emphasised the limited scope of revisional jurisdiction and held that there was no ground warranting annulment of the concurrent orders of conviction.
    • The decision therefore reinforces that revisional jurisdiction is not intended to provide another unrestricted opportunity to reassess factual findings when the trial and appellate courts have concurrently evaluated the evidence and the conclusions do not disclose a sufficient legal ground for interference.

    β‚Ή25,000 Fine Payable to State Set Aside

    • Although the conviction was upheld, the High Court found merit in one limited aspect of the accused’s challenge.
    • The trial court had directed that β‚Ή25,000 out of the total fine should be paid towards defraying the expenses of the State. The High Court held that this part of the sentence required interference because the dispute was essentially private between the parties and no State machinery was involved.
    • Accordingly, the β‚Ή25,000 component payable to the State was set aside.

    Conviction and β‚Ή89.75 Lakh Compensation Remain Intact

    • The Karnataka High Court consequently allowed the revision petition only in part.
    • The conviction of G.B. Chandre Gowda for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was maintained. Only the β‚Ή25,000 fine earmarked for State expenses was removed, while the rest of the sentence remained unaltered.
    • The Court further directed that the amount already deposited could be withdrawn by the complainant upon due identification.

    Legal Significance

    The judgment highlights an important practical aspect of Section 138 litigation. Once foundational facts are established and the statutory presumption under Section 139 becomes operative, merely asserting that no legally enforceable debt existed may not be sufficient. The accused must bring material capable of rebutting that presumption.

    In the present case, the admitted signature on the dishonoured cheque, coupled with promissory notes, ledger records, statements of account and acknowledgment letters, supported the complainant’s case. In the absence of contrary evidence from the accused, the High Court found no justification for disturbing the concurrent conviction.

    At the same time, the ruling demonstrates that a revisional court may still interfere with a specific and severable component of the sentence even where the underlying conviction is otherwise found to be legally sustainable.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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    Source: Karnataka High Court

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  • Bombay High Court: Temporary Access Over Government Land Cannot Be Converted Into Exclusive Private Right by Erecting Gates

    Bombay High Court: Temporary Access Over Government Land Cannot Be Converted Into Exclusive Private Right by Erecting Gates

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 11.09.2026

    Bombay High Court: Temporary Access Over Government Land Cannot Be Converted Into Exclusive Private Right by Erecting Gates

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Madhumita Jha. The views expressed are based on her interpretation of the law. She can be reached at her email id jhamadhumita27@gmail.com .  

    The Bombay High Court has held that a housing society permitted to use Government land as an access route cannot convert such permission into an exclusive private right by erecting gates and restricting access to others. The Court upheld the State’s action directing removal of gates erected by The Deccan Co-operative Housing Society Limited, while protecting the Society’s continued right to use the access along with others.

    Justice Arun R. Pedneker partly allowed the Society’s writ petition challenging the order dated 17 March 2026 passed by the Resident Deputy Collector, Mumbai Suburban District.

    Dispute Over Gate and Access Road

    • The dispute concerned a strip of land being used as an access route by the petitioner-Society. The Society challenged the Collector’s direction to remove gates installed on Government land and the subsequent attempts by officials to remove the gate.
    • According to the Society, the gate and pathway had remained in its exclusive and uninterrupted possession and use for more than 45 years. It contended that the authorities could not remove the gate without notice, hearing or following due process of law.
    • The dispute also arose against the backdrop of Civil Suit No. 287 of 2025, instituted by the Society concerning its claimed rights over a garden/open space. The Bombay High Court had earlier granted interim protection against coercive action in relation to that suit property.

    Access Was Originally Granted Only as a Temporary Arrangement

    • Examining historical documents, the High Court found that the Society’s plot had earlier been landlocked because a proposed 44-feet-wide Development Plan road had not yet been constructed.
    • The Municipal Corporation had therefore permitted a 30-feet-wide temporary access through Government land. Importantly, the permission was subject to a specific condition that the Society would discontinue the temporary access once the Development Plan road was constructed. The Society was also required to construct and maintain the temporary access at its own cost.
    • The Court noted that the 44-feet D.P. road had subsequently been completed and was being used by the Society.

    Access Strip Belongs to Government, Not Housing Society

    • After considering the maps and communications placed on record, the High Court concluded that the disputed strip was Government-owned land and did not form part of the land allotted to the Society in 1959.
    • The Court found that the land had been maintained as an open access connecting the D.P. road on one side with the public road on the other. By installing a gate, the Society had attempted to use the access exclusively and exclude other persons.
    • The Court consequently rejected the Society’s claim to exclusive use of the access.

    Constructing Road Does Not Create Exclusive Right Over Government Land

    • The High Court made an important distinction between a right to use an access and a right to possess the land exclusively.
    • The Society could not claim exclusive control merely because it had constructed a bitumen road over the strip. The Court held that Government land kept as an open access could not be appropriated for the Society’s exclusive use.
    • Justice Pedneker observed that the Society had no right to erect a gate over the access road because the land belonged to the Government and the original permission merely enabled the Society to use it as an access.

    Removal of Gate Does Not Amount to Dispossession

    • The Society relied upon the requirement of notice and due process under Section 53 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, arguing that even an unauthorised occupant of Government land could not be summarily dispossessed.
    • The High Court distinguished the precedent relied upon by the Society. It observed that the present case did not involve taking possession of land that had been granted to the Society. Rather, the Society had only been permitted to use Government land for access.
    • By removing the gate, the Collector had not terminated the Society’s access or dispossessed it from a granted property. The Society remained entitled to use the road; removal of the gate merely prevented it from excluding others.
    • The Court therefore held that the direction to remove the gate and keep the access open to everyone did not warrant interference.

    Collector’s Finding of β€œUnauthorised Use” Corrected

    • The High Court, however, did not accept every observation made by the Collector.
    • It specifically found incorrect the Collector’s observation that the Society was unauthorisedly using the road over Government land. The Court clarified that the road had, in fact, been used with the permission of the Municipal Corporation.
    • Thus, while the Society had no right to install gates and claim exclusive access, its underlying use of the access itself was not unauthorised.

    Public Access Must Remain Open

    • The Court emphasised the importance of protecting public spaces and access routes, particularly in densely populated areas.
    • It held that the Government land should remain accessible both to the petitioner-Society and to other persons. Since the Society had never been granted exclusive possession, installation of gates could not be used to transform a limited access right into exclusive control over Government property.
    • At the same time, the High Court imposed an important safeguard: the State cannot grant exclusive use of the access road to any other party either.
    • The access must remain open to the Society as well as others. Further, if the State proposes any action interfering with the Society’s existing access, appropriate notice would have to be issued.

    Writ Petition Partly Allowed

    • The Bombay High Court ultimately declined to interfere with the State’s direction for removal of the gates. However, it protected the Society’s continued non-exclusive access and clarified that the Government could not confer exclusive use of the road upon another party.
    • Accordingly, Writ Petition No. 7981 of 2026 was partly allowed.

    Key Legal Takeaway

    The judgment draws a clear distinction between permission to use Government land as an access and possession or ownership of that land. Long-standing use, expenditure on constructing or maintaining a road, or physical installation of gates does not by itself convert a permissive access into an exclusive proprietary right.

    At the same time, the ruling protects the legitimate access originally granted to the Society: the Government may keep the road open to the public, but it cannot arbitrarily stop the Society’s access or confer exclusive use upon another private party.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Bombay High Court

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  • Karnataka High Court Sets Aside Bank Account Defreezing Order; Says Banks Must Be Heard Before Release of Frozen Funds

    Karnataka High Court Sets Aside Bank Account Defreezing Order; Says Banks Must Be Heard Before Release of Frozen Funds

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 11.09.2026

    Karnataka High Court Sets Aside Bank Account Defreezing Order; Says Banks Must Be Heard Before Release of Frozen Funds

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate G Sridharamurthy. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id sriadv3@gmail.com . 

    The Karnataka High Court has set aside an order directing Axis Bank Limited to defreeze a bank account and has remanded the matter to the jurisdictional Magistrate for fresh consideration after giving the Bank an opportunity of hearing.

    Justice M. Nagaprasanna passed the order in a petition filed by Axis Bank under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, challenging the order dated 10 August 2023 passed by the 1st Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru in Crime No. 138/2023.

    Axis Bank Challenged Direction to Defreeze Account

    • The impugned Magistrate’s order had directed Axis Bank to defreeze account No. 922020041646754 maintained with the Bank. Axis Bank approached the High Court contending that in similar matters, coordinate Benches had already held that a bank should be heard before orders are passed for defreezing accounts and releasing money to complainants.
    • The Bank relied upon earlier Karnataka High Court orders where matters had been remanded to Magistrates to reconsider applications under Sections 451 and 457 CrPC after permitting the concerned bank to file objections and participate in the proceedings.

    Why Hearing the Bank Is Necessary

    • The High Court referred to an earlier coordinate Bench order which recognised the practical difficulty faced by banks where multiple criminal cases and multiple judicial orders concern the same accused or account.
    • In some cases, the amounts directed to be released may exceed the funds actually available in the account. The earlier order therefore held that before directing the bank to unfreeze an account and transfer money to a complainant, the Magistrate should first hear the bank.
    • The Court also relied upon another batch of petitions in which the Trial Courts had ordered defreezing and release of funds without hearing the petitioner-bank. The coordinate Bench held that such orders created serious compliance difficulties, especially where some customer accounts had insufficient or zero balances.

    Karnataka High Court Sets Aside Magistrate’s Order

    • Following the earlier coordinate Bench decisions, Justice Nagaprasanna allowed Axis Bank’s petition and set aside the Magistrate’s order dated 10 August 2023.
    • The matter was remanded to the 1st Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru to reconsider the application under Sections 451 and 457 CrPC afresh, after affording Axis Bank an opportunity of hearing.

    Bank Restrained From Releasing Money Until Fresh Decision

    • Pending reconsideration of the application, the High Court restrained Axis Bank from releasing money from the subject account in favour of any person.
    • The Court further directed the concerned Magistrate to decide the application under Sections 451 and 457 CrPC as expeditiously as possible and in any event within eight weeks from receipt of the High Court’s order.

    Key Legal Takeaway

    The ruling reinforces an important procedural safeguard in cases involving freezing and defreezing of bank accounts during criminal investigations. Where a judicial order may require a bank to release or transfer funds from an account, the bank should ordinarily be afforded an opportunity of hearing, particularly where multiple claims, prior freezing directions, insufficient balances or competing judicial orders may exist.

    The judgment does not finally decide who is entitled to the disputed funds. Instead, it requires the Magistrate to reconsider the matter after hearing the Bank and all concerned parties.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Karnataka High Court

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  • Bombay High Court Quashes β‚Ή1.22 Crore EPFO Demand Against Corporate Debtor; PF Assessment During IBC Moratorium Held Impermissible

    Bombay High Court Quashes β‚Ή1.22 Crore EPFO Demand Against Corporate Debtor; PF Assessment During IBC Moratorium Held Impermissible

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 10.09.2026

    Bombay High Court Quashes β‚Ή1.22 Crore EPFO Demand Against Corporate Debtor; PF Assessment During IBC Moratorium Held Impermissible

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Madhumita Jha. The views expressed are based on her interpretation of the law. She can be reached at her email id jhamadhumita27@gmail.com .  

    The Bombay High Court has quashed an Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) demand of β‚Ή1,22,48,716 raised against Dolphin Offshore Enterprises (India) Limited, holding that continuation of proceedings under Section 7A of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 during the moratorium imposed under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) was impermissible.

    Justice Sharmila U. Deshmukh held that the subsequent demand and recovery proceedings could not survive after approval of the resolution plan, particularly in light of Sections 14, 31(6) and 32A of the IBC.

    Background of the Case

    • Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) against Dolphin Offshore Enterprises was initiated by the NCLT on 16 July 2020. Following a public announcement inviting claims, EPFO submitted a claim of β‚Ή2,24,98,772, which was verified and admitted in full by the Resolution Professional.
    • The Committee of Creditors subsequently approved the resolution plan submitted by Deep Industries Limited, and the NCLT approved the plan on 29 September 2022. Under the approved resolution plan, EPFO was paid β‚Ή2,250 in full and final settlement of its claim.
    • However, EPFO had separately initiated an inquiry under Section 7A of the PF Act concerning provident fund contributions for the period April 2018 to September 2019. Despite being informed about the CIRP and moratorium, the inquiry continued.
    • Eventually, on 24 February 2023, after approval of the resolution plan, EPFO passed an order assessing PF dues at β‚Ή1,22,48,716 and directed the corporate debtor to make payment.

    Can EPFO Continue Section 7A Proceedings During IBC Moratorium?

    • The principal issue before the High Court was whether EPFO could continue assessment proceedings under Section 7A of the PF Act after a moratorium had come into operation under Section 14 of the IBC.
    • The Court observed that commencement of CIRP triggers the statutory moratorium. Once the moratorium is imposed, proceedings which have the effect of creating new liabilities against the corporate debtor cannot continue.
    • In the present case, EPFO was aware that CIRP had commenced. Despite such knowledge, it continued with the Section 7A inquiry and ultimately passed the impugned order after the resolution plan had already been approved.

    EPFO Order Was Not Merely an Assessmentβ€”It Was in the Nature of Recovery

    • A significant aspect of the judgment is the Court’s distinction between mere assessment of dues and proceedings that effectively seek recovery.
    • The EPFO order not only assessed β‚Ή1.22 crore as outstanding dues but directed payment within 15 days, failing which recovery proceedings under Sections 8B to 8G of the PF Act were to follow. It also contemplated damages, interest and prosecution.
    • The High Court therefore held that the order was β€œnot merely an assessment proceeding” but a proceeding in the nature of recovery, which was impermissible during the moratorium.

    Section 31(6) of IBC Extinguishes Pre-Resolution Claims

    • The Court placed substantial reliance upon the newly introduced Section 31(6) of the IBC, inserted through the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2026, notified on 26 May 2026.
    • The provision stipulates, inter alia, that unless otherwise provided in the resolution plan, claims against the corporate debtor and its assets arising prior to approval of the plan stand extinguished, and proceedingsβ€”including assessment proceedingsβ€”cannot be continued or instituted on the basis of such claims.
    • Importantly, the Court noted that Explanation III gives retrospective operation to Section 31(6) in respect of resolution plans approved from the commencement of the IBC, except matters that have already attained finality.
    • Accordingly, the Court held that the amount recognised in the approved resolution plan was protected, but the separate amount subsequently determined through the impugned Section 7A order was not.
    • The post-resolution quantification therefore stood extinguished and could not be recovered.

    EPFO Had Filed Its Claim but Did Not Challenge the Resolution Plan

    • Another important consideration was that EPFO had actually participated in the insolvency process by lodging its claim with the Resolution Professional.
    • The resolution plan ultimately recognised EPFO’s claim at β‚Ή2,250, and EPFO was informed about approval of the plan and forwarded the amount. The Court observed that EPFO had the opportunity to challenge the resolution plan before the NCLAT and seek full payment of its provident fund dues.
    • Instead, EPFO did not challenge the approved resolution plan and continued with its Section 7A inquiry.

    Court Says 2026 IBC Amendment Reinforces β€œClean Slate” Principle

    • The High Court also considered the earlier Bombay High Court decision in Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Limited v. Central Board of Trustees, EPFO.
    • The Court distinguished that decision on the facts and observed that, following the 2026 legislative amendment to the IBC, the effect of Dalmia Cement had been β€œconsiderably watered down.” The issue in the present caseβ€”continuation of a Section 7A inquiry during the moratoriumβ€”had also not arisen for consideration in Dalmia Cement.
    • More importantly, the Court observed that the β€œclean slate” principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. has now received legislative effect through the introduction of Section 31(6) of the IBC.

    Protection Under Section 32A of IBC

    • The High Court further relied upon Section 32A of the IBC, which grants immunity in respect of offences committed prior to commencement of CIRP once the resolution plan is approved and results in the prescribed change in management or control.
    • Since the EPFO order contemplated recovery against the corporate debtor’s assets as well as prosecution, the Court found that such action was also inconsistent with the protection afforded by Section 32A.

    Four Reasons Why the EPFO Order Was Unsustainable

    The Bombay High Court crystallised its findings into four grounds: the Section 7A inquiry was impermissibly continued during the Section 14 moratorium; the resultant recovery claim stood extinguished under Section 31(6) after approval of the resolution plan; EPFO had itself lodged a claim which was dealt with under the resolution plan but never challenged that plan; and Section 32A protected the corporate debtor and its assets following the qualifying change in ownership and control.

    High Court Quashes β‚Ή1.22 Crore Demand

    On these findings, the Bombay High Court held that the EPFO order dated 24 February 2023 was clearly unsustainable and consequently quashed and set it aside, allowing Dolphin Offshore Enterprises’ writ petition.

    Key Takeaway

    The ruling is significant for companies undergoing or emerging from CIRP because it reinforces the clean-slate principle under the IBC. Statutory authorities cannot disregard an IBC moratorium, participate in the resolution process, accept treatment of their claim under an approved resolution plan, and thereafter seek to impose a separate pre-resolution liability against the revived corporate debtor.

    The judgment is particularly important after the 2026 amendment introducing Section 31(6), which the Bombay High Court has treated as giving legislative effect to the principle that pre-resolution claims, unless preserved under the approved plan, stand extinguished and cannot subsequently form the basis of fresh assessment or recovery proceedings.

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    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Bombay High Court

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  • Karnataka High Court Upholds POCSO Conviction but Modifies Juvenile’s Sentence; Compensation Enhanced to β‚Ή3 Lakh

    Karnataka High Court Upholds POCSO Conviction but Modifies Juvenile’s Sentence; Compensation Enhanced to β‚Ή3 Lakh

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 10.09.2026

    Karnataka High Court Upholds POCSO Conviction but Modifies Juvenile’s Sentence; Compensation Enhanced to β‚Ή3 Lakh

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate G Sridharamurthy. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id sriadv3@gmail.com . 

    The Karnataka High Court has upheld the conviction of a person who was a juvenile at the time of the offence in a case involving allegations under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) and the Indian Penal Code, while modifying the custodial sentence and enhancing the compensation payable to the victim from β‚Ή1 lakh to β‚Ή3 lakh.

    The matter was decided by Justice H.P. Sandesh in Criminal Revision Petition No. 1262 of 2018. The revision challenged the appellate order dated 20 August 2018 and the Juvenile Justice Board’s order dated 26 April 2018.

    Background of the Case

    • The prosecution alleged that the petitioner, who was a juvenile at the relevant time, had sexually abused a four-year-old child. The case was registered after the child’s mother lodged a complaint, and the prosecution examined 12 witnesses, including the victim, her mother and medical witnesses.
    • The Juvenile Justice Board had convicted the petitioner under multiple provisions of the POCSO Act read with Sections 375 and 376 of the IPC and sentenced him to three years in a juvenile home, along with payment of β‚Ή1 lakh to the victim.

    Contradictory Medical Evidence Considered

    • A major argument raised in revision concerned differences in the medical evidence.
    • One doctor who examined the child shortly after the incident reportedly noticed swelling, while another doctor at Vanivilasa Hospital, who examined the child later, did not find such swelling or injury. The defence relied on this discrepancy to argue that the prosecution case was doubtful.
    • The State, however, contended that the discrepancy was minor and that the immediate complaint, the testimony of the victim and her mother, and the first medical examination supported the prosecution case.
    • The Court also noted that the FSL report did not detect seminal stains. However, the allegation itself was not one of penile penetration.

    Court Finds No Evidence of Penetrative Sexual Activity

    • While examining the evidence, the High Court observed that the medical and forensic materials did not suggest penetrative sexual activity.
    • The Court also took into account the petitioner’s status as a juvenile at the time of the offence, as well as the fact that he was by then married and had two children.
    • Instead of re-appreciating the entire evidence to disturb the conviction, the Court considered it appropriate to modify the sentence.

    Sentence Modified; Compensation Increased to β‚Ή3 Lakh

    • The High Court modified the original sentence of three years.
    • The petitioner had already undergone 117 days in custody, and the Court gave him set-off for that period. In lieu of the remaining custodial sentence, the Court enhanced the compensation from β‚Ή1 lakh to β‚Ή3 lakh, while expressly confirming the conviction.
    • The petitioner had already deposited β‚Ή1 lakh before the Trial Court and was directed to deposit the balance β‚Ή2 lakh before the High Court.

    Compensation to Be Secured for the Victim

    • The High Court further directed that both the existing β‚Ή1 lakh and the additional β‚Ή2 lakh be placed in fixed deposits in the name of the victim girl for three years or until she attained majority, whichever was earlier.
    • The victim’s mother was permitted to withdraw the quarterly interest on the fixed deposits for the child’s education.

    Key Legal Takeaway

    • The decision is significant because the Court adopted a balanced approach: it did not overturn the conviction, but modified the sentence in view of the petitioner’s juvenile status and the evidentiary circumstances, while strengthening the compensatory relief available to the victim.
    • The judgment also shows that in revision proceedings involving juvenile offenders, courts may consider the rehabilitative dimension of juvenile justice while ensuring that the victim’s interests remain protected.

    Conclusion

    In Arunachalam @ Arun v. State of Karnataka & Anr., the Karnataka High Court confirmed the conviction but modified the sentence imposed upon the juvenile offender. The Court took note of the medical evidence, the absence of proof of penetrative sexual activity, the petitioner’s juvenile status and the period of custody already undergone.

    The final result was that the custodial sentence was modified, 117 days of custody were given set-off, and compensation was enhanced from β‚Ή1 lakh to β‚Ή3 lakh, with the amount secured in fixed deposit for the victim’s benefit and education.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Karnataka High Court

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  • Bombay High Court Ruled Statutory Interest on Refund Runs from Three Months After Original Refund Application, Not from Appellate Order

    Bombay High Court Ruled Statutory Interest on Refund Runs from Three Months After Original Refund Application, Not from Appellate Order

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 09.09.2026

    Bombay High Court Ruled Statutory Interest on Refund Runs from Three Months After Original Refund Application, Not from Appellate Order

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Madhumita Jha. The views expressed are based on her interpretation of the law. She can be reached at her email id jhamadhumita27@gmail.com .  

    The Bombay High Court has delivered an important ruling on interest payable on delayed tax refunds under Section 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944, as made applicable to service tax matters through Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994. In Empire Industries Limited v. Union of India & Others, the Court held that statutory interest becomes payable after the expiry of three months from the date of the original refund application, and not from the date on which the assessee subsequently succeeds before the Appellate Tribunal.

    The Division Bench of Justice M. S. Karnik and Justice Sandesh D. Patil quashed the denial of interest by the Department and directed payment of statutory interest on the refund amount of β‚Ή53,05,173 from 20 August 2015 until the date of actual refund.

    This decision is particularly significant for assessees whose refund claims remain pending for years because of departmental rejection, appellate proceedings or litigation.

    Background of the Case

    Empire Industries Limited had filed a refund application under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 read with Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994 on 20 May 2015.

    The refund claim was not immediately granted. The dispute travelled through the appellate mechanism and was eventually decided in favour of the petitioner by the Appellate Tribunal on 8 December 2025. Thereafter, the petitioner issued a communication dated 5 January 2026, seeking implementation of the appellate order and release of the refund.

    The Department subsequently sanctioned the refund of β‚Ή53,05,173, which was actually paid on 23 June 2026. However, the Order-in-Original dated 24 March 2026 denied statutory interest for the period claimed by the petitioner.

    The petitioner therefore approached the Bombay High Court challenging the denial of interest.

    Core Issue Before the Bombay High Court

    The principal legal question was:

    From which date does interest under Section 11BB become payable when a refund application is initially rejected but ultimately succeeds before an appellate authority?

    The competing positions were straightforward.

    The petitioner argued that interest should run from the expiry of three months from the date of the original refund application, i.e. from 20 August 2015.

    The Revenue, on the other hand, treated the petitioner’s communication dated 5 January 2026 as the relevant refund claim and contended that interest did not become payable from the original 2015 application.

    The dispute therefore turned upon the correct interpretation of Sections 11B and 11BB.

    Petitioner’s Argument: Interest Follows the Original Refund Application

    Empire Industries relied upon the Supreme Court’s landmark judgment in Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. v. Union of India, 2011 (273) E.L.T. 3 (SC).

    The petitioner argued that once a refund application has been properly filed under Section 11B, the statutory clock under Section 11BB begins to run from that application itself. If the refund is not made within three months, interest becomes payable after the expiry of that period.

    The petitioner also contended that the letter dated 5 January 2026 was merely a continuation or reminder of the original refund claim of 20 May 2015 and could not be treated as a fresh refund application.

    Accordingly, the petitioner sought interest from 20 August 2015, being three months after the original application, until actual payment of the refund on 23 June 2026.

    Revenue’s Stand

    The Revenue argued that the refund became payable only as a consequence of the favourable CESTAT order dated 8 December 2025.

    According to the Department, the assessee’s letter dated 5 January 2026 should be regarded as the refund claim arising out of that appellate order.

    The Revenue further relied upon Section 11BB to contend that interest would become payable only where the refund remained unpaid beyond the applicable statutory period.

    The practical effect of the Revenue’s interpretation would have been to deny interest for the long period between 2015 and the appellate success in 2025.

    Bombay High Court Relies on Ranbaxy Laboratories

    The High Court rejected the Revenue’s interpretation.

    The Court relied squarely upon the binding Supreme Court decision in Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. and reiterated the legal position that Section 11BB becomes operational when a refund sanctioned under Section 11B is not paid within three months from the date of receipt of the refund application.

    The Court reproduced the principle that the statutory explanation deeming an appellate or court order to be an order under Section 11B(2) does not postpone the date from which interest becomes payable.

    This is the central ratio of the judgment.

    The Crucial Principle: Appellate Success Does Not Reset the Interest Clock

    The Court specifically held that interest is payable:

    from the expiry of three months from the date of filing the refund application until the date of actual refund, and not from the date of the favourable order of the Appellate Tribunal.

    This distinction is extremely important.

    Where an assessee files a valid refund claim and the Department rejects it, the subsequent appellate order merely establishes that the refund was legally due. It does not convert the appellate order into a fresh starting point for calculating interest.

    In effect, if the Department wrongly retains money for years and the assessee ultimately succeeds in appeal, the period spent in litigation cannot automatically be excluded while calculating statutory interest.

    5 January 2026 Letter Was Only a Reminder, Not a Fresh Refund Claim

    The Bombay High Court also expressly rejected the Department’s attempt to treat the petitioner’s letter dated 5 January 2026 as a new refund claim.

    The Court held that the original refund application had been filed on 20 May 2015, while the claim was ultimately allowed by the Appellate Tribunal on 8 December 2025.

    The subsequent communication of 5 January 2026 was therefore only a continuation/reminder of the original refund claim and could not be treated as a separate refund application under Section 11B.

    This finding is important for tax administration because departments sometimes treat post-appeal representations as fresh refund applications, thereby attempting to restart the statutory interest period.

    The judgment makes clear that such an approach cannot be sustained where the refund arises from an earlier valid application.

    How Section 11BB Operates

    Section 11BB is a statutory compensation mechanism for delay in granting refund.

    The Bombay High Court, following Ranbaxy Laboratories, treated the provision as creating a clear temporal rule:

    Refund application received β†’ three-month statutory period β†’ interest starts thereafter if refund remains unpaid.

    The fact that the refund claim may subsequently travel through adjudication, appeal or judicial proceedings does not alter the original date of application for the purpose of calculating interest.

    The Court’s reasoning also reflects the purpose of Section 11BB: to compensate the taxpayer for the period during which money lawfully refundable remains with the State beyond the statutory time limit.

    Why the Revenue’s Interpretation Was Rejected

    The Department’s interpretation effectively sought to shift the starting point for interest from 2015 to 2026.

    Had that argument succeeded, an assessee could theoretically wait several years for final appellate relief and still receive little or no interest for the period during which the Government retained the disputed amount.

    The High Court found this inconsistent with the interpretation already settled by the Supreme Court.

    The Court described the Department’s treatment of the 5 January 2026 communication as a refund claim as a β€œserious error.”

    Final Order of the Bombay High Court

    The Court allowed the writ petition.

    It quashed the Order-in-Original dated 24 March 2026 to the extent that it denied statutory interest on the sanctioned refund amount of β‚Ή53,05,173.

    The Assistant Commissioner was directed to pay the amount together with statutory interest:

    from 20 August 2015 until the date of actual refund, and the payment was directed to be made within eight weeks from the date of the High Court’s order.

    Key Legal Principles Emerging from the Judgment

    IssueBombay High Court’s ruling
    Original refund applicationFiled on 20 May 2015
    Statutory interest provisionSection 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944
    Service tax applicabilityThrough Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994
    When interest beginsAfter expiry of three months from receipt of original refund application
    Relevant interest date in this case20 August 2015
    CESTAT order8 December 2025
    Effect of appellate orderDoes not restart or postpone the interest period
    Letter dated 5 January 2026Merely a continuation/reminder, not a fresh refund application
    Refund amountβ‚Ή53,05,173
    High Court directionStatutory interest from 20 August 2015 till actual refund
    Time granted for complianceEight weeks
    Governing precedentRanbaxy Laboratories Ltd. v. Union of India

    Importance for Service Tax and Central Excise Refund Disputes

    Although the dispute arose in the context of the erstwhile service tax regime, the judgment remains highly relevant to legacy indirect tax litigation.

    A large number of service tax and central excise matters continue to remain in appellate proceedings even after the introduction of GST. In such cases, successful assessees frequently face a second round of dispute after winning the substantive appeal: the Department releases the principal refund but disputes the period for which interest is payable.

    The Bombay High Court’s decision reinforces that interest is not dependent upon the date on which the Department finally accepts the assessee’s legal position.

    Where the original refund application was validly filed, the statutory interest period must ordinarily be traced back to that application.

    Importance of the Ranbaxy Laboratories Principle

    The judgment is also a strong reaffirmation of the binding nature of Ranbaxy Laboratories.

    The Supreme Court had already settled that the explanation to Section 11BB, which deems an appellate or court order to be an order under Section 11B(2), does not alter the starting date for interest.

    The Bombay High Court applied that principle directly and rejected an administrative interpretation inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling.

    For taxpayers, this significantly strengthens claims in cases where refunds are ultimately granted after appellate litigation.

    Practical Takeaway for Assessees

    Businesses pursuing refunds under legacy central excise or service tax provisions should carefully preserve:

    • the original refund application;
    • proof of the date on which it was received by the Department;
    • acknowledgement or diary number;
    • adjudication and appellate orders;
    • subsequent correspondence seeking implementation; and
    • proof of the actual date on which refund was credited.

    The most critical document for Section 11BB purposes is often not the final appellate order, but the original refund application and its date of receipt.

    That date can determine several years’ worth of statutory interest.

    Practical Takeaway for Tax Authorities

    The decision also serves as a reminder to tax authorities that a post-appeal implementation letter should not automatically be treated as a fresh refund claim.

    Where the assessee had already filed a refund application and merely succeeds in getting that claim recognised through appeal, the subsequent letter ordinarily does not erase the original statutory timeline.

    The refund machinery cannot be interpreted in a way that financially disadvantages an assessee merely because the Department’s initial rejection was subsequently overturned.

    Broader Principle: The Government Cannot Benefit from Delayed Refund Adjudication

    Beyond the wording of Section 11BB, the decision embodies a broader fiscal principle.

    When money ultimately found refundable has remained with the Government beyond the statutory period, interest compensates the taxpayer for the delay.

    If interest were calculated only from the date of the final appellate order, the State could retain funds throughout prolonged litigation without compensating the assessee for that period.

    The Bombay High Court’s application of Ranbaxy Laboratories prevents that consequence and reinforces discipline in the administration of statutory refunds.

    Conclusion

    The Bombay High Court’s ruling in Empire Industries Limited v. Union of India & Others is an important reaffirmation of taxpayer rights in delayed refund cases.

    The Court has made it clear that the statutory interest clock under Section 11BB ordinarily begins after three months from the date of the original refund application and does not wait for the assessee to ultimately succeed before the Appellate Tribunal.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Bombay High Court

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  • Karnataka High Court Quashes Criminal Proceedings in Land Dispute

    Karnataka High Court Quashes Criminal Proceedings in Land Dispute

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 09.09.2026

    Karnataka High Court Quashes Criminal Proceedings in Land Dispute

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate G Sridharamurthy. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id sriadv3@gmail.com . 

    The Karnataka High Court recently delivered a significant judgment in Criminal Petition No. 9587 of 2017, quashing criminal proceedings against five accused individuals in a long-standing land dispute. This article provides a detailed overview of the case, the legal arguments, and the implications of the court’s decision.

    Background of the Case

    The dispute centers around land bearing Survey Nos. 212/2B and 213/1 in Devigere village, Hassan District. The complainant, D.T. Krishnegowda, alleged that the accusedβ€”K.S. Rathnamma and othersβ€”criminally trespassed onto the property, damaged coconut trees, and intimidated him with deadly weapons on June 22, 2014. The land in question was claimed to be owned by his sister, Jayalakshmamma, who had appointed him to manage it.

    Legal Proceedings Timeline

    1. Private Complaint Filed: The complainant filed a private complaint (PCR No. 249/2014) seeking legal action against the accused for offenses under Sections 427, 447, 392, 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
    2. Investigation and ‘B’ Report: The trial court referred the matter for police investigation. The investigating officer found no substance in the allegations and filed a ‘B’ report (closure report).
    3. Protest Petition: Dissatisfied, the complainant filed a protest petition and examined himself and two witnesses. The trial court rejected the protest petition and accepted the ‘B’ report.
    4. Revision Petition: The complainant challenged this order in Revision Petition No. 187/2015. The revisional court set aside the trial court’s order, rejected the ‘B’ report, and issued summons to the accused.
    5. High Court Petition: The accused approached the High Court, seeking to quash the proceedings.

    Key Arguments Presented

    • For the Petitioners (Accused):
      • The complainant was not the owner of the property and had not sustained any injury.
      • The actual owner, Jayalakshmamma, neither filed the complaint nor appeared as a witness.
      • Previous civil litigation (OS No. 178/2005) filed by Jayalakshmamma for permanent injunction was ultimately dismissed in appeal (RA No. 100/2013), undermining the basis of the criminal complaint.
      • The evidence presented by the complainant and his witnesses was inconsistent and insufficient.
    • For the Respondents (State):
      • Serious allegations of criminal conduct were made, warranting legal proceedings.
      • The complainant, though not the owner, reported criminal acts committed by the accused.

    High Court’s Analysis and Decision

    Justice M.G. Uma, after reviewing the case, observed:

    • The complainant’s authority to file the complaint was questionable since he was not the owner and the actual owner did not participate in the proceedings.
    • The civil suit that formed the basis of the complaint had been dismissed, and the appeal was still pending after ten years.
    • The evidence from the complainant and his witnesses was either inconsistent or did not support the prosecution’s case.
    • The revisional court erred in issuing summons based solely on the complainant’s testimony.

    Order:

    The High Court allowed the criminal petition, set aside the revisional court’s order, and quashed the criminal proceedings against the accused.

    Implications of the Judgment

    • Reinforces the Importance of Ownership: Only parties with a direct legal interest or injury can initiate criminal proceedings in property disputes.
    • Role of Evidence: Courts must rely on consistent and credible evidence before proceeding with criminal charges.
    • Civil vs. Criminal Remedies: The judgment underscores the distinction between civil disputes over property and criminal liability.

    Conclusion

    This judgment serves as a precedent for similar land dispute cases, emphasizing the need for clear ownership, credible evidence, and proper legal standing before invoking criminal law. It also highlights the judiciary’s role in preventing the misuse of criminal proceedings in civil disputes.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Karnataka High Court

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