Tag: #Delhi High Court

  • Delhi High Court Ruled Deemed Occupancy Certificate Claim Cannot Override RERA

    Delhi High Court Ruled Deemed Occupancy Certificate Claim Cannot Override RERA

    Date: 02.11.2026

    The Delhi High Court has dismissed two appeals by CJ Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., holding that the developer could not avoid the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA) on the basis of a claimed β€œdeemed” occupancy certificate and was required to comply with the statutory pre-deposit condition before its appeals could be heard.

    Background: Metroplex East commercial complex

    CJ Infrastructure developed Metroplex East, a commercial complex at 21, District Centre, Laxmi Nagar, Delhi. The project comprises 197 units along with common areas, including the entrance lobby, elevators and staircases. The developer stated that construction was completed on 14 February 2013 and that an architect had certified the building as fit for occupation.

    According to the company, it applied to the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) for an Occupancy-cum-Completion Certificate (OCC) in 2013 and early 2014. It argued that, because the DDA did not respond within the applicable period, the OCC should be treated as having been granted by operation of the building bye-laws.

    Between 2013 and 2015, the company sold or allotted 149 commercial units and executed registered conveyance deeds in favour of purchasers. Later, several purchasers initiated proceedings under RERA, principally alleging that the developer had not obtained a formal OCC for the building.

    The central dispute: Was the OCC deemed to have been granted?

    The developer’s principal argument was that the project had effectively been completed before RERA came into force and that a deemed OCC had arisen because of the DDA’s alleged inaction. On that basis, it contended that the RERA authorities lacked jurisdiction over the complaints.

    The Court did not accept this position. It examined the record placed by the DDA and highlighted key deficiencies:

    • The developer claimed that it had applied for completion on 14 February 2013, but the Fire Safety Certificate relied upon was dated 30 October 2013. The certificate was required for a completion application.
    • The OCC-fee receipt produced by the developer was dated 20 April 2017, approximately four years after the claimed OCC application.
    • The DDA reported deviations from the sanctioned plan.
    • The application was scrutinised under the Unified Building Bye-Laws, 2016, and the stated deficiencies were not rectified despite opportunities to do so.
    • The DDA rejected the OCC application on 8 September 2021.

    The Court held that a deemed OCC could not be claimed in these circumstances. It noted that deemed approval requires the applicant to have met the necessary requirements, including payment of applicable fees, and cannot authorise conduct contrary to lease conditions, the master plan, regulations or building bye-laws.

    Most importantly, the Court found that no OCC existed when the appeals were before the Real Estate Appellate Tribunal (REAT). Therefore, the project remained subject to RERA.

    Why the RERA pre-deposit requirement applied

    The second major issue concerned Section 43(5) of RERA. This provision requires a promoter challenging an order before the appellate tribunal to first deposit at least 30% of the penalty, or such higher percentage as the tribunal directs, or the total amount payable to the allottee, including interest and compensation, depending on the nature of the order.

    The REAT had required CJ Infrastructure to deposit the full adjudicated amounts as a condition for continuing its appeals. When the company did not make that deposit, the REAT dismissed the appeals.

    The Delhi High Court upheld that decision. It emphasised that the statutory wording, including β€œit shall not be entertained,” makes pre-deposit a mandatory threshold condition for a promoter’s appeal. The Court relied on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, which had held that this requirement is not unconstitutionally burdensome and serves to protect allottees’ financial interests.

    The Court also rejected the developer’s offer to provide immovable-property security instead of making the deposit. RERA contains no provision permitting such a substitute.

    Judgment and implications

    The High Court found no error in the REAT’s orders and dismissed both appeals. It nevertheless allowed the appellants an opportunity to seek revival of their REAT appeals within 30 days of the judgment, provided they comply with the applicable pre-deposit condition under Section 43(5).

    The ruling reinforces two important principles for real-estate developers:

    1. A deemed occupancy certificate cannot be assumed merely from alleged administrative inaction. The applicant must show compliance with the applicable approval requirements, including supporting documentation, fees and rectification of identified shortcomings.
    2. The RERA pre-deposit requirement is mandatory for promoters’ appeals. A developer cannot ordinarily have an appeal heard by REAT without first making the required statutory deposit, and offering property as security is not an authorised alternative.

    The judgment, pronounced on 29 August 2025 by a Division Bench of Justice Anil Kshetarpal and Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar, underscores the courts’ approach of enforcing RERA’s safeguards for allottees while requiring strict compliance from promoters seeking appellate relief.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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  • PhonePe Wins Remand in Trademark Dispute After Counter Statement Was Not Served

    PhonePe Wins Remand in Trademark Dispute After Counter Statement Was Not Served

    Date: 02.11.2026

    The Delhi High Court has set aside an earlier trademark opposition order involving PhonePe Limited after all parties confirmed that the opponent had not been served with the other side’s counter statement, as required by the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

    Court restores matter to the Trade Marks Registrar

    In PhonePe Limited v. The Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr., the Delhi High Court disposed of PhonePe’s appeal by overturning the order dated 19 December 2025 and remanding the opposition for fresh consideration before the Registrar of Trade Marks.

    Justice A. J. Bhambhani directed that the opposition be reconsidered only after the required notice is issued and pleadings are completed in accordance with law. The Registrar has been asked to decide the matter expeditiously, and in any event within four months from 21 September 2026.

    Central issue: counter statement was not served

    PhonePe’s case was based on a procedural failure in the opposition proceedings. Its counsel submitted that respondent No. 2’s counter statement had been filed but was never served on PhonePe, which had filed the notice of opposition.

    This was not disputed. The Registrar of Trade Marks confirmed, based on its records, that service had not been completed in accordance with the statutory requirement. Counsel for the contesting respondent also accepted that position.

    Why service is legally important

    Section 21(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 requires the Registrar to serve a copy of the counter statement on the person who filed the notice of opposition. This step is material because it enables the opponent to know the case being advanced in response and to complete its pleadings fairly.

    The Court treated the omission as sufficient reason to set aside the earlier order. Rather than deciding the merits of the trademark dispute itself, it restored the matter to the Registrar so that the opposition process can proceed after due notice and lawful completion of pleadings.

    Direction for a time-bound decision

    While agreeing that the matter should be remanded, the contesting respondent requested an expedited outcome. The Court accordingly required the Registrar to conclude the reconsidered opposition as quickly as possible and no later than four months from the date of the order.

    Key takeaway

    The order reinforces that statutory service requirements in trademark opposition proceedings are substantive safeguards of procedural fairness. Where an opponent is not served with a counter statement, an order passed in the proceedings may be vulnerable to being set aside and remanded for fresh consideration.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Delhi HC: Importers Cannot Be Penalised for Administrative Failure of Customs Settlement Board

    Delhi HC: Importers Cannot Be Penalised for Administrative Failure of Customs Settlement Board

    Date: 29.10.2026

    The Delhi High Court has ruled that the statutory clock for customs settlement proceedings must stop when the Interim Board for Settlement is unable to function for want of quorum, protecting applicants from losing their settlement remedy because of an institutional vacancy.

    Background of the dispute

    Holitech India Private Limited, an importer of components used in cellular mobile phones and related products, faced two customs show-cause notices dated 21 September 2023. The notices concerned alleged wrongful use of a customs-duty exemption notification, classification issues, and alleged non-payment of differential duty on unutilised or rejected goods.

    To resolve the disputes through the settlement route under Chapter XIVA of the Customs Act, 1962, Holitech filed settlement applications. After earlier applications were not admitted, fresh applications filed in August 2024 and March 2025 were admitted and taken forward.

    Following amendments introduced through the Finance Act, 2025, pending matters before the Settlement Commission were transferred to the Interim Board for Settlement-I, Delhi. The Board heard Holitech, co-applicants and departmental representatives on 22 August 2025. Holitech also supplied additional written submissions requested by the Board, and the matters were reserved for orders.

    The quorum issue

    Before the Interim Board could issue its orders, one of its members retired on 30 September 2025. From 1 October 2025, the Board lacked the required quorum and could not legally continue with or decide the settlement proceedings.

    The Board’s office later confirmed that the applications had remained pending β€œfor want of quorum” since 1 October 2025. Despite this acknowledged inability to function, communications dated 17 April 2026 treated the proceedings as abated from 8 April 2026 because no settlement order had been passed within the period prescribed by Section 127C of the Customs Act.

    The communications also stated that the jurisdictional customs authorities could resume adjudication of the show-cause notices.

    The legal question

    The central issue before the Delhi High Court was whether settlement proceedings automatically abate when the statutory deadline expires, even though the Interim Board was legally incapable of passing an order because it did not have the required quorum.

    Holitech argued that it had done everything required of it: its applications were admitted, hearings were completed, written submissions were filed and nothing remained pending on its side. It contended that it should not lose a statutory remedy because the adjudicatory forum became non-functional for administrative reasons.

    The respondents argued that the statutory time limit was mandatory and that, once it expired without an order, abatement followed automatically. They maintained that the law contained no express exception for a period when the Board lacked quorum.

    The Court’s reasoning

    The Court rejected a purely literal reading of the statutory time limit. It held that Section 127C must be interpreted as a complete scheme, rather than by isolating the provisions on deadlines and abatement.

    The Court emphasized that the statutory timeline assumes the continued existence of a legally constituted authority capable of carrying out its duties. A body without quorum cannot validly exercise adjudicatory powers or pronounce an order affecting the parties’ rights.

    The Court drew a critical distinction between:

    • a delay caused while a competent authority is able to decide but fails to do so; and
    • a delay caused because the authority itself is legally unable to function.

    Treating these situations identically, the Court said, would produce an unreasonable result. An applicant who had diligently pursued settlement proceedings would lose the remedy through circumstances entirely outside its control, while having no means to secure a decision from a non-functional Board.

    The Court held that the phrase requiring an order within the prescribed period cannot include a period during which the Interim Board had ceased to be an effective adjudicatory forum due to lack of quorum. The time for disposal must therefore exclude the period of institutional incapacity.

    Decision and relief granted

    The Court set aside both communications dated 17 April 2026 that had declared the settlement proceedings abated.

    It ruled that, for Holitech’s applications, the entire period from 1 October 2025 until 4 August 2026 must be excluded when calculating the timeline under Section 127C(8A), read with Section 127C(12), of the Customs Act.

    Because that period could not be counted, the alleged expiry of the statutory period on 8 April 2026 no longer had any legal basis. The settlement applications did not abate.

    The Court also noted that the vacancy had subsequently been filled and that Interim Board for Settlement-I, Delhi had regained the required quorum. It directed the Board to resume Holitech’s applications from the stage immediately before the abatement communications and decide them expeditiously in accordance with law.

    Why the ruling matters

    The decision establishes that statutory deadlines for settlement proceedings cannot be applied in a way that penalizes applicants for the adjudicatory forum’s legal inability to function.

    It preserves the purpose of the customs settlement mechanism: timely and conclusive resolution of disputes, without making access to that remedy dependent on administrative contingencies beyond an applicant’s control. The ruling does not decide the merits of Holitech’s customs disputes. Those issues remain open for determination by the duly constituted Interim Board.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Delhi HC: Invalid Arbitrator Appointment Clause Does Not Invalidate Arbitration Agreement

    Delhi HC: Invalid Arbitrator Appointment Clause Does Not Invalidate Arbitration Agreement

    Date: 26.10.2026

    The Delhi High Court has referred a payment and performance dispute between Greentree Building Energy Private Limited and the Bureau of Energy Efficiency (BEE) to arbitration, holding that BEE could not unilaterally appoint the sole arbitrator under the contract.

    Background of the dispute

    The dispute arose from a government engagement for conducting refresher courses for Energy Auditors and Energy Managers across India. BEE issued a request for proposal in December 2023, and Greentree’s bid was accepted through a Letter of Award dated 15 February 2024. The parties then entered into a Memorandum of Agreement/Service Agreement on 29 February 2024.

    Under the arrangement, Greentree was to provide refresher training to about 2,000 candidates through workshops held nationwide. The agreement included an arbitration clause providing that unresolved disputes would be referred to a sole arbitrator appointed by BEE, with New Delhi as the seat and venue of arbitration.

    Greentree’s claims

    Greentree contended that its work was hampered because BEE did not provide a functioning portal, candidate database, and necessary instructions or approvals concerning registration, payment verification and certification. According to Greentree, it had to deploy its own staff and technical resources to establish an alternative portal.

    The contract period was extended twice: first until 14 May 2025 and then until 1 October 2025. Greentree stated that it trained 636 candidates, exceeding the first milestone requirement of 600 candidates.

    For that milestone, Greentree issued an invoice of Rs. 46,11,204, inclusive of IGST, representing 30% of the total contract value of Rs. 1,53,70,680. It said that only Rs. 15,53,350 was released.

    BEE’s payment calculation treated Rs. 44,19,071 as payable but deducted:

    • Rs. 11,52,801 for alleged shortfalls in the minimum number of participants at six workshops; and
    • Rs. 15,37,068 as an alleged maximum 10% penalty on the total contract value.

    Greentree challenged these deductions as unilateral, arbitrary and inconsistent with the agreement. It also claimed a further Rs. 5,14,918 relating to 67 additional candidates trained under the same work order.

    BEE’s position

    BEE disputed Greentree’s claims. It maintained that Greentree had repeatedly failed to perform according to the agreed milestones and timelines, despite earlier communications. BEE also asserted that the deductions from the invoice were justified under the contractual framework.

    The Court did not decide these factual and contractual disputes. It held that questions relating to delay, performance, deductions and payment entitlement must be determined by the arbitral tribunal.

    Why the Court intervened

    Greentree invoked arbitration in April 2026 and asked BEE to agree to an independent and impartial sole arbitrator. While BEE responded to the notice, it did not concur with such an appointment.

    The Court found that the contractual provision allowing BEE to appoint the sole arbitrator could not be enforced. Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the Court reaffirmed that a party interested in the outcome of a dispute cannot unilaterally appoint the sole arbitrator. Such a process creates justified concerns regarding the arbitrator’s independence and impartiality and conflicts with the requirement of equal treatment of parties.

    Importantly, the Court clarified that an invalid appointment procedure does not invalidate the arbitration agreement itself. The parties’ clear intention to resolve disputes through arbitration remained effective; only the agreed method of appointment had failed.

    The Court’s decision

    The Delhi High Court appointed Ms. Manini Brar, Advocate, as the sole arbitrator to decide the disputes arising from the work order and service agreement.

    The arbitration will proceed under the aegis and rules of the Delhi International Arbitration Centre (DIAC). The parties must make the disclosures required under Section 12 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. BEE may raise any preliminary objections concerning jurisdiction or arbitrability before the arbitrator.

    All claims, counterclaims and substantive defences remain open for decision on their merits. The Court expressly stated that its order should not be treated as a view on the correctness of either party’s case.

    Legal significance

    The ruling reinforces a central principle of Indian arbitration law: a party to a dispute cannot retain exclusive control over the appointment of a sole arbitrator. Where such a clause exists, courts can preserve the arbitration agreement while replacing the defective appointment mechanism with an independent judicial appointment.

    For government bodies, contractors and commercial parties, the decision highlights the need to draft arbitration clauses that provide a neutral, balanced and legally sustainable appointment process.

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    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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  • Delhi High Court Refuses to Condone Customs Department’s Delay

    Delhi High Court Refuses to Condone Customs Department’s Delay

    Date: 24.10.2026

    The Delhi High Court has dismissed the Customs Department’s appeal against Spectro Lab Equipments Pvt. Ltd. after finding that its 154-day delay was supported by no reasonable, specific, or substantiated explanation.

    The ruling, delivered on 15 October 2026 in Commissioner of Customs Air Cargo Complex (Import) v. Spectro Lab Equipments Pvt. Ltd., reinforces a settled principle: government departments are subject to limitation laws just like any other litigant. Internal file movement, procedural delay, or an unsupported allegation that prior counsel failed to act will not automatically establish β€œsufficient cause” for a delayed appeal.

    Background of the dispute

    The Commissioner of Customs, Air Cargo Complex (Import), sought to challenge a Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal order dated 29 January 2025. The appeal was brought under Section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962.

    The Department stated that it received the Tribunal’s order on 13 February 2025 but filed its High Court appeal only on 9 January 2026. Because the filing exceeded the prescribed period, the Department submitted an application seeking condonation of a 154-day delay.

    Its explanation was that the complete case file had been handed to an earlier counsel on 26 June 2025. According to the Department, that counsel neither filed the appeal nor informed it of any issue. The file was then said to have been assigned to present counsel on 16 October 2025, after which additional documents were obtained and the appeal was filed.

    Why the Court rejected the explanation

    The Division Bench of Justice Avneesh Jhingan and Justice Shail Jain found material deficiencies in the Department’s explanation.

    1. More than four months passed before the file was given to counsel

    The Department received the impugned order on 13 February 2025 but claimed to have handed the file to its earlier counsel only on 26 June 2025. The Court noted this substantial initial period of inactivity.

    No detailed explanation was offered for why the Department took over four months to transfer the matter for filing an appeal.

    2. The Department did not show that it followed up with earlier counsel

    After allegedly handing over the file on 26 June 2025, the Department did not plead that it had made any inquiry about the appeal’s status. It also did not state when the file was retrieved from the earlier counsel.

    The Court treated this lack of follow-up as significant. A party seeking condonation must show diligence in protecting its legal rights; it cannot merely assert that a file was given to a lawyer and then remain inactive.

    3. The allegation against earlier counsel was unsupported

    Although the Department blamed its former counsel, it did not disclose that counsel’s details or submit an affidavit from the counsel supporting the account. This was especially relevant because the Department had its own panel of counsel.

    The Court found the allegation vague and unsubstantiated rather than a reliable factual basis for excusing the delay.

    4. The explanation was internally inconsistent

    The pleadings stated that a β€œcomplete” file was supplied to earlier counsel. However, the Department’s counsel also argued that additional documents had to be obtained after the present counsel received the matter, contributing to the filing delay.

    The Court considered these positions contradictory. If the first counsel received a complete file, the later assertion that necessary documentation was still unavailable required a clear explanation. None was provided.

    Government departments cannot claim special treatment under limitation law

    The Court relied on established Supreme Court decisions holding that the law of limitation applies equally to the government.

    In Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd., the Supreme Court held that administrative negligence, routine file movement, and bureaucratic red tape do not constitute sufficient cause unless the department provides a reasonable and acceptable explanation and demonstrates bona fide efforts to act in time.

    The Delhi High Court also referred to State of Bihar v. Deo Kumar Singh, which confirms that delay cannot be condoned merely because of lethargic governmental functioning. It further cited Rajneesh Kumar v. Ved Prakash, where the Supreme Court cautioned that litigants cannot escape responsibility for a prolonged delay simply by shifting all blame to their advocates.

    The Court additionally relied on Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector (LA), emphasizing that a liberal or justice-oriented approach does not remove the threshold requirement of β€œsufficient cause.” Courts cannot mechanically revive stale claims where negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fides is apparent.

    The Court’s decision

    The High Court held that the condonation application was cursory, vague, and lacking in particulars. The period between 26 June 2025 and 15 October 2025 had effectively been left unexplained, apart from the unsupported attempt to blame earlier counsel.

    Finding no reasonable explanation for the 154-day delay, the Court dismissed the application for condonation. As a result, the Customs appeal itself was also disposed of.

    Key legal takeaway

    This decision is a clear reminder that condonation of delay is an exception, not an anticipated benefit for government litigants. A department seeking relief must present a coherent, evidence-based timeline showing prompt action, regular monitoring, and a genuine cause for missing the limitation period. General references to internal processing or counsel-related delay, without supporting facts, will not meet that standard.

    For litigants and public authorities alike, the ruling underscores that vigilance in pursuing appeals is essential: limitation periods are binding, and courts will not overlook unexplained inactivity simply because the appellant is a government department.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Delhi HC: Common Words in Earlier Registered Marks Do Not Automatically Bar New Trademark Applications

    Delhi HC: Common Words in Earlier Registered Marks Do Not Automatically Bar New Trademark Applications

    Date: 21.10.2026

    The Delhi High Court has set aside the Trade Marks Registry’s refusal to register β€œPlanet E School” for educational services, holding that the mark must be assessed as a whole rather than rejected merely because it contains common words such as β€œPlanet,” β€œE,” and β€œSchool.”

    Background of the dispute

    Grey Matters Educational Trust applied to register β€œPlanet E School” in Class 41 for educational services. The Trade Marks Registry refused the application on 25 January 2019, citing Sections 9 and 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

    Section 9 bars marks that lack distinctiveness, while Section 11 addresses marks that may conflict with earlier trademarks and create a likelihood of confusion. The Registry’s order, however, stated only that the application was objectionable under these provisions, without providing detailed reasons or dealing with the applicant’s response to the examination report.

    Grey Matters Educational Trust appealed to the Delhi High Court under Section 91 of the Act. It argued that its mark was visually, structurally and phonetically different from the cited marks, and that the phrase β€œPlanet E School” had to be considered in its full commercial form.

    Court rejects a fragmented comparison of trademarks

    The Court found that the cited registrations and the applied-for mark shared elements such as β€œPlanet” and β€œE.” But that commonality alone was not enough to establish deceptive similarity.

    The Court applied the anti-dissection rule, a central principle of trademark law. Under this rule, a composite trademark must be evaluated in its entirety. Courts should not split a mark into individual words or components and compare those isolated pieces with portions of another mark.

    The relevant question is the overall impression created for an ordinary consumer. In this case, the Court held that the cited marks, when viewed as whole marks, were not prima facie similar or deceptively similar to β€œPlanet E School.” The Section 11 objection was therefore found to lack merit.

    Generic words can form a distinctive combination

    The Court also addressed the distinctiveness objection under Section 9. It accepted that β€œPlanet,” β€œE,” and β€œSchool,” viewed individually, are generic or commonly used expressions. Yet it held that their combination in the phrase β€œPlanet E School” creates a distinctive and unique commercial identity.

    This distinction is important for trademark applicants. A mark does not necessarily fail because some or all of its individual elements are descriptive, ordinary or generic. The legal assessment must focus on whether the combination, taken as a whole, can distinguish one party’s services from those of others.

    The Registry’s one-line refusal was inadequate

    A significant feature of the judgment is the Court’s criticism of the refusal order itself. The Registry had issued a one-line rejection without explaining how the mark failed under Sections 9 and 11. It also did not address the detailed reply filed by the applicant in response to the First Examination Report.

    The decision reinforces that trademark refusals must be reasoned. Where an applicant has placed substantive arguments on record, the Registry must engage with those arguments rather than issue a conclusory order.

    Conditions attached to the registration process

    Although the Court allowed the appeal, it imposed two important qualifications:

    • No exclusive right over β€œPlanet” alone: Grey Matters Educational Trust cannot claim exclusive rights in the standalone word β€œPlanet.”
    • Punjab-only territorial restriction: Use of the β€œPlanet E School” mark is restricted to the State of Punjab.

    The Court directed the Trade Marks Registry to process the application and advertise the mark under the Trade Marks Act and Trade Marks Rules. Any opposition filed during the advertisement process must be decided on its own merits.

    Why the decision matters

    The ruling provides useful guidance for businesses, schools and brand owners seeking protection for composite marks:

    • A shared word does not automatically make two marks deceptively similar.
    • Composite marks should be judged by their overall visual, phonetic and structural impression.
    • Generic or common terms may still be registrable when their combination creates distinctiveness.
    • Trademark authorities must provide reasons and consider an applicant’s substantive response before refusing registration.

    In allowing the appeal, the Delhi High Court reaffirmed that trademark examination is not a word-by-word exercise: the decisive issue is the complete commercial impression a mark creates in the marketplace.

    Connected Matter

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Delhi High Court Dismisses MIAL Appeal in Mumbai Airport Sahara Lease Arbitration Dispute

    Delhi High Court Dismisses MIAL Appeal in Mumbai Airport Sahara Lease Arbitration Dispute

    Date: 21.10.2026

    The Delhi High Court has dismissed Mumbai International Airport Limited’s appeal against an arbitral award that rejected its claim that the Airports Authority of India was obliged to transfer the lessor’s interest in a long-term lease at Mumbai Airport.

    The dispute at a glance

    The case arose from the privatisation and redevelopment framework for Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj International Airport in Mumbai. Airports Authority of India (AAI) had granted Sahara (Batra) Hospitality Private Limited a 29-year lease in 2002 for approximately 30,047 square metres of airport land, running until 4 June 2031.

    In 2006, AAI and Mumbai International Airport Limited (MIAL), a joint-venture company established to operate and develop the airport, entered into the Operation, Management and Development Agreement (OMDA) and a separate lease deed. The Sahara lease was listed as an β€œExisting Lease.”

    MIAL argued that AAI was required to transfer or novate the Sahara lease, including AAI’s rights as lessor, to MIAL during the transition phase. AAI disputed that obligation. An arbitral tribunal unanimously rejected MIAL’s claims in March 2023, and a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court later refused to set aside the award. MIAL then appealed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

    MIAL’s principal arguments

    MIAL relied on the OMDA provision requiring it to use best efforts, with AAI’s reasonable assistance, to transfer or novate existing contracts and agreements connected with the airport. It contended that this provision covered the Sahara lease and required the transfer of AAI’s lessor interest.

    MIAL also pointed to several supporting circumstances:

    • AAI’s 9 June 2006 letter stating that existing commercial and land licence or lease agreements were to be assigned or novated to the joint-venture company during the transition phase.
    • AAI’s transfer of lease-related amounts to MIAL for roughly ten years before stopping the payments in April 2019.
    • Inter-Ministerial Group minutes from 2004 recommending that the Sahara lease be assigned to the joint venture.
    • Communications from the Ministry of Civil Aviation that MIAL said supported its interpretation of the privatisation arrangement.

    MIAL further argued that the Single Judge had not independently evaluated its challenge because parts of the arbitral award were reproduced in the judgment.

    AAI’s response

    AAI maintained that the contractual documents expressly excluded land subject to Existing Leases from the premises leased to MIAL. Under the arrangements, that land would become part of MIAL’s demised premises only after the relevant third-party lease expired or ended early.

    AAI submitted that the payments made to MIAL were merely an interim arrangement and did not amount to assignment, novation, waiver, or recognition that the lessor’s interest had been transferred. It also argued that ministry communications and legal opinions could not amend the bilateral OMDA.

    Court’s reasoning: arbitration review is deliberately narrow

    The Division Bench emphasised that a court reviewing an arbitral award under Section 34 cannot reassess evidence or replace the tribunal’s contractual interpretation with its own preferred view. A challenge succeeds only where a statutory ground, such as patent illegality going to the root of the matter, is established.

    The Court held that review under Section 37 is narrower still. At that stage, the appellate court examines whether the Section 34 court stayed within its jurisdiction; it does not conduct a fresh merits appeal.

    This approach reflects a central principle of Indian arbitration law: parties who choose arbitration ordinarily receive finality, subject only to limited judicial supervision to address serious defects such as perversity, disregard of vital evidence, fraud, bias, or denial of natural justice.

    Reproducing an award does not automatically make a judgment defective

    The Court rejected MIAL’s argument that the Single Judge’s decision was invalid merely because it reproduced substantial passages from the arbitral award.

    According to the Court, the decisive issue is not the amount of copied text but whether the judgment demonstrates meaningful consideration of the objections raised. A court may adopt an arbitral tribunal’s reasoning if it finds that reasoning legally sustainable. The judgment would be vulnerable only if it mechanically reproduced the award without addressing material challenges or applying the statutory test.

    On an overall reading, the Court found that the Single Judge had considered the relevant contractual framework, MIAL’s submissions, and the applicable Section 34 standard.

    Existing leases and the transfer question

    The Court recognised that MIAL’s interpretation was arguable. The OMDA provisions on the demised premises dealt with the transfer of land to MIAL, while the transition provision dealt with transfer or novation of existing contracts. Therefore, excluding the Sahara-leased land from MIAL’s premises did not automatically answer whether AAI’s separate contractual rights as lessor could be transferred.

    However, the Court held that the arbitral tribunal’s contrary reading was not so unreasonable or perverse that judicial intervention was justified. The tribunal had read the transition provision together with the specific provisions governing Existing Leases and the demised premises. That was a permissible method of contractual interpretation within the tribunal’s authority.

    The Court also clarified that Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, addresses the consequences after a lessor’s interest is transferred. It does not itself establish that AAI had a contractual duty under the OMDA to make that transfer.

    Significance of the letter, payments and ministry communications

    The Court accepted that AAI’s 9 June 2006 letter was relevant because it referred to assignment or novation of existing commercial and land lease arrangements. But it found that the letter, as a post-contractual communication, could not independently amend the OMDA. Its meaning had to be assessed alongside the executed agreements.

    Similarly, AAI’s transfer of lease-related payments to MIAL for approximately a decade could be relevant evidence of how the parties implemented the arrangement. Yet those payments did not conclusively prove that AAI’s lessor interest had been assigned or that the OMDA compelled such an assignment.

    The Ministry of Civil Aviation communications were also insufficient to overturn the award. The Court agreed that ministry involvement in airport privatisation did not mean every later communication constituted a binding statutory policy direction under Section 40 of the Airports Authority of India Act, 1994.

    Finally, the 2004 Inter-Ministerial Group recommendation to assign the Sahara lease to the joint venture formed part of the background, but it did not by itself create an enforceable contractual obligation. The parties’ legal rights had to be determined primarily from the OMDA and related executed agreements.

    Outcome and wider importance

    The appeal was dismissed, leaving the arbitral award and the Single Judge’s decision intact. MIAL did not establish a ground for interference under Section 34, and therefore could not succeed under the even more limited appellate review available under Section 37. The judgment reinforces that Indian courts will not reopen arbitration disputes simply because a different contractual interpretation is plausible. To set aside an award, the challenging party must show a serious statutory defect, not merely an arguable disagreement over the contract or the weight of evidence.

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  • Delhi HC: Composite Trademarks Must Be Evaluated as a Whole Under Section 11(1) of Trade Marks Act

    Delhi HC: Composite Trademarks Must Be Evaluated as a Whole Under Section 11(1) of Trade Marks Act

    Date: 19.10.2026

    The Delhi High Court has set aside the Trade Marks Registry’s refusal to register the word mark β€œKAMA CASA”, holding that the Registry wrongly split the composite mark into separate elements and compared them with distinct earlier device marks.

    Background of the dispute

    Modi Woodspace Private Limited applied on 29 August 2023 to register KAMA CASA as a proposed-to-be-used word mark in Classes 20 and 35. The Trade Marks Registry objected under Section 11(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which concerns the likelihood of confusion with earlier trademarks.

    After hearings, the Registrar refused the application on 21 May 2025. The refusal was based on earlier Class 20 registrations containing the terms β€œKAMA” and β€œCASA.” The Registrar concluded that combining those words in β€œKAMA CASA” could confuse consumers and traders about the commercial origin of the goods.

    Modi Woodspace appealed to the Delhi High Court under Section 91 of the Act.

    The key issue: Can a composite mark be broken into parts?

    The central issue was whether the Registrar could assess the applicant’s mark by isolating the words β€œKAMA” and β€œCASA” and comparing each part separately with different prior marks.

    The Court held that this approach was incorrect. It applied the anti-dissection rule, a settled trademark principle requiring a mark to be assessed as a whole rather than broken into individual components.

    According to the Court, KAMA CASA is a composite word mark and should have been evaluated in its entirety. The cited prior marks were device or label marks with their own visual and design elements. The Registry could not disregard those elements, extract the words β€œKAMA” and β€œCASA,” and use them separately to reject the composite word mark.

    Why the refusal was flawed

    The Court identified two material distinctions:

    • Different mark types: The applicant sought registration of a word mark, while the cited marks were device marks.
    • Improper comparison: The cited device marks could not be reduced to their word elements alone. Their overall visual presentation and device features formed part of the registered marks.

    The Court found it difficult to understand how the Registrar could conclude that the composite word mark β€œKAMA CASA” was deceptively similar to separate device marks containing β€œKAMA” and β€œCASA,” particularly when each cited mark had distinctive device elements.

    It further observed that the mere fact that the marks fell in the same class did not establish similarity or a likelihood of confusion.

    Relevance of other β€œCASA” registrations

    During the appeal, Modi Woodspace submitted a Trade Marks Registry search report showing numerous registrations containing the word β€œCASA” in the same or similar classes. Although this report had not been submitted to the Registrar during the original examination process, the Court considered it relevant.

    The presence of multiple registered marks containing β€œCASA” may be important when evaluating whether that word, in the relevant market context, can by itself justify refusal of a later composite mark. The Court therefore directed the Registrar to consider the search report in the renewed examination.

    Court’s decision

    In its judgment delivered on 22 April 2026, the Delhi High Court:

    • quashed the refusal order dated 21 May 2025;
    • revived trademark application No. 6087367 for KAMA CASA;
    • remitted the application to the Registrar of Trade Marks for a fresh, de novo consideration; and
    • required the Registrar to complete that reconsideration within four months.

    The Court clarified that its observations were made for the purpose of remand and should not be treated as a final finding that the mark must be registered.

    Significance for trademark applicants

    The ruling reinforces that trademark similarity assessments must be based on the overall commercial impression of competing marks. A registry or court should not artificially dissect a composite mark and assemble objections from separate earlier registrations unless the law and the facts justify that conclusion.

    For applicants, the decision also highlights the value of submitting marketplace and registry search evidence early. Evidence of numerous similar registrations may help place a disputed word or element in context, especially where the applicant’s mark combines common or widely used terms into a distinct overall expression.

    Ultimately, the case confirms that a Section 11(1) objection requires a careful comparison of the marks as consumers encounter them, not an isolated comparison of selected words taken out of their full visual and commercial context.

    Connected Matter

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Delhi HC: Homebuyers Cannot Bypass RERA Proceedings by Filing Fresh Civil Suits Against Builders

    Delhi HC: Homebuyers Cannot Bypass RERA Proceedings by Filing Fresh Civil Suits Against Builders

    Date: 19.10.2026

    The Delhi High Court has dismissed Lalit Kumar’s appeal against the rejection of a wide-ranging civil suit brought by 12 homebuyers against E-Homes Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., holding that the claims were vague, time-barred in part, barred by prior proceedings in part, and improperly combined multiple independent disputes.

    Background of the dispute

    The case arose from allegations by purchasers of apartments in The Jewel of Noida, a group-housing project developed by E-Homes Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. The homebuyers alleged shortcomings in the project’s development, maintenance arrangements, owners’ association, electricity services, parking, charges, and contractual documentation.

    According to the plaintiffs, the developer had represented that the project would provide high-quality facilities and amenities. They later alleged a substantial mismatch between the apartments’ actual or carpet areas and the super areas on which charges were based. They also challenged several levies, including maintenance, club, electricity-meter, preferential-location, green-belt, lease-rent, tax, and parking charges.

    The plaintiffs further alleged that the developer had not transferred maintenance responsibilities to a lawful apartment owners’ association despite possession having been offered years earlier. They disputed the formation and functioning of the registered association, claiming that it was created through irregular procedures and without proper elections.

    Reliefs sought by the homebuyers

    The suit sought a broad set of remedies, including:

    • Restoration of essential services, including garbage collection and DG electricity supply;
    • Refunds for alleged excess area charges, maintenance charges, club charges, electricity-related charges, taxes, interest, parking charges, preferential-location charges, and green-belt charges;
    • Appointment of an independent architect, consultant, or court commissioner to measure carpet area, super area, and loading;
    • Directions concerning maintenance accounts and transfer of maintenance to an owners’ association;
    • Changes to allegedly one-sided provisions in the sub-lease deeds;
    • Adequate and independent parking arrangements; and
    • Compensation, punitive damages, and rendition of accounts.

    Why the civil suit was rejected

    The trial court dismissed the suit on 31 August 2024. On appeal, the High Court found no reason to interfere with that decision.

    1. Maintenance and electricity issues had already been pursued before RERA

    The court noted that disputes concerning electricity and maintenance charges were already before U.P. RERA and were subject to related proceedings. Under Section 79 of the RERA Act, civil courts cannot entertain matters that fall within the jurisdiction of the RERA authorities or appellate tribunal.

    The court therefore held that the plaintiffs could not use a civil suit to reopen or nullify adverse outcomes from the competent regulatory forum.

    2. Monetary recovery claims were beyond limitation

    The homebuyers’ refund claims were connected to purchases that had culminated in individual sale deeds. The suit was filed in 2024, while the relevant limitation period for recovery claims based on alleged misrepresentation or fraudulent sale was treated as three years.

    The court found that these claims were filed too late and were consequently barred by limitation.

    3. Earlier suits had been withdrawn

    The record showed that earlier civil suits concerning maintenance and electricity had been filed and later withdrawn. The High Court observed that where a suit is withdrawn without liberty to file afresh, Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code prevents a party from bringing another suit on the same cause of action.

    The plaintiffs had not specifically shown that permission had been obtained to preserve their right to refile those claims. The court also endorsed the trial court’s concern that repeated proceedings before different forums amounted to forum hunting.

    4. The suit combined distinct claims of 12 purchasers

    The court stressed that each of the 12 plaintiffs had an individual transaction and a separate cause of action. Their claims could not be treated as one consolidated dispute merely because they related to the same housing project.

    The pleading was therefore held to suffer from misjoinder of parties and causes of action. The claims were also viewed as unquantified, omnibus, and insufficiently specific, particularly because several refund demands were left to be determined later through a proposed local commissioner.

    High Court’s ruling

    Justice Neena Bansal Krishna dismissed Regular First Appeal No. 949/2025 on 11 May 2026. The court affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that the suit was an abuse of the legal process and upheld the dismissal with costs of Rs. 3,000 imposed on each plaintiff.

    Only Lalit Kumar pursued the appeal, while the other original plaintiffs were not parties to the appeal. The court found no merit in the challenge and disposed of the pending applications.

    Key legal takeaway

    The ruling shows that homebuyer grievances, even where numerous and connected to one project, must be pursued before the appropriate forum, within the applicable limitation period, and through precise, properly structured pleadings. A consolidated civil suit cannot be used to revisit matters already adjudicated or pending before RERA, nor to combine unquantified and legally distinct claims of multiple purchasers.

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  • Delhi High Court Upholds DMRC’s Refusal to Reimburse Rs.4.46 Crore in DVAT to L&T

    Delhi High Court Upholds DMRC’s Refusal to Reimburse Rs.4.46 Crore in DVAT to L&T

    Date: 18.10.2026

    The Delhi High Court has dismissed Larsen & Toubro Limited’s challenge to an arbitral award that denied reimbursement of Rs.4.46 crore in Delhi Value Added Tax (DVAT) from Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. (DMRC), holding that the relevant supplies were connected to inter-State trade and import transactions and therefore fell outside DVAT.

    The dispute: tax reimbursement under a metro contract

    The case arose from a 2008 DMRC contract awarded to a consortium comprising Larsen & Toubro (L&T) and Furrer + Frey AG. The contract concerned the design, supply, installation, testing and commissioning of a 25 kV rigid overhead contact system and related cabling for sections of Delhi Metro’s Phase-II network.

    The contract value was approximately Rs.43.37 crore, along with USD 2.02 million and Swiss Franc 5.49 million. It required the contractor to deliver and install equipment including contact wires, traction cables, sectioning posts, sub-sectioning posts, return conductors and associated systems.

    A key contractual clause provided that DMRC would reimburse DVAT or Uttar Pradesh trade tax, where applicable, on indigenous equipment upon proof of actual payment. L&T argued that it had paid DVAT of Rs.4,45,73,743 on the equipment and systems supplied to DMRC in Delhi and was entitled to reimbursement.

    Why L&T claimed DVAT reimbursement

    L&T procured high-voltage and low-voltage panels, cables and other components from suppliers outside Delhi. Some high-voltage panels were imported from Germany by an Indian supplier, while certain other materials were obtained through inter-State transactions.

    According to L&T, these components were not supplied to DMRC as standalone items. Instead, they were transported to project sites, assembled, integrated, installed and commissioned into sectioning and sub-sectioning posts and other bill-of-quantities items. L&T maintained that the completed systems were commercially distinct products supplied to DMRC in Delhi, making the transactions local sales subject to DVAT.

    L&T also relied on two aspects of DMRC’s conduct:

    • DMRC initially reimbursed one DVAT invoice, though it later recovered the amount from L&T’s running bills.
    • DMRC deducted works-contract tax at source from invoices, which L&T argued showed that DMRC had treated the supplies as local transactions.

    DMRC’s position: the supplies were exempt from DVAT

    DMRC argued that reimbursement was only available where DVAT was legally applicable. It contended that the goods were procured specifically for the metro project through imports and inter-State purchases, meaning that the transactions were exempt from DVAT under Section 7 of the DVAT Act.

    DMRC relied on facts showing a close contractual connection between the goods and the project:

    • DMRC prescribed technical specifications for the equipment.
    • It approved the suppliers, including the foreign supplier of the high-voltage panels.
    • It required pre-inspection of goods.
    • The goods were custom-made for the metro project.
    • DMRC issued customs and excise-duty exemption certificates.
    • The invoices and packaging identified DMRC as the consignee or stated that the goods were for the DMRC project.

    DMRC maintained that these facts established that the movement of goods into Delhi, whether from another State or from abroad, was occasioned by and integral to the underlying works contract.

    Arbitration award: no reimbursement due

    The arbitral tribunal rejected L&T’s claim in its entirety and issued a nil award. It concluded that the imported high-voltage panels and the materials procured from outside Delhi were directly connected with the DMRC contract.

    The tribunal found that the relevant domestic procurements were inter-State sales subject to Central Sales Tax, while the imported equipment was part of a transaction in the course of import. As these categories are excluded from DVAT under Section 7 of the DVAT Act, DMRC was not required to reimburse the tax paid by L&T.

    The tribunal also held that DMRC’s initial reimbursement of one invoice and later recovery of that amount was a rectifiable mistake, not an admission that DVAT was properly payable. Since the principal claim failed, the tribunal rejected L&T’s claims for interest and arbitration costs as well.

    High Court’s analysis: contractual tax disputes can be arbitrated

    Before addressing the tax issue, the Court considered L&T’s argument that an arbitral tribunal could not decide whether DVAT applied because taxability is a matter for statutory authorities.

    The Court rejected that objection. It drew a distinction between disputes that require a binding statutory tax determination and disputes between contracting parties over tax reimbursement or allocation of tax liability. The latter category is contractual and can be resolved through arbitration.

    Here, the dispute centred on whether DMRC was contractually obliged to reimburse DVAT under the relevant clause. The Court held that this was an arbitrable issue between the parties.

    ABB precedent was decisive

    The Court held that the case was squarely governed by the earlier decision in ABB Ltd., which had been affirmed by the Supreme Court. That precedent involved a DMRC works contract for electrical and traction systems and examined whether goods procured from outside Delhi or through import were subject to DVAT.

    The governing test is whether the movement of goods is integrally connected with the contract for their supply. An express contractual clause requiring inter-State movement is not necessary. It is enough if the movement is pursuant to, or incidental to, the contract.

    Applying this principle, the Court found a direct and continuing link between the procurement of the panels and other equipment and L&T’s obligations to DMRC. The fact that L&T integrated the input materials into sectioning and sub-sectioning posts did not break that connection.

    Limited judicial review under Section 34

    The Court emphasised that a Section 34 petition is not an appeal against an arbitral award. A court cannot reassess the evidence merely because another interpretation may be possible. Intervention is warranted only on narrow grounds, such as patent illegality going to the root of the matter.

    The tribunal had considered the relevant invoices, supplier approvals, customs exemptions, project specifications, consignment details and the parties’ submissions. Its conclusion that the supplies were linked to inter-State trade and import was therefore a plausible view supported by the record.

    Outcome and practical significance

    The Delhi High Court dismissed L&T’s petition, upheld the nil arbitral award and made no order on costs.

    The ruling reinforces two important principles for infrastructure and works-contract disputes:

    1. Tax reimbursement clauses depend on legal applicability. A contractual promise to reimburse VAT does not require reimbursement where the transaction is legally exempt from that State tax.
    2. The contractual nexus of goods movement is critical. In projects involving customized equipment, approved suppliers, import-duty exemptions and project-specific consignments, the movement of goods may remain an import or inter-State transaction even after installation or integration into a larger system.

    The decision also confirms that arbitrators may decide contractual disputes over which party must bear or reimburse tax, provided they are not purporting to replace the statutory tax authorities on matters that require a binding public-law tax determination.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi