Tag: #DutyExemption

  • Delhi HC: Trade Marks Registry Cannot Remove Mark Without Complying With Mandatory Section 25(3) Notice

    Delhi HC: Trade Marks Registry Cannot Remove Mark Without Complying With Mandatory Section 25(3) Notice

    Date: 03.10.2026

    In an important ruling concerning renewal and removal of registered trademarks, the Delhi High Court has held that the statutory obligation imposed upon the Registrar of Trade Marks under Section 25(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 to send notice of expiry to the registered proprietor cannot be treated as a mere procedural formality.

    Justice Tushar Rao Gedela described the requirement under Section 25(3) as β€œsacrosanct”, observing that expiry of a trademark registration can have drastic consequences, including exposing the mark to adoption by third parties and generating avoidable litigation.

    Allowing the writ petition filed by Coldsmiths Retail Services Private Limited, the Court permitted the company to file fresh Form TM-R for all eight trademarks, subject to payment of the prescribed fee and applicable fine.

    Coldsmiths Sought Protection of Eight Registered Trademarks

    • The petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India sought directions restraining the Registrar of Trade Marks from removing eight trademarks bearing Registration Nos. 1214096, 1214098, 1214099, 1214100, 1214102, 1214103, 1214104 and 1214105 from the Register on the ground of non-renewal.
    • Coldsmiths also sought a direction requiring the Registrar to renew the registrations.
    • The registrations originated from applications filed on 14 July 2003 by Nirula’s Corner House Private Limited, the petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest. Registration certificates for the eight marks were subsequently issued between December 2005 and March 2007.

    Trademarks Assigned to Coldsmiths

    • On 3 January 2018, Nirula’s Corner House executed an assignment deed transferring ownership of the trademarks to Coldsmiths Retail Services Private Limited.
    • Thereafter, a new agent, Mr. Munesh Kumar Gaur, was appointed and previous authorisations were revoked.
    • On 12 January 2018, Form TM-M along with the Power of Attorney was filed with the Trade Marks Registry requesting that communications concerning the trademarks be sent to the newly appointed agent. Coldsmiths simultaneously filed Form TM-P for each trademark to record the change of ownership.
    • The Registry acted upon Form TM-P and changed the registered proprietor’s name to Coldsmiths.

    Expiry Notices Allegedly Sent to Former Agent

    • The eight registrations were valid until 14 July 2023.
    • According to the Registry, notices under Section 25(3) were issued on 7 June 2023 in respect of seven of the eight trademarks. The judgment records that there appeared to be no such notice for the β€œPineapple Pop” trademark in Class 30.
    • Coldsmiths maintained that neither it nor its newly appointed authorised agent received the statutory expiry notices.
    • When the company later attempted to file Form TM-R seeking renewal, the online portal blocked the application on the ground that the delay was more than one year. This prompted Coldsmiths to approach the Delhi High Court.

    Registry Continued to Recognise the Former Agent

    • The dispute arose because the Trade Marks Registry continued to show Mr. Sashidhar S., the former agent, in its records.
    • Coldsmiths argued that the Registry had already been informed that Mr. Munesh Kumar Gaur had been appointed as the new authorised agent and that all previous authorisations stood revoked. Nevertheless, the statutory notices were issued to the former agent rather than to Coldsmiths or its actual authorised representative.
    • The Registry’s explanation was that the Form TM-M seeking change of authorised agent had not been accompanied by the prescribed β‚Ή900 fee, and therefore the previous agent’s name continued to remain in the records.

    Delhi HC Rejects Registry’s β‚Ή900 Fee Defence

    • The High Court was not persuaded by this explanation.
    • The Court found that the assignment, Power of Attorney and Form TM-M clearly demonstrated that the former agent’s authority had been revoked and Mr. Munesh Kumar Gaur had been appointed as the new agent.
    • It further noted that Coldsmiths had filed Form TM-P for all eight trademarks and paid the prescribed β‚Ή9,000 fee, following which the Registry itself changed the name of the registered proprietor to Coldsmiths.
    • The Court held that if there was a deficiency arising from non-payment of β‚Ή900 with Form TM-M, the Registry ought to have informed the petitioner of that deficiency. Having failed to do so, it could not subsequently place the fault entirely upon the trademark proprietor.

    Notice Sent to Unauthorised Former Agent Is Not Valid Compliance

    • This became one of the most important findings of the judgment.
    • The High Court noted that although RG-3 notices had been issued, they had been sent to a person who was no longer the petitioner’s authorised agent when those notices were issued.
    • The Court observed that the Power of Attorney and Forms TM-M clearly indicated that Mr. Munesh Kumar Gaur was authorised to receive communications from the Trade Marks Registry.
    • The Court further held that mere non-payment of the fee associated with Form TM-M could not ipso facto deprive Coldsmiths of its entitlement to receive the statutory notices under Section 25(3).
    • Significantly, Section 25(3) itself contemplates notice to the registered proprietor. Therefore, if the Registry had any doubt regarding the status of the authorised agent, it could and should have sent the expiry notice directly to Coldsmiths.

    Section 25(3) Obligation Is on Registrar, Not Trademark Proprietor

    • The Court undertook a detailed examination of the statutory mandate contained in Section 25(3).
    • It held that the Legislature had placed an obligation upon the Registrar to send notice, in the prescribed manner, to the registered proprietor informing it of the date of expiration and the conditions relating to payment of renewal fees.
    • The Registrar must therefore satisfy itself that the notice is issued to the registered proprietor or its duly authorised agent and must remain vigilant regarding any change in authorisation communicated to the Registry.
    • The Court emphasised that failure to renew a trademark can produce drastic consequences: the registration may lapse and the mark may become susceptible to adoption by a third party.

    It therefore held that the Section 25(3) requirement could not be reduced to a procedural technicality:

    β€œThe provision of Section 25(3) of the Act is sacrosanct.”

    Sending RG-3 Notice to Unauthorised Person Does Not Satisfy Statute

    • Applying that principle to the facts, the High Court held that sending the Section 25(3)/RG-3 notices to a person who was not the authorised agent on the relevant date could not amount to compliance with the statutory mandate under the Trade Marks Act and Rules.
    • This finding is particularly significant for trademark proprietors because it distinguishes between the mere generation or issuance of a notice and legally compliant communication to the person contemplated by the statute.

    Registry Cannot Shift Entire Responsibility to Trademark Owner

    • The Registrar argued that Coldsmiths could independently have applied for renewal before expiry or within the subsequent six-month statutory period.
    • The Delhi High Court expressly rejected this argument.
    • It held that the mandate under Section 25(3) lies upon the Registrar and not the petitioner. Consequently, the Registry could not defend its own failure to comply with the statutory notice requirement merely by arguing that the trademark proprietor should have acted independently.

    Delay and Laches Cannot Defeat Renewal Where Valid Notice Was Never Sent

    • The Registry also resisted relief on the ground that Coldsmiths had approached the Court after the registrations had already expired.
    • The High Court rejected this objection by relying upon the Division Bench decision in Charanjiv Kumar Taneja Trading as Chirag Enterprises v. Registrar of Trade Marks, LPA 461/2023, decided on 25 July 2023.
    • In Charanjiv Kumar, the Division Bench had held that trademark renewal or removal does not hinge simply upon the doctrine of laches. Section 25 imposes a positive obligation upon the Trade Marks Registry to send the prescribed notice.
    • Importantly, the Division Bench had distinguished between generation of a notice and actually sending or dispatching it, holding that mere generation does not satisfy the statutory obligation.
    • The Court also noted that Charanjiv Kumar had permitted renewal even after 16 years because no valid notice had been issued. It held that the ratio applied squarely to Coldsmiths’ case both on merits and on the issue of delay and laches.

    Removal of Trademark Is Not Automatic

    • The judgment also reproduces an important principle from Charanjiv Kumar concerning the language of Section 25(3).
    • The provision states that the Registrar β€œmay remove” a trademark if the registered proprietor fails to comply with the conditions specified in the statutory notice.
    • The Division Bench had held that this language negates the assumption that removal is an automatic or inevitable consequence of failure to renew within time.
    • Thus, the statutory notice assumes particular importance before the serious consequence of removal from the Register can follow.

    Delhi HC Allows Coldsmiths to File Fresh TM-R Applications

    • Having found the statutory notice requirement unfulfilled, the Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition.
    • Coldsmiths was permitted to file fresh Form TM-R in respect of all eight registered trademarks within 10 days, upon payment of the prescribed fee and any fine payable under the Trade Marks Rules.
    • The Registrar was directed to accept the applications and process them in accordance with the Rules.
    • The entire exercise was directed to be completed within eight weeks from receipt of the Court’s order.
    • It is important to note that the Court did not simply declare the registrations automatically renewed. Rather, it reopened the statutory renewal route by permitting fresh TM-R applications and directing the Registrar to accept and process them in accordance with the Rules.

    Key Legal Principles Emerging From the Judgment

    The judgment establishes several important principles for trademark renewal proceedings:

    • Section 25(3) creates a positive statutory obligation upon the Registrar to send the prescribed expiry notice to the registered proprietor.
    • A notice sent to a person who is no longer the authorised agent may not constitute valid statutory compliance.
    • Where the Registry has been informed of a change of agent, it must remain vigilant about the correct recipient of statutory communications.
    • If the Registry doubts the agent’s authority, the Section 25(3) notice can be sent directly to the registered proprietor.
    • Failure to pay a fee connected with change of agent does not automatically deprive the registered proprietor of the statutory right to receive an expiry notice.
    • The Registrar cannot shift the statutory burden under Section 25(3) entirely onto the trademark proprietor.
    • Mere generation of a statutory notice is distinguishable from actually sending it in accordance with law.
    • Delay and laches do not by themselves defeat renewal where the mandatory statutory notice was never validly sent.
    • Removal of a trademark is not necessarily automatic merely because the registration period has expired.

    Why the Judgment Matters

    The ruling has considerable practical significance for trademark owners, assignees and IP practitioners, particularly where ownership or authorised representatives have changed during the life of a registration.

    The judgment places responsibility on the Trade Marks Registry to ensure that its records and statutory communications reflect material changes properly brought to its notice. More importantly, it prevents the drastic consequence of losing a registered trademark from being founded merely upon an administrative communication sent to an unauthorised person. At the same time, trademark owners should continue to independently monitor renewal deadlines.

    The judgment provides relief based on the Registry’s failure to discharge the specific statutory obligation under Section 25(3); it should not be read as eliminating the proprietor’s broader commercial interest in timely renewal.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • No Narcotic Substance Found in Accused’s Possession: Telangana HC Grants Bail

    No Narcotic Substance Found in Accused’s Possession: Telangana HC Grants Bail

    Date: 03.10.2026

    The Telangana High Court has granted bail to a fourth-year B.Tech student arraigned as Accused No. 6 in an NDPS case after noting that no hash oil, ganja or Tapentadol tablets were recovered from his possession, while the narcotic substances forming the subject matter of the prosecution case were seized from other accused persons.

    Justice B.R. Madhusudhan Rao allowed the bail petition filed by Viskamalla Vishal in connection with FIR No. 326 of 2026 registered at Karimnagar Rural Police Station, subject to a personal bond of β‚Ή25,000 with two sureties and other conditions.

    NDPS and BNS Offences Alleged

    • The criminal petition was filed under Sections 480 and 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) seeking regular bail.
    • The petitioner was accused of offences under Sections 8(c) read with 20(b)(ii)(A)(B), 27(a) and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, along with Sections 271, 272, 223 and 125 read with Section 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

    Prosecution Case

    • According to the complaint, on 28 August 2026, police personnel were patrolling near the Karimnagar-Peddapalli railway line on the outskirts of Bommakal when they noticed certain persons in suspicious circumstances.
    • The police apprehended them and allegedly found hash oil and 50 mg Tapentadol tablets. Mediators were called and a confession-cum-seizure panchanama was conducted, following which FIR No. 326 of 2026 was registered.
    • The petitioner was arrested on the same day and remanded to judicial custody.

    No Narcotic Substance Recovered From Petitioner

    • The central factor emerging from the order was the absence of recovery of any narcotic substance from Accused No. 6.
    • The petitioner’s counsel argued that the remand report itself demonstrated that no contraband, narcotic drug or psychotropic substance was recovered from either the physical or conscious possession of the petitioner.
    • According to the defence, 500 grams of hash oil was recovered from Accused No. 1 and 500 grams of ganja from Accused No. 2, while the only article allegedly seized from Viskamalla Vishal was his Redmi 9 Power mobile phone.
    • The State opposed the application, submitting that the petitioner’s role was reflected in the remand case diary.

    Court Examines Accused-Wise Recoveries

    The High Court examined the remand case diary and specifically recorded the recoveries attributed to the different accused.

    The Court noted that:

    • Hash oil was seized from Accused No. 1 – Morri Akash;
    • Ganja was seized from Accused No. 2 – P. Vishnu Sai @ Manoj; and
    • Tapentadol tablets of 50 mg were seized from Accused No. 3 – B. Nithin.
    • As regards Viskamalla Vishal, the remand case diary showed seizure only of a Redmi 9 Power mobile phone from his possession. The case diary also described him as a consumer of hash oil.
    • Importantly, the High Court did not record any recovery of hash oil, ganja or Tapentadol tablets from the petitioner’s possession.

    Petitioner Was a Fourth-Year B.Tech Student

    • Another fact specifically noticed by the High Court was that the petitioner was a fourth-year B.Tech student.
    • After considering his role as reflected in the remand case diary and the fact that the contraband substances were recovered from other accused persons, the Court concluded that Accused No. 6 had made out a case for grant of bail.
    • The order should, however, be understood as a bail determination and not an adjudication on the petitioner’s guilt or innocence. The criminal proceedings remain subject to investigation, filing of the charge sheet and trial in accordance with law.

    Investigation Substantially Completed

    • The petitioner had been arrested on 28 August 2026. His counsel submitted that the police had completed the investigation and only the filing of the charge sheet remained.
    • This was relied upon along with the absence of recovery from the petitioner’s physical or conscious possession in seeking his release on bail.

    Telangana High Court Grants Bail

    • After considering the record, the High Court held that the petitioner had made out a case for bail.
    • The Court directed him to execute a personal bond of β‚Ή25,000 with two sureties for the like amount each, to the satisfaction of the I Additional Sessions Judge, Karimnagar.
    • The petitioner was also directed to appear before the concerned Station House Officer every Sunday between 10:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. for eight weeks or until filing of the charge sheet, whichever is earlier, and thereafter whenever required for investigation.
    • He was further directed to comply with the conditions under Section 437(3) CrPC, presently Section 480(3) BNSS, and prohibited from directly or indirectly influencing, threatening or inducing prosecution witnesses.
    • The Court made it clear that violation of any of these conditions would entitle the prosecution to seek cancellation of bail.
    • Accordingly, the criminal petition was allowed and pending miscellaneous applications were closed.

    Key Legal Significance

    The order is significant from the perspective of individualised consideration of an accused’s role in an NDPS prosecution. Although several persons were allegedly apprehended in connection with the same incident, the High Court specifically examined which substance was recovered from which accused.

    For Accused No. 6, the record before the Court showed only the seizure of his mobile phone, whereas the hash oil, ganja and Tapentadol tablets were attributed to other accused persons.

    The decision therefore demonstrates the importance, at the bail stage, of examining the specific role attributed to an individual accused and the nature of the recovery, if any, from that accused, rather than treating all persons implicated in the same FIR identically. At the same time, the order does not acquit the petitioner, quash the FIR, or finally determine whether the allegations under Sections 27(a) and 29 of the NDPS Act or the BNS provisions are established. It grants conditional bail pending further criminal proceedings.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • CESTAT Allahabad: Section 17(5) Acceptance Waives Speaking Order, Not Right to Challenge Reassessment

    CESTAT Allahabad: Section 17(5) Acceptance Waives Speaking Order, Not Right to Challenge Reassessment

    Date: 03.10.2026

    In an important ruling on Customs valuation and the statutory right of an importer to challenge reassessment, the CESTAT Allahabad has allowed eight appeals filed by M/s Seafox Impex and set aside the common Order-in-Appeal that had sustained enhancement of the declared value of imported polyester knitted fabrics.

    The Tribunal held that the dispute was squarely covered by the Delhi High Court’s ruling in Niraj Silk Mills v. Commissioner of Customs (ICD), Patparganj, which recognised that an importer’s written acceptance of reassessment under Section 17(5) of the Customs Act, 1962 may dispense with the requirement of a speaking order, but does not deprive the importer of the statutory right to subsequently challenge the correctness of the reassessment.

    Background: Import of Polyester Knitted Fabrics From China

    • Seafox Impex was engaged in importing various goods, including mixed lots of 100% polyester knitted fabrics in rolls of assorted colours and weights from China.
    • The dispute involved eight consignments imported between 17 July 2020 and 3 November 2020. The declared unit prices ranged from approximately USD 1.11 to USD 1.30 per kg, whereas Customs enhanced the unit prices to figures ranging from approximately USD 1.626 to USD 1.972 per kg.
    • On examination, the goods were found to be as per the declarations. However, after comparison with contemporaneous import data, Customs raised a query and sought further details concerning the composition, dimensions and other characteristics of the fabrics.
    • Thereafter, the Department proposed rejection of the declared transaction value under Rule 12 of the Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Imported Goods) Rules, 2007.

    Importer Alleged It Was Compelled to Accept Enhanced Valuation

    • Seafox Impex argued that it had correctly self-assessed Customs duty on the basis of the respective commercial invoices. However, no Out of Charge orders were initially passed.
    • According to the importer, it repeatedly requested the proper officer to clear the consignments provisionally by allowing payment of duty on the enhanced value under protest, so as to avoid delay in clearance.
    • The appellant alleged that these requests were not acted upon and that it was ultimately coerced into submitting letters accepting the valuation proposed by Customs. It subsequently requested speaking orders, but none were issued.
    • The Department maintained that reassessment had been carried out under Section 17(4) on the basis of the written consent and, therefore, a speaking order was not required under Section 17(5).
    • The Commissioner (Appeals) accepted that position and rejected Seafox Impex’s appeals essentially on the ground that the importer had accepted the enhanced valuation in writing.

    Can an Importer Appeal After Accepting Enhanced Value?

    • This became the central question before CESTAT.
    • Seafox Impex argued that even assuming there had been written acceptance of the enhanced valuation, such acceptance could not prevent the importer from challenging the reassessment through the statutory appellate process.
    • For this proposition, reliance was placed on Dunlop India Limited v. Union of India, 1983 (13) ELT 1566 (SC), with the appellant contending that there could be no estoppel against law.
    • The Tribunal ultimately accepted the importer’s position by applying the subsequent Delhi High Court ruling in Niraj Silk Mills.

    Section 17(5) Waiver Is Limited to Speaking Order

    • A particularly important aspect of the decision concerns the legal effect of an importer’s written acceptance under Section 17(5) of the Customs Act.
    • The Tribunal reproduced the Delhi High Court’s reasoning in Niraj Silk Mills, where the High Court explained that when an importer accepts the reassessment in writing, the proper officer is relieved of the obligation to pass a speaking order.
    • However, that concession is limited to the requirement of a speaking order. It cannot be expanded into an abandonment of the importer’s right to challenge the reassessment itself.
    • The Delhi High Court had held that the right to question the correctness of the proper officer’s decisionβ€”whether regarding formation of opinion or on meritsβ€”is protected by statute.
    • Accordingly, written acceptance of enhanced valuation does not, by itself, create an absolute bar against an appeal challenging the legality or correctness of that valuation.

    Transaction Value Cannot Be Rejected Without Following Section 14 and Rule 12

    • Seafox Impex also challenged the very manner in which Customs had rejected its declared transaction value.
    • The appellant relied heavily upon the Supreme Court judgment in Century Metal Recycling Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2019 (367) ELT 3 (SC).
    • The Tribunal noted that the Supreme Court had held that the mandate under Rule 12(2) of the Customs Valuation Rules, 2007 cannot simply be ignored or waived. Where the proper officer doubts the truth or accuracy of the declared value, formation of that reasonable doubt and communication of the grounds to the importer are mandatory in the circumstances contemplated by Rule 12.
    • The Supreme Court had also emphasised that rejection of transaction value must rest on facts and figures, and that statutory safeguards cannot be bypassed through procedural shortcuts.
    • CESTAT consequently examined the reassessment against Section 14 of the Customs Act read with Rule 12 of the Customs Valuation Rules, 2007.

    Acceptance Letter Did Not Disclose Contemporaneous Import Details

    • The Tribunal found an important evidentiary deficiency in the purported acceptance letters.
    • Although those letters stated that the grounds for rejecting the declared value had been explained and that details concerning contemporaneous imports of identical or similar goods had been shown to the importer, the actual details of those alleged contemporaneous imports were not mentioned in the letters.
    • CESTAT observed that there was a β€œwide gap” which had not been bridged by the Revenue, and therefore the contents of those communications could not simply be accepted at face value.
    • This finding is significant because it demonstrates that a generic statement that contemporaneous data was shown to the importer may not, by itself, establish the evidentiary foundation required for rejecting the declared transaction value.

    NIDB Data Alone Cannot Sustain Enhancement of Customs Value

    • Another major issue was whether Customs could enhance the value principally on the basis of NIDB data.
    • The Tribunal relied upon Niraj Silk Mills, in which the Delhi High Court had examined the jurisprudence on valuation additions based on NIDB data.
    • The High Court had observed that valuation enhancement based solely on NIDB data would be unwarranted and that reassessment must be supported by independent and cogent evidence.
    • External data without corroborative evidence or clear justification would not satisfy the requirements governing Customs valuation. Any departure from the declared transaction value must therefore be based upon tangible and justiciable material.
    • This principle assumes particular importance in valuation disputes involving commodities whose commercial price may vary according to characteristics such as quality, composition, quantity, GSM, specifications, commercial level, timing and other transaction-specific factors.
    • Indeed, Seafox Impex specifically argued that even comparison under the Customs Valuation Rules required consideration of parameters such as quantity, GSM, quality and timing of the import transaction.

    Department Relied on S.S. Overseas

    • The Revenue relied upon the Allahabad High Court decision in M/s S.S. Overseas & Ors., Writ Tax No. 881/2022, contending that once enhancement of value had been accepted in writing, there was no requirement to issue a speaking order under Section 17(5).
    • The Department further pointed out that the Supreme Court had dismissed the SLP arising from that matter.
    • Seafox Impex distinguished the case, arguing that S.S. Overseas concerned provisional assessment and non-issuance of speaking orders while finalising Bills of Entry. It also relied upon Kunhayammed & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Anr., (2000) 6 SCC 359, for the proposition concerning the legal effect of dismissal of an SLP and the doctrine of merger.

    CESTAT Finds Niraj Silk Mills Squarely Applicable

    • After considering the competing submissions and authorities, the Allahabad Bench held that the issues before it were squarely covered by the Delhi High Court’s decision in Niraj Silk Mills.

    That judgment had directly considered two crucial questions relevant to Seafox Impex:

    • first, whether Customs could enhance declared value based on NIDB data and acceptance letters; and second, whether an importer who had given an acceptance letter was thereafter prevented from challenging the reassessment.
    • The Delhi High Court had answered the relevant question in favour of the importers and restored the orders of the Commissioner (Appeals) in those proceedings.

    Eight Appeals Allowed; Orders-in-Appeal Set Aside

    CESTAT ultimately concluded that the common Orders-in-Appeal challenged by Seafox Impex were not sustainable in law.

    Accordingly, the Tribunal:

    • set aside the impugned Orders-in-Appeal; allowed all eight appeals filed by Seafox Impex; and granted consequential relief, if any, in accordance with law.
    • The ruling therefore represents a clear appellate victory for the importer in the valuation dispute.

    Cases Referred to in the Decision

    The principal authorities discussed or relied upon include:

    • Dunlop India Limited v. Union of India, 1983 (13) ELT 1566 (SC) β€” relied upon for the proposition that there can be no estoppel against law.
    • Century Metal Recycling Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2019 (367) ELT 3 (SC) β€” concerning Rule 12 and the requirement of reasonable doubt and compliance with the statutory valuation mechanism.
    • Niraj Silk Mills v. Commissioner of Customs (ICD), Patparganj, CUSAA 26/2022, Delhi High Court, decided 27.11.2024 β€” the principal authority ultimately found to squarely cover Seafox Impex’s appeals.
    • M/s S.S. Overseas & Ors., Writ Tax No. 881/2022 β€” relied upon by Revenue.
    • Kunhayammed & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Anr., (2000) 6 SCC 359 β€” relied upon regarding dismissal of an SLP and merger.
    • M/s Century Metal Recycling Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, Faridabad, Customs Appeal No. 61303/2019, Final Order Nos. 60266–60349/2025 dated 27.02.2025, CESTAT Chandigarh.
    • Commissioner of Customs, Patparganj v. M/s Artex Textile Private Limited, Customs Appeal Nos. 51414, 52809 and 52810–52864/2019, Final Order Nos. 50769–50825/2020.

    Key Legal Takeaways for Importers

    The decision reinforces three significant propositions in Customs valuation disputes.

    First, acceptance of reassessment in writing under Section 17(5) does not necessarily extinguish the importer’s statutory right to challenge that reassessment in appeal. The effect of such acceptance is principally to relieve the proper officer from passing a speaking order in respect of the accepted reassessment.

    Second, declared transaction value cannot be discarded mechanically. The requirements of Section 14 and the Customs Valuation Rules, particularly Rule 12, must be observed before moving away from the transaction value. Third, NIDB data by itself cannot automatically justify enhancement.

    reassessment must be supported by appropriate, independent and cogent material capable of establishing why the declared value is unacceptable and why the proposed comparison is legally and factually appropriate.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • P&H HC Orders Release of Imported Goods Withheld Despite Customs Clearance and Detention Certificate

    P&H HC Orders Release of Imported Goods Withheld Despite Customs Clearance and Detention Certificate

    Date: 02.10.2026

    The Punjab and Haryana High Court has granted significant relief to M/s SAB Tera Enterprises, directing the release of two consignments of imported Low Alloy Steel Scrap that remained withheld despite completion of Customs proceedings, payment of enhanced customs duty and issuance of detention certificates.

    The Division Bench held that an importer cannot be penalised for delays entirely attributable to the respondents, and that disputes among Customs authorities, the shipping line and the custodian cannot be used to deny physical delivery of imported goods after Customs formalities have been completed.

    The Court further clarified that the importer would not be liable for detention charges, container detention charges, ground rent or demurrage for the period during which the goods remained detained pursuant to Customs orders, as covered by the detention certificates.

    Background of the Dispute

    • SAB Tera Enterprises imported two consignments of Low Alloy Steel Scrap under Bill of Entry Nos. 9494291 dated 1 January 2024 and 9515603 dated 3 January 2024. The consignments were lying at ICD-Adani, Kila Raipur, Ludhiana.
    • The importer approached the High Court because, despite clearance by Customs and issuance of detention certificates, the goods were not physically released due to disputes among the respondents concerning waiver of detention/demurrage charges and issuance of delivery orders.
    • The goods were initially detained by Customs on 24 January 2024 and subsequently seized on 14 March 2024 for detailed examination under Section 110 of the Customs Act, 1962. Customs ultimately reassessed the consignments, following which the importer paid the requisite enhanced customs duty.
    • After completion of the proceedings, Customs issued communications and detention certificates dated 6 May 2024, directing waiver of detention charges and demurrage for the period during which the consignments remained under Customs control. These certificates were addressed to both the shipping line and the custodian.

    Importer: Detention Certificates Had Attained Finality

    • The petitioner argued that despite repeated representations and service of the detention certificates, the shipping line failed to issue delivery orders, resulting in continued non-release of the goods.
    • Reliance was placed on the Handling of Cargo in Customs Areas Regulations, 2009 (HCCAR) and the Sea Cargo Manifest and Transhipment Regulations, 2018 (SCMTR).
    • The importer also submitted that the respondents had not challenged the detention certificates dated 6 May 2024 before the Appellate Authority and, therefore, the certificates had attained finality. The Court was also informed that in an identical matter, CWP No. 13014 of 2024, an appeal filed against a detention-waiver certificate had been dismissed by the Appellate Authority on 3 February 2026.

    High Court Had Earlier Directed Release of Goods

    • During the pendency of the writ petition, the High Court had, on 3 October 2024, directed release of the goods subject to the petitioner furnishing surety bonds equivalent to the value of the goods.
    • The petitioner subsequently moved an application under Article 215 of the Constitution of India, seeking contempt proceedings over alleged non-compliance with that order and a direction for release of the imported goods.
    • The shipping line maintained that detention and container charges remained payable and therefore delivery orders could not be issued. The custodian, in turn, submitted that it could not release the goods in the absence of delivery orders from the shipping line.
    • The High Court found these stands β€œwholly untenable.”

    No Rent or Demurrage for Goods Detained by Customs: High Court

    • A crucial part of the judgment concerns the regulatory protection against detention and demurrage charges.
    • The Court referred to Regulation 6(1)(l) of the Handling of Cargo in Customs Areas Regulations, 2009, observing that it specifically provides that no rent or demurrage can be charged in respect of goods detained by Customs authorities.
    • Similarly, the Court referred to Regulation 10(1)(l) of the Sea Cargo Manifest and Transhipment Regulations, 2018, which prohibits recovery of rent or demurrage in respect of seized or detained goods.
    • The Court noted that the goods had remained under detention at the instance of the Customs Department. Once the proceedings culminated in reassessment and the importer paid the requisite duty, there was no justification for continuing to withhold physical delivery of the consignments.

    Court Refers to Customs Clearance Timelines

    • The Division Bench also referred to a circular/instruction dated 22 August 2006, issued by the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi Zone pursuant to an order passed in CWP-9882-2006.
    • According to the judgment, the instruction contemplated the first appraisement of imported goods within 48 hours, followed by assessment within 24 hours. In the case of second appraisement, assessment was contemplated within 24 hours of filing of the Bill of Entry and examination within 48 hours.
    • The instruction also contemplated that an importer should be informed in writing about the option to shift goods to a bonded warehouse under Section 49 of the Customs Act, 1962, and that failure to avail the facility could result in demurrage.
    • The High Court observed that the authorities were expected to conclude proceedings within the timelines indicated in that circular. However, although the imported goods were examined on 24 January 2024, the reassessment orders were passed only on 14 March 2024. The additional duty was thereafter paid, and the detention-waiver certificate was issued on 6 May 2024, yet the consignments continued to remain unreleased.

    Importer Cannot Be Penalised for Delay Attributable to Authorities

    The High Court laid down the central principle in clear terms:

    • β€œThe petitioner cannot be penalized for delays which are entirely attributable to the respondents.”
    • The Court further held that any inter se dispute between Customs authorities, the shipping line and the custodian cannot become a ground to deny delivery of imported goods after completion of Customs formalities.
    • It characterised the conduct of the shipping line and custodian in continuing to withhold the goods despite issuance of detention certificates and repeated requests by the importer as arbitrary and unsustainable in law.

    High Court Issues Mandamus for Release Within Two Weeks

    • Allowing the writ petition, the Punjab and Haryana High Court issued a writ of mandamus, directing the concerned respondents to release and physically hand over the goods covered by the two Bills of Entry to SAB Tera Enterprises within two weeks from receipt of the certified copy of the order.
    • The shipping line was specifically directed to issue all necessary delivery orders within three days from the date of uploading of the High Court’s order.

    No Detention, Container Detention, Ground Rent or Demurrage Payable by Importer

    Significantly, the Court expressly clarified that SAB Tera Enterprises would not be liable to pay:

    • detention charges;
    • container detention charges;
    • ground rent; or
    • demurrage,

    for the period during which the goods remained detained under orders of Customs, as certified in the detention certificates.

    • Any liability or financial dispute arising among the respondents was left to be resolved inter se in accordance with law, without burdening the importer. Other disputes among the respondents were also kept open for adjudication in appropriate proceedings.

    Why the Judgment Matters for Importers

    • The decision has practical significance for importers whose consignments remain stuck at ports, ICDs or other Customs areas because of disputes over detention charges after Customs proceedings have concluded.
    • The judgment reinforces that once the goods have been detained at the instance of Customs and a valid detention certificate covers the relevant period, disputes among Customs, the shipping line and the custodian should not be shifted onto the importer as a condition for physical release of the goods.
    • It also highlights the importance of Regulation 6(1)(l) of HCCAR, 2009 and Regulation 10(1)(l) of SCMTR, 2018 in disputes concerning rent and demurrage on goods detained or seized by Customs.

    Key Takeaway

    The Punjab and Haryana High Court has made it clear that an importer cannot be made to suffer financially or be denied delivery of imported goods because of delays attributable to authorities or disputes between Customs, the shipping line and the custodian.

    Where Customs has completed reassessment, the importer has paid the required duty and detention certificates have been issued, continued withholding of the goods on account of detention or demurrage disputes can be challenged as arbitrary.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Delhi HC: Trademark Renewal Notice Sent to Obsolete Address Cannot Prejudice Registered Proprietor

    Delhi HC: Trademark Renewal Notice Sent to Obsolete Address Cannot Prejudice Registered Proprietor

    Date: 01.10.2026

    The Delhi High Court has allowed a writ petition filed by Rajinder Singh, permitting him to file a fresh Form TM-R for renewal of his registered trademark β€œB.P.R.”, after finding fault with the Trade Marks Registry for sending the statutory renewal notice to the old address of the proprietor’s erstwhile trademark agent despite having consistently corresponded with the agent at its updated address for years.

    Justice Tushar Rao Gedela held that once the Registry had, β€œfor all intents and purposes,” taken note of the fresh address and itself used that address for communicationsβ€”including sending the registration certificateβ€”it could not subsequently rely upon the proprietor’s failure to file the prescribed form for formally changing the address for service.

    The Court also reiterated the importance of the Registrar’s statutory obligation under Section 25(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, holding that the renewal notice requirement cannot be reduced to a mere procedural formality.

    B.P.R. Trademark Adopted in 1979

    • According to the petition, Rajinder Singh first adopted and began using the trademark β€œB.P.R.” on 1 April 1979 for products including electric motors, grinders, polishers, mono block pump sets, air compressors, A.C. generators and submersible pump sets.
    • An application bearing No. 870775 in Class 7 was filed on 11 August 1999 for registration of the B.P.R. word mark.
    • The Trade Marks Registry initially raised objections. The petitioner’s trademark agent submitted a response to the examination report, following which the application was accepted and published in the Trade Marks Journal on 25 August 2003.
    • At that stage, the agent was Super Trade Mark Co., whose original address was at State Bank Nagar, Paschim Vihar, New Delhi.

    Opposition Filed Against B.P.R. Mark

    • In January 2004, M/s Phillips Brake Rubber Company filed an opposition against the trademark application.
    • The petitioner filed a counter-statement on 1 July 2004. Along with it, a fresh Power of Attorney in Form TM-48 was filed, reflecting the agent’s new address at 159-E, Kamla Nagar, Delhi-110007.
    • The opponent subsequently communicated with the Registry at this updated address.
    • During the pendency of the proceedings, another Power of Attorney dated 25 September 2014 was filed to communicate the change in the agent’s legal name from Super Trade Mark Co. to Concept Legal, while retaining the Kamla Nagar address.

    Registry Itself Repeatedly Used the New Address

    • This became a crucial fact before the High Court.
    • Hearing notices dated 5 September 2015, 15 October 2015, 22 August 2017 and 14 December 2017 were all sent by the Trade Marks Registry to the agent’s new address.
    • The opposition was eventually dismissed on 23 February 2018 under Rule 50(4) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017 after the opponent failed to appear.
    • The B.P.R. application was consequently ordered to be registered, and a registration certificate was issued on 27 May 2018.
    • Thus, the Registry was not merely informed about the updated addressβ€”it had itself been using the new address for official communications.

    Trademark Renewed for Ten Years From 11 August 2009

    • Rajinder Singh subsequently filed Form TM-R on 24 September 2018 for renewal of the trademark.
    • On 28 September 2018, the Registrar informed him that Application No. 870775 had been renewed for ten years from 11 August 2009, and the renewal had been published in the Trade Marks Journal.
    • Significantly, this communication was also sent to the agent at its updated Kamla Nagar address.
    • The next renewal therefore fell due on 11 August 2019.

    Renewal Notice Sent Back to the Old Address

    • The dispute arose when the Registry issued the statutory RG-3/O-3 renewal notice in May 2019.
    • Instead of sending the notice to the address which it had been consistently using, the Registry sent it to the agent’s original address at 14, State Bank Nagar, Paschim Vihar, New Delhi.
    • The notice was returned with the endorsement β€œno such firm” and was received back by the Registry on 29 May 2019.
    • The petitioner maintained that he remained unaware of any statutory intimation concerning renewal.
    • It was only after appointing a new agent in December 2025 that the position was discovered. An attempt was then made to file Form TM-R electronically, but the Trade Marks Registry’s online filing system did not permit the renewal application to be filed. This led to the writ petition before the Delhi High Court.

    Registry: Petitioner Never Filed Correct Form to Change Address for Service

    • The Trade Marks Registry defended its action on a technical but significant ground.
    • It argued that the petitioner had never filed the prescribed Form TM-16, now Form TM-M, for formally changing the address for service.
    • According to the Registry, Form TM-48 merely authorises an agent and cannot substitute for the prescribed form for changing the address for service. Consequently, its electronic database continued to show the original Paschim Vihar address.
    • The Registry explained that RG-3/O-3 notices are computer-generated and automatically sent to the address recorded in its database. Unless the appropriate statutory form was filed, the database could not be formally updated.
    • It therefore sought to place responsibility on the petitioner for not following the prescribed procedure.

    Delhi High Court Finds Registry’s Conduct Inconsistent

    • The High Court was not persuaded.
    • It considered particularly significant that during the opposition proceedings the change in the agent’s name and address had been communicated to the Registry, following which the Registry itself repeatedly sent official communications to the new address.
    • The Court observed that this factual position was undisputed.
    • Even the registration/renewal communication had been sent to the updated address.
    • Against that background, the Court found it difficult to understand why the crucial RG-3/O-3 renewal notice was suddenly sent to the old address of the erstwhile agent.
    • In the Court’s words, it was β€œunfathomable” why the Registry would issue the renewal notice to the old address in such circumstances.

    No Proof That Renewal Notice Was Served on Proprietor

    • The Registry additionally contended that the RG-3/O-3 notice had been sent directly to Rajinder Singh at the address recorded for him.
    • The petitioner denied receiving it.
    • Crucially, the Registry produced no proof of delivery.
    • The High Court therefore held that it would be difficult to presume deemed service upon the petitioner merely because the notice was claimed to have been dispatched to his address.
    • This finding became important because Section 25(3) places a statutory obligation on the Registrar regarding notice before expiry of trademark registration.

    Registry Cannot Rely on Technical Non-Compliance After Acting on Updated Address

    • The Court rejected the Registry’s contention that failure to file the technically correct form for change of address defeated the petitioner’s case.
    • It reasoned that once the Registry had actually taken note of the fresh address and had itself corresponded at that addressβ€”including sending the registration certificateβ€”it could not subsequently contend that the petitioner had failed to comply with the prescribed rules.

    The Court held:

    • β€œOnce the Trade Marks Registry, for all intents and purposes has noted the fresh address of the Agent… it does not lie in the mouth of the respondent to now contend that the petitioner has not complied with the prescribed Rules.”
    • The Registry’s objection was accordingly rejected.

    Section 25(3) Renewal Notice Is β€œSacrosanct”

    • The High Court relied heavily upon its earlier judgment in Coldsmiths Retail Services Private Limited v. Registrar of Trade Marks, W.P.(C)-IPD 37/2025, decided on 17 February 2026.
    • In Coldsmiths, the Court had explained that Section 25(3) of the Trade Marks Act places the mandate upon the Registrar to send the prescribed notice to the registered proprietor concerning the date of expiration and renewal requirements.
    • The provision assumes considerable importance because failure to renew a trademark may result in the registration lapsing and potentially leave the mark open to adoption by third parties.
    • For that reason, the Court had characterised the statutory mandate under Section 25(3) as β€œsacrosanct”, rather than a procedural requirement without substantive consequences.

    Notice to an Unauthorized or Outdated Agent Is Not Statutory Compliance

    • The Court reproduced the principle from Coldsmiths that sending Section 25(3)/RG-3 notices to a person who was not the authorised agent on the date of issuance cannot constitute proper compliance with the statutory mandate.
    • The Registrar must not only issue the notice but remain vigilant regarding changes in authorisation that have been communicated to the Registry.
    • This principle was particularly relevant in Rajinder Singh’s case because the Registry had years of correspondence demonstrating actual knowledge and use of the agent’s new address.

    Burden Under Section 25(3) Is on Registrar, Not Trademark Proprietor

    • Another important proposition reaffirmed by the Court concerns responsibility for renewal notices.
    • Referring again to Coldsmiths, the Court noted that an argument that the proprietor could independently have approached the Registry for renewal before expiryβ€”or within six months thereafterβ€”does not displace the statutory requirement.
    • The mandate under Section 25(3) lies upon the Registrar, not the proprietor.
    • The ruling therefore reinforces that the statutory renewal-notice mechanism has independent significance and cannot simply be neutralised by arguing that the trademark proprietor ought to have monitored the expiry date himself.

    6.5-Year Delay Not Barred by Delay and Laches

    • A notable aspect of the judgment is that the petitioner approached the Court after approximately 6.5 years.
    • The High Court nevertheless held that, in the circumstances, the petition should not be defeated on the ground of delay and laches.
    • The Court referred to Coldsmiths Retail Services, where a delay of approximately 1.5 to 2 years had been condoned, and Charanjiv Kumar Taneja Trading as Chirag Enterprises v. Registrar of Trade Marks, LPA 461/2023, decided on 25 July 2023, where a delay of 16 years had been condoned in similar circumstances.
    • Accordingly, the 6.5-year delay in the present matter did not prevent the Court from granting relief.

    Challenge to Rules 58(2) and 58(3) Not Decided

    • The original petition had also sought a declaration that Rules 58(2) and 58(3) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017 were ultra vires the Trade Marks Act and unconstitutional.
    • However, during the proceedings, the petitioner expressly stated that those prayers were not being pressed and sought liberty to challenge the validity of the Rules through an appropriate proceeding.
    • The High Court granted that liberty.
    • Therefore, the judgment should not be understood as striking down or declaring Rules 58(2) or 58(3) invalid.

    Final Decision: Fresh TM-R Permitted

    • The Delhi High Court ultimately accepted the petitioner’s contentions and allowed the writ petition.

    Rajinder Singh was permitted to file a fresh Form TM-R for the trademark registered in his name, subject to payment of:

    • the prescribed renewal fee; and any fine payable under the applicable Rules.
    • The fresh TM-R must be filed within 15 days from the date of the judgment.
    • The Registrar of Trade Marks was directed to accept the application if filed within the stipulated period and process it in accordance with the Rules.
    • The entire exercise must be completed within eight weeks from receipt of the Form TM-R. The writ petition and pending applications were accordingly disposed of.

    Why This Judgment Matters for Trademark Owners and Practitioners

    • The ruling is significant for trademark renewal practice because it addresses the interaction between formal procedural requirements for updating an address for service and the Registry’s own actual conduct.
    • The judgment does not suggest that trademark proprietors may routinely ignore prescribed forms for updating their addresses. Rather, its reasoning is tied to the unusual facts: the Registry had repeatedly used the new address for years and had even sent the registration/renewal communication there, yet reverted to an obsolete address when issuing the critical statutory renewal notice.
    • The ruling also reinforces the substantive importance of Section 25(3). Where failure to renew can lead to loss of registration and expose the mark to third-party adoption, the statutory renewal notice cannot be treated as an inconsequential procedural exercise.

    Key Takeaway

    • The Delhi High Court’s ruling in Rajinder Singh v. Registrar of Trade Marks establishes an important practical safeguard for registered trademark proprietors: where the Trade Marks Registry has actually recognised and consistently used an updated address of an authorised agent, it cannot ordinarily rely on its own outdated database to justify sending the critical Section 25(3) renewal notice to the old address and then place the consequences entirely upon the proprietor.
    • The Court accordingly permitted renewal proceedings to be revived even after a 6.5-year delay, while requiring the proprietor to file a fresh TM-R and pay the prescribed fee and applicable fine.

    Cases Referred

    The judgment principally relies upon:

    1. Coldsmiths Retail Services Private Limited v. Registrar of Trade Marks, W.P.(C)-IPD 37/2025, decided on 17 February 2026 β€” on the mandatory and β€œsacrosanct” nature of the Section 25(3) renewal notice.
    2. Charanjiv Kumar Taneja Trading as Chirag Enterprises v. Registrar of Trade Marks, LPA 461/2023, decided on 25 July 2023 β€” referred to in relation to condonation of substantial delay in similar circumstances.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Bare Statement of Co-Accused Without Supporting Material Cannot Alone Connect Accused to NDPS Offence

    Bare Statement of Co-Accused Without Supporting Material Cannot Alone Connect Accused to NDPS Offence

    Date: 01.10.2026

    The Gujarat High Court has granted regular bail to an accused alleged by the prosecution to be the β€œkingpin” behind the transportation of 22 kg of hybrid ganja from Maharashtra to Gujarat, observing that nothing was recovered from his conscious possession and no call detail records (CDR) or other material had been collected during investigation to connect him with the alleged offence, apart from the bare statement of a co-accused.

    Justice Hasmukh D. Suthar also took into account that the investigation had concluded, the chargesheet had been filed, nothing remained to be recovered or discovered from the applicant, and there was no likelihood of the trial concluding in the near future.

    The Court further relied on the principle of parity, noting that a co-accused who allegedly facilitated arrangements including money and travel plans had already been enlarged on regular bail.

    Background of the NDPS Case

    • The bail application arose from FIR C.R. No. 11191011260041 of 2026, registered with DCB Police Station, Ahmedabad City, for offences under Sections 8(c), 20(b)(ii)(c), 23(b) and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.
    • The applicant approached the Gujarat High Court for regular bail under Section 483 of the BNSS, 2023 after completion of investigation and filing of the chargesheet.

    Applicant: Nothing Recovered From Conscious Possession

    Counsel for the applicant argued that he had been falsely implicated in the case.

    It was submitted that:

    • the investigation was complete and the chargesheet had been filed;
    • nothing had been recovered from the applicant’s conscious possession;
    • his implication was based on the statement of a co-accused;
    • a co-accused having a similar role had already been granted bail; and
    • the applicant did not have a separate past antecedent as alleged by the prosecution.

    On these grounds, regular bail was sought subject to appropriate conditions.

    State: Applicant Was the β€œKingpin” of Drug Trafficking Operation

    • The State strongly opposed the application.
    • The prosecution alleged that the applicant was the β€œkingpin” and used to send persons to Thailand to receive consignments of drugs. According to the State, four personsβ€”Umesh, Prashant, Manish and Vishalβ€”had travelled to Thailand at the applicant’s behest.
    • The State further alleged that the applicant had been caught red-handed in Maharashtra and that a separate offence had been registered in Mumbai. According to the prosecution, 22 kg of contraband was transported to Ahmedabad, where co-accused Jiya and Chetan were caught in conscious possession of the contraband.
    • The prosecution invoked the stringent requirements of Section 37 of the NDPS Act and argued that the applicant had a similar antecedent in Maharashtra. It contended that, if released, there was a possibility of his becoming involved in similar activities again.

    Factors Governing Grant of Bail

    Before considering the facts, the High Court reiterated the factors ordinarily relevant while deciding a bail application, including:

    • the nature and gravity of the accusation and punishment; the material relied upon by the prosecution; possibility of tampering with witnesses; threat to the complainant or witnesses; possibility of securing the accused’s presence at trial; likelihood of absconding; character and circumstances peculiar to the accused; and the larger interests of the public and State.

    No Recovery or Discovery Remained After Chargesheet

    • On examining the investigation papers, the High Court identified several circumstances favouring consideration of bail.
    • The investigation had already concluded and the chargesheet had been filed. The applicant had been in custody since 25 February 2026, and there was nothing further to be recovered or discovered from him.
    • The Court also noted that there was no possibility of the trial concluding in the near future.

    No Contraband Found in Applicant’s Conscious Possession

    • The prosecution’s allegation was that the applicant was the kingpin and that the contraband had been transported from Maharashtra to Gujarat at his behest.
    • The High Court, however, considered it significant that nothing had been found in the conscious possession of the applicant.
    • In contrast, co-accused Jiya and Chetan were the persons apprehended with conscious possession of 22 kg of hybrid ganja.
    • This distinction became important while examining whether the material collected during investigation sufficiently connected the present applicant to the alleged trafficking operation.

    No CDR or Other Corroborative Material Collected

    • A particularly important observation in the order concerns the evidentiary material linking the applicant with the alleged offence.
    • The High Court recorded that β€œno material or CDR is collected during the investigation.”
    • It further observed that, in the absence of conscious possession and any other β€œinspiring material,” there was nothing connecting the applicant with the alleged offence except the bare statement of the co-accused.
    • Thus, notwithstanding the prosecution’s description of the applicant as the kingpin, the Court considered the actual material collected during investigation while deciding whether continued detention was justified at the bail stage.

    Section 37 NDPS Act Considered

    • The State specifically invoked the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which imposes stringent conditions on grant of bail in cases involving specified serious NDPS offences.
    • The High Court nevertheless considered the absence of conscious possession and lack of corroborative material linking the applicant to the alleged contraband. It also noted that a separate offence had been registered in Maharashtra in relation to the antecedent relied upon by the State.
    • The order therefore reflects the Court’s assessment of Section 37 in the context of the evidentiary material actually available against this particular applicant at the post-chargesheet stage.

    Parity With Co-Accused Also Favoured Bail

    • The Court additionally considered the principle of parity.
    • It noted that co-accused Haresh Vaghela, who allegedly facilitated the other accused, including by making arrangements concerning money and travel plans, had already been granted regular bail by a coordinate Bench.

    For this proposition, the Court referred to:

    Rameshbhai Batubhai Dhabi v. State of Gujarat, 2011 (3) GLR 1999.

    • The Court held that the present application deserved consideration on the ground of parity as well.

    Prolonged Pre-Trial Detention Cannot Become Pre-Trial Conviction

    The Gujarat High Court also relied upon two important Supreme Court decisions:

    • Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2012) 1 SCC 40; and
    • Gudikanti Narasimhulu & Ors. v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, (1978) 1 SCC 240.
    • Considering that conclusion of the trial would take time, the Court observed that keeping the accused behind bars in such circumstances would amount to pre-trial conviction.
    • The Court invoked the established bail jurisprudence that β€œbail is a rule and jail is exception”, together with the protection of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

    Final Decision: Regular Bail Granted

    • Considering the nature of the allegations and the material available at this stage, the Gujarat High Court found it to be a fit case for exercise of discretion in favour of the applicant.
    • The application was accordingly allowed, and Bhuvnesh was ordered to be released on regular bail on executing a personal bond of β‚Ή25,000 with one surety of the like amount, subject to conditions imposed by the Court.
    • Among other conditions, the applicant must not misuse his liberty or interfere with the prosecution evidence; must surrender his passport, if any; cannot leave India without prior permission of the Trial Court until conclusion of the trial; must mark his presence at the concerned police station once every month for six months; and must provide his Aadhaar card, email ID and residential details to the Investigating Officer and Court.
    • The Court also clarified that the applicant would be released only if he was not required in connection with any other offence. Breach of the bail conditions could result in appropriate action, including cancellation of bail.

    Observations Not to Influence Trial

    • Importantly, the High Court expressly clarified that its observations concerning the evidence were preliminary in nature and confined to the bail stage.
    • The Trial Court has been directed not to be influenced by these observations while deciding the criminal case on merits.
    • Therefore, the order constitutes a grant of regular bail, not an acquittal or final determination of the applicant’s criminal liability.

    Key Takeaway

    • The Gujarat High Court’s decision underscores that even where the prosecution invokes the stringent Section 37 NDPS Act and alleges that an accused is the β€œkingpin” of a trafficking operation, the Court will examine the specific material connecting that accused with the contraband.
    • In the present case, the Court considered the absence of recovery from the applicant’s conscious possession, absence of CDR or other corroborative material, reliance principally on a co-accused’s bare statement, completion of investigation, prolonged custody, likely delay in trial and parity with a co-accused.
    • On that cumulative assessment, the Court granted regular bail while leaving all questions concerning guilt and the evidentiary merits of the prosecution case open for trial.

    Cases Referred

    1. Rameshbhai Batubhai Dhabi v. State of Gujarat, 2011 (3) GLR 1999
    2. Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2012) 1 SCC 40
    3. Gudikanti Narasimhulu & Ors. v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, (1978) 1 SCC 240

    Gudikanti Narasimhulu & Ors. v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, (1978) 1 SCC 240

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Delhi HC: Already-Revoked Customs Broker Licence Cannot Be Revoked Again

    Delhi HC: Already-Revoked Customs Broker Licence Cannot Be Revoked Again

    Date: 01.10.2026

    In a significant ruling concerning proceedings under the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018 (CBLR), the Delhi High Court has held that the Customs Department’s action of attempting to revoke a Customs Broker licence that had already been revoked was beyond the statutory provisions and resulted in unnecessary multiplicity of litigation.

    The Division Bench observed that even where there are more than one cause of action for revocation, they should form part of the same proceedings. Once a Customs Broker licence has already been revoked, there is no occasion to pass another order revoking the same licence, without prejudice to the earlier order.

    The Court made these observations while dealing with an appeal filed by M/s R. K. Logistics under Section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962 against CESTAT’s Final Order No. 59921/2024 dated 23 December 2024 in Customs Appeal No. 50860/2021.

    Background of the Dispute

    • R.K. Logistics, a proprietorship concern, was granted a Customs Broker licence on 2 November 2016.
    • Following proceedings initiated by Customs, an order dated 1 July 2020 was passed whereby the Customs Broker licence was revoked, the security deposit of β‚Ή5 lakh was forfeited, and a penalty of β‚Ή50,000 was imposed under Regulation 18 of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018.

    However, the matter did not end there.

    Customs subsequently initiated separate proceedings against R.K. Logistics for an alleged violation of Regulation 10(n) of CBLR, 2018. These proceedings culminated in another order dated 16 April 2021, whereby Customs again:

    • revoked the Customs Broker licence;
    • forfeited the security deposit of β‚Ή5 lakh; and
    • imposed another penalty of β‚Ή50,000.

    R.K. Logistics challenged the second order before CESTAT.

    CESTAT Did Not Decide the Second Penalty

    • CESTAT disposed of the appeal against the order dated 16 April 2021 on the ground that the revocation of the Customs Broker licence had already been upheld in the proceedings concerning the earlier order dated 1 July 2020.
    • However, the Tribunal did not adjudicate the separate issue concerning the β‚Ή50,000 penalty imposed under the second order dated 16 April 2021. This omission became the central issue before the Delhi High Court.

    Earlier Revocation Had Already Been Upheld

    • The High Court clarified that the revocation of the licence and forfeiture of the security deposit under the earlier order dated 1 July 2020 had already been upheld by the Court in CUSAA 120/2025, by an order also dated 21 September 2026.
    • Accordingly, the Court held that the issue concerning the second forfeiture of the security deposit under the order dated 16 April 2021 no longer survived.
    • This distinction is important: the present judgment did not restore the Customs Broker licence or disturb the earlier revocation that had already been upheld.

    β€œRevoking an Already Revoked Licence” Beyond Statutory Provisions

    • The most significant observation in the judgment concerns Customs’ decision to initiate a second revocation proceeding.
    • The Delhi High Court held that the respondent’s action in revoking an already-revoked licence was beyond the statutory provisions and resulted in multiplicity of litigation concerning the same consequenceβ€”revocation of the licence.

    The Court further explained that:

    • even if there were more than one cause of action for revocation, they should form part of the same proceedings.
    • Once the licence had already been revoked, according to the Court, there was no occasion to pass a second revocation order, without prejudice to the earlier order.
    • The ruling therefore raises an important procedural principle for Customs Broker disciplinary proceedings: where multiple grounds capable of resulting in revocation exist, authorities should avoid successive proceedings seeking to impose the same revocation consequence on a licence that already stands revoked.

    Penalty Required Independent Adjudication

    • While CESTAT had treated the licence-revocation issue as concluded, the High Court found that it had failed to address an independent component of the second orderβ€”the β‚Ή50,000 penalty.
    • The Court held that the issue of imposition of penalty under the order dated 16 April 2021 still required adjudication despite the earlier revocation having been upheld.
    • Thus, the Tribunal could not dispose of the entire appeal merely because the question of licence revocation had already become settled.

    Final Decision: CESTAT Order Set Aside and Matter Remanded

    • The Delhi High Court ultimately set aside CESTAT’s Final Order No. 59921/2024 dated 23 December 2024.
    • The matter was remanded to CESTAT with a specific direction to decide, in accordance with law, the issue concerning the penalty imposed under the Customs order dated 16 April 2021.
    • Accordingly, R.K. Logistics succeeded in the present appeal to the extent that the CESTAT order was set aside and the unresolved penalty issue was restored for adjudication.
    • However, the judgment should not be read as restoration of the Customs Broker licence or cancellation of the β‚Ή50,000 penalty on merits. The earlier revocation remained unaffected, while the validity of the second penalty was left for CESTAT to determine.

    Key Legal Principles Emerging from the Judgment

    • The ruling highlights three important aspects of Customs Broker disciplinary proceedings.
    • First, an already-revoked Customs Broker licence cannot meaningfully be subjected to another revocation order, and the High Court characterised such action as beyond the statutory provisions.
    • Second, where there are multiple causes of action capable of leading to revocation, the Court indicated that they should form part of the same proceedings rather than result in successive revocation actions.
    • Third, even where the question of revocation has become academic or already stands concluded, a separately imposed monetary penalty cannot simply be left undecided. The appellate forum must adjudicate the surviving issue in accordance with law.

    Why the Judgment Matters for Customs Brokers

    • The judgment is significant for the administration of the CBLR framework because disciplinary proceedings against Customs Brokers can involve distinct consequences, including revocation, forfeiture of security deposit and monetary penalty.
    • The decision demonstrates that these consequences must be considered according to their own legal footing. The fact that a licence has already been revoked does not automatically dispose of an unresolved monetary penalty arising from another order.
    • At the same time, the Court’s criticism of successive revocation proceedings reinforces the need for procedural coherence and avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings where several grounds for revocation are available to Customs.

    Key Takeaway

    The Delhi High Court has made it clear that Customs should not repeatedly revoke the same Customs Broker licence through separate proceedings. If more than one cause of action for revocation exists, those grounds should form part of the same proceedings.

    In the case of R.K. Logistics, while the earlier revocation remained intact, the Court found that CESTAT had failed to decide the independent issue of the β‚Ή50,000 penalty arising from the subsequent order. The CESTAT order was therefore set aside and the penalty issue remanded for fresh adjudication in accordance with law.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Delhi HC: Changed Status of Conflicting Marks Can Alter Trademark Registration Outcome

    Delhi HC: Changed Status of Conflicting Marks Can Alter Trademark Registration Outcome

    Date: 30.09.2026

    The Delhi High Court has allowed an appeal concerning registration of the word mark β€œAXON” in Class 9, setting aside the Registrar of Trade Marks’ earlier refusal and directing the Trade Marks Registry to process the application and advertise the mark before acceptance under the proviso to Section 20(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

    The decision is significant for trademark applicants facing objections based on earlier conflicting marks, particularly where the status of those cited marks subsequently changes, their proprietors provide consent/no-objection, or the applicant agrees to appropriately restrict the specification of goods.

    Importantly, however, the High Court did not finally direct registration of β€œAXON.” It permitted the application to proceed to advertisement, leaving any opposition to be decided independently on its own merits.

    Background: Registrar Had Refused β€˜AXON’ Under Section 11

    • Axon Enterprise challenged an order dated 12 December 2018 by which the Registrar of Trade Marks refused its application for registration of the trademark β€œAXON”, Application No. 2538455, in Class 9.
    • The refusal was based on Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, because the examination report identified several conflicting marks already appearing on the Trade Marks Register. The appeal was brought before the Delhi High Court under Section 91(1) of the Trade Marks Act.
    • During the pendency of the proceedings, however, circumstances materially changed. Some cited marks had been abandoned or were likely to be removed, while proprietors of other cited marks issued consent/no-objection letters permitting Axon’s application to proceed subject to specified restrictions.

    What Were the Conflicting β€˜AXON’ Marks?

    • The Trade Marks Registry’s search report had identified several existing or pending AXON-formative marks in Class 9.
    • The status and treatment of these cited marks became central to the appeal.
    • Axon informed the Court that cited Application No. 1424653 and Application No. 1741626 had been abandoned, while Application No. 1308449 was likely to be removed because the renewal request had not been filed within the prescribed period. The appellant also stated that Application No. 2431177 had been abandoned.
    • For several other cited marks, the appellant obtained consent from their proprietors.

    Consent From Other β€˜AXON’ Trademark Owners

    • One important development was the consent granted by proprietors of certain cited trademarks.
    • Axon Digital Design B.V., Netherlands, proprietor/applicant associated with cited AXON mark No. 1643388, provided consent subject to a specified disclaimer.
    • Similarly, Axon Cable Inc., France, associated with cited trademark Nos. 1861530 and 1861531, issued consent/no-objection letters.
    • The Court recorded that the proprietors of trademark Nos. 1643388, 1861530 and 1861531 had consented to the appellant’s trademark application proceeding further, subject to certain restrictions.
    • Axon accepted those restrictions and undertook to file the necessary Form TM-M to amend the description of goods.

    Axon Agreed to Restrict Its Specification of Goods

    • Another important factor was the appellant’s willingness to narrow the scope of its Class 9 application.
    • In relation to cited trademark Application No. 2065690, registered for β€œbatteries, inverters and UPS”, Axon agreed to remove β€œbattery chargers” from its specification.
    • The Court also recorded that this cited mark had geographical restrictions covering Andhra Pradesh and Telangana.
    • Axon similarly agreed to delete β€œbattery chargers” while addressing cited trademark No. 2274394, which covered automotive batteries. The appellant sought to distinguish the respective goods and customers, asserting that its products related to technology for military, law-enforcement and related applications rather than automotive batteries.

    Proposed Disclaimer and Restricted Specification

    • The appellant also undertook to amend the specification for its Class 9 goods.
    • The proposed specification covered, among other things, apparatus for recording video and audio, cameras and digital recorders, software relating to video/audio playback and recording, and accessories forming part of camera assemblies.
    • The proposed restriction excluded the specified goods when used for video production or broadcasting, except in fields relating to law enforcement, surveillance, public safety, private security, weapons, electronic control devices or defence apparatus.
    • This undertaking was important because it narrowed the scope of the application and addressed the concerns arising from some of the earlier cited AXON marks.

    Delhi High Court: Application Can Proceed to Advertisement

    • After considering the affidavit, undertakings, status of the cited marks and consent given by proprietors of competing marks, Justice Sanjeev Narula concluded that the AXON application could proceed to the advertisement stage without acceptance under Section 20(1) of the Trade Marks Act.

    The Court stated:

    • β€œthe trademark application can proceed to a stage of advertisement without acceptance”
    • under Section 20(1) of the Act.
    • This is the central holding of the order.
    • The Court did not hold that the trademark was automatically entitled to final registration. Instead, it restored the application to the statutory process so that it could be advertised and potentially opposed by interested parties.

    Registrar’s Refusal Set Aside

    The High Court accordingly allowed Axon’s appeal and set aside the impugned refusal order.

    The Trade Marks Registry was directed to:

    • process the AXON trademark application;
    • advertise the mark before acceptance under the proviso to Section 20(1);
    • complete the advertisement within three months;
    • intimate the registered proprietors of the cited marks once the application is advertised in the Trade Marks Journal; and
    • independently determine any opposition that may subsequently be filed.

    Axon was also directed to send a copy of the High Court’s order to proprietors of the competing/cited marks and file the appropriate Form TM-M within two weeks, consistent with the undertaking given to the Court.

    Advertisement Before Acceptance Does Not Mean Final Registration

    • This distinction is particularly important when reporting the decision.
    • The Delhi High Court did not order direct registration of the AXON trademark.
    • Instead, it directed the application to proceed to advertisement before acceptance.
    • Consequently, third parties retain their statutory opportunity to oppose the application after publication in the Trade Marks Journal. The Court expressly directed that if any opposition is filed, it must be decided on its own merits and uninfluenced by the observations in this order.
    • The judgment therefore represents a procedural victory for Axon, allowing its application to move forward rather than a final judicial declaration that registration must necessarily be granted.

    Why the Decision Matters for Trademark Applicants

    • The order illustrates how developments occurring after an examination report or refusal may materially affect a trademark application’s position.
    • A cited trademark may subsequently be abandoned, lapse or become otherwise irrelevant. In other cases, coexistence concerns may potentially be addressed through consent from the proprietor of the earlier mark or by narrowing the applicant’s specification.
    • The AXON proceedings involved several such developments simultaneously: some cited applications had been abandoned, consent letters had been obtained from certain proprietors, a cited mark had geographical restrictions, and Axon undertook to delete overlapping goods and introduce restrictions into its own specification.
    • The High Court considered these developments sufficient to permit the application to advance to advertisement.

    Role of Consent / No-Objection Letters

    • The order is also noteworthy for the practical significance accorded to consent from proprietors of earlier marks.
    • The proprietors of trademark Nos. 1643388, 1861530 and 1861531 consented to Axon’s application proceeding subject to restrictions, and the appellant accepted those restrictions.
    • The Court then took those consents and the appellant’s undertaking into account while concluding that the application could proceed to advertisement.
    • The decision should not, however, be read as establishing that an NOC automatically guarantees registration. The final statutory processβ€”including advertisement and any oppositionβ€”continues to apply.

    Key Legal Provisions

    • Section 11 – Relative Grounds for Refusal:
      The Registrar had originally invoked Section 11 because of the presence of conflicting marks.
    • Section 20(1) – Advertisement of Application:
      The High Court ultimately directed advertisement of the AXON application before acceptance, under the proviso to Section 20(1).
    • Section 91(1) – Appeal:
      Axon’s challenge to the Registrar’s refusal was brought under Section 91(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

    Final Decision

    The outcome can be summarised precisely:

    Axon Enterprise succeeded in its appeal against the Registrar’s refusal, but did not receive an order for immediate trademark registration.

    The Delhi High Court:

    set aside the Registrar’s refusal order; directed the Registry to process Application No. 2538455 for β€œAXON”; ordered advertisement before acceptance within three months; preserved the rights of third parties to oppose the application; required any opposition to be independently decided on merits; and directed Axon to file Form TM-M implementing its promised amendments within two weeks.

    Key Takeaway

    The Axon Enterprise order demonstrates that a trademark application initially refused under Section 11 need not necessarily remain blocked where the circumstances surrounding cited marks subsequently change.

    Abandonment or changed status of conflicting marks, consent from their proprietors, removal of overlapping goods and carefully drafted limitations to the specification may materially alter the assessment.

    At the same time, the decision preserves the statutory safeguards of the trademark-registration system: advertisement is not registration, and any opposition filed after publication must still be adjudicated independently.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Uttarakhand HC: Stale Allegations Cannot Justify Preventive Detention Under PIT-NDPS Act

    Uttarakhand HC: Stale Allegations Cannot Justify Preventive Detention Under PIT-NDPS Act

    Date: 30.09.2026

    The Uttarakhand High Court has quashed a preventive detention order passed against Rekha Sahni under the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988, holding that unexplained delay had snapped the β€œlive and proximate link” between the alleged prejudicial activities and the necessity for preventive detention.

    The Division Bench also found a separate fundamental defect: although the sponsoring authority’s proposal disclosed that the detenue had already been granted bail in the criminal cases relied upon against her, the detaining authority did not demonstrate that it had considered this material circumstance while forming its subjective satisfaction.

    Allowing the habeas corpus petition, the Court quashed the detention order dated 17 April 2026 and directed that the detenue be released forthwith unless required in any other case.

    Background of the Case

    • The habeas corpus petition challenged a detention order dated 17 April 2026 and sought the immediate release of the detenue. The detention had been ordered on allegations that she was engaged in illegal narcotics activities and had a criminal history under the NDPS Act.
    • The State maintained that the detenue was a habitual offender involved in continuous illicit trafficking. It referred to 10 NDPS cases registered at Police Station Rishikesh between 2021 and 2024. According to the State, narcotics had been directly recovered from her in six cases, while in four others co-accused persons allegedly stated that they had purchased narcotics from her.
    • The State contended that whenever she obtained bail, she resumed illicit narcotics activity, making preventive detention necessary. It maintained that the detention order had been validly passed under Section 3(1) of the PIT NDPS Act after compliance with the statutory safeguards.

    The Crucial Timeline

    • The chronology became central to the High Court’s decision.
    • The last FIR relied upon against the detenue was registered on 16 July 2024.
    • However, the Senior Superintendent of Police, Dehradun forwarded the proposal recommending preventive detention only on 24 December 2025β€”approximately 17 months later.
    • Even after the recommendation was made, the preventive detention order was passed only on 17 April 2026, almost another four months later.
    • The petitioner argued that this delay made the grounds for detention stale and destroyed the necessary proximity between the alleged activities and the claimed need for preventive detention.

    Three Questions Considered by the High Court

    The Division Bench formulated three principal questions:

    • First, whether the considerable delay between the last FIR of 16 July 2024 and the preventive-detention proposal of 24 December 2025 made the proposal stale.
    • Second, whether the further delay of almost four months between the proposal and the detention order dated 17 April 2026 could be reconciled with the supposed existence of an imminent need for preventive detention.
    • Third, whether the detaining authority’s failure to consider that the detenue was already on bail in the other nine cases vitiated its subjective satisfaction.
    • The Court ultimately answered all three issues in favour of the petitioner.

    Preventive Detention Is an Extraordinary Measure

    • The High Court emphasised that preventive detention is an extraordinary measure and ordinarily should not be invoked where ordinary criminal law is capable of addressing the situation.
    • The Court found that the long gap between the last FIR and the recommendation for detention created serious doubt about whether there was any immediate necessity for invoking the PIT NDPS Act.
    • Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Sushanta Kumar Banik v. State of Tripura & Others, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1333, the Bench reiterated that where the detaining authority fails to act with promptitude and the delay remains unexplained, the live and proximate link between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention stands snapped.
    • The first issue was consequently decided in favour of Rekha Sahni.

    Four-Month Delay After the Detention Proposal Also Unexplained

    • The Court found a second unexplained delay.
    • Even after the detention proposal was forwarded on 24 December 2025, the detention order was not issued until 17 April 2026.
    • The Bench observed that the very purpose of preventive detention is to address an imminent and continuing threat. Where the detaining authority itself takes several months to act, the assertion of urgency or imminent danger becomes difficult to sustain.
    • Significantly, the State did not provide a satisfactory explanation for this additional delay.

    Earlier Uttarakhand HC Ruling in Raees Applied

    • The Court also relied upon its earlier judgment in Raees v. State of Uttarakhand & Others, Habeas Corpus Petition No. 8 of 2026, decided on 26 May 2026.
    • In Raees, the High Court had held that an inordinate and unexplained delay between alleged prejudicial activity, the detention proposal and the eventual detention order can sever the live and proximate connection required to justify preventive detention.
    • Applying that principle, the Bench found that the delay at both stages in Rekha Sahni’s case remained unexplained.
    • It consequently held that the subjective satisfaction underlying the detention order had become legally unsustainable.

    Bail Was a Vital Fact That the Detaining Authority Had to Consider

    • The judgment contains another important principle concerning preventive detention where the person concerned has already been granted bail.
    • The SSP’s proposal itself recorded that the detenue was on bail in the criminal cases. However, neither the order recording the subjective satisfaction nor the detention order demonstrated that the competent authority had actually considered the fact of her release on bail.
    • The Court drew an important distinction between merely placing information before the detaining authority and the authority actually applying its mind to that information.
    • Referring again to Sushanta Kumar Banik, the Court noted that subjective satisfaction can be vitiated where vital facts capable of influencing the decision are withheld, suppressed, ignored or not considered by the detaining authority.

    Why Availability of Bail Cancellation Mattered

    • The High Court further noted that despite the pending criminal cases and the detenue being on bail, there was no material showing that the State had resorted to ordinary remedies, including an application for cancellation of bail.
    • This became important because preventive detention is not intended to operate as a substitute for ordinary criminal-law remedies.
    • The Court relied upon Ameena Begum v. State of Telangana, (2023) 9 SCC 587, where the Supreme Court had cautioned against resorting to extraordinary preventive-detention legislation when ordinary criminal procedure provided adequate means to address the authorities’ concerns.
    • The judgment reproduced the Supreme Court’s observation that where bail conditions had not been violated and the State had not sought cancellation of bail, preventive detention should not be used to circumvent ordinary criminal procedure.

    Preventive Detention Cannot Be Used Merely to Keep an Accused Behind Bars

    • The High Court also referred, through Ameena Begum, to the Supreme Court’s decision in Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, (1984) 3 SCC 14 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 361.
    • The principle is significant: preventive-detention law is a stringent law affecting personal liberty and must therefore be strictly construed. It cannot simply be used to keep an accused detained where ordinary criminal law might otherwise result in bail.
    • Where a competent criminal court has already granted bail, greater caution is required when scrutinising a preventive detention order founded upon the same allegations.

    Supreme Court’s β€œLive and Proximate Link” Test

    • The judgment also relied on Ameena Begum for the broader framework governing judicial review of preventive-detention orders.
    • Among the factors identified by the Supreme Court is whether the detaining authority’s subjective satisfaction is based upon relevant and probative material and, importantly, whether there remains a live and proximate link between the person’s past conduct and the immediate necessity for detention, rather than the order being founded upon stale material.
    • The Uttarakhand High Court found that this requirement was not satisfied in the present case.

    State’s Criminal-History Argument Did Not Save the Detention

    • The State had strongly relied upon Rekha Sahni’s alleged criminal history, pointing to 10 registered NDPS cases and one conviction in 2022.
    • The Court did not treat criminal history as irrelevant. However, the central question was whether the requirements for preventive detention at the relevant point in time had been satisfied.

    The existence of earlier cases could not, by itself, cure:

    • the unexplained gap between the last alleged activity and the detention proposal;
    • the further unexplained delay in passing the detention order;
    • the absence of fresh prejudicial activity immediately preceding detention;
    • failure to consider the fact that the detenue had already been granted bail; and
    • failure to first resort to available ordinary criminal-law remedies such as cancellation of bail.

    The Court therefore distinguished between a person’s criminal prosecution and the separate constitutional and statutory requirements governing preventive detention.

    Final Decision: Detention Order Quashed

    The High Court found that the detention order suffered from non-consideration of relevant material, absence of a live and proximate link, and unexplained delay at different stages of the preventive-detention process.

    The Bench specifically took into account five circumstances:

    (i) the detenue had already been enlarged on bail;
    (ii) ordinary criminal-law remedies remained available;
    (iii) no proceedings for cancellation of bail had been initiated;
    (iv) there was no fresh prejudicial activity immediately preceding the detention order; and
    (v) the delay in passing the detention order remained unexplained.

    Accordingly, the High Court:

    quashed the detention order dated 17 April 2026 passed under Section 3(1) of the PIT NDPS Act; allowed the habeas corpus petition under Article 226 of the Constitution; and directed the detenue’s immediate release unless her detention was required in connection with another case.

    Legal Significance

    • The ruling reinforces an important distinction between punitive criminal prosecution and preventive detention.
    • Preventive detention is not justified merely because a person has multiple criminal cases or has previously been accused or convicted of an offence. The detaining authority must independently establish an immediate preventive necessity based upon current and relevant material.
    • Where substantial unexplained time has passed, ordinary criminal proceedings remain available, the person has already been granted bail, no cancellation of bail has been sought, and there is no fresh prejudicial activity, the constitutional justification for preventive detention becomes vulnerable to judicial review.
    • The judgment therefore reinforces three important safeguards: promptitude, proximity and genuine application of mind.

    Key Takeaway

    The Uttarakhand High Court has made clear that past criminal history cannot by itself substitute the statutory requirement of a live and proximate necessity for preventive detention. A detention order under the PIT NDPS Act may be vitiated where the State relies on stale allegations, fails to explain substantial delay, ignores the detenue’s bail status, and does not demonstrate why remedies under ordinary criminal law are inadequate.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Handy Download:

    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • CESTAT Kolkata Allows Customs Exemption on Solar PV Module Manufacturing Machinery

    CESTAT Kolkata Allows Customs Exemption on Solar PV Module Manufacturing Machinery

    Date: 30.09.2026

    In a significant ruling concerning the solar photovoltaic manufacturing sector, the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), Kolkata has granted substantial relief to M/s Sova Solar Limited, holding that machinery used sequentially for creating the electrical circuit architecture of solar PV modules is eligible for customs-duty exemption under Sl. No. 12 of Notification No. 24/2005-Customs dated 01.03.2005.

    The Tribunal also ruled that the expression β€œmultilayered sheets with tedlar base” in Sl. No. 18 of Notification No. 25/1999-Customs cannot be restricted only to material manufactured by or authorised by DuPont. PVF-based Solar PV Backsheets satisfying the substantive description of the exemption were held eligible for the benefit.

    The appeal was decided by a Division Bench comprising Judicial Member R. Muralidhar and Technical Member K. Anpazhakan.

    Background of the Dispute

    • Sova Solar Limited is engaged in the manufacture of Solar Photovoltaic (PV) Cells and Solar Photovoltaic Modules at its manufacturing unit in Durgapur, West Bengal. The dispute arose after the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), Hyderabad Zonal Unit analysed the company’s import data from March 2021 onwards.
    • The investigation gave rise to three separate customs issues.
    • The first related to exemption from Basic Customs Duty claimed on machinery imported for manufacturing solar PV modules under Notification No. 24/2005-Cus. The second concerned alleged short-payment of IGST due to the rate/classification adopted on certain imported goods. The third related to exemption claimed on imported Solar PV Backsheets under Notification No. 25/1999-Cus.

    Issue I: Customs Exemption on Solar PV Manufacturing Machinery

    Sova Solar had imported machinery including:

    • MBB-PV Cell Soldering Stringer;
    • Auto-Layup Machine;
    • Auto-Bussing Machine; and
    • Laminator Machine.

    The machinery was classified under CTH 84862000, and the company claimed exemption under Sl. No. 12 of Notification No. 24/2005-Cus., which covers:

    • β€œApparatus for the projection or drawing of circuit patterns on sensitized semiconductor materials.”
    • The disputed machinery was imported through six Bills of Entry.
    • Customs denied the exemption and raised a differential duty demand of β‚Ή2,93,47,918, including BCD, SWS and IGST.

    Revenue’s Interpretation: β€œDrawing” Meant Photolithography

    • The Customs authorities took the view that the imported machinery did not perform the function of projection or drawing contemplated by the notification.
    • According to the adjudicating authority, drawing or projection of circuit patterns in semiconductor manufacturing was ordinarily undertaken through photolithography, involving processes associated with semiconductor fabrication. On that reasoning, equipment performing stringing, lay-up, bussing and lamination in solar-module manufacturing was treated as falling outside the exemption.
    • Sova Solar challenged this interpretation as excessively restrictive.

    β€œProjection or Drawing” Creates Two Alternative Routes to Exemption

    • One of the crucial interpretative questions before CESTAT was the use of the word β€œor” in the expression β€œprojection or drawing of circuit patterns.”
    • Sova Solar argued that the exemption was framed disjunctively: an apparatus could qualify either because it performs projection of circuit patterns or because it performs drawing of circuit patterns. Both functions need not be performed simultaneously.
    • The Tribunal accepted this approach.
    • It held that the notification did not qualify β€œdrawing” by requiring it to occur through photolithographic exposure. Nor did the notification require the circuit pattern to be a microscopic circuit of the kind associated with integrated circuits or printed circuit boards.
    • The Tribunal reasoned that strict interpretation of an exemption notification cannot become a basis for adding words or technological limitations that the notification itself does not contain.
    • Importantly, reading β€œdrawing” merely as another expression for optical β€œprojection” would make the separate word β€œdrawing” redundant.

    Solar Module Is an Electrically Interconnected Semiconductor Network

    • The Tribunal examined the manufacturing process as an integrated technological sequence rather than treating each machine as an isolated piece of mechanical equipment.
    • The MBB-PV Cell Soldering Stringer electrically joins photovoltaic cells to form strings. The Auto-Layup Machine positions those strings in a predetermined configuration. The Auto-Bussing Machine establishes the necessary electrical interconnections using bus ribbons and soldering. Finally, the Laminator permanently integrates and protects the assembled electrical structure.
    • The Tribunal thus recognised that a solar PV module is not merely a collection of solar cells enclosed in glass. It represents an electrically interconnected network of semiconductor devices, with conductive pathways arranged in a predetermined configuration for generating, conducting and delivering electrical power.
    • On this reasoning, the machinery collectively gives physical expression to the electrical architecture or circuit pattern of the solar module.

    CESTAT Rejects Photolithography-Only Interpretation

    • CESTAT concluded that photolithography may certainly constitute one method of projecting or drawing circuit patterns, but it is not necessarily the exclusive method contemplated by the notification.
    • The Tribunal further noted the technical character of photovoltaic cells as sensitised semiconductor devices and found that the machinery operates on those cells while establishing their electrical interconnections and predetermined configuration.
    • Accordingly, the Tribunal held that the machinery answers the description of apparatus for the β€œdrawing of circuit patterns on sensitised semiconductor devices/materials” under Sl. No. 12 of Notification No. 24/2005-Cus.
    • The consequential differential duty demand of β‚Ή2,93,47,918 along with interest was therefore set aside.

    Issue II: Solar PV Backsheets and the Meaning of β€œTedlar”

    The second major dispute concerned two consignments of Solar PV Backsheets, classified under CTH 39209919, imported from a Chinese supplier.

    The exemption under Sl. No. 18 of Notification No. 25/1999-Cus. covered, among other materials used for manufacturing solar cells/modules:

    β€œmultilayered sheets with tedlar base.”

    The Department’s case was that β€œTedlar” was a proprietary trademark associated with DuPont, USA, and because the Chinese supplier had not been shown to be authorised by DuPont, the imported backsheets could not qualify for the exemption.

    On this basis, Customs demanded another β‚Ή12,70,790 in differential duty.

    Brand-Specific Restriction Cannot Be Read Into Exemption Notification

    • Sova Solar argued that the notification did not say β€œDuPont Tedlar” or require the goods to have been manufactured by DuPont or its authorised manufacturer.
    • The company pointed out that the expression appearing in the notification was simply β€œmultilayered sheets with tedlar base.”
    • It further relied on the Government’s historical use of the terminology. Earlier exemption notifications had themselves used expressions such as β€œPolyvinyl fluoride (TEDLAR); Tedlar; Aluminium Tedlar” in the context of materials used to manufacture solar cells/modules.
    • The Tribunal accepted the substance of this argument.
    • It found no condition in the notification relating to manufacturer, country of origin, trademark ownership, DuPont authorisation or procurement exclusively from DuPont.
    • The Tribunal therefore rejected the attempt to convert a description of material into an origin or brand-specific condition that was absent from the notification itself.

    Trade and Commercial Parlance Becomes Important

    • The judgment also carries wider significance for interpretation of technical expressions in customs law.
    • The Tribunal considered technical and industry materials indicating that in the solar PV industry, PVF (Polyvinyl Fluoride) and β€œTedlar” are used in connection with the material layer forming part of photovoltaic backsheets.
    • For this proposition, CESTAT applied the principles emerging from Union of India v. Garware Nylons Ltd. and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Welkin Foods.
    • The latter was relied upon for the principle that where an expression in a taxing statute is undefined, its meaning may be understood in the sense recognised by persons dealing with the goods, encompassing trade, commercial and popular parlance depending upon the context.
    • CESTAT consequently held that Revenue could not insert a manufacturer-specific restriction where the exemption notification prescribed none.
    • The Solar PV Backsheets containing the requisite PVF layer were therefore held eligible under Sl. No. 18 of Notification No. 25/1999-Cus., and the differential duty demand of β‚Ή12,70,790 plus consequential interest was set aside.

    Differential IGST of β‚Ή22 Lakh Remains Payable

    • Sova Solar did not contest the third component concerning differential IGST of β‚Ή22,00,549.
    • The amount had already been deposited and appropriated. The Tribunal therefore upheld this liability, along with consequential interest under Section 28AA of the Customs Act, 1962, if not already paid.
    • This distinction is important: although Sova Solar succeeded on both substantive customs-exemption disputes, its appeal did not result in elimination of the admitted differential IGST liability.

    β‚Ή1 Crore Redemption Fine and β‚Ή10 Lakh Penalty Set Aside

    • The adjudicating authority had earlier held imported goods having an aggregate assessable value of approximately β‚Ή37.59 crore liable to confiscation under Sections 111(m) and 111(q) of the Customs Act.

    It had imposed:

    • Redemption Fine β€” β‚Ή1 crore under Section 125
    • Penalty β€” β‚Ή10 lakh under Section 112(a)(ii)

    CESTAT found these consequences unsustainable.

    • For the goods relating to the admitted IGST differential, the Tribunal observed that there was no finding of concealment, suppression of identity, fictitious documents or importation of goods different from what had actually been declared. Acceptance of a higher tax rate subsequently could not, by itself, transform a disclosed classification or rate claim into a misdeclaration warranting confiscation.
    • For the machinery and Solar PV Backsheets, the very foundation for confiscation disappeared once the Tribunal accepted the exemption claims.
    • The Tribunal therefore set aside the confiscation, quashed the β‚Ή1 crore redemption fine, and also set aside the β‚Ή10 lakh penalty.

    Key Legal Principles Emerging From the Decision

    The decision is significant for customs and renewable-energy manufacturers on several fronts:

    • An exemption notification must be interpreted according to the language actually used, without importing additional technological or brand-specific conditions.
    • The use of β€œor” between two expressions ordinarily signifies alternative rather than cumulative requirements.
    • β€œDrawing of circuit patterns” under the particular exemption could not be confined only to photolithographic processes when the notification itself contained no such limitation.
    • Solar photovoltaic cells were treated in the relevant technical context as sensitised semiconductor devices, and machinery establishing their predetermined electrical interconnections could fall within the exemption.
    • An exemption referring to β€œtedlar” could not be converted into a requirement that the material must necessarily originate from DuPont, where the notification contained no such manufacturer-specific condition.
    • Trade, technical and commercial usage may assist in interpreting undefined expressions in specialised fiscal legislation.
    • A disputed tax classification or rate claim does not automatically establish misdeclaration or liability to confiscation.

    Why the Judgment Matters for the Solar Industry

    • The ruling has particular relevance for India’s expanding solar PV manufacturing ecosystem.
    • Modern solar-module manufacturing involves a technologically integrated sequence of stringing, lay-up, bussing, electrical interconnection and lamination. The Tribunal’s decision recognises that customs treatment of such equipment cannot necessarily be determined by examining individual machines in isolation or by importing technological assumptions from conventional integrated-circuit manufacturing.
    • The ruling on Solar PV Backsheets is equally significant. By rejecting an unwritten manufacturer-specific condition for β€œTedlar”, CESTAT has emphasised that exemption eligibility must flow from the statutory description, technical characteristics and relevant commercial context of the imported material, rather than from restrictions not stated in the notification.

    Final Outcome

    The appeal resulted in substantial relief to Sova Solar Limited.

    CESTAT held the imported solar PV manufacturing machinery eligible for exemption under Notification No. 24/2005-Cus. and set aside the β‚Ή2.93 crore differential duty demand and interest.

    It also allowed the exemption on Solar PV Backsheets under Notification No. 25/1999-Cus., setting aside the β‚Ή12.70 lakh demand and interest.

    The β‚Ή1 crore redemption fine and β‚Ή10 lakh penalty were quashed. Only the β‚Ή22,00,549 differential IGST liability, which Sova Solar had chosen not to contest, survived together with applicable consequential interest.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi