Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 05.11.2026
Gujarat High Court Grants Regular Bail in NDPS Case After Charge-Sheet Filing
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
The Gujarat High Court has granted regular bail to Meman Mahmadfejan Usmangani in an NDPS case, stressing that prolonged custody after completion of investigation should not become a form of pre-trial punishment.
Case at a glance
On 4 November 2026, Justice Hasmukh D. Suthar of the Gujarat High Court at Ahmedabad allowed a successive regular-bail application filed after submission of the charge-sheet. The case arises from FIR No. 11217014260400 of 2026 at Kakoshi Police Station, Patan, alleging offences under Sections 8(c), 21(c) and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act.
The applicant had been in custody since 11 July 2026. The Court ordered his release on a personal bond of Rs. 25,000 with one surety for the same amount, subject to specified conditions.
Allegations in the case
According to the order, the prosecution alleged that a co-accused possessed and sold narcotic cough syrup and pregabalin capsules without a drug licence, supporting documents, or a doctorβs prescription. The seized material included:
94 bottles of Corex cough syrup, each containing 100 ml of codeine phosphate, valued at Rs. 16,743.28;
15 strips of pregabalin capsules, each strip containing 10 capsules, valued at Rs. 4,176.
The allegation against the applicant was that he had supplied the contraband to the co-accused. The co-accused, from whose conscious possession the material was allegedly recovered, had already been released on bail.
Why the Court granted bail
The Court considered several circumstances in favour of the applicant:
Investigation was complete: The police had filed the charge-sheet, reducing the need for custodial interrogation.
No further recovery was required: The Court noted that there was nothing left to recover or discover from the applicant.
No criminal antecedents: The applicant had no prior criminal record noted in the order.
Parity with the co-accused: The co-accused from whom the alleged contraband was recovered had been granted bail.
Trial may take time: The Court observed that commencement and completion of the trial would take time.
No demonstrated need for continued detention: The prosecution had not shown circumstances justifying further incarceration.
The Court referred to established bail principles, including the Supreme Court decisions in Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation and Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh. It reiterated that βbail is a rule and jail is exception,β linking the principle to the constitutional protection of personal liberty under Article 21.
Bail conditions
The applicant must comply with conditions designed to ensure his availability for trial and prevent interference with the case. These include:
Not misusing the liberty granted by the Court.
Not acting against the prosecutionβs interests or tampering with evidence.
Surrendering any passport to the trial court within one week.
Not leaving Gujarat without prior permission from the trial court.
Reporting to the relevant police station once each month for six months, between 11:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m.
Providing Aadhaar details, email address and current residential address to the investigating officer and the court, and not changing residence or contact number without prior permission.
Not engaging in any illegal activity.
The order also states that breach of these conditions may lead to a warrant or cancellation of bail. Release remains subject to the applicant not being required in any other offence.
Significance of the order
The ruling illustrates the Courtβs approach to regular bail after a charge-sheet has been filed. While the allegations involve narcotic substances, the Court balanced the seriousness of the case against factors such as completed investigation, absence of prior antecedents, lack of need for further recovery, bail granted to the co-accused, and the likely duration of trial.
Importantly, the Court clarified that its preliminary observations for deciding bail must not influence the trial courtβs assessment of evidence during the criminal trial. The grant of bail is therefore not a finding on guilt or innocence; it is a conditional release while the case proceeds.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 18.09.2026
Gujarat HC Quashes Copyright FIR Over Alleged Counterfeit Apple Accessories; Says Trademark Dispute Cannot Be Camouflaged as Copyright Offence to Bypass Statutory Safeguards
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
In an important ruling concerning the overlap between copyright and trademark enforcement in counterfeit-goods cases, the Gujarat High Court has quashed an FIR registered against a shopkeeper following the seizure of alleged counterfeit Apple-branded electronic accessories worth approximately βΉ15.11 lakh.
Justice P. M. Raval held that commercial hardware such as AirPods, cables, power adapters and smartwatches does not, merely by being counterfeit or bearing a registered brand, constitute a literary or artistic work for the purpose of attracting criminal liability under Section 63 of the Copyright Act.
The Court further held that the authorities could not subsequently sustain the case under the Trade Marks Act because the raid itself had been conducted without complying with the mandatory safeguards under Section 115(4)βincluding obtaining the prior opinion of the Registrar of Trade Marks and having the search and seizure conducted by an officer of the statutorily prescribed rank.
FIR Registered Under Copyright Act Following Raid on Ahmedabad Shop
The petitioner, Jitendrabhai Mohanbhai Kriplani, approached the High Court under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of FIR C.R. No. 11191026220492 of 2022, registered on October 19, 2022 at Kalupur Police Station, Ahmedabad City.
The FIR invoked Sections 51, 63 and 64 of the Copyright Act, 1957.
The complainant was a manager of Griffin Intellectual Property Service Pvt. Ltd., which, according to the FIR, had been authorised by Apple Inc. to take legal action against persons allegedly infringing Apple’s rights or selling counterfeit iPhones, iPads, MacBooks, mobile phones and accessories.
Acting on information concerning alleged counterfeit Apple products being sold in shops in the Kalupur area, the complainant approached the police. A raid was subsequently conducted at βRaj Cover Houseβ, where the petitioner was present.
βΉ15.11 Lakh Worth of Alleged Counterfeit Apple Products Seized
According to the FIR, the authorities recovered several categories of allegedly counterfeit Apple-branded products, including AirPods, USB cables, power adapters, a smartwatch and different kinds of Apple-branded stickers and barcode/MRP labels.
The FIR placed the aggregate value of the seized items at βΉ15,11,193.
The key question before the High Court was whether allegations concerning the possession or sale of such duplicate commercial products could legally sustain criminal proceedings for copyright infringement.
Petitioner: Counterfeit Hardware Is Not a Copyrightable βWorkβ
The petitioner argued that the seized goods did not fall within the categories of works protected under Section 13 of the Copyright Act.
His case was that AirPods, cables, adapters, smartwatches and similar electronic products were commercial articles rather than literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works.
Accordingly, the ingredients necessary for invoking Sections 63 and 64 of the Copyright Act were absent.
The petitioner further argued that if the allegation was actually one of misuse of Apple’s trademark on counterfeit goods, the case would fall under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, rather than being converted into a copyright prosecution.
Gujarat HC: Commercial Hardware Is Not Literary or Artistic Work
The High Court accepted the central distinction advanced by the petitioner.
It held that copyright protection under Section 13 read with Section 2(c) is confined to protected categories of works, whereas hardware components, cables, power adapters and electronic devices are commercial industrial products.
The Court observed that misuse of a brand name or manufacture of duplicate hardware bearing a trademark would ordinarily constitute trademark falsification punishable under Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act, rather than an offence under the Copyright Act.
It consequently held that mere possession or sale of counterfeit commercial goods or accessories bearing brand labels does not, by itself, satisfy the requirements of Sections 13 and 63 of the Copyright Act.
FIR Failed to Identify Any Specific Copyrighted Literary or Artistic Work
The Court then examined whether the stickers, seals, packaging labels and other material allegedly recovered could independently support the copyright prosecution.
It noted that the FIR merely described the seized articles as goods infringing Apple’s copyright and bearing Apple’s trademark.
Crucially, however, the FIR did not identify any specific copyrighted literary workβsuch as an instruction sheet or user manualβor any specific artistic work such as an original graphical layout or packaging design whose copyright had allegedly been infringed.
The Court stressed that copyright is a statutory right, and an FIR invoking Section 63 must set out how the material allegedly infringed satisfies the statutory definition of a protected work under Sections 2 and 13.
No User Manuals or Instruction Manuals Were Actually Seized
The complainant argued that product literature, packaging, labels and instruction manuals constituted original literary or artistic works belonging to Apple.
The High Court, however, examined the investigation papers and found that no instruction manual or user leaflet had actually been recovered or seized from the petitioner’s shop.
The Court said a new factual foundation could not be introduced during oral arguments when it was absent from the police recovery memo.
The recovery panchnama was also silent regarding any user or instruction manual. Photographs produced later through an affidavit-in-reply, which were not part of the investigation papers, could not be relied upon to cure that deficiency.
MRP Tags and Barcodes Are Functional Data, Not Automatically Literary Works
The Court also addressed the argument that stickers, MRP labels and barcodes constituted literary works.
It held that an inclusive definition of βliterary workβ cannot be stretched so far as to convert every commercial label or container into a literary work.
An MRP price tag, standard barcode or technical model sticker contains essentially functional and factual information, the Court observed, and cannot automatically be treated as an original literary work of authorship.
This distinction was central to the Court’s conclusion that the alleged counterfeit hardware and functional labels could not sustain the criminal copyright case as framed in the FIR.
βCannot Camouflage a Trademark Dispute as a Copyright Offenceβ
One of the most significant observations in the judgment concerns attempts to invoke copyright law where the substance of the allegation is trademark counterfeiting.
The Court found that the primary allegation was the sale of counterfeit Apple hardware and accessories, a subject that fell within Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act.
It held that the complainant could not camouflage a trademark dispute as a copyright offence in a manner that bypassed the procedural safeguards prescribed for trademark searches and seizures under Section 115 of the Trade Marks Act.
Could the Case Continue Under the Trade Marks Act?
Having found Section 63 of the Copyright Act unsustainable, the High Court considered the respondents’ alternative submission.
The complainant and State argued that even if the Copyright Act provisions were incorrectly invoked, the allegations nevertheless disclosed offences under Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
In other words, it was argued that incorrect labelling of the statutory provision in the FIR should not prevent the investigation from proceeding under the appropriate law.
The High Court rejected this argument because the Trade Marks Act contains its own mandatory safeguards governing search and seizure.
Prior Opinion of Registrar Under Section 115(4) Is a Statutory Condition Precedent
Section 115(4) of the Trade Marks Act requires the police officer, before conducting search and seizure, to obtain the opinion of the Registrar on the facts involved in the offence relating to the trademark and abide by that opinion.
The High Court found from the FIR and police record that no prior written opinion had been sought or obtained from the Registrar of Trade Marks before the raid on Raj Cover House.
Justice Raval described this requirement as a βstatutory condition precedentβ rather than a technical formality.
The Court viewed the safeguard as designed to prevent arbitrary police raids on commercial establishments at the instance of private corporate entities.
The Court consequently held that a search and seizure conducted in total defiance of Section 115(4) was vitiated.
Raid Conducted by Officers Below Statutorily Required Rank
There was another fundamental procedural defect.
The Court noted that Section 115(4) provides that no police officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police or equivalent shall search and seize without warrant in such cases.
Although the initial application had been forwarded by the DCP Zone-03 to Kalupur Police Station, the actual raid, search and seizure were carried out under a Police Inspector along with head constables and police constables.
The High Court found these officers to be below the statutorily prescribed rank of DSP/ACP and consequently held that they lacked the requisite authority to conduct the search and seizure under the Trade Marks Act.
Court Finds βColourable Exercise of Powerβ
The High Court went further and described the record as demonstrating a βclear pattern of colourable exercise of power.β
According to the Court, the complainant-company was aware that proceeding under the Trade Marks Act required the Registrar’s prior opinion and execution of the raid by an appropriately ranked police officer.
The Court found that what was essentially a trademark dispute had instead been presented as copyright infringement, thereby enabling an immediate raid through local police officers without satisfying those statutory safeguards.
The Court held that permitting the prosecution subsequently to fall back upon trademark charges would effectively sanction an evasion of the statutory mandate.
It reiterated that the FIR and seizure memo did not disclose recovery of original literary works or user manuals and that the controversy essentially concerned alleged falsification of a registered trademark on commercial accessories.
Complainant’s Authority to Lodge FIR Was Upheld
Importantly, the High Court did not accept every contention raised by the petitioner.
The petitioner had challenged the complainant’s locus and authority to institute the proceedings.
On examining the authorisation documents, however, the Court found that authority had been given to the agency and, in turn, to its authorised person to lodge the FIR.
The petitioner’s objection regarding the complainant’s lack of locus was therefore rejected.
Thus, the FIR was not quashed because the complainant lacked authority. It was quashed because the Copyright Act provisions were found inapplicable to the allegations as framed and the statutory requirements necessary for a Trade Marks Act prosecution had not been followed.
Gujarat HC Quashes FIR and All Consequential Proceedings
Summarising its conclusions, the Gujarat High Court held that the allegations did not satisfy the statutory ingredients of Sections 13 and 63 of the Copyright Act, since the commercial hardware in question did not constitute literary or artistic works for the purposes of the prosecution as framed.
It further held that Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act could not simply be substituted to save the proceedings because the search, raid and seizure had been conducted in breach of Section 115(4)βboth because the Registrar’s prior opinion had not been obtained and because the operation was carried out by officers below the prescribed rank.
Continuation of the proceedings, the Court concluded, would amount to an abuse of the process of Court and cause grave miscarriage of justice.
Accordingly, the High Court allowed Jitendrabhai Kriplani’s petition and quashed FIR C.R. No. 11191026220492 of 2022 dated October 19, 2022 and all consequential proceedings insofar as the petitioner was concerned.
Why This Judgment Matters
The ruling draws an important boundary between copyright enforcement and trademark counterfeiting.
The judgment does not hold that counterfeit branded electronic goods are lawful. Rather, it holds that allegations of counterfeiting must be prosecuted under the correct statutory framework, and the procedural safeguards attached to that legislation cannot be avoided by characterising a trademark dispute as copyright infringement.
The decision is especially significant for intellectual-property enforcement agencies, brand-protection companies, police authorities, retailers and businesses because it stresses that the choice of statute directly affects the legality of search, seizure and prosecution.
Where the substance of an allegation concerns falsification of trademarks on commercial products, authorities cannot use the Copyright Act merely to circumvent the safeguards specifically prescribed by Section 115(4) of the Trade Marks Act.
Key Takeaway
Counterfeit commercial hardware bearing a registered brand does not automatically constitute copyright infringement. Where the allegations essentially concern trademark falsification, the Trade Marks Act must be followedβincluding its mandatory search-and-seizure safeguards. A trademark dispute cannot be dressed up as a copyright case merely to bypass those statutory requirements.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 16.09.2026
Gujarat High Court: Raiding Officer Cannot Himself Be the Gazetted Officer Offered for Search Under Section 50 NDPS Act
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
The Gujarat High Court has suspended the 15-year rigorous imprisonment imposed on two persons convicted in a commercial-quantity NDPS case and granted them bail pending their criminal appeals, after finding a prima facie issue of non-compliance with Section 50 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.
A Division Bench comprising Justice Ilesh J. Vora and Justice R.T. Vachhani, in Moneshkumar Sukhenbhai Garange v. State of Gujarat, passed the common interim order on 29 April 2026 in Criminal Misc. Application No. 1 of 2026 in Criminal Appeal Nos. 408 and 685 of 2026.
The Court found substance, at the prima facie stage, in the contention that the raiding officer could not have offered the accused an option of being searched before himself, in addition to the statutory alternatives of a Magistrate or Gazetted Officer. The Bench accordingly suspended the sentence during pendency of the appeals.
Importantly, the order is not a final acquittal. The High Court expressly clarified that its observations are tentative and prima facie and will not affect the final hearing of the criminal appeals.
Two Accused Sentenced to 15 Years in Mephedrone Case
The applicants, original Accused Nos. 1 and 2, had been convicted under Sections 8(c), 22(c) and 29 of the NDPS Act by the Additional Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad, in Special NDPS Case No. 42 of 2023.
By judgment dated 25 November 2025, they were sentenced to 15 years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of βΉ2 lakh. They subsequently filed criminal appeals before the Gujarat High Court and sought suspension of sentence and bail during pendency of those appeals.
Prosecution Alleged 118.240 Grams of Mephedrone Was Recovered
According to the prosecution, SOG Ahmedabad received secret information on 5 February 2023 that the accused had travelled to Rajasthan to obtain MD drugs and were returning to Ahmedabad in a Ford car.
Police recorded the information, transmitted it to a superior officer and intercepted the vehicle while it was allegedly entering Ahmedabad from the Gandhinagar-Koba Circle side towards Indira Bridge.
During the personal search, police claimed to have recovered 59.150 grams of mephedrone from Himesh Garange and 59.090 grams from Monesh Garange, making a total alleged recovery of 118.240 grams.
The prosecution examined 15 witnesses and produced 51 documents during trial. Accused Nos. 1 to 3 were eventually convicted under Sections 8(c) and 22(c) read with Section 29 of the NDPS Act.
Accused Challenge Search Under Section 50 NDPS Act
Senior Advocate Yatin Oza, appearing for the applicants, raised several objections to the conviction.
A principal contention was that there had been non-compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act, which provides safeguards when an authorised officer is about to search a person.
The accused had allegedly been told that they could be searched before a Gazetted Officer, the nearest Magistrate, or before PW-8 B.P. Chaudhary himself, who was the raiding officer and a Gazetted Officer.
The defence argued that Section 50 does not contemplate such a βthird optionβ and that the raiding officer could not simultaneously offer himself as the Gazetted Officer before whom the accused could choose to be searched.
Other arguments were also raised concerning Sections 42 and 43 and the handling and custody of samples, including alleged inconsistencies concerning the colour of the contraband, dispatch particulars and non-examination of the person who carried the samples to the FSL.
The High Court, however, primarily focused on the Section 50 issue while considering whether the sentence should be suspended.
State Invokes Commercial Quantity and Section 37 Rigours
The State opposed the applications, arguing that the trial court had correctly convicted the applicants on the basis of the evidence.
It maintained that the police officers were duly empowered to conduct the search and seizure and that the accused had been informed of their rights under Section 50 before consenting to the search.
The prosecution also relied upon the presumptions under Sections 35 and 54 of the NDPS Act and emphasised that the case involved commercial quantity. It therefore contended that the stringent requirements of Section 37 of the NDPS Act should apply even at the stage of considering suspension of sentence and bail pending appeal.
Appellate Court Must Examine Whether Conviction Has Fair Chance of Being Set Aside
The Gujarat High Court referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Om Prakash Sahni v. Jai Shankar Chaudhary & Anr., (2023) 6 SCC 123 on the principles governing suspension of sentence pending appeal.
The Court noted that, while deciding such an application, the appellate court may examine whether there is something apparent or gross on the face of the record that gives rise to a prima facie conclusion that the conviction may ultimately not be sustainable.
The Bench was conscious that the evidence could not be fully re-analysed at the interim stage. However, because the conviction was based upon the contraband allegedly recovered during the applicants’ personal searches, the Court considered compliance with Section 50 to be particularly significant.
Section 50 Safeguard Must Be Properly Communicated
The High Court referred to the Constitution Bench judgment in State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh, (1999) 6 SCC 172.
The Constitution Bench had explained that an accused about to be personally searched must be informed of the existence of the right under Section 50(1) to be searched before the nearest Gazetted Officer or Magistrate. Failure to observe the statutory safeguard can render recovery from the personal search suspect and affect a conviction based upon that recovery.
The Gujarat High Court then considered the more specific issue of whether the searching officer could introduce a third alternative.
The Bench placed significant reliance on State of Rajasthan v. Parmanand & Anr., (2014) 5 SCC 345.
In Parmanand, the Supreme Court emphasised that communication of the right under Section 50 must be clear, unambiguous and individual, because the safeguard is intended to protect an accused against the possibility of false implication in cases carrying stringent punishments.
More importantly, the Supreme Court had disapproved of an accused being told that, besides the nearest Magistrate or Gazetted Officer, he could be searched before a senior police officer who was himself part of the raiding party.
The Supreme Court reasoned that the statutory safeguard is intended to give the accused the opportunity of a search in the presence of an independent officer. Providing a third option not contemplated by Section 50 could frustrate that protection.
Searching Officer Cannot Act in Dual Capacity
The Gujarat High Court also discussed State of Rajasthan v. Ram Chandra.
The Supreme Court had explained that if the officer proposing to conduct the search is himself a Gazetted Officer and gives the accused the option of being searched in his own presence, the requirement of Section 50 would not be satisfied because the searching officer cannot act in a dual capacityβboth as the officer conducting the search and as the Gazetted Officer before whom the accused is offered the statutory choice of search.
This distinction became central to the Gujarat High Court’s consideration of the present applications.
Raiding Officer Offered Himself as an Option: Gujarat High Court
On examining the evidence of PW-8 and the written notices at Exhibits 80 and 82, the High Court found that PW-8, who was himself the raiding officer, had informed the accused that they could be searched before him, a Magistrate or any Gazetted Officer.
The Bench consequently recorded a prima facie view that the raiding officer could not have given the accused an option to be searched before himself.
Relying on Parmanand and the Supreme Court’s decision in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Surat Singh, the High Court held that there was substance in the applicants’ argument concerning non-compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act.
15-Year Sentence Suspended; Accused Granted Bail
Without undertaking an extensive examination of the merits, the Division Bench held that the circumstances justified exercise of discretion in favour of the applicants.
The Court therefore suspended the 15-year sentence imposed by the Special NDPS Judge during pendency of the criminal appeals and directed that the applicants be released on bail upon furnishing a personal bond of βΉ10,000 each with one surety each of the like amount.
The accused were directed not to leave India without prior permission of the High Court, to appear when the appeals are taken up for final hearing and to intimate any change in address to the concerned police station and the Court.
Bail Order Does Not Set Aside NDPS Conviction
The legal effect of the order needs to be distinguished from a final decision on the appeals.
The Gujarat High Court has not acquitted the applicants or finally declared the search illegal. Their convictions remain under challenge in the pending criminal appeals.
The Court specifically stated that the observations in the suspension-of-sentence order are βtentative and prima-facie in natureβ and shall not come in the way when the appeals are heard finally.
Why the Order Is Significant
The order reiterates the importance of strict adherence to procedural safeguards in cases involving personal search under the NDPS Act, particularly where the alleged recovery forms the principal basis of conviction.
It also highlights a crucial distinction under Section 50: merely informing an accused about a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate may not necessarily cure the process if the notice simultaneously introduces a legally impermissible option that could dilute or confuse the statutory right.
The Gujarat High Court’s prima facie reasoning therefore reinforces the proposition that the officer proposing to conduct the personal search cannot present himself as the independent Gazetted Officer contemplated by the Section 50 safeguard.
At the same time, because the present order concerns only suspension of sentence pending appeal, the final determination of the legality of the search, conviction and evidentiary issues remains open.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 16.09.2026
Gujarat High Court: Trademark Application Cannot Be Denied Advertisement Merely Due to Section 11(1) Objection
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
The Gujarat High Court has allowed an appeal filed by Lincoln Pharmaceuticals Private Limited against the rejection of its trademark application for βGLYPANTAβ, holding that Section 20 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 permits advertisement of a trademark application despite objections under Section 11(1).
Justice Mauna M. Bhatt, by an order dated 20 November 2025 in Lincoln Pharmaceuticals Private Limited v. Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr., R/Civil Appeal No. 7 of 2025, quashed the Trade Marks Registry’s rejection order dated 11 August 2025 and directed the Registry to proceed with advertisement of the application within three months.
The ruling does not amount to final registration of βGLYPANTA.β The Court directed advertisement of the application, leaving any opposition to be considered independently on its merits.
Lincoln Pharmaceuticals Sought Registration of βGLYPANTAβ
Lincoln Pharmaceuticals had filed an application on 22 August 2023 under Section 18(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, seeking registration of the mark βGLYPANTA.β
The application was examined by the Trade Marks Registry, which issued an examination report raising objections. Lincoln Pharmaceuticals responded through a detailed reply dated 30 October 2023, raising various grounds in support of registration.
According to the pharmaceutical company, however, the grounds raised in its response were not properly considered before the application was ultimately rejected on 11 August 2025.
The rejection prompted Lincoln Pharmaceuticals to approach the Gujarat High Court under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act.
Section 11(1) Objection Raised Over Similar Trademark
The principal objection before the Registry arose under Section 11(1) of the Trade Marks Act, which deals with relative grounds for refusal of trademark registration, including situations where similarity with an earlier trademark may create a likelihood of confusion.
Lincoln Pharmaceuticals argued that the objection was unsustainable and that its detailed response to the examination report had not been properly considered.
One of the company’s key arguments was that even where competing pharmaceutical trademarks fall within the same class, differences in the composition of the respective pharmaceutical products may constitute an additional mitigating factor while assessing likelihood of confusion.
Delhi High Courtβs Elyon Pharmaceuticals Decision Cited
To support this argument, Lincoln Pharmaceuticals relied upon the Delhi High Court’s decision in Elyon Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. v. Registrar of Trademarks, C.A. (COMM.IPD-TM) 153/2021, decided on 23 August 2023.
In that case, the Delhi High Court had considered the marks βELEMENTALβ and βELMENTINβ and observed that differences in the pharmaceutical composition of products could provide an additional mitigating consideration when examining the possibility of public confusion.
Lincoln Pharmaceuticals relied on this reasoning to argue that the Registry’s Section 11(1) objection against βGLYPANTAβ should not have resulted in rejection of its application in the manner adopted.
Company Says βGLYPANTAβ Was Already in Use Since 2023
Another argument raised before the High Court was that the Registry had relied upon trademarks that were proposed to be used, whereas Lincoln Pharmaceuticals claimed that βGLYPANTAβ had been in use since 2023 and had acquired a substantial market for the product.
The company also objected to the fact that its application had been rejected before publication in the Trade Marks Journal.
Its contention was that publication would enable the statutory process to proceed and, if any third party wished to oppose the application, such opposition could thereafter be considered in accordance with law.
Section 20 Permits Advertisement Despite Section 11 Objections: Lincoln Pharmaceuticals
Lincoln Pharmaceuticals placed particular reliance upon Section 20 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
It argued that even where objections under Sections 11(1) or 11(2) exist, the statutory framework permits advertisement of a trademark application.
The company therefore sought an opportunity for its application to be advertised rather than being rejected outright before publication.
The Registry’s counsel also raised an issue concerning non-joinder of the opposition party. Lincoln Pharmaceuticals responded that no private respondent was required at that stage because the challenge concerned rejection of the application before publication.
The High Court recorded that counsel appearing for the respondents could not dispute the provisions of Section 20.
Gujarat High Court Relies on Section 20
After considering the submissions, Justice Mauna M. Bhatt noted that Section 20 permits advertisement despite objections under Section 11(1).
On that basis, the Court allowed Lincoln Pharmaceuticals’ appeal and quashed and set aside the Trade Marks Registry’s order dated 11 August 2025.
The Registry was then specifically directed to proceed with advertisement of the subject trademark application in accordance with the proviso to Section 20 of the Trade Marks Act.
The Court directed that the exercise be completed within three months from receipt of its order.
Any Opposition to βGLYPANTAβ Must Be Decided on Its Own Merits
Significantly, the High Court did not direct the Registry to grant final registration of βGLYPANTA.β
Instead, the Court restored the application to the stage of advertisement. It expressly provided that if any opposition is filed against the trademark application after advertisement, such opposition must be decided on its own merits.
Thus, Lincoln Pharmaceuticals succeeded in having the rejection order set aside and obtaining publication of its application, but the ultimate registrability of βGLYPANTAβ remains subject to the statutory process, including any opposition that may be filed.
Why the Judgment Matters for Trademark Applicants
The order is significant for trademark prosecution because it highlights the distinction between an examination-stage objection and the subsequent advertisement/opposition process.
In the circumstances before it, the Gujarat High Court relied on Section 20 to permit the application to proceed to advertisement despite the Section 11(1) objection, rather than allowing the pre-publication rejection to stand.
The decision is particularly relevant to pharmaceutical trademark applications, where the Registry frequently examines competing marks closely because of concerns regarding similarity and confusion. The case also demonstrates that factors such as the nature and composition of competing pharmaceutical products may be raised by an applicant while responding to relative-ground objections, though the Gujarat High Court did not finally adjudicate the merits of the βGLYPANTAβ mark’s registrability in this order.
Key Legal Takeaway
The immediate principle emerging from the order is that the existence of a Section 11(1) objection does not, by itself in the circumstances considered by the Court, prevent the application from being advertised under Section 20.
At the same time, advertisement should not be confused with registration. Publication gives third parties an opportunity to oppose the mark, and the Registry retains the responsibility to determine any such opposition on its merits.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 16.09.2026
Gujarat High Court Directs Dissenting Members to Vacate Flats for Society Redevelopment; Holds 75% Consent and Section 41A Requirements Satisfied
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email idamitnaren@outlook.com.
The Gujarat High Court has directed dissenting members of Amity Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. to hand over peaceful vacant possession of their flats within eight weeks, clearing the way for redevelopment of the nearly five-decade-old residential society in Paldi, Ahmedabad.
Justice Mauna M. Bhatt, in Amity Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. through its Secretary and Chairman & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Ors., R/Special Civil Application No. 10596 of 2024, held that the Society had followed the prescribed redevelopment procedure and fulfilled the conditions under Section 41A of the Gujarat Ownership of Flats Act, 1973. The judgment was delivered on 8 April 2025.
The Court found that 72 out of 81 members had consented to redevelopment, comfortably exceeding the statutory 75% threshold, while the buildings were more than 25 years old and in a dilapidated condition.
Nearly 50-Year-Old Housing Society Opts for Redevelopment
Amity Co-operative Housing Society is a registered society owning approximately 6,825 square yards (5,706.38 sq. metres) of land at Final Plot No. 9/A, Town Planning Scheme No. 6, Paldi, Ahmedabad.
A total of 81 flats were constructed on the property during 1974-75, making it one of the older residential societies in the Paldi area.
According to the Society, the buildings had deteriorated substantially over time. The record referred to corrosion in RCC slabs, beams, columns and foundations, major structural cracks and bending of balcony slabs, raising concerns over safety.
Considering repairs and renovation impracticable, the Society decided to pursue redevelopment. The process had commenced as early as 2016, when an advertisement was published inviting offers from builders and developers.
Majority Members Approved Redevelopment
A General Body Meeting was held on 4 April 2021, followed by another meeting on 26 December 2021, to consider the redevelopment proposal.
The Court recorded that 72 out of 81 members consented to redevelopment and accepted the developer’s offer. The consenting members subsequently entered into an MoU with the developer in October 2022.
A structural engineer’s report described the buildings as more than 25 years old and unsound, unsafe and unstable.
The Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation had also issued a notice dated 1 April 2021 concerning the condition of the buildings. The photographs placed before the Court further supported the Society’s case regarding their dilapidated condition.
Dissenting Members Object to Developer and MoU Terms
Respondent Nos. 6 to 14 opposed the redevelopment.
One of their objections was that the General Body meetings had contemplated redevelopment through BTI Infrastructure Developer LLP, whereas the MoU was ultimately entered into with the proprietorship concern Tameer Infrastructure.
They also objected to the MoU on the ground that it did not contain provisions for a security deposit and penalty, contending that this was contrary to Rule 23 of the Gujarat Ownership Flats Rules.
The developer responded that there had been a change in the constitution of the development entity and that the person undertaking the redevelopment remained connected with the project. It was further argued that neither a security deposit nor a penalty clause was mandatory under Rule 23.
Section 41A Conditions Fulfilled: Gujarat High Court
The High Court found that the statutory requirements for redevelopment had been satisfied.
The Court specifically noted that the building was more than 25 years old, its condition was dilapidated, and 72 out of 81 members had consented to redevelopment, thereby satisfying the requirement of consent from not less than 75% of members.
The Court also examined the Society’s decision-making process and found that General Body Meetings had been held to discuss redevelopment and the developer’s offer. The majority-approved resolutions were followed by an MoU executed by the consenting members.
Accordingly, the Court found no defect in the procedure adopted by the Society for selecting and proceeding with the redevelopment proposal.
Change in Developer’s Constitution Not Sufficient to Stop Redevelopment
The Court was also not persuaded by the dissenting members’ objection concerning the change from BTI Infrastructure Developer LLP to the proprietorship concern undertaking the redevelopment.
The judgment records that the Court did not find any material change sufficient to invalidate the redevelopment process and observed that the private respondents had failed to demonstrate a justifiable basis for the objection.
Bank Guarantee and Penalty Clause Not Mandatory Under Rule 23
An important part of the judgment concerns the objections regarding the absence of a bank guarantee/security deposit and penalty clause.
The Court relied on an earlier coordinate-bench decision in Ratnamani Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. v. State of Gujarat and observed that providing a bank guarantee is not a mandatory requirement under Rule 23 of the Gujarat Ownership Flats Rules.
The MoU in the present case also provided for benefits including accommodation/transport-related arrangements, additional carpet area, gift money and rent.
The Court further held that a penalty payment was not mandatory in nature. Concerns relating to the project could also be addressed through project finance requirements and registration with the RERA authority, while the developer had filed an affidavit assuring compliance with the terms and conditions of the MoU.
Minority Members Cannot Stall Redevelopment Once Statutory Conditions Are Met
The High Court referred extensively to the Gujarat High Court’s earlier decision in Rabari Tejmalbhai Gagabhai v. Ratnamani Cooperative Housing Society Ltd..
That decision identified the principal requirements under Section 41A for redevelopment, including the age of the building, its ruinous/dilapidated condition where applicable, and consent of at least 75% of members.
The earlier Division Bench had also observed that where statutory procedures have been followed, a relatively small group of dissenting members cannot stall redevelopment merely on their own suspicions and notions. Members nevertheless retain the ability to participate constructively and raise legitimate concerns regarding the terms of the Development Agreement.
This reasoning supported the Court’s conclusion that the objections of the dissenting members could not prevent redevelopment in the present case after the Society had complied with the statutory framework.
Article 226 Can Be Used to Facilitate Redevelopment
The judgment also referred to Sarojben Kiritbhai Shah v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation concerning the High Court’s powers under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The precedent rejected the contention that a writ court could not direct non-consenting members to vacate merely because the Gujarat Ownership of Flats Act does not contain a summary eviction mechanism comparable to certain Maharashtra redevelopment laws.
Referring to Supreme Court decisions including Binny Ltd. v. V. Sadasivan, (2005) 6 SCC 657 and Dwarka Nath v. Income Tax Officer, 1965 3 SCR 536, the earlier decision recognised the wide remedial jurisdiction available to High Courts under Article 226.
Dissenting Members Given Eight Weeks to Vacate
Having examined the redevelopment process, the Gujarat High Court concluded that the petitioners had followed due procedure and satisfied the conditions necessary to bring the redevelopment within Section 41A of the Gujarat Ownership of Flats Act, 1973.
Exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, the Court allowed the petition and directed Respondent Nos. 6 to 14 to hand over peaceful vacant possession within eight weeks from receipt of the order.
The Court also requested all private respondents to cooperate with the redevelopment of the Society.
Why the Judgment Matters for Housing Society Redevelopment
The ruling reinforces an important principle governing redevelopment of co-operative housing societies in Gujarat: once the requirements prescribed under Section 41A and the applicable redevelopment rules are fulfilled, a minority of dissenting members cannot ordinarily bring an otherwise valid redevelopment process to a standstill merely because they disagree with the majority decision.
At the same time, the judgment does not eliminate the rights of minority members to challenge genuine statutory violations, fraud, procedural irregularities or deficiencies in a Development Agreement. Rather, the decision rests on the Court’s finding that the statutory conditions and redevelopment procedure had been complied with in this particular case. For housing societies, developers and flat owners, the ruling highlights the importance of maintaining a clear documentary record of General Body Meetings, member consent, structural condition, developer selection, resolutions, MoUs and compliance with the Gujarat Ownership of Flats Act and Rules.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 12.08.2026
Gujarat High Court on Recovery of Duty Drawback from Exporters
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
This article analyzes a significant judgment by the Gujarat High Court regarding the recovery of duty drawback payments made to exporters under the Customs and Central Excise Duty Drawback Rules. The case, involving Pratibha Syntex Limited and others versus the Union of India, addresses the legality and timeliness of recovering excess drawback payments from exporters.
Background: Duty Drawback Scheme and Dispute
The petitioners, recognized export houses, exported fabrics made from 100% polyester filament yarn. Under the Drawback Rules, exporters of specified goods are entitled to a refund (drawback) of duties paid on inputs. The relevant schedule (Sub Serial No. 5404) initially allowed a 20% drawback (subject to a maximum of Rs. 62 per kg of filament yarn content) if certain conditions were met. Later, a reduced rate of 17% was introduced for cases where exporters could not provide specific excise certificates, but there was confusion about whether the Rs. 62 per kg cap applied to this reduced rate.
Sequence of Events
Initial Payments: Exporters received drawback at 17% of FOB value without the Rs. 62 per kg cap, based on the authorities’ interpretation at the time.
Clarifications Issued: In September 1996, the Commissioner (Drawback) clarified that the Rs. 62 per kg ceiling applied even to the 17% rate. This was later reinforced in 1999, stating the clarification was effective from the original notification date.
Recovery Notices: Over three years after the original payments, show cause notices were issued to recover the excess drawback paid above the Rs. 62 per kg limit.
Legal Proceedings: The exporters challenged these recovery actions, arguing that such delayed demands were time-barred and violated principles of fairness.
Key Legal Issues
1. Applicability of Limitation Period
Rule 16 of the Drawback Rules: Allows recovery of erroneously paid drawback but does not specify a time limit.
Petitioners’ Argument: Even if no explicit limitation is prescribed, a reasonable period must be implied, drawing on Supreme Court precedents.
Government’s Argument: The absence of a statutory limitation means recovery can be initiated at any time.
2. Judicial Reasoning
The High Court examined:
Supreme Court rulings (e.g., Government of India v. Citedal Fine Pharmaceuticals) that, in the absence of a statutory limitation, authorities must act within a “reasonable period.”
The facts: Drawback was paid between December 1995 and August 1996; recovery notices were issued only in February 2000, despite clarifications being available much earlier.
The Court’s Decision
The Court held that a delay of more than three years in issuing recovery notices was not reasonable.
It ruled that, although Rule 16 does not specify a limitation period, the concept of a reasonable period must be read into the rule to prevent arbitrary and disruptive actions against exporters.
The show cause notices and subsequent recovery orders were quashed as time-barred.
Implications of the Judgment
Protection for Exporters: The judgment safeguards exporters from indefinite exposure to recovery actions, ensuring administrative certainty.
Guidance for Authorities: Customs and excise authorities must act promptly and within a reasonable timeframe when seeking to recover excess payments.
Legal Precedent: The decision reinforces the principle that, in the absence of explicit statutory limitation, a reasonable period is implied by law.
Conclusion
This Gujarat High Court judgment is a landmark in balancing government powers and exporters’ rights under the duty drawback scheme. It underscores the necessity for timely administrative action and provides clarity on the interpretation of limitation in recovery proceedings under the Drawback Rules.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 11.08.2026
Gujarat HC Upholds Finality of Goods Classification and Grants Relief on Duty Drawback Claims
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
Veer Impex, an importer and exporter of scaffolding items such as nuts, bolts, washers, and hand tools, faced show cause notices from customs authorities. The authorities alleged misclassification of goods under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, and claimed that Veer Impex had wrongly availed duty drawback benefits by declaring goods under specific headings (7318, 8205, 3926) instead of a more general heading (7308). The goods were detained and later released provisionally, but the dispute over classification and drawback claims persisted.
Legal Issues
The core legal issues revolved around:
Finality of Classification: Whether the classification of goods under specific customs headings, already settled by previous judgments, could be reopened.
Limitation Period: Whether show cause notices for recovery of excess or erroneous drawback could be issued without a prescribed time limit under Rule 16 of the Drawback Rules.
Authority of DRI: Whether the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) had the power to issue such show cause notices.
Procedural Fairness: Whether repeated and delayed issuance of show cause notices violated principles of natural justice.
Courtβs Analysis and Findings
1. Binding Precedents and Finality
The court noted that the classification of scaffolding items under specific headings had already been settled in earlier cases, and the authorities had not challenged those decisions. The Supreme Court had also dismissed the governmentβs appeal on this issue, making the classification final and binding.
2. Reasonable Limitation Period
Although Rule 16 of the Drawback Rules does not specify a limitation period, the court held that a reasonable period (three years) should be read into the rule. Show cause notices issued after three years from the date of payment of drawback were deemed unsustainable.
3. Jurisdiction of DRI
The court relied on the Supreme Courtβs decision in M/s. Canon India Private Limited, holding that the DRI did not have the authority to issue such show cause notices, further invalidating the actions taken against Veer Impex.
4. Natural Justice and Delay
The court criticized the authorities for keeping show cause notices pending for years without adjudication and for not informing the petitioner about the status of their cases. Such delays and repeated notices were found to be in breach of natural justice.
Judgment and Relief Granted
The Gujarat High Court quashed and set aside the impugned show cause notices against Veer Impex.
The court directed customs authorities to release any withheld drawback amounts within twelve weeks.
The connected petition regarding the release of export promotional documents was also allowed.
Significance of the Judgment
This judgment reinforces several important legal principles:
Respect for Judicial Precedent: Authorities must follow binding court decisions and cannot reopen settled issues for similarly placed parties.
Reasonable Limitation: Even in the absence of explicit statutory limits, a reasonable period must be observed for initiating recovery actions.
Jurisdictional Boundaries: Only properly empowered officers can issue show cause notices, as clarified by the Supreme Court.
Procedural Fairness: Delays and repeated actions without proper communication violate natural justice.
Conclusion
The Gujarat High Courtβs decision in favor of Veer Impex provides clarity and relief to exporters facing similar disputes. It underscores the importance of legal certainty, adherence to precedent, and procedural fairness in customs and trade matters.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS) – IDT Tax I Arbitration I Litigation
Date: 16.07.2026
Gujarat High Court Quashes Customs Corrigendum in Pigment Import
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
Messers Vidres India Ceramics Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. challenged a Corrigendum issued by the customs authorities after the conclusion of adjudication proceedings regarding the classification and assessment of imported pigments. The dispute centered on whether the imported goods should be classified as “Pigments” (as claimed by the petitioners) or “Printing Ink” (as alleged by the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, DRI), which would attract a higher customs duty.
Timeline of Events
2012β2013: Petitioners imported several consignments of pigments, cleared under the classification 32071090, and paid the assessed customs duties.
April 2014: DRI issued a show cause notice proposing to reclassify the imports as “Printing Ink” based on laboratory reports, seeking higher duties.
2014β2016: Petitioners responded, requested cross-examination, and participated in hearings. The adjudicating authority concluded the hearing on July 11, 2016, and reserved the matter for final orders.
August 22, 2016: After the hearing was concluded, the customs department issued a Corrigendum introducing new allegations and evidence, linking the petitioners’ imports to those of another company, M/s. Krishna Colour Chem.
Legal Arguments
Petitioners
The Corrigendum was issued after the adjudication process had concluded, which is not permissible under the law.
Corrigenda are meant for correcting minor errors, not for introducing new evidence or allegations.
The relevant legal provisions (Section 28 of the Customs Act, as it stood before March 29, 2018) did not allow for such post-hearing amendments.
Customs Department
Argued that amendments to Section 28 and subsequent regulations allowed for supplementary notices when new evidence emerged.
Cited the right to amend or supplement the show cause notice prior to adjudication, as stated in the original notice.
Court’s Analysis
The Court found that the adjudication process was completed on July 11, 2016, and the Corrigendum was issued more than a month later, introducing new allegations and evidence.
The clause in the show cause notice allowing amendments applied only “prior to the adjudication of the case.” Since the hearing had concluded, this did not apply.
Amendments to Section 28 of the Customs Act (including the power to issue supplementary notices) introduced after March 29, 2018, did not apply retroactively to this case, as clarified by Explanation-4 to Section 28.
The Corrigendum was not a mere correction but an attempt to introduce new material after the close of proceedings, which was not permissible.
Final Judgment
The Gujarat High Court ruled in favor of the petitioners:
The customs department’s Corrigendum dated August 22, 2016, was quashed.
The department was directed to pass final orders on the original show cause notice, ignoring the Corrigendum.
The ruling reinforces the principle that new evidence or allegations cannot be introduced after the conclusion of adjudication proceedings unless specifically permitted by law.
Significance
This judgment clarifies the limits of the customs authorities’ powers to amend or supplement show cause notices after the close of hearings. It upholds procedural fairness and ensures that parties are not subjected to new allegations without due process.
The case serves as an important precedent for importers and legal practitioners dealing with customs disputes, emphasizing the need for authorities to adhere strictly to statutory timelines and procedures.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS) – IDT Tax I Arbitration I Litigation
Date: 30.05.2026
Gujarat High Court Quashes CESTAT Registryβs Rejection of ROM Application as Time-Barred
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email idΒ intelconsul@gmail.com . Β
This article examines a significant judgment by the Gujarat High Court in the case of Vadilal Industries Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (Special Civil Application No. 19950 of 2005), which addresses the procedural nuances of rectification of mistake applications and the proper service of tribunal orders under the Central Excise Act, 1944.
Background of the Case
Parties Involved:
Petitioner: Vadilal Industries Ltd., which had taken over M/s Gujarat Cup Company, a manufacturer of paper cups for ice-cream.
Respondents: Union of India and related authorities.
Dispute Origin:
The dispute arose from the denial of a concessional rate of duty under Notification No. 20/94 for the period April 1994 to June 1997, resulting in a demand of Rs. 14,86,656 and a penalty of Rs. 50,000.
The petitioners’ appeals before the Commissioner (Appeals) and subsequently the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) were unsuccessful.
Key Events Leading to the Petition
Ex-Parte Decision:
On 16-10-2003, the CESTAT decided the appeal ex-parte after denying an adjournment request from the petitioners’ advocate.
The petitioners claimed they were unaware of the order as it was not served on them or their advocate.
Discovery and Application:
The petitioners learned of the order only in July 2005 and obtained a photocopy on 18-7-2005.
They filed a Rectification of Mistake (ROM) Application on 5-8-2005.
The CESTAT Registry returned the application as time-barred, stating it was filed after the six-month limitation period.
Legal Issues Examined
1. Computation of Limitation Period for ROM Applications
Section 35C(2) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 provides a six-month period for rectification of mistakes.
The Court clarified that this period should be computed from the date the party receives the order, not merely from the date the order is passed.
The rationale: A party can only identify a mistake after reviewing the order, making receipt of the order the logical starting point for limitation.
2. Proper Service of Tribunal Orders
Section 37C of the Act prescribes the modes of serving orders:
Registered Post with acknowledgment due.
If unserved, affixing a copy at the factory or relevant premises.
If still unserved, affixing a copy on the notice board of the issuing authority.
In this case, the order sent by registered post was returned unserved, and no further steps were taken as required by law.
The Court held that service was incomplete, and the petitioners’ claim of non-receipt was unrebutted.
3. Authority to Decide ROM Applications
The Technical Officer of CESTAT returned the ROM application without placing it before the Tribunal Bench.
The Court found this action improper, stating only the Tribunal has the authority to decide on such applications.
Court’s Decision and Directions
Quashing of Technical Officer’s Communication:
The letter returning the ROM application was set aside.
Directions to CESTAT:
The petitioner was allowed to re-present the ROM application, which the Tribunal must hear on merits.
Costs Imposed:
Due to the petitioner’s delay in following up after the adjournment, costs of Rs. 10,000 were imposed, payable to the respondents.
Key Takeaways for Practitioners and Litigants
Limitation Period:
The limitation for rectification applications starts from the date of receipt of the order, not the date of the order itself.
Service of Orders:
Authorities must strictly follow the prescribed modes of service. Failure to do so can invalidate subsequent procedural steps.
Procedural Fairness:
Administrative officers must not usurp the Tribunal’s authority in deciding applications.
Diligence Required:
Litigants must proactively follow up on their cases to avoid unnecessary delays and costs.
Conclusion
This judgment reinforces the importance of procedural compliance in legal proceedings, especially regarding service of orders and computation of limitation periods. It also clarifies the respective roles of administrative officers and judicial benches in handling rectification applications, ensuring fairness and due process for all parties involved.
