Tag: #IndirectTaxMatters

  • Drone Found With 500-Gram Heroin Packet: Punjab & Haryana HC Grants Bail to Accused After Year-Long Custody

    Drone Found With 500-Gram Heroin Packet: Punjab & Haryana HC Grants Bail to Accused After Year-Long Custody

    Date: 19.09.2026

    The Punjab and Haryana High Court has granted regular bail to an accused in an NDPS case involving the alleged recovery of 500 grams of heroin found alongside a drone, observing that the accused’s connection with the contraband and the admissibility of the disclosure statement relied upon by the prosecution are matters to be determined during trial.

    Justice Vikram Aggarwal, in Lovepreet Singh @ Labha v. State of Punjab, CRM-M-7640-2026 (O&M), passed the order on 17 September 2026.

    Drone and 500 Grams of Heroin Found in Riverbed

    • The case arose from FIR No. 22 dated 30 April 2025, registered at Police Station Narot Jaimal Singh, District Pathankot, under Section 21 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, along with Sections 10, 11 and 12 of the Aircraft Act, 1934.
    • According to the prosecution case recorded by the High Court, a drone was recovered from a riverbed on 30 April 2025. A packet was found alongside the drone, from which 500 grams of heroin was allegedly recovered.
    • Significantly, the order does not state that the heroin was physically recovered from Lovepreet Singh.

    Accused Linked to Recovery Through Later Disclosure Statement

    • The petitioner was subsequently apprehended in another caseβ€”FIR No. 92 dated 1 August 2025, registered at Police Station Taragarh under Sections 21 and 29 of the NDPS Act.
    • Another case, FIR No. 93 dated 2 August 2025, was also registered at the same police station under Sections 21 and 29 of the NDPS Act and Section 111 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.
    • The prosecution alleged that while involved in FIR No. 92, Lovepreet Singh made a disclosure statement on 31 August 2025, stating that the heroin recovered on 30 April 2025 belonged to him.
    • On that basis, he was arrested in the present case on 16 September 2025 and remained in custody thereafter.

    Defence: No Evidence Apart From Disclosure Statement

    • Counsel for Lovepreet Singh argued that the petitioner had been falsely implicated and could not otherwise be connected with the contraband recovered alongside the drone.
    • The defence specifically contended that, apart from the alleged disclosure statement, there was no other evidence linking the petitioner with the recovered heroin.
    • It was further submitted that the investigation had already been completed and the final report submitted, but charges had still not been framed. Of the 18 prosecution witnesses, none had been examined.
    • The defence therefore argued that the trial was likely to take considerable time and that continued incarceration would serve no useful purpose.

    Punjab Opposes Bail Citing Commercial Quantity

    • The State of Punjab opposed the regular bail application.
    • The State argued that the case involved a commercial quantity of heroin and relied upon the petitioner’s alleged statement that the recovered narcotic substance belonged to him.
    • The High Court, however, did not finally determine whether the disclosure statement was admissible or whether it sufficiently connected the petitioner with the contraband.

    Whether Disclosure Statement Is Admissible Must Be Decided at Trial: High Court

    • The High Court observed that the question of whether Lovepreet Singh could actually be linked with the recovered contraband could only be determined upon conclusion of the trial.
    • The Court noted that the recovery had taken place on 30 April 2025, whereas the petitioner, while already in custody in another case, was alleged to have subsequently made the disclosure statement regarding the heroin.

    Crucially, the Court observed:

    • β€œThe admissibility of the same shall also be determined at the stage of trial.”
    • Thus, for purposes of the bail proceedings, the High Court did not treat the alleged disclosure statement as finally establishing the petitioner’s connection with the narcotic substance.

    One Year in Custody; Not a Single Witness Examined

    • The duration of custody and lack of progress in the trial also weighed with the High Court.
    • Lovepreet Singh had remained in custody since 16 September 2025, meaning that approximately one year had elapsed by the time his bail petition was decided.
    • The investigation was complete and the final report had already been submitted. Despite this, charges had not been framed and none of the 18 prosecution witnesses had been examined.
    • The Court consequently found it clear that the trial would take a β€œsufficiently long time” to conclude.
    • In those circumstances, Justice Aggarwal held that no useful purpose would be served by keeping the petitioner in custody any longer.

    High Court Orders Release on Regular Bail

    • The Punjab and Haryana High Court accordingly allowed the petition without expressing any opinion on the merits of the criminal case.
    • Lovepreet Singh was ordered to be released on regular bail upon furnishing the required bail and surety bonds to the satisfaction of the concerned Trial Court, Chief Judicial Magistrate or Duty Magistrate.
    • The order is therefore a bail decision and not an acquittal. The questions of the petitioner’s connection with the heroin, the evidentiary value and admissibility of the disclosure statement, and the prosecution allegations remain open for determination during trial.

    Why the Order Is Significant

    • The order highlights two considerations that can become important in NDPS bail proceedings: the nature of the material connecting an accused with the recovered contraband and the progress of the criminal trial during prolonged custody.
    • Here, the alleged heroin was found alongside a drone months before the petitioner was arrested in the case, while the link asserted against him was based on a subsequent disclosure statement allegedly made while he was already in custody in another matter. The High Court expressly left the admissibility of that statement to be determined at trial.
    • At the same time, the Court took into account that the petitioner had spent a year in custody, investigation was over, the final report had been filed, charges remained unframed and 0 out of 18 witnesses had been examined.
    • The order should, however, be read on its own facts and does not contain a general ruling that every disclosure-statement-based NDPS case automatically entitles an accused to bail.

    Key Takeaway

    The Punjab and Haryana High Court granted regular bail to Lovepreet Singh in the 500-gram heroin case after noting that the narcotic substance had been recovered alongside a drone months before his arrest, while his alleged connection to it arose through a later disclosure statement whose admissibility remained a matter for trial.

    With the petitioner having spent around a year in custody, investigation completed, charges yet to be framed and none of the 18 witnesses examined, the Court concluded that continued incarceration would serve no useful purpose.

    The Court expressly refrained from commenting on the merits of the prosecution case.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Handy Download:

    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Punjab & Haryana HC: Trade Mark Search & Seizure Cannot Be Conducted by Officer Below DSP Rank

    Punjab & Haryana HC: Trade Mark Search & Seizure Cannot Be Conducted by Officer Below DSP Rank

    Date: 19.09.2026

    The Punjab and Haryana High Court has quashed a criminal prosecution under Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, holding that the mandatory safeguards prescribed under Section 115(4) were violated because the search and seizure was conducted by an officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police and without obtaining the prior opinion of the Registrar of Trade Marks.

    In Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab & Anr., CRM-M-12823-2021 (O&M), Justice Jasjit Singh Bedi held that the statutory procedure had been breached on two counts and that there was consequently a β€œclear statutory embargo” on the initiation and continuation of the criminal proceedings.

    The judgment was delivered on 10 January 2023.

    Allegations of Selling Duplicate β€œNorth Face” and β€œJansport” Bags

    • The proceedings originated from a complaint submitted by Vishal Joshi, described as an Enforcement Officer of United Overseas Trade Mark Company.
    • The complainant alleged that Ashok Kumar, proprietor of Amar Bag House, was manufacturing, selling and supplying duplicate bags bearing the marks β€œNorth Face” and β€œJansport.”
    • On the basis of the complaint, FIR No. 10 dated 1 February 2019 was registered at Police Station Mahilpur, District Hoshiarpur, initially under Sections 63 and 65 of the Copyright Act, 1957.

    136 Allegedly Fake Bags Recovered During Raid

    • During the investigation, the police raided the petitioner’s shop.
    • According to the judgment, the search resulted in recovery of 60 black bags carrying the β€œNorth Face” mark and 76 bags carrying the β€œJansport” mark, totalling 136 bags.
    • A wooden board carrying a β€œJansport” company sticker was also recovered. The recovered bags were alleged to be fake and were taken into police possession.
    • However, the legality of the manner in which this search and seizure was carried out ultimately became decisive before the High Court.

    Copyright Charges Deleted; Trade Marks Act Invoked

    • After investigation, the police initially prepared the final report under Sections 63 and 65 of the Copyright Act.
    • The matter was thereafter sent to the District Attorney, Hoshiarpur, who opined that offences under Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 were made out. Consequently, the Copyright Act offences were deleted and the report under Section 173(2) CrPC was presented under Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act.
    • Charges were subsequently framed against Ashok Kumar under those provisions on 1 February 2021.
    • The petitioner then approached the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, seeking quashing of the FIR, the order framing charges and all consequential proceedings.

    Petitioner Challenges Search and Seizure Under Section 115(4)

    • Ashok Kumar’s principal argument was that the investigation had failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 115(4) of the Trade Marks Act.
    • He raised two specific objections.
    • First, the search and seizure had been conducted by officers of the rank of Sub-Inspector/Assistant Sub-Inspector, whereas Section 115(4) authorises warrantless search and seizure by a police officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police or equivalent.
    • Second, the police had not obtained the opinion of the Registrar of Trade Marks before conducting the search and seizure, as required by the proviso to Section 115(4).
    • The petitioner therefore argued that the entire search and seizure stood vitiated and the resulting criminal prosecution could not legally continue.

    What Section 115(4) of the Trade Marks Act Requires

    • The High Court reproduced Section 115 of the Trade Marks Act and closely examined its statutory safeguards.
    • Under Section 115(3), offences under Sections 103, 104 and 105 are cognizable.
    • However, Section 115(4) provides that a police officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police or equivalent may conduct a warrantless search and seizure where satisfied that an offence referred to in Section 115(3) has been, is being, or is likely to be committed.
    • Crucially, the proviso further states that before conducting any search and seizure, the police officer shall obtain the opinion of the Registrar on the facts involved in the offence relating to the trade mark and shall abide by that opinion.
    • Thus, the Court treated the statutory scheme as imposing substantive procedural safeguards upon police action in such trademark prosecutions.

    Search by Sub-Inspector Violated Section 115(4)

    • The High Court found from the recovery memo and the final report under Section 173(2) CrPC that the search and seizure had in fact been conducted by an officer of the rank of Sub-Inspector.
    • Justice Bedi held that this directly violated Section 115(4), because the raid and consequential search and seizure were required to be undertaken by an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police or equivalent.
    • The Court consequently held that the proceedings emanating from the FIR were liable to be quashed on this ground.

    Prior Opinion of Registrar of Trade Marks Was Also Mandatory

    • There was a second and independent statutory violation.
    • The Court found that no opinion of the Registrar of Trade Marks had been obtained before the search and seizure.
    • The Sub-Inspector who conducted the search was therefore not only below the statutorily prescribed rank but had also proceeded without complying with the proviso to Section 115(4).
    • The High Court held that the proceedings were liable to be quashed on this ground as well.

    State Argues Objections Should Be Decided During Trial

    • The State opposed the quashing petition.
    • It argued that after registration of the FIR, the police had completed investigation and presented the report under Section 173(2) CrPC. Charges had also been framed.
    • According to the State, the grounds raised by the petitioner could therefore be adjudicated during the trial rather than being used to quash the prosecution at the threshold.
    • However, the State also conceded that its reply contained no specific denial of the petitioner’s contentions concerning the alleged statutory violations.
    • The High Court ultimately rejected the argument that the petitioner should be relegated to trial because the defect concerned violation of the statutory conditions governing the very search and seizure underlying the prosecution.

    Mandatory Procedure Under Trade Marks Act Cannot Be Ignored

    • The High Court relied on its earlier decisions in Anil Kumar v. State of Punjab & Anr. and Satpal & Anr. v. State of Punjab & Ors..
    • In Anil Kumar, the Court had held that Section 115(4) does not permit an officer below the rank of DSP to conduct the relevant search and seizure. It had further held that obtaining the Registrar’s opinion before such action was mandatory, observing that use of the word β€œshall” indicated the mandatory nature of the requirement.
    • Similarly, in Satpal, the Court held that where the search was conducted by a Sub-Inspector without obtaining the Registrar’s opinion, the proceedings stood vitiated. It emphasised that where a statute creating an offence also prescribes a procedure, authorities cannot simply ignore that procedure.

    Other High Court Precedents Support Mandatory Compliance

    • The judgment also referred to the Madhya Pradesh High Court decision in Kasim Ali v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., where prosecution under the Trade Marks Act was found unsustainable because the mandatory Section 115 procedure had not been followed.
    • That decision similarly recognised that a search under Section 115(4) must be conducted by the prescribed rank of police officer and only after obtaining the Registrar’s opinion.
    • The Punjab and Haryana High Court also considered Pitambra Industries v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., in which the Madhya Pradesh High Court treated obtaining the Registrar’s opinion before search and seizure as a sine qua non and held that compliance with Section 115(4) was mandatory.
    • The Court further referred to the Bombay High Court’s ruling in Shrenik Shantilal Dhadiwal v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., where investigation by an Assistant Police Inspector without the Registrar’s opinion was found contrary to Section 115(4).

    Bhajan Lal Principles Applied

    • The petitioner also relied upon the Supreme Court’s landmark judgment in State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335.
    • Among the recognised categories for exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC is a situation where there exists an express legal bar under the Code or the concerned statute to the institution or continuation of criminal proceedings.
    • Applying this principle, the High Court found that Section 115(4) had been violated in two material respects:
    • the search and seizure was undertaken by an officer below the rank of DSP, and the proceedings were initiated without obtaining the opinion of the Registrar of Trade Marks.
    • The Court therefore concluded that there was a clear statutory embargo on the initiation and continuation of the proceedings.

    FIR, Charges and Entire Criminal Proceedings Quashed

    Having found both statutory violations established, the Punjab and Haryana High Court allowed Ashok Kumar’s petition.

    It quashed:

    • FIR No. 10 dated 1 February 2019 under Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act at Police Station Mahilpur, District Hoshiarpur;
    • the order dated 1 February 2021 framing charges against the petitioner; and
    • all subsequent proceedings arising from the FIR.

    Thus, Ashok Kumar succeeded before the High Court, and the prosecution arising from the allegedly counterfeit β€œNorth Face” and β€œJansport” bags was brought to an end because the mandatory statutory procedure governing search and seizure had not been followed.

    Key Takeaway

    The judgment underscores that the procedural safeguards contained in Section 115(4) of the Trade Marks Act cannot be bypassed in criminal enforcement actions involving offences under Sections 103, 104 and 105.

    Where a warrantless search and seizure is undertaken under Section 115(4), the judgment treats two requirements as critical: the officer conducting the statutory search must be not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police or equivalent, and the prescribed opinion of the Registrar of Trade Marks must be obtained before the search and seizure. In Ashok Kumar, failure to satisfy both requirements was sufficient for the High Court to hold that continuation of the prosecution was legally impermissible and to quash the FIR, charge-framing order and all consequential proceedings.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Handy Download:

    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Gujarat High Court: Customs Refund Limitation Cannot Run Until Final Assessment Is Communicated to Importer; Mere ICEGATE Upload Not Enough

    Gujarat High Court: Customs Refund Limitation Cannot Run Until Final Assessment Is Communicated to Importer; Mere ICEGATE Upload Not Enough

    Date: 19.09.2026

    The Gujarat High Court has held that merely uploading an order finalising provisional assessment on the Customs electronic portal is not sufficient to start the limitation period for claiming refund under Section 27(1B)(c) of the Customs Act, 1962. The final assessment must be communicated to the assessee before the statutory one-year period can operate against it.

    The Division Bench of Justice Bhargav D. Karia and Justice Niral R. Mehta, in Principal Commissioner, Customs, Ahmedabad Commissionerate v. M/s GAIL (India) Ltd., R/Tax Appeal No. 211 of 2024, dismissed the Revenue’s appeal on 13 June 2024, finding no infirmity in CESTAT’s decision in favour of GAIL. The judgment carries neutral citation 2024:GUJHC:30963-DB.

    Dispute Over Refund of Excess Customs Duty on Imported LNG

    • GAIL (India) Ltd. was engaged in the import of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). It filed 16 Bills of Entry, which were initially assessed provisionally under Section 18 of the Customs Act upon execution of a bond. After production of the original documents, the Bills of Entry were subsequently finalised.
    • The table reproduced by the High Court on pages 3 and 4 of the judgment records the provisional and finally assessed quantities, Customs duty paid and the refund claimed for each Bill of Entry. The aggregate excess duty claimed as refund was β‚Ή7,78,98,646.
    • GAIL eventually filed its refund application on 26 October 2016. It also submitted a Chartered Accountant’s certificate dated 7 September 2016 concerning unjust enrichment, stating that the excess Customs duty had been reflected as a receivable in its books and had not been passed on to customers.

    Customs Department Rejected Refund as Time-Barred

    • The adjudicating authority rejected GAIL’s refund claim on limitation.
    • According to Customs, the 16 Bills of Entry had been finally assessed between 7 October 2015 and 20 October 2015. Since the refund application was filed on 26 October 2016, the Department treated it as having been filed beyond the one-year limitation prescribed under Section 27(1B)(c).
    • The Department’s case was essentially that Section 27(1B)(c), where duty has been provisionally paid under Section 18, computes the limitation period from the date of adjustment of duty after final assessment or, in the case of reassessment, from the date of reassessment.

    CESTAT Allowed GAIL’s Appeal

    • GAIL challenged the rejection before CESTAT.
    • The Tribunal allowed the appeal by relying upon Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., 2014 (308) E.L.T. 169, holding that the relevant point for limitation was the date of service of the finalisation of provisional assessment.
    • The precedent emphasised that where an order gives rise to a remedial right, the date on which the order is served upon the person concerned assumes significance for exercising that remedy.
    • CESTAT consequently rejected the Department’s contention that the importer should simply have discovered the finalisation through ICEGATE.

    Revenue Approaches Gujarat High Court

    • The Principal Commissioner of Customs challenged the Tribunal’s order before the Gujarat High Court under Section 130 of the Customs Act.
    • The principal question proposed by Revenue was whether CESTAT was correct in treating the date of service of the finalisation order as the relevant date for limitation when Section 27(1B)(c) refers to the date of adjustment of duty after final assessment or the date of reassessment.
    • Revenue argued that the final assessments had already been uploaded on the ICEGATE system and that GAIL was required to take notice of the assessments made available on the portal. On this basis, Customs contended that the refund application was beyond limitation.

    Section 27(1B)(c): One-Year Limitation After Finalisation

    • The High Court examined Sections 18 and 27 of the Customs Act, 1962.
    • Section 27(1B)(c) provides that where duty has been paid provisionally under Section 18, the one-year limitation is computed from the date of adjustment of duty after final assessment, or, in the case of reassessment, from the date of reassessment.
    • The High Court accepted that once provisional assessment is completed and an assessee becomes entitled to refund, the refund application has to be made within the period prescribed under Section 27 read with Section 27(1B).
    • The crucial question, however, was whether limitation could operate against an assessee before the final assessment had actually been communicated to it.

    GAIL’s August 2016 Letter Became Crucial

    • A significant factual circumstance was GAIL’s letter dated 19 August 2016.
    • The adjudicating authority itself had recorded that this letter requested the Department to finalise the Customs duty/final assessment. Customs rejected GAIL’s argument that this letter itself should be treated as a refund claim, observing that it was merely a request for early finalisation and was unrelated to a refund application.
    • But that finding had another consequence.
    • The Gujarat High Court observed that the very fact that GAIL was requesting finalisation on 19 August 2016 indicated that, until then, the assessee was not aware that the final assessments had already been completed.
    • This became an important factual basis for rejecting Revenue’s limitation argument.

    Mere Upload on Customs Portal Is Not Sufficient Communication

    The most important part of the judgment is the High Court’s finding concerning electronic uploading of the assessment order.

    The Court held:

    • β€œMerely because the Custom Department has uploaded the final assessment orders on portal is not sufficient compliance of intimation to the assessee…”
    • The Court treated communication of the final assessment as a condition sine qua non for the assessee to exercise the statutory right of seeking refund within one year under Section 27(1B)(c).
    • It further held that CESTAT had correctly considered the documents showing when the finalisation of provisional assessments was actually communicated to GAIL.
    • The decision therefore draws an important distinction between an order merely being available electronically on a departmental portal and the order being communicated to the person whose statutory remedy depends upon knowledge of that order.

    Gujarat High Court Dismisses Revenue’s Appeal

    • The High Court found no infirmity in CESTAT’s order and held that no question of law, much less any substantial question of law, arose for consideration.
    • The Revenue’s appeal was therefore dismissed as being devoid of merit.
    • Thus, GAIL (India) Ltd. succeeded before the Gujarat High Court on the limitation dispute concerning its Customs refund claim.

    Why the Judgment Is Important for Importers

    • The decision has considerable practical importance for importers whose Bills of Entry have been provisionally assessed under Section 18 and who subsequently become entitled to refund following finalisation.
    • The judgment establishes that the Department cannot necessarily rely only upon the internal date of final assessment or the fact that the assessment was uploaded on ICEGATE when the importer was not shown to have been duly informed of the finalisation.
    • For refund disputes under Section 27(1B)(c), evidence relating to communication or service of the final assessment can therefore become critical in determining whether the refund application is within limitation.
    • The judgment is particularly relevant where Customs argues that the importer should have independently monitored the portal even though no effective communication of the final assessment was established.

    Key Legal Principle

    The principle emerging from the judgment can be stated succinctly:

    Where refund arises following finalisation of provisional assessment under Section 18 of the Customs Act, the statutory limitation under Section 27(1B)(c) cannot effectively be invoked against the assessee merely on the basis that the final assessment was uploaded on the Customs portal. Communication of the final assessment to the assessee is essential before limitation can operate against the refund claim.

    The ruling therefore reinforces the procedural importance of actual communication of Customs assessment orders, particularly where commencement of a limitation period affects an importer’s substantive right to claim refund.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Handy Download:

    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Supreme Court Acquits Man Sentenced to 10 Years; Finds Serious Lapses in NDPS Sampling Procedure

    Supreme Court Acquits Man Sentenced to 10 Years; Finds Serious Lapses in NDPS Sampling Procedure

    Date: 18.09.2026

    The Supreme Court has acquitted a man sentenced to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment in an NDPS case after finding serious deficiencies in the seizure and sampling process, including failure to draw representative samples in the presence of a Magistrate and non-compliance with the procedure contemplated under Section 52A of the NDPS Act.

    In Nadeem Ahamed v. State of West Bengal, the Court held that the cumulative procedural lapses made the integrity of the seizure and sampling process doubtful. It further held that the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report could not be read in evidence, leaving no acceptable evidence to establish that the substance allegedly recovered from the appellant was heroin. The conviction was consequently set aside and Nadeem Ahamed was acquitted.

    Trial Court Had Sentenced Accused to 10 Years’ Rigorous Imprisonment

    • Nadeem Ahamed had been convicted by the Special Court under the NDPS Act at Alipore, West Bengal, for offences punishable under Sections 21(c) and 29 of the NDPS Act.
    • By its judgment dated August 24, 2021 and sentencing order dated August 26, 2021, the Trial Court sentenced him to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of β‚Ή1 lakh, with a further six months’ rigorous imprisonment in default of payment of the fine.
    • His appeal before the Calcutta High Court was filed with a delay of 1,183 days. The High Court declined to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal without examining the conviction on merits.

    Alleged Recovery of 125 Grams of Heroin

    • According to the prosecution, on July 16, 2018, police received information that two men would arrive near Pragati Maidan Police Station in Kolkata to supply heroin.
    • A raiding team intercepted Nadeem Ahamed and co-accused Amit Dutta alias Rakesh. The accused opted to be searched in the presence of a Gazetted Officer.
    • The prosecution claimed that approximately 130 grams of suspected heroin was recovered from Amit Dutta, while 125 grams was recovered from Nadeem.
    • The combined weight of the substances was 255 grams, and the prosecution treated the recovery as commercial quantity. One sample weighing 10 grams was drawn from each packet and marked S1 and S2.
    • The samples were subsequently sent to the FSL, which reported that both tested positive for heroin.

    Supreme Court Says High Court Was Wrong to Dismiss Appeal Solely on Delay

    • Before considering the merits, the Supreme Court strongly disagreed with the Calcutta High Court’s decision to dismiss the criminal appeal merely because it had been filed late.
    • The Court noted that Nadeem had remained incarcerated since his initial apprehension and did not have the financial means to file his appeal within time.
    • It held that rejecting his statutory appeal solely on delay was β€œtoo harsh and unjustified”. The High Court ought to have condoned the delay and decided the appeal on merits.
    • Instead of remanding the caseβ€”which would have caused further delayβ€”the Supreme Court itself examined the merits of the conviction.

    Two Separate Recoveries Could Not Automatically Be Clubbed Together

    • A major error identified by the Supreme Court concerned the treatment of the two recoveries as one combined commercial quantity.
    • The Court held that merely because Nadeem and Amit Dutta were walking side-by-side, were apprehended simultaneously and were individually carrying suspected narcotics did not establish that either knew about the substance carried by the other.
    • Such circumstances could create suspicion, but the Court reiterated that β€œsuspicion… cannot take place of proof.”
    • To invoke conspiracy under Section 29 and club the quantities recovered from two separate individuals, the prosecution was required to produce positive and tangible evidence demonstrating prior knowledge or conspiracy.
    • The Supreme Court found no such evidence. Apart from the allegation that the two men were walking together and were searched one after another, there was no material establishing a prior conspiracy.

    125 Grams and 130 Grams Could Not Be Clubbed to Cross Commercial-Quantity Threshold

    • The Trial Court had combined the alleged recoveries of 125 grams and 130 grams, resulting in a total of 255 grams, and treated this as exceeding the commercial-quantity threshold of 250 grams.
    • The Supreme Court found this approach legally unsustainable in the absence of evidence proving conspiracy between the two accused.
    • Relying upon Amarsingh Ramjibhai Barot v. State of Gujarat, (2005) 7 SCC 550, the Court held that the Trial Court had committed a grave factual error by clubbing the heroin allegedly recovered from two distinct individuals merely to bring the total above the commercial-quantity threshold.

    Serious Defects Found in Sampling Procedure

    • The Supreme Court then examined the manner in which the alleged contraband was sampled and found several significant deficiencies.
    • The seizure officer had collected only one sample from each packet. The Court noted that this was contrary to Clause 2.2 of Standing Order No. 1 of 1989 dated June 13, 1989, issued by the Anti-Smuggling Unit, Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance.
    • The Standing Order contemplated that samples from seized narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances should be drawn in duplicate at the spot of recovery, in the presence of the panch witnesses and the person from whom the substance was recovered.
    • The Court referred to Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417, where the Supreme Court had emphasised compliance with such guidelines, particularly in penal proceedings.

    Accused’s Signatures Missing From Sample and Mother Packets

    • Another serious discrepancy concerned the signatures on the seized material.
    • The seizure officer claimed that the accused, Gazetted Officer and witnesses had signed the seizure list and labels. However, when the sample packets were opened during trial, the Court found that the labels did not bear the accused-appellant’s signatures.
    • After examining the evidence, the Supreme Court recorded that neither the mother packet nor the sample packets bore Nadeem’s signatures when they were opened and exhibited before the Trial Court.
    • This discrepancy further undermined the reliability and integrity of the sampling process.

    No Separate Sample Seizure List, Test Memo or Weighment Chart

    • The Court identified additional gaps in the prosecution evidence.
    • No separate seizure list had been prepared for the samples drawn from the appellant. There was also no test memo or weighment chart prepared at the spot, and no specimen seal memo was proved during the seizure officer’s evidence.
    • Although two independent witnesses had allegedly participated in the proceedings, only one was examined by the prosecution, without explaining why the other was withheld.

    Complete Failure to Follow Section 52A Procedure

    • The most significant deficiency identified by the Supreme Court concerned Section 52A(2) of the NDPS Act.
    • The record showed that neither the seizure officer nor the officer-in-charge undertook the statutory procedure concerning inventory and sampling in the presence of a Magistrate.
    • The Trial Court itself had noted that the seizure officer could not even state whether an inventory list had been prepared at the time of the raid.
    • The Supreme Court consequently held that there had been a β€œcomplete and unexplained failure” to adhere to Section 52A.
    • Neither representative samples were drawn in the presence of a Magistrate nor was an inventory prepared and certified as contemplated by law.
    • According to the Court, these lapses went to the root of the prosecution case and rendered the integrity of the seizure and sampling process wholly doubtful.

    Section 52A Not Mandatory Per Se, But Cumulative Lapses Proved Fatal

    • Importantly, the Supreme Court did not hold that every breach of Section 52A automatically results in acquittal.
    • The Court expressly clarified that the procedure under Section 52A had not been considered mandatory by the Supreme Court.
    • However, in the present case, the failure to draw samples in accordance with Standing Order No. 1 of 1989, when considered together with the complete non-compliance with Section 52A, made the seizure and sampling procedure unreliable.
    • The Court went so far as to describe the cumulative procedure as a β€œtotal farce” and β€œunworthy of credence.”
    • This qualification is particularly important: the decision turns on the combined effect of multiple serious procedural defects, rather than laying down a rule of automatic acquittal for every Section 52A irregularity.

    FSL Report Loses Evidentiary Significance

    • The consequence of the defective sampling procedure was decisive.
    • The Supreme Court held that the FSL report lost significance because of the flawed manner in which samples had been collected, coupled with the total failure to comply with Section 52A.
    • It ultimately held that the FSL report could not be read in evidence. Once the forensic report was excluded, there was no acceptable evidence proving that the substance allegedly recovered from Nadeem was heroin within the meaning of the NDPS Act.

    Conviction Set Aside; Nadeem Ahamed Acquitted

    • The Supreme Court consequently set aside the impugned judgments and acquitted Nadeem Ahamed of the charges.
    • It directed that he be released from custody forthwith, unless his detention was required in any other case.
    • The appeals were accordingly allowed.

    Key Takeaway

    The ruling underscores two important safeguards in NDPS prosecutions.

    First, narcotics allegedly recovered separately from two accused cannot automatically be aggregated to reach commercial quantity merely because they were apprehended together. Where the prosecution relies on Section 29 conspiracy to combine the quantities, it must establish conspiracy through positive and tangible evidence rather than suspicion or conjecture.

    Second, although the Supreme Court did not treat Section 52A compliance as invariably mandatory in every case, serious and cumulative deficiencies in sampling, sealing, identification, inventory and Magistrate-supervised procedures can undermine the integrity of the alleged contraband itself.

    Where those deficiencies render the sampling process unreliable, even a positive FSL report may cease to provide a safe evidentiary foundation for conviction.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Gujarat HC Quashes Copyright FIR Over Alleged Counterfeit Apple Accessories; Says Trademark Dispute Cannot Be Camouflaged as Copyright Offence to Bypass Statutory Safeguards

    Gujarat HC Quashes Copyright FIR Over Alleged Counterfeit Apple Accessories; Says Trademark Dispute Cannot Be Camouflaged as Copyright Offence to Bypass Statutory Safeguards

    Date: 18.09.2026

    In an important ruling concerning the overlap between copyright and trademark enforcement in counterfeit-goods cases, the Gujarat High Court has quashed an FIR registered against a shopkeeper following the seizure of alleged counterfeit Apple-branded electronic accessories worth approximately β‚Ή15.11 lakh.

    Justice P. M. Raval held that commercial hardware such as AirPods, cables, power adapters and smartwatches does not, merely by being counterfeit or bearing a registered brand, constitute a literary or artistic work for the purpose of attracting criminal liability under Section 63 of the Copyright Act.

    The Court further held that the authorities could not subsequently sustain the case under the Trade Marks Act because the raid itself had been conducted without complying with the mandatory safeguards under Section 115(4)β€”including obtaining the prior opinion of the Registrar of Trade Marks and having the search and seizure conducted by an officer of the statutorily prescribed rank.

    FIR Registered Under Copyright Act Following Raid on Ahmedabad Shop

    • The petitioner, Jitendrabhai Mohanbhai Kriplani, approached the High Court under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of FIR C.R. No. 11191026220492 of 2022, registered on October 19, 2022 at Kalupur Police Station, Ahmedabad City.
    • The FIR invoked Sections 51, 63 and 64 of the Copyright Act, 1957.
    • The complainant was a manager of Griffin Intellectual Property Service Pvt. Ltd., which, according to the FIR, had been authorised by Apple Inc. to take legal action against persons allegedly infringing Apple’s rights or selling counterfeit iPhones, iPads, MacBooks, mobile phones and accessories.
    • Acting on information concerning alleged counterfeit Apple products being sold in shops in the Kalupur area, the complainant approached the police. A raid was subsequently conducted at β€œRaj Cover House”, where the petitioner was present.

    β‚Ή15.11 Lakh Worth of Alleged Counterfeit Apple Products Seized

    • According to the FIR, the authorities recovered several categories of allegedly counterfeit Apple-branded products, including AirPods, USB cables, power adapters, a smartwatch and different kinds of Apple-branded stickers and barcode/MRP labels.
    • The FIR placed the aggregate value of the seized items at β‚Ή15,11,193.
    • The key question before the High Court was whether allegations concerning the possession or sale of such duplicate commercial products could legally sustain criminal proceedings for copyright infringement.

    Petitioner: Counterfeit Hardware Is Not a Copyrightable β€œWork”

    • The petitioner argued that the seized goods did not fall within the categories of works protected under Section 13 of the Copyright Act.
    • His case was that AirPods, cables, adapters, smartwatches and similar electronic products were commercial articles rather than literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works.
    • Accordingly, the ingredients necessary for invoking Sections 63 and 64 of the Copyright Act were absent.
    • The petitioner further argued that if the allegation was actually one of misuse of Apple’s trademark on counterfeit goods, the case would fall under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, rather than being converted into a copyright prosecution.

    Gujarat HC: Commercial Hardware Is Not Literary or Artistic Work

    • The High Court accepted the central distinction advanced by the petitioner.
    • It held that copyright protection under Section 13 read with Section 2(c) is confined to protected categories of works, whereas hardware components, cables, power adapters and electronic devices are commercial industrial products.
    • The Court observed that misuse of a brand name or manufacture of duplicate hardware bearing a trademark would ordinarily constitute trademark falsification punishable under Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act, rather than an offence under the Copyright Act.
    • It consequently held that mere possession or sale of counterfeit commercial goods or accessories bearing brand labels does not, by itself, satisfy the requirements of Sections 13 and 63 of the Copyright Act.

    FIR Failed to Identify Any Specific Copyrighted Literary or Artistic Work

    • The Court then examined whether the stickers, seals, packaging labels and other material allegedly recovered could independently support the copyright prosecution.
    • It noted that the FIR merely described the seized articles as goods infringing Apple’s copyright and bearing Apple’s trademark.
    • Crucially, however, the FIR did not identify any specific copyrighted literary workβ€”such as an instruction sheet or user manualβ€”or any specific artistic work such as an original graphical layout or packaging design whose copyright had allegedly been infringed.
    • The Court stressed that copyright is a statutory right, and an FIR invoking Section 63 must set out how the material allegedly infringed satisfies the statutory definition of a protected work under Sections 2 and 13.

    No User Manuals or Instruction Manuals Were Actually Seized

    • The complainant argued that product literature, packaging, labels and instruction manuals constituted original literary or artistic works belonging to Apple.
    • The High Court, however, examined the investigation papers and found that no instruction manual or user leaflet had actually been recovered or seized from the petitioner’s shop.
    • The Court said a new factual foundation could not be introduced during oral arguments when it was absent from the police recovery memo.
    • The recovery panchnama was also silent regarding any user or instruction manual. Photographs produced later through an affidavit-in-reply, which were not part of the investigation papers, could not be relied upon to cure that deficiency.

    MRP Tags and Barcodes Are Functional Data, Not Automatically Literary Works

    • The Court also addressed the argument that stickers, MRP labels and barcodes constituted literary works.
    • It held that an inclusive definition of β€œliterary work” cannot be stretched so far as to convert every commercial label or container into a literary work.
    • An MRP price tag, standard barcode or technical model sticker contains essentially functional and factual information, the Court observed, and cannot automatically be treated as an original literary work of authorship.
    • This distinction was central to the Court’s conclusion that the alleged counterfeit hardware and functional labels could not sustain the criminal copyright case as framed in the FIR.

    β€œCannot Camouflage a Trademark Dispute as a Copyright Offence”

    • One of the most significant observations in the judgment concerns attempts to invoke copyright law where the substance of the allegation is trademark counterfeiting.
    • The Court found that the primary allegation was the sale of counterfeit Apple hardware and accessories, a subject that fell within Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act.
    • It held that the complainant could not camouflage a trademark dispute as a copyright offence in a manner that bypassed the procedural safeguards prescribed for trademark searches and seizures under Section 115 of the Trade Marks Act.

    Could the Case Continue Under the Trade Marks Act?

    • Having found Section 63 of the Copyright Act unsustainable, the High Court considered the respondents’ alternative submission.
    • The complainant and State argued that even if the Copyright Act provisions were incorrectly invoked, the allegations nevertheless disclosed offences under Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
    • In other words, it was argued that incorrect labelling of the statutory provision in the FIR should not prevent the investigation from proceeding under the appropriate law.
    • The High Court rejected this argument because the Trade Marks Act contains its own mandatory safeguards governing search and seizure.

    Prior Opinion of Registrar Under Section 115(4) Is a Statutory Condition Precedent

    • Section 115(4) of the Trade Marks Act requires the police officer, before conducting search and seizure, to obtain the opinion of the Registrar on the facts involved in the offence relating to the trademark and abide by that opinion.
    • The High Court found from the FIR and police record that no prior written opinion had been sought or obtained from the Registrar of Trade Marks before the raid on Raj Cover House.
    • Justice Raval described this requirement as a β€œstatutory condition precedent” rather than a technical formality.
    • The Court viewed the safeguard as designed to prevent arbitrary police raids on commercial establishments at the instance of private corporate entities.
    • The Court consequently held that a search and seizure conducted in total defiance of Section 115(4) was vitiated.

    Raid Conducted by Officers Below Statutorily Required Rank

    • There was another fundamental procedural defect.
    • The Court noted that Section 115(4) provides that no police officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police or equivalent shall search and seize without warrant in such cases.
    • Although the initial application had been forwarded by the DCP Zone-03 to Kalupur Police Station, the actual raid, search and seizure were carried out under a Police Inspector along with head constables and police constables.
    • The High Court found these officers to be below the statutorily prescribed rank of DSP/ACP and consequently held that they lacked the requisite authority to conduct the search and seizure under the Trade Marks Act.

    Court Finds β€œColourable Exercise of Power”

    • The High Court went further and described the record as demonstrating a β€œclear pattern of colourable exercise of power.”
    • According to the Court, the complainant-company was aware that proceeding under the Trade Marks Act required the Registrar’s prior opinion and execution of the raid by an appropriately ranked police officer.
    • The Court found that what was essentially a trademark dispute had instead been presented as copyright infringement, thereby enabling an immediate raid through local police officers without satisfying those statutory safeguards.
    • The Court held that permitting the prosecution subsequently to fall back upon trademark charges would effectively sanction an evasion of the statutory mandate.
    • It reiterated that the FIR and seizure memo did not disclose recovery of original literary works or user manuals and that the controversy essentially concerned alleged falsification of a registered trademark on commercial accessories.

    Complainant’s Authority to Lodge FIR Was Upheld

    • Importantly, the High Court did not accept every contention raised by the petitioner.
    • The petitioner had challenged the complainant’s locus and authority to institute the proceedings.
    • On examining the authorisation documents, however, the Court found that authority had been given to the agency and, in turn, to its authorised person to lodge the FIR.
    • The petitioner’s objection regarding the complainant’s lack of locus was therefore rejected.
    • Thus, the FIR was not quashed because the complainant lacked authority. It was quashed because the Copyright Act provisions were found inapplicable to the allegations as framed and the statutory requirements necessary for a Trade Marks Act prosecution had not been followed.

    Gujarat HC Quashes FIR and All Consequential Proceedings

    • Summarising its conclusions, the Gujarat High Court held that the allegations did not satisfy the statutory ingredients of Sections 13 and 63 of the Copyright Act, since the commercial hardware in question did not constitute literary or artistic works for the purposes of the prosecution as framed.
    • It further held that Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act could not simply be substituted to save the proceedings because the search, raid and seizure had been conducted in breach of Section 115(4)β€”both because the Registrar’s prior opinion had not been obtained and because the operation was carried out by officers below the prescribed rank.
    • Continuation of the proceedings, the Court concluded, would amount to an abuse of the process of Court and cause grave miscarriage of justice.
    • Accordingly, the High Court allowed Jitendrabhai Kriplani’s petition and quashed FIR C.R. No. 11191026220492 of 2022 dated October 19, 2022 and all consequential proceedings insofar as the petitioner was concerned.

    Why This Judgment Matters

    • The ruling draws an important boundary between copyright enforcement and trademark counterfeiting.
    • The judgment does not hold that counterfeit branded electronic goods are lawful. Rather, it holds that allegations of counterfeiting must be prosecuted under the correct statutory framework, and the procedural safeguards attached to that legislation cannot be avoided by characterising a trademark dispute as copyright infringement.
    • The decision is especially significant for intellectual-property enforcement agencies, brand-protection companies, police authorities, retailers and businesses because it stresses that the choice of statute directly affects the legality of search, seizure and prosecution.
    • Where the substance of an allegation concerns falsification of trademarks on commercial products, authorities cannot use the Copyright Act merely to circumvent the safeguards specifically prescribed by Section 115(4) of the Trade Marks Act.

    Key Takeaway

    Counterfeit commercial hardware bearing a registered brand does not automatically constitute copyright infringement. Where the allegations essentially concern trademark falsification, the Trade Marks Act must be followedβ€”including its mandatory search-and-seizure safeguards. A trademark dispute cannot be dressed up as a copyright case merely to bypass those statutory requirements.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • CESTAT Chennai: Refund Limitation Cannot Begin Before Final Assessment Order Is Communicated to Importer

    CESTAT Chennai: Refund Limitation Cannot Begin Before Final Assessment Order Is Communicated to Importer

    Date: 18.09.2026

    In an important ruling concerning the limitation period for Customs refunds arising from provisional assessments, the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), Chennai has held that the one-year limitation under Section 27(1B)(c) of the Customs Act, 1962 must be reckoned from the date on which the order finalising the provisional assessment is communicated to the person entitled to claim the refund, and not merely from the date on which the order is passed.

    The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue’s appeal against Tamilnadu Newsprint and Papers Ltd. (TNPL) and upheld the Commissioner (Appeals)’ finding that TNPL’s refund claim was not time-barred.

    Background: β‚Ή75.50 Lakh Refund Arising From Provisional Assessment

    • TNPL had imported non-coking coal under Bill of Entry No. 3551653 dated October 17, 2013. The Bill of Entry was provisionally assessed because original documents and the test report were unavailable at the time of assessment.
    • After the relevant documents were produced, the Assistant Commissioner of Customs, Nagapattinam finalised the assessment through Order-in-Original No. 35/2014 dated April 30, 2014. The finalisation resulted in a finding that TNPL had paid excess Customs duty of β‚Ή75,50,539, which was ordered to be refunded.
    • TNPL subsequently filed its refund claim dated May 13, 2015, received by Customs on May 15, 2015. After the Department issued a deficiency memo, the claim was resubmitted on June 4, 2015 and received on June 9, 2015.

    Customs Department Rejected Refund as Time-Barred

    • The Department took the position that the limitation period had commenced on April 30, 2014, when the provisional assessment was finalised.
    • According to Customs, Section 27(1B)(c) specifically provides that where duty has been paid provisionally under Section 18, the one-year limitation period is computed from the date of adjustment of duty after final assessment.
    • On that reasoning, even TNPL’s original filing in May 2015 was beyond one year from April 30, 2014. The adjudicating authority therefore rejected the refund as time-barred by Order No. 37/2015 dated September 2, 2015.

    Commissioner (Appeals) Allowed TNPL’s Appeal

    • The Commissioner (Appeals), however, set aside the rejection.
    • It held that under Section 153 of the Customs Act, an order has to be communicated in the prescribed manner and that the relevant date for pursuing a remedial measure is the date on which the order is communicated to the affected person.
    • The appellate authority relied upon CESTAT’s decision in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, 2014 (308) E.L.T. 169 (Tri.-Del.).
    • TNPL had also produced a postal cover bearing the postal authority’s seal and stamp as evidence regarding receipt of the finalisation order. The Department, on the other hand, could not establish an earlier date of communication. The Commissioner (Appeals) consequently directed the refund claim to be considered, prompting Revenue to approach CESTAT.

    Core Question Before CESTAT

    • The Tribunal identified the central issue as whether TNPL’s refund claim relating to duty paid provisionally under Section 18 was filed within the one-year limitation prescribed under Section 27(1B)(c).
    • The Department argued for a literal construction: the statute refers to the date of adjustment following final assessment and does not expressly use the word β€œcommunication.”
    • CESTAT, however, held that the provision could not be interpreted in isolation from the settled principles governing limitation where an affected person has to pursue a legal remedy.

    Limitation Cannot Begin Before Party Knows About the Order

    • The Tribunal placed significant reliance on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Collector of Central Excise, Madras v. M.M. Rubber & Co., 1991 (55) E.L.T. 289 (SC).
    • CESTAT explained that the Supreme Court had distinguished between two situations.
    • Where a statutory authority is required to exercise its own power within a prescribed period, limitation may run from the date the order is made because the authority cannot claim ignorance of its own action. But where limitation governs the right of an aggrieved person to pursue a remedy, actual or constructive knowledge of the order becomes essential.
    • Applying that principle, CESTAT observed that TNPL was not the author of the final assessment order. It was the person required to act upon that order to recover excess duty. It would therefore be incongruous for the limitation period to begin running even before the order was communicated to it.

    Gujarat High Court’s GAIL Ruling Followed

    • The Tribunal found substantial support in Principal Commissioner of Customs, Ahmedabad v. GAIL (India) Ltd., (2024) 20 Centax 516 (Guj.).
    • The Gujarat High Court had considered essentially the same question: whether the β€œdate of service” of an order finalising provisional assessment is relevant for calculating limitation under Section 27(1B)(c), despite the statutory language referring to adjustment of duty after final assessment.
    • The High Court decided the issue against Revenue and held that communication of the finalisation order to the assessee is a condition sine qua non for filing the refund claim within the prescribed period.
    • Importantly, CESTAT also noted the Gujarat High Court’s finding that mere uploading of an assessment order on the Department’s portal, without more, would not satisfy the requirement of communication.
    • CESTAT consequently held that the issue was no longer res integra.

    One-Year Period Runs From Communication of Final Assessment Order

    • The Chennai Bench crystallised the legal position in clear terms.
    • It held that the one-year limitation prescribed under Section 27(1B)(c), for refund of duty paid provisionally under Section 18, runs from the date on which the order finalising the assessment is communicated to the person entitled to the refund, rather than from the bare date on which the finalisation order is passed.
    • This distinction is significant for importers whose provisional assessments are finalised but where the resulting order is communicated after a delay.

    Mere Dispatch Is Not Enough; Customs Must Prove Service

    • CESTAT went further and examined what amounts to valid communication under Section 153 of the Customs Act.
    • The Tribunal held that the Department must demonstrate actual communication in accordance with the prescribed statutory mechanism. Mere assertion that an order was dispatched is insufficient.
    • It relied upon the Larger Bench ruling in Margra Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, New Delhi, 2006 (202) E.L.T. 244 (Tri.-LB), which held that dispatch by post without proof of delivery does not constitute sufficient compliance where the special statute itself prescribes the manner of service.
    • The Bench also relied upon the Madras High Court’s decision in Schiller Healthcare India Pvt. Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Customs, 2021-TIOL-1357-HC-MAD-CUS, where the Court dealt with the hierarchy of modes of service contemplated under Section 153.

    Burden of Proving Communication Lies on Revenue

    • Another important principle emerging from the ruling concerns the burden of proof.
    • Referring to its earlier ruling in Rane (Madras) Ltd. v. Commissioner of GST and Central Excise, Chennai South Commissionerate, along with the Chhattisgarh High Court’s decision in Vijay Pratap and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Saral Wire Craft Pvt. Ltd., the Tribunal held that the prescribed statutory method of service must be strictly followed.
    • CESTAT stated that the burden of proving that an order adversely affecting an assessee has been served through the prescribed method rests on Revenue.

    Section 153 Applies to Assessment Orders Too

    • Revenue could also not escape the communication requirement merely because the order in question finalised a provisional assessment rather than being an adjudication order in the conventional sense.
    • The Tribunal noted that Section 153 speaks of an β€œorder or decision” without restricting its operation to adjudication orders.
    • Further, provisional assessment falls within the definition of β€œassessment” under Section 2(2) of the Customs Act.
    • Relying upon Commissioner of Customs (Export), Mumbai v. Goodwill Sales Pvt. Ltd., 2016 (343) E.L.T. 1193 (Tri.-Mumbai), CESTAT observed that although assessment and adjudication are conceptually distinct, both constitute orders or decisions for purposes of the Customs Act.

    Revenue Failed to Prove Earlier Service

    • On the facts, the Department could not produce evidence demonstrating that the finalisation order had been dispatched to TNPL by registered post, speed post or another method contemplated under Section 153, much less evidence establishing delivery on an earlier date.
    • TNPL, in contrast, had produced the postal cover bearing the seal and stamp of the postal department.
    • The Department’s suggestion that the postal cover might have contained some other correspondence was rejected by the Tribunal as a bare surmise unsupported by evidence.

    Refund Claim Held Within Limitation

    • After adopting the date of communication as the relevant starting point, the Tribunal found TNPL’s refund claim to be within the statutory limitation.
    • The order records that, reckoned from the accepted date of communication, the one-year period expired on June 10, 2015. TNPL’s refund claim dated May 13, 2015 and received on May 15, 2015 was therefore within time.
    • Even its resubmission after curing the deficiencyβ€”made on June 4 and received by Customs on June 9, 2015β€”fell within the one-year period.

    Revenue’s Appeal Dismissed

    • CESTAT ultimately found no error in the Commissioner (Appeals)’ conclusion that TNPL’s refund claim was not barred by limitation.
    • Accordingly, the Tribunal dismissed the Revenue’s appeal and upheld Order-in-Appeal No. 91/16-TRY(CUS) dated April 5, 2016, with consequential relief in accordance with law. Thus, Tamilnadu Newsprint and Papers Ltd. succeeded before CESTAT on the limitation issue.

    Why the Ruling Matters for Importers

    The judgment has practical significance beyond TNPL’s individual refund claim. It reinforces that an importer cannot ordinarily be deprived of a statutory remedy by allowing limitation to run from an order that has not been properly communicated to it.

    The decision is particularly relevant in cases involving provisional assessment under Section 18, refund applications under Section 27, and disputes regarding service or communication under Section 153 of the Customs Act.

    The ruling also underscores a crucial evidentiary point for Customs proceedings: where Revenue relies on an earlier date of service to defeat a claim on limitation, the burden of establishing proper communication through the statutorily prescribed mode rests upon the Department.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Delhi High Court Sets Aside Rejection of β€œELMENTIN” Trademark; Says Phonetic Similarity Must Be Assessed by Look, Sound and Surrounding Circumstances

    Delhi High Court Sets Aside Rejection of β€œELMENTIN” Trademark; Says Phonetic Similarity Must Be Assessed by Look, Sound and Surrounding Circumstances

    Date: 17.09.2026

    The Delhi High Court has set aside the Trade Marks Registry’s refusal to register the pharmaceutical word mark β€œELMENTIN”, holding that it could not be regarded as phonetically similar to the earlier registered mark β€œELEMENTAL” merely because both marks related to medicinal and pharmaceutical products.

    In Elyon Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. v. The Registrar of Trademarks, C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 153/2021, Justice C. Hari Shankar held that ELMENTIN and ELEMENTAL have distinctly different sounds, syllabic structures and meanings. The Court also observed that differences in the pharmaceutical composition of competing products may constitute an additional mitigating factor while assessing likelihood of confusion.

    Trademark Registry Had Rejected β€œELMENTIN”

    • Elyon Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. had filed Application No. 2668081 seeking registration of the word mark β€œELMENTIN” for a pharmaceutical composition containing Amoxycillin and Clavulanic Acid.
    • The Examiner of Trade Marks rejected the application by an order dated August 27, 2018, invoking Section 11(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
    • The objection was based on an earlier registered trademark, β€œELEMENTAL”, registered in favour of Juggat Pharma Pvt. Ltd. for medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations in Class 5. The Registry considered ELMENTIN deceptively similar to ELEMENTAL and found a potential likelihood of confusion.
    • Elyon Pharmaceuticals challenged the rejection before the Delhi High Court.

    Elyon Pharmaceuticals: ELMENTIN and ELEMENTAL Sound Different

    • Counsel for Elyon Pharmaceuticals argued that the two marks could not properly be regarded as phonetically similar and, therefore, the basis for refusing registration was unsustainable.
    • The Registrar defended the decision, arguing that the phonetic difference between the two expressions was minimal and that ELEMENTAL already stood registered for medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations in the same class.
    • After examining the rival contentions, however, the High Court disagreed with the Registry.

    Delhi HC: The Two Words Have β€œDistinctly Different Sounds”

    • Justice Hari Shankar observed that, when properly articulated, ELMENTIN and ELEMENTAL have distinctly different sounds.
    • The Court specifically noted that even the concluding syllables of the two expressions were different.
    • This distinction was important because trademark similarity cannot be determined merely by identifying common letters or portions of competing marks. The marks must be considered from the perspective of their overall visual and phonetic impression and the circumstances in which consumers encounter them.

    Court Applies the Classic β€œPianotist” Test

    • The Delhi High Court relied upon the well-established test laid down in In re Pianotist Co.’s Application, [1906] 23 RPC 774.
    • Under that approach, competing marks must be assessed by considering their look and sound, the goods to which they are applied, the nature of likely consumers, the surrounding circumstances and what is likely to happen if both marks are used normally in the marketplace.
    • The Court noted that the Pianotist test had received approval from the Supreme Court in Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satya Deo Gupta, AIR 1963 SC 449, and Khoday Distilleries v. Scotch Whisky Association, (2008) 10 SCC 723.

    β€œELMENTIN” Is a Coined Word; β€œELEMENTAL” Is an Ordinary English Expression

    • Applying that test, the Court found substantial differences between the marks.
    • β€œELEMENTAL” was described as a word of common English usageβ€”an adjective associated with β€œelement” and synonymous with β€œfundamental.”
    • β€œELMENTIN,” on the other hand, was a coined expression having no etymological meaning.
    • The Court also compared the syllabic structures. ELMENTIN contains three syllables, while ELEMENTAL contains four. Their concluding syllables were also different.
    • These distinctions led the Court to conclude that it was difficult to sustain the Examiner’s finding that use of the two marks for pharmaceutical preparations was likely to confuse the public.

    Coined and Arbitrary Marks Entitled to Greater Protection

    • The Court further observed that ELMENTIN, being a meaningless, arbitrary and coined word, was entitled to additional trademark protection.
    • For this proposition, the judgment referred to Kirorimal Kashiram Marketing & Agencies Ltd. v. Shree Sita Chawal Udyog Mill, (2010) 44 PTC 293 (DB), and South India Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. General Mills Marketing Inc., (2015) 61 PTC 231 (DB).
    • The ruling therefore reinforces the significance of invented or arbitrary terminology when examining distinctiveness and competing trademark claims.

    Different Pharmaceutical Compositions Can Reduce Likelihood of Confusion

    • One of the most significant observations in the judgment concerns the composition of pharmaceutical products.
    • The High Court noted that the record did not establish whether the pharmaceutical composition sold under the earlier ELEMENTAL mark was the same as the composition for which Elyon Pharmaceuticals sought registration of ELMENTIN.
    • Justice Hari Shankar observed that if the two pharmaceutical compositions were different, that would constitute an additional mitigating factor against the likelihood of confusion among the public.
    • The observation is important because it indicates that the likelihood-of-confusion inquiry in pharmaceutical trademarks is not necessarily confined to comparing the words in isolation. The nature and composition of the underlying products may also be relevant to the overall factual assessment.

    Section 11(1)(b) Rejection Set Aside

    • Section 11(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Act deals with situations where similarity with an earlier trademark, coupled with identity or similarity of the relevant goods or services, creates a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, including likelihood of association with the earlier mark.
    • After applying the phonetic, visual and contextual comparison, the High Court held that the Examiner’s conclusion that ELMENTIN was disentitled to registration because of the pre-existing ELEMENTAL mark could not be sustained.
    • The rejection order was accordingly set aside.

    Application Remanded to Trade Marks Registry for Fresh Consideration

    • Importantly, the Delhi High Court did not itself finally order registration of ELMENTIN.
    • Instead, Application No. 2668081 was remitted to the concerned officer of the Trade Marks Registry for de novo consideration.
    • The Registry was directed to consider the application on its own merits, but it was specifically restrained from rejecting the application on the grounds contained in Sections 11(1)(a) or 11(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Act.
    • The appeal was accordingly allowed to that extent, with no order as to costs.

    Cases Referred to by the Delhi High Court

    The judgment expressly refers to four authorities while explaining the applicable principles of trademark comparison:

    1. In re Pianotist Co.’s Application, [1906] 23 RPC 774 β€” the classic test requiring marks to be compared by look, sound, goods, consumers and surrounding circumstances.
    2. Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satya Deo Gupta, AIR 1963 SC 449 β€” Supreme Court approval of the Pianotist approach.
    3. Khoday Distilleries v. Scotch Whisky Association, (2008) 10 SCC 723 β€” also cited as approving the Pianotist standard.
    4. Kirorimal Kashiram Marketing & Agencies Ltd. v. Shree Sita Chawal Udyog Mill, (2010) 44 PTC 293 (DB), and South India Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. General Mills Marketing Inc., (2015) 61 PTC 231 (DB) β€” relied upon concerning protection available to arbitrary and coined marks.

    Why the Judgment Matters for Pharmaceutical Trademarks

    • The ruling provides a useful framework for examination of allegedly similar pharmaceutical marks. It indicates that similarity should not be determined simply because two marks share some letters or are registered in the same class.
    • Instead, the decision requires consideration of the overall appearance, pronunciation, syllabic structure, meaning, nature of the products, relevant consumers and surrounding commercial circumstances.
    • It is equally important that the Court did not treat different pharmaceutical compositions as automatically eliminating confusion. Rather, it described such difference as an additional mitigating factor, meaning it forms part of the broader likelihood-of-confusion assessment.

    Key Takeaway

    The Delhi High Court’s ruling establishes that ELMENTIN could not be refused merely on the ground that it was allegedly phonetically similar to ELEMENTAL.

    The Court found meaningful differences in sound, syllables, meaning and overall impression and set aside the Section 11(1)(b) rejection. At the same time, the judgment should not be read as a final grant of trademark registration.

    The application was sent back to the Registry for fresh consideration on its own merits, subject to the Court’s direction that it could not again be rejected under Sections 11(1)(a) or 11(1)(b).

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • CESTAT Mumbai: Vitamin and Enzyme Premixes for Animal Feed Classifiable Under CTH 2309

    CESTAT Mumbai: Vitamin and Enzyme Premixes for Animal Feed Classifiable Under CTH 2309

    Date: 17.09.2026

    The Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), Mumbai has ruled in favour of DSM Nutritional Products India Pvt. Ltd. in a long-running customs classification dispute, holding that imported vitamin premixes and enzyme preparations meant for use in animal feeding are classifiable under Customs Tariff Heading (CTH) 2309, and not under CTH 2936 or CTH 3507 as contended by Customs.

    A Division Bench comprising S.K. Mohanty, Member (Judicial), and M.M. Parthiban, Member (Technical) set aside the May 8, 2024 order of the Commissioner of Customs (Appeals), JNCH, Nhava Sheva, and allowed Customs Appeal Nos. 87088 to 87126 of 2024 with consequential relief. The final order was pronounced on September 11, 2026.

    The ruling is significant for the tariff classification of feed-grade vitamin and enzyme premixes, particularly where such products contain active ingredients along with carriers, fillers, stabilisers, anti-caking agents and other substances specifically designed for animal-feed applications.

    DSM Imported Vitamin and Enzyme Premixes for Animal Feeding

    • DSM Nutritional Products India imported preparations containing vitamins and enzymes from its related overseas supplier, DSM Nutrients Asia Pacific Private Limited, Singapore.
    • The imports included a range of Rovimix vitamin premixes and Ronozyme enzyme preparations, which were intended for use in preparation of animal feed.
    • DSM classified these products under CTH 2309, covering preparations of a kind used in animal feeding.
    • Because the overseas supplier was a related party, the assessments had remained provisional since October 2010. The Special Valuation Branch subsequently concluded in 2016 that the relationship had not influenced the declared import price.

    Customs Sought Classification Under Chapters 29 and 35

    • The dispute arose after the Central Intelligence Unit and Special Investigation & Intelligence Branch examined the classification adopted by DSM.
    • Customs took the position that the vitamin and vitamin premixes should be classified under CTH 2936, while enzyme preparations should fall under CTH 3507, instead of Heading 2309.
    • Consequently, provisional assessments covering imports from October 2010 to December 2020 remained pending.
    • DSM repeatedly sought finalisation of the assessments and refund of pre-deposits/Extra Duty Deposits. When the matter remained unresolved, it approached the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No. 3323 of 2021. The High Court directed Customs to finalise the provisional assessments.

    Customs Finalised Assessments Against DSM

    • The Assistant Commissioner of Customs eventually passed an Order-in-Original dated September 22, 2023 rejecting DSM’s classification under CTH 2309.
    • The authority classified the vitamin products under CTH 2936 and enzyme products under CTH 3507, finalised the assessments under Section 18(2) of the Customs Act, 1962, demanded differential customs duty with interest and ordered appropriation against deposits already made by DSM.
    • Interestingly, the Tribunal recorded that the exact amount of duty demanded, confirmed or appropriated was not mentioned in the operative portion of the original order.
    • The Commissioner (Appeals) subsequently upheld the classification adopted by the original authority and dismissed DSM’s appeals, leading to the proceedings before CESTAT.

    DSM: Products Are Exclusively Intended for Animal Feed

    • DSM argued that the disputed vitamin and enzyme premixes were exclusively intended for animal feeding and were not used for human consumption.
    • The preparations contained vitamins or enzymes as active ingredients together with carriers, fillers, anti-caking agents, stabilisers and other additives selected keeping their animal-feed end use in view.
    • DSM further used these imported premixes to manufacture composite premixes containing vitamins, minerals, enzymes and other ingredients, which were also intended exclusively for animal feeding.
    • DSM therefore relied heavily on the Larger Bench decision in Tetragon Chemie (P) Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Bangalore, 2001 (138) E.L.T. 414 (Tri.-LB), which had held that premixes of the relevant nature used in animal feeding fall under the animal-feed heading. That ruling was upheld by the Supreme Court when the Revenue’s appeal was dismissed.

    Earlier Venkateshwara B.V. Bio Corp Ruling Became Crucial

    • A particularly important aspect of DSM’s case was the Tribunal’s earlier ruling in Venkateshwara B.V. Bio Corp Private Limited v. Commissioner of Customs (NS-I), (2025) 26 Centax 283 (Tri.-Bom.).
    • DSM argued that the classification dispute in Venkateshwara was virtually identical, arose from the same investigation and even involved the same overseas supplier, DSM Nutritional Products Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd., Singapore.
    • In that case, CESTAT had classified the imported products under CTI 2309 9090. Customs challenged that ruling before the Supreme Court, but its appeal was dismissed on February 7, 2025.
    • The Supreme Court order reproduced on page 10 of the CESTAT judgment records that it found no good ground to interfere with the Tribunal’s decision, particularly in light of Circular No. 188/22/96-CX dated March 26, 1996, and dismissed the Revenue’s appeal.

    Core Issue Before CESTAT: CTH 2309 vs 2936/3507

    • The Tribunal framed the principal issue as whether the imported vitamin premixes and enzyme preparations for feed/animal grade were classifiable under CTI 2309 9020 as claimed by DSM, or whether vitamins should be classified under CTH 2936 and enzymes under CTH 3507 as determined by Customs.
    • Customs had reasoned that vitamins and enzymes had specific tariff headings and that a specific classification should prevail over what it regarded as the more general or residual animal-feed heading.
    • The Commissioner (Appeals) had relied substantially upon Rule 3(a) of the General Rules for Interpretation and the ingredients of the imported products in concluding that vitamins belonged under 2936 and enzyme preparations under 3507.

    CESTAT Finds Customs Order Legally Deficient

    • The Tribunal was not persuaded by that approach.
    • It observed that neither the Commissioner (Appeals) nor the original authority had undertaken a sufficiently detailed examination of the scope of the competing tariff headings and the relevant HSN Explanatory Notes.
    • According to CESTAT, a comprehensive classification exercise under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 required proper examination of the competing entries rather than merely proceeding on the premise that Chapters 29 and 35 contained more specific descriptions.
    • The Tribunal therefore found, even at the preliminary level of its analysis, that the impugned appellate order was not sustainable.

    Larger Bench in Tetragon Chemie Supports Heading 2309

    • CESTAT then relied on the Larger Bench ruling in Tetragon Chemie.
    • That decision had considered the specific question whether preparations used in animal feeding consisting of one or more vitamins mixed with diluents should be classified under the vitamin heading or under the animal-feed heading.
    • The Larger Bench concluded that premixes containing mineral substances, vitamins or provitamins, trace elements, appetisers, soya flour or meal, yeast and similar ingredients were covered by Heading 23.09 of the HSN, corresponding to the relevant animal-feed heading in the Central Excise Tariff.
    • The Larger Bench ultimately answered the classification issue in favour of the assessees.
    • CESTAT noted that this decision was upheld by the Supreme Court in 2001 (132) E.L.T. 525 (S.C.).

    Indian Trading Bureau Decision Also Favoured Animal-Feed Classification

    • The Mumbai Bench further referred to Indian Trading Bureau Private Limited v. Commissioner of Customs (Port), Kolkata, 2024 (2) TMI 1030 – CESTAT Kolkata.
    • In that case, vitamins and enzymes used as animal-feed additives were classified under CTH 2309 rather than the competing tariff heading asserted by Revenue.
    • The decision emphasised the product literature showing that the goods were part of animal feed and were not fit for human consumption.
    • The Revenue’s appeal against that decision was also dismissed by the Supreme Court.

    CESTAT: DSM’s Case Identical to Venkateshwara Classification Dispute

    • The Tribunal found the classification dispute in DSM’s appeals to be identical to the issue already considered in Venkateshwara B.V. Bio Corp.
    • It noted that the overseas supplier in the present case was also one of the suppliers involved in that earlier dispute.
    • The Venkateshwara decision had examined the Customs Tariff Act, General Rules for Interpretation, competing tariff headings 2309 and 2936, HSN Explanatory Notes and CBEC Circular No. 188/2/96-CX dated March 26, 1996.
    • That decision had concluded that the disputed goods were classifiable under CTH 2309 and not CTH 2936, and the Supreme Court subsequently declined to interfere with the Tribunal’s decision.

    Vitamin and Enzyme Feed Preparations Classifiable Under CTH 2309

    • On the basis of these authorities and its own analysis, the Mumbai Bench concluded that DSM’s imported goods were properly classifiable under CTH 2309 of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975.
    • The Tribunal expressly held that the May 8, 2024 appellate order sustaining classification under CTH 2936 and CTH 3507 did not withstand legal scrutiny and was legally unsustainable.
    • This finding resolved the substantive classification dispute in DSM’s favour.

    DSM Nutritional Products Wins 39 Customs Appeals

    • CESTAT accordingly set aside the impugned Order-in-Appeal and allowed DSM Nutritional Products India’s appeals, together with consequential relief, if any, in accordance with law.
    • The ruling therefore represents a substantive victory for DSM on tariff classification: its animal-feed vitamin and enzyme preparations were held classifiable under Heading 2309, rather than being split between the vitamin and enzyme headings in Chapters 29 and 35.

    Key Legal Takeaway

    The decision reinforces an important classification principle for feed-grade preparations: the presence of vitamins or enzymes as active ingredients does not, by itself, necessarily require classification of the finished preparation under the standalone vitamin or enzyme headings.

    The nature of the preparation, its composition, HSN guidance, relevant tariff notes, established judicial precedent and its exclusive design and use in animal feeding must all be considered.

    The ruling is particularly important because CESTAT found the dispute materially covered by previous decisionsβ€”including Tetragon Chemie and Venkateshwara B.V. Bio Corpβ€”whose outcomes had survived Revenue challenges before the Supreme Court.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Supreme Court Acquits Two in NDPS Case Over Broken Chain of Custody: Says FSL Report Cannot Survive Serious Gaps in Sample Integrity

    Supreme Court Acquits Two in NDPS Case Over Broken Chain of Custody: Says FSL Report Cannot Survive Serious Gaps in Sample Integrity

    Date: 17.09.2026

    The Supreme Court has acquitted two persons convicted in a narcotics case after finding serious deficiencies in the prosecution’s evidence concerning the identification, sealing, safekeeping and movement of samples allegedly drawn from the seized contraband.

    In Abdul Rajik v. State of M.P. along with Govind v. State of M.P., 2026 INSC 1001, a Bench of Justice Sandeep Mehta and Justice Manmohan held that the link evidence had been completely breached, undermining the sanctity and integrity of the samples. Once the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report was excluded, there was no legally admissible evidence establishing that the seized substance was charas.

    Background of the NDPS Case

    • The prosecution alleged that on November 29, 2004, police in Jabalpur received information that two persons were carrying charas in bags. A raiding team intercepted Abdul Rajik and Govind at Bandariya Tiraha.
    • According to the prosecution, 1 kilogram of suspected charas was recovered from Abdul Rajik’s bag and 800 grams from Govind’s bag. Samples were drawn and the accused were arrested. The FSL subsequently reported that the samples were charas.
    • The Special NDPS Court convicted both accused. Abdul Rajik was sentenced to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of β‚Ή1 lakh, while Govind was sentenced to eight years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of β‚Ή80,000. The Madhya Pradesh High Court dismissed their appeals in November 2010 and affirmed the convictions.
    • The matter ultimately reached the Supreme Court.

    Sections 42 and 50 Not Applicable to Search of Bags in Public Place

    • The accused argued, among other things, that the mandatory requirements of Sections 42, 50 and 52A of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 had not been complied with.
    • The Supreme Court, however, did not accept the challenge based on Sections 42 and 50.
    • It observed that the alleged recovery was from bags being carried by the accused when they were apprehended in an open public place. Consequently, the Court held that neither Section 42 nor Section 50 applied to the search and seizure in the circumstances of the case.
    • The acquittal instead turned principally on the failure to establish reliable link evidence and chain of custody, considered alongside total non-compliance with Section 52A.

    Supreme Court Finds Serious Problems With Identification of Samples

    • The Court closely examined the evidence of the seizure officer regarding the manner in which representative samples were drawn and sealed.
    • It found that the officer did not state that the sample packets themselves had been sealed by him or that identifiable markings β€” such as signatures or thumb impressions of the accused, panch witnesses or seizure officer β€” had been placed on those packets.
    • The sample packets were also not separately produced and exhibited when the muddamal articles were produced before the trial court.
    • The Court further examined the sample panchnamas and found no indication that the packets had been secured with signatures or identifiable chits enabling the samples subsequently tested by the FSL to be correlated with the contraband allegedly recovered from each accused. Even the FSL report did not refer to signatures or thumb impressions on the sample packets.

    Missing Link Between Maalkhana and FSL

    • Another major deficiency concerned the prosecution’s failure to establish the movement and safe custody of the samples.
    • Although the maalkhana register recorded the deposit of samples on November 29, 2004, the Supreme Court noted that there was no corresponding entry recording their exit from the police station for transportation to the FSL.
    • The prosecution also failed to prove documents such as the police station forwarding letter and road certificates that could establish the link between seizure, storage and delivery to the laboratory.
    • The Court stressed that evidence regarding safe custody is crucial because the prosecution must demonstrate that the very samples drawn from the seized substance reached the forensic laboratory without substitution, interference or unexplained gaps.

    Unexplained Five-Day Gap Further Breaks Chain of Custody

    • The Court identified another material discrepancy.
    • The forwarding letter from the Office of the Superintendent of Police was dated December 1, 2004, whereas the FSL report recorded that the samples were received through Constable Ramkrishna on December 6, 2004.
    • The prosecution provided no explanation as to where the samples remained and in whose custody they were kept during this five-day period. The carrier constable was also not examined.
    • The Supreme Court described this unexplained five-day gap as a grave discrepancy that completely breached the link in the chain of custody.

    Chain of Custody Essential Before FSL Report Can Be Relied Upon

    • The Supreme Court laid down an important evidentiary principle for NDPS prosecutions: the prosecution must establish through proper link evidence that samples extracted from the alleged contraband were properly sealed and remained in a safe and secure condition from seizure until receipt by the FSL.
    • For an FSL report to be relied upon, the prosecution must establish through credible oral and documentary evidence a complete chain of custody preserving the integrity and sanctity of the samples.
    • This assumes particular significance in NDPS prosecutions because the chemical analysis ordinarily provides the scientific foundation for establishing whether the recovered material was in fact a prohibited narcotic drug or psychotropic substance.

    Total Non-Compliance With Section 52A

    • The Supreme Court also considered compliance with Section 52A of the NDPS Act, which provides safeguards relating to inventory, photographs and representative sampling of seized narcotic substances.
    • The Court clarified that mere non-compliance with Section 52A or the applicable Standing Orders/Rules does not automatically vitiate every trial or result in acquittal. The relevant question includes whether and to what extent the non-compliance caused prejudice to the accused.
    • However, the Court distinguished minor procedural lapses from complete non-compliance. It found that in the present case no effort whatsoever was made to undertake the Section 52A procedure for drawing representative samples in the presence of a Magistrate, amounting to total non-compliance.

    Supreme Court Relies on Earlier NDPS Precedents

    • The Court referred to Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif, (2024) 11 SCC 372, and Bharat Aambale v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2025) 8 SCC 452, while explaining that Section 52A non-compliance does not by itself automatically lead to acquittal and that prejudice and evidentiary consequences must be examined.
    • It also relied upon Nadeem Ahamed v. State of West Bengal, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1779, where failure to draw representative samples before a Magistrate and absence of a certified inventory were held to undermine the integrity of the seizure and sampling process.
    • The Court further referred to State of Rajasthan v. Tara Singh, (2011) 11 SCC 559, which emphasised the significance of accounting for the custody of seized samples between dispatch and receipt at the laboratory, particularly given the stringent penalties under the NDPS Act.

    FSL Report Discarded

    • Applying these principles, the Supreme Court concluded that the link evidence had been totally breached, resulting in the collapse of the sanctity and integrity of the samples.
    • Consequently, the FSL report could no longer safely be relied upon and had to be discarded.
    • Once the FSL report was excluded, there was no other legally admissible evidence proving that the substance allegedly recovered from Abdul Rajik and Govind was charas within Section 2(iii)(a) of the NDPS Act, an essential foundational fact for attracting penal consequences under Section 20.

    Burning Suspected Substance Is Not Scientific Proof of Charas

    • The Supreme Court also rejected the seizure officer’s assertion that the suspected substance had been tested by burning a portion of it and could therefore be identified as charas.
    • The Court found no scientific material demonstrating that a substance could reliably be identified as charas merely by burning it. Accordingly, such testimony could not substitute for reliable scientific evidence establishing the identity of the alleged contraband.

    Supreme Court Acquits Both Accused

    • The Court ultimately held that the prosecution had failed to prove that the substance recovered from the accused was charas.
    • It therefore found the convictions recorded by the Special NDPS Court and affirmed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court unsustainable in law and extended the benefit of doubt to both appellants.
    • The Supreme Court set aside the conviction and sentence and acquitted Abdul Rajik and Govind of all charges. Since both were already on bail, the Court directed that they need not surrender and discharged their bail bonds. The appeals were accordingly allowed.

    Key Legal Takeaway

    The judgment reinforces that in NDPS prosecutions, an FSL report cannot be viewed in isolation from the evidentiary chain connecting the tested sample with the substance allegedly seized from the accused. While every procedural irregularity under Section 52A does not automatically result in acquittal, total non-compliance coupled with serious defects in identification, sealing, safekeeping and movement of samples can destroy the prosecution’s link evidence.

    Where that breakdown makes it impossible to establish that the substance scientifically tested was the same substance allegedly recovered from the accused, the forensic report may lose its evidentiary foundation.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Gujarat High Court: Raiding Officer Cannot Himself Be the Gazetted Officer Offered for Search Under Section 50 NDPS Act

    Gujarat High Court: Raiding Officer Cannot Himself Be the Gazetted Officer Offered for Search Under Section 50 NDPS Act

    Date: 16.09.2026

    The Gujarat High Court has suspended the 15-year rigorous imprisonment imposed on two persons convicted in a commercial-quantity NDPS case and granted them bail pending their criminal appeals, after finding a prima facie issue of non-compliance with Section 50 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.

    A Division Bench comprising Justice Ilesh J. Vora and Justice R.T. Vachhani, in Moneshkumar Sukhenbhai Garange v. State of Gujarat, passed the common interim order on 29 April 2026 in Criminal Misc. Application No. 1 of 2026 in Criminal Appeal Nos. 408 and 685 of 2026.

    The Court found substance, at the prima facie stage, in the contention that the raiding officer could not have offered the accused an option of being searched before himself, in addition to the statutory alternatives of a Magistrate or Gazetted Officer. The Bench accordingly suspended the sentence during pendency of the appeals.

    Importantly, the order is not a final acquittal. The High Court expressly clarified that its observations are tentative and prima facie and will not affect the final hearing of the criminal appeals.

    Two Accused Sentenced to 15 Years in Mephedrone Case

    • The applicants, original Accused Nos. 1 and 2, had been convicted under Sections 8(c), 22(c) and 29 of the NDPS Act by the Additional Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad, in Special NDPS Case No. 42 of 2023.
    • By judgment dated 25 November 2025, they were sentenced to 15 years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of β‚Ή2 lakh. They subsequently filed criminal appeals before the Gujarat High Court and sought suspension of sentence and bail during pendency of those appeals.

    Prosecution Alleged 118.240 Grams of Mephedrone Was Recovered

    • According to the prosecution, SOG Ahmedabad received secret information on 5 February 2023 that the accused had travelled to Rajasthan to obtain MD drugs and were returning to Ahmedabad in a Ford car.
    • Police recorded the information, transmitted it to a superior officer and intercepted the vehicle while it was allegedly entering Ahmedabad from the Gandhinagar-Koba Circle side towards Indira Bridge.
    • During the personal search, police claimed to have recovered 59.150 grams of mephedrone from Himesh Garange and 59.090 grams from Monesh Garange, making a total alleged recovery of 118.240 grams.
    • The prosecution examined 15 witnesses and produced 51 documents during trial. Accused Nos. 1 to 3 were eventually convicted under Sections 8(c) and 22(c) read with Section 29 of the NDPS Act.

    Accused Challenge Search Under Section 50 NDPS Act

    • Senior Advocate Yatin Oza, appearing for the applicants, raised several objections to the conviction.
    • A principal contention was that there had been non-compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act, which provides safeguards when an authorised officer is about to search a person.
    • The accused had allegedly been told that they could be searched before a Gazetted Officer, the nearest Magistrate, or before PW-8 B.P. Chaudhary himself, who was the raiding officer and a Gazetted Officer.
    • The defence argued that Section 50 does not contemplate such a β€œthird option” and that the raiding officer could not simultaneously offer himself as the Gazetted Officer before whom the accused could choose to be searched.
    • Other arguments were also raised concerning Sections 42 and 43 and the handling and custody of samples, including alleged inconsistencies concerning the colour of the contraband, dispatch particulars and non-examination of the person who carried the samples to the FSL.
    • The High Court, however, primarily focused on the Section 50 issue while considering whether the sentence should be suspended.

    State Invokes Commercial Quantity and Section 37 Rigours

    • The State opposed the applications, arguing that the trial court had correctly convicted the applicants on the basis of the evidence.
    • It maintained that the police officers were duly empowered to conduct the search and seizure and that the accused had been informed of their rights under Section 50 before consenting to the search.
    • The prosecution also relied upon the presumptions under Sections 35 and 54 of the NDPS Act and emphasised that the case involved commercial quantity. It therefore contended that the stringent requirements of Section 37 of the NDPS Act should apply even at the stage of considering suspension of sentence and bail pending appeal.

    Appellate Court Must Examine Whether Conviction Has Fair Chance of Being Set Aside

    • The Gujarat High Court referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Om Prakash Sahni v. Jai Shankar Chaudhary & Anr., (2023) 6 SCC 123 on the principles governing suspension of sentence pending appeal.
    • The Court noted that, while deciding such an application, the appellate court may examine whether there is something apparent or gross on the face of the record that gives rise to a prima facie conclusion that the conviction may ultimately not be sustainable.
    • The Bench was conscious that the evidence could not be fully re-analysed at the interim stage. However, because the conviction was based upon the contraband allegedly recovered during the applicants’ personal searches, the Court considered compliance with Section 50 to be particularly significant.

    Section 50 Safeguard Must Be Properly Communicated

    • The High Court referred to the Constitution Bench judgment in State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh, (1999) 6 SCC 172.
    • The Constitution Bench had explained that an accused about to be personally searched must be informed of the existence of the right under Section 50(1) to be searched before the nearest Gazetted Officer or Magistrate. Failure to observe the statutory safeguard can render recovery from the personal search suspect and affect a conviction based upon that recovery.
    • The Gujarat High Court then considered the more specific issue of whether the searching officer could introduce a third alternative.

    Supreme Court’s Parmanand Judgment: β€œThird Option” Can Vitiate Section 50 Compliance

    • The Bench placed significant reliance on State of Rajasthan v. Parmanand & Anr., (2014) 5 SCC 345.
    • In Parmanand, the Supreme Court emphasised that communication of the right under Section 50 must be clear, unambiguous and individual, because the safeguard is intended to protect an accused against the possibility of false implication in cases carrying stringent punishments.
    • More importantly, the Supreme Court had disapproved of an accused being told that, besides the nearest Magistrate or Gazetted Officer, he could be searched before a senior police officer who was himself part of the raiding party.
    • The Supreme Court reasoned that the statutory safeguard is intended to give the accused the opportunity of a search in the presence of an independent officer. Providing a third option not contemplated by Section 50 could frustrate that protection.

    Searching Officer Cannot Act in Dual Capacity

    • The Gujarat High Court also discussed State of Rajasthan v. Ram Chandra.
    • The Supreme Court had explained that if the officer proposing to conduct the search is himself a Gazetted Officer and gives the accused the option of being searched in his own presence, the requirement of Section 50 would not be satisfied because the searching officer cannot act in a dual capacityβ€”both as the officer conducting the search and as the Gazetted Officer before whom the accused is offered the statutory choice of search.
    • This distinction became central to the Gujarat High Court’s consideration of the present applications.

    Raiding Officer Offered Himself as an Option: Gujarat High Court

    • On examining the evidence of PW-8 and the written notices at Exhibits 80 and 82, the High Court found that PW-8, who was himself the raiding officer, had informed the accused that they could be searched before him, a Magistrate or any Gazetted Officer.
    • The Bench consequently recorded a prima facie view that the raiding officer could not have given the accused an option to be searched before himself.
    • Relying on Parmanand and the Supreme Court’s decision in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Surat Singh, the High Court held that there was substance in the applicants’ argument concerning non-compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act.

    15-Year Sentence Suspended; Accused Granted Bail

    • Without undertaking an extensive examination of the merits, the Division Bench held that the circumstances justified exercise of discretion in favour of the applicants.
    • The Court therefore suspended the 15-year sentence imposed by the Special NDPS Judge during pendency of the criminal appeals and directed that the applicants be released on bail upon furnishing a personal bond of β‚Ή10,000 each with one surety each of the like amount.
    • The accused were directed not to leave India without prior permission of the High Court, to appear when the appeals are taken up for final hearing and to intimate any change in address to the concerned police station and the Court.

    Bail Order Does Not Set Aside NDPS Conviction

    • The legal effect of the order needs to be distinguished from a final decision on the appeals.
    • The Gujarat High Court has not acquitted the applicants or finally declared the search illegal. Their convictions remain under challenge in the pending criminal appeals.
    • The Court specifically stated that the observations in the suspension-of-sentence order are β€œtentative and prima-facie in nature” and shall not come in the way when the appeals are heard finally.

    Why the Order Is Significant

    The order reiterates the importance of strict adherence to procedural safeguards in cases involving personal search under the NDPS Act, particularly where the alleged recovery forms the principal basis of conviction.

    It also highlights a crucial distinction under Section 50: merely informing an accused about a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate may not necessarily cure the process if the notice simultaneously introduces a legally impermissible option that could dilute or confuse the statutory right.

    The Gujarat High Court’s prima facie reasoning therefore reinforces the proposition that the officer proposing to conduct the personal search cannot present himself as the independent Gazetted Officer contemplated by the Section 50 safeguard.

    At the same time, because the present order concerns only suspension of sentence pending appeal, the final determination of the legality of the search, conviction and evidentiary issues remains open.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi