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  • Bombay High Court: Deemed Conveyance Orders Cannot Ignore Builder’s FSI and Development Rights Objections β€” Section 11 MOFA Order Set Aside

    Bombay High Court: Deemed Conveyance Orders Cannot Ignore Builder’s FSI and Development Rights Objections β€” Section 11 MOFA Order Set Aside

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 21.10.2026

    Bombay High Court: Deemed Conveyance Orders Cannot Ignore Builder’s FSI and Development Rights Objections β€” Section 11 MOFA Order Set Aside

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id amitnaren@outlook.com .  

    The Bombay High Court has set aside a deemed conveyance order granted to a housing society in Vile Parle, holding that the competent authority failed to deal with material objections and provide adequate reasons for its decision.

    Background of the dispute

    The case concerns a 4,133.68 sq. metre plot at Dixit Road, Vile Parle (East), Mumbai, comprising Plot Nos. 157, 158 and 159 and Final Plot No. 324 of TPS II. M/s. Vimal Builders, now the proprietorship of petitioner Hasmukh Narrotamdas Malkan, had agreed to purchase the land in 1973. A residential building, Vimal Apartments, was constructed and completed in 1975, and flats were sold to individual purchasers.

    The flat purchasers formed the Vile Parle Vimal Gauri Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. in 1982. The builder later obtained conveyance of the land pursuant to a decree for specific performance against the original owners.

    The society sought conveyance of the property, first through a civil suit and later through an application for deemed conveyance under Section 11 of the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act, 1963 (MOFA). In March 2025, the District Deputy Registrar granted deemed conveyance of the entire plot to the society.

    Why the builder challenged the order

    The petitioner contended that the authority had not properly considered key issues affecting the extent of the society’s entitlement. These included:

    • The agreements for sale, which the petitioner said contemplated development of more than one building on the land.
    • The petitioner’s asserted right to use remaining development potential, including FSI/TDR, for a second building.
    • A 1976 sanctioned layout plan and the claimed existence of a plinth for the proposed second building.
    • Alleged statements in the society’s earlier civil plaint that recognised the petitioner’s right to use the balance FSI.
    • The authority of the society’s secretary to institute the deemed conveyance application.

    The builder argued that a summary proceeding under MOFA does not remove the authority’s duty to consider relevant documents and explain why significant objections are rejected.

    Court’s findings

    Justice Farhan P. Dubash found that the competent authority had referred to the promoter’s statutory obligation to convey property and to clause 22 of the flat-purchase agreements. However, it did not address other contractual clauses and documents relied on by the petitioner.

    The Court held that simply recording a party’s submissions is not enough. A quasi-judicial authority must show that it has considered the material disputes relevant to the relief sought and must give reasons for its conclusions.

    The judgment identified three central deficiencies in the 2025 order:

    • Contractual documents were not fully examined: The authority did not explain why the agreements and clauses said to support a multi-building layout did not affect the society’s claim to the entire plot.
    • FSI and second-building objections were not addressed: The authority did not assess the relevance of the alleged admission in the society’s earlier plaint, the 1976 plan, or the claimed surviving plinth.
    • Secretary’s authority was left undecided: The order contained no finding on the objection that the society’s secretary lacked authority to file the application.

    The Court stressed that the issue was not that the authority’s reasons were too brief. Rather, the order lacked reasoned consideration of material points that could directly affect the scope of conveyance.

    Importance of the earlier remand

    The application had already been remanded once by the High Court in November 2024, with a specific direction to consider the parties’ submissions and issue reasoned findings. The Court held that the authority’s failure to address the material objections also amounted to non-compliance with that direction.

    The Court further noted that the authority had initially rejected the society’s application in 2023 on the basis that ownership disputes could not be decided in summary proceedings. After remand, it reached the opposite result on the same broad factual record without adequately explaining why the society was entitled to the conveyance sought.

    The ruling and its implications

    The High Court set aside the deemed conveyance order dated 20 March 2025 and remitted the society’s 2021 application to the District Deputy Registrar for fresh consideration.

    The authority must now hear all parties, consider their material submissions and relevant documents, and issue a reasoned order by 31 March 2027. The Court did not decide whether the society is ultimately entitled to deemed conveyance, whether the entire plot should be conveyed, or whether the builder’s claims regarding FSI and a second building are valid.

    The decision reinforces an important principle in MOFA deemed conveyance proceedings: although the jurisdiction is summary, authorities must still assess the relevant agreements and evidence, address material objections, and clearly explain the basis of their decision. The outcome on the merits remains open for determination by the competent authority.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Bombay High Court

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  • Delhi High Court Dismisses MIAL Appeal in Mumbai Airport Sahara Lease Arbitration Dispute

    Delhi High Court Dismisses MIAL Appeal in Mumbai Airport Sahara Lease Arbitration Dispute

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 21.10.2026

    Delhi High Court Dismisses MIAL Appeal in Mumbai Airport Sahara Lease Arbitration Dispute

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Arbitrator Shobhit Mallik. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id shobhit.Ica23@gmail.com .

    The Delhi High Court has dismissed Mumbai International Airport Limited’s appeal against an arbitral award that rejected its claim that the Airports Authority of India was obliged to transfer the lessor’s interest in a long-term lease at Mumbai Airport.

    The dispute at a glance

    The case arose from the privatisation and redevelopment framework for Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj International Airport in Mumbai. Airports Authority of India (AAI) had granted Sahara (Batra) Hospitality Private Limited a 29-year lease in 2002 for approximately 30,047 square metres of airport land, running until 4 June 2031.

    In 2006, AAI and Mumbai International Airport Limited (MIAL), a joint-venture company established to operate and develop the airport, entered into the Operation, Management and Development Agreement (OMDA) and a separate lease deed. The Sahara lease was listed as an β€œExisting Lease.”

    MIAL argued that AAI was required to transfer or novate the Sahara lease, including AAI’s rights as lessor, to MIAL during the transition phase. AAI disputed that obligation. An arbitral tribunal unanimously rejected MIAL’s claims in March 2023, and a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court later refused to set aside the award. MIAL then appealed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

    MIAL’s principal arguments

    MIAL relied on the OMDA provision requiring it to use best efforts, with AAI’s reasonable assistance, to transfer or novate existing contracts and agreements connected with the airport. It contended that this provision covered the Sahara lease and required the transfer of AAI’s lessor interest.

    MIAL also pointed to several supporting circumstances:

    • AAI’s 9 June 2006 letter stating that existing commercial and land licence or lease agreements were to be assigned or novated to the joint-venture company during the transition phase.
    • AAI’s transfer of lease-related amounts to MIAL for roughly ten years before stopping the payments in April 2019.
    • Inter-Ministerial Group minutes from 2004 recommending that the Sahara lease be assigned to the joint venture.
    • Communications from the Ministry of Civil Aviation that MIAL said supported its interpretation of the privatisation arrangement.

    MIAL further argued that the Single Judge had not independently evaluated its challenge because parts of the arbitral award were reproduced in the judgment.

    AAI’s response

    AAI maintained that the contractual documents expressly excluded land subject to Existing Leases from the premises leased to MIAL. Under the arrangements, that land would become part of MIAL’s demised premises only after the relevant third-party lease expired or ended early.

    AAI submitted that the payments made to MIAL were merely an interim arrangement and did not amount to assignment, novation, waiver, or recognition that the lessor’s interest had been transferred. It also argued that ministry communications and legal opinions could not amend the bilateral OMDA.

    Court’s reasoning: arbitration review is deliberately narrow

    The Division Bench emphasised that a court reviewing an arbitral award under Section 34 cannot reassess evidence or replace the tribunal’s contractual interpretation with its own preferred view. A challenge succeeds only where a statutory ground, such as patent illegality going to the root of the matter, is established.

    The Court held that review under Section 37 is narrower still. At that stage, the appellate court examines whether the Section 34 court stayed within its jurisdiction; it does not conduct a fresh merits appeal.

    This approach reflects a central principle of Indian arbitration law: parties who choose arbitration ordinarily receive finality, subject only to limited judicial supervision to address serious defects such as perversity, disregard of vital evidence, fraud, bias, or denial of natural justice.

    Reproducing an award does not automatically make a judgment defective

    The Court rejected MIAL’s argument that the Single Judge’s decision was invalid merely because it reproduced substantial passages from the arbitral award.

    According to the Court, the decisive issue is not the amount of copied text but whether the judgment demonstrates meaningful consideration of the objections raised. A court may adopt an arbitral tribunal’s reasoning if it finds that reasoning legally sustainable. The judgment would be vulnerable only if it mechanically reproduced the award without addressing material challenges or applying the statutory test.

    On an overall reading, the Court found that the Single Judge had considered the relevant contractual framework, MIAL’s submissions, and the applicable Section 34 standard.

    Existing leases and the transfer question

    The Court recognised that MIAL’s interpretation was arguable. The OMDA provisions on the demised premises dealt with the transfer of land to MIAL, while the transition provision dealt with transfer or novation of existing contracts. Therefore, excluding the Sahara-leased land from MIAL’s premises did not automatically answer whether AAI’s separate contractual rights as lessor could be transferred.

    However, the Court held that the arbitral tribunal’s contrary reading was not so unreasonable or perverse that judicial intervention was justified. The tribunal had read the transition provision together with the specific provisions governing Existing Leases and the demised premises. That was a permissible method of contractual interpretation within the tribunal’s authority.

    The Court also clarified that Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, addresses the consequences after a lessor’s interest is transferred. It does not itself establish that AAI had a contractual duty under the OMDA to make that transfer.

    Significance of the letter, payments and ministry communications

    The Court accepted that AAI’s 9 June 2006 letter was relevant because it referred to assignment or novation of existing commercial and land lease arrangements. But it found that the letter, as a post-contractual communication, could not independently amend the OMDA. Its meaning had to be assessed alongside the executed agreements.

    Similarly, AAI’s transfer of lease-related payments to MIAL for approximately a decade could be relevant evidence of how the parties implemented the arrangement. Yet those payments did not conclusively prove that AAI’s lessor interest had been assigned or that the OMDA compelled such an assignment.

    The Ministry of Civil Aviation communications were also insufficient to overturn the award. The Court agreed that ministry involvement in airport privatisation did not mean every later communication constituted a binding statutory policy direction under Section 40 of the Airports Authority of India Act, 1994.

    Finally, the 2004 Inter-Ministerial Group recommendation to assign the Sahara lease to the joint venture formed part of the background, but it did not by itself create an enforceable contractual obligation. The parties’ legal rights had to be determined primarily from the OMDA and related executed agreements.

    Outcome and wider importance

    The appeal was dismissed, leaving the arbitral award and the Single Judge’s decision intact. MIAL did not establish a ground for interference under Section 34, and therefore could not succeed under the even more limited appellate review available under Section 37. The judgment reinforces that Indian courts will not reopen arbitration disputes simply because a different contractual interpretation is plausible. To set aside an award, the challenging party must show a serious statutory defect, not merely an arguable disagreement over the contract or the weight of evidence.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Delhi High Court

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  • Bombay High Court Protects Retiral Benefits After Post-Retirement Caste Certificate Invalidation

    Bombay High Court Protects Retiral Benefits After Post-Retirement Caste Certificate Invalidation

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 21.10.2026

    Bombay High Court Protects Retiral Benefits After Post-Retirement Caste Certificate Invalidation

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Madhumita Jha. The views expressed are based on her interpretation of the law. She can be reached at her email id jhamadhumita27@gmail.com .  

    The Bombay High Court has held that an employee who rendered 38 years of service cannot be denied pension, gratuity, and other retirement benefits solely because her Scheduled Tribe certificate was invalidated after she had retired.

    In Mangal Dagadu More v. State of Maharashtra & Others, decided on 19 October 2026, a Division Bench of Justices G. S. Kulkarni and Dr. Neela Gokhale set aside the Scheduled Tribe Scrutiny Committee’s order invalidating the petitioner’s claim and directed release of all retiral dues with 8% annual interest.

    Background of the case

    Mangal Dagadu More, a former peon at the Primary Health Centre in Ahire, Satara district, claimed to belong to the Thakar Scheduled Tribe. She received a caste certificate in 2009 and applied for its verification the same year.

    Her claim was supported by extensive historical material. The record included school and revenue documents concerning paternal blood relatives, with entries dating back to 1918 and continuing through several later years, consistently recording the family’s caste as Thakar. She also relied on the caste-validity certificate issued to her real brother after a vigilance inquiry.

    Despite this evidence, the Scrutiny Committee initially invalidated her certificate in 2019 on a technical ground: it was not issued in the prescribed Form C. She was allowed to obtain a fresh certificate and seek validation again. She obtained the fresh certificate in November 2020.

    By then, however, she had already retired on 31 May 2020 after 38 years of unblemished service. Because a validity certificate had not been issued, she was not considered for promotion during service, and her pensionary benefits, gratuity, and other retirement dues were withheld after retirement.

    Scrutiny Committee’s 2022 decision challenged

    The Committee referred the renewed claim to its vigilance cell in December 2021. Following a hearing on 9 February 2022, it invalidated More’s tribe claim two days later.

    More approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, arguing that the Committee had failed to properly consider the old documentary evidence and the validity certificate of her brother. She also explained that medical treatment and hospitalisation had delayed her challenge to the 2022 order.

    Court’s reasoning: long service cannot be ignored

    The High Court emphasized that the legal position on post-retirement denial of benefits is settled. Where an employee has been permitted to serve for years and retires without the employer taking action to terminate service under the applicable caste-verification law, retirement benefits cannot ordinarily be withheld merely because a caste claim is invalidated later.

    The Court noted several important factors:

    • Long and undisputed service: More completed 38 years of service. During that period, the absence of a caste-validity certificate had not led to disciplinary action or discharge from employment.
    • Post-retirement impact: The adverse consequences arose after retirement, when pension and gratuity were withheld.
    • Government policy: A Maharashtra Government Resolution dated 27 December 2019 recognized the hardship faced by Scheduled Tribe employees whose certificates were not validated or were invalidated after long service. It provided humanitarian protection through supernumerary posts in specified circumstances.
    • Consistent judicial approach: Earlier Bombay High Court decisions had recognized pension and family-pension rights even where caste claims were invalidated, particularly after substantial service. The Court also referred to a Supreme Court ruling that granted pensionary relief to an employee whose certificate was invalidated after superannuation.

    The Bench concluded that More could not be deprived of her retirement dues solely because the certificate was invalidated after she retired.

    Key directions issued by the High Court

    The Court allowed the writ petition and:

    1. Quashed and set aside the Scrutiny Committee’s order dated 11 February 2022.
    2. Directed the Primary Health Centre to release More’s pension, gratuity, and all other retiral benefits.
    3. Required payment within three weeks from the date the judgment is uploaded.
    4. Awarded interest at 8% per annum from the dates on which the payments became due.

    Why the ruling matters

    This ruling reinforces a humanitarian principle in public employment law: a worker who has provided decades of service should not be left without livelihood-related retirement benefits because of a caste-verification outcome reached only after retirement.

    The decision does not treat caste verification as unimportant. Instead, it distinguishes between verification issues and the separate question of whether long-serving, retired employees may be deprived of accrued pensionary entitlements. In cases involving prolonged service, no prior discharge action, and post-retirement invalidation, courts may protect retirement benefits to prevent unjust hardship.

    For employees and families facing withheld retirement dues in comparable circumstances, the judgment highlights the relevance of service history, the timing of the invalidation, employer conduct during service, applicable government policy, and established judicial protections for pensionary benefits.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Bombay High Court

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  • Karnataka High Court Quashes FIR and Charge Sheet Over Unsworn Section 156(3) CrPC Complaint

    Karnataka High Court Quashes FIR and Charge Sheet Over Unsworn Section 156(3) CrPC Complaint

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 21.10.2026

    Karnataka High Court Quashes FIR and Charge Sheet Over Unsworn Section 156(3) CrPC Complaint

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate G Sridharamurthy. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id sriadv3@gmail.com . 

    The Karnataka High Court has quashed an FIR and subsequent charge sheet against N.V. Babu Reddy, holding that the private complaint which triggered the criminal case suffered from a fundamental procedural defect: it was not supported by an affidavit.

    Background of the case

    The criminal petition arose from Crime No. 30/2020 of Mahalakshmipuram Police Station, Bengaluru. The FIR alleged offences under Sections 323, 324, 307 and 120B read with Section 511 of the Indian Penal Code, involving allegations of assault, threats and an alleged conspiracy.

    According to the complainant’s version, a dispute initially developed over non-payment for work completed. The complainant stated that he had earlier approached police regarding the payment issue. He further alleged that, after being asked to meet near Geleyara Balaga in Mahalakshmi Layout on December 17, 2019, he and another person, Prabhakar, were surrounded by a group that abused and attempted to physically attack them. The complainant claimed they escaped after Prabhakar allegedly saw someone taking weapons from an autorickshaw.

    The complaint also alleged continued threats to the complainant and his family. Police had received a later complaint and registered an NCR, but an acknowledgment reportedly described the dispute as civil in nature and advised the complainant to approach the court. The complainant then filed a private complaint before the Magistrate, who referred the matter for police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

    Petitioner’s challenge

    Babu Reddy sought to quash the proceedings under Section 482 of the CrPC. His principal argument was that the private complaint was not accompanied by an affidavit, contrary to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh.

    The petitioner also argued that the complaint was an abuse of criminal process in a dispute connected to money recovery. He referred to an earlier complaint that had already been quashed by the High Court.

    The State opposed the petition on the basis that the police had investigated the matter and filed a charge sheet on May 15, 2020.

    Court’s reasoning

    Justice H.P. Sandesh found that the absence of an affidavit was a fundamental defect. The Court noted that the Supreme Court’s decision in Priyanka Srivastava, followed in later judgments, requires a private complaint seeking action under Section 156(3) CrPC to be supported by an affidavit.

    The Court distinguished this issue from the petitioner’s separate objection about compliance with Sections 154(1) and 154(3) CrPC. Since police had received the complaint, issued an NCR and provided an acknowledgment, the Court held that there was no refusal by police requiring the complainant to first approach the Superintendent of Police.

    However, that did not cure the lack of an affidavit. The Court held that an unsupported private complaint could not be entertained, and that no legal value could attach to the complaint or to the charge sheet that followed from it.

    Outcome and legal significance

    The High Court allowed the criminal petition and quashed both the proceedings in Crime No. 30/2020 and the charge sheet against the petitioner. The ruling underscores that the affidavit requirement for private complaints referred for investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC is not a technical formality. Where that requirement is missing, the very initiation of criminal proceedings may be invalid, even if investigation has progressed to the filing of a charge sheet.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Karnataka High Court

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  • Delhi HC: Homebuyers Cannot Bypass RERA Proceedings by Filing Fresh Civil Suits Against Builders

    Delhi HC: Homebuyers Cannot Bypass RERA Proceedings by Filing Fresh Civil Suits Against Builders

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 19.10.2026

    Delhi HC: Homebuyers Cannot Bypass RERA Proceedings by Filing Fresh Civil Suits Against Builders

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id amitnaren@outlook.com .  

    The Delhi High Court has dismissed Lalit Kumar’s appeal against the rejection of a wide-ranging civil suit brought by 12 homebuyers against E-Homes Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., holding that the claims were vague, time-barred in part, barred by prior proceedings in part, and improperly combined multiple independent disputes.

    Background of the dispute

    The case arose from allegations by purchasers of apartments in The Jewel of Noida, a group-housing project developed by E-Homes Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. The homebuyers alleged shortcomings in the project’s development, maintenance arrangements, owners’ association, electricity services, parking, charges, and contractual documentation.

    According to the plaintiffs, the developer had represented that the project would provide high-quality facilities and amenities. They later alleged a substantial mismatch between the apartments’ actual or carpet areas and the super areas on which charges were based. They also challenged several levies, including maintenance, club, electricity-meter, preferential-location, green-belt, lease-rent, tax, and parking charges.

    The plaintiffs further alleged that the developer had not transferred maintenance responsibilities to a lawful apartment owners’ association despite possession having been offered years earlier. They disputed the formation and functioning of the registered association, claiming that it was created through irregular procedures and without proper elections.

    Reliefs sought by the homebuyers

    The suit sought a broad set of remedies, including:

    • Restoration of essential services, including garbage collection and DG electricity supply;
    • Refunds for alleged excess area charges, maintenance charges, club charges, electricity-related charges, taxes, interest, parking charges, preferential-location charges, and green-belt charges;
    • Appointment of an independent architect, consultant, or court commissioner to measure carpet area, super area, and loading;
    • Directions concerning maintenance accounts and transfer of maintenance to an owners’ association;
    • Changes to allegedly one-sided provisions in the sub-lease deeds;
    • Adequate and independent parking arrangements; and
    • Compensation, punitive damages, and rendition of accounts.

    Why the civil suit was rejected

    The trial court dismissed the suit on 31 August 2024. On appeal, the High Court found no reason to interfere with that decision.

    1. Maintenance and electricity issues had already been pursued before RERA

    The court noted that disputes concerning electricity and maintenance charges were already before U.P. RERA and were subject to related proceedings. Under Section 79 of the RERA Act, civil courts cannot entertain matters that fall within the jurisdiction of the RERA authorities or appellate tribunal.

    The court therefore held that the plaintiffs could not use a civil suit to reopen or nullify adverse outcomes from the competent regulatory forum.

    2. Monetary recovery claims were beyond limitation

    The homebuyers’ refund claims were connected to purchases that had culminated in individual sale deeds. The suit was filed in 2024, while the relevant limitation period for recovery claims based on alleged misrepresentation or fraudulent sale was treated as three years.

    The court found that these claims were filed too late and were consequently barred by limitation.

    3. Earlier suits had been withdrawn

    The record showed that earlier civil suits concerning maintenance and electricity had been filed and later withdrawn. The High Court observed that where a suit is withdrawn without liberty to file afresh, Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code prevents a party from bringing another suit on the same cause of action.

    The plaintiffs had not specifically shown that permission had been obtained to preserve their right to refile those claims. The court also endorsed the trial court’s concern that repeated proceedings before different forums amounted to forum hunting.

    4. The suit combined distinct claims of 12 purchasers

    The court stressed that each of the 12 plaintiffs had an individual transaction and a separate cause of action. Their claims could not be treated as one consolidated dispute merely because they related to the same housing project.

    The pleading was therefore held to suffer from misjoinder of parties and causes of action. The claims were also viewed as unquantified, omnibus, and insufficiently specific, particularly because several refund demands were left to be determined later through a proposed local commissioner.

    High Court’s ruling

    Justice Neena Bansal Krishna dismissed Regular First Appeal No. 949/2025 on 11 May 2026. The court affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that the suit was an abuse of the legal process and upheld the dismissal with costs of Rs. 3,000 imposed on each plaintiff.

    Only Lalit Kumar pursued the appeal, while the other original plaintiffs were not parties to the appeal. The court found no merit in the challenge and disposed of the pending applications.

    Key legal takeaway

    The ruling shows that homebuyer grievances, even where numerous and connected to one project, must be pursued before the appropriate forum, within the applicable limitation period, and through precise, properly structured pleadings. A consolidated civil suit cannot be used to revisit matters already adjudicated or pending before RERA, nor to combine unquantified and legally distinct claims of multiple purchasers.

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    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Delhi High Court

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  • Himachal Pradesh High Court Sets Aside Arbitration Order Over Commercial Court Jurisdiction

    Himachal Pradesh High Court Sets Aside Arbitration Order Over Commercial Court Jurisdiction

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 19.10.2026

    Himachal Pradesh High Court Sets Aside Arbitration Order Over Commercial Court Jurisdiction

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Arbitrator Shobhit Mallik. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id shobhit.Ica23@gmail.com .

    The Himachal Pradesh High Court has set aside a district court order in an arbitration dispute involving M/s Ech Ess Builders and the State of Himachal Pradesh, holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to decide the matter because it had not been constituted as a Commercial Court at the relevant time.

    Background of the construction dispute

    The dispute arose from a public works contract awarded in December 2005 to M/s Ech Ess Builders for a project valued at β‚Ή1.60 crore. The stipulated completion period was two years.

    According to the contractor, the work was disrupted when the site began sliding during the 2010 monsoon season. It said that the work was stopped, cracks developed in the area, and no further execution instructions were provided despite repeated communications. The contractor also alleged that designs and drawings were not made available in time, contributing to the delay.

    M/s Ech Ess Builders sought compensation for idle infrastructure and staff, additional overheads, unpaid work, price escalation, withheld security deposit, and earnest money. It also claimed costs and interest at 18% per annum.

    Arbitration award and court proceedings

    The arbitrator issued an award on 5 December 2019. Among other directions, the award granted simple interest at 8% per annum on:

    • β‚Ή4,46,039 from 27 November 2013 to 22 August 2019; and
    • β‚Ή2,52,492 from 27 November 2013 to 4 August 2017.

    Both the State authorities and the contractor challenged the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. On 9 August 2024, the District Judge, Kinnaur dismissed both sets of objections and upheld the arbitral award.

    The State then appealed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The High Court also condoned the delay in filing that appeal, accepting that it resulted from administrative processes rather than deliberate inaction.

    Why the High Court intervened

    Justice Sandeep Sharma held that this was a commercial dispute because it arose from a construction and infrastructure contract, which falls within the scope of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

    The decisive issue was jurisdiction. When the Section 34 objections were filed in July 2020, the District Judge was not notified or constituted as a Commercial Court under Section 3 of the Commercial Courts Act. Commercial Courts at the district level in Himachal Pradesh were notified only in May 2026.

    Relying on earlier High Court decisions, the Court concluded that a court not constituted as a Commercial Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over such commercial arbitration objections. As a result, the 2024 judgment was treated as having been passed without jurisdiction.

    Court’s order

    The High Court did not examine the merits of the contractor’s claims or the State’s objections to the arbitration award. Instead, it:

    • set aside the District Judge’s order dated 9 August 2024;
    • directed the District Judge to return the parties’ Section 34 objections for presentation before the appropriate forum under the Commercial Courts Act; and
    • ordered that the period from filing the appeal until the parties receive a certified copy of the High Court’s order will be excluded when calculating limitation.

    Legal significance

    The ruling reinforces that jurisdictional requirements under the Commercial Courts Act are mandatory in commercial arbitration matters. Even where a district court has considered an arbitral award in detail, its decision cannot stand if the court was not legally designated to hear commercial disputes when the case was instituted and decided.

    For parties to government construction contracts, the decision highlights the importance of filing arbitration challenges before the correctly constituted commercial forum. Procedural defects in forum selection can invalidate years of litigation without resolving the underlying contractual dispute.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Himachal Pradesh High Court

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  • Karnataka High Court- False Promise of Marriage Cannot Be Treated as Consent

    Karnataka High Court- False Promise of Marriage Cannot Be Treated as Consent

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 19.10.2026

    Karnataka High Court- False Promise of Marriage Cannot Be Treated as Consent

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate G Sridharamurthy. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id sriadv3@gmail.com . 

    The Karnataka High Court has overturned a trial court’s acquittal and convicted an accused of rape, cheating and criminal intimidation, holding that a sexual relationship induced by a false promise of marriage cannot be treated as consensual merely because the parties were in a relationship.

    The case at a glance

    In Manjula v. Devaraju and State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 2047 of 2018), a Division Bench of Justices H.P. Sandesh and B. Pramod set aside the 2018 acquittal issued by the V Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tiptur. The High Court found that the trial court had failed to properly assess the complainant’s testimony, her original complaint, the DNA evidence, and allegations of threats.

    The accused was convicted under:

    • Section 417 IPC for cheating;
    • Section 376 IPC for rape; and
    • Section 506 IPC for criminal intimidation.

    He was sentenced to life imprisonment for rape, along with prison terms and fines for the other offences. The sentences are to run concurrently.

    Allegations and evidence before the Court

    The complainant stated that she and the accused had known each other since their school days and were in a relationship. According to her complaint and testimony, the accused repeatedly assured her that he would marry her, told her he would not marry anyone else, and continued sexual relations on the strength of that assurance.

    She alleged that after she became pregnant, the accused asked her to terminate the pregnancy. When she refused and pressed him to marry her, he allegedly refused and threatened her life. The complaint also referred to an earlier case and alleged that the accused had pressured her to withdraw it by continuing to promise marriage.

    The High Court placed particular weight on a DNA report establishing that the accused was the biological father of the complainant’s daughter. The judgment notes that the accused did not effectively challenge the DNA evidence. Medical and investigative evidence, including the pregnancy finding and potency report, was also before the trial court.

    Why the High Court rejected the acquittal

    The trial court had treated the case as one involving consensual sexual relations, largely because the complainant acknowledged a love affair and prior physical relationship with the accused. The High Court held that this approach was incomplete and legally flawed.

    The Court emphasized that the central issue was not simply whether the parties were in a relationship, but whether the complainant’s consent had been obtained through a promise of marriage that induced her to engage in sexual relations. It found that the trial court had not meaningfully considered:

    • the specific allegations in the original complaint;
    • the complainant’s testimony that the accused repeatedly promised marriage;
    • the allegation that he continued the relationship while asking her to withdraw an earlier complaint;
    • the DNA evidence confirming paternity; and
    • the accusation that he threatened her after she became pregnant and refused an abortion.

    According to the High Court, the absence of physical injuries did not undermine the prosecution case. Where consent is obtained on the basis of a promise of marriage, the Court reasoned, physical injuries are not an expected indicator of the offence. It held that a continuing sexual relationship based on such a promise could not automatically be categorised as consensual sex.

    Appellate court’s finding: material evidence was overlooked

    The High Court described the trial court’s assessment as perverse because it did not properly evaluate key oral and documentary evidence. It found that the acquittal had resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

    The Bench also noted that the trial court had not adequately addressed the elements of cheating under Section 417 or criminal intimidation under Section 506. The complaint and the complainant’s evidence contained specific allegations of deception and threats, but these were not substantively analysed in the acquittal judgment.

    Relying on Supreme Court principles concerning appellate interference with acquittals, the High Court held that an appellate court may reverse an acquittal where cogent evidence has not been properly appreciated and the result is a miscarriage of justice.

    Sentence and compensation directions

    After conviction, the Court imposed the following sentence:

    • Section 417 IPC: One year’s imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,00,000.
    • Section 376 IPC: Life imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5,00,000.
    • Section 506 IPC: Two years’ imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,00,000.

    The total fine is Rs. 7,00,000. If deposited, Rs. 5,00,000 is to be kept in a fixed deposit in the daughter’s name until she reaches adulthood. The remaining Rs. 2,00,000 is to be released to the complainant for her livelihood and for the child’s educational needs.

    The Court also directed the District Legal Services Authority, Tumkur, to award maximum compensation to the complainant and her child within four months. It noted that the trial court had failed to consider victim compensation under Section 357A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, even while the complainant and child were facing hardship.

    Maintenance order also noted

    During the appeal, the Court was informed that a maintenance order had directed the accused to pay Rs. 2,000 each per month to the complainant and her daughter. The complainant’s side stated that this amount had not been paid, and the accused did not dispute that assertion. The High Court considered this conduct while determining sentence and compensation.

    Broader legal significance

    The ruling underscores that the existence of a romantic relationship does not, by itself, resolve the question of consent in a criminal case. Courts must closely examine whether consent was given freely or was induced by deception, particularly where a complainant alleges that sexual relations occurred because of a promise of marriage.

    It also highlights the duty of trial courts to assess all material evidence, including the complaint, testimony, scientific evidence, and allegations of intimidation, rather than limiting their analysis to whether there was force or physical injury. The judgment further reinforces the importance of victim-compensation mechanisms, including in cases where a trial court initially records an acquittal.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Karnataka High Court

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  • Bombay High Court Says Merchant Settlement Funds Cannot Be Treated as Payment Aggregator Assets

    Bombay High Court Says Merchant Settlement Funds Cannot Be Treated as Payment Aggregator Assets

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 19.10.2026

    Bombay High Court Says Merchant Settlement Funds Cannot Be Treated as Payment Aggregator Assets

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Madhumita Jha. The views expressed are based on her interpretation of the law. She can be reached at her email id jhamadhumita27@gmail.com .  

    The Bombay High Court has set aside provisional GST attachments on 1Pay Mobileware Private Limited’s bank and escrow accounts, holding that the DGGI acted on suspicion without showing a specific GST liability or cogent material linking the payment aggregator to tax evasion.

    Court finds Section 83 power was used without the required foundation

    In 1Pay Mobileware Private Limited v. Union of India & Ors. (Writ Petition No. 4586 of 2026), decided on 16 October 2026, the Bombay High Court examined whether the Directorate General of GST Intelligence (DGGI) could freeze the accounts of an RBI-authorised payment aggregator during an investigation into alleged GST evasion by an online money-gaming syndicate.

    The Court concluded that the attachment orders did not meet the strict statutory conditions under Section 83 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. It therefore allowed the writ petition and quashed the impugned attachment orders, including the continuing restrictions under the partial de-freezing orders.

    Background: payment aggregator’s accounts frozen during gaming-syndicate investigation

    1Pay Mobileware is a company incorporated in 2019 and authorised by the Reserve Bank of India to operate as an online payment aggregator from May 2024. In June 2026, it also received authorisation to operate as an offline payment aggregator.

    On 10 August 2026, DGGI officers sealed the company’s Mumbai premises and provisionally attached several bank accounts under Section 83 of the CGST Act. These included current accounts and RBI-mandated escrow accounts maintained with HDFC Bank, ICICI Bank, Kotak Mahindra Bank and IDFC Bank.

    DGGI alleged that 1Pay may have played a role beyond that of a payment intermediary in an organised online money-gaming network. According to the department, fictitious or non-functional merchants may have been onboarded to route and layer funds generated from gaming activities without payment of applicable GST.

    The agency also relied on alleged non-cooperation in the investigation. It stated that the company’s registered and additional business premises were locked, records were unavailable, its server was empty, and certain information sought through summons had not been furnished. DGGI said that approximately 88 merchants identified from the company’s GSTR-1 data appeared to be non-existent or non-functional.

    1Pay argued that the freeze paralysed legitimate payment settlements

    The company contended that it was a regulated payment aggregator, comparable in function to other payment platforms, and that its escrow funds largely belonged to third-party merchants rather than to 1Pay itself. It submitted that the blanket freeze had disrupted settlement payments for government, public-sector and statutory bodies using its platform.

    Among the entities identified as having unsettled funds were IRCTC, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, LIC Housing Finance, HDFC Bank and Tamil Nadu Power Finance and Infrastructure Development Corporation. The company also highlighted disruptions to FASTag and National Electronic Toll Collection settlements.

    DGGI subsequently permitted limited settlement payments from one escrow account to specified government and PSU-linked entities. However, it continued the debit freeze over the accounts generally, stating that it was needed to safeguard revenue while the investigation continued.

    Why the High Court set aside the attachments

    The Court held that Section 83 authorises provisional attachment only after proceedings under the specified chapters of the CGST Act have been initiated and only where the Commissioner forms an opinion, based on tangible material, that attachment is necessary to protect government revenue.

    Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Radha Krishan Industries, the Court stressed that provisional attachment is a β€œdraconian” power. It cannot be used merely because attachment seems convenient, expedient or commercially useful. The authority must demonstrate a live link between credible material, the proposed attachment and the necessity to protect revenue.

    The Court identified several decisive deficiencies:

    • No identified GST liability of 1Pay: The attachment orders did not explain any tax liability attributable to the payment aggregator itself. The allegations broadly concerned suspected money laundering and GST evasion by unnamed third parties.
    • No particulars of alleged wrongful transactions: The orders did not identify the specific transactions, merchants, nature of GST evasion, or the company’s alleged role in it.
    • No basis for treating 1Pay as a person covered by Section 83: The material did not show that 1Pay was a taxable person with a relevant liability or a person falling within Section 122(1A) of the CGST Act.
    • Escrow money was not 1Pay’s property: The Court held that funds in the RBI-mandated escrow account were impressed with a trust and belonged to merchants and beneficiaries, not the payment aggregator. They could not be attached as the company’s property under Section 83.
    • Orders could not be repaired through later affidavits: The Court said the deficiencies in the original attachment orders could not be justified by explanations added in DGGI’s affidavit filed during the writ proceedings.
    • Suspicion was not enough: Although the department cited non-cooperation and suspected involvement with 88 merchants, it did not disclose their identities, transaction details, or evidence showing 1Pay’s involvement in any GST evasion.

    The Court also noted that 1Pay serviced several government entities and could not be treated as a β€œfly-by-night operator” on the material before it.

    Significance for payment aggregators and GST investigations

    This judgment reinforces that GST authorities must exercise provisional attachment powers with exceptional care. An investigation or a general suspicion of wrongdoing does not, by itself, justify freezing operational bank accounts, particularly where the accounts hold third-party settlement funds.

    For RBI-regulated payment aggregators, the ruling is especially significant because escrow accounts are designed to hold merchant funds pending settlement. Treating those balances as the payment aggregator’s attachable property can disrupt payments to merchants, government bodies, banks and consumers while exceeding the limits of Section 83.

    The decision also underlines three broader principles:

    1. Specificity is essential: Authorities must identify the taxpayer’s own alleged liability and the factual basis for attachment.
    2. Necessity and proportionality must be demonstrated: A freeze must be truly necessary to protect revenue, not simply useful for an ongoing inquiry.
    3. Third-party funds require distinct treatment: Funds held in escrow for merchant settlement cannot automatically be treated as assets belonging to the payment intermediary.

    Outcome

    The Bombay High Court allowed 1Pay Mobileware’s writ petition and quashed the challenged provisional attachment orders and continuing partial-freezing restrictions. No order as to costs was made. The ruling confirms that Section 83 cannot be used as an investigative shortcut: a provisional attachment requires credible, recorded material showing that the taxpayer’s own property must be frozen to protect a genuine revenue interest.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Bombay High Court

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  • Bombay HC: Builders Cannot Collect More Than 10% of Flat Price Without Registered Sale Agreement β€” RERA Section 13 Compliance Mandatory

    Bombay HC: Builders Cannot Collect More Than 10% of Flat Price Without Registered Sale Agreement β€” RERA Section 13 Compliance Mandatory

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 17.10.2026

    Bombay HC: Builders Cannot Collect More Than 10% of Flat Price Without Registered Sale Agreement β€” RERA Section 13 Compliance Mandatory

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id amitnaren@outlook.com .  

    The Bombay High Court has directed Rare Townships Pvt. Ltd. to execute and register a RERA-compliant agreement for sale within four weeks, while treating 4 October 2024 as a tentative possession date pending final determination by the Maharashtra Real Estate Appellate Tribunal.

    Background of the dispute

    The dispute concerns a residential flat in the developer’s Ghatkopar project, originally marketed as β€œRising City” and later registered under RERA as β€œNorth Sea Heights (A-1).”

    The buyers initially received a holding receipt in January 2011 for a different flat. The parties subsequently changed the unit, and a provisional allotment letter dated 30 November 2014 was issued for Flat No. 805 in Building A-1, with a stated consideration of Rs. 1.248 crore.

    The parties ultimately agreed that the buyers had paid Rs. 38.47 lakh by 2016. Despite this payment, no registered agreement for sale was executed. The core disagreements included the unpaid balance, the agreement’s terms, the possession timeline, parking and amenities, and each side’s liability for delay.

    RERA authority’s earlier directions

    In July 2025, MahaRERA partly allowed the buyers’ complaint. It required the developer to execute a registered agreement for sale under Section 13 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, based on the allotment letter.

    MahaRERA also held that:

    • The buyers would pay the outstanding consideration and any applicable interest for delayed payments under the statutory framework.
    • The developer would pay interest for delayed possession from 4 October 2024 until it offered possession with an Occupation Certificate.
    • The parties’ respective payment obligations could be adjusted and set off when possession was delivered.

    The buyers appealed for a more complete RERA-compliant agreement, including parking, amenities, model-agreement protections and safeguards against payment demands or termination before registration.

    Interim tribunal order and developer’s challenge

    The Appellate Tribunal initially directed the developer to provide and execute a RERA-compliant agreement. It also restrained the developer from demanding further money or issuing termination notices until the agreement was executed and registered. A review order corrected the buyers’ payment figure to Rs. 38.47 lakh and corrected the allotment-letter date.

    Rare Townships challenged the interim order in the High Court. Its principal objection was that the Tribunal had effectively decided disputed issues at an interim stage, particularly by requiring the agreement to state a possession date and by excluding interest for alleged payment delays before the agreement’s execution.

    High Court’s reasoning

    The Court emphasized that a registered agreement for sale is not optional once substantial sums have been accepted from a buyer. It noted that both the earlier Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act framework and RERA seek to prevent promoters from accepting significant advances without documenting the parties’ rights and obligations in a registered agreement.

    Under Section 13 of RERA, a promoter cannot accept more than 10% of an apartment’s cost before entering into a registered written agreement for sale. The agreement must cover key matters, including project specifications, payment schedules, the possession date and default interest.

    Here, the Court found that the developer had accepted more than 30% of the agreed consideration without executing the agreement. It therefore upheld the essential requirement to execute a registered, RERA-compliant agreement.

    The Court drew a distinction, however, between requiring an agreement and conclusively determining the contractual possession date. The possession date remained an issue in the buyers’ pending appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. The High Court therefore modified the interim arrangement rather than treating that issue as finally settled.

    Final directions

    The Court disposed of the second appeal with these principal directions:

    • Tentative possession date: The agreement must record 4 October 2024 as the possession date.
    • No final determination: That date is tentative, without prejudice to either side, and remains subject to final adjudication by the Appellate Tribunal.
    • Rectification if required: If the Tribunal changes the possession date, the parties’ rights and liabilities will follow that determination and they must execute a deed of rectification.
    • RERA-compliant agreement: The agreement must comply with Section 13 of RERA and the prescribed model agreement under Maharashtra’s 2017 RERA Rules.
    • Time limit: The developer must execute and register the agreement within four weeks of the judgment.
    • Issues kept open: All remaining disputes, including payment, interest, parking, amenities, compensation and the final possession timeline, remain open before the Appellate Tribunal.

    Why the decision matters

    The ruling reinforces that developers cannot retain substantial buyer payments while postponing the registered agreement for sale. It also confirms that a RERA-compliant agreement must transparently state essential commercial terms, including payment obligations, possession and default consequences.

    At the same time, the judgment preserves procedural fairness: an interim order can secure the statutory agreement and protect buyers from premature demands or termination, but contested issues such as the final possession date must remain available for full appellate adjudication.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Bombay High Court

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  • Bombay High Court Holds That Non-Recovery of a Journey Ticket Does Not Defeat Railway Accident Compensation Claim

    Bombay High Court Holds That Non-Recovery of a Journey Ticket Does Not Defeat Railway Accident Compensation Claim

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 17.10.2026

    Bombay High Court Holds That Non-Recovery of a Journey Ticket Does Not Defeat Railway Accident Compensation Claim

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Madhumita Jha. The views expressed are based on her interpretation of the law. She can be reached at her email id jhamadhumita27@gmail.com .  

    The Bombay High Court has awarded β‚Ή8,00,438.36 to the parents of a man who died after falling from a crowded local train, holding that the absence of a ticket for one leg of his journey did not by itself disprove that he was a bona fide passenger.

    Background of the case

    Bhaskar Kandh Panda and Prafulla, also known as Pranita Bhaskar Panda, sought compensation following the death of their son, Sandeep P. Panda, on 1 September 2015. According to their case, Sandeep travelled from Kurla to Belapur for personal work and later boarded a local train from Belapur toward Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Terminus (CSMT) to meet a friend.

    The parents said that the train was heavily crowded and that Sandeep, who was standing near the door, was pushed and fell between Kurla and Chunabhatti stations. He suffered severe head injuries and later died at Sion Hospital.

    A railway ticket for the Kurla-to-Belapur journey was recovered from his wallet during the inquest. However, the ticket for the later Belapur-to-CSMT journey was not found.

    Why the Railway Claims Tribunal rejected the claim

    The Railway Claims Tribunal initially dismissed the parents’ compensation application in March 2020. Although it accepted that Sandeep had fallen from a train and died in an untoward incident, it concluded that he was not a bona fide passenger because the ticket for the Belapur-to-CSMT leg was missing.

    Central Railway defended that conclusion, arguing that the deceased’s account of travel was unreliable and that standing near a train door amounted to negligence. It also contended that there was no eyewitness to establish the alleged fall.

    High Court’s findings

    Justice Aarti Sathe found the Tribunal’s reasoning internally inconsistent. The Tribunal had already accepted the police material, inquest panchanama and railway records showing that Sandeep fell from a train between Kurla and Chunabhatti and died from the resulting injuries. It could not, the High Court held, deny compensation solely because one ticket was not recovered.

    The Court relied on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Union of India v. Rina Devi, which clarifies that a missing ticket does not automatically defeat a railway accident claim. A claimant may meet the initial burden by filing an affidavit setting out relevant facts, after which the burden shifts to the Railways to rebut the case through the surrounding evidence.

    In this case, the parents had produced an affidavit and supporting records, while a valid one-way ticket was recovered from the deceased. The Railways did not produce sufficient evidence to establish that the death fell within any statutory exception under Section 124A of the Railways Act, 1989.

    Key legal principles reaffirmed

    • A missing ticket is not conclusive: The absence of a ticket after a fatal railway accident cannot, by itself, establish that the deceased was travelling without authority.
    • Evidence must be assessed as a whole: The Court considered the recovered ticket, inquest record, police report, affidavit and finding that the death resulted from a train fall.
    • Negligence does not automatically bar compensation: The Railways did not prove that the case fell under an exception to statutory liability merely because the deceased was allegedly near the door of a crowded train.
    • Beneficial legislation requires a liberal approach: The Railways Act’s compensation provisions are intended to protect victims and dependants. Where two reasonable interpretations are possible, the one favouring the beneficiary should be preferred.

    Compensation awarded

    The High Court set aside the Tribunal’s dismissal and allowed the claim. It noted that compensation for death under the applicable rules had increased from β‚Ή4 lakh to β‚Ή8 lakh after the 2016 amendment.

    Applying the principle that claimants should receive the higher of the applicable amounts, the Court awarded β‚Ή8,00,438.36. This amount reflects the original β‚Ή4 lakh compensation with interest at 9% per year from the accident date, which marginally exceeded the revised fixed compensation of β‚Ή8 lakh.

    The award is to be divided equally between the deceased’s father and mother. Central Railway must deposit the amount within eight weeks after receiving their bank details; any delay will attract further interest at 9% per annum.

    Significance of the ruling

    The decision reinforces that railway compensation claims cannot be rejected on technical grounds when the overall evidence supports an untoward railway incident. It also underscores the Railway Administration’s obligation to rebut a credible claim rather than relying only on the non-recovery of a ticket after an accident.

    For families pursuing compensation after railway accidents, the judgment highlights the importance of preserving available documents, filing a clear affidavit describing the journey and accident, and relying on inquest, police and railway records to establish the circumstances of the incident.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Bombay High Court

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