Tag: #Linkedin

  • Supreme Court: β€œPatent Illegality” Cannot Be Invoked to Re-Appreciate Evidence or Substitute Court’s View for Arbitrator’s Findings

    Supreme Court: β€œPatent Illegality” Cannot Be Invoked to Re-Appreciate Evidence or Substitute Court’s View for Arbitrator’s Findings

    Date: 12.09.2026

    In a significant judgment governing judicial interference with arbitral awards, the Supreme Court has restored an arbitral award of β‚Ή3.71 crore with statutory interest in favour of contractor Ramesh Kumar Jain against Bharat Aluminium Company Limited (BALCO), holding that the Chhattisgarh High Court exceeded the limited jurisdiction available under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by effectively re-appreciating evidence and substituting its own interpretation for that of the arbitrator.

    The Court reiterated that an arbitral award cannot be set aside merely because a court considers another interpretation of the evidence or contractual arrangement to be more plausible. The threshold of β€œpatent illegality” requires something substantially more serious than an erroneous factual assessment or a difference of opinion with the arbitrator.

    Background of the Dispute

    • BALCO had invited tenders for mining and transportation of 3,70,000 metric tonnes of bauxite from its Mainpat mines to the Korba Alumina Plant. Ramesh Kumar Jain submitted the lowest bid, and after negotiations an agreement dated 11 December 1999 was entered into for mining and transportation of 2,22,000 MT of bauxite at β‚Ή634.20 per MT.
    • The work was originally required to be completed within 18 months, by May 2001, but was extended until September 2001. After the contracted quantity had been supplied, BALCO requested Jain, through a letter dated 5 January 2002, to continue the mining and transportation work, with the rate for the additional work to be decided subsequently after consultation.
    • Jain continued the work and supplied approximately 1,95,000 MT of additional bauxite between 16 June 2001 and 31 March 2002. A dispute thereafter arose regarding payment for the additional work, resulting in invocation of the arbitration clause. The High Court eventually referred the dispute to arbitration under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act.

    Arbitrator Awards β‚Ή3.71 Crore With Statutory Interest

    • After considering the pleadings and evidence and framing 13 issues, the sole arbitrator passed an award dated 15 July 2012 in favour of Jain.
    • The award covered, among other things, compensation for additional work, increased transportation costs arising from restrictions on truck capacity, idle manpower and machinery during a strike period, and interest attributable to delay in payment of a running-account bill. The aggregate amount of the substantive claims, inclusive of the specified pre-award interest, was β‚Ή2,34,57,783.
    • The arbitrator further awarded 12% interest from 1 September 2007 to 15 July 2012 amounting to β‚Ή1,37,22,801, bringing the total award to β‚Ή3,71,80,584, along with statutory interest under Section 31(7)(b) from the date of the award until payment.

    Commercial Court Upholds Award, High Court Sets It Aside

    • BALCO challenged the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The Commercial Court, Raipur, rejected the challenge on 2 January 2017, finding that the arbitrator had rendered reasoned findings on the claims after considering the oral and documentary evidence and that the award could not be characterised as arbitrary or capricious.
    • BALCO thereafter approached the Chhattisgarh High Court under Section 37. The High Court allowed the appeal on 3 May 2023 and set aside the arbitral award that had been affirmed by the Commercial Court.
    • This brought the original claimant, Ramesh Kumar Jain, before the Supreme Court.

    Supreme Court: Section 37 Does Not Permit Re-Appreciation of Evidence

    • The Supreme Court framed the central question as whether the High Court could interfere with the arbitral award on the ground of patent illegality under Section 37 after the award had already survived scrutiny under Section 34.
    • The Court emphasised the legislative policy of minimal judicial intervention in arbitration. Section 34 provides only a narrow supervisory jurisdiction, and courts exercising that jurisdiction do not sit as appellate courts over arbitral awards.
    • More importantly, the scope of scrutiny under Section 37 is not wider than Section 34. The Court relied upon authorities including MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., Konkan Railway Corporation Ltd. v. Chenab Bridge Project Undertaking and Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. v. NHAI to reiterate that Section 37 does not enlarge the appellate court’s power to reassess an arbitral award.
    • The Supreme Court further observed that the scope of interference under Section 37 is even narrower where the arbitral award has already been upheld or substantially upheld under Section 34. Reassessment or re-appreciation of evidence lies outside the permissible contours of judicial review under both provisions.

    What Constitutes β€œPatent Illegality”?

    • The judgment contains an important exposition of the meaning of patent illegality in arbitration law.
    • Following the 2015 amendment to Section 34, an award cannot be set aside merely because there has been an erroneous application of law or because a court would appreciate the evidence differently. The illegality must go to the root of the award.
    • The Supreme Court explained that an award may be vulnerable where an arbitrator ignores a binding precedent or an express contractual prohibition, or where a finding is based on no evidence at all. But if there is some evidence on the record from which the arbitrator has drawn a reasonably plausible inference, a court should ordinarily not substitute its own view.
    • The Court made an especially important distinction between β€œno evidence” and weak or scant evidence. Patent illegality may arise when a crucial conclusion has absolutely no evidentiary basis. However, where even some relevant evidence existsβ€”including witness testimony or documentsβ€”the court cannot label the award patently illegal merely because it considers that evidence to have low probative value.

    Arbitrator Is the Master of Facts and Evidence

    • On examining the award, the Supreme Court found that the arbitrator had considered both oral and documentary material, including the evidence of claimant R.K. Jain and BALCO’s Assistant General Manager/Engineer-in-Charge, along with affidavits and correspondence.
    • The Court noted that the arbitrator had not mechanically accepted every claim. Certain claims were reduced while another claim relating to removal of extra overburden was rejected altogether. This demonstrated an application of mind rather than arbitrary acceptance of the contractor’s calculations.
    • The Supreme Court therefore rejected the High Court’s conclusion that the award was founded merely upon guesswork or lacked evidence.

    Arbitrator Can Apply Quantum Meruit Where Contract Is Silent

    • Another major aspect of the ruling concerns Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and the principle of quantum meruit.
    • The Supreme Court clarified that an arbitrator cannot make an award contrary to an express contractual prohibition. However, where the contract is simply silent on a legitimate claim naturally arising from the parties’ contractual relationship, the tribunal can interpret implied terms or fill the contractual gap, provided it does not contradict an express provision.
    • Section 70 creates a restitutionary obligation where one person lawfully does something for another without intending it to be gratuitous and the other person enjoys the resulting benefit. In such circumstances, compensation may be payable for the benefit received.

    β‚Ή10 Per MT Additional Compensation Did Not Rewrite Contract

    • BALCO had contendedβ€”and the High Court had acceptedβ€”that the arbitrator effectively rewrote the contract by increasing the compensation for additional work by β‚Ή10 per MT.
    • The Supreme Court disagreed.
    • It found that after the earlier contractual period, Jain continued mining and transporting an additional 1,95,000 MT of bauxite at BALCO’s request, while the price for such additional work had expressly been left open to be settled subsequently by mutual consensus. That exercise was never completed.
    • In those circumstances, the arbitrator did not rewrite an agreed contractual rate. Rather, he filled a contractual vacuum by awarding reasonable compensation under Section 70 of the Contract Act to prevent unjust enrichment.
    • The additional β‚Ή10 per MTβ€”raising the rate from β‚Ή634.20 to β‚Ή644.20 per MTβ€”was therefore treated as reasonable compensation for additional work rather than an impermissible modification of an agreed contractual term.
    • The Supreme Court further held that claims based on quantum meruit or unjust enrichment can be determined in arbitration where they fall within the scope of disputes referred to the tribunal, either expressly or by necessary implication.

    β€œGuesswork” Does Not Automatically Make an Award Patently Illegal

    • The Supreme Court also rejected the High Court’s reasoning regarding percentage-based or approximate calculations adopted by the arbitrator.
    • It held that the alleged errors concerning lack of evidence or percentage-based allowances did not, individually or cumulatively, reach the threshold of patent illegality. There was at least some evidence and logical reasoning supporting each component of the award, and the arbitrator’s conclusions constituted a possible view that a reasonable decision-maker could take.
    • The Court also stressed that arbitrators are not bound by strict rules of evidence, having regard to Section 19 of the Arbitration Act. A court cannot interfere simply because an arbitrator’s reasoning is brief, so long as the reasoning path leading to the conclusion can be discerned.

    Supreme Court Restores Arbitral Award

    • Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the Chhattisgarh High Court had impermissibly re-appreciated the evidence and substituted its own interpretation for that of the arbitrator while exercising its limited jurisdiction under Section 37.
    • Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed Ramesh Kumar Jain’s appeal and set aside the High Court judgment dated 3 May 2023.
    • As a consequence, the Commercial Court’s judgment dated 2 January 2017 affirming the arbitral award dated 15 July 2012 was restored. The β‚Ή3.71 crore arbitral award, together with the statutory interest directed by the arbitrator, therefore stands revived.

    Significance of the Judgment

    • The ruling reinforces three important principles of Indian arbitration law.
    • First, Sections 34 and 37 do not provide courts with appellate jurisdiction over the merits of an arbitral award. Secondly, β€œpatent illegality” cannot become a device for reopening factual findings merely because another interpretation appears preferable. Thirdly, where a contract is silent regarding compensation for additional work that was requested and accepted, an arbitral tribunal may, in an appropriate case, apply Section 70 of the Contract Act and principles of quantum meruit/unjust enrichment to determine reasonable compensation.

    The judgment therefore strengthens the principle of arbitral finality and minimal judicial interference, while also clarifying the dividing line between an arbitrator impermissibly rewriting a contract and legitimately filling a contractual vacuum arising from additional work performed and accepted by the other party.

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  • Allahabad High Court: RERA Recovery Proceedings Cannot Be Challenged Directly Through Writ When Statutory Appeal Is Available

    Allahabad High Court: RERA Recovery Proceedings Cannot Be Challenged Directly Through Writ When Statutory Appeal Is Available

    Date: 12.09.2026

    In an important ruling concerning the remedies available against orders and recovery proceedings initiated under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA), the Allahabad High Court has declined to interfere with a recovery certificate challenged directly under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court held that the petitioners could approach the competent Appellate Tribunal under Section 43(5) of the RERA Act against the underlying order on which the recovery proceedings were founded.

    Background of the Case

    • The writ petition was filed by M/s Singh Brothers, Kanpur Nagar, through its partner Amarpreet Singh and seven others against U.P. RERA and other respondents. The petitioners sought quashing of a recovery certificate dated 25 November 2023 issued by U.P. RERA to the District Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar. They also sought a direction restraining the authorities from taking coercive action pursuant to the recovery certificate.
    • According to the petitioners, they were owners and in legal possession of land situated at Govind Nagar, Kanpur. A builder agreement had been entered into on 30 July 2008 with M/s College Group Infrastructure Private Limited for development of the land, and a General Power of Attorney was also executed in favour of the builder for implementation of the agreement.

    Petitioners Claimed They Were Not Co-Promoters

    • The builder subsequently launched a project known as β€œViva City Square” in Kanpur and registered itself on the U.P. RERA portal. Significantly, the petitioners contended that they were never registered as co-promoters of the project.
    • Certain allottees subsequently filed a complaint before U.P. RERA regarding the conduct of the builder. After adjudication of the complaint, a recovery certificate was issued. The petitioners’ grievance was that the recovery certificate was being sought to be enforced against them even though, according to them, they were neither registered as co-promoters nor proprietors of the project.
    • They further contended that the original RERA complaintβ€”Complaint No. LKO157/07/55720/2020, Lalit Kumar Singh v. M/s College Group Infrastructure Private Limitedβ€”was not filed against them and that they had not been heard when U.P. RERA passed its order dated 1 April 2021.

    Earlier High Court Direction for Execution of Recovery Certificate

    • U.P. RERA brought to the Court’s attention an earlier order dated 18 March 2024 passed by a coordinate Bench in Lalit Kumar Singh v. State of U.P. & Others, Writ-C No. 2557 of 2024.
    • In that proceeding, the High Court had directed the District Magistrate, Kanpur, to execute the recovery certificate dated 25 November 2023 within three months from the date on which a certified copy of the order was furnished.
    • RERA therefore argued that the authorities were merely acting in compliance with the earlier direction of the High Court and that the petitioners could have sought review of that order before the concerned Division Bench.

    Alternative Remedy Under RERA

    • To overcome the objection regarding availability of an alternative statutory remedy, the petitioners relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Assistant Commissioner of State Tax & Others v. Commercial Steel Limited, Civil Appeal No. 5121 of 2021, decided on 3 September 2021.
    • The petitioners argued that existence of an alternative remedy does not automatically bar the High Court from exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226.

    The High Court examined the Supreme Court judgment and noted that an alternative remedy is indeed not an absolute bar to maintainability of a writ petition. However, interference despite availability of a statutory remedy is ordinarily justified in exceptional situations such as:

    • breach of fundamental rights;
    • violation of principles of natural justice;
    • excess of jurisdiction; or
    • challenge to the vires of a statute or delegated legislation.

    The Division Bench, however, concluded that the petitioners’ case did not fall within any of those recognised exceptional circumstances.

    High Court Directs Petitioners Towards RERA Appellate Remedy

    • The Court took note of the petitioners’ contention that they were not named as proprietors, were not parties to the original complaint and had not been heard when U.P. RERA passed the underlying order dated 1 April 2021.
    • Nevertheless, instead of adjudicating these issues in the writ proceedings, the High Court held that if the petitioners were aggrieved by the order dated 1 April 2021, which formed the basis of the subsequent recovery certificate, they could approach the Appellate Tribunal under Section 43(5) of the RERA Act.
    • The writ petition was accordingly disposed of with the above observations.

    Key Legal Takeaway

    The ruling reiterates the principle that the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is wide, and availability of an alternative remedy is not an absolute prohibition against entertaining a writ petition. However, where an effective statutory appellate mechanism exists and the case does not fall within one of the recognised exceptional categories, the High Court may decline to exercise writ jurisdiction.

    The judgment is particularly relevant in the RERA context because a person who claims to have been wrongly affected by an underlying RERA order cannot ordinarily bypass the statutory appellate mechanism merely by challenging the consequential recovery certificate through a writ petition. The appropriate course, as indicated by the Court in this case, is to challenge the foundational RERA order before the competent Appellate Tribunal under Section 43(5).

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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  • Supreme Court Sets Aside Compulsory Retirement of Indian Trade Service Officer; Awards β‚Ή15 Lakh in Costs and Compensation

    Supreme Court Sets Aside Compulsory Retirement of Indian Trade Service Officer; Awards β‚Ή15 Lakh in Costs and Compensation

    Date: 12.09.2026

    In a significant ruling concerning the Government’s power to compulsorily retire public servants under Fundamental Rule 56(j), the Supreme Court has set aside the premature retirement of former Indian Trade Service officer S.S. Das, holding that the action suffered from manifest contradiction and was vitiated by malice in law. The Court found the case to be one warranting judicial intervention on grounds of arbitrariness, perversity and mala fides.

    The Supreme Court not only restored all service benefits that would have accrued to Das had he not been prematurely retired, but also directed payment of β‚Ή6 lakh as costs and β‚Ή9 lakh as compensation for loss of reputation.

    Background of the Case

    • S.S. Das joined the Indian Trade Service (ITS) in 1989 and rose through the ranks, serving in senior positions including Deputy Director General of Foreign Trade, Joint Director General of Foreign Trade and Additional Director in the Directorate General of Anti-Dumping. He was placed in the Senior Administrative Grade at Joint Secretary level in November 2017 and was promoted on a regular basis on 27 February 2018.
    • However, barely a few months after his promotion, the Government passed an order dated 10 May 2018, compulsorily retiring him under FR 56(j) in public interest, before he reached his normal age of superannuation.
    • Das challenged the decision before the Central Administrative Tribunal. The CAT dismissed his application, reasoning that judicial review of an FR 56(j) decision did not extend to examining the adequacy or sufficiency of material before the competent authority. The Delhi High Court subsequently declined to interfere, leading to the appeal before the Supreme Court.

    Supreme Court Examines Entire Service Record

    • The Supreme Court framed the central issue as whether the compulsory retirement was based upon material capable of sustaining the Government’s satisfaction and whether there was a rational nexus between the material relied upon and the conclusion that premature retirement was required in public interest.
    • A crucial aspect of the Court’s examination was Das’s service record. His ACRs/APARs showed that he had consistently received high assessments over a substantial part of his career.
    • The Court noted that the officer was consistently graded β€œOutstanding” or β€œVery Good” from 1994 to 2008-09, followed by high numerical APAR gradings. Significantly, he had also been found suitable for promotion to the Senior Administrative Grade and promoted to the level of Joint Secretary shortly before the decision to compulsorily retire him.
    • This chronology assumed considerable importance because the Review Committee met on 27 November 2017, shortly after his promotion, and there was no identifiable intervening act of misconduct between his promotion and subsequent compulsory retirement that could reasonably explain the dramatic reversal in the Government’s assessment of his suitability for continued service.

    Unsubstantiated Allegations Could Not Override Service Record

    • The Government relied substantially upon a confidential note dated 30 March 2017 relating to Das’s tenure in the Directorate General of Anti-Dumping. The note referred to allegations made by representatives of domestic industry regarding demands for favours.
    • However, the note itself acknowledged that there was no evidence supporting those allegations and not even a written complaint.
    • The Review Committee also relied upon an APAR entry for 2014-15 stating that there was β€œroom for improvement” in relation to integrity and upon an earlier 1998-99 entry noting that complaints had been received.
    • The Supreme Court’s examination of the actual record, however, revealed that the 1998-99 entry itself recorded that β€œno substance” had been found in those complaints. The service records over the years otherwise contained favourable assessments regarding integrity and quality of work.

    Promotion Does Not Automatically Wipe Out Past Adverse Materialβ€”But It Matters

    • The judgment importantly clarifies the relationship between an officer’s promotion and the Government’s subsequent exercise of power under FR 56(j).
    • The Supreme Court did not hold that promotion automatically wipes out every earlier adverse entry. Instead, it held that the entire service record must be evaluated, with appropriate weight being given to the officer’s immediate past.
    • The Court observed that where the same departmental machinery had examined the officer’s record and found him fit for promotion to the higher position of Joint Secretary, a subsequent conclusion that his continuation in service was no longer in public interest required something more substantial than a general invocation of β€œquestionable integrity.”
    • Thus, a recent promotion does not grant immunity from review under FR 56(j), but it remains a highly relevant circumstance which the reviewing authority must meaningfully consider.

    Supreme Court Criticises Selective Reliance on Precedents

    • Another notable aspect of the judgment is the Court’s criticism of the Review Committee’s approach to earlier Supreme Court decisions.
    • The Committee had relied upon precedents including State of Gujarat v. Umedbhai M. Patel, S. Ramachandra Raju v. State of Orissa, K. Kandaswamy v. Union of India, Shyam Lal v. State of U.P., Baikuntha Nath Das v. District Medical Officer, Union of India v. Col. J.N. Sinha and Shivcharan Singh v. State of Mysore.
    • The Supreme Court observed that these precedents had been invoked selectively. According to the Court, the authorities concentrated upon propositions permitting consideration of past adverse material while failing to meaningfully engage with the corresponding safeguardsβ€”particularly the requirement to examine the entire service record, give due weight to recent performance, and appropriately consider subsequent promotion.

    FR 56(j) Power Cannot Be Exercised on Mere Suspicion

    • The Supreme Court reiterated that the Government undoubtedly possesses the power to compulsorily retire an officer in public interest under FR 56(j), and the scope of judicial review of such administrative satisfaction remains limited.
    • For instance, Baikuntha Nath Das v. District Medical Officer, (1992) 2 SCC 299, recognises that courts do not ordinarily act as appellate authorities over compulsory-retirement decisions. Nevertheless, judicial interference remains available where the decision is mala fide, unsupported by evidence or so arbitrary that no reasonable person could have formed the requisite opinion.
    • Applying those principles, the Supreme Court held that FR 56(j) β€œshould not be exercised lightly or in a casual manner.” The material supporting such action must be credible and cogent rather than based merely upon suspicion or conjecture.
    • The Court ultimately characterised the compulsory retirement order as suffering from a β€œmanifest contradiction” and being β€œthoroughly vitiated by malice in law.” It further held that the case disclosed arbitrariness, perversity and mala fides sufficient to warrant judicial interference.

    Delhi High Court and CAT Orders Set Aside

    • The Supreme Court held that the Delhi High Court had failed to properly exercise its constitutional power of judicial review by examining the relevant record from the correct perspective.
    • Consequently, the Court set aside three decisions: the Delhi High Court judgment, the CAT order, and the original compulsory retirement order dated 10 May 2018.
    • Since Das had already attained the age of superannuation, physical reinstatement was no longer possible. The Supreme Court therefore moulded the relief and directed that he should receive all service benefits available in law as though the compulsory retirement order had never been passed. This expressly includes notional promotion if any of his juniors had been promoted during the period he remained out of service.

    Supreme Court Directs DGFT to Give Officer a Farewell With Full Honour

    • In an unusual and significant direction, the Supreme Court ordered that the Director General of Foreign Trade must call S.S. Das back to the office and accord him a farewell β€œwith full honour”, in the manner he would have received upon normal superannuation but for his premature removal from service.
    • The direction reflects the Court’s concern not merely with the financial consequences of the unlawful compulsory retirement but also with restoring the dignity and professional standing of the officer.

    β‚Ή6 Lakh Costs and β‚Ή9 Lakh Compensation for Loss of Reputation

    • The Supreme Court allowed the appeal with β‚Ή6 lakh in costs payable by the Union of India to S.S. Das.
    • Going a step further, the Court awarded an additional β‚Ή9 lakh as compensation for the loss of reputation suffered by him, taking the total costs and compensation component to β‚Ή15 lakh.
    • The Court directed that the service benefits, emoluments, compensation and costs be released within three months.
    • Significantly, the Supreme Court also granted liberty to the Union Government to recover the compensation and costs, in accordance with law, from the officers largely responsible for acting β€œarbitrarily and in a high-handed manner.”

    Why the Judgment Is Significant

    The ruling does not dilute the Government’s statutory power to weed out unsuitable officers under FR 56(j). Rather, it reinforces an equally important limitation: β€œpublic interest” cannot operate as a formula that shields an arbitrary decision from judicial scrutiny.

    A compulsory-retirement decision must bear a rational relationship with the officer’s actual service record. Old or adverse material can be considered, but it cannot be selectively extracted while ignoring a long record of strong performance, recent assessments and promotion to higher responsibility.

    The judgment is therefore particularly important for civil-service jurisprudence because it demonstrates that although the threshold for judicial interference with an FR 56(j) order is high, constitutional courts canβ€”and shouldβ€”intervene where the record reveals arbitrariness, perversity, mala fides or absence of credible supporting material.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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  • Karnataka High Court Upholds Section 138 NI Act Conviction; Says Unrebutted Statutory Presumption Supports Cheque Dishonour Liability

    Karnataka High Court Upholds Section 138 NI Act Conviction; Says Unrebutted Statutory Presumption Supports Cheque Dishonour Liability

    Date: 12.09.2026

    In an important ruling concerning cheque dishonour under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the Karnataka High Court has upheld the conviction of an accused after finding that the cheque admittedly belonged to him, his signature was undisputed, and he failed to rebut the statutory presumption available to the complainant under Section 139 of the NI Act.

    The High Court, however, partly allowed the revision by setting aside the additional β‚Ή25,000 fine imposed towards defraying the expenses of the State, while leaving the conviction and the remainder of the sentence intact.

    Background of the Case

    • The dispute arose from a complaint filed by M/s MABA Corporate Services Private Limited, a finance company, against G.B. Chandre Gowda under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
    • The trial court convicted the accused and sentenced him to pay a total fine of β‚Ή90 lakh. In default of payment, he was directed to undergo six months’ simple imprisonment. Out of the fine amount, β‚Ή89.75 lakh was directed to be paid to the complainant as compensation, while β‚Ή25,000 was ordered to go to the State.
    • The accused challenged the conviction before the First Appellate Court in Criminal Appeal No. 2149 of 2018. After re-appreciating the evidence, the appellate court dismissed his appeal and confirmed the trial court’s decision. He thereafter approached the Karnataka High Court in revision.

    Accused Contended There Was No Legally Recoverable Debt

    • Before the High Court, the accused principally argued that the cheque in question did not represent any legally recoverable debt and therefore his conviction under Section 138 suffered from legal infirmity and factual error.
    • He additionally challenged the imposition of β‚Ή25,000 towards the expenses of the State and sought interference with the sentence to that extent. The complainant, on the other hand, supported the concurrent findings of the courts below.

    Signature on Cheque Was Not Disputed

    • After examining the record, the Karnataka High Court found that the cheque marked as Ex.P2 belonged to the accused, had been dishonoured, and, importantly, the accused did not dispute his signature on the cheque.
    • According to the complainant, the cheque had been issued towards repayment arising out of loan transactions. The complainant had also produced substantial documentary material to support its claim.
    • This evidence included on-demand promissory notes marked Ex.P14 to Ex.P18, ledger account Ex.P19, statements of account Ex.P20 to Ex.P26 and acknowledgment letters Ex.P27 and Ex.P28. The High Court held that this material was sufficient for the trial magistrate to raise the statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act in favour of the complainant.

    Section 139 Presumption Is Rebuttable, But Accused Must Rebut It

    • The Court acknowledged that the presumption available under Section 139 is rebuttable. The crucial question, therefore, was whether the accused had produced sufficient material to rebut it.
    • The High Court found that he had not.
    • The accused neither entered the witness box nor produced documentary evidence to rebut the statutory presumption. Further, the cross-examination of the complainant’s witness, PW-1, did not bring out sufficient material capable of rebutting the presumption operating in favour of the complainant.
    • This aspect became central to the High Court’s decision to sustain the conviction.

    High Court Refuses to Interfere With Concurrent Conviction

    • Justice V. Srishananda held that the trial magistrate was justified in convicting the accused and directing payment of compensation. The First Appellate Court had also properly re-appreciated the material and affirmed the conviction.
    • The High Court emphasised the limited scope of revisional jurisdiction and held that there was no ground warranting annulment of the concurrent orders of conviction.
    • The decision therefore reinforces that revisional jurisdiction is not intended to provide another unrestricted opportunity to reassess factual findings when the trial and appellate courts have concurrently evaluated the evidence and the conclusions do not disclose a sufficient legal ground for interference.

    β‚Ή25,000 Fine Payable to State Set Aside

    • Although the conviction was upheld, the High Court found merit in one limited aspect of the accused’s challenge.
    • The trial court had directed that β‚Ή25,000 out of the total fine should be paid towards defraying the expenses of the State. The High Court held that this part of the sentence required interference because the dispute was essentially private between the parties and no State machinery was involved.
    • Accordingly, the β‚Ή25,000 component payable to the State was set aside.

    Conviction and β‚Ή89.75 Lakh Compensation Remain Intact

    • The Karnataka High Court consequently allowed the revision petition only in part.
    • The conviction of G.B. Chandre Gowda for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was maintained. Only the β‚Ή25,000 fine earmarked for State expenses was removed, while the rest of the sentence remained unaltered.
    • The Court further directed that the amount already deposited could be withdrawn by the complainant upon due identification.

    Legal Significance

    The judgment highlights an important practical aspect of Section 138 litigation. Once foundational facts are established and the statutory presumption under Section 139 becomes operative, merely asserting that no legally enforceable debt existed may not be sufficient. The accused must bring material capable of rebutting that presumption.

    In the present case, the admitted signature on the dishonoured cheque, coupled with promissory notes, ledger records, statements of account and acknowledgment letters, supported the complainant’s case. In the absence of contrary evidence from the accused, the High Court found no justification for disturbing the concurrent conviction.

    At the same time, the ruling demonstrates that a revisional court may still interfere with a specific and severable component of the sentence even where the underlying conviction is otherwise found to be legally sustainable.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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  • CESTAT Mumbai: EPCG Duty Demand Cannot Survive Once DGFT Issues EODC Confirming Fulfilment of Export Obligation

    CESTAT Mumbai: EPCG Duty Demand Cannot Survive Once DGFT Issues EODC Confirming Fulfilment of Export Obligation

    Date: 12.09.2026

    In a significant ruling concerning imports under the Export Promotion Capital Goods (EPCG) Scheme, the CESTAT Mumbai has set aside the customs duty demand, redemption fine and penalties imposed upon Unison Hotels Limited and its Managing Director, Umesh Saraf, in relation to the import of a Honda CR-V under an EPCG authorization.

    The Tribunal held that the alleged violation of EPCG conditions could not legally survive once the competent DGFT authority had issued an Export Obligation Discharge Certificate (EODC) in favour of the importer.

    Background of the Dispute

    • Unison Hotels Limited is engaged in providing hotel-related services. For its business operations, it obtained EPCG authorizations from the Directorate General of Foreign Trade for importing four vehicles as capital goods while availing concessional customs duty benefits. One Honda CR-V was imported through Mumbai Sea Port, while three BMW cars were imported through Chennai Sea Port.
    • The Department initiated investigation on the basis of information alleging that the vehicles were being used as private vehicles for the personal use of the Managing Director and his family members rather than for commercial purposes connected with earning foreign exchange and fulfilling the prescribed export obligation.
    • In respect of the Honda CR-V imported through Mumbai, a show cause notice dated 30 August 2011 sought recovery of customs duty of β‚Ή9,41,922 along with interest, besides confiscation and penalties. The adjudicating authority confirmed the demand, ordered confiscation under Sections 111(d) and 111(o) of the Customs Act, 1962, permitted redemption on payment of a fine of β‚Ή7 lakh, and imposed penalties of β‚Ή1.50 lakh on Unison Hotels and β‚Ή1 lakh on Umesh Saraf. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the order.

    Issue Before CESTAT

    • The principal question before the Tribunal was whether the appellants had violated the conditions of the EPCG authorization and consequently failed to satisfy the requirements of Notification No. 97/2004-Customs dated 17 September 2004, under which concessional customs duty had been availed for import of the Honda CR-V.
    • The EPCG authorization required the importer, among other things, to fulfil an export obligation equivalent to eight times the duty saved within eight years and comply with the actual-user condition. In respect of the Honda CR-V, the authorization recorded an export obligation connected with the imported vehicle and required fulfillment through use of the imported capital goods.

    Appellants Relied on Earlier Chennai CESTAT Decision

    • The appellants argued that an identical dispute involving the other three BMW cars imported under the same EPCG arrangement had already been decided in their favour by a coordinate Bench of CESTAT Chennai through Final Order Nos. 40598-40599/2023 dated 21 July 2023. They contended that the facts and legal issues relating to the Honda CR-V were materially identical and therefore the same reasoning ought to apply.
    • The Mumbai Bench accepted this contention, observing that the factual matrix relating to the Honda CR-V was exactly similar to that relating to the BMW cars already adjudicated by the coordinate Bench. It consequently held that it could not take a different view in relation to the same appellants and substantially identical EPCG conditions.

    Revenue’s Allegation Found Premature

    • The Tribunal reproduced the reasoning adopted in the earlier proceedings, where it had been held that initiation of proceedings before expiry of the period available for fulfilment of the export obligation was premature. The EPCG authorization allowed eight years for fulfilment of the export obligation, whereas the show cause proceedings were initiated well before that period had expired.
    • The earlier Bench had also found that the importer had declared substantial foreign-exchange earnings, which were not disputed by the Revenue. The Tribunal emphasized that the essential inquiry was whether the imported capital goods had satisfied the actual-user requirement, and observed that the existence of foreign-exchange earnings supported the appellant’s case.
    • It further noted that allegations concerning vehicle registration, insurance or parking arrangements were matters primarily within the jurisdiction of the concerned transport or other authorities and could not, by themselves, establish a violation of EPCG conditions enforceable by Customs.

    DGFT’s EODC Became Crucial

    • A decisive factor in the Mumbai proceedings was that the DGFT had eventually issued the EODC/Redemption Letter on 11 January 2024 in respect of the relevant EPCG authorization.
    • The Tribunal recorded that the appellants had furnished the vehicle’s installation certificate, registration certificate showing the Honda CR-V as a β€œTourist Taxi Deluxe”, details of foreign-exchange earnings and repeated requests for issuance of the EODC.
    • The Bench held that once the competent DGFT authority had issued the EODC, the allegation of non-compliance with EPCG conditions under Notification No. 97/2004-Customs could no longer legally sustain. It also noted that the importer had asserted fulfillment of the export obligation even during the original proceedings and that DGFT had subsequently formally discharged the obligation.
    • The Tribunal further observed that non-production of the EODC during the earlier adjudication and appellate proceedings could not be held against the appellants because the certificate had not yet been issued by DGFT and the delay was beyond their control.

    Earlier Judicial Authorities Considered

    • The Tribunal also referred to several earlier decisions dealing with EPCG imports and actual-user requirements. Among them was Goldfinch Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, 2015 (328) E.L.T. 282 (Tri.-Mumbai), where CESTAT had held that mere parking of an EPCG vehicle at a particular place or statements of drivers could not, without more, establish breach of the actual-user condition. The Bombay High Court later dismissed Revenue’s appeal against that decision.
    • The order also refers to Vadilal Chemicals Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2005 (192) E.L.T. 33 (S.C.), and M Far Hotels Ltd. v. Union of India, 2011 (270) E.L.T. 158 (Ker.), in the context of EPCG benefits and compliance with prescribed statutory or policy conditions.
    • The Tribunal additionally referred to the Delhi High Court’s ruling in Interglobe Enterprises Ltd. v. Union of India, 2006 (203) E.L.T. 202 (Del.), as followed in subsequent EPCG litigation, noting that the Supreme Court had dismissed the Revenue’s SLP in the connected matter.

    CESTAT’s Final Ruling

    The Mumbai Bench concluded that the order sustaining the customs duty demand, redemption fine and penalties was not legally sustainable. It therefore set aside the impugned order and allowed both appeals in favour of Unison Hotels Limited and Umesh Saraf.

    Key Takeaway

    The ruling reinforces an important principle in EPCG disputes: where the DGFT, being the competent licensing authority, has accepted fulfillment of the export obligation and issued an EODC, Customs cannot ordinarily continue to sustain a demand founded on an allegation of non-fulfilment of the very same EPCG obligation without a legally sustainable basis to disregard that discharge.

    The decision is also significant because CESTAT rejected a purely factual inference of personal use based on matters such as vehicle location, registration-related allegations and statements, particularly when the importer demonstrated foreign-exchange earnings and subsequently secured formal discharge of its EPCG obligation from DGFT.

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  • CESTAT Ahmedabad- Customs Cannot Reclassify Naphtha as NGL Without Conclusive Scientific Evidence

    CESTAT Ahmedabad- Customs Cannot Reclassify Naphtha as NGL Without Conclusive Scientific Evidence

    Date: 11.09.2026

    The Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), Ahmedabad has allowed the appeals filed by Hazel Mercantile Limited and connected appellants in a major customs classification dispute concerning whether imported petroleum cargo declared as Naphtha could be reclassified by Customs as Natural Gasoline Liquid (NGL).

    A Division Bench comprising Judicial Member Somesh Arora and Technical Member A.K. Jyotishi held that the Customs Department had failed to authoritatively establish the classification sought by it and that the classification declared by the importer could not be disturbed.

    The Naphtha vs NGL Dispute

    • Hazel Mercantile is engaged in the import, export and trading of petrochemicals, including Naphtha. The dispute arose from a consignment of approximately 20,110.767 MT which the company stated had been imported as Naphtha and was ultimately intended for export.
    • Hazel filed seven Bills of Entry declaring the product as Naphtha under CTH 2710 1229. Customs, however, alleged that the imported product was actually Natural Gasoline Liquid (NGL) and proposed classification under CTH 2710 1290. The goods were consequently seized by DRI.
    • The subsequent show cause notice proposed rejection of the declared description and classification, enhancement of the assessable value, confiscation under Sections 111(d), 111(m), 111(p) and 111(o) of the Customs Act, and penalties under Sections 112(a), 112(b), 114AA and 117.

    Conflicting Laboratory Reports Become Central Issue

    • The dispute largely turned on competing technical reports.
    • CRCL Kandla and CRCL Delhi treated the product as NGL. On the other hand, the importer relied upon reports from TUV India, Geo Chem Laboratories and CSIR-Indian Institute of Petroleum (IIP), Dehradun, apart from the load-port certification, to maintain that the product was Naphtha.
    • Pursuant to directions of the Gujarat High Court, fresh samples had been drawn. Geo Chem concluded that the sample conformed to Naphtha specifications, while IIP Dehradun concluded that the sample fell within the light Naphtha range.
    • CESTAT ultimately placed considerable weight on the expertise and depth of testing undertaken by these specialised laboratories.

    Specialised Laboratory Reports Preferred Over CRCL

    • The Tribunal observed that IIP Dehradun, which specialises in petroleum and petroleum-product testing, had conducted multiple tests before concluding that the sample fell within the range of light Naphtha.
    • It similarly noted that Geo Chem had subjected the sample supplied by the Department itself to detailed examination and concluded that the product was Naphtha.
    • CESTAT rejected Revenue’s contention that the private reports were unreliable merely because the importer had referred to the sample as Naphtha while forwarding it for testing. The Bench reasoned that a laboratory of such stature would not simply accept the description supplied by the party without conducting its own technical analysis.
    • The Tribunal therefore preferred the reports of the specialised testing agencies, finding that they had greater wherewithal to test petroleum products than the departmental laboratories.

    Burden to Prove Reclassification Lies on Customs

    • CESTAT reiterated the settled principle that where the Department seeks to change the tariff classification declared by an importer, the burden of proving the proposed alternative classification rests upon Revenue.
    • The Tribunal referred to Hewlett Packard India Sales Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, observing that even where classification emerges from self-assessment, the Department must discharge the burden if it seeks to alter that classification.
    • It also relied upon Tata Chemicals Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, Union of India v. Garware Nylons Ltd. and Commissioner of Customs, Mundra v. Sunrise Traders on the relevance of scientific evidence, BIS standards and the insufficiency of inconclusive expert reports for disturbing an assessee’s classification.

    Reliance Industries Naphtha–NGL Ruling Considered

    • Hazel placed substantial reliance upon the earlier CESTAT Ahmedabad decision in Reliance Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, Ahmedabad, 2024 (10) TMI 1555 – CESTAT Ahmedabad.
    • In that case, the Tribunal had observed that Naphtha is the genus and NGL is a species, and that NGL could fall within the broader description of Naphtha in the context considered there.
    • The Revenue’s appeal against the Reliance Industries decision was subsequently dismissed by the Supreme Court on 9 April 2025 in Civil Appeal Nos. 5133–5137 of 2025, the Court finding no good reason to interfere with CESTAT’s order.
    • CESTAT considered this jurisprudence while analysing Hazel’s classification dispute.

    β€œMost Akin” Test Does Not Help Revenue

    • The Department relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Gastrade International Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, Kandla and argued that the imported goods were most akin to NGL.
    • CESTAT, however, found the argument to be self-defeating in the facts of Hazel’s case.
    • The Bench observed that the reports of IIP Dehradun and Geo Chem were based on a significantly wider range of parameters and were issued by more specialised agencies. Those reports supported the appellant’s case even when the β€œmost akin” test was applied.
    • The Tribunal consequently held that whether the dispute was examined on the basis of akinness, inconclusive test reports or the common-parlance understanding that NGL is a species within the broader category of Naphtha, Revenue had failed to establish its proposed classification.

    Importer’s Classification Cannot Be Disturbed

    The Tribunal therefore reached the categorical conclusion that:

    β€œthe classification of the appellant cannot be allowed to be disturbed.”

    • It further held that the conclusions reached by the adjudicating authority were incorrect and could not be adopted.
    • This finding went to the root of the proceedings because the Department’s confiscation and penalty case substantially flowed from its allegation that Hazel had misdeclared NGL as Naphtha.

    CESTAT Allows Appeals on Merits

    • Having decided the fundamental classification controversy in favour of Hazel Mercantile, CESTAT observed that it was inclined to allow the appeals without going into the Department’s other pleas, since the appellants succeeded on the factual and legal merits of the classification issue.
    • The Tribunal accordingly allowed the appeals through Final Order Nos. 10728–10735/2026, pronounced on 7 September 2026.

    Important Observation on WhatsApp and Electronic Evidence

    • The proceedings also involved reliance by Revenue upon WhatsApp chats and other material extracted from mobile devices.
    • While deciding the matter principally on classification, CESTAT referred to Section 138C of the Customs Act, concerning admissibility of computer-generated evidence, and made an unusual concluding observation suggesting that the Department should consider a dedicated statutory provision governing mobile-phone evidence and the procedure for its extraction, rather than relying solely on Section 138C.
    • This observation could assume wider significance in customs investigations increasingly dependent upon mobile-phone data, messaging applications and digital forensic evidence.

    Key Legal Takeaway

    The decision reinforces a fundamental customs-classification principle: the Department cannot disturb an importer’s declared tariff classification merely by asserting an alternative description; the proposed reclassification must be affirmatively established through reliable technical evidence.

    Where competing laboratory reports exist, the expertise of the testing body, comprehensiveness of the parameters tested and reliability of the methodology become critical considerations.

    The ruling is particularly significant for the petroleum and petrochemical sector because it also engages with the continuing tariff distinction between Naphtha and Natural Gasoline Liquid, the β€œmost akin” test and the earlier Reliance Industries ruling recognising NGL as a species within the broader genus of Naphtha.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Supreme Court- Section 67 NDPS Statements Cannot Be Used as Confessions; Officers Under Section 53 Are β€œPolice Officers” for Evidence Act

    Supreme Court- Section 67 NDPS Statements Cannot Be Used as Confessions; Officers Under Section 53 Are β€œPolice Officers” for Evidence Act

    Date: 11.09.2026

    In a landmark judgment having major implications for prosecutions under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), the Supreme Court held that officers invested with powers under Section 53 of the NDPS Act are β€œpolice officers” for the purposes of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Consequently, confessional statements made before such officers are inadmissible for securing the conviction of an accused.

    The ruling came in Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, arising from Criminal Appeal No. 152 of 2013 along with several connected appeals and Special Leave Petitions. The majority judgment was delivered by Justice R.F. Nariman, with Justice Navin Sinha concurring, while Justice Indira Banerjee dissented on the principal questions.

    The Core Issue Before the Supreme Court

    • The controversy arose from the use of statements recorded by officers under Section 67 of the NDPS Act. Tofan Singh challenged his conviction primarily on the ground that it was based upon a purported confessional statement recorded under Section 67.
    • The appellant argued that the officer recording such a statement should be regarded as a β€œpolice officer” and, therefore, the confession was hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act. It was also contended that Section 67 merely authorises officers to call for information and does not empower them to record confessions capable of being treated as substantive evidence.
    • The larger Bench was essentially required to determine two questions: whether officers empowered under Section 53 of the NDPS Act are police officers for Section 25 of the Evidence Act, and whether a statement recorded under Section 67 can be treated as a confessional statement against an accused.

    Section 53 NDPS Officers Are β€œPolice Officers”

    • The majority answered the first question in favour of the accused.
    • The Supreme Court held that officers invested with powers under Section 53 of the NDPS Act are β€œpolice officers” within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, any confessional statement made to such an officer is barred by Section 25 and cannot be taken into account to convict an accused under the NDPS Act.
    • The ruling is particularly significant because Section 53 enables officers belonging to departments such as Customs, Revenue Intelligence, Narcotics and other specified government departments to be invested with powers of an officer-in-charge of a police station for investigation of NDPS offences.
    • The majority rejected an interpretation under which constitutional and evidentiary safeguards available to an accused could depend merely upon the departmental designation of the investigating officer. The Court observed that permitting a confession before such an officer to become the basis of conviction, without safeguards and without excluding Section 25 of the Evidence Act, would infringe the constitutional protections under Articles 14, 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution.

    Section 67 Statement Cannot Be Used as a Confession

    The second and equally important finding concerned Section 67 of the NDPS Act.

    The Supreme Court categorically held:

    β€œA statement recorded under section 67 of the NDPS Act cannot be used as a confessional statement in the trial of an offence under the NDPS Act.”

    • The decision therefore substantially altered the evidentiary position in NDPS prosecutions where investigative agencies had relied upon Section 67 statements as confessions against accused persons.
    • The judgment reinforces the constitutional protection against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) and the evidentiary prohibition contained in Section 25 of the Evidence Act.

    Raj Kumar Karwal and Kanhaiyalal Overruled

    • The Supreme Court expressly reconsidered its earlier judgments in Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India, (1990) 2 SCC 409 and Kanhaiyalal v. Union of India, (2008) 4 SCC 668.
    • Those decisions had supported the proposition that officers exercising powers under Section 53 were not police officers within Section 25 of the Evidence Act and had permitted reliance upon Section 67 statements in circumstances considered therein.
    • The majority in Tofan Singh held that both judgments β€œdo not state the law correctly” and expressly overruled them. It further clarified that other judgments expressly relying upon those decisions or the principles laid down in them would also stand overruled to that extent.
    • By contrast, the Supreme Court approved Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417 and Nirmal Singh Pehlwan v. Inspector, Customs, (2011) 12 SCC 298, declaring them to be correct in law.

    Important Distinction From Statements Under the Customs Act

    • The judgment also discusses the distinction between Section 67 of the NDPS Act and the powers available to Customs officers under Sections 107 and 108 of the Customs Act, 1962.
    • The reference order itself noted that Section 108 of the Customs Act expressly empowers Customs officers to summon persons to give evidence and produce documents, whereas Section 67 of the NDPS Act uses materially different language.
    • Accordingly, the Tofan Singh ruling should be understood in its specific statutory context under the NDPS Act and should not automatically be read as declaring every statement recorded by Customs officers under Section 108 of the Customs Act inadmissible.

    Justice Indira Banerjee’s Dissent

    • Justice Indira Banerjee disagreed with the majority. In her dissent, she concluded that officers invested with powers under Section 53 of the NDPS Act should not be regarded as police officers for Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act.
    • She was also unable to agree with the proposition that a statement recorded under Section 67 could not be used against an accused. In her view, statements made during an inquiry or investigation before authorised NDPS officers could be tendered and proved in accordance with law.
    • The binding position, however, is the 2:1 majority ruling.

    Did the Supreme Court Acquit Tofan Singh in This Judgment?

    • An important procedural distinction must be noted. The larger Bench was deciding the referred questions of law. It did not finally dispose of Tofan Singh’s individual appeal on merits through this judgment.
    • After answering the reference, the Supreme Court directed that the appeals and Special Leave Petitions be sent back to the appropriate Division Benches for disposal on merits in light of the majority judgment.
    • Therefore, it is more accurate to say that the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the accused on the referred legal issues, rather than stating that this larger-Bench judgment itself acquitted Tofan Singh.

    Key Legal Takeaway

    Tofan Singh fundamentally changed the evidentiary landscape of NDPS prosecutions. The binding principles are clear: an officer invested with powers under Section 53 of the NDPS Act is a police officer for Section 25 of the Evidence Act, a confession made to such an officer cannot be used to convict an accused, and a statement recorded under Section 67 cannot be treated as a confessional statement at an NDPS trial.

    The judgment consequently remains a major authority on Section 67 statements, self-incrimination, admissibility of confessions and the investigative powers of NCB, DRI, Customs and other officers empowered under the NDPS Act.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Allahabad HC: RERA Application Pending Beyond 30 Days Results in Deemed Registration; UPRERA Cannot Insist on Landowner as Co-Promoter

    Allahabad HC: RERA Application Pending Beyond 30 Days Results in Deemed Registration; UPRERA Cannot Insist on Landowner as Co-Promoter

    Date: 11.09.2026

    In a significant ruling concerning the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA), the Allahabad High Court has held that where the Real Estate Regulatory Authority neither grants nor rejects a complete project-registration application within the statutory period of 30 days, the project becomes deemed to be registered under Section 5(2) of the RERA Act.

    A Division Bench comprising Justice Mahesh Chandra Tripathi and Justice Prashant Kumar delivered the judgment in a writ petition filed by Larsen & Toubro Limited (L&T) against the State of Uttar Pradesh and U.P. RERA.

    Dispute Over Registration of L&T’s β€œGreen Reserve” Project

    • The dispute concerned L&T’s proposed β€œGreen Reserve” residential project comprising four towers in Jaypee Greens Wish Town, Noida. L&T had acquired development rights pursuant to an Assignment Agreement dated 31 July 2017 executed with Jaypee Infratech Limited (JIL)/Jaiprakash Associates Limited (JAL). The judgment records that β‚Ή487.5 crore was paid in connection with the Assignment Agreement.
    • L&T applied to UPRERA for registration of Towers 1 and 2 and subsequently Towers 3 and 4. UPRERA, however, repeatedly required L&T to include JIL as a β€œpromoter”, principally because the project land and sanctioned map were not in L&T’s ownership.
    • L&T maintained that the development, construction, marketing and sale rights had been assigned to it and that JIL was not required to be made a co-promoter.

    Landowner Need Not Necessarily Be a β€œPromoter”

    • One of the most important questions before the High Court was whether the landowner must necessarily be joined as a co-promoter for registration under RERA.
    • The Court examined the definition of β€œpromoter” under Section 2(zk) and held that a person who does not own the land but constructs/develops the project for sale can independently fall within the statutory definition of promoter.
    • The Court observed that the person who constructs and sells can be the promoter even when construction is undertaken on land belonging to another person, provided there is a valid arrangement between the owner and developer. It consequently held that JIL did not fall within the category of promoter for this particular project.
    • Accordingly, UPRERA’s insistence that JIL/JAL must sign the registration application as co-promoter was held to be unsupported by the Act.

    UPRERA Cannot Demand Documents Beyond Section 4(2)

    • The High Court also found that L&T’s application was complete and accompanied by the documents contemplated under Section 4(2) of the RERA Act.
    • The Court held that once an application is in the prescribed format and contains the documents statutorily required, UPRERA cannot engage in a β€œhair-splitting exercise” by repeatedly demanding additional documents not contemplated under Section 4(2).
    • The Court therefore found no justification for UPRERA to keep L&T’s application pending beyond the statutory period.

    Section 5(2): 30-Day Period Has a Statutory Consequence

    • The central issue in the judgment concerned the interpretation of Section 5 of the RERA Act.
    • Under Section 5(1), the Authority is required, within 30 days of receiving an application, either to grant registration or reject the application for reasons recorded in writing. Section 5(2) expressly provides that if the Authority fails to do either, the project β€œshall be deemed to have been registered.”
    • The Court emphasised that where legislation prescribes not only a time period for performance of a statutory duty but also expressly specifies the consequence of failure to act within that period, the statutory consequence must be given effect.
    • In L&T’s case, the applications remained pending despite the company having answered the objections and furnished the relevant documentation.

    Project Deemed Registered After Expiry of 30 Days

    • The High Court consequently held that UPRERA had only two options: either grant registration within 30 days or reject the application within that period.
    • Keeping the application pending was not a third option available to the Authority.
    • The Division Bench categorically concluded that once the statutory 30-day period expired without rejection, L&T’s application became deemed registered under Section 5(2). UPRERA was thereafter required to provide the registration number, Login ID and password to the developer.

    UPRERA Cannot Subsequently Reject a Deemed Registration

    • The Court went a step further and held that once deemed registration had taken effect, UPRERA no longer had jurisdiction to subsequently reject the original registration application.
    • According to the Court, once a project stands registered by operation of the deeming provision, any subsequent action against such registration would have to be taken in accordance with the mechanism contemplated under Section 7 of the RERA Act, rather than by belatedly rejecting the original application.
    • This is an important interpretation because it gives substantive effect to the statutory deeming fiction under Section 5(2).

    High Court Sets Aside UPRERA’s Rejection

    • The High Court ultimately ruled substantially in favour of Larsen & Toubro.
    • It held that the objection requiring JIL to be included as co-promoter was β€œbaseless and incorrect”, that L&T’s project-registration application acquired deemed-registration status after expiry of the mandatory period, and that UPRERA could not thereafter reject the application in the manner adopted by it.
    • The Court accordingly set aside UPRERA’s decision rejecting L&T’s applications.

    Key Takeaway

    The judgment establishes two significant principles under RERA. First, ownership of the project land is not by itself determinative of who must be treated as a promoter; a developer with valid development rights who constructs and sells the project may independently qualify as promoter under Section 2(zk).

    Second, and more importantly, Section 5(2) creates a genuine statutory deeming fiction. RERA authorities cannot indefinitely keep a complete registration application pending. If the Authority neither grants nor rejects it within the prescribed 30 days, the consequence stipulated by Parliament followsβ€”the project is deemed registered.

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  • Delhi High Court: Arbitral Award Can Be Partly Set Aside Where Invalid Claims Are Severable

    Delhi High Court: Arbitral Award Can Be Partly Set Aside Where Invalid Claims Are Severable

    Date: 11.09.2026

    The Delhi High Court has partly set aside an arbitral award in favour of NCC Limited, holding that the award suffered from β€œpatent illegality” insofar as it related to two claims concerning contractual payment and prolongation costs. The Court, however, refused to interfere with the remainder of the award and upheld the arbitrator’s grant of interest.

    The judgment was delivered by Justice Mini Pushkarna on 9 September 2026 in a petition filed by the Union of India under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The dispute arose from a contract dated 9 March 2010 between the Union of India, through the Director General, Married Accommodation Project (DG MAP), and NCC Limited.

    Dispute Over Defence Housing Construction Project

    • NCC Limited had been awarded a contract for construction of dwelling units for officers of the Army, Navy and Air Force at Binnaguri and Cooch Behar in West Bengal, for a contract value of approximately β‚Ή190.58 crore. The project, originally scheduled for completion within two years, was ultimately delayed substantially and completed on 18 July 2016.
    • Disputes subsequently arose regarding payment of the final bill, leading NCC Limited to invoke arbitration. The sole arbitrator published an award on 18 March 2019, allowing wholly or partly 10 out of NCC’s 15 claims and awarding β‚Ή12,14,18,020 along with interest. The award also directed release of NCC’s performance bank guarantee of β‚Ή9.53 crore and rejected all four counterclaims raised by the Union of India.
    • The Union of India challenged the award under Section 34, raising several grounds including denial of adequate opportunity, violation of natural justice, questions concerning the arbitrator’s independence and mandate, excessive interest, and patent illegality in awarding damages.

    Section 34 Court Cannot Re-Appreciate Evidence

    • The High Court reiterated the limited nature of judicial interference with arbitral awards. It observed that a court exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 does not sit in appeal over an arbitral tribunal and ordinarily cannot re-appreciate evidence merely to reach a different factual conclusion.
    • At the same time, the Court recognised that interference is permissible where an award suffers from patent illegality, including where an arbitrator ignores a clear contractual prohibition, reaches a conclusion based on no evidence, or adopts an interpretation of the contract that is not a plausible one.

    No Denial of Natural Justice

    • One of the principal challenges raised by the Union of India was that it had not been afforded sufficient opportunity to present its case and that requests for adjournment and change of venue had been rejected.
    • The High Court rejected this challenge. It held that the requirement of a β€œfull opportunity” under the Arbitration Act must be assessed on the standard of reasonableness, and every refusal of an adjournment does not automatically constitute denial of a fair hearing.
    • The Court found that sufficient notice and multiple opportunities had been afforded during the arbitral proceedings. Consequently, it found no infirmity in the award on grounds relating to natural justice, the independence or impartiality of the arbitrator, or the continuation of the arbitrator’s mandate.

    Award Set Aside on Claim Nos. 7 and 9

    • The crucial relief granted to the Union of India concerned Claim Nos. 7 and 9.
    • Claim No. 7 concerned the difference in payment under Special Condition 19 of the contract vis-Γ -vis Condition 13 of the General Conditions of Contract. The arbitrator had awarded β‚Ή1,31,71,996 to NCC Limited.
    • Claim No. 9 concerned additional expenditure allegedly incurred because of prolongation of the contract, including overheads, site establishment and deployment of manpower beyond the stipulated completion period. NCC had claimed more than β‚Ή16.15 crore under this head, against which the arbitrator awarded approximately β‚Ή6.94 crore.
    • After examining the contractual provisions and the manner in which these claims had been adjudicated, the High Court concluded that the award suffered from patent illegality in respect of Claim Nos. 7 and 9.
    • Importantly, the Court held that these portions of the award were capable of being separated from the remainder. It therefore adopted the principle of severability and restricted the setting aside of the award only to those two claims, rather than disturbing the entire arbitral award.

    12% Interest Upheld as Reasonable

    • The Union of India also challenged the award of 12% simple interest, but the High Court declined to interfere.
    • The Court held that Section 31(7) of the Arbitration Act gives an arbitral tribunal wide discretion in awarding interest. It found that the award of pendente lite and future interest at 12% per annum could not be regarded as arbitrary or punitive.
    • The Court further rejected the argument that pre-reference interest could not be granted without a notice under the Interest Act, 1978. It recognised the arbitrator’s statutory power under Section 31(7) to award interest, including on damages, subject to the contractual framework.

    Section 34 Petition Partly Allowed

    • The Delhi High Court ultimately held that only the amounts awarded under Claim Nos. 7 and 9 were liable to be set aside for patent illegality, while the remaining portions of the arbitral award were left undisturbed.
    • The Court also vacated the interim stay on execution of the award granted on 26 November 2021 and all consequential orders. The connected enforcement proceedings were directed to be placed before the Roster Bench on 28 September 2026 for determination of the final amount payable under the surviving portions of the award, including interest.

    Key Takeaway

    The judgment reinforces two important principles governing challenges to arbitral awards. Section 34 does not permit a court to reassess an arbitral dispute as an appellate court, but judicial restraint does not protect an award where a particular claim suffers from patent illegality. At the same time, where the defective portion of an award is independently severable, the court may set aside only that part instead of nullifying the entire award.

    The decision also reiterates the broad discretion available to arbitrators under Section 31(7) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act in awarding reasonable pre-award, pendente lite and future interest.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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  • Bombay High Court: Temporary Access Over Government Land Cannot Be Converted Into Exclusive Private Right by Erecting Gates

    Bombay High Court: Temporary Access Over Government Land Cannot Be Converted Into Exclusive Private Right by Erecting Gates

    Date: 11.09.2026

    The Bombay High Court has held that a housing society permitted to use Government land as an access route cannot convert such permission into an exclusive private right by erecting gates and restricting access to others. The Court upheld the State’s action directing removal of gates erected by The Deccan Co-operative Housing Society Limited, while protecting the Society’s continued right to use the access along with others.

    Justice Arun R. Pedneker partly allowed the Society’s writ petition challenging the order dated 17 March 2026 passed by the Resident Deputy Collector, Mumbai Suburban District.

    Dispute Over Gate and Access Road

    • The dispute concerned a strip of land being used as an access route by the petitioner-Society. The Society challenged the Collector’s direction to remove gates installed on Government land and the subsequent attempts by officials to remove the gate.
    • According to the Society, the gate and pathway had remained in its exclusive and uninterrupted possession and use for more than 45 years. It contended that the authorities could not remove the gate without notice, hearing or following due process of law.
    • The dispute also arose against the backdrop of Civil Suit No. 287 of 2025, instituted by the Society concerning its claimed rights over a garden/open space. The Bombay High Court had earlier granted interim protection against coercive action in relation to that suit property.

    Access Was Originally Granted Only as a Temporary Arrangement

    • Examining historical documents, the High Court found that the Society’s plot had earlier been landlocked because a proposed 44-feet-wide Development Plan road had not yet been constructed.
    • The Municipal Corporation had therefore permitted a 30-feet-wide temporary access through Government land. Importantly, the permission was subject to a specific condition that the Society would discontinue the temporary access once the Development Plan road was constructed. The Society was also required to construct and maintain the temporary access at its own cost.
    • The Court noted that the 44-feet D.P. road had subsequently been completed and was being used by the Society.

    Access Strip Belongs to Government, Not Housing Society

    • After considering the maps and communications placed on record, the High Court concluded that the disputed strip was Government-owned land and did not form part of the land allotted to the Society in 1959.
    • The Court found that the land had been maintained as an open access connecting the D.P. road on one side with the public road on the other. By installing a gate, the Society had attempted to use the access exclusively and exclude other persons.
    • The Court consequently rejected the Society’s claim to exclusive use of the access.

    Constructing Road Does Not Create Exclusive Right Over Government Land

    • The High Court made an important distinction between a right to use an access and a right to possess the land exclusively.
    • The Society could not claim exclusive control merely because it had constructed a bitumen road over the strip. The Court held that Government land kept as an open access could not be appropriated for the Society’s exclusive use.
    • Justice Pedneker observed that the Society had no right to erect a gate over the access road because the land belonged to the Government and the original permission merely enabled the Society to use it as an access.

    Removal of Gate Does Not Amount to Dispossession

    • The Society relied upon the requirement of notice and due process under Section 53 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, arguing that even an unauthorised occupant of Government land could not be summarily dispossessed.
    • The High Court distinguished the precedent relied upon by the Society. It observed that the present case did not involve taking possession of land that had been granted to the Society. Rather, the Society had only been permitted to use Government land for access.
    • By removing the gate, the Collector had not terminated the Society’s access or dispossessed it from a granted property. The Society remained entitled to use the road; removal of the gate merely prevented it from excluding others.
    • The Court therefore held that the direction to remove the gate and keep the access open to everyone did not warrant interference.

    Collector’s Finding of β€œUnauthorised Use” Corrected

    • The High Court, however, did not accept every observation made by the Collector.
    • It specifically found incorrect the Collector’s observation that the Society was unauthorisedly using the road over Government land. The Court clarified that the road had, in fact, been used with the permission of the Municipal Corporation.
    • Thus, while the Society had no right to install gates and claim exclusive access, its underlying use of the access itself was not unauthorised.

    Public Access Must Remain Open

    • The Court emphasised the importance of protecting public spaces and access routes, particularly in densely populated areas.
    • It held that the Government land should remain accessible both to the petitioner-Society and to other persons. Since the Society had never been granted exclusive possession, installation of gates could not be used to transform a limited access right into exclusive control over Government property.
    • At the same time, the High Court imposed an important safeguard: the State cannot grant exclusive use of the access road to any other party either.
    • The access must remain open to the Society as well as others. Further, if the State proposes any action interfering with the Society’s existing access, appropriate notice would have to be issued.

    Writ Petition Partly Allowed

    • The Bombay High Court ultimately declined to interfere with the State’s direction for removal of the gates. However, it protected the Society’s continued non-exclusive access and clarified that the Government could not confer exclusive use of the road upon another party.
    • Accordingly, Writ Petition No. 7981 of 2026 was partly allowed.

    Key Legal Takeaway

    The judgment draws a clear distinction between permission to use Government land as an access and possession or ownership of that land. Long-standing use, expenditure on constructing or maintaining a road, or physical installation of gates does not by itself convert a permissive access into an exclusive proprietary right.

    At the same time, the ruling protects the legitimate access originally granted to the Society: the Government may keep the road open to the public, but it cannot arbitrarily stop the Society’s access or confer exclusive use upon another private party.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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