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  • Drone Found With 500-Gram Heroin Packet: Punjab & Haryana HC Grants Bail to Accused After Year-Long Custody

    Drone Found With 500-Gram Heroin Packet: Punjab & Haryana HC Grants Bail to Accused After Year-Long Custody

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 19.09.2026

    Drone Found With 500-Gram Heroin Packet: Punjab & Haryana HC Grants Bail to Accused After Year-Long Custody

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    The Punjab and Haryana High Court has granted regular bail to an accused in an NDPS case involving the alleged recovery of 500 grams of heroin found alongside a drone, observing that the accused’s connection with the contraband and the admissibility of the disclosure statement relied upon by the prosecution are matters to be determined during trial.

    Justice Vikram Aggarwal, in Lovepreet Singh @ Labha v. State of Punjab, CRM-M-7640-2026 (O&M), passed the order on 17 September 2026.

    Drone and 500 Grams of Heroin Found in Riverbed

    • The case arose from FIR No. 22 dated 30 April 2025, registered at Police Station Narot Jaimal Singh, District Pathankot, under Section 21 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, along with Sections 10, 11 and 12 of the Aircraft Act, 1934.
    • According to the prosecution case recorded by the High Court, a drone was recovered from a riverbed on 30 April 2025. A packet was found alongside the drone, from which 500 grams of heroin was allegedly recovered.
    • Significantly, the order does not state that the heroin was physically recovered from Lovepreet Singh.

    Accused Linked to Recovery Through Later Disclosure Statement

    • The petitioner was subsequently apprehended in another caseβ€”FIR No. 92 dated 1 August 2025, registered at Police Station Taragarh under Sections 21 and 29 of the NDPS Act.
    • Another case, FIR No. 93 dated 2 August 2025, was also registered at the same police station under Sections 21 and 29 of the NDPS Act and Section 111 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.
    • The prosecution alleged that while involved in FIR No. 92, Lovepreet Singh made a disclosure statement on 31 August 2025, stating that the heroin recovered on 30 April 2025 belonged to him.
    • On that basis, he was arrested in the present case on 16 September 2025 and remained in custody thereafter.

    Defence: No Evidence Apart From Disclosure Statement

    • Counsel for Lovepreet Singh argued that the petitioner had been falsely implicated and could not otherwise be connected with the contraband recovered alongside the drone.
    • The defence specifically contended that, apart from the alleged disclosure statement, there was no other evidence linking the petitioner with the recovered heroin.
    • It was further submitted that the investigation had already been completed and the final report submitted, but charges had still not been framed. Of the 18 prosecution witnesses, none had been examined.
    • The defence therefore argued that the trial was likely to take considerable time and that continued incarceration would serve no useful purpose.

    Punjab Opposes Bail Citing Commercial Quantity

    • The State of Punjab opposed the regular bail application.
    • The State argued that the case involved a commercial quantity of heroin and relied upon the petitioner’s alleged statement that the recovered narcotic substance belonged to him.
    • The High Court, however, did not finally determine whether the disclosure statement was admissible or whether it sufficiently connected the petitioner with the contraband.

    Whether Disclosure Statement Is Admissible Must Be Decided at Trial: High Court

    • The High Court observed that the question of whether Lovepreet Singh could actually be linked with the recovered contraband could only be determined upon conclusion of the trial.
    • The Court noted that the recovery had taken place on 30 April 2025, whereas the petitioner, while already in custody in another case, was alleged to have subsequently made the disclosure statement regarding the heroin.

    Crucially, the Court observed:

    • β€œThe admissibility of the same shall also be determined at the stage of trial.”
    • Thus, for purposes of the bail proceedings, the High Court did not treat the alleged disclosure statement as finally establishing the petitioner’s connection with the narcotic substance.

    One Year in Custody; Not a Single Witness Examined

    • The duration of custody and lack of progress in the trial also weighed with the High Court.
    • Lovepreet Singh had remained in custody since 16 September 2025, meaning that approximately one year had elapsed by the time his bail petition was decided.
    • The investigation was complete and the final report had already been submitted. Despite this, charges had not been framed and none of the 18 prosecution witnesses had been examined.
    • The Court consequently found it clear that the trial would take a β€œsufficiently long time” to conclude.
    • In those circumstances, Justice Aggarwal held that no useful purpose would be served by keeping the petitioner in custody any longer.

    High Court Orders Release on Regular Bail

    • The Punjab and Haryana High Court accordingly allowed the petition without expressing any opinion on the merits of the criminal case.
    • Lovepreet Singh was ordered to be released on regular bail upon furnishing the required bail and surety bonds to the satisfaction of the concerned Trial Court, Chief Judicial Magistrate or Duty Magistrate.
    • The order is therefore a bail decision and not an acquittal. The questions of the petitioner’s connection with the heroin, the evidentiary value and admissibility of the disclosure statement, and the prosecution allegations remain open for determination during trial.

    Why the Order Is Significant

    • The order highlights two considerations that can become important in NDPS bail proceedings: the nature of the material connecting an accused with the recovered contraband and the progress of the criminal trial during prolonged custody.
    • Here, the alleged heroin was found alongside a drone months before the petitioner was arrested in the case, while the link asserted against him was based on a subsequent disclosure statement allegedly made while he was already in custody in another matter. The High Court expressly left the admissibility of that statement to be determined at trial.
    • At the same time, the Court took into account that the petitioner had spent a year in custody, investigation was over, the final report had been filed, charges remained unframed and 0 out of 18 witnesses had been examined.
    • The order should, however, be read on its own facts and does not contain a general ruling that every disclosure-statement-based NDPS case automatically entitles an accused to bail.

    Key Takeaway

    The Punjab and Haryana High Court granted regular bail to Lovepreet Singh in the 500-gram heroin case after noting that the narcotic substance had been recovered alongside a drone months before his arrest, while his alleged connection to it arose through a later disclosure statement whose admissibility remained a matter for trial.

    With the petitioner having spent around a year in custody, investigation completed, charges yet to be framed and none of the 18 witnesses examined, the Court concluded that continued incarceration would serve no useful purpose.

    The Court expressly refrained from commenting on the merits of the prosecution case.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Punjab & Haryana High Court

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Bombay High Court: Section 79 RERA Bars Civil Suit Where Reliefs Can Be Granted by RERA Authority

    Bombay High Court: Section 79 RERA Bars Civil Suit Where Reliefs Can Be Granted by RERA Authority

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 19.09.2026

    Bombay High Court: Section 79 RERA Bars Civil Suit Where Reliefs Can Be Granted by RERA Authority

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id amitnaren@outlook.com .  

    The Bombay High Court has held that where the relief sought by flat purchasers essentially concerns enforcement of a promoter’s statutory obligations in a RERA-registered project, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred by Section 79 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA) if the relief can be granted under the statutory mechanism created by RERA.

    In Mr. Yadavalli Venkata Gopalam & Anr. v. M/s Sai Siddhant Developers & Anr., the High Court dismissed an appeal challenging a City Civil Court order that had returned the purchasers’ plaint under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for presentation before the appropriate RERA forum.

    Justice Sandeep V. Marne pronounced the judgment on 4 November 2023, after reserving it on 23 October 2023. The decision is reported with neutral citation 2023:BHC-AS:33740.

    Flat Purchasers Approached Civil Court Against Developer and Society

    • The appellants had instituted S.C. Suit No. 964 of 2023 before the City Civil Court, Mumbai.
    • Their dispute concerned Flat No. 1105 on the 11th Floor, having a carpet area of 643 sq. ft. and built-up area of 772 sq. ft., in the building known as D.N. Nagar Shivneri CHS Ltd., Andheri West, Mumbai.
    • They sought a mandatory direction requiring the developer, M/s Sai Siddhant Developers, to adhere to the terms and conditions of the agreement concerning the flat and fulfil its statutory obligations under the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act, 1963 (MOFA).
    • They also sought an injunction restraining the defendants from selling, transferring, alienating or creating third-party rights in the flat.

    Society Invokes Section 79 of RERA

    • D.N. Nagar Shivneri Co-operative Housing Society filed a Notice of Motion seeking return of the plaint under Order VII Rule 10 CPC.
    • The Society argued that the Civil Court could not entertain the suit because its jurisdiction was barred by Section 79 of RERA.
    • The City Civil Court accepted the objection and, by an order dated 11 July 2023, returned the plaint for presentation before RERA. The purchasers challenged that decision before the Bombay High Court.

    Purchasers Argue Suit Was for Specific Performance

    • The purchasers argued before the High Court that their suit was actually one for specific performance of the Agreement for Sale dated 10 June 2015.
    • They contended that they had already paid a substantial portion of the agreed consideration but that the developer had failed to perform its contractual obligations.
    • They further alleged collusion between the developer and the Society and argued that RERA could not determine questions involving fraud and collusion.
    • The purchasers relied upon the Constitution Bench judgment in Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., AIR 1969 SC 78, to argue that exclusion of Civil Court jurisdiction should not be readily inferred.
    • They also relied upon State of A.P. v. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao & Ors., (2000) 3 SCC 689, which reiterates the general principle that Civil Courts possess jurisdiction over suits of a civil nature unless jurisdiction is expressly or impliedly excluded.

    Society: Suit Was Really About Enforcement of Promoter’s Statutory Obligations

    • The Society disputed the purchasers’ characterization of the suit.
    • It argued that the suit was not actually for specific performance of the Agreement for Sale. Instead, the purchasers were asking the developer to fulfil obligations arising under MOFA which, following registration of the project under RERA, could be enforced through the remedies available under the RERA framework.
    • The Society relied on Sections 11, 19, 34 and 79 of RERA, arguing that the Act provides an adequate mechanism for seeking completion of construction, possession and enforcement of the promoter’s statutory obligations.

    Bombay HC Examines Actual Prayers in the Plaint

    • A crucial part of the High Court’s analysis concerned the actual reliefs sought in the plaint, rather than the purchasers’ description of their case during arguments.
    • The principal prayer sought a mandatory direction requiring the developer to adhere to the agreement relating to Flat No. 1105 and fulfil its statutory obligations under MOFA.
    • The purchasers had also sought a permanent injunction against creation of third-party rights, appointment of a Court Receiver, and a direction requiring the developer to deposit β‚Ή68,78,890 with 18% interest to secure the money paid by them.

    After examining those prayers, the High Court reached an important factual conclusion:

    • β€œThus, there is no prayer for specific performance of the agreement for sale dated 10 June 2015.”
    • According to the Court, the suit instead sought adherence to the terms of the agreement and/or fulfilment of statutory obligations under MOFA.

    Court-Fee Valuation Also Showed Suit Was Not for Specific Performance

    • The High Court also examined how the purchasers themselves had valued their suit.
    • They had valued the proceeding under Section 6(iv)(j) of the Maharashtra Court Fees Act, stating that the relief was incapable of monetary valuation because what they sought was enforcement of the developer’s statutory obligations under MOFA.
    • The Court contrasted this with Section 6(xi) of the Court Fees Act, which specifically deals with suits for specific performance and, in the case of a contract of sale, requires valuation according to the amount of consideration.
    • The High Court therefore found that the purchasers’ own pleadings and court-fee valuation supported the conclusion that the suit was not a suit for specific performance.

    Mere Allegation of Fraud or Collusion Cannot Create Civil Court Jurisdiction

    • The purchasers also attempted to sustain the Civil Court’s jurisdiction by alleging fraud and collusion between the Society and the developer.
    • The High Court rejected this contention on the facts.
    • Justice Marne noted that the word β€œfraud” was not even pleaded in the suit, while references to β€œcollusion” were unsupported by material particulars.
    • The Court relied upon the Supreme Court’s ruling in C.S. Ramaswamy v. V.K. Senthil & Ors., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1330, which emphasised that a mere allegation of fraud is insufficient and that fraud must be supported by specific pleadings explaining how it was committed.
    • Accordingly, unsupported references to fraud or collusion could not be used to alter the true character of the suit or avoid the statutory jurisdictional bar.

    RERA Project Registration Was Crucial

    • The High Court noted that under the first proviso to Section 3(1) of RERA, projects for which a completion certificate had not been issued when RERA commenced are required to be registered with the Authority.
    • In this case, the project had been registered with MahaRERA under Registration No. P51800004197 on 8 August 2017.
    • The Court therefore found that the purchasers could seek enforcement of the promoter’s obligations through the remedies created by RERA.
    • Those remedies included seeking refund with interest, fulfilment of the promoter’s obligations and possession of the flat under Section 19(3).

    Section 79 RERA Bars Civil Court Jurisdiction Over Matters RERA Can Determine

    • Section 79 provides that no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain a suit or proceeding concerning any matter which the RERA Authority, adjudicating officer or Appellate Tribunal is empowered under the Act to determine.
    • It also prohibits courts or other authorities from granting injunctions concerning action taken or proposed under powers conferred by RERA.
    • Applying this provision to the particular reliefs sought by the appellants, Justice Marne held that the City Civil Court had correctly concluded that its jurisdiction was barred.
    • The High Court stated that, in the circumstances before it, the bar under Section 79 was β€œabsolute”, because an adequate mechanism existed under RERA for the purchasers to seek fulfilment of the developer/promoter’s obligations.

    Important Qualification: Court Leaves Broader Specific-Performance Question Open

    • An important qualification in the judgment should not be overlooked.
    • The Bombay High Court did not hold that every civil suit seeking specific performance of an agreement concerning a RERA-registered project is barred by Section 79.
    • During arguments, counsel for the Society fairly conceded that such an absolute proposition could not necessarily be advanced.
    • The Court expressly stated that the broader questionβ€”whether Civil Court jurisdiction is barred in every suit seeking specific performance of an agreement concerning a RERA projectβ€”was being left open for determination in an appropriate case.
    • The decision therefore turns substantially on the Court’s finding that the particular plaint before it was not actually a suit for specific performance.

    What Supreme Court’s Imperia Structures Decision Meant

    • The Society had also relied upon Imperia Structures Ltd. v. Anil Patni & Anr., (2020) 10 SCC 783.
    • The Bombay High Court observed that Imperia Structures principally concerned the relationship between remedies under RERA and those available before consumer fora.
    • The Supreme Court had recognised that Section 79 bars Civil Court jurisdiction over matters which the RERA Authority, adjudicating officer or Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine, while consumer remedies remain separately available in the circumstances considered in that case.
    • However, Justice Marne clarified that Imperia Structures did not resolve the broader issue of whether every specific-performance suit concerning a RERA agreement is barred.

    Appeal Dismissed; City Civil Court Order Upheld

    • The Bombay High Court ultimately found no patent error in the City Civil Court’s decision.
    • Accordingly, Appeal From Order No. 662 of 2023 was dismissed without costs.
    • As a consequence, the connected Interim Application No. 14511 of 2023 also did not survive and was disposed of.
    • Thus, the order returning the purchasers’ plaint for presentation before the appropriate RERA forum remained undisturbed.

    Key Takeaway

    The judgment demonstrates that the substance of the plaint and the actual reliefs claimedβ€”not merely the label given to the suitβ€”will be crucial when determining whether Section 79 RERA excludes Civil Court jurisdiction. Where a purchaser essentially seeks enforcement of obligations that the RERA Authority is empowered to enforce, the Civil Court may lack jurisdiction.

    At the same time, the Bombay High Court deliberately left open the broader question of whether a genuine suit for specific performance of an agreement for sale in a RERA-registered project is necessarily barred.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Bombay High Court

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  • Supreme Court: Section 29A Application Can Be Filed Even After Arbitrator’s Mandate Expires

    Supreme Court: Section 29A Application Can Be Filed Even After Arbitrator’s Mandate Expires

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 19.09.2026

    Supreme Court: Section 29A Application Can Be Filed Even After Arbitrator’s Mandate Expires

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Arbitrator Shobhit Mallik. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id shobhit.Ica23@gmail.com .

    The Supreme Court of India has clarified an important question concerning timelines in arbitration, holding that an application for extension of an arbitral tribunal’s mandate under Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 can be filed even after the tribunal’s mandate has expired.

    In M/s Ajay Protech Pvt. Ltd. v. General Manager & Anr., 2024 INSC 889, the Bench of Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Sandeep Mehta set aside the Gujarat High Court’s order refusing extension and extended the time for making the arbitral award until 31 December 2024. The Supreme Court also explained how the expression β€œsufficient cause” under Section 29A(5) should be understood.

    Dispute Arose From a Works Contract

    • The appellant, M/s Ajay Protech Pvt. Ltd., had entered into a works contract with Respondent No. 1. After disputes arose between the parties, the appellant invoked arbitration by issuing a notice on 12 February 2018.
    • The Gujarat High Court subsequently allowed the appellant’s application under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act for appointment of a sole arbitrator through orders dated 8 February 2019 and 15 February 2019.
    • The first meeting of the arbitral tribunal took place on 24 June 2019, and pleadings were completed on 9 October 2019.
    • Under Section 29A(1), the 12-month period for making the award therefore commenced from that date and would ordinarily have expired on 8 October 2020. With the additional six-month extension available by mutual consent under Section 29A(3), the 18-month period would ordinarily have extended until 9 April 2021.

    COVID-19 Interrupted the Arbitration Timeline

    • Before the statutory period expired, the COVID-19 pandemic intervened.
    • The Supreme Court had earlier, in In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, (2022) 3 SCC 117, directed that the period from 15 March 2020 to 28 February 2022 be excluded while computing various limitation periods, expressly including the periods prescribed under Sections 23(4) and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.
    • The arbitral proceedings, which had been adjourned because of the pandemic, resumed in 2022. Eventually, the hearing was concluded on 5 May 2023.
    • The parties recorded before the arbitral tribunal that they would approach the Court under Section 29A(4) for extension of time. Ajay Protech thereafter filed its extension application before the Gujarat High Court on 1 August 2023.

    Gujarat High Court Refused Extension

    • The Gujarat High Court dismissed the application on 3 November 2023.
    • It reasoned that the initial 12-month statutory period had expired on 8 October 2020 and, after the six-month consensual extension, the tribunal’s mandate had expired on 9 April 2021.
    • Since the Section 29A application was filed only in August 2023, the High Court treated the delay as exceeding two years and four months and held that the tribunal’s mandate had already terminated. It therefore dismissed the application as misconceived.
    • Ajay Protech challenged this decision before the Supreme Court.

    Two Questions Before the Supreme Court

    • The Supreme Court identified two principal issues:
    • First, can an application for extension under Section 29A(4) be entertained after the arbitral tribunal’s mandate has already expired?
    • Second, if such an application is maintainable, did the circumstances of this case constitute β€œsufficient cause” to justify extension?
    • The Court answered both questions in favour of Ajay Protech.

    Section 29A(4) Expressly Permits Post-Expiry Extension

    • The Supreme Court examined the language of Section 29A(4), which provides that if an award is not made within the period prescribed under Section 29A(1), or the extended period under Section 29A(3), the arbitrator’s mandate terminates unless the Court has β€œeither prior to or after the expiry of the period so specified” extended the period.
    • The Court found this wording clear and explicit.
    • According to the Supreme Court, Section 29A(4) itself enables a court to extend the tribunal’s mandate after the expiry of the statutory and mutually extendable 18-month period.
    • Thus, expiry of the tribunal’s mandate does not permanently extinguish the Court’s jurisdiction to grant an extension.

    Supreme Court Relies on Rohan Builders

    • The Court relied heavily upon its recent judgment in Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2494.
    • Interestingly, the respondents themselves had relied on Rohan Builders to argue that the extension application had to be filed before the tribunal’s mandate expired. The Supreme Court held that the precedent actually decided the issue against the respondents.
    • The Court reiterated that Section 29A(4) empowers courts to extend the period for making an arbitral award either before or after expiry of the prescribed period.
    • It explained that although the tribunal’s mandate terminates upon expiry of the prescribed period, this termination is conditional in the sense that the statute still permits a party to approach the Court and seek revival/extension of the mandate.

    Accordingly, the Supreme Court held:

    An application under Section 29A(4) can be filed either before or after termination of the arbitral tribunal’s mandate upon expiry of the statutory and extendable period.

    Extension Is Not Automatic: β€˜Sufficient Cause’ Must Be Shown

    • The Court simultaneously cautioned that merely filing an application after expiry does not create an automatic right to extension.
    • Under Section 29A(5), extension may be granted only when the Court is satisfied that there is β€œsufficient cause”.
    • The Supreme Court noted that this involves exercise of judicial discretion. Courts may also impose appropriate terms and conditions while granting extension.
    • Referring again to Rohan Builders, the Court observed that this requirement operates as a safeguard against frivolous or vexatious attempts to revive stale arbitrations.
    • Therefore, the ruling should not be understood as permitting indefinite or mechanical extensions merely because Section 29A(4) allows a post-expiry application.

    Gujarat High Court’s Calculation of Delay Was Erroneous

    • The Supreme Court found a fundamental error in the Gujarat High Court’s computation of delay.
    • Because the COVID exclusion period from 15 March 2020 to 28 February 2022 had to be removed from the calculation, the relevant Section 29A period did not expire in April 2021 in the manner assumed by the High Court.
    • The Supreme Court calculated that, after giving effect to the COVID exclusion, the applicable period would have expired on 31 March 2023.
    • Since Ajay Protech filed its application on 1 August 2023, the relevant period requiring explanation was therefore essentially from 31 March 2023 to 1 August 2023, rather than the two years and four months calculated by the High Court.
    • The Supreme Court consequently held that the High Court’s reasoning on the extent of delay was erroneous.

    Why the Supreme Court Found β€˜Sufficient Cause’

    • Ajay Protech had placed several circumstances before the Court to explain why extension was necessary.
    • The arbitral tribunal had resumed online hearings in 2022 but proceedings had to be adjourned on several occasions at the request of the respondents’ counsel due to changes concerning the panel from which the arbitrator had been appointed.
    • The dispute also involved technical and legal questions, and the record was bulky. Ajay Protech further argued that the delay was attributable neither to the parties nor to the tribunal and that the tribunal had acted promptly and cautiously.
    • Most importantly, the hearing had already concluded and only the award remained to be delivered. Refusing extension at that stage would therefore cause hardship and potentially frustrate an arbitration that had substantially reached its conclusion.

    β€˜Sufficient Cause’ Must Be Interpreted in Light of Arbitration’s Purpose

    • The judgment contains an important explanation of the expression β€œsufficient cause” under Section 29A(5).
    • The Supreme Court emphasised that efficiency and expeditious completion are integral to arbitration. At the same time, the Arbitration Act recognises the Court’s power to intervene where necessary to ensure that the agreed dispute-resolution process reaches its logical conclusion.
    • The Court held that:
    • β€œThe meaning of ‘sufficient cause’ for extending the time to make an award must take colour from the underlying purpose of the arbitration process.”
    • It further explained that the primary objective is to resolve disputes through the dispute-resolution mechanism agreed upon by the parties. Consequently, β€œsufficient cause” should be interpreted in a manner that facilitates effective dispute resolution.
    • This observation gives the judgment significance beyond its particular facts, as it provides guidance for courts considering future Section 29A extension applications.

    Supreme Court Allows Ajay Protech’s Appeal

    Taking into account the COVID interruption and the parties’ agreement on 5 May 2023 to approach the Court for extension, the Supreme Court concluded that sufficient cause existed for extending the tribunal’s mandate.

    The Court accordingly:

    • allowed Ajay Protech’s civil appeal;
    • set aside the Gujarat High Court’s order dated 3 November 2023 in MCA No. 1 of 2023;
    • extended the period for making the arbitral award until 31 December 2024; and
    • directed the parties to bear their own costs.

    Thus, Ajay Protech Pvt. Ltd. succeeded before the Supreme Court on the Section 29A extension issue.

    Why This Judgment Is Important for Arbitration Proceedings

    • The judgment clarifies two important principles governing Section 29A.
    • First, expiry of an arbitral tribunal’s mandate does not by itself prevent a party from subsequently seeking extension from the Court. The statutory language expressly gives courts power to extend the period even after expiry.
    • Second, post-expiry extension is discretionary rather than automatic. The applicant must establish sufficient cause, and the Court must examine the circumstances of the particular arbitration.
    • The decision therefore attempts to balance two objectives of the Arbitration Act: ensuring that arbitration remains time-bound and efficient, while preventing procedural timelines from unnecessarily destroying an arbitration that can still effectively resolve the parties’ dispute.

    Key Takeaway

    The Supreme Court has made it clear that the termination of an arbitral tribunal’s mandate upon expiry of the Section 29A timeline is not an absolute bar to revival or extension. Courts retain jurisdiction under Section 29A(4) to extend the period even where the application is filed after expiry.

    However, such relief is not mechanical. Under Section 29A(5), the applicant must demonstrate sufficient cause, which the Court said should be understood in light of arbitration’s fundamental objectiveβ€”effective resolution of disputes through the mechanism chosen by the parties.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Supreme Court

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  • Bombay HC Clarifies 2026 IBC Amendment: Section 96(4) Extends to Pending Personal Insolvency Proceedings

    Bombay HC Clarifies 2026 IBC Amendment: Section 96(4) Extends to Pending Personal Insolvency Proceedings

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 19.09.2026

    Bombay HC Clarifies 2026 IBC Amendment: Section 96(4) Extends to Pending Personal Insolvency Proceedings

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Madhumita Jha. The views expressed are based on her interpretation of the law. She can be reached at her email id jhamadhumita27@gmail.com .  

    In a significant ruling concerning personal guarantors, secured creditors and recovery proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), the Bombay High Court has held that the newly introduced Section 96(4) of the IBC operates retroactively and therefore applies even to applications under Sections 94 and 95 that were already pending when the amendment came into force on May 26, 2026.

    The Division Bench of Justice Manish Pitale and Justice Shreeram V. Shirsat delivered the judgment on September 18, 2026, in a batch of petitions led by Indian Bank v. Shabbir Abbas Patel & Ors., Writ Petition No. 2819 of 2026. The judgment bears neutral citation 2026:BHC-OS:20542-DB.

    The ruling has potentially wide implications for banks, financial institutions and other creditors facing recovery obstacles because of interim moratoriums triggered by personal insolvency applications against guarantors.

    The Central Question Before the Bombay High Court

    • The core issue was whether Section 96(4), introduced into the IBC with effect from May 26, 2026, applies only to fresh applications filed after that date or whether it also affects applications already filed and pending.
    • The Court framed the issue specifically as whether the amendment operates retroactively, so that the exclusion introduced by Section 96(4) applies to pending personal-guarantor insolvency proceedings as well.
    • This question arose because, before the amendment, filing an application under Sections 94 or 95 could trigger an interim moratorium under Section 96, affecting legal actions or proceedings concerning debts.
    • The petitioning creditors argued that the amendment was introduced to address misuse of this mechanism and must therefore apply to pending cases. The opposing parties contended that the amendment was prospective and could affect only applications filed after May 26, 2026.

    Why Section 96 Was Amended

    • A major part of the creditors’ case concerned what they described as the misuse of the interim moratorium by debtors and personal guarantors.
    • The petitioners relied upon the report of the Select Committee on the IBC (Amendment) Bill, 2025, contending that stakeholders, including members of the NCLT, had highlighted misuse of Sections 94, 95 and 96 by debtors to obstruct legitimate creditor action.
    • Reliance was also placed on the Bombay High Court’s earlier decision in Rozina Firoz Hajiani v. Union of India, where the Court had taken judicial notice of concerns surrounding misuse of the interim moratorium.
    • The creditors consequently argued that restricting the amendment only to future applications would allow the very problem sought to be remedied to continue in all applications that happened to be pending on May 26.

    Creditors Argue Amendment Is Curative and Retroactive

    • The banks and financial institutions argued that the amendment was remedial or curative in nature.
    • They relied upon Supreme Court authorities dealing with retrospective and retroactive operation of statutory amendments, including BCCI v. Kochi Cricket Pvt. Ltd., (2018) 6 SCC 287, and M. Rajendran v. KPK Oils and Proteins India Pvt. Ltd., (2026) 3 SCC 505.
    • It was also argued that the interim moratorium was not a vested right of the debtor or guarantor. Decisions including Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, (2020) 9 SCC 1 and SEBI v. Rajkumar Nagpal, (2023) 8 SCC 274 were relied upon while explaining the concept of retroactive operation.

    Personal Guarantors Oppose Retroactive Application

    • The contesting respondents argued that the normal presumption is that legislation operates prospectively unless retrospective operation is expressly stated or follows by necessary implication.
    • They emphasised the wording of Section 96(4), particularly the expression β€œshall not apply where an application is filed”, contending that it points towards prospective application from May 26, 2026.
    • The respondents further argued that an interim moratorium provides a debtor with significant statutory protection from creditor action and that this protection should not be taken away in already pending proceedings.
    • Reliance was placed, among other authorities, on Rakesh Bhanot v. Gurdas Agro Pvt. Ltd., (2025) 6 SCC 781, concerning the importance of the interim moratorium under Section 96.

    Bombay High Court: Amendment Is Retroactive

    • After examining the statutory language, legislative background, object of the amendment and principles governing retroactive legislation, the Division Bench rejected the argument that Section 96(4) could operate only against applications filed after May 26, 2026.
    • The Court held that the amendment β€œmust operate retroactively” and consequently applies not merely to proceedings initiated on or after May 26, 2026, but also to proceedings already pending on that date.
    • The Court reasoned that the purpose of the amendmentβ€”to address the identified misuse of the interim moratoriumβ€”would be fully achieved only by applying the new provision to pending proceedings as well.
    • It also concluded that the respondents did not possess a vested right to the interim moratorium during the procedural stage governed by Sections 94 to 99 of the IBC.

    Section 96(4) Applies Even to Pending Sections 94 and 95 Proceedings

    • The Court ultimately answered the central question in categorical terms.
    • It held that Section 96(4), introduced with effect from May 26, 2026, applies retroactively and therefore extends to pending proceedings. Although the amendment operates from May 26, 2026 onwards, its effect extends to proceedings under Sections 94 and 95 that were already pending on that date.
    • The Division Bench also agreed with the approach previously adopted by a Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in Tata Capital Financial Services Ltd. v. Neel Motors LLP & Ors., as well as the Delhi High Court’s order in IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd. v. Manish Jain & Ors.
    • This ruling therefore settles, at least for the batch before the Bombay High Court, the dispute over whether pre-amendment personal-guarantor applications can continue to enjoy the earlier Section 96 interim-moratorium protection after May 26, 2026.

    Indian Bank’s Case: DRT Restraint Set Aside

    • The consequences of this interpretation were directly applied in Indian Bank v. Shabbir Abbas Patel.
    • Indian Bank had challenged orders dated October 3, 2024 and March 13, 2026 passed by DRT-I, Mumbai, restraining the Bank from proceeding with an auction. The restraint was linked to the interim moratorium arising from personal insolvency proceedings.
    • An earlier Section 95 petition had been dismissed by the NCLT on February 18, 2026. The respondents, however, relied upon a subsequent Section 95 petition filed on February 19, 2026 and registered on May 6, 2026.
    • Applying its interpretation of the amended law, the High Court held that even the interim moratorium triggered by the subsequent Section 95 proceeding ceased to operate from May 26, 2026.

    Court Finds Repeated Insolvency Proceedings Highlighted the Mischief

    • The Division Bench considered the facts of the Indian Bank matter to illustrate the problem that the legislative amendment sought to address.
    • The Court observed that allowing the interim moratorium to continue because of the subsequent Section 95 petition would be contrary to the legal position after the amendment and would permit repeated reliance on insolvency proceedings to obstruct creditor action.
    • Accordingly, Writ Petition No. 2819 of 2026 filed by Indian Bank was allowed.

    Auction and Sale Certificate Upheld

    • The High Court granted substantial relief to Indian Bank.
    • The DRT-I orders dated October 3, 2024 and March 13, 2026 were quashed and set aside, resulting in the restraint on the Bank ceasing to operate.
    • The Court further held that the Bank’s action in confirming the sale pursuant to the auction conducted on September 30, 2024, as well as issuance of the sale certificate dated February 25, 2026 and its registration on February 27, 2026, were validly taken in the circumstances.
    • The Court Commissioner was permitted to proceed in accordance with law for taking possession of the secured asset. The police authorities were directed to provide appropriate protection and assistance so that possession could be obtained and handed over to the Bank for delivery to the auction purchaser.
    • The underlying Securitisation Application No. 115 of 2024 was directed to be decided expeditiously by DRT-I, Mumbai.

    Other Banks and Financial Institutions Also Before the Court

    • The judgment did not concern Indian Bank alone. It disposed of a batch of petitions involving several secured creditors and financial institutions, including RBL Bank Ltd., Godrej Finance Ltd., Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Ltd. and Apna Sahakari Bank Ltd.
    • In the ARCIL matter, for example, the Court held that the pending Section 95 petition did not prevent the DRAT from hearing the creditors’ appeals, because Section 96(4) meant that the interim moratorium was no longer operating after May 26, 2026.
    • The judgment therefore has significance beyond the facts of a single borrower-creditor dispute.

    Significance for Banks and Secured Creditors

    • The ruling is important for secured-creditor enforcement because the Court has clarified that the May 2026 amendment cannot be avoided merely because a personal insolvency application was filed before the amendment took effect.
    • Where Section 96(4) applies to a personal guarantor to a corporate debtor, a pending Section 94 or Section 95 application cannot continue to provide the earlier interim-moratorium protection merely on the basis of its pre-May 26 filing date.
    • This can have direct consequences for SARFAESI proceedings, DRT/DRAT proceedings, auctions, recovery proceedings and possession of secured assets where creditors had previously faced objections founded upon Section 96.
    • The judgment, however, does not eliminate every remedy available to personal guarantors or decide the merits of their insolvency applications. Its central holding concerns the effect of Section 96(4) on the interim moratorium from May 26, 2026.

    Key Legal Principle

    The principle emerging from the judgment can be stated as follows:

    • Section 96(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, introduced with effect from May 26, 2026, operates retroactively. Therefore, its effect extends to applications under Sections 94 and 95 that were already pending on May 26, 2026, and the excluded interim-moratorium protection cannot continue merely because the personal insolvency proceeding was instituted before the amendment.
    • This interpretation, according to the Bombay High Court, gives effect to the legislative object of preventing misuse of the interim moratorium while not taking away any vested right, because no such vested right exists in the Section 96 interim moratorium during the procedural stage of Sections 94 to 99.

    Key Takeaway

    The Bombay High Court’s ruling substantially clarifies the effect of the 2026 amendment to Section 96 of the IBC. A personal guarantor cannot claim continuation of the earlier Section 96 interim moratorium after May 26, 2026 merely because the Section 94 or 95 proceeding was filed before that date.

    For Indian Bank, this meant the DRT restraint was set aside, the relevant auction and sale certificate were sustained, and steps for obtaining physical possession of the secured asset were permitted to proceed.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Bombay High Court

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  • Karnataka High Court: Non-Compoundable Offences Can Be Quashed Under Section 482 CrPC After Amicable Settlement

    Karnataka High Court: Non-Compoundable Offences Can Be Quashed Under Section 482 CrPC After Amicable Settlement

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 19.09.2026

    Karnataka High Court: Non-Compoundable Offences Can Be Quashed Under Section 482 CrPC After Amicable Settlement

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate G Sridharamurthy. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id sriadv3@gmail.com . 

    The Karnataka High Court has quashed criminal proceedings involving allegations under Sections 498A, 323, 448, 341, 504, 506, 143 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) after noting that the underlying matrimonial and family dispute had been amicably settled.

    Justice S. Vishwajith Shetty, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ramgopal and Another v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reiterated that notwithstanding the restrictions contained in Section 320 CrPC, a High Court exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC can quash proceedings involving non-compoundable offences depending upon the nature of the case, relationship between the parties and gravity of the alleged offences.

    The decision was delivered on 29 June 2026 in Smt. Thuya Mani & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Anr., Criminal Petition No. 8571 of 2022, bearing neutral citation 2026:KHC:32279.

    Relatives of Accused Husband Approach High Court

    • The petition was filed by Thuya Mani and Velamkani/Velangani, who were arrayed as Accused Nos. 4 and 5.
    • They approached the Karnataka High Court under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of proceedings in C.C. No. 51695 of 2019, pending before the XXIX Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru.
    • The proceedings arose from Crime No. 11 of 2018, registered at Vivek Nagar Police Station, Bengaluru, for alleged offences punishable under Sections 143, 448, 498A, 341, 323, 504, 506 read with Section 149 IPC.

    Matrimonial Dispute Amicably Settled

    • When the matter came before the High Court, advocates representing the contesting private parties informed the Court that the dispute between the husband and wife had been amicably settled.
    • The Court was also informed that the criminal proceedings against Accused Nos. 1 to 3 had already been quashed by a Coordinate Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Criminal Petition No. 8383 of 2026, decided on 24 June 2026.
    • The present petitioners were relatives of Accused No. 1. They filed a joint application supported by a joint affidavit under Section 320 CrPC seeking permission to compound the offences and bring the criminal dispute to an end.

    Settlement Voluntary and Without Coercion

    • The parties stated before the Court that the settlement had been reached with the intervention of elders, well-wishers, family members and other responsible persons.
    • Respondent No. 2, Susainathan, informed the Court that he no longer intended to proceed with the criminal case against the petitioners.

    The joint application specifically recorded that the compromise was:

    • voluntary, lawful and genuine;
    • entered into without force, threat or coercion;
    • free from undue influence, pressure or misrepresentation; and
    • intended to finally resolve the personal, matrimonial and family disputes between the parties.

    Respondent No. 2 expressly stated that he had no objection to quashing the criminal proceedings against the two petitioners.

    The parties further submitted that no surviving grievance remained between them and that continuing the criminal prosecution despite settlement would serve no useful purpose and would amount to an abuse of the process of law.

    Can Non-Compoundable Criminal Offences Be Quashed After Settlement?

    • The important legal issue arose because not every criminal offence can be formally compounded under Section 320 CrPC.
    • The High Court therefore considered whether it could nevertheless use its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to terminate the proceedings once the private dispute had been genuinely resolved.

    For this purpose, Justice Shetty relied upon the Supreme Court’s judgment in:

    Ramgopal and Another v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in (2022) 14 SCC 531.

    • The Karnataka High Court noted that the Supreme Court had recognised the High Court’s power to quash criminal proceedings involving non-compoundable offences, notwithstanding the restrictions under Section 320 CrPC.

    Section 320 Does Not Completely Restrict High Court’s Section 482 Powers

    Referring to Ramgopal, the Court observed that the power under Section 482 can be exercised depending upon factors such as:

    the nature of the case, the relationship between the parties and the gravity of the alleged offences.

    • Therefore, the fact that an offence is technically non-compoundable under Section 320 does not, by itself, prevent the High Court from examining whether the continuation of criminal proceedings would serve any legitimate purpose after a genuine settlement.
    • This distinction is significant: the High Court was not simply treating every non-compoundable offence as compoundable. Rather, it exercised its separate inherent power of quashing under Section 482 CrPC in light of the nature and circumstances of the dispute.

    Matrimonial and Family Nature of Dispute Considered

    • The underlying controversy arose from a personal and matrimonial dispute, and the parties themselves informed the Court that their differences had been completely resolved.
    • The petitioners were relatives of Accused No. 1, while proceedings against Accused Nos. 1 to 3 had already been quashed following the settlement.
    • Against that background, the High Court concluded that the parties should be permitted to β€œput an end to the dispute.”
    • The decision reflects the distinction courts draw between offences having an overwhelmingly private or personal character and serious crimes involving broader public interest. The Court’s reliance on Ramgopal makes clear that the nature of the offence and gravity of the allegations remain relevant considerations rather than settlement automatically resulting in quashing.

    Criminal Proceedings Quashed Against Accused Nos. 4 and 5

    • The Karnataka High Court ultimately allowed Criminal Petition No. 8571 of 2022.
    • It quashed the entire proceedings in C.C. No. 51695 of 2019 pending before the XXIX Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru, arising from Crime No. 11 of 2018 registered by Vivek Nagar Police Station, insofar as the two petitioners were concerned.
    • Accordingly, the criminal prosecution against Thuya Mani and Velamkani/Velangani (Accused Nos. 4 and 5) came to an end.

    Supreme Court Precedent Relied Upon

    • The principal judicial precedent expressly relied upon in the order was:
    • Ramgopal and Another v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2022) 14 SCC 531.
    • The Karnataka High Court relied on the judgment for the proposition that High Courts can, in appropriate circumstances, exercise their inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC to quash criminal proceedings involving non-compoundable offences despite the limitations under Section 320 CrPC.

    Why the Judgment Is Significant

    • The order reinforces the legal distinction between compounding an offence under Section 320 CrPC and quashing criminal proceedings through the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC.
    • A criminal offence that is not statutorily compoundable does not necessarily mean that proceedings must continue irrespective of a subsequent settlement. In an appropriate case, particularly where the controversy is essentially personal or matrimonial in character, the High Court may examine whether continuation of prosecution would serve any meaningful purpose.
    • At the same time, the ruling does not establish that every non-compoundable criminal case can be quashed merely because the parties have reached a compromise. The Court expressly referred to the nature of the case, relationship between the parties and gravity of the alleged offences as relevant considerations.

    Key Takeaway

    The Karnataka High Court has reiterated that the restrictions governing statutory compounding under Section 320 CrPC do not completely curtail the High Court’s inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC.

    Where parties have genuinely settled a personal or matrimonial dispute, the High Court may quash even proceedings involving non-compoundable offences after considering the nature of the case, relationship between the parties and gravity of the offences.

    In the present case, with the matrimonial and family disputes amicably resolved and the complainant having no objection to quashing, the Court concluded that the proceedings against Accused Nos. 4 and 5 should be brought to an end.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Karnataka High Court

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  • Punjab & Haryana HC: Trade Mark Search & Seizure Cannot Be Conducted by Officer Below DSP Rank

    Punjab & Haryana HC: Trade Mark Search & Seizure Cannot Be Conducted by Officer Below DSP Rank

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 19.09.2026

    Punjab & Haryana HC: Trade Mark Search & Seizure Cannot Be Conducted by Officer Below DSP Rank

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    The Punjab and Haryana High Court has quashed a criminal prosecution under Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, holding that the mandatory safeguards prescribed under Section 115(4) were violated because the search and seizure was conducted by an officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police and without obtaining the prior opinion of the Registrar of Trade Marks.

    In Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab & Anr., CRM-M-12823-2021 (O&M), Justice Jasjit Singh Bedi held that the statutory procedure had been breached on two counts and that there was consequently a β€œclear statutory embargo” on the initiation and continuation of the criminal proceedings.

    The judgment was delivered on 10 January 2023.

    Allegations of Selling Duplicate β€œNorth Face” and β€œJansport” Bags

    • The proceedings originated from a complaint submitted by Vishal Joshi, described as an Enforcement Officer of United Overseas Trade Mark Company.
    • The complainant alleged that Ashok Kumar, proprietor of Amar Bag House, was manufacturing, selling and supplying duplicate bags bearing the marks β€œNorth Face” and β€œJansport.”
    • On the basis of the complaint, FIR No. 10 dated 1 February 2019 was registered at Police Station Mahilpur, District Hoshiarpur, initially under Sections 63 and 65 of the Copyright Act, 1957.

    136 Allegedly Fake Bags Recovered During Raid

    • During the investigation, the police raided the petitioner’s shop.
    • According to the judgment, the search resulted in recovery of 60 black bags carrying the β€œNorth Face” mark and 76 bags carrying the β€œJansport” mark, totalling 136 bags.
    • A wooden board carrying a β€œJansport” company sticker was also recovered. The recovered bags were alleged to be fake and were taken into police possession.
    • However, the legality of the manner in which this search and seizure was carried out ultimately became decisive before the High Court.

    Copyright Charges Deleted; Trade Marks Act Invoked

    • After investigation, the police initially prepared the final report under Sections 63 and 65 of the Copyright Act.
    • The matter was thereafter sent to the District Attorney, Hoshiarpur, who opined that offences under Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 were made out. Consequently, the Copyright Act offences were deleted and the report under Section 173(2) CrPC was presented under Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act.
    • Charges were subsequently framed against Ashok Kumar under those provisions on 1 February 2021.
    • The petitioner then approached the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, seeking quashing of the FIR, the order framing charges and all consequential proceedings.

    Petitioner Challenges Search and Seizure Under Section 115(4)

    • Ashok Kumar’s principal argument was that the investigation had failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 115(4) of the Trade Marks Act.
    • He raised two specific objections.
    • First, the search and seizure had been conducted by officers of the rank of Sub-Inspector/Assistant Sub-Inspector, whereas Section 115(4) authorises warrantless search and seizure by a police officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police or equivalent.
    • Second, the police had not obtained the opinion of the Registrar of Trade Marks before conducting the search and seizure, as required by the proviso to Section 115(4).
    • The petitioner therefore argued that the entire search and seizure stood vitiated and the resulting criminal prosecution could not legally continue.

    What Section 115(4) of the Trade Marks Act Requires

    • The High Court reproduced Section 115 of the Trade Marks Act and closely examined its statutory safeguards.
    • Under Section 115(3), offences under Sections 103, 104 and 105 are cognizable.
    • However, Section 115(4) provides that a police officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police or equivalent may conduct a warrantless search and seizure where satisfied that an offence referred to in Section 115(3) has been, is being, or is likely to be committed.
    • Crucially, the proviso further states that before conducting any search and seizure, the police officer shall obtain the opinion of the Registrar on the facts involved in the offence relating to the trade mark and shall abide by that opinion.
    • Thus, the Court treated the statutory scheme as imposing substantive procedural safeguards upon police action in such trademark prosecutions.

    Search by Sub-Inspector Violated Section 115(4)

    • The High Court found from the recovery memo and the final report under Section 173(2) CrPC that the search and seizure had in fact been conducted by an officer of the rank of Sub-Inspector.
    • Justice Bedi held that this directly violated Section 115(4), because the raid and consequential search and seizure were required to be undertaken by an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police or equivalent.
    • The Court consequently held that the proceedings emanating from the FIR were liable to be quashed on this ground.

    Prior Opinion of Registrar of Trade Marks Was Also Mandatory

    • There was a second and independent statutory violation.
    • The Court found that no opinion of the Registrar of Trade Marks had been obtained before the search and seizure.
    • The Sub-Inspector who conducted the search was therefore not only below the statutorily prescribed rank but had also proceeded without complying with the proviso to Section 115(4).
    • The High Court held that the proceedings were liable to be quashed on this ground as well.

    State Argues Objections Should Be Decided During Trial

    • The State opposed the quashing petition.
    • It argued that after registration of the FIR, the police had completed investigation and presented the report under Section 173(2) CrPC. Charges had also been framed.
    • According to the State, the grounds raised by the petitioner could therefore be adjudicated during the trial rather than being used to quash the prosecution at the threshold.
    • However, the State also conceded that its reply contained no specific denial of the petitioner’s contentions concerning the alleged statutory violations.
    • The High Court ultimately rejected the argument that the petitioner should be relegated to trial because the defect concerned violation of the statutory conditions governing the very search and seizure underlying the prosecution.

    Mandatory Procedure Under Trade Marks Act Cannot Be Ignored

    • The High Court relied on its earlier decisions in Anil Kumar v. State of Punjab & Anr. and Satpal & Anr. v. State of Punjab & Ors..
    • In Anil Kumar, the Court had held that Section 115(4) does not permit an officer below the rank of DSP to conduct the relevant search and seizure. It had further held that obtaining the Registrar’s opinion before such action was mandatory, observing that use of the word β€œshall” indicated the mandatory nature of the requirement.
    • Similarly, in Satpal, the Court held that where the search was conducted by a Sub-Inspector without obtaining the Registrar’s opinion, the proceedings stood vitiated. It emphasised that where a statute creating an offence also prescribes a procedure, authorities cannot simply ignore that procedure.

    Other High Court Precedents Support Mandatory Compliance

    • The judgment also referred to the Madhya Pradesh High Court decision in Kasim Ali v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., where prosecution under the Trade Marks Act was found unsustainable because the mandatory Section 115 procedure had not been followed.
    • That decision similarly recognised that a search under Section 115(4) must be conducted by the prescribed rank of police officer and only after obtaining the Registrar’s opinion.
    • The Punjab and Haryana High Court also considered Pitambra Industries v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., in which the Madhya Pradesh High Court treated obtaining the Registrar’s opinion before search and seizure as a sine qua non and held that compliance with Section 115(4) was mandatory.
    • The Court further referred to the Bombay High Court’s ruling in Shrenik Shantilal Dhadiwal v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., where investigation by an Assistant Police Inspector without the Registrar’s opinion was found contrary to Section 115(4).

    Bhajan Lal Principles Applied

    • The petitioner also relied upon the Supreme Court’s landmark judgment in State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335.
    • Among the recognised categories for exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC is a situation where there exists an express legal bar under the Code or the concerned statute to the institution or continuation of criminal proceedings.
    • Applying this principle, the High Court found that Section 115(4) had been violated in two material respects:
    • the search and seizure was undertaken by an officer below the rank of DSP, and the proceedings were initiated without obtaining the opinion of the Registrar of Trade Marks.
    • The Court therefore concluded that there was a clear statutory embargo on the initiation and continuation of the proceedings.

    FIR, Charges and Entire Criminal Proceedings Quashed

    Having found both statutory violations established, the Punjab and Haryana High Court allowed Ashok Kumar’s petition.

    It quashed:

    • FIR No. 10 dated 1 February 2019 under Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act at Police Station Mahilpur, District Hoshiarpur;
    • the order dated 1 February 2021 framing charges against the petitioner; and
    • all subsequent proceedings arising from the FIR.

    Thus, Ashok Kumar succeeded before the High Court, and the prosecution arising from the allegedly counterfeit β€œNorth Face” and β€œJansport” bags was brought to an end because the mandatory statutory procedure governing search and seizure had not been followed.

    Key Takeaway

    The judgment underscores that the procedural safeguards contained in Section 115(4) of the Trade Marks Act cannot be bypassed in criminal enforcement actions involving offences under Sections 103, 104 and 105.

    Where a warrantless search and seizure is undertaken under Section 115(4), the judgment treats two requirements as critical: the officer conducting the statutory search must be not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police or equivalent, and the prescribed opinion of the Registrar of Trade Marks must be obtained before the search and seizure. In Ashok Kumar, failure to satisfy both requirements was sufficient for the High Court to hold that continuation of the prosecution was legally impermissible and to quash the FIR, charge-framing order and all consequential proceedings.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Punjab & Haryana High Court

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Gujarat High Court: Customs Refund Limitation Cannot Run Until Final Assessment Is Communicated to Importer; Mere ICEGATE Upload Not Enough

    Gujarat High Court: Customs Refund Limitation Cannot Run Until Final Assessment Is Communicated to Importer; Mere ICEGATE Upload Not Enough

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 19.09.2026

    Gujarat High Court: Customs Refund Limitation Cannot Run Until Final Assessment Is Communicated to Importer; Mere ICEGATE Upload Not Enough

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    The Gujarat High Court has held that merely uploading an order finalising provisional assessment on the Customs electronic portal is not sufficient to start the limitation period for claiming refund under Section 27(1B)(c) of the Customs Act, 1962. The final assessment must be communicated to the assessee before the statutory one-year period can operate against it.

    The Division Bench of Justice Bhargav D. Karia and Justice Niral R. Mehta, in Principal Commissioner, Customs, Ahmedabad Commissionerate v. M/s GAIL (India) Ltd., R/Tax Appeal No. 211 of 2024, dismissed the Revenue’s appeal on 13 June 2024, finding no infirmity in CESTAT’s decision in favour of GAIL. The judgment carries neutral citation 2024:GUJHC:30963-DB.

    Dispute Over Refund of Excess Customs Duty on Imported LNG

    • GAIL (India) Ltd. was engaged in the import of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). It filed 16 Bills of Entry, which were initially assessed provisionally under Section 18 of the Customs Act upon execution of a bond. After production of the original documents, the Bills of Entry were subsequently finalised.
    • The table reproduced by the High Court on pages 3 and 4 of the judgment records the provisional and finally assessed quantities, Customs duty paid and the refund claimed for each Bill of Entry. The aggregate excess duty claimed as refund was β‚Ή7,78,98,646.
    • GAIL eventually filed its refund application on 26 October 2016. It also submitted a Chartered Accountant’s certificate dated 7 September 2016 concerning unjust enrichment, stating that the excess Customs duty had been reflected as a receivable in its books and had not been passed on to customers.

    Customs Department Rejected Refund as Time-Barred

    • The adjudicating authority rejected GAIL’s refund claim on limitation.
    • According to Customs, the 16 Bills of Entry had been finally assessed between 7 October 2015 and 20 October 2015. Since the refund application was filed on 26 October 2016, the Department treated it as having been filed beyond the one-year limitation prescribed under Section 27(1B)(c).
    • The Department’s case was essentially that Section 27(1B)(c), where duty has been provisionally paid under Section 18, computes the limitation period from the date of adjustment of duty after final assessment or, in the case of reassessment, from the date of reassessment.

    CESTAT Allowed GAIL’s Appeal

    • GAIL challenged the rejection before CESTAT.
    • The Tribunal allowed the appeal by relying upon Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., 2014 (308) E.L.T. 169, holding that the relevant point for limitation was the date of service of the finalisation of provisional assessment.
    • The precedent emphasised that where an order gives rise to a remedial right, the date on which the order is served upon the person concerned assumes significance for exercising that remedy.
    • CESTAT consequently rejected the Department’s contention that the importer should simply have discovered the finalisation through ICEGATE.

    Revenue Approaches Gujarat High Court

    • The Principal Commissioner of Customs challenged the Tribunal’s order before the Gujarat High Court under Section 130 of the Customs Act.
    • The principal question proposed by Revenue was whether CESTAT was correct in treating the date of service of the finalisation order as the relevant date for limitation when Section 27(1B)(c) refers to the date of adjustment of duty after final assessment or the date of reassessment.
    • Revenue argued that the final assessments had already been uploaded on the ICEGATE system and that GAIL was required to take notice of the assessments made available on the portal. On this basis, Customs contended that the refund application was beyond limitation.

    Section 27(1B)(c): One-Year Limitation After Finalisation

    • The High Court examined Sections 18 and 27 of the Customs Act, 1962.
    • Section 27(1B)(c) provides that where duty has been paid provisionally under Section 18, the one-year limitation is computed from the date of adjustment of duty after final assessment, or, in the case of reassessment, from the date of reassessment.
    • The High Court accepted that once provisional assessment is completed and an assessee becomes entitled to refund, the refund application has to be made within the period prescribed under Section 27 read with Section 27(1B).
    • The crucial question, however, was whether limitation could operate against an assessee before the final assessment had actually been communicated to it.

    GAIL’s August 2016 Letter Became Crucial

    • A significant factual circumstance was GAIL’s letter dated 19 August 2016.
    • The adjudicating authority itself had recorded that this letter requested the Department to finalise the Customs duty/final assessment. Customs rejected GAIL’s argument that this letter itself should be treated as a refund claim, observing that it was merely a request for early finalisation and was unrelated to a refund application.
    • But that finding had another consequence.
    • The Gujarat High Court observed that the very fact that GAIL was requesting finalisation on 19 August 2016 indicated that, until then, the assessee was not aware that the final assessments had already been completed.
    • This became an important factual basis for rejecting Revenue’s limitation argument.

    Mere Upload on Customs Portal Is Not Sufficient Communication

    The most important part of the judgment is the High Court’s finding concerning electronic uploading of the assessment order.

    The Court held:

    • β€œMerely because the Custom Department has uploaded the final assessment orders on portal is not sufficient compliance of intimation to the assessee…”
    • The Court treated communication of the final assessment as a condition sine qua non for the assessee to exercise the statutory right of seeking refund within one year under Section 27(1B)(c).
    • It further held that CESTAT had correctly considered the documents showing when the finalisation of provisional assessments was actually communicated to GAIL.
    • The decision therefore draws an important distinction between an order merely being available electronically on a departmental portal and the order being communicated to the person whose statutory remedy depends upon knowledge of that order.

    Gujarat High Court Dismisses Revenue’s Appeal

    • The High Court found no infirmity in CESTAT’s order and held that no question of law, much less any substantial question of law, arose for consideration.
    • The Revenue’s appeal was therefore dismissed as being devoid of merit.
    • Thus, GAIL (India) Ltd. succeeded before the Gujarat High Court on the limitation dispute concerning its Customs refund claim.

    Why the Judgment Is Important for Importers

    • The decision has considerable practical importance for importers whose Bills of Entry have been provisionally assessed under Section 18 and who subsequently become entitled to refund following finalisation.
    • The judgment establishes that the Department cannot necessarily rely only upon the internal date of final assessment or the fact that the assessment was uploaded on ICEGATE when the importer was not shown to have been duly informed of the finalisation.
    • For refund disputes under Section 27(1B)(c), evidence relating to communication or service of the final assessment can therefore become critical in determining whether the refund application is within limitation.
    • The judgment is particularly relevant where Customs argues that the importer should have independently monitored the portal even though no effective communication of the final assessment was established.

    Key Legal Principle

    The principle emerging from the judgment can be stated succinctly:

    Where refund arises following finalisation of provisional assessment under Section 18 of the Customs Act, the statutory limitation under Section 27(1B)(c) cannot effectively be invoked against the assessee merely on the basis that the final assessment was uploaded on the Customs portal. Communication of the final assessment to the assessee is essential before limitation can operate against the refund claim.

    The ruling therefore reinforces the procedural importance of actual communication of Customs assessment orders, particularly where commencement of a limitation period affects an importer’s substantive right to claim refund.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Gujarat High Court

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  • Supreme Court Acquits Man Sentenced to 10 Years; Finds Serious Lapses in NDPS Sampling Procedure

    Supreme Court Acquits Man Sentenced to 10 Years; Finds Serious Lapses in NDPS Sampling Procedure

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 18.09.2026

    Supreme Court Acquits Man Sentenced to 10 Years; Finds Serious Lapses in NDPS Sampling Procedure

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    The Supreme Court has acquitted a man sentenced to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment in an NDPS case after finding serious deficiencies in the seizure and sampling process, including failure to draw representative samples in the presence of a Magistrate and non-compliance with the procedure contemplated under Section 52A of the NDPS Act.

    In Nadeem Ahamed v. State of West Bengal, the Court held that the cumulative procedural lapses made the integrity of the seizure and sampling process doubtful. It further held that the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report could not be read in evidence, leaving no acceptable evidence to establish that the substance allegedly recovered from the appellant was heroin. The conviction was consequently set aside and Nadeem Ahamed was acquitted.

    Trial Court Had Sentenced Accused to 10 Years’ Rigorous Imprisonment

    • Nadeem Ahamed had been convicted by the Special Court under the NDPS Act at Alipore, West Bengal, for offences punishable under Sections 21(c) and 29 of the NDPS Act.
    • By its judgment dated August 24, 2021 and sentencing order dated August 26, 2021, the Trial Court sentenced him to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of β‚Ή1 lakh, with a further six months’ rigorous imprisonment in default of payment of the fine.
    • His appeal before the Calcutta High Court was filed with a delay of 1,183 days. The High Court declined to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal without examining the conviction on merits.

    Alleged Recovery of 125 Grams of Heroin

    • According to the prosecution, on July 16, 2018, police received information that two men would arrive near Pragati Maidan Police Station in Kolkata to supply heroin.
    • A raiding team intercepted Nadeem Ahamed and co-accused Amit Dutta alias Rakesh. The accused opted to be searched in the presence of a Gazetted Officer.
    • The prosecution claimed that approximately 130 grams of suspected heroin was recovered from Amit Dutta, while 125 grams was recovered from Nadeem.
    • The combined weight of the substances was 255 grams, and the prosecution treated the recovery as commercial quantity. One sample weighing 10 grams was drawn from each packet and marked S1 and S2.
    • The samples were subsequently sent to the FSL, which reported that both tested positive for heroin.

    Supreme Court Says High Court Was Wrong to Dismiss Appeal Solely on Delay

    • Before considering the merits, the Supreme Court strongly disagreed with the Calcutta High Court’s decision to dismiss the criminal appeal merely because it had been filed late.
    • The Court noted that Nadeem had remained incarcerated since his initial apprehension and did not have the financial means to file his appeal within time.
    • It held that rejecting his statutory appeal solely on delay was β€œtoo harsh and unjustified”. The High Court ought to have condoned the delay and decided the appeal on merits.
    • Instead of remanding the caseβ€”which would have caused further delayβ€”the Supreme Court itself examined the merits of the conviction.

    Two Separate Recoveries Could Not Automatically Be Clubbed Together

    • A major error identified by the Supreme Court concerned the treatment of the two recoveries as one combined commercial quantity.
    • The Court held that merely because Nadeem and Amit Dutta were walking side-by-side, were apprehended simultaneously and were individually carrying suspected narcotics did not establish that either knew about the substance carried by the other.
    • Such circumstances could create suspicion, but the Court reiterated that β€œsuspicion… cannot take place of proof.”
    • To invoke conspiracy under Section 29 and club the quantities recovered from two separate individuals, the prosecution was required to produce positive and tangible evidence demonstrating prior knowledge or conspiracy.
    • The Supreme Court found no such evidence. Apart from the allegation that the two men were walking together and were searched one after another, there was no material establishing a prior conspiracy.

    125 Grams and 130 Grams Could Not Be Clubbed to Cross Commercial-Quantity Threshold

    • The Trial Court had combined the alleged recoveries of 125 grams and 130 grams, resulting in a total of 255 grams, and treated this as exceeding the commercial-quantity threshold of 250 grams.
    • The Supreme Court found this approach legally unsustainable in the absence of evidence proving conspiracy between the two accused.
    • Relying upon Amarsingh Ramjibhai Barot v. State of Gujarat, (2005) 7 SCC 550, the Court held that the Trial Court had committed a grave factual error by clubbing the heroin allegedly recovered from two distinct individuals merely to bring the total above the commercial-quantity threshold.

    Serious Defects Found in Sampling Procedure

    • The Supreme Court then examined the manner in which the alleged contraband was sampled and found several significant deficiencies.
    • The seizure officer had collected only one sample from each packet. The Court noted that this was contrary to Clause 2.2 of Standing Order No. 1 of 1989 dated June 13, 1989, issued by the Anti-Smuggling Unit, Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance.
    • The Standing Order contemplated that samples from seized narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances should be drawn in duplicate at the spot of recovery, in the presence of the panch witnesses and the person from whom the substance was recovered.
    • The Court referred to Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417, where the Supreme Court had emphasised compliance with such guidelines, particularly in penal proceedings.

    Accused’s Signatures Missing From Sample and Mother Packets

    • Another serious discrepancy concerned the signatures on the seized material.
    • The seizure officer claimed that the accused, Gazetted Officer and witnesses had signed the seizure list and labels. However, when the sample packets were opened during trial, the Court found that the labels did not bear the accused-appellant’s signatures.
    • After examining the evidence, the Supreme Court recorded that neither the mother packet nor the sample packets bore Nadeem’s signatures when they were opened and exhibited before the Trial Court.
    • This discrepancy further undermined the reliability and integrity of the sampling process.

    No Separate Sample Seizure List, Test Memo or Weighment Chart

    • The Court identified additional gaps in the prosecution evidence.
    • No separate seizure list had been prepared for the samples drawn from the appellant. There was also no test memo or weighment chart prepared at the spot, and no specimen seal memo was proved during the seizure officer’s evidence.
    • Although two independent witnesses had allegedly participated in the proceedings, only one was examined by the prosecution, without explaining why the other was withheld.

    Complete Failure to Follow Section 52A Procedure

    • The most significant deficiency identified by the Supreme Court concerned Section 52A(2) of the NDPS Act.
    • The record showed that neither the seizure officer nor the officer-in-charge undertook the statutory procedure concerning inventory and sampling in the presence of a Magistrate.
    • The Trial Court itself had noted that the seizure officer could not even state whether an inventory list had been prepared at the time of the raid.
    • The Supreme Court consequently held that there had been a β€œcomplete and unexplained failure” to adhere to Section 52A.
    • Neither representative samples were drawn in the presence of a Magistrate nor was an inventory prepared and certified as contemplated by law.
    • According to the Court, these lapses went to the root of the prosecution case and rendered the integrity of the seizure and sampling process wholly doubtful.

    Section 52A Not Mandatory Per Se, But Cumulative Lapses Proved Fatal

    • Importantly, the Supreme Court did not hold that every breach of Section 52A automatically results in acquittal.
    • The Court expressly clarified that the procedure under Section 52A had not been considered mandatory by the Supreme Court.
    • However, in the present case, the failure to draw samples in accordance with Standing Order No. 1 of 1989, when considered together with the complete non-compliance with Section 52A, made the seizure and sampling procedure unreliable.
    • The Court went so far as to describe the cumulative procedure as a β€œtotal farce” and β€œunworthy of credence.”
    • This qualification is particularly important: the decision turns on the combined effect of multiple serious procedural defects, rather than laying down a rule of automatic acquittal for every Section 52A irregularity.

    FSL Report Loses Evidentiary Significance

    • The consequence of the defective sampling procedure was decisive.
    • The Supreme Court held that the FSL report lost significance because of the flawed manner in which samples had been collected, coupled with the total failure to comply with Section 52A.
    • It ultimately held that the FSL report could not be read in evidence. Once the forensic report was excluded, there was no acceptable evidence proving that the substance allegedly recovered from Nadeem was heroin within the meaning of the NDPS Act.

    Conviction Set Aside; Nadeem Ahamed Acquitted

    • The Supreme Court consequently set aside the impugned judgments and acquitted Nadeem Ahamed of the charges.
    • It directed that he be released from custody forthwith, unless his detention was required in any other case.
    • The appeals were accordingly allowed.

    Key Takeaway

    The ruling underscores two important safeguards in NDPS prosecutions.

    First, narcotics allegedly recovered separately from two accused cannot automatically be aggregated to reach commercial quantity merely because they were apprehended together. Where the prosecution relies on Section 29 conspiracy to combine the quantities, it must establish conspiracy through positive and tangible evidence rather than suspicion or conjecture.

    Second, although the Supreme Court did not treat Section 52A compliance as invariably mandatory in every case, serious and cumulative deficiencies in sampling, sealing, identification, inventory and Magistrate-supervised procedures can undermine the integrity of the alleged contraband itself.

    Where those deficiencies render the sampling process unreliable, even a positive FSL report may cease to provide a safe evidentiary foundation for conviction.

    Connected Matter

    Supreme Court Acquits Two in NDPS Case Over Broken Chain of Custody: Says FSL Report Cannot Survive Serious Gaps in Sample Integrity

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Supreme Court

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  • Bombay HC: RERA Tribunal Cannot Grant Declaration, Permanent Injunction or Cancel Sanction Plan

    Bombay HC: RERA Tribunal Cannot Grant Declaration, Permanent Injunction or Cancel Sanction Plan

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 18.09.2026

    Bombay HC: RERA Tribunal Cannot Grant Declaration, Permanent Injunction or Cancel Sanction Plan

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id amitnaren@outlook.com .  

    In a significant ruling concerning the interface between RERA and the jurisdiction of civil courts, the Bombay High Court has dismissed a revision application filed by Macrotech Developers Limited, holding that the bar under Section 79 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 does not extend to reliefs that the RERA authorities are not empowered to grant.

    Justice Milind N. Jadhav held that a dispute involving a cooperative housing society’s substantive rights over an existing clubhouse and internal roads, coupled with prayers for declaration, permanent injunction and cancellation of a sanctioned development plan, could be adjudicated by the Civil Court because RERA does not empower its authorities to grant such reliefs.

    The High Court consequently upheld the Trial Court’s refusal to reject the suit under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure and dismissed Macrotech Developers’ Civil Revision Application.

    Dispute Relates to Lodha Belmondo Project in Pune

    • Macrotech Developers Limited was the promoter of the Lodha Belmondo development project at Village Gahunje, Taluka Maval, District Pune. The project comprised multiple towers and villas over a large parcel of land.
    • Saint Andrews Co-operative Housing Society represented flat owners in various towers and villas situated within an area described as β€œThe Reserve” in the Lodha Belmondo project.
    • According to the Society, the project had been marketed from around 2012–2013 and agreements for sale had been entered into with purchasers. Its case was that Towers B, C and D and Villas 1–28, along with other towers, were integral parts of β€œThe Reserve.”

    Multiple Sanction Plans and Clubhouse at Centre of Dispute

    • The judgment records a series of sanctioned development plans.
    • A third sanctioned plan dated April 30, 2013 showed six buildings and 28 villas as part of β€œThe Reserve”. A fifth sanctioned plan dated June 22, 2018 specifically referred to a clubhouse for members of β€œThe Reserve”. A subsequent seventh sanctioned plan dated September 20, 2021, however, showed the clubhouse near Tower No. 26 as proposed to be demolished.
    • Members of the Society had received possession of their flats in 2017 following issuance of an Occupation Certificate, while the Society itself was registered in March 2021.
    • The dispute escalated in October 2022 when Macrotech’s workers allegedly prevented Society members from entering and using the clubhouse on the ground that the existing facility was to be demolished and replaced.

    Society Approaches Civil Court

    • The Society instituted a civil suit seeking, among other things, a declaration regarding the clubhouse situated behind Tower No. 26 and an injunction restraining the developer and its representatives from preventing members from accessing the clubhouse.
    • It also sought to prevent demolition or additional construction pursuant to changes made in the layout and the seventh sanctioned plan.
    • The Trial Court rejected Macrotech Developers’ application under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC seeking rejection of the plaint as barred by law.
    • Macrotech thereafter approached the Bombay High Court by way of the present Civil Revision Application challenging that order.

    Macrotech: Section 79 RERA Bars Civil Court Jurisdiction

    • Macrotech argued that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction because Section 79 of RERA expressly bars Civil Courts from entertaining matters that fall within the jurisdiction of the authorities constituted under RERA.
    • The developer contended that once a project is registered under RERA, disputes arising out of or incidental to that project must be pursued before the competent forum under the statute.
    • Macrotech also relied upon Section 149 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act and argued that the suit was barred under that enactment as well.
    • It relied, inter alia, on the Supreme Court’s ruling in New Tech Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1044, to contend that RERA applies to ongoing projects which had not received completion certificates before the legislation came into force.
    • Macrotech also relied on Imperia Structures Ltd. v. Anil Patni & Anr., (2020) 10 SCC 783, and argued that the Society could pursue appropriate remedies before the RERA forum or Consumer Forum rather than the Civil Court.

    Society: RERA Cannot Grant the Declaratory Reliefs Sought

    • The Society opposed the revision and argued that it was itself a separate legal entity registered under the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 and was not an individual β€œallottee” within the meaning of RERA.
    • It further argued that Section 79 could not operate as a blanket exclusion of Civil Court jurisdiction in disputes between a cooperative housing society and a promoter.
    • More importantly, the Society contended that it had sought declaratory and other civil reliefs that RERA authorities could not grant.
    • According to the Society, Civil Courts retain jurisdiction over civil disputes unless expressly or impliedly barred, and the nature of the relief sought was therefore crucial in deciding jurisdiction.

    Bombay HC Explains Test Under Order VII Rule 11(d)

    • The High Court reiterated that while considering rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11, the Court must examine the averments contained in the plaint along with its annexures as a whole.
    • At this stage, material outside the plaint cannot be added or subtracted to determine whether the suit is barred by law.
    • The Court observed that rejection under Order VII Rule 11(d) is justified only when the plaint itself discloses that the action is legally barred.
    • In the present case, the Society sought a declaration that the clubhouse behind Tower No. 26 was an integral part of β€œThe Reserve”, a permanent injunction against its demolition, and a declaration challenging the September 20, 2021 sanction plan to the extent it contemplated demolition of the existing clubhouse and construction of another structure in its place.

    Section 79 RERA Is Not a Blanket Bar Against Civil Suits

    • The High Court then examined Sections 79, 88 and 89 of RERA.
    • Section 79 bars Civil Courts from entertaining suits or proceedings concerning matters that the RERA Authority, Adjudicating Officer or Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine.
    • However, Section 88 expressly provides that RERA operates β€œin addition to, and not in derogation of” other laws, while Section 89 gives RERA overriding effect where inconsistency exists.
    • Reading these provisions together, the High Court held that RERA is not the sole remedy for every dispute between allottees and promoters/developers.
    • The Section 79 bar applies only to those matters that the authorities constituted under RERA are actually empowered to determine.

    Can RERA Authority Grant the Same Relief as a Civil Court? Bombay HC Applies Supreme Court Test

    • The High Court relied upon the Supreme Court’s judgment in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, (1985) 4 SCC 10.
    • The principle applied was that even where a special statute creates a tribunal and accords finality to its decisions, exclusion of Civil Court jurisdiction depends materially upon whether the statutory tribunal is capable of granting the relief that a Civil Court would ordinarily grant.
    • Where the specialised forum does not possess the power to grant such relief, exclusion of Civil Court jurisdiction cannot readily be inferred.
    • This became the decisive principle in the case.

    RERA Tribunal Cannot Grant Declaration, Permanent Injunction and Cancellation of Sanction Plan: Bombay HC

    Applying the above principle, Justice Jadhav held that the dispute involved the Society’s substantive right to use an existing clubhouse and its challenge to a subsequent sanctioned plan allegedly validated without its approval.

    The Court specifically found an β€œapparent and glaring absence” of provisions under RERA empowering its authorities to adjudicate reliefs in the nature of:

    • declaration;
    • permanent injunction; and
    • cancellation of a sanction plan approved by the Planning Authority.

    Consequently, such a dispute could not be said to fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the authorities constituted under RERA.

    Society’s Right to Use Clubhouse Had β€œCrystallized”

    • The High Court also took note of the factual history of the clubhouse.
    • The clubhouse had appeared in the fifth sanctioned plan dated June 22, 2018, had subsequently been constructed, and was being used by members of the Society.
    • The seventh sanctioned plan dated September 20, 2021 proposed its demolition. The Court noted that the Society’s consent had admittedly not been obtained before the seventh plan was validated or proposed.
    • The Court observed that the Society members’ right to use the clubhouse had already β€œstood crystallized and in place since inception and on construction of the Clubhouse.”
    • The dispute also involved internal roads that were allegedly proposed to be constructed upon pursuant to the seventh sanctioned plan without the Society’s consent.

    Civil Court Alone Can Grant Appropriate Relief in Such Circumstances

    • The High Court concluded that the substantive rights claimed by the Society could be protected through the civil suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
    • It rejected Macrotech Developers’ contention that the Society’s remedy lay before the RERA Tribunal and held that, in the circumstances before it, the Civil Court could entertain the dispute and grant appropriate reliefs.
    • Accordingly, the Court upheld the Trial Court’s order refusing to reject the plaint and dismissed Macrotech Developers’ Civil Revision Application.

    Important Clarification: Merits of Society’s Suit Not Finally Decided

    • The ruling should not be read as a final determination that the seventh sanctioned plan is invalid or that the Society has conclusively established all of the substantive rights asserted in its suit.
    • The High Court expressly clarified that its findings were prima facie and restricted to the revision proceedings, and that they should not influence the ultimate adjudication of the underlying suit. The parties’ other contentions and remedies were kept open.
    • Thus, Saint Andrews Co-operative Housing Society succeeded on the jurisdiction/maintainability issue, while the underlying civil dispute remains to be adjudicated on merits.

    Key Legal Takeaway

    The judgment reinforces that Section 79 of RERA does not create a universal bar against Civil Court jurisdiction merely because a dispute concerns a RERA-registered real estate project.

    The decisive inquiry is whether the particular matter and relief sought are within the statutory powers of the RERA Authority, Adjudicating Officer or Appellate Tribunal. Where the dispute requires relief such as a civil declaration, permanent injunction or cancellation of a sanctioned development plan that the RERA forum is not empowered to grant, the Civil Court’s jurisdiction may remain available.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Bombay High Court

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  • Bombay High Court: Arbitral Tribunal’s Mandate Can Be Extended Even After Expiry if β€œSufficient Cause” Is Shown

    Bombay High Court: Arbitral Tribunal’s Mandate Can Be Extended Even After Expiry if β€œSufficient Cause” Is Shown

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 18.09.2026

    Bombay High Court: Arbitral Tribunal’s Mandate Can Be Extended Even After Expiry if β€œSufficient Cause” Is Shown

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Arbitrator Shobhit Mallik. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id shobhit.Ica23@gmail.com .

    The Bombay High Court has allowed a petition filed by SAP India Private Limited seeking extension of the mandate of an arbitral tribunal constituted by the Supreme Court, holding that where arbitral proceedings could not conclude for reasons beyond the control of the party or tribunal, and the delay was not attributable to wilful or deliberate default, refusing an extension despite sufficient cause could defeat the purpose of arbitration.

    Justice Arif S. Doctor, in SAP India Private Limited v. Cox and Kings Limited, Commercial Arbitration Petition No. 865 of 2026, pronounced the judgment on September 10, 2026. The Court extended the time available to the arbitral tribunal to make its award by one year from the date on which the High Court’s order was uploaded.

    Dispute Between SAP India and Cox & Kings

    • The dispute arose from a contract between SAP India and Cox & Kings for the provision of business software and related implementation services. Clause 15.7 of the General Terms and Conditions provided for arbitration.
    • SAP claimed that certain amounts remained outstanding under the contractual arrangement and moved an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
    • By an order dated January 2, 2019, the Supreme Court constituted a three-member arbitral tribunal. The tribunal was presided over by former Supreme Court judge Justice Madan B. Lokur, and was referred to in the judgment as the β€œJustice Lokur Tribunal.” SAP was the claimant before this tribunal.
    • SAP filed its Statement of Claim on March 22, 2019, seeking approximately β‚Ή17.98 crore from Cox & Kings. Cox & Kings subsequently filed its Statement of Defence and Counter-claim on July 31, 2019, claiming approximately β‚Ή45.99 crore from SAP.

    CIRP Moratorium Brought Arbitration to a Halt

    • A major turn occurred on October 22, 2019, when the National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai admitted Cox & Kings into the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP).
    • Consequently, the statutory moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) came into operation, staying legal proceedings against the company.
    • Because of the moratorium, the Justice Lokur Tribunal informed the parties on November 5, 2019 that the arbitral proceedings stood adjourned sine die.
    • Cox & Kings was subsequently ordered into liquidation by the NCLT on December 16, 2021. SAP lodged its claim with the Liquidator in February 2022, and the Liquidator admitted it at a nominal value of Re. 1, recording that the liability could not be quantified because of the ongoing arbitration proceedings.

    Second Arbitration Added Another Layer to the Dispute

    • Meanwhile, Cox & Kings had issued a fresh arbitration notice against SAP India and its parent company, SAP SE.
    • On September 9, 2024, the Supreme Court appointed former Bombay High Court Chief Justice Justice Mohit Shah as sole arbitrator to adjudicate those disputes. The High Court referred to this as the β€œJustice Shah Tribunal.”
    • Cox & Kings initially claimed β‚Ή45.99 crore before the Justice Shah Tribunal and subsequently amended its claim to β‚Ή45,99,71,097.
    • SAP argued that this amount was virtually identical to the counter-claim Cox & Kings had already raised before the Justice Lokur Tribunal. SAP consequently challenged the jurisdiction of the Justice Shah Tribunal under Section 16 of the Arbitration Act, but its objections were rejected.
    • SAP pursued the jurisdictional issue before the Bombay High Court and then the Supreme Court. Its Special Leave Petition was ultimately dismissed on January 23, 2026.

    SAP Sought Revival of Original Arbitration

    • Soon after the Supreme Court proceedings ended, SAP approached the Justice Lokur Tribunal on February 2, 2026, seeking resumption and continuation of its original arbitration.
    • Cox & Kings opposed the request, contending that the Justice Lokur Tribunal had become functus officio and no longer possessed jurisdiction to revive the proceedings. It also pointed to the existence of the Justice Shah Tribunal and SAP’s claim in the liquidation process.
    • The Justice Lokur Tribunal ultimately directed SAP to approach the Bombay High Court for an extension of time. SAP accordingly filed the present petition under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

    SAP: Delay Was Caused by Circumstances Beyond Its Control

    • SAP argued that it had diligently pursued its claims and that the original arbitration could not proceed because of circumstances outside its control.
    • It relied on the commencement of CIRP, the statutory moratorium, the COVID-19 limitation exclusion period and Cox & Kings’ subsequent pursuit of another arbitration involving substantially the same subject matter.
    • SAP therefore argued that it had established β€œsufficient cause” under Section 29A(5) for extending the Justice Lokur Tribunal’s mandate.

    Cox & Kings Opposed Extension, Alleging Unexplained Delay

    • Cox & Kings argued that Section 29A(5) does not permit extension as a matter of course and that SAP had failed to explain a substantial intervening period.
    • It contended that SAP could have sought extension much earlier and characterised SAP’s conduct as β€œfence-sitting”, alleging that SAP attempted to revive the Justice Lokur arbitration only after its challenges to the Justice Shah Tribunal had failed.
    • Cox & Kings also argued that reviving the Justice Lokur Tribunal would serve little purpose because it was already in liquidation and SAP’s claim had been admitted in the liquidation process.
    • Another concern raised was the possibility of parallel arbitrations producing inconsistent or conflicting findings, because the claims before the two tribunals arose from the same contractual framework.

    Bombay High Court: Section 29A Extension Can Be Granted Even After Mandate Expires

    • The High Court rejected the proposition that the application must fail merely because the tribunal’s mandate had already expired.
    • Relying upon Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Ltd., the Court reiterated that time for completing arbitral proceedings can be extended even after expiry of the initial 12-month period or the extended six-month period.
    • The real question was therefore not simply when the application was filed, but whether SAP had demonstrated sufficient cause under Section 29A(5).

    β€œSufficient Cause” Must Be Examined in Context of Purpose of Arbitration

    • The Court emphasised that Section 29A is intended to ensure expeditious arbitral proceedings, but the power of extension requires examination of the particular facts and circumstances.
    • Referring to C. Velusamy v. K. Indhera and Ajay Protech Pvt. Ltd. v. General Manager & Anr., the High Court observed that β€œsufficient cause” must be understood in the context of arbitration’s underlying purposeβ€”the resolution of disputes through the mechanism chosen by the parties.
    • The Court held, in substance, that where arbitration does not conclude within the prescribed timeline because of circumstances beyond the parties’ or tribunal’s control, and the delay is not caused by wilful default or a deliberate attempt to delay proceedings by the party seeking extension, it would be unjust to refuse condonation where sufficient cause is otherwise demonstrated.

    Length of Delay Alone Is Not Decisive

    • An important principle emerging from the judgment is that a long delay does not, by itself, automatically defeat a Section 29A petition.
    • The Court distinguished decisions relied upon by Cox & Kings where extensions had been refused because the intervening delay was not satisfactorily explained.
    • According to the High Court, the decisive consideration in those cases was the absence of sufficient cause, rather than merely the length of time that had passed.
    • This distinction is important for Section 29A applications because it requires courts to examine why the arbitration was delayed, rather than applying an inflexible rule based solely on the duration of the delay.

    SAP Was Justified in Pursuing Jurisdictional Challenge

    • The Court also rejected the contention that SAP had simply sat on its rights.
    • When the Supreme Court appointed the Justice Shah Tribunal in 2024, it had kept open SAP’s rights and contentions to raise its jurisdictional objections before that tribunal.
    • The Bombay High Court therefore found that SAP was justified in pursuing its challenge to the jurisdiction of the Justice Shah Tribunal.
    • After the Supreme Court dismissed SAP’s SLP on January 23, 2026, SAP approached the Justice Lokur Tribunal on February 2, 2026β€”within a short periodβ€”to seek resumption of its original arbitration.
    • The High Court considered this conduct inconsistent with any suggestion that SAP had abandoned the Justice Lokur proceedings.

    β€œFence-Sitter” Argument Rejected

    • The Court consequently rejected Cox & Kings’ characterisation of SAP as a β€œfence sitter”.
    • It noted that the original proceedings had stopped after Cox & Kings entered CIRP and the Section 14 IBC moratorium became operative. Cox & Kings subsequently initiated another arbitration involving a claim virtually identical to the counter-claim it had raised before the Justice Lokur Tribunal.
    • Against this factual background, SAP’s pursuit of jurisdictional remedies before the Justice Shah Tribunal and higher courts could not be treated simply as abandonment or negligent inactivity.

    Liquidation Does Not By Itself Defeat Section 29A Extension

    • Cox & Kings had also argued that extending the tribunal’s mandate would be futile because the company was already in liquidation.
    • The Court did not accept this as a reason to refuse the Section 29A extension.
    • It noted, among other things, SAP’s reliance on Regulation 29 of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, concerning mutual credits and set-off. The Court clarified that questions relating to the effect of liquidation and objections concerning SAP’s claim could be raised before the arbitral tribunal and did not have to be finally determined while deciding the Section 29A application.

    Court Finds β€œSufficient Cause” for Extension

    • After considering the unusual procedural history, the Bombay High Court concluded that SAP had established sufficient cause for extension of the Justice Lokur Tribunal’s mandate.
    • Crucially, the Court found that the delay in completion of the arbitration could not, in the circumstances, be attributed to any deliberate, wilful or negligent default on the part of SAP, much less to the tribunal.
    • The Court reasoned that allowing the mandate to lapse without giving SAP an opportunity to have its pending claim adjudicated would defeat rather than advance the underlying object of the arbitral process.

    Justice Lokur Tribunal Gets One-Year Extension

    • Accordingly, the Bombay High Court allowed SAP India’s petition and extended the time available to the Justice Lokur Tribunal to make its award by one year.
    • The one-year extended period will run from the date on which a copy of the High Court’s order was uploaded.
    • The Court made no order as to costs.
    • Thus, SAP India succeeded in obtaining the Section 29A extension. Importantly, however, the ruling does not decide the merits of SAP’s underlying β‚Ή17.98 crore contractual claim against Cox & Kings; it permits that pending claim to proceed before the arbitral tribunal.

    Key Legal Takeaway

    The judgment reinforces that Section 29A is not an inflexible limitation mechanism under which expiry of an arbitral tribunal’s mandate automatically forecloses an extension.

    A post-expiry application can be entertained, but the applicant must establish β€œsufficient cause”. In assessing that requirement, courts may consider the entire procedural history, whether circumstances outside the applicant’s control interrupted the arbitration, whether the applicant acted diligently once those impediments ended, and whether the delay resulted from wilful or negligent conduct.

    The ruling also demonstrates that the mere passage of a substantial period is not necessarily determinative. The central enquiry remains whether the delay has been satisfactorily explained in the factual circumstances of the particular arbitration.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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    Source: Bombay High Court

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