ALS

π€πšππ«π’π€πšπš π‹πžπ πšπ₯ π’πžπ«π―π’πœπžπ¬ (𝐀𝐋𝐒)

Tag: #Youtube

  • Delhi High Court Quashes β‚Ή76.72 Lakh Excise Demand; Holds Adjudicating Authority Cannot Disregard Binding CESTAT Order

    Delhi High Court Quashes β‚Ή76.72 Lakh Excise Demand; Holds Adjudicating Authority Cannot Disregard Binding CESTAT Order

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 15.09.2026

    Delhi High Court Quashes β‚Ή76.72 Lakh Excise Demand; Holds Adjudicating Authority Cannot Disregard Binding CESTAT Order

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    The Delhi High Court has ruled in favour of Wellspring Universal, setting aside a β‚Ή76.72 lakh demand raised by the Central GST authorities after finding that the adjudicating authority had failed to give effect to an earlier CESTAT order which had already upheld the taxpayer’s entitlement to refund.

    A Division Bench comprising Justice Anil Kshetrapal and Justice Shail Jain, in Wellspring Universal v. Additional Commissioner of Central GST, W.P.(C) 11957/2025, set aside both the Demand-cum-Show Cause Notice dated 10 December 2019 and the consequential Order-in-Original dated 24 March 2025. The judgment was pronounced on 14 September 2026.

    The Court also directed refund of the petitioner’s β‚Ή7,67,200 statutory pre-deposit with applicable interest.

    Background of the Dispute

    • Wellspring Universal is a partnership firm engaged in manufacturing engineering products, particularly in the welding sector. It was registered as a 100% Export Oriented Unit (EOU) and also as a private bonded warehouse under Sections 58 and 65 of the Customs Act, 1962.
    • The dispute had a lengthy history involving CENVAT credit, excise duty paid on exports and subsequent refund proceedings.
    • Between April and December 2007, Wellspring exported goods through 36 consignments after paying excise duty of β‚Ή76,72,000. It initially sought rebate under Rule 18 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002. After the Department took the position that the EOU was not required to pay duty on exported goods, the petitioner repaid rebate already sanctioned and subsequently pursued its claim through the CENVAT credit/refund mechanism.
    • Earlier proceedings eventually culminated in an Order-in-Original dated 21 March 2017, whereby proceedings against the petitioner were dropped. That order was accepted by the competent reviewing authority and was not challenged.

    β‚Ή76.72 Lakh Refund Sanctioned

    • Following these proceedings, Wellspring filed a refund claim for β‚Ή76,72,000, which was sanctioned by the Assistant Commissioner, CGST, Janakpuri through Refund Order dated 6 May 2019.
    • The authority found, among other things, that the refund claim was within limitation and that the necessary documents evidencing export had been furnished.
    • The Department, however, reviewed the refund order and filed an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals). During the pendency of that appeal, a separate Demand-cum-Show Cause Notice dated 10 December 2019 was issued alleging that the β‚Ή76.72 lakh refund had been erroneously sanctioned and proposing recovery with interest.
    • The Commissioner (Appeals) subsequently allowed the Department’s appeal on 16 December 2019, including on the ground that the credit ought to have been transitioned through TRAN-1 and that cash refund could not be sustained.

    CESTAT Ultimately Upheld Wellspring’s β‚Ή76.72 Lakh Refund

    • Wellspring challenged the Commissioner (Appeals)’ order before CESTAT.
    • In Final Order No. 56215/2024 dated 1 August 2024, CESTAT allowed Wellspring’s appeal and set aside the Commissioner (Appeals)’ order.
    • Significantly, CESTAT did not decide the matter merely on a technical ground. It expressly held that Wellspring was entitled to refund of β‚Ή76,72,000 under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.
    • CESTAT further held that a substantive benefit could not be denied merely because the petitioner had quoted the wrong rule while claiming refund or because the Assistant Commissioner had sanctioned it with reference to an incorrect rule.
    • CESTAT also specifically examined the Department’s limitation objection and held that the refund claim was not barred by limitation.

    Department Still Confirmed β‚Ή76.72 Lakh Demand

    • Despite the CESTAT decision, the Additional Commissioner passed an Order-in-Original on 24 March 2025, confirming the β‚Ή76.72 lakh demand against Wellspring.
    • Among the grounds adopted were that earlier refund claims had been rejected and not challenged, that the subsequent refund applications constituted fresh claims barred by limitation, and that the 2019 Refund Order had been set aside by the Commissioner (Appeals).
    • This prompted Wellspring to approach the Delhi High Court.

    Delhi High Court: CESTAT’s Operative Order Could Not Be Ignored

    • The High Court found a fundamental flaw in the Department’s approach.
    • It observed that the Commissioner (Appeals)’ order dated 16 December 2019, on which the Additional Commissioner had relied, had itself already been set aside by CESTAT on 1 August 2024.
    • Therefore, the adjudicating authority could not proceed in March 2025 as though the Commissioner (Appeals)’ order continued to remain an operative determination against Wellspring.

    The Court emphasised a significant principle governing departmental adjudication:

    An adjudicating authority exercising statutory powers must take into account operative orders passed by appellate authorities having appellate jurisdiction over it and cannot disregard a subsequent appellate determination directly bearing upon the issue under adjudication.

    Limitation Issue Could Not Be Reopened Contrary to CESTAT Finding

    • The High Court also rejected the Department’s attempt to once again treat the refund as time-barred.
    • CESTAT had already specifically considered the limitation issue and decided it in Wellspring’s favour. The Additional Commissioner, therefore, could not simply treat the refund as a fresh application and reach a conclusion directly contrary to the Tribunal’s determination.
    • The High Court observed that the petitioner had specifically communicated CESTAT’s 2024 decision to the adjudicating authority on 24 February 2025. Thus, this was not a situation where the authority was unaware of the appellate decision.
    • Nevertheless, the Order-in-Original was passed on 24 March 2025 without dealing with its effect.

    Substantive Refund Benefit Cannot Be Denied Merely for Quoting Wrong Rule

    • Another important aspect of the case is CESTAT’s underlying finding, which the High Court treated as operative.
    • CESTAT had held that Wellspring was substantively entitled to the β‚Ή76.72 lakh refund under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, and that the benefit could not be denied merely because an incorrect rule had been quoted while filing or sanctioning the refund claim.
    • The High Court clarified that CESTAT’s order had not merely removed the Commissioner (Appeals)’ order on a procedural or technical basis; the Tribunal had actually examined and upheld Wellspring’s substantive entitlement to the refund.

    Delhi High Court Quashes SCN and Order-in-Original

    • The Court ultimately found that the Additional Commissioner had committed a β€œmanifest error” in confirming the β‚Ή76.72 lakh demand.
    • It held that the impugned adjudication was fundamentally unsustainable because it failed to give effect to CESTAT’s subsequent Final Order and proceeded on the basis of an appellate order that had already ceased to exist.

    Accordingly, the High Court:

    • allowed Wellspring Universal’s writ petition;
    • set aside the Demand-cum-Show Cause Notice dated 10 December 2019;
    • set aside the Order-in-Original dated 24 March 2025 confirming β‚Ή76.72 lakh demand; and
    • directed refund of β‚Ή7,67,200 deposited as statutory pre-deposit, together with applicable interest in accordance with law.

    Why the Judgment Is Significant

    • The ruling reinforces judicial and quasi-judicial discipline within the tax adjudication hierarchy. Once a competent appellate tribunal has conclusively decided an issue and its order has neither been stayed nor set aside, a subordinate adjudicating authority cannot effectively nullify that decision by deciding the same issue on a contrary premise.
    • The High Court specifically recorded that CESTAT’s Final Order dated 1 August 2024 had not been shown to have been stayed or set aside in subsequent proceedings.
    • The judgment is also significant for legacy Central Excise/CENVAT disputes transitioning into the GST era. It demonstrates that the existence of a separate demand proceeding cannot justify ignoring an operative appellate determination that directly decides the taxpayer’s entitlement and limitation issues.

    Key Legal Principle

    A statutory adjudicating authority cannot disregard an operative decision of the appellate authority having jurisdiction over it. Where CESTAT has already adjudicated the taxpayer’s substantive entitlement to refund and limitation, the adjudicating authority cannot subsequently confirm a demand on premises directly contrary to that binding appellate determination.

    Listen to this on our #YouTube Channel

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Delhi High Court

    Disclaimer

    Handy Download:

    “Handy Order for Download”Download

    Write to us at office@aadrikaalaw.com

    Tel: +91-11-4999 2707

    www.aadrikaalaw.com

    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Delhi High Court: Prior Formal Declaration Not Required to Claim Protection as a Well-Known Trademark Under Section 11(2)

    Delhi High Court: Prior Formal Declaration Not Required to Claim Protection as a Well-Known Trademark Under Section 11(2)

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 14.09.2026

    Delhi High Court: Prior Formal Declaration Not Required to Claim Protection as a Well-Known Trademark Under Section 11(2)

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    In an important ruling on the protection of well-known trademarks across dissimilar classes of goods, the Delhi High Court has held that a trademark need not have already been formally declared a β€œwell-known trademark” before its proprietor can invoke Section 11(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 to oppose registration of an identical or similar mark for dissimilar goods.

    Justice Jyoti Singh delivered the ruling in an appeal filed by Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., challenging the Registrar of Trade Marks’ rejection of its opposition to registration of the mark β€œGHOST BUSTER” in Class 05. The Court did not itself finally declare GHOSTBUSTERS a well-known trademark or finally reject the rival mark. Instead, it remanded the matter to the Registrar for fresh consideration of Columbia Pictures’ well-known-mark and bad-faith objections.

    Columbia Pictures Opposed Registration of β€˜GHOST BUSTER’ in Class 05

    • The dispute arose after an application was filed for registration of β€œGHOST BUSTER” in Class 05 for pharmaceutical, veterinary and sanitary preparations, dietetic substances for medical use, food for babies, dressings, disinfectants, fungicides, herbicides and other specified products.
    • Columbia Pictures filed a notice of opposition on 18 April 2022. However, the Registrar rejected the opposition by an order dated 16 April 2025, prompting Columbia Pictures to approach the Delhi High Court under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act read with Rule 156 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017.

    Columbia Relied on Decades-Old GHOSTBUSTERS Franchise

    • Columbia Pictures asserted that it is an American film studio and production company and that GHOSTBUSTERS, first released in 1984, became one of the best-known supernatural comedy film franchises.
    • The judgment records that the franchise subsequently expanded through sequels, animated television series and later films, including Ghostbusters: Afterlife and Ghostbusters: Frozen Empire. In India, the movies have been released since 1985 and have also been made available through various streaming platforms.
    • Columbia also relied upon extensive merchandising, advertising and media coverage associated with the GHOSTBUSTERS name. The judgment records that merchandise bearing the markβ€”including apparel, toys, mugs, keychains, books and other productsβ€”was available in India.

    GHOSTBUSTERS Already Registered in India in Multiple Classes

    • There was no dispute that Columbia Pictures held Indian registrations for GHOSTBUSTERS in Classes 09 and 41, registered on 14 August 2012 with claimed use since 29 November 1985, and registrations in Classes 25 and 28 dated 25 October 2019.
    • The rival application for GHOST BUSTER, however, was filed on 1 December 2020 on a β€œproposed to be used” basis in Class 05.
    • This difference in classes became central to the controversy.

    Registrar Rejected Opposition Because Goods Were Dissimilar

    • The Registrar essentially rejected Columbia’s opposition because its GHOSTBUSTERS registrations related to Classes 09, 41, 25 and 28, whereas the rival GHOST BUSTER application concerned Class 05.
    • The Registrar reasoned that Columbia had not shown prior use of GHOSTBUSTERS specifically for Class 05 goods and therefore could not claim monopoly merely on the strength of registrations in other classes.
    • The Registrar also accepted the rival applicant’s explanation that β€œGHOST” referred to unexpected β€œghost peaks” appearing in chromatography and β€œBUSTER” referred to the product’s function of eliminating or removing impurities responsible for such peaks.

    Delhi HC Finds Registrar Failed to Consider a Crucial Section 11(2) Objection

    • The High Court found a fundamental flaw in this approach.
    • Justice Jyoti Singh observed that Columbia had specifically claimed that GHOSTBUSTERS was an earlier well-known trademark within the meaning of Section 11(2) and was consequently entitled to protection even against a nearly identical mark proposed for registration in a different class.
    • Yet the Registrar had failed to adjudicate this contention.
    • The Court described the non-consideration as a β€œglaring error”, noting that once such an opposition was raised, the Registrar was required to examine it and decide whether the earlier mark qualified for protection under Section 11(2).

    Section 11(2) Protects Well-Known Marks Even Against Dissimilar Goods

    • Section 11(2) assumes particular significance because it extends trademark protection beyond the conventional requirement that competing goods or services must be similar.
    • The provision contemplates refusal of registration where the later mark is identical or similar to an earlier trademark, even for dissimilar goods or services, if the earlier mark is a well-known trademark in India and use of the later mark without due cause would take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive character or reputation of the earlier mark.
    • Accordingly, if Columbia could establish that GHOSTBUSTERS satisfied the statutory threshold of a well-known trademark, the mere fact that the rival application fell in Class 05 could not, by itself, dispose of its opposition.

    Prior Formal Declaration as β€˜Well-Known’ Is Not Mandatory

    • The most important legal finding of the judgment concerns whether an opponent must first obtain a formal declaration of well-known status before relying on Section 11(2).
    • The Delhi High Court answered that question in the negative.
    • Justice Jyoti Singh held that Section 11(2) neither requires nor envisages that the earlier trademark must already have been formally declared a well-known trademark. Instead, the inquiry is whether the earlier mark satisfies the statutory threshold of being well known among the relevant segment of the public and enjoys the requisite reputation in India.
    • The Court emphasised the statutory phrase β€œentitled to protection as a well-known trademark” and held that β€œentitled” cannot simply be read as β€œdeclared”. The factors prescribed under Sections 11(6) and 11(7) are therefore relevant to determining whether the mark satisfies that threshold.

    Rule 124 Is Not the Only Route to Well-Known Mark Protection

    • The Registrar’s side argued that Columbia should first have invoked Rule 124 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, which provides a mechanism for determination of a trademark as well known.
    • The High Court rejected the proposition that Rule 124 constitutes a mandatory pre-condition for invoking Section 11(2) in opposition proceedings.
    • The Court pointed out that the legislation deliberately uses different expressionsβ€”β€œwell-known trademark” in Section 11(2) and β€œdetermined to be well known” in Section 11(8). It consequently held that there is no statutory prescription requiring the proprietor of an earlier mark first to secure a formal well-known trademark declaration before invoking Section 11(2).

    Registrar Can Determine Well-Known Character During Opposition Proceedings

    • The ruling has important procedural implications.
    • According to the High Court, when Section 11(2) is invoked in opposition proceedings, the Registrar is empowered to examine whether the earlier mark is well known by considering evidence against the statutory factors contained in Sections 11(6) and 11(7), read with Section 2(1)(zg).
    • Those factors may include the duration and extent of use, promotion, recognition among the relevant public, registrations and the record of successful enforcement of trademark rights.
    • The decision therefore distinguishes between requiring a pre-existing formal declaration and determining whether the mark qualifies for well-known protection in the course of an opposition.

    Dissimilarity of Goods Does Not End the Inquiry

    • The Court further held that if Columbia succeeds in establishing that GHOSTBUSTERS meets the statutory threshold under Section 2(1)(zg), read with Sections 11(6) and 11(7), it can oppose the nearly identical GHOST BUSTER mark under Section 11(2) despite the dissimilarity of goods and difference in classes.
    • The Registrar, however, had focused almost entirely on the fact that Columbia’s registrations and activities were in entertainment, media and allied goods and services, whereas the rival application concerned Class 05 products.
    • The High Court criticised this approach, observing that the Registrar had taken the β€œwrong path” by failing to examine the well-known-mark issue.

    Columbia Had Produced Extensive Evidence of GHOSTBUSTERS Reputation

    • Columbia had placed substantial material before the Registrar in support of its claim.
    • The evidence referred to the release of the first GHOSTBUSTERS film in India in 1985, subsequent sequels, worldwide revenues, merchandising, availability on OTT platforms, extensive advertising and promotion, media coverage and longstanding Indian trademark registrations.
    • It also relied on registration of the mark in more than 50 countries and prior enforcement activity concerning the mark.
    • Crucially, however, the High Court did not itself finally rule that GHOSTBUSTERS is a well-known trademark in India. It held that the Registrar had failed to perform the required statutory examination and must now do so on remand.

    Alleged Bad-Faith Adoption of β€˜GHOST BUSTER’ Must Also Be Examined

    • The High Court also found that Columbia’s allegation of bad-faith adoption had not been properly considered.
    • Columbia argued that the GHOSTBUSTERS mark was so well known that adoption of the nearly identical expression GHOST BUSTER could not be coincidental.
    • It also relied upon an earlier US proceeding involving Welch Materials Inc., described in the judgment as a sister concern of Respondent No.2. Welch had applied in the United States for GHOST BUSTER in June 2019. Columbia opposed the application; it was subsequently abandoned, and the USPTO passed an order refusing the application on 7 January 2020. The Indian GHOST BUSTER application was thereafter filed on 1 December 2020.
    • The High Court observed that the Registrar’s impugned order did not address this significant contention.

    Delhi HC Discusses Meaning of β€˜Bad Faith’ in Trademark Applications

    • The Court referred to its earlier decisions in BPI Sports LLC v. Saurabh Gulati and Kia Wang v. Registrar of Trademarks while discussing bad-faith trademark adoption.
    • The judgment noted that bad faith may include cases where an applicant intentionally submits wrong or misleading information to the Trade Marks Office as well as situations where registration is sought with the intention of laying hands on a third party’s trademark.
    • The question whether the present GHOST BUSTER application actually amounted to bad-faith adoption was nevertheless left for the Registrar to decide after proper consideration.

    Delhi High Court Remands Matter to Registrar for Fresh Decision

    • After examining the Registrar’s order, Columbia’s opposition, evidence and written submissions, the High Court concluded that the matter required fresh consideration by the Registrar of Trade Marks.
    • The Registrar was specifically directed to examine all relevant contentions and supporting documents, particularly Columbia’s allegations concerning bad faith and its claim that GHOSTBUSTERS is entitled to protection as a well-known trademark under Section 11(2), tested against Sections 2(1)(zg), 11(6) and 11(7) of the Trade Marks Act.
    • Thus, Columbia Pictures obtained a significant procedural and legal victory, but the judgment should not be read as a final declaration that GHOSTBUSTERS is already a well-known trademark in India or as a final refusal of the GHOST BUSTER application. Those questions are to be reconsidered by the Registrar.

    Significance of the Judgment

    • The ruling is particularly important for owners of famous brands because it clarifies that cross-class protection under Section 11(2) is not dependent upon obtaining a formal well-known-mark declaration in advance.
    • A proprietor can raise well-known status as a ground in trademark opposition proceedings and produce evidence demonstrating that the earlier mark satisfies the statutory requirements. The Registrar must then adjudicate that claim instead of dismissing the opposition merely because the competing goods fall in different classes.
    • At the same time, the decision does not create an automatic cross-class monopoly for every reputed trademark. The proprietor must still establish, through evidence, that its mark meets the statutory threshold for well-known protection and satisfies the requirements of Section 11(2).

    Key Takeaway

    The Delhi High Court has clarified that an earlier trademark does not need a prior formal declaration as a β€œwell-known trademark” before its proprietor can invoke Section 11(2) of the Trade Marks Act against an identical or similar mark covering dissimilar goods.

    What matters is whether the earlier mark can establish, on evidence, that it qualifies for such protection under the statutory criteria. In Columbia Pictures’ case, the Registrar’s failure to examine the claimed well-known character of GHOSTBUSTERS and the allegation of bad-faith adoption of GHOST BUSTER warranted reconsideration. The matter was therefore remanded for a fresh decision.

    Connected Matter

    Delhi HC Cancels Deceptively Similar β€˜ROCKPAPA’ Trademark; Holds Prior User Has Superior Rights Over Registered Proprietor

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Delhi High Court

    Disclaimer

    Handy Download:

    “Handy Order for Download”Download

    Write to us at office@aadrikaalaw.com

    Tel: +91-11-4999 2707

    www.aadrikaalaw.com

    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Madras High Court Grants Bail in NDPS Case Involving 862 Grams of Hydroponic Ganja; Says Further Incarceration Not Required

    Madras High Court Grants Bail in NDPS Case Involving 862 Grams of Hydroponic Ganja; Says Further Incarceration Not Required

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 14.09.2026

    Madras High Court Grants Bail in NDPS Case Involving 862 Grams of Hydroponic Ganja; Says Further Incarceration Not Required

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    The Madras High Court has granted bail to Chandra Pratapray Nirankari in an NDPS case involving alleged possession of 862 grams of Hydroponic Ganja/Marijuana, holding that, considering the nature of the allegations, the period of incarceration already undergone and the fact that the quantity involved was treated as an intermediate quantity, further incarceration was not required.

    Justice N. Ramesh ordered the petitioner’s release on bail subject to execution of a bond of β‚Ή25,000 with two sureties for a like sum, along with reporting and other conditions.

    Petitioner Arrested Under NDPS Act

    • The petitioner had been arrested and remanded to judicial custody on 17 August 2026 in connection with O.S. No.535/2026-AIU-B and O.S. No.39 of 2026 INT-AIR.
    • The alleged offences were under Section 8(c) read with Sections 23, 28 and 29, and Section 20(b)(ii)(A) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.
    • The bail petition was filed under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

    Prosecution Alleged Possession of 862 Grams of Hydroponic Ganja

    • According to the prosecution, the petitioner was found in possession of 862 grams of Hydroponic Ganja/Marijuana.
    • Counsel for the petitioner argued that he had been falsely implicated and had not committed the alleged offence. It was also submitted that the quantity involved was not commercial quantity and that the petitioner was willing to comply with any conditions imposed by the Court.
    • The prosecution opposed bail, while also informing the Court that the petitioner had no previous case pending against him.

    High Court Treats Quantity as Intermediate

    After hearing both sides and examining the record, the Madras High Court took into account three principal factors:

    • the nature of the allegations,
    • the period of incarceration already undergone, and
    • the fact that the quantity involved was an intermediate quantity.

    On that basis, the Court concluded that further incarceration of the petitioner was not required and granted bail.

    The order is therefore significant as a bail ruling based on the circumstances of the case and the quantity involved. It does not amount to a finding on the petitioner’s guilt or innocence, which remains to be determined during investigation and trial.

    Bail Bond of β‚Ή25,000 With Two Sureties

    • The Court directed the petitioner to execute a bond for β‚Ή25,000, along with two sureties for a like sum, to the satisfaction of the Judicial Magistrate, Special Court for Customs at Alandur.
    • The sureties were also directed to affix their photographs and left thumb impressions in the prescribed surety application, with the Magistrate required to obtain an identity proof to verify their identities.

    Daily Reporting for 15 Days

    The High Court imposed a reporting condition requiring the petitioner to appear before the respondent authorities every day at 10:30 a.m. for 15 days, and thereafter whenever required for interrogation.

    The petitioner was also directed:

    • not to abscond during investigation or trial; and
    • not to tamper with evidence or witnesses.

    Trial Court Empowered to Act on Breach of Bail Conditions

    • The Court further made it clear that if any of the bail conditions are breached, the Magistrate or Trial Court would be entitled to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law.
    • For this proposition, the Madras High Court relied upon the Supreme Court decision in P.K. Shaji v. State of Kerala, (2005) 13 SCC 283.
    • The order also states that if the accused subsequently absconds, a fresh FIR may be registered under Section 269 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.

    Why the Order Is Significant

    • The ruling reinforces the principle that continued pre-trial detention is not automatic in every NDPS prosecution and that the Court must assess the circumstances of the individual case, including the quantity of contraband, period of custody and antecedents of the accused.
    • Here, the Court specifically recorded that the quantity involved was intermediate and that the petitioner had no previous pending case. These factors weighed in favour of bail.
    • At the same time, the Court balanced the grant of liberty with strict conditions requiring regular reporting, cooperation with the investigation, non-interference with witnesses and continued availability during proceedings.

    Key Takeaway

    The Madras High Court granted bail to the petitioner in an NDPS case involving 862 grams of Hydroponic Ganja/Marijuana, holding that further incarceration was unnecessary in view of the period already spent in custody and the intermediate quantity involved.

    The petitioner therefore succeeded in the bail petition, though the order does not decide the merits of the prosecution case.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Madras High Court

    Disclaimer

    Handy Download:

    “Handy Order for Download”Download

    Write to us at office@aadrikaalaw.com

    Tel: +91-11-4999 2707

    www.aadrikaalaw.com

    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Madras HC: Subsequent Amendment Cannot Be Applied Retrospectively to Deny Provisional Release of Imported Goods

    Madras HC: Subsequent Amendment Cannot Be Applied Retrospectively to Deny Provisional Release of Imported Goods

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 14.09.2026

    Madras HC: Subsequent Amendment Cannot Be Applied Retrospectively to Deny Provisional Release of Imported Goods

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    The Madras High Court has ruled in favour of importer M/s Smart Impex Solutions on the issue of provisional release of imported goods, holding that a subsequent statutory amendment cannot govern imports covered by Bills of Lading issued before the amendment came into force unless the notification expressly provides for retrospective operation.

    Justice Hemant Chandangoudar directed Customs authorities to consider the petitioner’s request for provisional release under Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962, within four weeks and, upon compliance with the conditions imposed, release the goods provisionally within a further period of two weeks.

    Dispute Over Import of Second-Hand Digital Multifunction Machines

    1. Smart Impex Solutions approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of mandamus directing Customs authorities to allow provisional release of two consignments comprising various models of second-hand Highly Specialized Equipment – Digital Multifunction Print and Copying Machines.
    2. The consignments were covered by two Bills of Entry dated 3 August 2026. The corresponding Bills of Lading were dated 26 May 2026 and 24 May 2026, respectively.
    3. The importer sought provisional release on execution of a simple bond for 100% of the enhanced value of the goods and payment of applicable total GST on the enhanced value. The order records that Customs Duty was exempted. The enhanced valuation was based on inspection reports and valuation certificates issued by the Chartered Engineers, M/s Supreme Techno Associates Pvt. Ltd.

    Importer Relied on Earlier Madras High Court Decision

    1. Counsel for Smart Impex Solutions argued that the issue was no longer res integra and was squarely covered by an earlier common order of the Madras High Court dated 10 July 2025 in W.P. Nos. 29418 of 2024 etc. batch.
    2. In that batch of cases, the Court had directed consideration of importers’ requests for provisional release of similar goods under Section 110A of the Customs Act.

    Customs Relied on 2026 Amendment

    • The Customs Department opposed the petition by relying upon an amendment dated 10 March 2026 to the Notification dated 1 July 2021.
    • According to the Department’s submission recorded in the judgment, the amendment provided an exemption in respect of Highly Specialized Equipment satisfying the prescribed criteria, subject to a specific exemption issued by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology under paragraph 2 of the Gazette Notification dated 18 March 2021, as amended on 26 April 2023, where the equipment was manufactured or imported in quantities of less than 100 units per model per year.
    • Crucially, the amendment was stated to have come into force with effect from 15 June 2026.
    • Customs further submitted that, for considering the petitioner’s claim, the date of the Bills of Lading would be considered as provided under Section 15 of the Customs Act, 1962.

    Bills of Lading Pre-Dated the Amendment

    • The dates became decisive.
    • The High Court noted that the two Bills of Lading were dated 26 May 2026 and 24 May 2026, whereas the amendment relied upon by Customs came into force only on 15 June 2026.
    • The Court then laid down the central principle governing the dispute:
    • β€œUnless a statutory notification expressly provides for retrospective operation, it can only operate prospectively.”
    • Accordingly, the Court held that the amendment relied upon by Customs could not govern imports covered by Bills of Lading issued before the amendment commenced. Consequently, Customs could not refuse to consider the importer’s request for provisional release by relying upon that amendment.

    Earlier Judgment on Similar Imports Also Favoured Consideration of Provisional Release

    • The High Court further observed that the issue concerning provisional release of similar imported goods had already been considered in its common order dated 10 July 2025 in W.P. Nos. 29418 of 2024 etc. batch.
    • Importantly, the Customs authorities were unable to point out any distinguishing feature that would justify taking a different view in the case of Smart Impex Solutions.

    Customs Directed to Decide Section 110A Request Within Four Weeks

    • In view of these findings, the High Court disposed of the writ petition with specific directions.
    • The respondents were directed to consider Smart Impex Solutions’ request for provisional release under Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962 and pass an appropriate order within four weeks from receipt of a copy of the High Court’s order. Customs was permitted to impose such conditions as may be considered necessary in accordance with law.
    • More importantly, the Court directed that once the petitioner complies with the conditions imposed by Customs, the imported goods shall be provisionally released within two weeks thereafter.

    Provisional Release Does Not Decide Customs Adjudication

    • The High Court nevertheless made an important distinction between provisional release of the goods and final adjudication of the Customs dispute.
    • It expressly clarified that provisional release would remain subject to the outcome of adjudication proceedings under the Customs Act, 1962.
    • The adjudicating authority was directed to decide those proceedings independently on their own merits and in accordance with law, without being influenced by observations made in the High Court’s order.
    • Thus, the judgment should not be interpreted as a final determination of the legality of the import, classification, valuation or any other issue that may arise during Customs adjudication. The relief granted by the High Court concerns the provisional release of the consignments.

    Why the Judgment Is Significant for Importers

    • The decision is significant for importers facing detention or non-release of goods where Customs seeks to rely upon a regulatory amendment introduced after the relevant import transaction.
    • The judgment reiterates the basic principle that, unless retrospective operation has expressly been provided, a statutory notification ordinarily operates prospectively. In the present case, because the Bills of Lading pre-dated the amendment’s commencement, Customs could not rely upon that later amendment as a ground for refusing even to consider provisional release.
    • The ruling also reinforces the practical importance of Section 110A of the Customs Act, which provides the statutory mechanism for provisional release of goods pending adjudication, subject to appropriate conditions.

    Key Takeaway

    The Madras High Court’s decision provides relief to M/s Smart Impex Solutions by requiring Customs to process its request for provisional release rather than reject it on the basis of a subsequently effective amendment.

    The key proposition emerging from the judgment is:

    A statutory amendment or notification cannot ordinarily be applied retrospectively to imports covered by Bills of Lading issued before its commencement unless retrospective operation is expressly provided. Customs therefore cannot rely upon such a subsequent amendment to refuse consideration of provisional release under Section 110A of the Customs Act.

    The petitioner/importer therefore succeeded on the provisional-release issue, although the underlying Customs adjudication remains open for independent determination.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Madras High Court

    Disclaimer

    Handy Download:

    “Handy Order for Download”Download

    Write to us at office@aadrikaalaw.com

    Tel: +91-11-4999 2707

    www.aadrikaalaw.com

    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Delhi High Court Acquits NDPS Accused; Mixing Contents of Multiple Packets Before Sampling Violates Prescribed Procedure

    Delhi High Court Acquits NDPS Accused; Mixing Contents of Multiple Packets Before Sampling Violates Prescribed Procedure

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 12.09.2026

    Delhi High Court Acquits NDPS Accused; Mixing Contents of Multiple Packets Before Sampling Violates Prescribed Procedure

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    In an important judgment concerning sampling of seized narcotic substances under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), the Delhi High Court acquitted an accused who had earlier been convicted under Section 21(c) of the NDPS Act and sentenced to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment.

    The High Court found a fundamental defect in the sampling procedure adopted by the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB): the contents of four separate packets were mixed together before the representative samples were drawn. The Court held that such a procedure did not conform either to Section 52A of the NDPS Act or to the applicable Standing Orders and consequently the samples sent for chemical examination could not be treated as representative of the individual packets.

    Background of the Case

    • The appellant, Amani Fidel Chris, had been convicted by the Special Judge on 28 July 2015 for an offence punishable under Section 21(c) of the NDPS Act. He was sentenced to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of β‚Ή1 lakh, with six months’ simple imprisonment in default. The trial court had also directed his deportation after completion of the sentence.
    • According to the prosecution, NCB officials received secret information on 1 February 2010 that the appellant was suspected of carrying a large quantity of heroin while travelling through the Sealdah Rajdhani Express. He was intercepted at Platform No. 12 of New Delhi Railway Station.

    Four Packets Recovered From Door-Spring Machines

    • During the search of the appellant’s stroller bag, NCB officers found four cartons containing door-spring machines. Each machine allegedly contained a concealed packet carrying a powdery substance.
    • The contents of the four packets were separately subjected to a field-testing kit and tested positive for heroin. However, thereafter, the investigating officer transferred the contents of all four packets into one polythene bag, mixed them together, and then drew two samples from the combined substance. The combined quantity was stated to weigh 1.5 kg.
    • It was this method of sampling that ultimately became decisive before the High Court.

    Accused Challenges Sampling Procedure

    • The appellant’s principal argument was that once four separate packets had allegedly been recovered, representative samples ought to have been drawn from each packet individually.
    • By mixing all four packets first and drawing samples only from the resulting mixture, it became impossible to establish through laboratory analysis whether each individual packet actually contained heroin.
    • The NCB argued that no prejudice had been caused because material from each packet had initially been separately tested using a field-testing kit and all four had returned positive results.
    • The High Court did not accept this argument.

    Standing Orders Require Representative Sampling

    • Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri examined Standing Order No. 1/88 dated 15 March 1988 issued by the NCB as well as Standing Order No. 1/89 dated 13 June 1989 issued by the Department of Revenue.
    • The Court noted that where more than one package or container is recovered, the prescribed procedure contemplates drawing samples from individual packages. In appropriate circumstances, where packages are identical and satisfy the prescribed conditions, they can be bunched into lots. But even in such cases, representative quantities have to be taken from the individual packages and thereafter mixed to create the composite sample.
    • Crucially, the Court held:
    • β€œMixing of the contents of container/package (in one lot) and then drawing the representative samples is not permissible under the Standing Orders.”

    Entire Contents of Different Packets Cannot Be Mixed First

    • Applying the prescribed procedure to the facts, the High Court found that NCB officials should have drawn samples in duplicate from each of the four packets separately.
    • Even if the prosecution’s contention that all four packets could be treated as a single lot were accepted, the correct procedure would have been to first draw representative quantities from each individual packet, combine those representative quantities into a composite whole, and then draw the sample from that composite material.
    • The Court specifically observed that the Standing Order nowhere permits the entire contents of all containers or packages to be mixed together before samples are drawn.
    • This distinction is significant. Mixing entire packets first destroys their individual identity and makes it impossible to establish the nature and quantity of the substance contained in each packet through subsequent laboratory testing.

    Section 52A NDPS Act Also Not Followed

    • The High Court separately examined the sampling requirements under Section 52A of the NDPS Act.
    • Referring to the Supreme Court’s decision in Union of India v. Mohanlal, (2016) 3 SCC 379, the Court noted that the statutory scheme contemplates approaching the Magistrate for drawing representative samples and certification. The Supreme Court had emphasised that sampling should be undertaken under the Magistrate’s supervision in accordance with Section 52A.
    • In the present case, the High Court found that the NCB had followed neither route properly.
    • It had not filed an application before the Magistrate for drawing samples under judicial supervision, nor had it correctly followed the representative-sampling procedure contained in Standing Order No. 1/89.

    CRCL Sample Was Not Representative of Four Packets

    • The consequence of this procedural failure was substantial.
    • The Court held that the samples eventually sent to the Central Revenues Control Laboratory (CRCL) were not representative samples.
    • By mixing the contents of all four packets before taking a sample, the investigating agency not only destroyed the individual identity or sanctity of each packet but also lost evidence regarding the quantity contained in each individual packet.
    • This meant that a positive laboratory result obtained from the mixed sample could not safely establish that the entire alleged quantity recovered from all four packets constituted the narcotic substance alleged by the prosecution.

    Delhi High Court Relies on Supreme Court’s Noor Aga Ruling

    • The High Court relied significantly upon Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417, where the Supreme Court had dealt with the importance of compliance with the guidelines governing seizure and preservation of narcotic substances.
    • The Supreme Court had emphasised that such guidelines cannot simply be disregarded, particularly in penal proceedings carrying severe consequences, and that substantial compliance must be insisted upon to preserve the sanctity of physical evidence.
    • The Delhi High Court also referred to Union of India v. Bal Mukund, (2009) 12 SCC 161, where the Supreme Court recognised the requirement of proper sampling under Standing Instruction No. 1/88.

    Supreme Court’s Gaunter Edwin Kircher Principle Applied

    • The Court further relied upon Gaunter Edwin Kircher v. State of Goa, (1993) 3 SCC 145.
    • In that case, only one of two pieces of suspected charas had been chemically analysed. The Supreme Court held that the laboratory result relating to one piece could not automatically establish that the other piece also contained charas. It stressed that, where the entire seized quantity cannot be sent for analysis, sufficient representative samples should be taken from each packet or piece recovered.
    • That reasoning directly supported the appellant’s argument that chemical analysis of a mixed sample could not reliably establish the character of each separate packet.

    Delhi High Court’s Earlier Sampling Decisions Followed

    • The Court also relied upon its earlier decision in Basant Rai v. State, (2012) 191 DLT 403, where samples taken after combining material from several packets were found problematic because it could not be established that every individual packet contained contraband.
    • Similarly, in Edward Khimani Kamau v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 9860, the Delhi High Court had held that transferring powder from nine packets into one polythene bag and thereafter drawing samples caused serious prejudice because it could not be determined whether all nine packets contained heroin.
    • The Court also followed Charlse Howell @ Abel Kom v. NCB (Delhi), where material recovered from 166 polythene strips had been mixed before samples were drawn. The Court in that case held that the resulting sample was not representative of the entire quantity.

    Independent Public Witnesses Were Not Examined

    • The High Court additionally noticed that the two independent public witnessesβ€”Sher Singh and Pinkesh Kumarβ€”who had participated in the raid and had put their signatures or thumb impressions on documents prepared at the spot were not examined during the trial.
    • The Court also recorded that the prosecution had originally alleged two recoveries against the appellant. The first recovery, relating to a courier parcel, had already been disbelieved by the trial court, and the prosecution had not challenged that finding. The appeal before the High Court therefore effectively concerned the second recovery from the railway station.

    Prosecution Failed to Prove Case Beyond Reasonable Doubt

    • Considering the defective sampling procedure, the failure to comply with Section 52A and the applicable Standing Orders, and the other circumstances appearing from the record, the Delhi High Court concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.
    • Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal and acquitted Amani Fidel Chris. His bail bonds were cancelled and the pending applications were disposed of.

    Why the Judgment Is Significant

    The ruling underscores the heightened importance of procedural safeguards in NDPS prosecutions, where the punishments prescribed by law are particularly stringent.

    The judgment establishes an important distinction between testing material from individual packets using a field-testing kit and obtaining a legally reliable representative sample for chemical examination. A positive field test of each packet does not necessarily cure a subsequent defective sampling process.

    Where several packets are recovered, the investigating agency cannot simply mix their entire contents and thereafter rely upon the chemical analysis of a sample drawn from that mixture to establish the nature of every individual packet. Proper representative sampling is essential to maintain the identity and evidentiary integrity of the seized material.

    The decision therefore reinforces a fundamental principle of NDPS jurisprudence: the more stringent the penal consequences, the greater the importance of preserving the sanctity of physical evidence and adhering to the prescribed safeguards governing seizure and sampling.

    Connected Matter

    Delhi High Court Grants Bail Under NDPS Act Over 51-Day Delay in Sampling

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Delhi High Court

    Disclaimer

    Handy Download:

    “Handy Order for Download”Download

    Write to us at office@aadrikaalaw.com

    Tel: +91-11-4999 2707

    www.aadrikaalaw.com

    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Supreme Court: Complex Biotechnology Patent Validity Cannot Be Decided Summarily Without Trial and Expert Evidence

    Supreme Court: Complex Biotechnology Patent Validity Cannot Be Decided Summarily Without Trial and Expert Evidence

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 12.09.2026

    Supreme Court: Complex Biotechnology Patent Validity Cannot Be Decided Summarily Without Trial and Expert Evidence

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    In a significant ruling concerning patent protection for biotechnology, genetically modified cotton technology and the scope of Section 3(j) of the Patents Act, 1970, the Supreme Court set aside the Delhi High Court Division Bench judgment that had effectively decided Monsanto’s patent validity against it at the interim stage.

    The Supreme Court held that technically complex questions concerning patentability, patent exclusion and biotechnology cannot be summarily adjudicated without a full trial, evidence and expert testimony. It restored the earlier order of the Single Judge and remanded the suit for adjudication in accordance with law.

    Importantly, the Supreme Court did not finally decide whether Monsanto’s patent was valid or whether its biotechnology was excluded from patentability under Section 3(j). Those substantive questions were expressly left open for determination in appropriate proceedings on evidence.

    Background: Monsanto’s BOLGARD and BOLGARD II Technology

    • Monsanto Technology LLC and the other plaintiffs had instituted a commercial suit seeking a permanent injunction against Nuziveedu Seeds Ltd. and others in relation to the trademarks β€œBOLGARD” and β€œBOLGARD II” and alleged infringement of registered Patent No. 214436.
    • Monsanto also sought to restrain the defendants from selling or using seeds and hybrid seeds bearing the patented technology, along with rendition of accounts.
    • The parties had entered into a sub-licence agreement dated 21 February 2004, initially for ten years. Under the agreement, the defendants were permitted to develop genetically modified hybrid cotton planting seeds using Monsanto’s technology, subject to contractual restrictions and payment of licence fee/trait value.
    • Disputes subsequently arose over the payment of licence fee or trait value following the introduction of a statutory price-control regime. Monsanto ultimately terminated the agreement on 14 November 2015 and sought an injunction against continued use of its patented technology.

    Nuziveedu Challenges Monsanto Patent Under Section 3(j)

    • Nuziveedu contested Monsanto’s claim and relied upon the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act, 2001 (PPVFR Act).
    • It also filed a counterclaim seeking revocation of Monsanto’s patent under Section 64 of the Patents Act, arguing that the patent fell within the exclusion contained in Section 3(j) concerning plants, seeds and essentially biological processes.
    • This raised a legally and scientifically complex question: whether the patented nucleic acid sequence and associated biotechnology constituted a patentable invention or whether, when incorporated into a plant or seed, it attracted the statutory exclusion under Section 3(j).

    Single Judge Says Patent Questions Require Evidence

    • At the interim stage, the Delhi High Court’s Single Judge declined to finally determine the validity of the patent.
    • In the order dated 28 March 2017, the Single Judge observed that the issues required formal proof and, particularly in a technically complicated patent dispute, expert opinion was crucial for determining the nature and breadth of the monopoly claimed under the patent.
    • Pending disposal of the suit, the parties were directed to remain bound by their respective obligations under the sub-licence agreement, with licence fee/trait value governed by the applicable law. Significantly, the Single Judge merely issued notice on Nuziveedu’s counterclaim for revocation; the counterclaim itself was not adjudicated.

    Division Bench Rules Against Monsanto on Section 3(j)

    • Both sides challenged the Single Judge’s order.
    • The Division Bench dismissed Monsanto’s appeal and accepted the defendants’ contention concerning the exclusion from patentability under Section 3(j) of the Patents Act. It held that Monsanto could seek registration under the PPVFR Act and consequently allowed the defendants’ counterclaim.
    • The underlying suit was, however, permitted to continue in relation to damages and other reliefs.
    • The matter then reached the Supreme Court.

    Supreme Court: Division Bench Went Beyond the Injunction Appeal

    • The Supreme Court identified a fundamental procedural problem with the Division Bench’s approach.
    • The defendants’ counterclaim seeking revocation of the patent had never been adjudicated by the Single Judge; only notice had been issued on it. The Supreme Court found no justification for the Division Bench effectively deciding the validity of the patent in the course of appeals arising from the interim injunction proceedings.
    • According to the Supreme Court, the Division Bench ought to have confined itself to deciding whether the interim injunction granted by the Single Judge was justified.
    • It should not have assumed the Single Judge’s jurisdiction and proceeded to determine the unpatentability of the claims through a summary exercise.

    Patent Disputes Involving Biotechnology Require Expert Evidence

    • A particularly important aspect of the judgment is the Supreme Court’s recognition of the technical complexity involved in biotechnology patent litigation.
    • The Court noted that the dispute involved questions concerning chemical, biochemical, biotechnological and microbiological processes. Among the questions requiring examination were whether the nucleic acid sequence, once inserted into a plant variety, could subsequently be removed and whether the patented DNA sequence constituted a plant or part of a plant.
    • Such questions, the Court held, could not properly be decided merely from pleadings and publicly available documents without evidence from expert witnesses.
    • The Court therefore observed that summary adjudication of a technically complex patent suit requiring expert evidence at the injunction stage was neither desirable nor permissible in law.

    Section 64 Counterclaim Cannot Be Decided Without Proper Trial

    • The Supreme Court also considered the procedural framework for revocation of patents under Section 64 of the Patents Act.
    • It held that a counterclaim seeking revocation necessarily requires proper consideration of both the suit and counterclaim in accordance with law. Such a dispute cannot be decided summarily and without evidence merely through an abstract consideration of textbooks or other materials.
    • The Court emphasised the importance of ordinary civil trial safeguards, including settlement of issues, examination and cross-examination of witnesses, discovery and inspection of documents, followed by a proper hearing.

    Supreme Court: β€œThere Are No Short-Cuts in the Trial of Suits”

    • The Supreme Court relied upon Alka Gupta v. Narender Kumar Gupta, (2010) 10 SCC 141, reiterating the fundamental principle that civil litigation ordinarily has to proceed through the procedure prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure.
    • The cited precedent emphasised that courts cannot short-circuit a civil suit by deciding disputed questions of fact merely from pleadings and documents without conducting a trial.
    • This principle assumed particular importance in Monsanto’s case because the controversy involved sophisticated scientific questions whose resolution required expert and technical evidence.

    Supreme Court Does Not Decide Whether Monsanto’s Patent Is Valid

    • One of the most important aspects of the ruling is what the Supreme Court did not decide.
    • Despite extensive arguments concerning the Patents Act, the PPVFR Act, WTO obligations, GATT, TRIPS and the technical nature of Monsanto’s biotechnology, the Supreme Court expressly declined to rule upon those substantive issues at this stage.
    • The Court stated that, given the nature of the order it proposed to pass, it was unnecessary to determine those questions and accordingly left all questions of fact and law open for consideration in appropriate proceedings.
    • Therefore, the judgment should not be interpreted as a final Supreme Court declaration that Monsanto’s Bt cotton patent was either valid or invalid under Section 3(j).
    • Rather, the Supreme Court’s ruling was primarily procedural: such a technically complex question had to be decided through a proper trial.

    What Were Monsanto’s Patent Claims?

    • The judgment records that Claims 1–24 related to processes, whereas Claims 25–27 concerned the chemical product described as a nucleic acid sequence (NAS).
    • According to Monsanto, the latter was a man-made DNA construct that did not exist in nature. Monsanto argued that when inserted into a plant, the construct conferred insect-tolerant characteristics upon the plant.
    • The competing arguments over whether such technology remained independently patentable or became inseparable from a plantβ€”and therefore potentially subject to Section 3(j)β€”were precisely the kind of scientific and legal questions the Supreme Court considered inappropriate for summary determination.

    Division Bench Judgment Set Aside; Single Judge’s Order Restored

    • Ultimately, the Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench judgment.
    • The order of the Single Judge dated 28 March 2017 was restored, and the suit was remanded to the Single Judge for disposal in accordance with law. Given the importance of the questions involved, the Supreme Court also expected the parties to cooperate in facilitating an early disposal of the suit.
    • The connected appeals and intervention applications were accordingly disposed of.

    Who Won the Supreme Court Case?

    • In terms of the immediate appellate outcome, Monsanto Technology LLC succeeded before the Supreme Court because the Division Bench judgment that had gone against Monsanto on patentability was set aside.
    • However, Monsanto did not obtain a final declaration from the Supreme Court that Patent No. 214436 was valid or that Nuziveedu had infringed it.
    • Instead, the Supreme Court restored the Single Judge’s interim arrangement and sent the substantive patent dispute back for trial. Thus, Monsanto succeeded on the issue of improper summary adjudication, while the ultimate questions of patent validity, Section 3(j) exclusion and infringement remained open.

    Legal Significance of the Judgment

    The judgment is important well beyond the immediate Monsanto-Nuziveedu dispute. It establishes a strong procedural principle for intellectual-property litigation: courts should not finally determine technically complex patent validity questions at an interim stage when those questions require scientific evidence and expert testimony.

    It also reinforces the distinction between deciding whether an interim injunction should operate and finally adjudicating a counterclaim for revocation of a patent.

    For biotechnology disputes in particular, the judgment recognises that questions involving genetic constructs, biological processes, plant characteristics and patent exclusions cannot necessarily be resolved simply by reading statutory provisions and technical literature. Where competing scientific propositions are involved, those propositions must ordinarily be tested through evidence.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Supreme Court

    Disclaimer

    Handy Download:

    “Handy Order for Download”Download

    Write to us at office@aadrikaalaw.com

    Tel: +91-11-4999 2707

    www.aadrikaalaw.com

    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • CESTAT Mumbai: EPCG Duty Demand Cannot Survive Once DGFT Issues EODC Confirming Fulfilment of Export Obligation

    CESTAT Mumbai: EPCG Duty Demand Cannot Survive Once DGFT Issues EODC Confirming Fulfilment of Export Obligation

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 12.09.2026

    CESTAT Mumbai: EPCG Duty Demand Cannot Survive Once DGFT Issues EODC Confirming Fulfilment of Export Obligation

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    In a significant ruling concerning imports under the Export Promotion Capital Goods (EPCG) Scheme, the CESTAT Mumbai has set aside the customs duty demand, redemption fine and penalties imposed upon Unison Hotels Limited and its Managing Director, Umesh Saraf, in relation to the import of a Honda CR-V under an EPCG authorization.

    The Tribunal held that the alleged violation of EPCG conditions could not legally survive once the competent DGFT authority had issued an Export Obligation Discharge Certificate (EODC) in favour of the importer.

    Background of the Dispute

    • Unison Hotels Limited is engaged in providing hotel-related services. For its business operations, it obtained EPCG authorizations from the Directorate General of Foreign Trade for importing four vehicles as capital goods while availing concessional customs duty benefits. One Honda CR-V was imported through Mumbai Sea Port, while three BMW cars were imported through Chennai Sea Port.
    • The Department initiated investigation on the basis of information alleging that the vehicles were being used as private vehicles for the personal use of the Managing Director and his family members rather than for commercial purposes connected with earning foreign exchange and fulfilling the prescribed export obligation.
    • In respect of the Honda CR-V imported through Mumbai, a show cause notice dated 30 August 2011 sought recovery of customs duty of β‚Ή9,41,922 along with interest, besides confiscation and penalties. The adjudicating authority confirmed the demand, ordered confiscation under Sections 111(d) and 111(o) of the Customs Act, 1962, permitted redemption on payment of a fine of β‚Ή7 lakh, and imposed penalties of β‚Ή1.50 lakh on Unison Hotels and β‚Ή1 lakh on Umesh Saraf. The Commissioner (Appeals) upheld the order.

    Issue Before CESTAT

    • The principal question before the Tribunal was whether the appellants had violated the conditions of the EPCG authorization and consequently failed to satisfy the requirements of Notification No. 97/2004-Customs dated 17 September 2004, under which concessional customs duty had been availed for import of the Honda CR-V.
    • The EPCG authorization required the importer, among other things, to fulfil an export obligation equivalent to eight times the duty saved within eight years and comply with the actual-user condition. In respect of the Honda CR-V, the authorization recorded an export obligation connected with the imported vehicle and required fulfillment through use of the imported capital goods.

    Appellants Relied on Earlier Chennai CESTAT Decision

    • The appellants argued that an identical dispute involving the other three BMW cars imported under the same EPCG arrangement had already been decided in their favour by a coordinate Bench of CESTAT Chennai through Final Order Nos. 40598-40599/2023 dated 21 July 2023. They contended that the facts and legal issues relating to the Honda CR-V were materially identical and therefore the same reasoning ought to apply.
    • The Mumbai Bench accepted this contention, observing that the factual matrix relating to the Honda CR-V was exactly similar to that relating to the BMW cars already adjudicated by the coordinate Bench. It consequently held that it could not take a different view in relation to the same appellants and substantially identical EPCG conditions.

    Revenue’s Allegation Found Premature

    • The Tribunal reproduced the reasoning adopted in the earlier proceedings, where it had been held that initiation of proceedings before expiry of the period available for fulfilment of the export obligation was premature. The EPCG authorization allowed eight years for fulfilment of the export obligation, whereas the show cause proceedings were initiated well before that period had expired.
    • The earlier Bench had also found that the importer had declared substantial foreign-exchange earnings, which were not disputed by the Revenue. The Tribunal emphasized that the essential inquiry was whether the imported capital goods had satisfied the actual-user requirement, and observed that the existence of foreign-exchange earnings supported the appellant’s case.
    • It further noted that allegations concerning vehicle registration, insurance or parking arrangements were matters primarily within the jurisdiction of the concerned transport or other authorities and could not, by themselves, establish a violation of EPCG conditions enforceable by Customs.

    DGFT’s EODC Became Crucial

    • A decisive factor in the Mumbai proceedings was that the DGFT had eventually issued the EODC/Redemption Letter on 11 January 2024 in respect of the relevant EPCG authorization.
    • The Tribunal recorded that the appellants had furnished the vehicle’s installation certificate, registration certificate showing the Honda CR-V as a β€œTourist Taxi Deluxe”, details of foreign-exchange earnings and repeated requests for issuance of the EODC.
    • The Bench held that once the competent DGFT authority had issued the EODC, the allegation of non-compliance with EPCG conditions under Notification No. 97/2004-Customs could no longer legally sustain. It also noted that the importer had asserted fulfillment of the export obligation even during the original proceedings and that DGFT had subsequently formally discharged the obligation.
    • The Tribunal further observed that non-production of the EODC during the earlier adjudication and appellate proceedings could not be held against the appellants because the certificate had not yet been issued by DGFT and the delay was beyond their control.

    Earlier Judicial Authorities Considered

    • The Tribunal also referred to several earlier decisions dealing with EPCG imports and actual-user requirements. Among them was Goldfinch Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, 2015 (328) E.L.T. 282 (Tri.-Mumbai), where CESTAT had held that mere parking of an EPCG vehicle at a particular place or statements of drivers could not, without more, establish breach of the actual-user condition. The Bombay High Court later dismissed Revenue’s appeal against that decision.
    • The order also refers to Vadilal Chemicals Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2005 (192) E.L.T. 33 (S.C.), and M Far Hotels Ltd. v. Union of India, 2011 (270) E.L.T. 158 (Ker.), in the context of EPCG benefits and compliance with prescribed statutory or policy conditions.
    • The Tribunal additionally referred to the Delhi High Court’s ruling in Interglobe Enterprises Ltd. v. Union of India, 2006 (203) E.L.T. 202 (Del.), as followed in subsequent EPCG litigation, noting that the Supreme Court had dismissed the Revenue’s SLP in the connected matter.

    CESTAT’s Final Ruling

    The Mumbai Bench concluded that the order sustaining the customs duty demand, redemption fine and penalties was not legally sustainable. It therefore set aside the impugned order and allowed both appeals in favour of Unison Hotels Limited and Umesh Saraf.

    Key Takeaway

    The ruling reinforces an important principle in EPCG disputes: where the DGFT, being the competent licensing authority, has accepted fulfillment of the export obligation and issued an EODC, Customs cannot ordinarily continue to sustain a demand founded on an allegation of non-fulfilment of the very same EPCG obligation without a legally sustainable basis to disregard that discharge.

    The decision is also significant because CESTAT rejected a purely factual inference of personal use based on matters such as vehicle location, registration-related allegations and statements, particularly when the importer demonstrated foreign-exchange earnings and subsequently secured formal discharge of its EPCG obligation from DGFT.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: CESTAT Mumbai

    Disclaimer

    Handy Download:

    “Handy Order for Download”Download

    Write to us at office@aadrikaalaw.com

    Tel: +91-11-4999 2707

    www.aadrikaalaw.com

    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • CESTAT Ahmedabad- Customs Cannot Reclassify Naphtha as NGL Without Conclusive Scientific Evidence

    CESTAT Ahmedabad- Customs Cannot Reclassify Naphtha as NGL Without Conclusive Scientific Evidence

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 11.09.2026

    CESTAT Ahmedabad- Customs Cannot Reclassify Naphtha as NGL Without Conclusive Scientific Evidence

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    The Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), Ahmedabad has allowed the appeals filed by Hazel Mercantile Limited and connected appellants in a major customs classification dispute concerning whether imported petroleum cargo declared as Naphtha could be reclassified by Customs as Natural Gasoline Liquid (NGL).

    A Division Bench comprising Judicial Member Somesh Arora and Technical Member A.K. Jyotishi held that the Customs Department had failed to authoritatively establish the classification sought by it and that the classification declared by the importer could not be disturbed.

    The Naphtha vs NGL Dispute

    • Hazel Mercantile is engaged in the import, export and trading of petrochemicals, including Naphtha. The dispute arose from a consignment of approximately 20,110.767 MT which the company stated had been imported as Naphtha and was ultimately intended for export.
    • Hazel filed seven Bills of Entry declaring the product as Naphtha under CTH 2710 1229. Customs, however, alleged that the imported product was actually Natural Gasoline Liquid (NGL) and proposed classification under CTH 2710 1290. The goods were consequently seized by DRI.
    • The subsequent show cause notice proposed rejection of the declared description and classification, enhancement of the assessable value, confiscation under Sections 111(d), 111(m), 111(p) and 111(o) of the Customs Act, and penalties under Sections 112(a), 112(b), 114AA and 117.

    Conflicting Laboratory Reports Become Central Issue

    • The dispute largely turned on competing technical reports.
    • CRCL Kandla and CRCL Delhi treated the product as NGL. On the other hand, the importer relied upon reports from TUV India, Geo Chem Laboratories and CSIR-Indian Institute of Petroleum (IIP), Dehradun, apart from the load-port certification, to maintain that the product was Naphtha.
    • Pursuant to directions of the Gujarat High Court, fresh samples had been drawn. Geo Chem concluded that the sample conformed to Naphtha specifications, while IIP Dehradun concluded that the sample fell within the light Naphtha range.
    • CESTAT ultimately placed considerable weight on the expertise and depth of testing undertaken by these specialised laboratories.

    Specialised Laboratory Reports Preferred Over CRCL

    • The Tribunal observed that IIP Dehradun, which specialises in petroleum and petroleum-product testing, had conducted multiple tests before concluding that the sample fell within the range of light Naphtha.
    • It similarly noted that Geo Chem had subjected the sample supplied by the Department itself to detailed examination and concluded that the product was Naphtha.
    • CESTAT rejected Revenue’s contention that the private reports were unreliable merely because the importer had referred to the sample as Naphtha while forwarding it for testing. The Bench reasoned that a laboratory of such stature would not simply accept the description supplied by the party without conducting its own technical analysis.
    • The Tribunal therefore preferred the reports of the specialised testing agencies, finding that they had greater wherewithal to test petroleum products than the departmental laboratories.

    Burden to Prove Reclassification Lies on Customs

    • CESTAT reiterated the settled principle that where the Department seeks to change the tariff classification declared by an importer, the burden of proving the proposed alternative classification rests upon Revenue.
    • The Tribunal referred to Hewlett Packard India Sales Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, observing that even where classification emerges from self-assessment, the Department must discharge the burden if it seeks to alter that classification.
    • It also relied upon Tata Chemicals Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, Union of India v. Garware Nylons Ltd. and Commissioner of Customs, Mundra v. Sunrise Traders on the relevance of scientific evidence, BIS standards and the insufficiency of inconclusive expert reports for disturbing an assessee’s classification.

    Reliance Industries Naphtha–NGL Ruling Considered

    • Hazel placed substantial reliance upon the earlier CESTAT Ahmedabad decision in Reliance Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, Ahmedabad, 2024 (10) TMI 1555 – CESTAT Ahmedabad.
    • In that case, the Tribunal had observed that Naphtha is the genus and NGL is a species, and that NGL could fall within the broader description of Naphtha in the context considered there.
    • The Revenue’s appeal against the Reliance Industries decision was subsequently dismissed by the Supreme Court on 9 April 2025 in Civil Appeal Nos. 5133–5137 of 2025, the Court finding no good reason to interfere with CESTAT’s order.
    • CESTAT considered this jurisprudence while analysing Hazel’s classification dispute.

    β€œMost Akin” Test Does Not Help Revenue

    • The Department relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Gastrade International Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, Kandla and argued that the imported goods were most akin to NGL.
    • CESTAT, however, found the argument to be self-defeating in the facts of Hazel’s case.
    • The Bench observed that the reports of IIP Dehradun and Geo Chem were based on a significantly wider range of parameters and were issued by more specialised agencies. Those reports supported the appellant’s case even when the β€œmost akin” test was applied.
    • The Tribunal consequently held that whether the dispute was examined on the basis of akinness, inconclusive test reports or the common-parlance understanding that NGL is a species within the broader category of Naphtha, Revenue had failed to establish its proposed classification.

    Importer’s Classification Cannot Be Disturbed

    The Tribunal therefore reached the categorical conclusion that:

    β€œthe classification of the appellant cannot be allowed to be disturbed.”

    • It further held that the conclusions reached by the adjudicating authority were incorrect and could not be adopted.
    • This finding went to the root of the proceedings because the Department’s confiscation and penalty case substantially flowed from its allegation that Hazel had misdeclared NGL as Naphtha.

    CESTAT Allows Appeals on Merits

    • Having decided the fundamental classification controversy in favour of Hazel Mercantile, CESTAT observed that it was inclined to allow the appeals without going into the Department’s other pleas, since the appellants succeeded on the factual and legal merits of the classification issue.
    • The Tribunal accordingly allowed the appeals through Final Order Nos. 10728–10735/2026, pronounced on 7 September 2026.

    Important Observation on WhatsApp and Electronic Evidence

    • The proceedings also involved reliance by Revenue upon WhatsApp chats and other material extracted from mobile devices.
    • While deciding the matter principally on classification, CESTAT referred to Section 138C of the Customs Act, concerning admissibility of computer-generated evidence, and made an unusual concluding observation suggesting that the Department should consider a dedicated statutory provision governing mobile-phone evidence and the procedure for its extraction, rather than relying solely on Section 138C.
    • This observation could assume wider significance in customs investigations increasingly dependent upon mobile-phone data, messaging applications and digital forensic evidence.

    Key Legal Takeaway

    The decision reinforces a fundamental customs-classification principle: the Department cannot disturb an importer’s declared tariff classification merely by asserting an alternative description; the proposed reclassification must be affirmatively established through reliable technical evidence.

    Where competing laboratory reports exist, the expertise of the testing body, comprehensiveness of the parameters tested and reliability of the methodology become critical considerations.

    The ruling is particularly significant for the petroleum and petrochemical sector because it also engages with the continuing tariff distinction between Naphtha and Natural Gasoline Liquid, the β€œmost akin” test and the earlier Reliance Industries ruling recognising NGL as a species within the broader genus of Naphtha.

    Listen to this on our #YouTube Channel

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: CESTAT Ahmedabad

    Disclaimer

    Handy Download:

    “Handy Order for Download”Download

    Write to us at office@aadrikaalaw.com

    Tel: +91-11-4999 2707

    www.aadrikaalaw.com

    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Supreme Court- Section 67 NDPS Statements Cannot Be Used as Confessions; Officers Under Section 53 Are β€œPolice Officers” for Evidence Act

    Supreme Court- Section 67 NDPS Statements Cannot Be Used as Confessions; Officers Under Section 53 Are β€œPolice Officers” for Evidence Act

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 11.09.2026

    Supreme Court- Section 67 NDPS Statements Cannot Be Used as Confessions; Officers Under Section 53 Are β€œPolice Officers” for Evidence Act

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    In a landmark judgment having major implications for prosecutions under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), the Supreme Court held that officers invested with powers under Section 53 of the NDPS Act are β€œpolice officers” for the purposes of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Consequently, confessional statements made before such officers are inadmissible for securing the conviction of an accused.

    The ruling came in Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, arising from Criminal Appeal No. 152 of 2013 along with several connected appeals and Special Leave Petitions. The majority judgment was delivered by Justice R.F. Nariman, with Justice Navin Sinha concurring, while Justice Indira Banerjee dissented on the principal questions.

    The Core Issue Before the Supreme Court

    • The controversy arose from the use of statements recorded by officers under Section 67 of the NDPS Act. Tofan Singh challenged his conviction primarily on the ground that it was based upon a purported confessional statement recorded under Section 67.
    • The appellant argued that the officer recording such a statement should be regarded as a β€œpolice officer” and, therefore, the confession was hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act. It was also contended that Section 67 merely authorises officers to call for information and does not empower them to record confessions capable of being treated as substantive evidence.
    • The larger Bench was essentially required to determine two questions: whether officers empowered under Section 53 of the NDPS Act are police officers for Section 25 of the Evidence Act, and whether a statement recorded under Section 67 can be treated as a confessional statement against an accused.

    Section 53 NDPS Officers Are β€œPolice Officers”

    • The majority answered the first question in favour of the accused.
    • The Supreme Court held that officers invested with powers under Section 53 of the NDPS Act are β€œpolice officers” within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, any confessional statement made to such an officer is barred by Section 25 and cannot be taken into account to convict an accused under the NDPS Act.
    • The ruling is particularly significant because Section 53 enables officers belonging to departments such as Customs, Revenue Intelligence, Narcotics and other specified government departments to be invested with powers of an officer-in-charge of a police station for investigation of NDPS offences.
    • The majority rejected an interpretation under which constitutional and evidentiary safeguards available to an accused could depend merely upon the departmental designation of the investigating officer. The Court observed that permitting a confession before such an officer to become the basis of conviction, without safeguards and without excluding Section 25 of the Evidence Act, would infringe the constitutional protections under Articles 14, 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution.

    Section 67 Statement Cannot Be Used as a Confession

    The second and equally important finding concerned Section 67 of the NDPS Act.

    The Supreme Court categorically held:

    β€œA statement recorded under section 67 of the NDPS Act cannot be used as a confessional statement in the trial of an offence under the NDPS Act.”

    • The decision therefore substantially altered the evidentiary position in NDPS prosecutions where investigative agencies had relied upon Section 67 statements as confessions against accused persons.
    • The judgment reinforces the constitutional protection against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) and the evidentiary prohibition contained in Section 25 of the Evidence Act.

    Raj Kumar Karwal and Kanhaiyalal Overruled

    • The Supreme Court expressly reconsidered its earlier judgments in Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India, (1990) 2 SCC 409 and Kanhaiyalal v. Union of India, (2008) 4 SCC 668.
    • Those decisions had supported the proposition that officers exercising powers under Section 53 were not police officers within Section 25 of the Evidence Act and had permitted reliance upon Section 67 statements in circumstances considered therein.
    • The majority in Tofan Singh held that both judgments β€œdo not state the law correctly” and expressly overruled them. It further clarified that other judgments expressly relying upon those decisions or the principles laid down in them would also stand overruled to that extent.
    • By contrast, the Supreme Court approved Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417 and Nirmal Singh Pehlwan v. Inspector, Customs, (2011) 12 SCC 298, declaring them to be correct in law.

    Important Distinction From Statements Under the Customs Act

    • The judgment also discusses the distinction between Section 67 of the NDPS Act and the powers available to Customs officers under Sections 107 and 108 of the Customs Act, 1962.
    • The reference order itself noted that Section 108 of the Customs Act expressly empowers Customs officers to summon persons to give evidence and produce documents, whereas Section 67 of the NDPS Act uses materially different language.
    • Accordingly, the Tofan Singh ruling should be understood in its specific statutory context under the NDPS Act and should not automatically be read as declaring every statement recorded by Customs officers under Section 108 of the Customs Act inadmissible.

    Justice Indira Banerjee’s Dissent

    • Justice Indira Banerjee disagreed with the majority. In her dissent, she concluded that officers invested with powers under Section 53 of the NDPS Act should not be regarded as police officers for Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act.
    • She was also unable to agree with the proposition that a statement recorded under Section 67 could not be used against an accused. In her view, statements made during an inquiry or investigation before authorised NDPS officers could be tendered and proved in accordance with law.
    • The binding position, however, is the 2:1 majority ruling.

    Did the Supreme Court Acquit Tofan Singh in This Judgment?

    • An important procedural distinction must be noted. The larger Bench was deciding the referred questions of law. It did not finally dispose of Tofan Singh’s individual appeal on merits through this judgment.
    • After answering the reference, the Supreme Court directed that the appeals and Special Leave Petitions be sent back to the appropriate Division Benches for disposal on merits in light of the majority judgment.
    • Therefore, it is more accurate to say that the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the accused on the referred legal issues, rather than stating that this larger-Bench judgment itself acquitted Tofan Singh.

    Key Legal Takeaway

    Tofan Singh fundamentally changed the evidentiary landscape of NDPS prosecutions. The binding principles are clear: an officer invested with powers under Section 53 of the NDPS Act is a police officer for Section 25 of the Evidence Act, a confession made to such an officer cannot be used to convict an accused, and a statement recorded under Section 67 cannot be treated as a confessional statement at an NDPS trial.

    The judgment consequently remains a major authority on Section 67 statements, self-incrimination, admissibility of confessions and the investigative powers of NCB, DRI, Customs and other officers empowered under the NDPS Act.

    Connected Matter

    Delhi High Court Grants Bail Under NDPS Act Over 51-Day Delay in Sampling

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Supreme Court

    Disclaimer

    Handy Download:

    “Handy Order For Download”Download

    Write to us at office@aadrikaalaw.com

    Tel: +91-11-4999 2707

    www.aadrikaalaw.com

    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Delhi High Court Sets Aside Refusal of β€˜HEALTHSKOOL’ Trademark; Holds Suggestive Marks Are Inherently Distinctive and Registrable

    Delhi High Court Sets Aside Refusal of β€˜HEALTHSKOOL’ Trademark; Holds Suggestive Marks Are Inherently Distinctive and Registrable

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 11.09.2026

    Delhi High Court Sets Aside Refusal of β€˜HEALTHSKOOL’ Trademark; Holds Suggestive Marks Are Inherently Distinctive and Registrable

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    The Delhi High Court has set aside an order of the Trade Marks Registry refusing registration of the mark β€œHEALTHSKOOL” for medical and allied products in Class 10, holding that the Senior Examiner had applied an incorrect legal standard while examining the distinctiveness of the mark.

    Justice Prathiba M. Singh allowed the appeal filed by Disruptive Health Solutions Private Limited under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and directed the Registrar of Trade Marks to proceed with advertisement of the mark, subject to a disclaimer that the proprietor would have no exclusive rights over the word β€œHealth” independently.

    Trademark Registry Refused β€œHEALTHSKOOL” as Descriptive

    • The dispute arose from Trade Mark Application No. 3942420, filed for the word mark β€œHEALTHSKOOL” on a β€œproposed to be used” basis in Class 10.
    • The application covered products including bandages, condoms, surgical, medical, dental and veterinary apparatus and instruments, artificial limbs, orthopaedic articles, suture materials and other medical products.
    • The Senior Examiner rejected the application under Section 9(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Act, reasoning that β€œHEALTHSKOOL” indicated the purpose or use of the goods and was therefore descriptive.

    Appellant Already Held β€œHEALTHSKOOL” Registrations in Other Classes

    • Before the High Court, Disruptive Health Solutions pointed out that β€œHEALTHSKOOL” had been adopted in 2015 for medicinal and other products and e-pharmacy activities.
    • The company already held registrations for the mark in Classes 3, 5 and 44, including both word and logo registrations. The Registrar’s counsel also confirmed before the Court that registrations for the same mark had been granted in other classes.
    • The Court further noted that the Registry’s examination report had not cited any identical or deceptively similar trademark. The only objection raised against the application was under Section 9(1)(b).

    Delhi High Court Explains β€œSpectrum of Distinctiveness”

    • The High Court found that the Senior Examiner had β€œerred in law” in applying the standard for registration of trademarks.
    • The Court explained that trademarks broadly fall across a spectrum comprising arbitrary/fanciful/invented marks, suggestive marks, descriptive marks and generic marks.
    • Relying on Bata India Limited v. Chawla Boot House, (2019) 259 DLT 292, the Court reiterated the spectrum of trademark distinctiveness:

    Generic β†’ Descriptive β†’ Suggestive β†’ Arbitrary/Invented

    While generic expressions enjoy the least distinctiveness and descriptive marks generally require secondary meaning, suggestive marks are inherently distinctive and do not require proof of secondary meaning.

    How to Distinguish a Suggestive Mark From a Descriptive Mark

    • The judgment provides an important test for determining whether a mark is descriptive or merely suggestive.
    • Referring to Bata India, the Court noted that the inquiry can involve two considerations: the degree of imagination required to connect the mark with the product, and the competitor’s need to use the mark.
    • The Court also relied on the Bombay High Court’s judgment in People Interactive (India) Private Limited v. Vivek Pahwa, 2016 (68) PTC 225 (Bom), which explains that suggestive words merely hint at a feature or speciality of the goods and require the consumer to make a mental connection between the expression and the product. Such marks do not require proof of secondary meaning before registration.

    Descriptive Element Does Not Automatically Make Entire Mark Unregistrable

    • The High Court further clarified that a mark can obtain protection either because it is inherently distinctive or because it has acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning.
    • Importantly, the Court held that merely because some portion of a trademark has a reference or indication concerning the goods or services, the entire mark cannot automatically be rejected.
    • The Registry must examine the mark on its merits, the extent of its use and other registrations held by the applicant. The Court also recognised that a trademark owner is entitled to expand into additional goods and services as a natural consequence of business expansion.

    β€œHEALTHSKOOL” Distinctive Enough to Proceed for Advertisement

    • Applying these principles, the Court noted that β€œHEALTHSKOOL” had been used by the appellant since 2015 and was already protected through several registrations in other classes.
    • The company had also recorded sales of approximately β‚Ή23 crore during 2020-21.
    • Significantly, the appellant informed the Court that it was not claiming exclusive rights over the word β€œHealth” per se.
    • Considering these circumstances, the High Court concluded that β€œHEALTHSKOOL” was sufficiently distinctive at that stage to proceed for advertisement.

    Registry Directed to Advertise Mark Within Two Months

    • The Delhi High Court consequently held that the Senior Examiner’s refusal order was unsustainable and liable to be set aside.
    • The Court directed that the trademark application proceed for advertisement in the Trade Marks Journal with the condition:

    β€œNo exclusive rights in the word β€˜Health’.”

    The Registrar was directed to advertise the mark within two months. The Court, however, clarified that its decision would not bind any opposition proceedings that might subsequently be initiated by a third party. The appeal was accordingly allowed.

    Key Legal Takeaway

    • The judgment reinforces that the Trade Marks Registry cannot treat every mark having some connection with the relevant goods as automatically descriptive. The proper inquiry requires consideration of the spectrum of distinctiveness.
    • In particular, suggestive marks are inherently distinctive, whereas descriptive marks ordinarily require secondary meaning. The degree of imagination required by a consumer to connect a mark with the product remains an important test in drawing that distinction.

    The decision also recognises that the presence of a potentially descriptive component within a composite trademark does not necessarily justify rejection of the entire mark, particularly where an appropriate disclaimer can protect the public interest.

    Connected Matter

    Delhi HC Ruled β€œONE FOR ALL” Trademark Registrable for Books; Common Words Can Be Distinctive When Unconnected with the Goods

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Delhi High Court

    Disclaimer

    Handy Download:

    “Handy Order for Download”Download

    Write to us at office@aadrikaalaw.com

    Tel: +91-11-4999 2707

    www.aadrikaalaw.com

    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi