Category: Pre Trial

  • Bombay High Court: Railway Board Circular Cannot Override 2013 Land Acquisition Act

    Bombay High Court: Railway Board Circular Cannot Override 2013 Land Acquisition Act

    Date: 26.09.2026

    The Bombay High Court has held that tenants whose structures are acquired for a public project fall within the definition of β€œaffected family” under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, and are entitled to statutory rehabilitation and resettlement benefits.

    The Division Bench rejected an attempt by the Dedicated Freight Corridor Corporation of India Limited (DFCCIL) to rely upon a Railway Board-approved Entitlement Matrix to restrict the tenants’ entitlement to merely three months’ notice and β‚Ή10,000 as shifting allowance.

    The Court categorically held that administrative instructions issued by the Ministry of Railways cannot override the statutory provisions of the 2013 Land Acquisition Act. It directed payment of β‚Ή14.17 lakh to each petitioner, together with statutory interest under Section 80β€”9% per annum for the first year from taking possession and 15% per annum from the second year onwards.

    Dispute Arose From Dedicated Freight Corridor Project in Raigad

    • The petitioners were tenants occupying structures acquired by DFCCIL for the Dedicated Freight Corridor passing through Alibag, District Raigad.
    • Their grievance was that although competent authorities had already confirmed their eligibility and quantified the monetary compensation payable to them, DFCCIL subsequently prevented the amounts from being disbursed.
    • The petitioners had approached the Appellate Authority for Rehabilitation in 2021 as members of affected families/project-affected persons. Possession of their structures was admittedly taken during 2021–2022.

    Appellate Authority Had Already Declared Tenants Eligible for Compensation

    • On 16 June 2022, the Deputy Commissioner (Rehabilitation), Konkan Division, acting as the Appellate Authority, allowed the petitioners’ appeals and held that they were eligible to receive compensation.
    • Those orders referred to the Maharashtra Government Resolution dated 22 May 2018, which provided the mechanism for payment of compensation to affected persons.
    • DFCCIL filed review applications challenging the petitioners’ eligibility, but the review applications were rejected. Consequently, the orders confirming their eligibility remained undisturbed.

    β‚Ή14.17 Lakh Compensation Determined for Each Petitioner

    • Following the determination of eligibility, the District Rehabilitation Officer submitted a proposal to the State Government seeking approval for payment.
    • Eventually, on 6 November 2025, the Deputy Collector (Rehabilitation), acting as Administrator for Rehabilitation for the project, passed a reasoned order determining compensation of:

    β‚Ή14,17,000 for each petitioner

    • DFCCIL and the rehabilitation authority thereafter informed the concerned bank regarding payment. In fact, instructions were issued on 6 November 2025 for transferring a substantial portionβ€”β‚Ή10 lakh to each petitioner through RTGS.
    • The dispute took a different turn shortly thereafter.

    DFCCIL Suddenly Halts Compensation

    • On 24 November 2025, the Project Manager of DFCCIL wrote to the District Rehabilitation Officer taking a position contrary to the steps already undertaken for payment.

    DFCCIL asserted that because the petitioners were merely tenants, they were entitled only to:

    • three months’ written notice; and
    • β‚Ή10,000 towards shifting allowance.

    For this position, DFCCIL relied upon an Entitlement Matrix based on its September 2012 Relief and Rehabilitation Plan.

    The District Rehabilitation Officer responded on 8 December 2025, pointing out that the State Government had already approved the petitioners’ eligibility and their entitlement to the compensation.

    Despite this, DFCCIL did not release the amounts. The petitioners issued a legal notice on 5 March 2026 and thereafter approached the Bombay High Court in April 2026.

    DFCCIL Relies on Railway Board’s 2015 Entitlement Matrix

    • Before the High Court, DFCCIL relied principally on a letter dated 23 May 2015 issued by the Director Planning (Special), Ministry of Railways, Railway Board, to the Managing Director of DFCCIL.
    • The communication approved an Entitlement Matrix for Dedicated Freight Corridor projects based on DFCCIL’s September 2012 Rehabilitation and Resettlement Plan.
    • DFCCIL argued that the Matrix governed compensation payable to lessees and tenants.
    • It also contended that compensation had already been paid to the owners of the structures occupied by the petitioners and, therefore, the tenants could not separately claim the β‚Ή14.17 lakh quantified by the rehabilitation authority.
    • Another argument was based on the Maharashtra Government Resolution dated 22 May 2018. DFCCIL claimed that since the structures stood on Gaothan land, the second schedule to the Government Resolution applied and only owners were entitled to compensation.

    Tenants Expressly Included in Definition of β€˜Affected Family’

    • The High Court examined Section 3(c) of the 2013 Act, particularly Section 3(c)(ii).
    • The provision includes within β€œaffected family” a family that does not own land but whose member or members may be:
    • β€œagricultural labourers, tenants including any form of tenancy…”
    • subject to the statutory requirements concerning the impact of acquisition on livelihood.
    • The Court found that it was undisputed that the petitioners were tenants in the structures acquired by DFCCIL.
    • It consequently held that the petitioners were covered by the statutory definition and were entitled to compensation under the 2013 Act by applying Schedule II.

    Section 31 Requires Rehabilitation and Resettlement Award for Affected Families

    • The Division Bench also examined Section 31 of the 2013 Act, which requires the Collector to pass a Rehabilitation and Resettlement Award for each affected family in accordance with the entitlements under the Second Schedule.
    • Such an award may contain rehabilitation and resettlement amounts, bank account details, house sites, land allotments, subsistence and transportation allowances, amounts for cattle sheds and petty shops, benefits for artisans and small traders, employment-related entitlements, annuity and other statutory benefits.
    • Reading Section 31 together with Section 3(c) and Schedule II, the Court concluded that the petitioners’ status as tenants did not exclude them from the statutory rehabilitation framework.

    Railway Board’s Administrative Instructions Cannot Override Statute

    • The most significant legal finding concerns the relationship between the Railway Board’s administrative instructions and the 2013 Act.
    • The High Court rejected DFCCIL’s reliance on the Railway Board letter dated 23 May 2015 and the corresponding Entitlement Matrix.

    The Bench held:

    • β€œSuch instructions cannot prevail upon the statutory provisions”
    • and found that the Railway Board communication could not override the statutory provisions of the 2013 Act.
    • Thus, an administrative compensation policy or departmental entitlement matrix cannot be invoked to reduce or take away a benefit that the governing legislation confers upon an eligible affected family.

    DFCCIL’s Objection Was Raised at a Belated Stage

    • The High Court also found DFCCIL’s conduct significant.
    • The petitioners’ eligibility had already been determined by the Appellate Authority in June 2022. DFCCIL’s review applications had failed. The competent authority subsequently quantified compensation at β‚Ή14.17 lakh each.
    • More importantly, the Chief General Manager of DFCCIL had itself joined the competent authority in directing the bank to transfer β‚Ή10 lakh to each petitioner.
    • Only thereafter did the Project Manager issue the communication dated 24 November 2025 objecting to payment and invoking the 2015 Entitlement Matrix.
    • The Court characterised this objection as belated.

    Government Resolution Also Could Not Reduce Statutory Benefits

    • DFCCIL’s reliance on the Maharashtra Government Resolution dated 22 May 2018 also failed.
    • The High Court noted that paragraph 6 of the Government Resolution itself recognised that where the compensation or relief available under the 2013 Act was higher, the higher statutory benefit would prevail.
    • The Bench connected this principle with Section 108 of the 2013 Act, which gives affected families the option to avail themselves of better compensation and rehabilitation and resettlement benefits.
    • Consequently, DFCCIL could not rely upon the second schedule to the Government Resolution to reduce the petitioners’ statutory entitlement.

    Bombay HC Orders β‚Ή14.17 Lakh Compensation to Each Tenant

    • The Court rejected the grounds advanced by DFCCIL and allowed all the connected writ petitions.
    • It held that each petitioner was entitled to:
    • β‚Ή14,17,000 as compensation, along with statutory interest
    • The principal amount had already been deposited by DFCCIL. The Court therefore ordered that β‚Ή14.17 lakh be disbursed to each petitioner within two weeks.

    9% Interest for First Year and 15% Thereafter

    • The petitioners had sought interest at 18% per annum.
    • The High Court did not grant the claimed 18% rate. Instead, it applied the statutory interest mechanism contained in Section 80 of the 2013 Act.
    • According to the judgment, delayed payment attracts:
    • 9% per annum for the first year from the date possession was taken, and 15% per annum from the second year onwards.
    • The Court considered statutory interest appropriate because DFCCIL had taken an β€œunreasonable stand belatedly” and had deprived the petitioners of their rightful dues without justification.
    • It particularly noted that DFCCIL had initially directed substantial payment of β‚Ή10 lakh each through RTGS and then suddenly reversed its position and objected to the disbursement.

    Time-Bound Directions for Payment of Interest

    • The High Court laid down a specific schedule for implementation.
    • The competent authority was directed to calculate the interest payable to each petitioner within four weeks.
    • It must thereafter communicate the calculation to the Chief General Manager and Project Manager of DFCCIL within one week.
    • DFCCIL must then deposit the interest amount with the competent authority within two weeks, following which the authority must disburse it to the petitioners within one further week.

    Final Decision

    • The Bombay High Court made the rule absolute and allowed all seven connected writ petitions.

    The petitioners were:

    • Sanjay Baban Girhe, Heena Suhas Niromkar, Vijaykumar Subedar Mourya, Rajendra Muktaji Shinde, Vandana Ulhas Girhe, Mahesh Mahillappa Kallure and Sambhaji Shivhar Mule.
    • Each petitioner is to receive β‚Ή14.17 lakh plus statutory interest under Section 80 of the 2013 Act.

    Key Takeaway

    The judgment establishes an important principle for land acquisition and infrastructure projects: tenancy does not by itself exclude a person from rehabilitation and resettlement benefits under the 2013 Land Acquisition Act.

    Where a tenant satisfies the statutory definition of an β€œaffected family” under Section 3(c), the entitlement must be determined under the Act, including Section 31 and Schedule II. An internal policy, project-specific Entitlement Matrix, Railway Board instruction or State Government resolution cannot be used to dilute a superior statutory entitlement.

    The ruling is particularly significant for infrastructure projects undertaken by government corporations because the Court made clear that administrative instructions must yield to the governing legislation, while Section 108 protects an affected family’s entitlement to opt for better compensation and rehabilitation benefits.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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  • Bombay High Court Awards β‚Ή8.14 Lakh Compensation to Parents of Passenger Who Fell From Train

    Bombay High Court Awards β‚Ή8.14 Lakh Compensation to Parents of Passenger Who Fell From Train

    Date: 25.09.2026

    The Bombay High Court has awarded β‚Ή8,14,641 as compensation to the parents of a 26-year-old railway passenger who died after falling from a local train, setting aside a Railway Claims Tribunal order that had treated the death as a case of trespassing on railway tracks.

    Justice Aarti Sathe held that entries in railway records may be admissible under Section 191 of the Railways Act, 1989, but they do not become conclusive proof merely because they form part of official railway records. Their reliability and evidentiary value must still be judicially tested, particularly when they conflict with independent evidence.

    The Court found that the Railway Claims Tribunal had ignored the inquest panchanama, relied heavily on a DRM report containing only a tentative conclusion, and reached a finding of trespassing despite there being no eyewitness or other evidence establishing that the deceased was crossing the railway tracks.

    Parents Challenge Rejection of Railway Compensation Claim

    • The appeal was filed by Waman Maruti Suryawanshi and Prabhavati Waman Suryawanshi, parents of deceased Rahul Waman Suryawanshi, challenging the Railway Claims Tribunal, Mumbai’s judgment dated 20 September 2019, which had dismissed their compensation claim.
    • The appeal was filed under Section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987.
    • At the relevant time, Rahul was employed with the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation (MIDC) and, according to his parents, was the sole breadwinner of the family. They claimed to have been financially dependent upon him.

    Parents Said Son Accidentally Fell From Moving Local Train

    • According to the appellants, on 22 March 2015, Rahul purchased a valid railway ticket at Ghansoli Railway Station and boarded a local train for Airoli.
    • Their case was that while the train was travelling between Ghansoli and Rabale railway stations, Rahul accidentally fell from the moving train, suffered serious injuries and died before he could be admitted to hospital.
    • The parents further claimed that a railway ticket was recovered from Rahul’s body and recorded in the inquest panchanama, though the ticket was subsequently misplaced by them.
    • They filed a compensation claim under Section 124A of the Railways Act, 1989 on 9 April 2015.

    Railways Claimed Deceased Was Trespassing

    • Central Railway disputed the claim.
    • Following a statutory investigation under the Railway Passengers (Manner of Investigation of Untoward Incident) Rules, 2003, the Divisional Railway Manager’s report concluded that Rahul had been trespassing on the railway track and was injured after being hit by a train.
    • The Railways relied, among other things, on a Station Master’s memo recording that an unknown person aged about 26 years had allegedly been hit by an unknown train while trespassing.
    • On that basis, the Railways denied that Rahul’s death constituted an β€œuntoward incident” under Section 123(c)(2) and also disputed that he was a bona fide passenger.

    Tribunal Found Him to Be a Bona Fide Passenger but Still Rejected Compensation

    • Significantly, the Railway Claims Tribunal itself found from the inquest panchanama that Rahul had been carrying a valid railway ticket and was therefore a bona fide passenger.
    • However, the Tribunal nevertheless concluded that the parents had failed to establish that Rahul had fallen from a local train.
    • It instead accepted the theory that he had been knocked down by an unknown train between Ghansoli and Rabale and consequently dismissed the compensation claim.
    • This apparent inconsistency became an important issue before the Bombay High Court.

    No Eyewitness Supported Railways’ Trespassing Theory

    • The High Court found the Tribunal’s conclusion erroneous.
    • Justice Sathe noted that there was β€œabsolutely no eyewitness” and no evidence led by the Railways to establish that Rahul was actually crossing or trespassing on the railway tracks.
    • The Tribunal had essentially relied upon the DRM report and Station Master’s memo without independently examining whether the factual conclusion recorded therein was correct.
    • More importantly, the office note forming part of the DRM report itself did not conclusively state that Rahul was trespassing. It merely stated that the incident β€œmight have taken place while the victim was crossing Railway Track.”
    • The High Court therefore found that a tentative departmental conclusion could not, without supporting evidence, establish trespassing.

    Inquest Panchanama Recorded Fall From Local Train and Recovery of Ticket

    • The High Court attached considerable significance to the inquest panchanama, which the Tribunal had failed to properly consider.
    • The document recorded that Rahul had β€œfallen down from unknown local train” and sustained injuries.
    • It also expressly recorded that when his body was checked, authorities found, among other belongings, a railway ticket.
    • The panchanama further recorded the conclusion that Rahul had died due to a fall from an unknown local train after sustaining serious injuries, subject to determination of the medical cause of death through post-mortem examination.
    • The High Court observed that the DRM report had been prepared while ignoring this crucial recording in the inquest panchanama.

    Railway Records Admissible, But Not Conclusive Proof

    • One of the most significant legal findings in the judgment concerns Section 191 of the Railways Act.
    • The Railways argued that the DRM report resulted from a statutory investigation and had sufficient evidentiary value under Section 191.
    • The High Court rejected the argument that this gave the report conclusive status.

    Justice Sathe held that Section 191 makes entries contained in railway records admissible in evidence, but:

    β€œthe same does not render them conclusive proof as facts stated therein.”

    • The credibility of such records must still be judicially tested for reliability and corroboration, particularly where the railway records conflict with independent evidence.
    • For this proposition, the Court also relied upon the Orissa High Court’s decision in Basanta Mangaraj & Anr. v. Union of India, F.A.O. No. 170 of 2025.

    Accidental Fall From Passenger Train Is an β€˜Untoward Incident’

    • Section 123(c)(2) of the Railways Act expressly includes within the definition of an β€œuntoward incident” the accidental falling of a passenger from a train carrying passengers.
    • The High Court noted that the Tribunal had already found Rahul to be a bona fide passenger carrying a valid ticket.
    • Once that finding existed, the Tribunal could not simply rely upon the Station Master’s memo and DRM report to conclude that there was no untoward incident, particularly in the absence of evidence establishing trespassing.

    Negligence of Passenger Does Not by Itself Defeat Compensation

    • The High Court relied upon the Supreme Court decisions in Jameela & Ors. v. Union of India, 2010 ACJ 2453 and Union of India v. Rina Devi, 2018 ACJ 1441.
    • The judgment reiterated that where a passenger falls from a running train during the journey, the incident constitutes an untoward incident and the Railways would be liable unless the case falls within one of the statutory exceptions under Section 124A.
    • The statutory exceptions include death or injury caused by suicide or attempted suicide, self-inflicted injury, the passenger’s own criminal act, intoxication or insanity, and specified natural or medical causes.
    • The Court referred to Jameela for the distinction between ordinary negligence and the β€œcriminal act” contemplated by the proviso to Section 124A. The Supreme Court had explained that even negligent or rash conduct, without more, does not necessarily amount to the criminal act contemplated by the statutory exception.

    Tribunal Cannot Act as Expert on Nature of Injuries

    • The High Court also criticised the Tribunal’s attempt to infer from the nature of Rahul’s injuries that he must have been knocked down or run over by a train rather than having fallen from one.
    • Justice Sathe held that the Tribunal was not an expert body competent to draw such a medical or technical conclusion without supporting evidence.
    • There was nothing on record establishing that the injuries were of a kind that could only have resulted from being struck by a train.
    • The Court therefore held that the Tribunal’s personal opinion regarding the nature of the injuries could not become the decisive basis for determining how the accident occurred.

    Railways Failed to Establish Section 124A Exception

    • The High Court further found that the Tribunal had failed to properly examine whether Rahul’s death actually fell within any of the exceptions contained in clauses (a) to (e) of the proviso to Section 124A.
    • In the absence of such a finding, denial of compensation was held to be legally unsustainable.
    • The Court accordingly concluded that the Tribunal’s judgment deserved to be set aside.

    Railways Act Is Beneficial Legislation and Must Receive Liberal Interpretation

    • Justice Sathe also emphasised the beneficial nature of the Railways Act.
    • Rahul’s father and mother were undisputedly his dependants within the meaning of Section 123(b).
    • The Court observed that where legislation is beneficial in nature, it should receive a liberal interpretation and, where two constructions are reasonably possible, the interpretation favouring the beneficiary should be preferred.
    • According to the High Court, the Tribunal had adopted a narrow and erroneous interpretation which deprived the deceased passenger’s family of the benefit intended by the legislation.

    Compensation: β‚Ή8 Lakh or β‚Ή4 Lakh Plus Interest?

    • The accident occurred on 22 March 2015, when the prescribed compensation for death was β‚Ή4 lakh.
    • However, by the time the Tribunal delivered its judgment on 20 September 2019, the Railway Accidents and Untoward Incidents (Compensation) Rules had been amended and compensation for death had been enhanced to β‚Ή8 lakh.
    • Applying the principle in Rina Devi, the High Court compared the enhanced statutory compensation with the original β‚Ή4 lakh amount together with applicable interest.
    • The Court applied interest at 9% per annum from the date of the accident, finding that β‚Ή4 lakh together with interest up to the date of its judgment came to β‚Ή8,14,641.
    • Since this was higher than the amended fixed compensation of β‚Ή8 lakh, the Court awarded the higher figure.

    Bombay High Court Awards β‚Ή8,14,641 to Parents

    • The High Court ultimately allowed the First Appeal and quashed the Railway Claims Tribunal’s judgment dated 20 September 2019.
    • The parents’ compensation claim was allowed for β‚Ή8,14,641, to be distributed equally between them.
    • Central Railway was directed to deposit the amount into their bank accounts within eight weeks from the date on which the appellants furnish their bank details to the Chief Claim Officer, Central Railway.
    • If the Railways fails to deposit the compensation within the stipulated period, the amount will carry further interest at 9% per annum until payment.

    Key Takeaway

    The judgment establishes an important evidentiary principle for railway compensation cases: departmental railway records such as DRM reports and Station Master memos may be admissible, but they are not conclusive proof of how an accident occurred.

    Where the Railways alleges trespassing, its internal records must still withstand judicial scrutiny and be tested against independent evidence. A tentative departmental statement that an accident β€œmight” have occurred while crossing railway tracks cannot automatically outweigh an inquest panchanama, the recovery of a valid railway ticket and the absence of any eyewitness supporting the trespassing theory.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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  • NPPA Cannot Apply Blanket Drug Price Ceiling Without Following DPCO Formula: Bombay HC Quashes Notifications and β‚Ή13-Crore-Plus Demand

    NPPA Cannot Apply Blanket Drug Price Ceiling Without Following DPCO Formula: Bombay HC Quashes Notifications and β‚Ή13-Crore-Plus Demand

    Date: 23.09.2026

    The Bombay High Court has delivered a significant ruling on pharmaceutical price control, holding that the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA) cannot bypass the statutory mechanism prescribed under the Drugs (Price Control) Order, 1995 (DPCO 1995) and impose a ceiling price upon a formulation merely because it contains a scheduled drug as one of its ingredients.

    Allowing a writ petition filed by Pharmed Limited, the Division Bench of Justice Manish Pitale and Justice Shreeram V. Shirsat struck down NPPA’s notification dated 30 January 2009 in its entirety, while quashing the notification dated 27 September 2007 to the extent it was sought to be applied to Pharmed’s β€œCartigen Forte” formulation. Consequently, the authorities were restrained from acting upon the impugned recovery demands against the company.

    The dispute had culminated in recovery proceedings demanding amounts running beyond β‚Ή13 crore, including alleged overcharging and interest. Earlier, a recovery notice dated 21 November 2016 had sought β‚Ή13,41,06,802 under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966.

    Dispute Over Price Control of Cartigen Forte

    • Pharmed Limited manufactures and markets pharmaceutical formulations. The dispute concerned its product β€œCartigen Forte Tablets”, a formulation used for treatment of osteoarthritis.
    • Pharmed’s central case was that the Government had never specifically fixed a ceiling price for Cartigen Forte, either for its formulation existing before January 2010 or for its altered composition thereafter.
    • The controversy arose under the DPCO 1995, issued by the Central Government in exercise of powers under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act. The statutory framework empowered the Government to fix, among other things, retail and ceiling prices of scheduled formulations.

    NPPA’s 2007 Notification Covered Multivitamin and Mineral Formulations

    • On 27 September 2007, NPPA issued a notification fixing ceiling prices for multivitamin and mineral tablets and capsules.
    • Pharmed contended that Cartigen Forte was not such a formulation and that the 2007 notification could not simply be extended to it. The company also challenged a subsequent NPPA notification dated 30 January 2009 as impermissibly broad and contrary to the DPCO itself.
    • The 2009 notification purported to provide that any formulation or composition not already covered in NPPA’s tables, but containing any scheduled drug as an ingredient, would become subject to the ceiling price mentioned against that ingredient in the relevant notification unless the manufacturer subsequently obtained a specific price from NPPA.
    • That blanket approach ultimately became central to the High Court’s ruling.

    Initial Overcharging Demand of β‚Ή10.97 Crore

    • NPPA issued a show-cause notice to Pharmed on 13 October 2010, alleging that Cartigen Forte had been sold above the applicable ceiling price.
    • The authority initially proposed recovery of approximately β‚Ή10.97 crore as estimated overcharging.
    • Pharmed replied on 31 January 2011, contending, among other things, that Cartigen Forte was not a multivitamin formulation, its composition had changed from January 2010, and NPPA could not impose a blanket ceiling in the manner proposed.

    Demand Continued to Escalate With Interest

    • In September 2014, NPPA recalculated the alleged overcharged amount at β‚Ή6,33,62,316 and added β‚Ή4,90,71,525 as interest, taking the amount to β‚Ή11,24,33,841.
    • A further demand dated 26 November 2014 called upon Pharmed to deposit β‚Ή11,42,82,631.
    • Subsequent recovery action under Section 267 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code demanded β‚Ή12,05,92,401 and threatened attachment proceedings. An earlier writ petition resulted in the matter being sent back to NPPA for reconsideration and a speaking order.
    • After remand, however, further demands followed: β‚Ή12,73,36,583 on 7 March 2016, β‚Ή12,93,41,609 on 12 May 2016, and eventually a recovery notice for β‚Ή13,41,06,802 on 21 November 2016.

    Bombay HC: Cartigen Forte Is Neither a Multivitamin Nor Mineral Tablet

    • A significant part of the Court’s analysis concerned the actual composition of Cartigen Forte.
    • Before January 2010, the formulation contained, among other ingredients, Glucosamine Sulfate Potassium Chloride, Chondroitin Sulfate Sodium, Methyl Sulfonyl Methane, Vitamin D3, Vitamin E and Vitamin C. From January 2010, its composition changed.
    • The Court observed that prior to January 2010, Vitamin C and Vitamin E were scheduled bulk drugs included in the First Schedule to DPCO 1995. However, those two ingredients were no longer present in the formulation from January 2010.
    • More importantly, the Court accepted Pharmed’s contention that the product’s active pharmaceutical ingredients for treatment of osteoarthritis were Glucosamine Sulfate Potassium Chloride, Chondroitin Sulfate Sodium and Methyl Sulfonyl Methane.
    • After examining the undisputed composition, the Bench agreed that Cartigen Forte was neither a multivitamin nor a mineral tablet/capsule.

    Presence of a Scheduled Ingredient Does Not Eliminate Statutory Price-Fixation Exercise

    • The Court did accept an important part of NPPA’s legal position.
    • It held that the authorities possess power under Paragraphs 4 and 11 of DPCO 1995 to fix a formulation’s price based on available information where a manufacturer fails to furnish the information or application required under the DPCO.
    • It also accepted that a formulation containing a bulk drug specified in the First Schedule could fall within the definition of a β€œscheduled formulation.”
    • But that did not end the statutory exercise.
    • The Court held that the Central Government or NPPA was still required to actually fix the ceiling price of the particular scheduled formulation, and while exercising power under Paragraph 9, the authority was required to do so in accordance with the formula prescribed by Paragraph 7.
    • Accordingly, merely establishing that a product contained a scheduled bulk drug could not substitute the statutory price-fixation process.

    Paragraph 7 Formula Must Be Applied

    The judgment places considerable emphasis on the pricing formula prescribed under Paragraph 7 of DPCO 1995:

    R.P. = (M.C. + C.C. + P.M. + P.C.) Γ— (1 + MAPE/100) + E.D.

    The calculation therefore required consideration of factors including:

    • Material Cost (M.C.)
    • Conversion Cost (C.C.)
    • Packing Material Cost (P.M.)
    • Packing Charges (P.C.)
    • Maximum Allowable Post-Manufacturing Expenses (MAPE)
    • Excise Duty (E.D.)

    The statutory provisions themselves contemplated that the Government would fix the retail price of a scheduled formulation in accordance with this formula.

    Similarly, Paragraph 9 contemplated fixation of a ceiling price for a scheduled formulation by notification in the Official Gazette in accordance with the Paragraph 7 formula.

    The High Court found that no such exercise had been undertaken specifically for Cartigen Forte.

    2007 Multivitamin Notification Could Not Be Applied to Cartigen Forte

    • The Court therefore rejected NPPA’s attempt to apply the notification dated 27 September 2007 to Pharmed’s product.
    • That notification had specifically fixed prices for multivitamin and mineral tablets/capsules. The Court found that Cartigen Forte was a different formulation and its ceiling price had not independently been calculated by applying the statutory formula.
    • The Court also noted the significant differences in composition. Before January 2010, Cartigen Forte contained Vitamin C and Vitamin E only in quantities lower than those specified in the multivitamin/mineral formulations covered by the 2007 notification. From January 2010, those ingredients were no longer present.
    • The High Court therefore held that the 2007 notification could not form the basis for treating Cartigen Forte as having breached a notified ceiling price.

    Specific Gazette Notification Required for the Formulation

    • The Court laid down an important principle concerning the structure of DPCO 1995.
    • Even where Paragraphs 4 and 11 empower the authorities to determine price on the basis of available information, the procedure prescribed by Paragraph 9 read with Paragraph 7 must still be followed.
    • A specific order by way of notification in the Official Gazette was required in respect of the formulation concerned before the authorities could assert that a particular ceiling price applied.
    • Since no such exercise was undertaken for Cartigen Forte, the Court found that the very foundation of NPPA’s allegation of overcharging disappeared.
    • Accordingly, the notification dated 27 September 2007 was liable to be set aside only insofar as NPPA sought to apply it to Pharmed’s Cartigen Forte formulation.

    2009 NPPA Notification Declared Ultra Vires DPCO 1995

    • The Court went considerably further with respect to the 30 January 2009 notification.
    • The notification essentially attempted to make a price ceiling fixed for a scheduled ingredient applicable to any formulation containing that ingredient, unless a specific price had subsequently been obtained.
    • The Bombay High Court found this approach fundamentally inconsistent with the DPCO 1995.
    • According to the Bench, the notification was β€œextremely widely worded” and effectively dispensed with the statutory formula under Paragraph 7.
    • The Court reasoned that if the ceiling price for a formulation could simply be deemed to exist because one of its ingredients was covered by another pricing notification, the entire statutory exercise of calculating a formulation-specific ceiling price under Paragraphs 7 and 9 would be bypassed.
    • The Court therefore held the notification dated 30 January 2009 to be ultra vires the DPCO 1995.

    Notification Was Overbroad and Beyond NPPA’s Power: Bombay HC

    • The High Court further characterised the 2009 notification as overbroad and expansive, operating contrary to the provisions of the DPCO itself.
    • The Bench found that it went beyond the power vested in NPPA and effectively amounted to an abdication of the responsibility imposed upon the Central Government and NPPA to specifically determine a ceiling price under Paragraph 9 by applying the rigorous formula prescribed under Paragraph 7.
    • The Court consequently held that NPPA’s exercise of power under Paragraphs 9 and 11 for issuing the 2009 notification was arbitrary and unsustainable.

    β‚Ή13-Crore-Plus Recovery Proceedings Lose Their Foundation

    • Once the Court found the two notifications incapable of supporting NPPA’s case, the consequential demands could not survive.
    • The Court reasoned that the very foundation of the allegation that Pharmed had overcharged customers for Cartigen Forte had been removed.
    • Consequently, the demand notices issued by NPPA and the recovery proceedings initiated by the Collector under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code were also liable to be quashed.
    • The Court held that there was no independent basis for the Collector to pursue recovery once NPPA’s underlying demand itself became unsustainable.

    Court Also Flags Interest Calculation

    • The High Court separately found substance in Pharmed’s challenge to the huge interest component.
    • It noted that considerable time had elapsed because of delay attributable to NPPA itself in granting a hearing, while earlier demand notices had also been set aside on natural justice grounds.
    • The Court held that time consumed because of the authority’s own fault could not operate to its advantage and to Pharmed’s detriment when calculating interest.
    • Relying on Franco Indian Remedies Private Limited & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr., 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 16344, the Court observed that, at worst, interest could have been calculated from the demand notice issued after the earlier proceedings were remanded.

    Natural Justice and SSI Exemption Issues Left Open

    • Pharmed had also raised questions regarding violation of natural justice, including the alleged failure to pass a proper speaking order after remand, as well as its entitlement and that of its contract manufacturer to a small-scale industrial unit exemption.
    • However, the High Court found it unnecessary to finally determine those issues.
    • Since the notifications forming the foundation of the alleged overcharging were themselves unsustainable, the writ petition could be decided on that basis alone.

    Final Order: Pharmed Wins; NPPA Notifications and Demands Set Aside

    • The Bombay High Court ultimately allowed Pharmed Limited’s writ petition.
    • Crucially, the Court drew a distinction between the two impugned notifications:
    • Notification dated 27 September 2007 was quashed only to the extent it was sought to be applied to Pharmed’s Cartigen Forte formulation.
    • Notification dated 30 January 2009 was quashed and set aside in its entirety.
    • As a consequence, the authorities were directed not to act upon the impugned demand notices against Pharmed.
    • Thus, Pharmed Limited succeeded in eliminating the legal foundation of the substantial overcharging and interest demands raised against it.

    Why the Judgment Matters for Pharmaceutical Price Control

    The ruling is significant because it distinguishes between two separate propositions under DPCO 1995.

    A formulation may qualify as a scheduled formulation because it contains a scheduled bulk drug. But that classification does not, by itself, permit NPPA to automatically import the ceiling price of some other formulation or ingredient and impose it on the manufacturer’s product.

    Where the DPCO requires the ceiling price of a formulation to be determined under Paragraph 9 in accordance with the Paragraph 7 pricing formula, the authority cannot replace that statutory calculation with a blanket deeming mechanism.

    The judgment therefore reinforces the principle that drug-price regulation must remain within the pricing methodology and statutory powers conferred by the DPCO itself.

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  • Bombay HC Orders Return of Deposit and Discharge of Bank Guarantee

    Bombay HC Orders Return of Deposit and Discharge of Bank Guarantee

    Date: 22.09.2026

    The Bombay High Court has permitted Kunal Sancheti Associates to withdraw the amount it had deposited before the Court pursuant to an interim stay order, along with accrued interest, if any, and has also ordered discharge of the corresponding bank guarantee after noting that the underlying recovery notice had already been declared illegal, null and void by the competent civil court.

    Justice Gauri Godse held that once the decree was in favour of the applicant and the impugned recovery notice stood declared illegal, there was no surviving liability requiring the applicant to make payment to the State.

    Dispute Originated From Section 48 Maharashtra Land Revenue Code Notice

    • The dispute originated from a notice issued against Kunal Sancheti Associates under Section 48 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966.
    • The firm challenged the notice by instituting a civil suit. However, the plaint was initially rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, following which the applicant preferred First Appeal No. 784 of 2010 before the Bombay High Court.
    • During the pendency of the first appeal, the High Court granted an interim stay subject to conditions requiring the applicant to deposit part of the amount covered by the notice and furnish a bank guarantee for another part of the amount. The applicant complied with those conditions, and both the deposit and bank guarantee remained with the Court.

    Appeal Transferred to District Court; Suit Ultimately Restored

    • Subsequently, because of a change in pecuniary jurisdiction, the first appeal was transferred to the District Court.
    • The District Court allowed the appeal and restored the applicant’s civil suit. The litigation thereafter proceeded before the trial court.
    • Eventually, by a judgment and decree dated 20 October 2021, the suit was decreed in favour of Kunal Sancheti Associates.
    • The impugned notice was specifically declared β€œillegal, null and void”, and Defendant No. 3 was restrained from executing the order for recovery of the amount.

    Deposit and Bank Guarantee Continued Despite Decree in Applicant’s Favour

    • Despite the decree, the amount deposited before the High Court and the bank guarantee furnished pursuant to the earlier interim order dated 12 January 2011 continued to remain with the Court.
    • Kunal Sancheti Associates therefore filed Interim Application No. 3183 of 2026, seeking permission to withdraw the deposited amount and requesting discharge and cancellation of the bank guarantee.
    • The applicant argued that because the recovery notice itself had already been declared illegal and the decree in its favour had not been challenged, there was no longer any justification for retaining either the deposited money or the bank guarantee.

    State Unable to Confirm Any Challenge to Decree

    • The High Court recorded that the learned Assistant Government Pleader had been granted time on various occasions to verify whether the decree passed in favour of Kunal Sancheti Associates had been challenged.
    • However, the State’s counsel had no instructions as to whether any such challenge had been filed.
    • Counsel for Kunal Sancheti Associates stated that, to the applicant’s knowledge, the respondents had never challenged the decree.

    No Liability Survives After Recovery Notice Declared Illegal: Bombay HC

    • After examining the application and the decree passed by the trial court, Justice Gauri Godse accepted the applicant’s submission.
    • The High Court held that, in view of the decree in the applicant’s favour, there was no liability upon Kunal Sancheti Associates to make payment to the respondents under the impugned notice, because that notice had already been declared illegal.
    • The Court also emphasised the purpose for which the money had originally been deposited. It had not been deposited as satisfaction of a final adjudicated liability; rather, the deposit was made as a condition for obtaining an interim stay against implementation of the disputed recovery notice.
    • Once the underlying notice itself ceased to have legal effect following the decree, the basis for continuing to retain the security also disappeared.

    Bombay High Court Allows Withdrawal With Accrued Interest

    • The High Court accordingly allowed the interim application and permitted Kunal Sancheti Associates to withdraw the amount deposited pursuant to the order dated 12 January 2011, together with accrued interest, if any.
    • The Court further directed that the amount should be released in favour of the applicant upon production of an authenticated copy of the order.
    • This part of the order is particularly relevant in disputes where substantial sums remain deposited before courts for extended periods solely because of interim protection granted during litigation.

    Bank Guarantee Stands Discharged

    • The Court also granted the second substantive relief sought by the applicant.
    • The bank guarantee furnished pursuant to the High Court’s order dated 12 January 2011 was declared discharged.
    • The Court directed that the bank guarantee be returned to Kunal Sancheti Associates so that it could be submitted to the concerned bank for cancellation.
    • The Interim Application was consequently allowed in these terms.

    Legal Significance of the Order

    • The order illustrates an important procedural consequence when a litigant has furnished money or security merely as a condition for interim protection.
    • Where the underlying demand is subsequently adjudicated against the authority and declared illegal, continued retention of the security may lose its foundation. In the present case, the Bombay High Court expressly linked the applicant’s entitlement to withdrawal and cancellation of the bank guarantee to the fact that the recovery notice had been declared illegal and, consequently, no liability remained payable under that notice.
    • The ruling should, however, be understood in its procedural context. This order did not itself decide the original legality of the Section 48 notice. That issue had already been decided by the trial court through its decree dated 20 October 2021. The High Court’s order dealt specifically with the consequential release of the amount deposited and discharge of the bank guarantee.

    Key Takeaway

    The Bombay High Court’s order makes the position straightforward in this case: once the underlying recovery notice had been declared illegal, null and void, and the applicant consequently had no liability to make payment under that notice, the amount earlier deposited merely as a condition of interim stay could not continue to be retained.

    Kunal Sancheti Associates was therefore permitted to recover its court deposit along with accrued interest, if any, while the bank guarantee furnished in 2011 was ordered to be discharged and returned for cancellation.

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  • Bombay High Court Quashes FIR After Parties Reconcile Redevelopment Dispute

    Bombay High Court Quashes FIR After Parties Reconcile Redevelopment Dispute

    Date: 21.09.2026

    The Bombay High Court has quashed an FIR arising from a dispute between a member of a co-operative housing society and persons allegedly involved with the new developer appointed for the society’s redevelopment, after the complainant and the accused reconciled their dispute and filed consent affidavits.

    Justice Milind N. Jadhav, while allowing a batch of six petitions, explained that Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) substantially reproduces the inherent powers earlier contained in Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) and enables High Courts to intervene to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice.

    The order was passed on September 18, 2026, with the lead matter being Mohammed Jasim Bhati v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., Criminal Writ Petition No. 4532 of 2026.

    Six Petitions Sought Quashing of Same FIR

    • The High Court was dealing with six petitions arising from FIR No. 0456 of 2026 registered with Versova Police Station, Mumbai.
    • The lead petition was filed by Mohammed Jasim Bhati. The connected petitions were filed by Rajeev Narayandas Bhathija, Samina Rayees Khan, Horace Poorekhorsandi, Abdul Kader Haji Noor Mohammed and Shakeel Ahmed Bhati.
    • All the petitions were filed under Section 528 BNSS seeking quashing of the FIR.

    FIR Arose From Society Redevelopment Dispute

    • The complainant was a member of a co-operative housing society and had a dispute concerning his gala premises in relation to the redevelopment undertaken by the society.
    • According to the order, the petitioners were accused by the complainant of having colluded with the new developer appointed by the society.
    • However, the Court specifically noted that the complainant’s grievance was restricted to his own gala premises.
    • The dispute subsequently took a different course when the complainant and petitioners reconciled and jointly sought to bring the criminal proceedings to an end.

    Former Developer Seeks to Intervene

    • An additional issue arose when the society’s former developer, whose Development Agreement had been terminated, sought to intervene in the criminal writ petitions.
    • Counsel appearing for the old developer argued that the FIR concerning the complainant’s gala also affected certain substantive rights of the former developer.
    • The Court was informed that several civil proceedings relating to the parties’ substantive rights were already pending before the High Court as well as in arbitration.
    • The old developer therefore sought time to intervene in the proceedings.

    Bombay HC Rejects Old Developer’s Intervention

    • The High Court rejected the intervention request outright.
    • Justice Jadhav observed that whatever substantive rights the old developer might have against the society concerning the terminated Development Agreement could be pursued in the appropriate proceedings available under law.
    • The Court noted that the former developer had already initiated civil proceedings before the High Court and arbitration proceedings.
    • His intervention in criminal petitions which the complainant and accused themselves wanted to have quashed by consent was therefore held to be not maintainable.
    • At the same time, the High Court protected the former developer’s position by expressly keeping open any rights he might have concerning his relationship with the society, the redevelopment or the terminated Development Agreement.
    • The Court made it clear that it was expressing no opinion on the merits of those substantive rights.

    Six Consent Affidavits Filed by Complainant

    • A decisive development was the filing of six consent affidavits dated September 12, 2026, one in each of the six petitions.
    • After examining the affidavits, the High Court recorded that the parties had β€œreconciled their dispute altogether.”
    • Justice Jadhav observed that the Court needed to intervene so that the β€œignominy of the criminal proceeding” concerning the complainant’s single gala was not carried forward after the underlying dispute had been resolved.
    • The Court therefore found it appropriate to allow the petitions.

    Section 528 BNSS Carries Forward Inherent Powers Under Section 482 CrPC

    The judgment is particularly relevant because it explains the relationship between Section 482 CrPC and Section 528 BNSS.

    The High Court observed that Section 482 CrPC conferred inherent powers upon High Courts to make orders necessary to:

    • Give effect to an order of the Court, prevent abuse of the process of any Court, or otherwise secure the ends of justice.
    • The Court then noted that under the BNSS, this power has been incorporated in Section 528, which substantially reproduces the language and intent of the former Section 482 CrPC.
    • The ruling therefore reinforces that the transition from the CrPC to the BNSS has not removed the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings in appropriate cases.

    Section 528 BNSS Remains a Discretionary Power

    • Justice Jadhav emphasised that the inherent power is not mechanical or automatic.
    • The Court observed that High Courts may intervene where proceedings have been instituted with mala fide motives, to harass an accused, or where continuation of proceedings would result in procedural harassment.
    • The provision can also enable the Court to terminate FIRs or criminal proceedings where the circumstances justify exercise of its inherent jurisdiction.
    • Importantly, however, the High Court stated that exercise of powers formerly under Section 482 CrPC and now under Section 528 BNSS remains discretionary and depends upon the facts of each case.

    Bombay HC Relies on Supreme Court’s Bhajan Lal Judgment

    • The High Court referred to the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 AIR 604.
    • The Court noted that Bhajan Lal laid down model categories and guidelines identifying circumstances in which FIRs may be quashed.
    • Justice Jadhav further observed that the Supreme Court had explained that the inherent power is an acknowledgment of powers already inherent in the High Court rather than the source of some additional jurisdiction.

    Even Non-Compoundable Offences May Be Quashed in Appropriate Cases

    • The Bombay High Court also reiterated an important distinction between compounding an offence and quashing criminal proceedings through the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction.
    • Referring to the principles discussed in Bhajan Lal, the Court observed that even non-compoundable offences may be quashed where necessary, with the High Court required to consider whether continuation of the prosecution would further or undermine the interests of justice.
    • At the same time, the Court specifically cautioned that grave offences such as murder, rape and dacoity ordinarily cannot be quashed merely because the parties have reached a settlement, since such offences carry wider societal implications.
    • The order therefore does not lay down that every criminal case must be quashed once the parties settle. Rather, the inherent jurisdiction remains dependent upon the nature of the controversy and the interests of justice.

    Private Nature of Redevelopment Dispute Considered

    • In the present case, the criminal proceedings arose from a dispute connected with a society member’s own gala in a redevelopment project.
    • The complainant’s allegations against the petitioners concerned their alleged collusion with the new developer, but the grievance remained confined to the complainant’s premises.
    • With the complainant and petitioners having subsequently reconciled their dispute and filed consent affidavits, the High Court concluded that continuation of the criminal proceedings was unnecessary.

    FIR No. 0456 of 2026 Quashed

    • The Bombay High Court ultimately allowed all six writ petitions in terms of their respective prayer clauses.
    • The petitions sought issuance of an appropriate writ calling for the records concerning FIR C.R. No. 0456 of 2026 registered with Versova Police Station, Mumbai, and quashing the FIR after examining its legality, validity and propriety.
    • The connected petitions contained substantially identical reliefs concerning the same FIR.
    • The High Court accordingly recorded:
    • β€œAll six Petitions are allowed and disposed.”
    • Thus, Mohammed Jasim Bhati and the petitioners in the five connected matters succeeded in having the FIR quashed.
    • What Happens to the Former Developer’s Claims?
    • The order contains an important qualification concerning the former developer.
    • Quashing of the criminal FIR does not adjudicate or extinguish the former developer’s independent civil or contractual rights.

    The High Court expressly left open whatever rights the former developer may have regarding:

    • his relationship with the co-operative housing society;
    • the redevelopment project;
    • termination of his Development Agreement; and
    • remedies otherwise available to him under law.

    Those questions may continue to be litigated in the already pending civil or arbitration proceedings, and the High Court expressly refrained from giving any opinion on their merits.

    This distinction is important: the judgment terminates the criminal proceedings arising from the complainant’s individual gala dispute, but it does not determine the broader redevelopment dispute involving the former developer.

    Why the Judgment Is Significant

    • The ruling has significance under the new criminal procedural regime introduced by the BNSS because it expressly recognises the continuity between Section 482 CrPC and Section 528 BNSS.
    • The Bombay High Court has confirmed that Section 528 substantially preserves the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction to intervene where necessary to prevent abuse of judicial process and secure the ends of justice.
    • The judgment also illustrates the distinction between criminal proceedings arising from an essentially private dispute and independent civil or contractual disputes involving third parties. Settlement of the former may justify quashing in an appropriate case, while the latter can remain open for adjudication in their proper forum.

    Key Takeaway

    The Bombay High Court’s ruling makes clear that Section 528 BNSS carries forward the inherent quashing jurisdiction previously exercised under Section 482 CrPC.

    Where a criminal proceeding arises from a private dispute, the parties have fully reconciled, and continuation of the prosecution would no longer advance the interests of justice, the High Court may exercise its inherent powers to bring the proceedings to an end. However, settlement is not an automatic ground for quashing every offence.

    The nature and gravity of the alleged offence and its impact on society remain material considerations, with serious offences ordinarily standing on a different footing.

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  • Bombay HC Clarifies 2026 IBC Amendment: Section 96(4) Extends to Pending Personal Insolvency Proceedings

    Bombay HC Clarifies 2026 IBC Amendment: Section 96(4) Extends to Pending Personal Insolvency Proceedings

    Date: 19.09.2026

    In a significant ruling concerning personal guarantors, secured creditors and recovery proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), the Bombay High Court has held that the newly introduced Section 96(4) of the IBC operates retroactively and therefore applies even to applications under Sections 94 and 95 that were already pending when the amendment came into force on May 26, 2026.

    The Division Bench of Justice Manish Pitale and Justice Shreeram V. Shirsat delivered the judgment on September 18, 2026, in a batch of petitions led by Indian Bank v. Shabbir Abbas Patel & Ors., Writ Petition No. 2819 of 2026. The judgment bears neutral citation 2026:BHC-OS:20542-DB.

    The ruling has potentially wide implications for banks, financial institutions and other creditors facing recovery obstacles because of interim moratoriums triggered by personal insolvency applications against guarantors.

    The Central Question Before the Bombay High Court

    • The core issue was whether Section 96(4), introduced into the IBC with effect from May 26, 2026, applies only to fresh applications filed after that date or whether it also affects applications already filed and pending.
    • The Court framed the issue specifically as whether the amendment operates retroactively, so that the exclusion introduced by Section 96(4) applies to pending personal-guarantor insolvency proceedings as well.
    • This question arose because, before the amendment, filing an application under Sections 94 or 95 could trigger an interim moratorium under Section 96, affecting legal actions or proceedings concerning debts.
    • The petitioning creditors argued that the amendment was introduced to address misuse of this mechanism and must therefore apply to pending cases. The opposing parties contended that the amendment was prospective and could affect only applications filed after May 26, 2026.

    Why Section 96 Was Amended

    • A major part of the creditors’ case concerned what they described as the misuse of the interim moratorium by debtors and personal guarantors.
    • The petitioners relied upon the report of the Select Committee on the IBC (Amendment) Bill, 2025, contending that stakeholders, including members of the NCLT, had highlighted misuse of Sections 94, 95 and 96 by debtors to obstruct legitimate creditor action.
    • Reliance was also placed on the Bombay High Court’s earlier decision in Rozina Firoz Hajiani v. Union of India, where the Court had taken judicial notice of concerns surrounding misuse of the interim moratorium.
    • The creditors consequently argued that restricting the amendment only to future applications would allow the very problem sought to be remedied to continue in all applications that happened to be pending on May 26.

    Creditors Argue Amendment Is Curative and Retroactive

    • The banks and financial institutions argued that the amendment was remedial or curative in nature.
    • They relied upon Supreme Court authorities dealing with retrospective and retroactive operation of statutory amendments, including BCCI v. Kochi Cricket Pvt. Ltd., (2018) 6 SCC 287, and M. Rajendran v. KPK Oils and Proteins India Pvt. Ltd., (2026) 3 SCC 505.
    • It was also argued that the interim moratorium was not a vested right of the debtor or guarantor. Decisions including Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, (2020) 9 SCC 1 and SEBI v. Rajkumar Nagpal, (2023) 8 SCC 274 were relied upon while explaining the concept of retroactive operation.

    Personal Guarantors Oppose Retroactive Application

    • The contesting respondents argued that the normal presumption is that legislation operates prospectively unless retrospective operation is expressly stated or follows by necessary implication.
    • They emphasised the wording of Section 96(4), particularly the expression β€œshall not apply where an application is filed”, contending that it points towards prospective application from May 26, 2026.
    • The respondents further argued that an interim moratorium provides a debtor with significant statutory protection from creditor action and that this protection should not be taken away in already pending proceedings.
    • Reliance was placed, among other authorities, on Rakesh Bhanot v. Gurdas Agro Pvt. Ltd., (2025) 6 SCC 781, concerning the importance of the interim moratorium under Section 96.

    Bombay High Court: Amendment Is Retroactive

    • After examining the statutory language, legislative background, object of the amendment and principles governing retroactive legislation, the Division Bench rejected the argument that Section 96(4) could operate only against applications filed after May 26, 2026.
    • The Court held that the amendment β€œmust operate retroactively” and consequently applies not merely to proceedings initiated on or after May 26, 2026, but also to proceedings already pending on that date.
    • The Court reasoned that the purpose of the amendmentβ€”to address the identified misuse of the interim moratoriumβ€”would be fully achieved only by applying the new provision to pending proceedings as well.
    • It also concluded that the respondents did not possess a vested right to the interim moratorium during the procedural stage governed by Sections 94 to 99 of the IBC.

    Section 96(4) Applies Even to Pending Sections 94 and 95 Proceedings

    • The Court ultimately answered the central question in categorical terms.
    • It held that Section 96(4), introduced with effect from May 26, 2026, applies retroactively and therefore extends to pending proceedings. Although the amendment operates from May 26, 2026 onwards, its effect extends to proceedings under Sections 94 and 95 that were already pending on that date.
    • The Division Bench also agreed with the approach previously adopted by a Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in Tata Capital Financial Services Ltd. v. Neel Motors LLP & Ors., as well as the Delhi High Court’s order in IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd. v. Manish Jain & Ors.
    • This ruling therefore settles, at least for the batch before the Bombay High Court, the dispute over whether pre-amendment personal-guarantor applications can continue to enjoy the earlier Section 96 interim-moratorium protection after May 26, 2026.

    Indian Bank’s Case: DRT Restraint Set Aside

    • The consequences of this interpretation were directly applied in Indian Bank v. Shabbir Abbas Patel.
    • Indian Bank had challenged orders dated October 3, 2024 and March 13, 2026 passed by DRT-I, Mumbai, restraining the Bank from proceeding with an auction. The restraint was linked to the interim moratorium arising from personal insolvency proceedings.
    • An earlier Section 95 petition had been dismissed by the NCLT on February 18, 2026. The respondents, however, relied upon a subsequent Section 95 petition filed on February 19, 2026 and registered on May 6, 2026.
    • Applying its interpretation of the amended law, the High Court held that even the interim moratorium triggered by the subsequent Section 95 proceeding ceased to operate from May 26, 2026.

    Court Finds Repeated Insolvency Proceedings Highlighted the Mischief

    • The Division Bench considered the facts of the Indian Bank matter to illustrate the problem that the legislative amendment sought to address.
    • The Court observed that allowing the interim moratorium to continue because of the subsequent Section 95 petition would be contrary to the legal position after the amendment and would permit repeated reliance on insolvency proceedings to obstruct creditor action.
    • Accordingly, Writ Petition No. 2819 of 2026 filed by Indian Bank was allowed.

    Auction and Sale Certificate Upheld

    • The High Court granted substantial relief to Indian Bank.
    • The DRT-I orders dated October 3, 2024 and March 13, 2026 were quashed and set aside, resulting in the restraint on the Bank ceasing to operate.
    • The Court further held that the Bank’s action in confirming the sale pursuant to the auction conducted on September 30, 2024, as well as issuance of the sale certificate dated February 25, 2026 and its registration on February 27, 2026, were validly taken in the circumstances.
    • The Court Commissioner was permitted to proceed in accordance with law for taking possession of the secured asset. The police authorities were directed to provide appropriate protection and assistance so that possession could be obtained and handed over to the Bank for delivery to the auction purchaser.
    • The underlying Securitisation Application No. 115 of 2024 was directed to be decided expeditiously by DRT-I, Mumbai.

    Other Banks and Financial Institutions Also Before the Court

    • The judgment did not concern Indian Bank alone. It disposed of a batch of petitions involving several secured creditors and financial institutions, including RBL Bank Ltd., Godrej Finance Ltd., Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Ltd. and Apna Sahakari Bank Ltd.
    • In the ARCIL matter, for example, the Court held that the pending Section 95 petition did not prevent the DRAT from hearing the creditors’ appeals, because Section 96(4) meant that the interim moratorium was no longer operating after May 26, 2026.
    • The judgment therefore has significance beyond the facts of a single borrower-creditor dispute.

    Significance for Banks and Secured Creditors

    • The ruling is important for secured-creditor enforcement because the Court has clarified that the May 2026 amendment cannot be avoided merely because a personal insolvency application was filed before the amendment took effect.
    • Where Section 96(4) applies to a personal guarantor to a corporate debtor, a pending Section 94 or Section 95 application cannot continue to provide the earlier interim-moratorium protection merely on the basis of its pre-May 26 filing date.
    • This can have direct consequences for SARFAESI proceedings, DRT/DRAT proceedings, auctions, recovery proceedings and possession of secured assets where creditors had previously faced objections founded upon Section 96.
    • The judgment, however, does not eliminate every remedy available to personal guarantors or decide the merits of their insolvency applications. Its central holding concerns the effect of Section 96(4) on the interim moratorium from May 26, 2026.

    Key Legal Principle

    The principle emerging from the judgment can be stated as follows:

    • Section 96(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, introduced with effect from May 26, 2026, operates retroactively. Therefore, its effect extends to applications under Sections 94 and 95 that were already pending on May 26, 2026, and the excluded interim-moratorium protection cannot continue merely because the personal insolvency proceeding was instituted before the amendment.
    • This interpretation, according to the Bombay High Court, gives effect to the legislative object of preventing misuse of the interim moratorium while not taking away any vested right, because no such vested right exists in the Section 96 interim moratorium during the procedural stage of Sections 94 to 99.

    Key Takeaway

    The Bombay High Court’s ruling substantially clarifies the effect of the 2026 amendment to Section 96 of the IBC. A personal guarantor cannot claim continuation of the earlier Section 96 interim moratorium after May 26, 2026 merely because the Section 94 or 95 proceeding was filed before that date.

    For Indian Bank, this meant the DRT restraint was set aside, the relevant auction and sale certificate were sustained, and steps for obtaining physical possession of the secured asset were permitted to proceed.

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  • Supreme Court Pulls Up Financier for Forcibly Repossessing Borrower’s Truck at Night; Awards β‚Ή10 Lakh Compensation and Orders Refund of Sale Price

    Supreme Court Pulls Up Financier for Forcibly Repossessing Borrower’s Truck at Night; Awards β‚Ή10 Lakh Compensation and Orders Refund of Sale Price

    Date: 18.09.2026

    In a significant judgment concerning vehicle loan recovery and repossession practices by banks and Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs), the Supreme Court has held that a financier’s contractual right to repossess a secured vehicle cannot become an unrestricted licence to seize a borrower’s property by force, stealth or without following due process.

    Allowing the appeal of Hari Dutta Sharma, the Supreme Court found that the repossession and subsequent sale of his truck by the finance company were unauthorised and arbitrary, and that the manner in which he was deprived of the vehicle violated Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The Court ordered closure of his loan accounts, refund of the β‚Ή4.50 lakh sale price with 6% interest, payment of β‚Ή10 lakh compensation, and β‚Ή50,000 costs.

    Commercial Vehicle Loan Led to Repossession Dispute

    • The dispute arose after Sharma obtained a commercial vehicle loan from Cholamandalam Investment and Finance Company Limited on March 25, 2019 for a Tata SFC 407 truck bearing registration No. UP-16-GT-0449.
    • Of the sanctioned amount of approximately β‚Ή10.40 lakh, β‚Ή9.36 lakh was disbursed. The loan was repayable in 75 monthly instalments and was secured by hypothecation of the vehicle. A supplementary loan of approximately β‚Ή1.04 lakh was subsequently extended in June 2021.
    • Sharma defaulted on repayment. The financier issued a recall-cum-demand notice in January 2022 and initially repossessed the vehicle. After Sharma paid β‚Ή86,726 and assured regularisation of the account, the truck was released to him.

    Borrower Alleged Truck Was Taken Away at 1 AM

    • The controversy arose after further defaults.
    • According to Sharma, on April 9, 2023, the truck was parked at a consignor’s godown in Ayodhya when four unidentified persons allegedly broke its steering lock at around 1:00 a.m. and drove it away. He claimed that no notice of repossession had been given to him.
    • Believing that the truck had been stolen, he lodged a lost-article report and an e-FIR on the same day and subsequently complained to the Superintendent of Police.
    • It was only later, through a legal notice dated September 30, 2023, that the financier disclosed that it had taken possession of the vehicle and had sold it on August 31, 2023 for β‚Ή4.50 lakh.
    • The company further claimed that β‚Ή5,71,914 remained payable as of the date of sale and, after adjusting the sale proceeds, demanded another β‚Ή1,25,571 from Sharma.

    Allahabad High Court Dismissed Borrower’s Writ Petition

    • Sharma first pursued criminal proceedings and later approached the Allahabad High Court.
    • The High Court dismissed his writ petition on April 4, 2025, noting that the vehicle had already been sold in August 2023, that Sharma had approached the Court belatedly and that he had defaulted on repayment of the loan instalments.
    • The matter then reached the Supreme Court.

    Default Does Not Give Financier an Unrestricted Right to Seize Property

    • The Supreme Court accepted that a financier may possess a contractual right to take possession of a financed vehicle where the agreement permits it.
    • Referring to Orix Auto Finance (India) Ltd. v. Jagmander Singh, (2006) 2 SCC 598 and Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. T. Thankam, (2015) 14 SCC 444, the Court observed that there is ordinarily no legal impediment to exercising such a contractual right unless the agreement is unconscionable or opposed to public policy.
    • However, the Court drew an important distinction between the existence of a right of repossession and the manner in which that right is exercised.
    • Because self-help repossession operates outside immediate court or tribunal supervision, the Court said it must be construed with great circumspection. Otherwise, it could effectively become an unrestricted licence to seize property by stealth or force.

    RBI Fair Practices Code Has to Be Followed

    • The Supreme Court examined the regulatory framework developed by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) governing loan recovery.
    • It noted that RBI had issued its Fair Practices Code for Lenders in 2003 to protect borrowers dealing with banks and NBFCs and to curb arbitrary recovery practices. Those guidelines prohibit undue harassment, including persistently disturbing borrowers at odd hours and using muscle power for recovery.
    • The Court also referred to subsequent RBI guidelines and circulars regulating recovery agents, repossession clauses, customer privacy, debt collection, grievance redressal and the procedure for taking possession of secured assets.

    Supreme Court Lays Down Key Safeguards for Vehicle Repossession

    • After examining the RBI framework, the Court summarised a series of safeguards that banks and financial institutions must observe.
    • Among other things, lenders must not use harassment or muscle power; vehicle seizure must occur only through lawful means; recovery agents must undergo proper due diligence and comply with RBI requirements; repossession clauses must conform to the Indian Contract Act, 1872; and contracts should specify the notice period, circumstances for waiver, repossession procedure, final opportunity to repay, restoration procedure and process for sale or auction.
    • These observations make the ruling particularly important for banks, NBFCs, vehicle-finance companies and recovery agencies.

    Loan Agreement’s Repossession Clause Failed Legal Standards

    • The Court closely examined Article 11 of the loan agreement, which governed repossession, termination and the financier’s other rights.
    • The agreement contemplated a seven-day notice in case of default but also contained provisions permitting the financier, in certain circumstances, to waive notice at its discretion. It also authorised repossession and subsequent sale of the asset.
    • The Supreme Court found significant problems with the clause.
    • It held that allowing the borrower’s rights over the asset to terminate β€œipso facto without any notice” conflicted with the requirement of a notice period. The authority given to recovery agents to enter places searching for the asset was also found inconsistent with RBI guidelines.
    • Further, the clause did not prescribe an adequate procedure for taking possession or conducting the sale or auction and instead left these matters substantially to the company’s discretion.
    • The Court therefore concluded that, to that extent, Article 11 did not satisfy the legal standard required of a valid repossession clause.

    No Seven-Day Notice Before Repossession

    • On the facts, the Supreme Court found that the financier had not issued the contractual seven-day notice before repossessing the truck.
    • Accordingly, the Court held that the contractual right of repossessionβ€”being conditional upon such noticeβ€”never accrued to the company in the first place.
    • The Court also took serious note of Sharma’s unrebutted assertion that recovery agents took the vehicle at about 1 a.m. after breaking its steering lock. The possession memorandum did not bear Sharma’s signature.
    • The Bench characterised this method of taking possession as far removed from a peaceful repossession and linked it to the coercive recovery practices previously condemned by the Supreme Court and RBI.

    Supreme Court Reiterates: Banks Cannot Use β€œGoondas” for Recovery

    • The Court relied significantly on ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Prakash Kaur & Ors., (2007) 2 SCC 711.
    • In that case, the Supreme Court had emphasised that India is governed by the rule of law and that banks and financial institutions cannot employ β€œgoondas” to forcibly seize financed vehicles.
    • The present Bench reiterated the principle that legitimate debt recovery must remain within the bounds of law, even where the borrower has admittedly defaulted.
    • This is an important aspect of the judgment: the Supreme Court did not excuse Sharma’s repayment defaults. Instead, it held that the existence of the debt did not legitimise an unlawful method of recovery.

    High Court Wrong to Dismiss Case Merely on Delay

    • The Supreme Court also disagreed with the Allahabad High Court’s conclusion that Sharma had approached the Court belatedly.
    • It noted that he had lodged an FIR on the very day the vehicle disappeared, believing that it had been stolen, and subsequently pursued proceedings under Section 156(3) CrPC.
    • Remarkably, he also continued to receive traffic challans in January 2024, November 2024 and February 2025 even though the financier claimed to have sold the vehicle in August 2023.
    • The Supreme Court held that these circumstances required examination and that the writ petition should not have been rejected merely on the ground of delay without considering the merits and without any demonstrated prejudice to the financier.

    Financier β€œForfeits Protection” When It Steps Outside Lawful Recovery Framework

    • The Court delivered a strong statement on the limits of self-help repossession.
    • It observed that financial institutions operating under RBI regulation hold repossession powers subject to procedural safeguards, including notice, an opportunity to cure the default, a fair method of taking possession and a transparent method of sale.
    • Where a financier steps outside that framework and takes possession without notice or due process, it exposes itself to the legal consequences of an unauthorised and arbitrary seizure.

    Articles 14 and 21 Violated; Borrower Entitled to Compensation

    • The Supreme Court ultimately set aside the Allahabad High Court’s April 4, 2025 order.
    • Since the vehicle had already been sold, the Court declined to undo the sale at that stage. However, it expressly disapproved of the financier’s unauthorised repossession and sale.
    • The Court noted that Sharma was a man of modest means who depended solely upon the truck for his livelihood through his transportation business.
    • It held that he had been deprived of his livelihood in an arbitrary and unfair manner, resulting in violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Compensation was therefore warranted.

    Supreme Court Orders β‚Ή10 Lakh Compensation, β‚Ή4.50 Lakh Refund and Closure of Loans

    • The Supreme Court issued three major substantive directions.
    • First, the finance company was ordered to close both of Sharma’s loan accounts.
    • Second, it was directed to refund the β‚Ή4.50 lakh sale price realised from the vehicle, together with 6% annual interest from the date of sale until payment.
    • Third, Sharma was awarded β‚Ή10 lakh as compensation for mental agony and loss of livelihood for a considerable period.
    • The appeal was allowed with an additional β‚Ή50,000 in costs.

    Supreme Court Directs RBI to Ensure Genuine Compliance

    • The ruling also goes beyond the individual dispute.
    • The Supreme Court observed that RBI’s guidelines, master circulars and clarifications governing recovery practices had existed but had not been effectively implemented.
    • It therefore directed the RBI to take effective steps to secure genuine compliance by NBFCs and Scheduled Commercial Banks with its recovery-related guidelines and instructions.
    • The Supreme Court Registry was directed to forward a copy of the judgment to RBI.

    Key Takeaway

    The judgment establishes a clear distinction between a financier’s legal right to recover a debt and the methods that may lawfully be employed to enforce that right.

    A borrower’s default does not authorise banks, NBFCs or their recovery agents to bypass contractual notice requirements, RBI safeguards or lawful repossession procedures. Self-help repossession may be contractually permissible, but it must remain peaceful, fair and within the bounds of law.

    The decision is therefore significant not only for vehicle-finance borrowers but also for banks, NBFCs and recovery agencies, which may face substantial monetary consequences where repossession is undertaken arbitrarily or through coercive means.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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  • Bombay High Court Lays Down Landmark Principles for Deemed Conveyance and Proportionate Land Division Under MOFA

    Bombay High Court Lays Down Landmark Principles for Deemed Conveyance and Proportionate Land Division Under MOFA

    Date: 17.09.2026

    In a significant judgment affecting cooperative housing societies, developers and redevelopment projects across Maharashtra, the Bombay High Court has laid down detailed principles governing proportionate division and deemed conveyance of land in multi-building layouts, particularly where different buildings have consumed different amounts of base FSI, TDR or additional development potential.

    In Satellite Garden I Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. and connected petitions, Justice Sandeep V. Marne held that a housing society’s entitlement to proportionate layout land crystallises and freezes when the statutory period for conveyance under Section 11 of the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act, 1963 (MOFA), read with Rule 9 of the MOF Rules, 1964, expires. Subsequent revision of building plans cannot, by itself, reduce that crystallised entitlement.

    The 170-page judgment, pronounced on September 16, 2026, arose from three connected writ petitions concerning societies in a Goregaon, Mumbai layout.

    Bombay HC Addresses Long-Standing Problem of Land Division in Large Layouts

    • At the outset, the Court identified a recurring difficulty in real-estate development: while conveyance of land for a standalone building is relatively straightforward, disputes become considerably more complicated when several housing societies occupy different buildings within a common layout.
    • The problem becomes particularly acute where buildings are constructed at different times, revised plans are sanctioned, TDR is subsequently loaded, or different FSI regimes apply.
    • Justice Marne observed that organisations of flat purchasers in the first building need not indefinitely wait for the developer to complete the entire layout. Their right to obtain conveyance of a proportionate share in the land is recognised in law. The real difficulty is determining how much land should be conveyed to each society.
    • The Court therefore used the three petitions not merely to resolve the individual disputes, but also to formulate broader principles for proportionate land division in layout developments.

    Dispute Involved Four Constructed Buildings and One Proposed Building

    • The case concerned a larger property at A.K. Vaidya Marg, Goregaon (East), Mumbai, originally measuring approximately 55,696.70 sq. metres.
    • Development rights were granted to BPM Industries, later known as Satellite Developers Ltd. The relevant Sub-Plot A was initially approximately 16,855.47 sq. metres and was later realigned to approximately 21,807.18 sq. metres.
    • Satellite Garden I CHSL was formed in respect of the first building in October 2002. Further buildings were subsequently constructed, leading to the formation of Sadguru Complex 1 (AB) CHSL, Sadguru Complex 1 (CD) CHSL and Satellite Tower CHSL. A fifth building was contemplated but remained unconstructed.
    • The societies had significantly different built-up areas. According to the last sanctioned plan referred to in the judgment, Satellite Garden I had BUA of 11,186.41 sq. metres, Sadguru AB 3,936.31 sq. metres, Sadguru CD 3,917.76 sq. metres, and Satellite Tower 20,728.06 sq. metres.

    Competent Authority Applied Different Standards to Different Societies

    • A major reason for the litigation was the lack of a uniform approach in the deemed-conveyance orders.
    • Satellite Tower CHSL had been granted only 4,864.21 sq. metres, corresponding to its building’s plinth area. Sadguru Complex 1 (AB) CHSL was granted just 643.81 sq. metres, even though its plinth itself measured approximately 959.69 sq. metres.
    • In contrast, Sadguru Complex 1 (CD) CHSL was granted 2,134.15 sq. metres, including a proportionate share in the recreational-ground area, after applying a BUA-based calculation.
    • The High Court noted that the Competent Authority had therefore failed to apply a uniform yardstick to societies situated within the same layout.

    TDR Created an Unusual Land-Sharing Problem

    • The case became more complex because TDR had not been uniformly used across the buildings.
    • Satellite Garden I had no TDR loaded on it. Sadguru AB had 720 sq. metres of TDR, Sadguru CD had 3,086.08 sq. metres, while Satellite Tower had a massive 14,949.6 sq. metres of TDR, over its base BUA of 5,778 sq. metres.
    • The Court explained that blindly dividing land according to the final total BUA would create an anomalous result. Satellite Tower, whose base BUA represented only about 25% of the base BUA, could end up receiving more than 50% of the layout land because of the later loading of substantial TDR.
    • The Court described this as a potential windfall and noted that Satellite Garden I, where no TDR had been used, would consequently be disadvantaged.

    Society’s Right to Land Crystallises Four Months After Formation

    • The most important part of the judgment is the set of principles formulated by the High Court for future deemed-conveyance disputes.
    • Justice Marne held that the right to obtain conveyance of land and building accrues to the organisation of flat purchasers upon expiry of the statutory period prescribed by Section 11 of MOFA read with Rule 9 of the MOF Rules.
    • Accordingly, in a layout development, the proportionate land that ought to have been conveyed to a society crystallises and freezes when four months expire from the society’s formation.
    • This means that a developer cannot ordinarily reduce the society’s proportionate land entitlement simply by obtaining revised plans at a later stage.

    Subsequent Revised Plans Cannot Automatically Reduce Earlier Society’s Share

    • The Court held that proportionate land division should ordinarily be determined with reference to either the first sanctioned plan or the plan existing when the society’s right crystallised upon expiry of the Rule 9 period.
    • The Competent Authority must therefore consider the sanctioned plan existing when four months expired from formation of the organisation of flat purchasers.
    • This principle has considerable practical importance in phased developments where developers continue construction for several years and repeatedly revise the sanctioned layout.
    • An earlier society’s entitlement cannot simply continue shrinking every time another building is introduced or additional development potential is subsequently loaded onto the plot.

    Written Consent Can Alter the Position

    • The Court, however, created an important exception.
    • Where flat purchasers of an earlier building or their society have given written consent to modification or revision of the layout plan, proportionate land division may be undertaken by considering the plan carrying such consent.
    • Thus, the Court did not impose an inflexible first-plan rule. The relevant plan would ordinarily be the plan existing when the statutory right crystallised, or a subsequent plan supported by the requisite written consent, whichever is later.

    Developers Must Warn Buyers About TDR and Incentive FSI

    • The judgment also places an important disclosure responsibility on promoters and developers.
    • The Court held that developers and promoters must give adequate notice to flat purchasers where buildings are proposed to be constructed using incentive FSI or TDR, including warning purchasers of the potential risk that the land ultimately conveyed to their society may be less than the BUA consumed by their building.
    • This observation strengthens the importance of disclosures in agreements for sale and sanctioned layout plans in phased developments.

    Use of TDR Does Not Always Mean Conveyance Must Be Restricted to Plinth Area

    • The Court also examined the Maharashtra Government’s GR dated June 22, 2018, which contains guidelines for deemed conveyance.
    • The GR provides, among other things, that where TDR is utilised in a layout, conveyance may be made according to the plinth and appurtenant area.
    • However, the High Court noted that its earlier ruling in Neelkanth Mansion and Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. had already clarified that use of TDR does not mean that proportionate land division must be abandoned in every case.
    • Where difficulties arise because of unequal TDR loading during an incomplete layout development, plinth-and-appurtenant-area conveyance can operate as a transitional mechanism. It is not necessarily an immutable rule for final division of layout land.

    Deemed Conveyance Is Not Final Determination of Title

    • Another important clarification concerns the jurisdiction of the Competent Authority.
    • The High Court observed that deemed conveyance granted under Section 11 of MOFA is not finally determinative of all competing rights and title claims in the land.
    • If a developer or another society believes that it has an entitlement contrary to the land division determined by the Competent Authority, it can approach the Civil Court.
    • At the same time, a society seeking application of the crystallisation/freezing principle should not itself be forced into civil litigation merely to obtain its proportionate deemed conveyance.

    Court Rejects 2010 Plan as Basis for Land Distribution in Present Case

    • Applying these principles to the societies before it, the High Court held that the land distribution could not properly be based upon the revised sanctioned plan dated July 9, 2010, under which substantial slum TDR had been loaded on Sadguru CD and Satellite Tower.
    • The deemed conveyance granted to Sadguru CD based upon that revised plan was therefore found unsustainable. Similarly, the conveyances restricting Satellite Tower and Sadguru AB merely to plinth areas were also liable to be set aside.
    • Instead, the Court directed that the exercise should be undertaken by reference to the BUA figures reflected in the layout plan dated March 10, 2005.

    Court Identifies BUA Figures for Fresh Land-Division Exercise

    For purposes of the fresh exercise, the High Court identified the following BUA figures:

    • Satellite Garden Phase I β€” 11,186.41 sq. metres
    • Sadguru AB β€” 3,126.32 sq. metres
    • Sadguru CD β€” 830.92 sq. metres
    • Satellite Tower β€” 5,778 sq. metres

    The Court directed that these figures be used as the basis for proportionate division of the entire Sub-Plot A.

    Significantly, the Court explained that this is essentially a notional subdivision of layout land. Physical division may not always be possible because internal roads, amenities and other common spaces are spread across the layout.

    Three Deemed-Conveyance Orders Set Aside

    • The Bombay High Court ultimately set aside all three impugned orders passed by the Competent Authority:
    • the October 31, 2025 order concerning Sadguru Complex 1 (CD) CHSL; the May 16, 2024 order concerning Satellite Tower CHSL; and the March 6, 2025 order concerning Sadguru Complex 1 (AB) CHSL.
    • All three applications were remanded to the Competent Authority for fresh adjudication.
    • The Competent Authority was directed to obtain a fresh certificate from architect Aniket Mathakar showing distribution of the entire 21,807.18 sq. metres of Sub-Plot A on the basis of the BUA figures identified by the Court.
    • The authority must then freshly determine each society’s land entitlement while applying the principles laid down in the judgment.
    • All three writ petitions were accordingly disposed of, with no order as to costs.

    Seven Principles Laid Down by Bombay High Court

    For housing societies, developers and conveyancing authorities, the judgment can be distilled into seven major rules:

    • The right to conveyance accrues upon expiry of the Section 11/Rule 9 period.
    • the society’s proportionate land entitlement then crystallises and freezes
    • later plan revisions cannot ordinarily diminish that entitlement.
    • land division should generally follow the sanctioned plan existing at crystallization.
    • a later plan may be considered where the earlier purchasers or society have given written consent.
    • parties asserting contrary title rights can approach the Civil Court.
    • developers must adequately disclose the use of TDR/incentive FSI and the consequent risk to land entitlement.

    Why the Judgment Matters

    The ruling has potentially wide significance for deemed conveyance and redevelopment of multi-building housing layouts in Maharashtra.

    The central principle is that an earlier society’s land rights cannot remain indefinitely fluid while a developer repeatedly changes plans, introduces new buildings or loads additional TDR over several years.

    By fixing the relevant point at which the society’s proportionate entitlement β€œcrystallises and freezes,” the judgment provides a framework for balancing the rights of earlier flat purchasers against subsequent lawful development within the same layout.

    At the same time, the Court has preserved the jurisdiction of civil courts where complicated questions of title or competing substantive rights require a full evidentiary adjudication.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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  • Bombay HC Quashes Upa-Lokayukta Order Cancelling 1984 Mutation Entry; Holds Recommendatory Powers Cannot Replace Statutory Appellate Jurisdiction

    Bombay HC Quashes Upa-Lokayukta Order Cancelling 1984 Mutation Entry; Holds Recommendatory Powers Cannot Replace Statutory Appellate Jurisdiction

    Date: 16.09.2026

    ​​​The Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench, has set aside an order of the Upa-Lokayukta, Maharashtra, which had recommended cancellation of a decades-old mutation entry and recovery of possession of agricultural land, holding that the Upa-Lokayukta had exceeded the jurisdiction available under the Maharashtra Lokayukta and Upa-Lokayuktas Act, 1971.

    Justice Pravin S. Patil, deciding Rajendra s/o Bhagirath Bansile & Ors. v. The Up Lok-Ayukta, Maharashtra State & Anr., Writ Petition No. 5794 of 2013, 2026:BHC-NAG:11956, held that while the Upa-Lokayukta possesses recommendatory jurisdiction, such powers cannot be exercised as a substitute for the statutory powers vested in authorities under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code.

    The Court ultimately restored Mutation Entry No. 97 relating to Survey No. 84/3, Gat No. 216, in favour of the petitioners.

    Dispute Over Agricultural Land and Mutation Entry

    • The petitioners claimed to be co-owners of agricultural land bearing Gat No. 216, Old Survey No. 84/3, situated at village Pimpalgaon (Chilamkha), Tahsil Deulgaon Raja, District Buldhana.
    • According to them, Bhagirath Ramdas Bansile, father of the first two petitioners, had been cultivating and possessing approximately 5.05 hectares of land out of Survey No. 84/3, with his name appearing in the crop statement since 1973-74.
    • In March 1989, the land was partitioned between Bhagirath Bansile and his four sons, following which their names were mutated in the revenue records. Petitioners 3 to 5 subsequently purchased 3.05 hectares through a registered sale deed dated 5 February 2009 and their names were also entered in the revenue records.

    Complaint Before Upa-Lokayukta Questioned 1984 Revenue Entry

    • The controversy began when the second respondent lodged a complaint before the Upa-Lokayukta on 7 August 2009.
    • The complaint alleged, among other things, that certain lands had wrongly been reflected as Occupant Class-I instead of Class-II, and that the sale in favour of some of the petitioners had been effected without obtaining the Collector’s permission or depositing the alleged unearned income.
    • It was further alleged that Survey No. 84/3 had not been allotted to Bhagirath Bansile during consolidation proceedings in 1984 and that the Consolidation Officer had allegedly extended undue favour by causing the land to be mutated in his name.
    • Following the complaint, the Upa-Lokayukta initiated an inquiry and sought reports from revenue officers.

    SDO Had Already Ordered Regularisation in 2013

    • During the pendency of the Upa-Lokayukta proceedings, the Sub-Divisional Officer, Buldhana, by an order dated 24 May 2013, granted permission for regularisation of the land in the petitioners’ names and forwarded the matter to the Tahsildar, Deulgaon Raja for further action.
    • The revenue authorities also placed this development before the Upa-Lokayukta.
    • Nevertheless, on 7 August 2013, the Upa-Lokayukta passed the impugned order recommending cancellation of the mutation entries in favour of the petitioners and steps for recovery of possession.
    • The petitioners consequently approached the Bombay High Court.

    Three-Year Limitation Under Section 8(5)

    • One of the central issues before the High Court concerned Section 8(5) of the Maharashtra Lokayukta and Upa-Lokayuktas Act, 1971.
    • The provision distinguishes between a complaint involving a β€œgrievance” and one involving an β€œallegation.”
    • Under Section 8(5), a complaint involving an allegation cannot be investigated if it is made after three years from the date on which the complained-of action is alleged to have taken place. The statutory proviso permitting consideration of sufficient cause applies to the period concerning a β€œgrievance,” rather than providing a similar extension for an allegation beyond the prescribed three-year period.
    • The Act defines an β€œallegation” in relation to a public servant to include assertions involving abuse of position to obtain gain or favour, improper or corrupt motives, corruption or lack of integrity. A β€œgrievance,” on the other hand, concerns a claim of injustice or undue hardship resulting from maladministration.

    Complaint Was an β€œAllegation”, Not Merely a β€œGrievance”: High Court

    • After examining the complaint, the High Court held that it fell within the category of an β€œallegation.”
    • The complaint accused the authorities of extending undue favour to Bhagirath Bansile while effecting the revenue entry. Consequently, the applicable limitation period was three years from the complained-of action.
    • The impugned Mutation Entry No. 97 was dated 30 April 1984, whereas the complaint before the Upa-Lokayukta was lodged only on 7 August 2009.
    • The High Court therefore found that the complaint was prima facie barred by limitation and held that, in view of the mandate of Section 8(5), the Upa-Lokayukta could not investigate the complaint.

    Upa-Lokayukta Has Recommendatory, Not Appellate, Jurisdiction

    • The second major issue concerned the nature and extent of the Upa-Lokayukta’s powers.
    • The State relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Additional Tahsildar & Anr. v. Urmila G. & Ors., (2023) 20 SCC 642, contending that the Lokayukta/Upa-Lokayukta exercises recommendatory jurisdiction.
    • The High Court accepted the principle that the Upa-Lokayukta can make recommendations to the competent authorities. However, Justice Patil emphasised that a Lokayukta or Upa-Lokayukta cannot act as an appellate authority over decisions of competent forums created under other statutes.
    • Where a statute creates its own appeal or revision mechanism, an aggrieved party must pursue those statutory remedies.
    • The Court succinctly observed that β€œRecommendatory powers cannot take place of statutory powers.”

    Upa-Lokayukta Effectively Exercised Land Revenue Powers

    • Although the impugned order was styled as a recommendation under Section 12 of the 1971 Act, the High Court examined its substance rather than merely its title.
    • The Court found that the Upa-Lokayukta had directed the Collector, Buldhana, to cancel Mutation Entry No. 97, forfeit the land to the Government and initiate disciplinary proceedings against the concerned officers.
    • According to the High Court, this demonstrated that the Upa-Lokayukta had effectively exercised powers of an appellate authority under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code.
    • The Court consequently held that the order was unsustainable in law because the Upa-Lokayukta had exceeded the limits of its statutory jurisdiction.

    Failure to Consider SDO’s Regularisation Order

    • The High Court also took note of the fact that the SDO’s 24 May 2013 regularisation order had been brought to the notice of the Upa-Lokayukta before the impugned order was passed.
    • Despite this, the Upa-Lokayukta’s order did not consider the regularisation decision, even though the High Court regarded it as a fact capable of materially affecting the decision.
    • Thus, apart from the jurisdictional and limitation issues, the Court found that relevant factual and legal aspects had not been appropriately considered.

    Bombay High Court Restores Mutation Entry

    Allowing the writ petition, the Bombay High Court:

    1. quashed and set aside the Upa-Lokayukta’s order dated 7 August 2013 in Case No. ULA/COM/104/2010 (T-15); and
    2. directed restoration of Mutation Entry No. 97 concerning Survey No. 84/3, Gat No. 216, Mouza Pimpalgaon Chilamkha, Taluka Deulgaon Raja, District Buldhana, in favour of the petitioners.

    The Court made no order as to costs.

    Significance of the Judgment

    The judgment draws a clear institutional boundary around the powers of the Lokayukta and Upa-Lokayukta. Their statutory role may include investigation and recommendations, but that role cannot be transformed into an appellate or supervisory jurisdiction over authorities exercising powers under separate enactments.

    The ruling is also significant on limitation under Section 8(5) of the Maharashtra Lokayukta and Upa-Lokayuktas Act, 1971. Where a complaint falls within the statutory category of an β€œallegation,” the High Court’s reasoning confirms the importance of the prescribed three-year period. Accordingly, the case reinforces two distinct safeguards: statutory limitation on the investigation of stale allegations and jurisdictional limits on recommendatory authorities interfering with decisions governed by separate statutory appeal or revision mechanisms.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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  • Bombay HC Grants Regularisation to Nine ONGC Workers After 10 Years of Service; Modifies CGIT’s 240-Day Permanency Award

    Bombay HC Grants Regularisation to Nine ONGC Workers After 10 Years of Service; Modifies CGIT’s 240-Day Permanency Award

    Date: 15.09.2026

    Mumbai, 9 September 2026: The Bombay High Court has granted significant relief to nine long-serving workers of Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (ONGC), holding that they cannot be denied regularisation after having continuously served the public sector undertaking for more than two decades following a selection process through the Employment Exchange.

    Justice Sandeep V. Marne, in Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-II & Anr., Writ Petition No. 13673 of 2025, partly allowed ONGC’s petition but modified, rather than set aside, the Central Government Industrial Tribunal’s award. The judgment bears neutral citation 2026:BHC-AS:37194.

    The High Court held that the workers should be treated as being in regular service of ONGC from the date on which each completed 10 years of service, with consequential benefits to be granted within eight weeks.

    CGIT Had Granted Permanency After 240 Days

    • The dispute originated from the employment of Field Operators/Assistant Rigmen by ONGC for its offshore exploration and production operations.
    • In 2000-01, ONGC sought candidates through the Employment Exchange for fixed-tenure engagements. Candidates were required to possess prescribed technical qualifications and were subjected to a written test, interview and medical examination before appointment. Their engagement was nevertheless expressly structured as fixed-term employment.
    • In 2008, a total of 79 workmen raised an industrial dispute seeking regularisation. During the lengthy proceedings, 55 were appointed on a regular basis through recruitment exercises, while 15 dropped out due to retirement, death or resignation. The dispute eventually survived in respect of nine workers.
    • On 24 April 2025, CGIT-II, Mumbai held that the nine employees were entitled to permanency and directed ONGC to make them permanent from the date of completion of 240 days of service, together with financial benefits.
    • ONGC challenged that award before the Bombay High Court.

    ONGC: Fixed-Term Employees Cannot Claim Permanency

    • ONGC argued that the workers were consciously engaged on fixed tenure because oil exploration was uncertain and manpower requirements could not be predicted permanently.
    • It relied substantially upon the Constitution Bench judgment in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1, contending that long service by itself cannot create a right to regularisation where appointments do not conform to the constitutional requirements governing public employment under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
    • ONGC further argued that granting permanency merely after completion of 240 days effectively amounted to the Tribunal creating posts on ONGC’s establishment, which an industrial adjudicator could not do.

    ONGC Also Questioned Application of Industrial Disputes Act to Offshore Rigs

    • A significant jurisdictional argument was raised by ONGC.
    • It contended that the workers were deployed on oil rigs located beyond 12 nautical miles from the Indian coastline, and therefore the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 did not apply to them. ONGC relied upon the Supreme Court judgment in Aban Loyd Chiles Offshore Ltd. v. Union of India, (2008) 11 SCC 439.
    • The Bombay High Court firmly rejected this contention.
    • The Court noted that the workers’ appointments were made in Mumbai and that decisions concerning their service conditions were also taken in Mumbai. Disciplinary proceedings concerning employees working on the rigs were conducted within Indian territory under Indian law.
    • The High Court therefore held that ONGC’s objection to the applicability of the Industrial Disputes Act and the CGIT’s jurisdiction was baseless.

    Aban Loyd Judgment Distinguished

    • The Court specifically distinguished Aban Loyd Chiles Offshore.
    • It observed that the Supreme Court case concerned the applicability of customs duty to spare parts required for oil rigs situated outside territorial waters but within India’s Exclusive Economic Zone. In that case, the Supreme Court had held customs duty applicable by virtue of extension of Indian territory to designated areas in the EEZ.
    • The Bombay High Court held that this principle had no application to the present industrial dispute concerning workers who were merely deployed on offshore rigs while their appointments and service-related decisions were made in Mumbai.

    Workers Were Not β€˜Backdoor Entrants’: High Court

    • A crucial finding in favour of the workers was that their appointments could not be characterised as classic β€œbackdoor entries.”
    • ONGC itself admitted that the workers had been sponsored by the Employment Exchange. Eligibility requirements were prescribed, and the candidates underwent a written test, interview and medical fitness examination before being selected.
    • The High Court therefore observed that their appointments could, at the highest, be characterised as irregular rather than appointments completely dehors the constitutional scheme of public employment.
    • The Court further noted that the nine employees had continued working without any real break for over a quarter of a century. Repeated issuance of fresh fixed-tenure appointment orders did not, in the Court’s view, constitute an actual break in their service.

    25 Years of Continuous Service Showed Continuing Need for Workers

    • The High Court attached considerable importance to the factual reality of the employment relationship.
    • It observed that the nine workers had remained in continuous service for over 25 years, making it difficult to accept that their engagement was exclusively for a short-term or specific project or that ONGC had no continuing requirement for their services.
    • The evidence instead suggested that the workers had become an asset to ONGC and had continued to work in adverse conditions on offshore oil rigs for more than two decades.
    • The Court also rejected the contention that the workers had lost their right to seek regularisation merely because they had participated in subsequent regular recruitment exercises. Their participation in such selection processes did not estop them from pursuing their pending claim.

    High Court Applies Exception Under Paragraph 53 of Umadevi

    • While recognising the general rule laid down in Umadevi (3) against regularising appointments made outside the constitutional scheme, the High Court relied upon the important exception recognised in paragraph 53 of that judgment.
    • Paragraph 53 contemplates consideration of regularisation in cases involving irregular, as distinguished from illegal, appointments of duly qualified persons who have served for 10 years or more, subject to the conditions explained by the Supreme Court.
    • In the present case, the High Court noted that the workers were qualified and had undergone a selection process after sponsorship through the Employment Exchange.
    • Their continued engagement for over 25 years also gave rise, in the Court’s assessment, to an inference regarding ONGC’s continuing requirement for their services.
    • Accordingly, the Court held that the benefit of regularisation could not be denied to them.

    Industrial Tribunal Cannot Grant Permanency Merely After 240 Days

    • The High Court, however, did not fully approve the CGIT’s award.
    • It held that the Tribunal had erred in directing that the workers be made permanent merely upon completion of 240 days of service.
    • The Court reasoned that such a direction would effectively amount to creation of posts on the establishment of ONGC, a power that an industrial adjudicator does not possess in relation to a State instrumentality.
    • The Court relied upon Municipal Council Tirora v. Tulsidas Baliram Bindhade, 2016 (6) Mh.L.J. 867, where it had been held that completion of 240 days by itself cannot confer a right to permanency in the absence of the necessary legal conditions concerning posts and recruitment.
    • The High Court also referred to Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Casteribe Rajya P. Karmachari Sanghatana, (2009) 8 SCC 556 and Hari Nandan Prasad v. Employer I/R to Management of FCI, (2014) 7 SCC 190, while considering the applicability of Umadevi principles to industrial adjudication involving government entities and instrumentalities.

    Regularisation From Completion of 10 Years, Not 240 Days

    • The Court ultimately struck a balance between the constitutional restrictions governing public employment and the peculiar facts of the workers’ long-standing engagement.
    • It held that while permanency merely upon completion of 240 days was legally impermissible, the nine workers could receive the benefit of regularisation after completing 10 years of service, applying the exception recognised in Umadevi.
    • The Court also rejected ONGC’s contention that such relief necessarily amounted to impermissible retrospective regularisation. Since the industrial reference itself had been made in 2008 and the workers would complete 10 years around or after 2011, the Court observed that the relief would operate after the reference and could not, in that sense, be characterised as retrospective.

    Bombay High Court Modifies CGIT Award

    • Accordingly, the High Court partly allowed ONGC’s writ petition and modified the CGIT award dated 24 April 2025.
    • Instead of granting permanency from completion of 240 days, the Court directed that all nine workers be treated as being in regular service of ONGC with effect from the date on which they completed 10 years of service from their initial engagements.
    • ONGC was further directed to grant them all consequential benefits within eight weeks. No order as to costs was passed.

    Key Legal Principles Emerging From the Judgment

    The judgment draws an important distinction between illegal/backdoor appointments and irregular appointments. While long continuation alone does not create a right to regularisation, employees who entered service through a genuine selection mechanism and whose appointments are irregular rather than illegal may, in appropriate circumstances, fall within the Umadevi paragraph 53 framework.

    At the same time, the judgment makes clear that completion of 240 days does not automatically create a right to permanency in a State instrumentality, particularly where doing so would effectively require an industrial adjudicator to create posts.

    The decision is also significant for offshore employment disputes. Merely because employees are physically deployed on offshore installations beyond 12 nautical miles does not, on the facts of this case, displace Indian labour law where their appointments and service conditions are fundamentally administered within India.

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