Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 10.09.2026
Bombay High Court Quashes βΉ1.22 Crore EPFO Demand Against Corporate Debtor; PF Assessment During IBC Moratorium Held Impermissible
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Madhumita Jha. The views expressed are based on her interpretation of the law. She can be reached at her email idjhamadhumita27@gmail.com.
The Bombay High Court has quashed an Employeesβ Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) demand of βΉ1,22,48,716 raised against Dolphin Offshore Enterprises (India) Limited, holding that continuation of proceedings under Section 7A of the Employeesβ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 during the moratorium imposed under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) was impermissible.
Justice Sharmila U. Deshmukh held that the subsequent demand and recovery proceedings could not survive after approval of the resolution plan, particularly in light of Sections 14, 31(6) and 32A of the IBC.
Background of the Case
Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) against Dolphin Offshore Enterprises was initiated by the NCLT on 16 July 2020. Following a public announcement inviting claims, EPFO submitted a claim of βΉ2,24,98,772, which was verified and admitted in full by the Resolution Professional.
The Committee of Creditors subsequently approved the resolution plan submitted by Deep Industries Limited, and the NCLT approved the plan on 29 September 2022. Under the approved resolution plan, EPFO was paid βΉ2,250 in full and final settlement of its claim.
However, EPFO had separately initiated an inquiry under Section 7A of the PF Act concerning provident fund contributions for the period April 2018 to September 2019. Despite being informed about the CIRP and moratorium, the inquiry continued.
Eventually, on 24 February 2023, after approval of the resolution plan, EPFO passed an order assessing PF dues at βΉ1,22,48,716 and directed the corporate debtor to make payment.
Can EPFO Continue Section 7A Proceedings During IBC Moratorium?
The principal issue before the High Court was whether EPFO could continue assessment proceedings under Section 7A of the PF Act after a moratorium had come into operation under Section 14 of the IBC.
The Court observed that commencement of CIRP triggers the statutory moratorium. Once the moratorium is imposed, proceedings which have the effect of creating new liabilities against the corporate debtor cannot continue.
In the present case, EPFO was aware that CIRP had commenced. Despite such knowledge, it continued with the Section 7A inquiry and ultimately passed the impugned order after the resolution plan had already been approved.
EPFO Order Was Not Merely an AssessmentβIt Was in the Nature of Recovery
A significant aspect of the judgment is the Court’s distinction between mere assessment of dues and proceedings that effectively seek recovery.
The EPFO order not only assessed βΉ1.22 crore as outstanding dues but directed payment within 15 days, failing which recovery proceedings under Sections 8B to 8G of the PF Act were to follow. It also contemplated damages, interest and prosecution.
The High Court therefore held that the order was βnot merely an assessment proceedingβ but a proceeding in the nature of recovery, which was impermissible during the moratorium.
Section 31(6) of IBC Extinguishes Pre-Resolution Claims
The Court placed substantial reliance upon the newly introduced Section 31(6) of the IBC, inserted through the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2026, notified on 26 May 2026.
The provision stipulates, inter alia, that unless otherwise provided in the resolution plan, claims against the corporate debtor and its assets arising prior to approval of the plan stand extinguished, and proceedingsβincluding assessment proceedingsβcannot be continued or instituted on the basis of such claims.
Importantly, the Court noted that Explanation III gives retrospective operation to Section 31(6) in respect of resolution plans approved from the commencement of the IBC, except matters that have already attained finality.
Accordingly, the Court held that the amount recognised in the approved resolution plan was protected, but the separate amount subsequently determined through the impugned Section 7A order was not.
The post-resolution quantification therefore stood extinguished and could not be recovered.
EPFO Had Filed Its Claim but Did Not Challenge the Resolution Plan
Another important consideration was that EPFO had actually participated in the insolvency process by lodging its claim with the Resolution Professional.
The resolution plan ultimately recognised EPFO’s claim at βΉ2,250, and EPFO was informed about approval of the plan and forwarded the amount. The Court observed that EPFO had the opportunity to challenge the resolution plan before the NCLAT and seek full payment of its provident fund dues.
Instead, EPFO did not challenge the approved resolution plan and continued with its Section 7A inquiry.
The High Court also considered the earlier Bombay High Court decision in Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Limited v. Central Board of Trustees, EPFO.
The Court distinguished that decision on the facts and observed that, following the 2026 legislative amendment to the IBC, the effect of Dalmia Cement had been βconsiderably watered down.β The issue in the present caseβcontinuation of a Section 7A inquiry during the moratoriumβhad also not arisen for consideration in Dalmia Cement.
More importantly, the Court observed that the βclean slateβ principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. has now received legislative effect through the introduction of Section 31(6) of the IBC.
Protection Under Section 32A of IBC
The High Court further relied upon Section 32A of the IBC, which grants immunity in respect of offences committed prior to commencement of CIRP once the resolution plan is approved and results in the prescribed change in management or control.
Since the EPFO order contemplated recovery against the corporate debtor’s assets as well as prosecution, the Court found that such action was also inconsistent with the protection afforded by Section 32A.
Four Reasons Why the EPFO Order Was Unsustainable
The Bombay High Court crystallised its findings into four grounds: the Section 7A inquiry was impermissibly continued during the Section 14 moratorium; the resultant recovery claim stood extinguished under Section 31(6) after approval of the resolution plan; EPFO had itself lodged a claim which was dealt with under the resolution plan but never challenged that plan; and Section 32A protected the corporate debtor and its assets following the qualifying change in ownership and control.
High Court Quashes βΉ1.22 Crore Demand
On these findings, the Bombay High Court held that the EPFO order dated 24 February 2023 was clearly unsustainable and consequently quashed and set it aside, allowing Dolphin Offshore Enterprises’ writ petition.
Key Takeaway
The ruling is significant for companies undergoing or emerging from CIRP because it reinforces the clean-slate principle under the IBC. Statutory authorities cannot disregard an IBC moratorium, participate in the resolution process, accept treatment of their claim under an approved resolution plan, and thereafter seek to impose a separate pre-resolution liability against the revived corporate debtor.
The judgment is particularly important after the 2026 amendment introducing Section 31(6), which the Bombay High Court has treated as giving legislative effect to the principle that pre-resolution claims, unless preserved under the approved plan, stand extinguished and cannot subsequently form the basis of fresh assessment or recovery proceedings.
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Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 10.09.2026
Delhi HC Ruled βONE FOR ALLβ Trademark Registrable for Books; Common Words Can Be Distinctive When Unconnected with the Goods
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
The Delhi High Court has ruled in favour of Oswaal Books and Learnings Private Limited, holding that its mark βONE FOR ALLβ is capable of registration for educational books and allied publications under Class 16 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
A Division Bench comprising Justice C. Hari Shankar and Justice Om Prakash Shukla set aside the orders of both the Registrar of Trade Marks and the Single Judge which had refused registration on the ground that βONE FOR ALLβ was a common, laudatory and non-distinctive expression.
Trademark Registry Had Refused βONE FOR ALLβ
Oswaal Books, engaged in the publication and sale of educational books and academic material, claimed to have adopted the mark βONE FOR ALLβ from 20 August 2020 for its educational publications.
It filed Trade Mark Application No. 4711190 on 20 October 2020 for registration in Class 16. The Registry raised an objection under Section 9(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act, requiring Oswaal to establish that the mark was capable of distinguishing its goods from those of other traders.
The application was ultimately refused on 14 December 2023 on the ground that βONE FOR ALLβ was a common and non-distinctive expression and that Oswaal had failed to establish acquired distinctiveness or secondary meaning.
Single Judge Also Found the Mark Descriptive
Oswaal challenged the Registry’s decision before the Delhi High Court under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act.
The Single Judge, however, upheld the refusal, reasoning that βONE FOR ALLβ was a common laudatory phrase suggesting that Oswaal’s books constituted a universal or βone-stopβ solution for students across different examinations and boards.
The Single Judge further found that the evidence produced by Oswaal largely related to its house mark βOSWAAL BOOKSβ, rather than establishing βONE FOR ALLβ as an independent source identifier.
Oswaal then preferred the Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench.
Distinctiveness Must Be Examined in Context of the Goods
The Division Bench clarified an important principle of trademark law: a mark cannot be declared non-distinctive merely because it consists of ordinary or commonly used words.
Distinctiveness has to be assessed in relation to the particular goods or services for which registration is sought.
The Court relied on its earlier decision in Leayan Global Pvt. Ltd. v. Bata India Ltd. and reiterated that even a common dictionary word can acquire distinctive character when used for goods or services with which the expression has no immediate connection.
The test, therefore, is not simply whether the words are commonly used in the English language, but whether consumers would immediately associate those words with the nature, quality, characteristics or purpose of the relevant goods.
Slogans and Taglines Can Function as Trademarks
The judgment also contains an important observation regarding the modern commercial significance of slogans and taglines.
The High Court held that slogans are capable of constituting trademarks within the meaning of Sections 2(m) and 2(zb) of the Trade Marks Act where they are capable of distinguishing one person’s goods from those of another.
The Court particularly noted the increasing importance of slogans in the modern digital marketplace. With the rapid expansion of digital marketing, slogans and taglines can perform a source-identifying function and may, in some cases, become even more readily recognised than the brand or trade name itself.
This observation could have wider significance for businesses seeking trademark protection for advertising slogans and brand taglines.
βONE FOR ALLβ Has No Immediate Connection With Books: Delhi High Court
The Division Bench expressly disagreed with the Single Judge’s conclusion that βONE FOR ALLβ was descriptive of Oswaal’s books.
According to the Court, the expression cannot naturally or immediately be associated with books or other goods falling within Class 16.
The phrase ordinarily conveys the idea of a single solution capable of replacing multiple alternatives. That meaning, the Court found, does not directly describe books, printed material or other Class 16 goods.
The Court further observed that βONE FOR ALLβ was not shown to be a common expression used in Class 16 to describe the relevant goods.
No Identical or Deceptively Similar Commercial Use Shown
Another factor weighing in Oswaal’s favour was the absence of evidence showing commercial use of an identical or deceptively similar mark in Class 16.
The Court noted that the Registrar had failed to demonstrate such use and that the Examination Report itself contained no objection under Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act, which deals with relative grounds for refusal based, among other things, on conflict with earlier trademarks.
βONE FOR ALLβ Is Suggestive, Not Descriptive
The Division Bench ultimately held that the mark did not evoke an immediate connection with books.
βONE FOR ALLβ could communicate the broader idea of universality or comprehensive coverage, but it did not directly and unequivocally describe books.
The Court therefore concluded that the expression was, at the highest, suggestive rather than descriptive.
Even if Oswaal intended to project its publications as a universal solution for different academic needs, some degree of mental process was still necessary to connect the phrase with educational books. This was insufficient to render the mark descriptive.
Accordingly, the Court held that βONE FOR ALLβ satisfies the statutory requirement of distinctiveness and is capable of registration.
High Court Sets Aside Refusal of Trademark
The Division Bench consequently set aside both the Single Judge’s judgment and the Registrar of Trade Marks’ refusal order.
Oswaal’s trademark application was restored to the stage at which it stood when the refusal order was passed, with directions that the application proceed further from that stage.
The appeal was accordingly allowed with no order as to costs.
Key Legal Takeaway
The judgment reinforces that the use of common English words does not automatically make a trademark non-distinctive. The correct inquiry under Section 9(1)(a) is whether the mark, considered as a whole and in the context of the goods or services concerned, is capable of distinguishing one trader’s goods from another’s.
It also draws an important distinction between descriptive and suggestive marks. Where the connection between a phrase and the goods is not immediate and requires imagination or mental association, the mark may merely be suggestiveβand therefore capable of registration.
The ruling is particularly relevant to businesses using slogans, taglines and common-word combinations as sub-brands, especially in digital marketing, publishing and consumer-facing industries.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 09.09.2026
Bombay High Court Ruled Statutory Interest on Refund Runs from Three Months After Original Refund Application, Not from Appellate Order
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Madhumita Jha. The views expressed are based on her interpretation of the law. She can be reached at her email idjhamadhumita27@gmail.com.
The Bombay High Court has delivered an important ruling on interest payable on delayed tax refunds under Section 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944, as made applicable to service tax matters through Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994. In Empire Industries Limited v. Union of India & Others, the Court held that statutory interest becomes payable after the expiry of three months from the date of the original refund application, and not from the date on which the assessee subsequently succeeds before the Appellate Tribunal.
The Division Bench of Justice M. S. Karnik and Justice Sandesh D. Patil quashed the denial of interest by the Department and directed payment of statutory interest on the refund amount of βΉ53,05,173 from 20 August 2015 until the date of actual refund.
This decision is particularly significant for assessees whose refund claims remain pending for years because of departmental rejection, appellate proceedings or litigation.
Background of the Case
Empire Industries Limited had filed a refund application under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 read with Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994 on 20 May 2015.
The refund claim was not immediately granted. The dispute travelled through the appellate mechanism and was eventually decided in favour of the petitioner by the Appellate Tribunal on 8 December 2025. Thereafter, the petitioner issued a communication dated 5 January 2026, seeking implementation of the appellate order and release of the refund.
The Department subsequently sanctioned the refund of βΉ53,05,173, which was actually paid on 23 June 2026. However, the Order-in-Original dated 24 March 2026 denied statutory interest for the period claimed by the petitioner.
The petitioner therefore approached the Bombay High Court challenging the denial of interest.
Core Issue Before the Bombay High Court
The principal legal question was:
From which date does interest under Section 11BB become payable when a refund application is initially rejected but ultimately succeeds before an appellate authority?
The competing positions were straightforward.
The petitioner argued that interest should run from the expiry of three months from the date of the original refund application, i.e. from 20 August 2015.
The Revenue, on the other hand, treated the petitioner’s communication dated 5 January 2026 as the relevant refund claim and contended that interest did not become payable from the original 2015 application.
The dispute therefore turned upon the correct interpretation of Sections 11B and 11BB.
Petitionerβs Argument: Interest Follows the Original Refund Application
Empire Industries relied upon the Supreme Court’s landmark judgment in Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. v. Union of India, 2011 (273) E.L.T. 3 (SC).
The petitioner argued that once a refund application has been properly filed under Section 11B, the statutory clock under Section 11BB begins to run from that application itself. If the refund is not made within three months, interest becomes payable after the expiry of that period.
The petitioner also contended that the letter dated 5 January 2026 was merely a continuation or reminder of the original refund claim of 20 May 2015 and could not be treated as a fresh refund application.
Accordingly, the petitioner sought interest from 20 August 2015, being three months after the original application, until actual payment of the refund on 23 June 2026.
Revenueβs Stand
The Revenue argued that the refund became payable only as a consequence of the favourable CESTAT order dated 8 December 2025.
According to the Department, the assessee’s letter dated 5 January 2026 should be regarded as the refund claim arising out of that appellate order.
The Revenue further relied upon Section 11BB to contend that interest would become payable only where the refund remained unpaid beyond the applicable statutory period.
The practical effect of the Revenue’s interpretation would have been to deny interest for the long period between 2015 and the appellate success in 2025.
Bombay High Court Relies on Ranbaxy Laboratories
The High Court rejected the Revenue’s interpretation.
The Court relied squarely upon the binding Supreme Court decision in Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. and reiterated the legal position that Section 11BB becomes operational when a refund sanctioned under Section 11B is not paid within three months from the date of receipt of the refund application.
The Court reproduced the principle that the statutory explanation deeming an appellate or court order to be an order under Section 11B(2) does not postpone the date from which interest becomes payable.
This is the central ratio of the judgment.
The Crucial Principle: Appellate Success Does Not Reset the Interest Clock
The Court specifically held that interest is payable:
from the expiry of three months from the date of filing the refund application until the date of actual refund, and not from the date of the favourable order of the Appellate Tribunal.
This distinction is extremely important.
Where an assessee files a valid refund claim and the Department rejects it, the subsequent appellate order merely establishes that the refund was legally due. It does not convert the appellate order into a fresh starting point for calculating interest.
In effect, if the Department wrongly retains money for years and the assessee ultimately succeeds in appeal, the period spent in litigation cannot automatically be excluded while calculating statutory interest.
5 January 2026 Letter Was Only a Reminder, Not a Fresh Refund Claim
The Bombay High Court also expressly rejected the Department’s attempt to treat the petitioner’s letter dated 5 January 2026 as a new refund claim.
The Court held that the original refund application had been filed on 20 May 2015, while the claim was ultimately allowed by the Appellate Tribunal on 8 December 2025.
The subsequent communication of 5 January 2026 was therefore only a continuation/reminder of the original refund claim and could not be treated as a separate refund application under Section 11B.
This finding is important for tax administration because departments sometimes treat post-appeal representations as fresh refund applications, thereby attempting to restart the statutory interest period.
The judgment makes clear that such an approach cannot be sustained where the refund arises from an earlier valid application.
How Section 11BB Operates
Section 11BB is a statutory compensation mechanism for delay in granting refund.
The Bombay High Court, following Ranbaxy Laboratories, treated the provision as creating a clear temporal rule:
Refund application received β three-month statutory period β interest starts thereafter if refund remains unpaid.
The fact that the refund claim may subsequently travel through adjudication, appeal or judicial proceedings does not alter the original date of application for the purpose of calculating interest.
The Court’s reasoning also reflects the purpose of Section 11BB: to compensate the taxpayer for the period during which money lawfully refundable remains with the State beyond the statutory time limit.
Why the Revenueβs Interpretation Was Rejected
The Department’s interpretation effectively sought to shift the starting point for interest from 2015 to 2026.
Had that argument succeeded, an assessee could theoretically wait several years for final appellate relief and still receive little or no interest for the period during which the Government retained the disputed amount.
The High Court found this inconsistent with the interpretation already settled by the Supreme Court.
The Court described the Department’s treatment of the 5 January 2026 communication as a refund claim as a βserious error.β
Final Order of the Bombay High Court
The Court allowed the writ petition.
It quashed the Order-in-Original dated 24 March 2026 to the extent that it denied statutory interest on the sanctioned refund amount of βΉ53,05,173.
The Assistant Commissioner was directed to pay the amount together with statutory interest:
from 20 August 2015 until the date of actual refund, and the payment was directed to be made within eight weeks from the date of the High Court’s order.
Key Legal Principles Emerging from the Judgment
Issue
Bombay High Court’s ruling
Original refund application
Filed on 20 May 2015
Statutory interest provision
Section 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944
Service tax applicability
Through Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994
When interest begins
After expiry of three months from receipt of original refund application
Relevant interest date in this case
20 August 2015
CESTAT order
8 December 2025
Effect of appellate order
Does not restart or postpone the interest period
Letter dated 5 January 2026
Merely a continuation/reminder, not a fresh refund application
Refund amount
βΉ53,05,173
High Court direction
Statutory interest from 20 August 2015 till actual refund
Time granted for compliance
Eight weeks
Governing precedent
Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. v. Union of India
Importance for Service Tax and Central Excise Refund Disputes
Although the dispute arose in the context of the erstwhile service tax regime, the judgment remains highly relevant to legacy indirect tax litigation.
A large number of service tax and central excise matters continue to remain in appellate proceedings even after the introduction of GST. In such cases, successful assessees frequently face a second round of dispute after winning the substantive appeal: the Department releases the principal refund but disputes the period for which interest is payable.
The Bombay High Court’s decision reinforces that interest is not dependent upon the date on which the Department finally accepts the assessee’s legal position.
Where the original refund application was validly filed, the statutory interest period must ordinarily be traced back to that application.
Importance of the Ranbaxy Laboratories Principle
The judgment is also a strong reaffirmation of the binding nature of Ranbaxy Laboratories.
The Supreme Court had already settled that the explanation to Section 11BB, which deems an appellate or court order to be an order under Section 11B(2), does not alter the starting date for interest.
The Bombay High Court applied that principle directly and rejected an administrative interpretation inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling.
For taxpayers, this significantly strengthens claims in cases where refunds are ultimately granted after appellate litigation.
Practical Takeaway for Assessees
Businesses pursuing refunds under legacy central excise or service tax provisions should carefully preserve:
the original refund application;
proof of the date on which it was received by the Department;
acknowledgement or diary number;
adjudication and appellate orders;
subsequent correspondence seeking implementation; and
proof of the actual date on which refund was credited.
The most critical document for Section 11BB purposes is often not the final appellate order, but the original refund application and its date of receipt.
That date can determine several years’ worth of statutory interest.
Practical Takeaway for Tax Authorities
The decision also serves as a reminder to tax authorities that a post-appeal implementation letter should not automatically be treated as a fresh refund claim.
Where the assessee had already filed a refund application and merely succeeds in getting that claim recognised through appeal, the subsequent letter ordinarily does not erase the original statutory timeline.
The refund machinery cannot be interpreted in a way that financially disadvantages an assessee merely because the Department’s initial rejection was subsequently overturned.
Broader Principle: The Government Cannot Benefit from Delayed Refund Adjudication
Beyond the wording of Section 11BB, the decision embodies a broader fiscal principle.
When money ultimately found refundable has remained with the Government beyond the statutory period, interest compensates the taxpayer for the delay.
If interest were calculated only from the date of the final appellate order, the State could retain funds throughout prolonged litigation without compensating the assessee for that period.
The Bombay High Court’s application of Ranbaxy Laboratories prevents that consequence and reinforces discipline in the administration of statutory refunds.
Conclusion
The Bombay High Court’s ruling in Empire Industries Limited v. Union of India & Others is an important reaffirmation of taxpayer rights in delayed refund cases.
The Court has made it clear that the statutory interest clock under Section 11BB ordinarily begins after three months from the date of the original refund application and does not wait for the assessee to ultimately succeed before the Appellate Tribunal.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 09.09.2026
Delhi High Court Sets Aside Trademark Refusal: Composite Marks Containing Geographical Names Are Not Automatically Barred from Registration
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
The Delhi High Court in Abu Dhabi Global Market v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Delhi delivered an important ruling on the registrability of composite trademarks containing geographical names, while also strongly criticising the manner in which the Trade Marks Registry had dealt with the applicantβs response to the examination objections.
Justice C. Hari Shankar set aside the order of the Assistant Registrar refusing registration of the appellantβs device mark and remanded the application to the Trade Marks Registry for advertisement and further proceedings in accordance with law.
The judgment is especially significant for three propositions: a trademark need not be βcoinedβ or βinventiveβ to qualify for registration; evidence of prior use is not necessary to establish distinctiveness where an application is filed on a βproposed to be usedβ basis; and Section 9(1)(b) does not automatically prohibit registration of a composite mark merely because one element of the mark contains a geographical name.
Background of the Case
Abu Dhabi Global Market had filed Application No. 3184380 seeking registration of a composite device mark incorporating its logo together with the words βABU DHABI GLOBAL MARKET.β
The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks rejected the application by order dated 9 December 2022.
The refusal was broadly based on three objections:
the mark was allegedly neither βcoinedβ nor βinventedβ;
the applicant had not established distinctiveness by filing an affidavit evidencing use of the mark; and
βAbu Dhabiβ was a geographical name and the mark as a whole was allegedly non-distinctive and incapable of monopolisation.
The appellant challenged these findings before the Delhi High Court.
Appellantβs Case
Counsel for Abu Dhabi Global Market argued that none of the grounds relied upon by the Trade Marks Registry could survive either on facts or in law.
One important submission was that the appellantβs logo already stood registered in its favour. According to the appellant, this demonstrated that the Registry had itself recognised the distinctiveness of the device element.
The appellant argued that the mark could not suddenly lose its distinctiveness merely because the words βABU DHABI GLOBAL MARKETβ were placed beneath the logo.
The appellant also explained that the trading name βAbu Dhabi Global Marketβ was not an arbitrary descriptive expression. It had been adopted under Federal Decree No. 15 of 2013 dated 11 February 2013, issued in the name of the President of the United Arab Emirates, which provided for establishment of a financial free zone under the name βAbu Dhabi Global Market.β
Can a Trademark Be Refused Merely Because It Is Not βCoinedβ or βInventiveβ?
The Delhi High Court emphatically answered this question in the negative.
The Court observed that the grounds for refusal of registration are contained in Sections 9 and 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and these provisions are comprehensive in that regard.
The Court found no statutory requirement that a trademark must necessarily be βcoinedβ or βinventiveβ in order to qualify for registration.
Justice Hari Shankar drew an important conceptual distinction:
Distinctiveness is required for trademark registration; inventiveness is not.
Inventiveness is a concept associated with patent and design law, whereas trademark law focuses upon whether a mark is capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one person from those of another.
The Court therefore held that the Assistant Registrar could not lawfully refuse registration simply because the mark was allegedly not coined or inventive.
Trademark Law Is About Distinctiveness, Not Inventiveness
This aspect of the judgment is commercially important.
A business does not need to create a completely new word in order to obtain trademark protection.
Many trademarks are made up of ordinary words, surnames, geographical references, symbols, logos or combinations of these elements.
What matters under Section 9(1)(a) is whether the mark is capable of functioning as a badge of origin β that is, whether it can distinguish the applicantβs goods or services from those of other traders.
The Court therefore rejected an approach that imported patent-law concepts of novelty or inventiveness into trademark examination.
Trade Name Was Backed by UAE Federal Decree
The Court additionally found that even factually the objection regarding the name being neither coined nor invented was unjustified.
The appellant had specifically explained that the name βABU DHABI GLOBAL MARKETβ had been adopted pursuant to Federal Decree No. 15/2013.
The Court noted that this explanation had already been placed before the Trade Marks Registry in the appellantβs reply to the First Examination Report, but the impugned order made no reference to it.
This omission later became part of the Courtβs wider criticism concerning non-application of mind by the Registry.
No Affidavit of Use Required for a βProposed to Be Usedβ Application
The second major ground of refusal was the absence of an affidavit establishing use of the mark.
The Delhi High Court rejected this objection as well.
The appellantβs application had been filed on a βproposed to be usedβ basis.
The Court observed that there was no lawful basis for linking distinctiveness with evidence of actual prior use in such circumstances.
Justice Hari Shankar stated that the Assistant Registrar had confused distinctiveness with actual user of the mark.
The Court went further and explained that if evidence of use were always required to establish distinctiveness, it would become impossible to register any trademark on a proposed-to-be-used basis.
Such an interpretation would directly conflict with the statutory scheme.
What Does βDistinctivenessβ Mean Under Section 9(1)(a)?
Section 9(1)(a) concerns marks which are devoid of distinctive character, namely marks that are not capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one person from those of another.
The High Court stressed that the proper legal inquiry is therefore:
Is the mark capable of distinguishing the applicantβs goods or services from those of another person?
It is not enough merely to say that a mark has not yet been used.
The Court found that the impugned order contained no finding that the Abu Dhabi Global Market mark was actually incapable of performing this distinguishing function.
Existing Registration of the Logo Was Relevant
The Court also noted that the logo forming part of the composite mark already stood registered in favour of the appellant.
This meant that the Registry had already recognised the distinctiveness of the logo.
The Court accepted the appellantβs contention that adding the words βABU DHABI GLOBAL MARKETβ beneath an already distinctive logo did not, by itself, destroy the distinctiveness of the mark.
Geographical Names and Section 9(1)(b)
The third major issue concerned the presence of the words βAbu Dhabiβ.
The Trade Marks Registry had treated the expression as problematic because Abu Dhabi is the capital of the United Arab Emirates and therefore a geographical name.
The Delhi High Court closely analysed Section 9(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Act.
The provision bars registration of marks which consist exclusively of signs or indications which may serve in trade to designate, among other things, the geographical origin of goods or services.
The word βexclusivelyβ became decisive.
Composite Marks Are Outside the Automatic Bar of Section 9(1)(b)
The Court held that Section 9(1)(b) does not automatically prohibit every mark containing a geographical reference.
The statutory prohibition applies where the mark consists exclusively of matter indicating geographical origin.
A composite mark incorporating other elements stands on a different footing.
The Court held that:
Composite marks are ipso facto outside the scope of Section 9(1)(b) merely on the basis that one component may refer to geographical origin.
In the present case, the mark was not simply the geographical expression βAbu Dhabi.β
It consisted of the words βABU DHABI GLOBAL MARKETβ together with a distinctive logo.
The Court therefore concluded that Section 9(1)(b), by its very terms, could not automatically apply to such a composite mark.
βDominant Partβ Test Has No Role Under Section 9(1)(b)
The Registrar attempted to argue that βAbu Dhabiβ was the dominant part of the mark, and therefore the Section 9 objection should still survive.
The Court rejected this argument in categorical terms.
Justice Hari Shankar held that the βdominant partβ principle is alien to Section 9(1)(b).
That doctrine may be relevant in infringement litigation when courts compare competing trademarks and determine whether the dominant components are deceptively similar.
But Section 9(1)(b) contains the statutory word βexclusively.β
Accordingly, the Court held that the dominant-part doctrine could not override the express statutory requirement of exclusivity.
This is one of the strongest doctrinal aspects of the ruling.
Registration Proceedings and Infringement Proceedings Are Different
The judgment usefully distinguishes between two trademark-law exercises:
Registration analysis under Section 9, and infringement analysis involving comparison of rival marks.
In infringement cases, courts may examine dominant or essential features of rival marks.
But while applying Section 9(1)(b), the focus is on whether the mark as a whole consists exclusively of prohibited descriptive or geographical matter.
The two tests cannot be indiscriminately mixed.
Court Criticises the Trade Marks Registry for Non-Application of Mind
The judgment also contains unusually strong observations regarding administrative decision-making by the Trade Marks Registry.
The Court first referred to one sentence in the refusal order stating:
βThe attorney failed to establish the Identity of the mark in applied class.β
Justice Hari Shankar observed that the sentence was incomprehensible and that even counsel appearing for the Registrar was unable to explain what it meant.
The Court therefore held that an incomprehensible sentence could obviously not constitute a lawful ground for rejecting a trademark application.
Detailed FER Replies Cannot Simply Be Ignored
The Court noted that after issuance of the First Examination Report dated 16 September 2016, the appellant had filed an extensive response consisting of 11 pages and 23 paragraphs, which together with accompanying documents ran into more than 100 pages.
Yet the impugned order appeared not to have considered that response meaningfully.
Justice Hari Shankar strongly observed that applicants do not file detailed responses to examination reports βfor the sake of fun.β
The Court stated that the least expected from the quasi-judicial officer deciding the application is to read the response and apply their mind to the submissions.
Trade Marks Registrar Exercises Quasi-Judicial Functions
The Court characterised the manner in which the application had been decided as a complete abdication of quasi-judicial functions vested under the Trade Marks Act and Rules.
It further observed that the impugned decision effectively reduced Section 18(5) of the Trade Marks Act to redundancy.
This aspect of the judgment has significance beyond the particular mark involved.
Trademark examination and hearing orders must be:
reasoned;
intelligible;
responsive to the applicantβs submissions; and
based on the statutory grounds actually available under the Trade Marks Act.
A formulaic refusal unsupported by reasoning is vulnerable to challenge.
Delhi High Courtβs Final Order
The High Court ultimately held that none of the grounds relied upon by the Assistant Registrar could survive.
The order dated 9 December 2022 was consequently quashed and set aside.
The Court remanded Application No. 3184380 dated 11 February 2016 to the Trade Marks Registry with a direction that it proceed to advertisement and subsequent proceedings in accordance with the Trade Marks Act and the Trade Marks Rules.
Importantly, therefore, the High Court did not itself finally register the mark. It removed the unlawful refusal and directed the application to proceed through the statutory registration process.
Key Legal Principles Emerging from the Judgment
Issue
Delhi High Courtβs Finding
Must a trademark be βcoinedβ?
No
Must a trademark be βinventiveβ?
No
Relevant trademark requirement
Distinctiveness, not inventiveness
Proposed-to-be-used application
Prior-use affidavit is not necessary merely to establish distinctiveness
Meaning of distinctiveness
Capability of distinguishing one personβs goods/services from anotherβs
Geographical name in a mark
Does not automatically bar registration
Section 9(1)(b)
Applies to marks consisting exclusively of prohibited descriptive/geographical indications
Composite geographical mark
Not automatically barred merely because one part is geographic
Dominant-part doctrine
Not applicable to overcome the word βexclusivelyβ in Section 9(1)(b)
Registryβs duty
Must meaningfully consider replies and give reasoned decisions
Final result
Refusal quashed; application remanded for advertisement and further proceedings
Why This Judgment Matters for Trademark Applicants
The ruling is particularly useful for businesses seeking protection for marks containing:
city names;
country names;
regional names;
geographical references;
institutional names; or
combinations of geographical words with logos or other distinctive elements.
The mere presence of a geographical expression does not necessarily make a mark unregistrable.
The correct analysis must examine the mark as a whole and the exact language of Section 9(1)(b).
Importance for International Businesses Entering India
The judgment is also relevant for foreign governmental bodies, free zones, financial centres, international institutions and multinational enterprises seeking trademark protection in India.
Names of foreign institutions frequently incorporate geographical identifiers.
If every composite institutional mark containing a city or country name were automatically rejected, many established global trade names would face unnecessary barriers in India.
The decision confirms that Indian trademark law requires a more nuanced statutory analysis.
Important Distinction: βAbu Dhabiβ Versus βAbu Dhabi Global Market + Logoβ
The judgment can be understood through a simple distinction.
A mark consisting solely of a geographical expression such as βABU DHABIβ may raise a different Section 9(1)(b) analysis.
But the application before the Court was for a composite device mark, consisting of:
a logo + the words βABU DHABI GLOBAL MARKET.β
The Court was therefore required to examine the entire composite mark rather than isolate one component and treat that isolated component as determinative.
This is why the statutory word βexclusivelyβ assumed such importance.
Practical Takeaways for Trademark Practitioners
For trademark attorneys and applicants, the judgment offers several useful lessons.
When responding to an examination report involving Section 9 objections, the response should clearly demonstrate:
the composite nature of the mark;
the distinctive graphical or device elements;
whether any existing registrations already recognise distinctiveness;
the factual origin of the trade name;
whether the application is on a proposed-to-be-used basis;
why proof of prior use is therefore unnecessary;
why the mark does not consist exclusively of geographical or descriptive matter; and
why the mark as a whole is capable of distinguishing the applicantβs goods or services.
The decision also provides a strong basis for challenging refusals that mechanically invoke Section 9 without examining the statutory wording.
Administrative Law Significance of the Judgment
Beyond trademark law, the decision reflects fundamental principles of administrative and quasi-judicial decision-making.
Where a statutory authority receives a detailed reply, it must meaningfully engage with the response.
A decision should demonstrate:
application of mind, intelligible reasoning, consideration of relevant material and reliance upon legally recognised grounds.
An authority cannot simply reproduce objections from an examination report and reject an application without addressing the applicantβs answers.
This aspect of the judgment strengthens procedural fairness in intellectual-property administration.
Broader Impact on Section 9 Jurisprudence
The ruling provides useful clarity on the relationship between Sections 9(1)(a) and 9(1)(b).
Section 9(1)(a) deals with lack of distinctive character.
Section 9(1)(b) addresses marks consisting exclusively of descriptive or geographical indications.
The two provisions should not be conflated.
A geographical component does not automatically establish lack of distinctiveness, particularly where the mark contains other distinctive features.
Similarly, absence of prior use does not establish non-distinctiveness in a proposed-to-be-used application.
Conclusion
The Delhi High Courtβs judgment in Abu Dhabi Global Market v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Delhi is an important authority on the registration of composite trademarks under the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
The Court clarified that trademarks need not be coined or inventive, that actual use is not a prerequisite to distinctiveness in a proposed-to-be-used application, and that a composite mark containing a geographical name is not automatically barred under Section 9(1)(b).
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 09.09.2026
Delhi High Court Grants Bail in NDPS Case After Five Yearsβ Custody
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
The Delhi High Court in Mahender Pal v. State granted regular bail to an accused who had remained in judicial custody for more than five years in a case registered under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (βNDPS Actβ).
The Court held that although the prosecution sought to attribute an aggregate recovery of 230 kg of poppy straw to all three accused, the recovery specifically attributable to the applicant was 40 kg of poppy straw, which constituted an intermediate quantity. Consequently, the stringent bail conditions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act were held not to apply to him.
The judgment is significant because it addresses three recurring issues in NDPS bail jurisprudence: individual attribution of contraband, applicability of Section 37 based on quantity, and prolonged incarceration as a constitutional consideration under Article 21.
Background of the Case
The case arose out of FIR No. 628/2017, registered at Police Station Samaypur Badli under Sections 15, 29, 61 and 85 of the NDPS Act.
The bail application was filed under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking regular bail. The matter was heard by Justice Amit Sharma of the Delhi High Court. The judgment was reserved on 11 May 2023 and pronounced on 18 May 2023.
According to the prosecution, police received secret information that the applicant, Mahender Pal, was allegedly involved in transporting poppy straw in his auto-rickshaw. A raiding team was constituted, and the applicant was allegedly followed to a godown.
The prosecution claimed that the applicant was seen loading a carton into the auto-rickshaw with the assistance of another person. A third individual was also allegedly present inside the godown.
Recovery Alleged by the Prosecution
Upon search of the applicantβs auto-rickshaw, the police allegedly recovered 40 kg of poppy straw contained in packets.
Thereafter, the godown was searched and another 190 kg of poppy straw was allegedly recovered.
Accordingly, the prosecution treated the total recovery as 230 kg and sought to attribute the entire quantity jointly to the accused persons.
The prosecution further relied upon the FSL report, which stated that the seized exhibits contained Morphine, Codeine, Thebaine, Papaverine and Narcotine β constituents of poppy straw.
Charges under Sections 15(c) and 29 of the NDPS Act had been framed against the applicant.
Applicantβs Case: Only 40 Kg Was Recovered from Him
The principal contention advanced on behalf of the applicant was that the recovery directly attributable to him was only 40 kg of poppy straw.
His counsel argued that this was an intermediate quantity, rather than a commercial quantity.
The applicant also relied heavily on the fact that he had remained in custody for over five years and that the trial had not concluded. It was further pointed out that he had been granted interim bail on several occasions and had surrendered each time without misusing the liberty granted to him.
The applicant was stated to be an auto-rickshaw driver with a family dependent on him.
Stateβs Argument: Commercial Quantity and Section 37 Should Apply
The State opposed the bail application.
It argued that charges had been framed under Sections 15(c) and 29 of the NDPS Act and that, because the prosecution case concerned commercial quantity, Section 37 of the NDPS Act would apply.
The State also submitted that only four prosecution witnesses remained to be examined and, therefore, the trial would conclude shortly.
The Court also noted that at the stage of framing of charge there had been a concession on behalf of the applicant regarding framing of charges under Sections 15(c)/29, and that the revision petition against the charge order had later been withdrawn.
Crucial Finding: Recovery from Applicant Was 40 Kg, Not 230 Kg
The most important factual aspect of the judgment is the distinction drawn by the Court between:
the recovery from the applicantβs auto-rickshaw; and the recovery from the godown.
The FIR recorded that 40 kg of poppy straw was recovered from the auto-rickshaw of the applicant.
The additional 190 kg was recovered from the godown and was stated by the prosecution itself to have been in the possession of the other accused persons, namely Bahadur Singh and Prempal.
The Court specifically referred to the prosecutionβs own status report, which stated that the 190 kg recovered from the godown was in the possession of Bahadur Singh and Prempal.
This factual segregation became decisive in assessing whether the stringent conditions of Section 37 could be invoked against Mahender Pal.
Section 37 of the NDPS Act: Why It Matters
Section 37 imposes stringent conditions for the grant of bail in certain NDPS cases involving, among other things, commercial quantity.
In such cases, bail ordinarily cannot be granted unless the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that:
the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence; and
the accused is not likely to commit an offence while on bail.
These requirements make bail substantially more difficult in commercial quantity cases.
However, the Delhi High Court held that the recovery qua the applicant was only 40 kg of poppy straw, which was an intermediate quantity and punishable with imprisonment up to ten years.
Accordingly, the Court held that Section 37 of the NDPS Act was not attracted qua the applicant.
Prolonged Incarceration and Article 21
The second major aspect of the judgment was prolonged judicial custody.
The applicant had already spent more than five years in custody.
The Court examined prior decisions emphasising that, even in serious NDPS cases, prolonged detention without a timely conclusion of trial engages the fundamental right to personal liberty and speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution.
The Court relied upon Anil Kumar v. Directorate of Revenue Intelligence and related authorities to reiterate that prolonged deprivation of liberty without the assurance of speedy trial runs contrary to constitutional principles.
The judgment reproduced the principle that fair, just and reasonable procedure is implicit in Article 21 and that an accused has a constitutional right to be tried speedily.
Reliance on Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee Case
The Delhi High Court referred to the principles laid down in Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing Undertrial Prisoners) v. Union of India.
That line of authority recognises that undertrials cannot be incarcerated indefinitely merely because they are charged under stringent statutes.
The Court also referred to a coordinate Bench decision in Sarvan Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi), where it had been observed that the rigours of Section 37 would not necessarily stand in the way where an undertrial had remained in custody for a prolonged period.
Reliance on Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb
The Delhi High Court further relied upon the Supreme Courtβs decision in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713.
In K.A. Najeeb, the Supreme Court had held that statutory restrictions on bail do not completely extinguish the power of constitutional courts to protect fundamental rights.
The Court noted the principle that where a timely trial is not reasonably possible and an accused has already undergone substantial incarceration, courts may be constitutionally required to consider release on bail.
The cited passage further explains that the rigours of statutory bail restrictions may βmelt downβ where there is no likelihood of the trial concluding within a reasonable period and the incarceration already undergone becomes substantial in relation to the prescribed sentence.
Conduct During Interim Bail Also Favoured the Applicant
The Court also took note of the applicantβs conduct.
The nominal roll reflected that he had been released on interim bail on multiple occasions and had not misused the liberty.
This factor helped demonstrate that there was no adverse conduct during temporary release that would justify continued incarceration solely on apprehension of misuse.
Delhi High Courtβs Final Reasoning
The Court ultimately rested its bail decision on a combination of circumstances:
the recovery directly attributable to the applicant was 40 kg;
this was an intermediate quantity;
Section 37 of the NDPS Act therefore did not apply qua the applicant;
he had already undergone more than five years of judicial custody;
the constitutional right to speedy trial and personal liberty had to be taken into account; and
his conduct during previous interim bail periods had been satisfactory.
The Court therefore allowed the bail application.
Bail Conditions Imposed by the Court
The applicant was directed to furnish:
a personal bond of βΉ50,000 along with one surety of the like amount.
The Court also imposed conditions requiring him to inform the Investigating Officer of any change of address, not to leave India without prior permission of the Trial Court, keep his mobile numbers operational, and refrain from tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses.
The Court further directed that bail would stand cancelled if it was established that the applicant had committed similar offences or attempted to interfere with the evidence.
No Opinion on Merits of the Trial
Importantly, the Delhi High Court clarified that nothing stated in the bail judgment should be treated as an expression on the merits of the pending criminal case.
The trial court therefore remained free to adjudicate the evidence independently.
Key Legal Principles Emerging from the Judgment
Issue
Delhi High Courtβs Finding
Recovery from applicant
40 kg of poppy straw
Recovery from godown
190 kg
Total prosecution recovery
230 kg
Quantity attributable to applicant for bail analysis
40 kg
Nature of quantity
Intermediate quantity
Section 37 NDPS Act
Not attracted qua the applicant
Custody undergone
More than five years
Interim bail conduct
Liberty not misused
Constitutional consideration
Article 21 right to personal liberty and speedy trial
Bail amount
βΉ50,000 personal bond + one surety of like amount
Result
Regular bail granted
Why This Judgment Is Important for NDPS Bail Jurisprudence
This decision is particularly important because it highlights that quantity attribution cannot be applied mechanically.
Where drugs are recovered from different locations and from different accused, courts must examine who was actually in possession of what quantity before invoking the consequences associated with commercial quantity.
The mere fact that a common seizure memo exists does not automatically answer the question of individual possession.
In this case, the prosecutionβs own status report distinguished between the 40 kg found in the applicantβs auto-rickshaw and the 190 kg recovered from the godown.
That distinction ultimately influenced whether Section 37 applied.
Importance of Individual Attribution in Joint NDPS Cases
NDPS prosecutions frequently involve multiple accused and recoveries from different vehicles, premises or persons.
A central issue in such cases is whether the entire recovery can be attributed collectively to every accused through allegations of conspiracy under Section 29, or whether the individual physical recovery must be separately examined at the bail stage.
The Mahender Pal judgment demonstrates that courts may closely examine the prosecution record itself to determine what quantity is specifically attributable to an applicant.
This can be crucial because the classification between small, intermediate and commercial quantity directly affects the statutory bail regime.
Prolonged Custody Cannot Become Pre-Trial Punishment
The judgment also reinforces another important principle: pre-trial incarceration cannot become a substitute for punishment.
An accused remains presumed innocent until convicted.
If a person spends a substantial part of the maximum possible sentence in custody before guilt is determined, the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty becomes severely implicated.
The Courtβs reliance on Article 21 jurisprudence therefore reflects the continuing judicial effort to balance the societal harm caused by narcotic offences against the constitutional rights of undertrial prisoners.
Practical Takeaway for Defence Counsel
The judgment provides several useful points for lawyers dealing with NDPS bail matters.
At the bail stage, counsel should carefully examine:
the exact quantity recovered from the applicant;
whether additional recovery came from a separate place or co-accused;
the wording of the seizure memo;
the prosecutionβs own status report;
the applicability of Section 29 conspiracy allegations;
custody period already undergone;
number of witnesses examined and remaining;
prior interim bail conduct; and
whether the applicant has any criminal antecedents.
Where the prosecution’s own documents show a recovery below commercial quantity, that fact may materially affect the applicability of Section 37.
Practical Takeaway for Prosecution Agencies
The decision also underscores the importance of precise attribution in seizure and investigation records.
Where different quantities are recovered from different accused or locations, the prosecution must clearly establish the evidentiary basis for attributing the entire commercial quantity to each accused.
A generalised reference to a collective recovery may not be sufficient at the bail stage if the record itself distinguishes possession.
Conclusion
The Delhi High Courtβs decision in Mahender Pal v. State is a significant ruling at the intersection of NDPS bail law, quantity attribution and constitutional liberty. The Court held that the recovery directly attributable to the applicant was 40 kg of poppy straw β an intermediate quantity β and therefore the stringent conditions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act were not attracted qua him.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 09.09.2026
Gujarat High Court Order on IGST Refunds for Exporters
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
The Gujarat High Court recently delivered a significant judgment in the case of Messrs Aculife Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. vs. The Union of India & Anr., addressing the contentious issue of IGST refunds on exported goods procured under the Advance Authorization Scheme. This article provides a detailed overview of the case, the legal arguments, the court’s reasoning, and its broader implications for exporters and GST compliance.
Background of the Case
Export Transactions and IGST Refunds
The petitioner, Aculife Healthcare Pvt. Ltd., exported medicaments between July 2017 and April 2019, paying Integrated Goods & Services Tax (IGST) on these exports.
The IGST paid was refunded under Section 16 of the IGST Act, 2017.
Dispute Arises
Authorities issued a show-cause notice in April 2023, arguing that since the petitioner procured goods duty-free under the Advance Authorization Scheme, they were not eligible to pay IGST on exports as per Sub-rule (10) of Rule 96 of the CGST Rules, 2017.
The Assistant Commissioner raised a demand for refund reversal, citing that the IGST payment and refund were contrary to Rule 96(10).
Appellate Proceedings
The petitioner appealed, and the Commissioner (Appeals) reduced the demand, referencing the Gujarat High Court’s earlier decision in the Cosmo Films Ltd. case, which clarified the prospective application of Rule 96(10) from October 9, 2018.
The demand was reduced to Rs. 9,97,222/-.
Legal Arguments Presented
Petitioner’s Stand:
The petitioner argued that the appeal was pending when Notification No. 20/2024 (dated October 8, 2024) omitted Rule 96(10).
Citing the Adwrap Packaging Ltd. case, the petitioner contended that the omission of Rule 96(10) should apply to all pending proceedings where final adjudication had not occurred.
Respondent’s Position:
The government did not dispute that the appeal was pending when the notification was issued.
The High Court’s Decision
The Court held that since the proceedings were pending before the appellate authority when Notification No. 20/2024 was issued, the omission of Rule 96(10) applied to the petitioner’s case.
The impugned order demanding refund reversal was quashed and set aside.
The petition was allowed, providing relief to the exporter.
Key Takeaways and Implications
Prospective Omission of Rule 96(10):
The omission of Rule 96(10) by Notification No. 20/2024 applies to all cases pending final adjudication as of the notification date.
Exporters with similar pending disputes may benefit from this precedent.
Legal Certainty for Exporters:
The judgment reinforces the principle that changes in tax rules, especially those affecting substantive rights, should not be applied retrospectively to the detriment of taxpayers.
Reference to Precedents:
The Court relied on its earlier decisions (Cosmo Films Ltd. and Adwrap Packaging Ltd.), ensuring consistency in GST jurisprudence.
Practical Impact:
Exporters who procured goods under duty-free schemes and faced IGST refund reversals can seek relief if their cases were pending as of October 8, 2024.
Conclusion
This Gujarat High Court order provides much-needed clarity on the application of GST rules to exporters using the Advance Authorization Scheme. It underscores the importance of timely legal recourse and highlights the judiciary’s role in protecting taxpayer rights amidst evolving tax regulations.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 08.09.2026
Supreme Court Clarifies Jurisdiction Over Release and Confiscation of Vehicles Seized Under NDPS Act
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
The Supreme Court of India, in a significant decision delivered on August 24, 2026, in the case of R Manimaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, has clarified the legal process for the release of vehicles seized under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act). This article provides a detailed analysis of the judgment, its background, and its implications for vehicle owners and law enforcement agencies.
Background of the Case
A lorry was intercepted by authorities, leading to the alleged recovery of 66 kg of ganja. Three individuals were arrested, and the vehicle was seized under the NDPS Act.
The trial court acquitted all accused on four main grounds:
The arrest memo predated the FIR registration, raising doubts about the investigation’s integrity.
No proper register was maintained for the custody of the contraband.
Official witnesses could not explain how the lorry was operating during pandemic restrictions.
There was an unexplained delay in sending samples to the court and laboratory.
Following acquittal, the trial court initially ordered the release of the lorry to its owner after the appeal period. However, when the owner applied for release, the trial court and subsequently the High Court rejected the request, citing the need for Drug Disposal Committee (DDC) involvement as per Section 52A of the NDPS Act and related rules.
Key Legal Issues Addressed
1. Confiscation Proceedings and Vehicle Release
The Supreme Court examined whether the release of a vehicle seized under the NDPS Act must always go through the DDC, even after acquittal.
The Court noted that confiscation proceedings under the NDPS Act are distinct from criminal proceedings. Acquittal does not automatically entitle the owner to the vehicle’s release, as the standards of proof differ.
2. Court’s Power vs. DDC’s Role
The Court clarified that the power to confiscate or release a vehicle lies with the trial court under Section 63(1) of the NDPS Act, not with the DDC.
The NDPS (Seizure, Storage, Sampling and Disposal) Rules, 2022, allow for disposal of seized items, but only with the court’s permission.
The DDC cannot independently dispose of a vehicle without a court order, especially while criminal proceedings are pending.
3. Interim Custody and Final Release
The Court distinguished between interim custody (during trial) and final release (after trial).
If the owner or any claimant does not seek custody, the Investigating Officer may request the court to refer the vehicle to the DDC for disposal, but only after giving the owner an opportunity to be heard.
Any proceeds from the sale of the vehicle by the DDC must be deposited with the jurisdictional court.
Supreme Court’s Decision
The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the trial court and the High Court, directing the immediate release of the vehicle to the appellant (owner), as the accused had been acquitted and the prosecution’s case was found to be unreliable.
The Court emphasized that the trial court’s original order to release the vehicle was justified and that the DDC’s involvement was not required in this scenario.
Implications of the Judgment
Reinforces Judicial Authority: The judgment reaffirms that the trial court has the primary authority to decide on the release or confiscation of vehicles seized under the NDPS Act.
Protects Owners’ Rights: Vehicle owners acquitted in NDPS cases can seek the return of their property directly from the court, without unnecessary procedural hurdles.
Clarifies DDC’s Limited Role: The DDC can only act with the court’s permission and cannot independently dispose of vehicles while criminal proceedings are ongoing or when the court has ordered release.
Ensures Due Process: The decision ensures that owners are given a fair opportunity to be heard before their property is disposed of, aligning with principles of natural justice.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s ruling in R Manimaran v. State of Tamil Nadu provides much-needed clarity on the process for releasing vehicles seized under the NDPS Act. By upholding the trial court’s authority and ensuring procedural fairness, the judgment balances the interests of law enforcement with the rights of property owners. This precedent will guide future cases involving the seizure and release of vehicles in NDPS matters.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 08.09.2026
Bombay High Court on Stamp Duty Valuation for Joint Development Agreements Involving Contingent Rights and Future Entitlements
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Madhumita Jha. The views expressed are based on her interpretation of the law. She can be reached at her email idjhamadhumita27@gmail.com.
The Bombay High Court recently delivered a significant judgment in the case of Wadhwa Constructions & Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra, addressing the complex issue of stamp duty assessment on a Joint Development Agreement (JDA) for a large land development project in Raigad. This article provides a detailed analysis of the dispute, the legal arguments, the Court’s findings, and the implications for real estate developers and authorities.
Background of the Dispute
Parties Involved:
Petitioners: Wadhwa Constructions & Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. and Navin Makhija
Respondents: State of Maharashtra and Stamp Authorities
Project: Development of land parcels in Panvel, Raigad, under a JDA with Valuable Properties Pvt. Ltd. (VPPL)
Key Dates:
JDA executed: 18 February 2014
Initial stamp duty paid: Rs. 15.67 crore
Authorities later demanded additional stamp duty, alleging a deficit of over Rs. 21.92 crore
Core Issues
Calculation of Stamp Duty:
Whether the authorities were correct in including future and contingent rights (such as additional FSI, revenue sharing, and development of additional land) in the present valuation for stamp duty.
Interpretation of the JDA:
Whether rights over the entire land (including a 50-acre parcel subject to a future ‘Swap Notice’) and potential future FSI should be valued as present rights.
Application of Valuation Guidelines:
Dispute over the use of conversion factors (1.5 vs. 1.2) and rates (construction cost vs. market sale price) for calculating the value of constructed area and parking.
Legal Arguments
Petitioners’ Stand
Only rights and entitlements actually created and operative on the date of execution should be considered for stamp duty.
Contingent rights (like the 50-acre parcel and additional FSI) should not be included until the relevant event (e.g., Swap Notice) occurs.
The correct conversion factor for carpet area to built-up area is 1.2 (not 1.5), and construction cost (Rs. 8,500/sq.m.) should be used instead of market sale price (Rs. 24,000/sq.m.).
State’s Stand
The JDA and applicable guidelines justify including all possible rights and entitlements, including those dependent on future events, in the present valuation.
The use of 1.5 as a conversion factor and market sale price is supported by the agreement’s definitions and the Annual Statement of Rates (ASR).
Court’s Analysis and Findings
Key Principles Established
Present vs. Contingent Rights:
Only rights and development potential actually available and operative on the date of execution can be included in stamp duty valuation.
Contingent rights (dependent on future events like Swap Notice or FSI increase) cannot be treated as present rights for valuation.
Conversion Factor and Valuation Rate:
The correct conversion factor for carpet area to built-up area is 1.2, as per ASR guidelines, not 1.5 as used in the agreement for internal calculations.
Construction cost (Rs. 8,500/sq.m.) should be used for constructed area, not the market sale price (Rs. 24,000/sq.m.).
Revenue Sharing:
Deferred revenue sharing can be considered as part of consideration, but only to the extent it relates to rights actually granted on the date of execution.
Parking Calculation:
Parking requirements must be based on the development area and entitlements available at the time of execution, not on future or contingent development.
Orders Passed
The Court quashed the orders of the Collector of Stamps and the Appellate Authority to the extent they included future/contingent rights and used incorrect valuation methods.
Directed a fresh determination of market value and stamp duty, strictly based on rights and entitlements operative on the date of execution, using the correct conversion factor and construction cost.
The 298 acres (First Schedule) are to be valued as present rights; the 50.23 acres (Second Schedule) are to be excluded unless and until the Swap Notice is exercised.
Implications for Real Estate and Stamp Duty Law
Clarity on Stamp Duty Assessment: The judgment clarifies that only present and operative rights can be considered for stamp duty, not hypothetical or contingent future rights.
Guidance for Drafting JDAs: Developers and landowners must clearly distinguish between present and contingent rights in agreements to avoid inflated stamp duty demands.
Role of ASR Guidelines: Authorities must apply the correct conversion factors and valuation rates as per statutory guidelines, not merely rely on contractual definitions.
Protection Against Arbitrary Valuation: The judgment protects parties from arbitrary and excessive stamp duty assessments based on speculative future events.
Conclusion
This Bombay High Court judgment sets a crucial precedent for the real estate sector, ensuring that stamp duty is levied only on actual, present rights and entitlements, and not on speculative or contingent future benefits. It reinforces the need for strict adherence to statutory guidelines and careful drafting of development agreements.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 08.09.2026
Delhi High Court Sets Aside Refusal of “OFFER” Trademark Registration for Alcoholic Beverages
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
The Delhi High Court recently delivered a significant judgment in favor of ADS Spirits Pvt. Ltd., overturning the Registrar of Trade Marks’ refusal to register the trademark “OFFER” for alcoholic beverages. This decision not only impacts the parties involved but also clarifies important principles regarding trademark distinctiveness under Indian law.
Background of the Case
ADS Spirits Pvt. Ltd., a prominent player in the Indian liquor industry, applied for registration of the trademark “OFFER” in Class 33 (covering alcoholic beverages except beers) in July 2022. The company, known for brands like Royal Green Whisky and Double Blue Whisky, sought to secure statutory rights over the mark, arguing that it was arbitrary and inherently distinctive for their products.
However, the Registrar of Trade Marks refused the application, citing Section 9(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The Registrar argued that “OFFER” was a common English word, used in the context of discounts or promotions, and thus lacked the required distinctiveness to function as a trademark.
Key Arguments
ADS Spirits Pvt. Ltd.’s Position
Arbitrary and Distinctive Mark: The company contended that “OFFER” is arbitrary in relation to alcoholic beverages and not commonly used in the industry as a brand name.
Registrar’s Non-Application of Mind: ADS Spirits argued that the Registrar failed to consider their detailed submissions, including examples of other registered marks containing the word “OFFER” and relevant case law.
Wrong Legal Test Applied: The refusal was based on the mark’s lack of “uniqueness,” whereas the law requires an assessment of “distinctiveness”βwhether the mark can distinguish the applicant’s goods from others.
Registrar of Trade Marks’ Position
Common Usage: The Registrar maintained that “OFFER” is a generic term, commonly associated with discounts, and thus not unique or distinctive.
Sufficient Reasoning: It was argued that the order provided adequate reasoning and that detailed explanations were not legally required.
Court’s Analysis and Findings
Justice Jyoti Singh, presiding over the case, found several flaws in the Registrar’s approach:
Non-Speaking and Unreasoned Order: The Court criticized the Registrar for issuing a cryptic order that failed to address the applicant’s submissions or provide clear reasoning.
Incorrect Legal Standard: The Registrar wrongly focused on “uniqueness” instead of “distinctiveness.” The Court clarified that a mark need not be unique or novel; it must simply be capable of distinguishing the applicant’s goods.
Context Matters: The Court emphasized that distinctiveness must be assessed in relation to the specific goods. While “OFFER” is a common word, it is arbitrary when used for alcoholic beverages and not inherently promotional in this context.
Precedents Ignored: The Registrar overlooked relevant case law and examples of similar marks that had been registered in the past.
The Judgment
The Delhi High Court quashed the Registrar’s order, directing a fresh consideration of ADS Spirits Pvt. Ltd.’s application. The Court instructed the Registrar to:
Re-examine the application using the correct legal test of distinctiveness under Section 9(1)(a).
Consider all submissions, documents, and case law provided by the applicant.
Provide a reasoned and speaking order after granting the applicant an opportunity to be heard.
The decision must be made within four months from the date of the judgment.
Implications of the Ruling
This judgment reinforces the importance of reasoned decision-making by quasi-judicial authorities and clarifies the legal standards for assessing trademark distinctiveness. It also highlights that even common English words can serve as trademarks if they are arbitrary in relation to the goods or services in question.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 08.09.2026
CESTAT Chennai on Refund of Excess Export Duty and Limitation under Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
The Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) Chennai recently delivered a significant judgment in the case of JSW Steel Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Customs, addressing the complex issue of export duty refunds and the application of statutory time limits. This article provides a detailed analysis of the case, its background, legal arguments, and the Tribunal’s final decision, offering valuable insights for exporters and legal professionals alike.
Case Background
JSW Steel Ltd. exported “Non Alloy Steel Slabs Export Prime Steel” under four shipping bills in June and July 2008. At the time, export duty was levied at 15% ad valorem, as per Notification No.66/2008-Cus. The company paid export duty based on the Free on Board (FOB) value declared in the shipping bills.
However, a subsequent CBEC Circular (No.18/2008-Cus dated 10.11.2008) clarified that until 31.12.2008, the FOB price should be treated as the cum-duty price for export duty computation. This clarification revealed that JSW Steel had overpaid export duty. Consequently, JSW filed a refund claim for Rs.1,61,96,066/- on 30.01.2009.
Chronology of Legal Proceedings
Initial Rejection: The refund claim was initially rejected as time-barred under Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962.
First Appeal: The Commissioner (Appeals) allowed JSW’s appeal, holding that Section 27’s time limit did not apply.
Tribunal Remand: On Revenue’s appeal, the Tribunal remanded the case for reconsideration of facts and the applicability of Section 27.
Refund Sanctioned: The original authority, after reassessment, sanctioned the refund, recognizing the excess payment and the applicability of the CBEC Circular.
Revenue’s Appeal: The Commissioner (Appeals) again held the refund claim as time-barred, prompting JSW to appeal to CESTAT Chennai.
Key Legal Issues
1. Limitation Period for Refund Claims
JSW’s Argument: The limitation period should run from the date of reassessment (21.09.2015), not the original payment date, as the excess payment was only recognized after the CBEC Circular and subsequent reassessment.
Revenue’s Argument: The relevant date is the original payment date, making the refund claim time-barred under Section 27.
2. Nature of the Excess Payment
JSW contended that the excess amount was not “duty” as defined under the Act, since it was collected without authority of law, and thus not subject to Section 27’s limitation.
3. Interest on Refund
JSW also sought interest on the refunded amount, arguing that the delay was due to departmental actions.
Tribunal’s Analysis and Findings
A. Applicability of Section 27 Limitation
The Tribunal held that the cause of action for refund arose only upon reassessment on 21.09.2015, when the excess payment was officially recognized.
The refund application, though filed earlier, was linked to the reassessment, and thus not time-barred.
The Tribunal rejected arguments to bypass Section 27 using the Limitation Act or Article 265 of the Constitution, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India.
B. Assessment and Reassessment
The Tribunal clarified that the Note dated 21.09.2015 constituted a valid reassessment under Section 2(2) of the Customs Act.
Only the excess amount, not reflected in the original assessment, was subject to refund upon reassessment.
C. Interest on Refund
Interest under Section 27A is payable from three months after the date of reassessment (21.09.2015), not from the original refund application date.
This aligns with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. v. Union of India.
Final Order and Implications
The Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the Commissioner (Appeals) and restored the original order sanctioning the refund of Rs.1,61,96,066/- to JSW Steel Ltd.
Interest is to be paid from 22.12.2015 (three months after reassessment) until the date of actual refund.
The decision reinforces the principle that refund claims linked to reassessment are not time-barred from the original payment date, providing clarity for exporters facing similar issues.
Conclusion
The CESTAT Chennai’s decision in the JSW Steel Ltd. case sets an important precedent for the treatment of export duty refunds, particularly regarding the limitation period and the recognition of reassessment as the trigger for refund claims. Exporters and legal practitioners should carefully consider this ruling when dealing with similar disputes, ensuring that refund applications are aligned with the latest assessments and departmental clarifications.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
