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Tag: #Classification

  • CESTAT Allahabad: Customs Cannot Bypass Mandatory Valuation Rules Through Importer’s Consent Letter

    CESTAT Allahabad: Customs Cannot Bypass Mandatory Valuation Rules Through Importer’s Consent Letter

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 27.10.2026

    CESTAT Allahabad: Customs Cannot Bypass Mandatory Valuation Rules Through Importer’s Consent Letter

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    The CESTAT Allahabad held that an importer’s written acceptance of an enhanced customs value does not remove its statutory right to challenge that reassessment, particularly where Customs has not properly disclosed the grounds and evidence for rejecting the declared transaction value.

    Case at a glance

    In Final Order Nos. 70472-70474/2026, decided on 16 October 2026, the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), Allahabad, allowed three connected appeals filed by Artex Overseas Pvt. Ltd. and Artex Textile Pvt. Ltd. against the Principal Commissioner of Customs, ICD Dadri.

    The dispute concerned imports of polyester knitted fabric from China. Customs had enhanced the declared unit values of the consignments based on alleged contemporaneous import data. The Commissioner (Appeals) rejected the importers’ challenges primarily because they had signed written letters accepting the enhanced values at the time of clearance.

    CESTAT set aside those appellate orders and granted consequential relief in accordance with law.

    Background: declared values were substantially enhanced

    The importers had declared negotiated invoice values for polyester knitted fabric. Customs enhanced those values as follows:

    • Artex Overseas Pvt. Ltd.: declared value of USD 1.00 per kg enhanced to USD 1.77 per kg for three Bills of Entry dated 20 and 24 May 2019.
    • Artex Textile Pvt. Ltd.: declared value of USD 1.05 per kg enhanced to USD 1.85 per kg for Bills of Entry dated 31 March 2020 and 7 April 2020.

    The goods were found to conform to the declarations on examination. However, Customs raised concerns after comparing the consignments with contemporaneous import data and sought more detailed information on the fabric, including composition and dimensions.

    The department then treated the declared values as liable for rejection under Rule 12 of the Customs Valuation Rules, 2007, and reassessed the goods at higher values.

    Importers’ case: acceptance was compelled and lacked legal foundation

    Artex Overseas and Artex Textile argued that they had correctly self-assessed duty on the basis of their invoices and negotiated purchase prices. They maintained that the department did not issue out-of-charge orders and did not act on their requests for provisional assessment.

    According to the importers, they paid duty at the enhanced values under protest to prevent clearance delays and were effectively compelled to issue letters of consent. They repeatedly sought speaking orders explaining the reassessment, but none were issued.

    Their principal legal arguments were:

    • A written acceptance of enhancement does not bar an importer from filing an appeal.
    • Customs must follow Section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962 and the valuation process prescribed by the Customs Valuation Rules, 2007.
    • Rule 12 requires the proper officer to form a reasonable doubt about the truth or accuracy of the declared value and, when required, communicate the grounds in writing.
    • A generic reference to contemporaneous import data is insufficient; Customs must provide material showing genuine comparability, including relevant factors such as quantity, quality, GSM, commercial level and timing of the transaction.
    • Mere reliance on NIDB or external import data cannot, without independent and cogent supporting evidence, justify rejection of the declared transaction value.

    Department’s position: written consent eliminated the need for a speaking order

    The department relied on the importers’ acceptance letters. It argued that the letters recorded that the importers had been informed of the grounds for rejecting their declared values, had seen data relating to similar or identical imports, and had agreed to the enhanced values without seeking a show-cause notice or speaking order.

    On that basis, the department contended that Section 17(5) of the Customs Act relieved Customs of the obligation to issue a speaking order once reassessment was accepted in writing.

    Tribunal’s findings: waiver is limited to the speaking order, not the right to appeal

    The Tribunal found that the Commissioner (Appeals) had focused too narrowly on the acceptance letters and had not applied the full legal principles governing customs valuation.

    CESTAT relied on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Century Metal Recycling Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, which confirms that Rule 12(2) cannot be bypassed or waived. The proper officer must form a reasoned view that there is doubt about the declared value and communicate the grounds for that doubt to the importer when required.

    The Tribunal also followed the Delhi High Court’s decision in Niraj Silk Mills v. Commissioner of Customs, which clarified that:

    • Written acceptance under Section 17(5) may waive the procedural requirement for a speaking order.
    • It does not waive or extinguish the importer’s statutory right to challenge the reassessment.
    • A reassessment based only on NIDB data is not sustainable unless supported by independent, cogent evidence and a reasoned justification for departing from the declared value.

    The Tribunal noted that the acceptance letters did not themselves disclose the alleged contemporaneous-import details on which Customs relied.

    The revenue authorities had therefore failed to bridge the gap between a standard-form acceptance and the evidentiary basis required to lawfully reject transaction value.

    Decision and practical significance

    CESTAT held that the case was squarely governed by the Delhi High Court’s ruling in Niraj Silk Mills. It therefore set aside all three Orders-in-Appeal and allowed the appeals of Artex Overseas Pvt. Ltd. and Artex Textile Pvt. Ltd., with consequential relief as permitted by law.

    The ruling reinforces an important safeguard in customs valuation: an importer’s consent to clearance at an enhanced value cannot be treated as a blanket surrender of its right to contest an unlawful reassessment. Customs must still demonstrate, through disclosed and relevant material, why the declared transaction value should be rejected and why the substituted value is legally supportable.

    For importers, the decision underscores that consent letters signed to secure release of detained goods do not necessarily end the valuation dispute.

    For Customs authorities, it emphasizes the need for transparent, evidence-based valuation orders rather than reassessments founded solely on generic references to database values or contemporaneous imports.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: CESTAT Allahabad

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Supreme Court: Being a B.Tech Graduate Does Not Entitle an NDPS Accused to Bail

    Supreme Court: Being a B.Tech Graduate Does Not Entitle an NDPS Accused to Bail

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 27.10.2026

    Supreme Court: Being a B.Tech Graduate Does Not Entitle an NDPS Accused to Bail

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    The Supreme Court of India cancelled the bail granted to Prateek Shukla, holding that the Allahabad High Court had not properly applied the stringent bail standards required under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act).

    Background of the case

    The case arose from an investigation by the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) into suspected diversion of acetic anhydride, a controlled substance that can be used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs. In October 2018, the NCB received information that Altruist Chemicals Private Limited had purchased a substantial quantity of acetic anhydride but had not filed the required quarterly returns for two reporting periods.

    During searches connected with the company, the NCB alleged that it recovered 896 grams of acetic anhydride and 1.885 kg of amphetamine from the company’s registered premises. Investigators also found documents relating to Griffin International, of which Prateek Shukla and Afghan national Bismillah Khan Ahmadzai were stated to be directors.

    The investigation subsequently extended to a godown in Karheda village, Ghaziabad, where the NCB alleged that it recovered 9,650 kg of acetic anhydride along with empty drums. A search of Shukla’s residence allegedly yielded company stamps, banking documents, business papers and other material said to connect multiple entities and co-accused persons.

    Allegations and prosecution case

    The NCB’s complaint alleged that the accused were part of an international drug syndicate involved in the diversion, storage, sale, purchase and export of the controlled substance. Shukla was arrested on 22 October 2018 and was charged under Sections 8, 9A, 25A, 23 and 29 of the NDPS Act.

    The prosecution argued that the material recovered during the investigation established a prima facie connection between Shukla and the alleged conspiracy. It also contended that, given the gravity of NDPS offences, the High Court had granted bail without adequate reasons or proper consideration of the statutory restrictions in Section 37 of the NDPS Act.

    Defence raised by the respondent

    Shukla maintained that he had resigned as a director of Altruist Chemicals on 4 May 2018, after joining the company earlier that year. He argued that the relevant purchases and deliveries of acetic anhydride took place after his resignation and that he had informed the NCB of his departure from the company on 22 May 2018.

    He further contended that he could not be held responsible for the company’s later failure to submit quarterly returns. The High Court accepted his bail plea, observing prima facie that he may not be guilty, while also referring to his clean background and educational qualification.

    Why the Supreme Court intervened

    The Supreme Court found that the High Court’s reasoning did not demonstrate judicial consideration of the seriousness of the allegations or the legal test governing bail under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It emphasized that merely noting the parties’ submissions is not enough; a bail order must show a reasoned application of the statutory standards.

    The Court specifically criticized the High Court’s reliance on Shukla being educated and holding a Bachelor of Technology degree as a reason to conclude that he was unlikely to commit an offence in the future. It held that this was an extraneous consideration in an NDPS bail decision.

    The Supreme Court also noted that the prosecution’s materials showed Shukla as a director of Altruist Chemicals, while his own bail application referred to transferring 99% of his shareholding to Bismillah Khan Ahmadzai. The Court observed that the respondent’s materials appeared to suppress more than they disclosed, though it did not decide the criminal charges at this stage.

    Supreme Court’s decision

    Allowing the Union of India’s appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the Allahabad High Court’s order dated 7 May 2019. Shukla’s bail was cancelled, and he was directed to surrender immediately.

    Legal significance

    The ruling underscores that bail in serious NDPS cases cannot rest on general observations about an accused person’s education, background or future conduct. Courts must apply the specific statutory safeguards under Section 37 and give reasons that engage with the allegations, the evidence and the gravity of the offence.

    The decision reinforces the Supreme Court’s expectation that bail orders in narcotics cases reflect a careful and legally grounded assessment rather than a cursory evaluation.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Supreme Court

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Supreme Court: Narcotics Need Not Be Recovered from Accused’s Body to Establish Conscious Possession

    Supreme Court: Narcotics Need Not Be Recovered from Accused’s Body to Establish Conscious Possession

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 26.10.2026

    Supreme Court: Narcotics Need Not Be Recovered from Accused’s Body to Establish Conscious Possession

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    The Supreme Court of India upheld Jeet Ram’s conviction for possessing 13 kg of charas under the NDPS Act, while reducing his sentence from 15 years’ rigorous imprisonment to 10 years because of the case’s age and his advanced age.

    Background of the case

    The case arose from an operation by officers of the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB), Chandigarh, on 18 June 2001 near the Nangala Devi Temple in Himachal Pradesh. According to the prosecution, NCB officers stopped at a roadside dhaba while travelling from Shimla to Theog. They said they detected the smell of charas and questioned Jeet Ram, who was present at the establishment.

    The officers alleged that Jeet Ram became nervous and attempted to flee. A gunny bag found beneath the dhaba counter was searched, and it was found to contain 13 kg of charas. The contraband was divided into two parcels of 6.5 kg each, with samples drawn, sealed and sent for chemical analysis. The chemical analyst confirmed that the samples were charas.

    Jeet Ram was prosecuted under Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.

    Trial court acquittal and High Court reversal

    The Sessions Court in Shimla acquitted Jeet Ram in 2003. It identified several weaknesses in the prosecution’s case, including:

    • the absence of independent witnesses;
    • doubts over whether the charas was recovered from Jeet Ram’s dhaba or from his conscious possession;
    • alleged non-compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act;
    • concerns about the handling of seals and possible tampering of samples; and
    • the perceived improbability of leaving a large quantity of charas in an accessible gunny bag.

    The NCB appealed. The Himachal Pradesh High Court reappraised the evidence, overturned the acquittal and convicted Jeet Ram. It imposed 15 years’ rigorous imprisonment, a fine of Rs. 2,00,000, and one additional year of imprisonment in default of payment.

    Supreme Court’s findings

    The Supreme Court held that the High Court was entitled to review the evidence and reverse the acquittal because the trial court’s conclusions were contrary to the record. It reiterated that an appellate court has broad authority to review, reappreciate and reconsider evidence in an appeal against acquittal.

    However, the Court also restated an important safeguard: when two reasonable conclusions are genuinely possible on the evidence, an appellate court should ordinarily not disturb an acquittal. In this case, it found that the trial court’s view was not a reasonably possible one on the evidence presented.

    Why the Court accepted the prosecution case

    Section 50 did not apply to the bag search. The Court held that Section 50 safeguards apply to a personal search, not to the search of a bag or other object. Therefore, the trial court was wrong to treat the alleged non-compliance with Section 50 as a reason for acquittal.

    No adverse inference from lack of independent witnesses. The recovery allegedly occurred around 10:30 p.m. at a dhaba away from the village. The persons present were either linked to Jeet Ram or employed at the dhaba. The Court held that the lack of an independent witness, by itself, did not undermine credible official testimony.

    Conscious possession was established. Jeet Ram was present at the counter, where the gunny bag was found. The dhaba stood on land owned by his wife, and there was evidence that he described himself as its owner. The Court concluded that he had physical control over the contraband and knowledge of its presence and character.

    Tampering concerns were unsupported. A Judicial Magistrate had signed the samples and bulk parcels on 19 June 2001. The Court also noted that no suggestion of tampering had been put to the relevant NCB witnesses during the proceedings.

    The statutory presumption applied. The Court stated that, once possession was established and Jeet Ram did not adequately explain it, the presumption under Section 54 of the NDPS Act operated against him. It also noted that his version in his Section 313 CrPC statement was not supported by the witnesses he referred to or by defence evidence.

    Sentence reduced from 15 to 10 years

    Although the conviction was maintained, the Court found the original sentence excessive in the particular circumstances. The incident was nearly two decades old by the time of judgment, and Jeet Ram was about 65 years old. He had also claimed to be a priest at the nearby temple.

    The Court therefore reduced the custodial sentence to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment. The fine of Rs. 2,00,000 was retained.

    Legal significance

    The ruling reinforces two significant principles in criminal appeals and NDPS prosecutions:

    1. Appellate courts may reverse an acquittal after a full review of the evidence when the trial court’s findings are unsupported or unreasonable. But they should not interfere merely because a second reasonable view is available.
    2. Conscious possession may be inferred from the facts and surrounding circumstances, including control over the premises and proximity to the contraband. A search of a bag is not treated as a personal search requiring Section 50 compliance.

    The judgment ultimately confirms that procedural concerns must be assessed against the complete evidentiary record, while sentencing may still be tailored to the individual circumstances of the accused.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Supreme Court

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • CESTAT Kolkata: Foreign Origin and Smuggled Character Are Two Distinct Questions Under Customs Law

    CESTAT Kolkata: Foreign Origin and Smuggled Character Are Two Distinct Questions Under Customs Law

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 26.10.2026

    CESTAT Kolkata: Foreign Origin and Smuggled Character Are Two Distinct Questions Under Customs Law

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    The Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), Kolkata has allowed nine connected appeals concerning the seizure of 39.156 metric tonnes of betel nuts, ruling that Customs did not establish that the goods were of foreign origin or had been smuggled into India.

    In Final Order Nos. 76499-76507/2026, pronounced on 15 October 2026, the Tribunal set aside the confiscation order and all related penalties. The decision underscores an important principle in customs law: for non-notified goods such as betel nuts, the burden remains on the Revenue to prove smuggling with reliable evidence rather than assumptions, inconclusive reports, or uncorroborated statements.

    Background: Two Trucks Intercepted Near Siliguri

    The case arose from a Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) operation on 3 March 2019. Acting on intelligence that allegedly smuggled betel nuts from Myanmar were being transported through the Siliguri area, officers intercepted two trucks at Goaltuli More on the Fulbari-Ghoshpukur Bypass Road in Darjeeling district, West Bengal.

    The trucks, bearing registration numbers AP-27TX-6129 and WB-65C-5608, were carrying betel nuts stated to have been loaded at Vairengte, Mizoram, for delivery to consignees in Hooghly and Nabadwip, West Bengal. The drivers produced transport documents, tax invoices, consignment notes and e-way bills. One consignment was documented as supplied by M/s A.D. Store to M/s Papai Traders, while the other was documented as supplied by M/s Zotei Enterprise to Shri Narayan Karmakar.

    Following a search at the DRI office in Siliguri, officers found:

    • 209 bags weighing 16.302 MT in truck AP-27TX-6129;
    • 293 bags weighing 22.854 MT in truck WB-65C-5608; and
    • A combined quantity of 39.156 MT, valued by Customs at Rs. 1,07,67,900.

    Customs seized the goods, the two carrier vehicles, related documents and two mobile phones. The department alleged that the betel nuts had been smuggled from Myanmar through the Indo-Myanmar border and were therefore liable to confiscation under Sections 111(b) and 111(d) of the Customs Act, 1962.

    Customs Case and Earlier Orders

    The Revenue relied mainly on statements recorded from the truck drivers and helpers, investigation into the consignors and consignees, call-detail records, and a report from the Arecanut Research and Development Foundation (ARDF), Mangalore.

    The ARDF report stated that the samples β€œseems to be of North-East including Myanmar region.” It also noted mould infestation and non-compliance with BIS standards. Customs treated this report, along with the statements and surrounding circumstances, as support for the allegation that the consignments were of Myanmar origin and had entered India illegally.

    On 28 August 2020, the adjudicating authority ordered absolute confiscation of the betel nuts and imposed penalties on the persons connected with the consignments. The Commissioner of Customs (Appeals) upheld that order on 23 February 2022.

    The affected parties, including Debasish Saha of M/s Papai Traders, Dipak Saha, Narayan Karmakar, Sujit Mitra, Md. Shamim Uddin, Zoramthari, Nilkamal Saha, Anjan Kumar Paul and Lalenkawli, then appealed to CESTAT.

    Tribunal’s Findings: Evidence Did Not Prove Smuggling

    The Tribunal found that the department’s evidence was insufficient to establish either foreign origin or illegal importation.

    1. The ARDF opinion was not conclusive

    CESTAT noted that the ARDF report did not say the goods were of Myanmar origin. Its wordingβ€”that the samples β€œseems to be of North-East including Myanmar region”—was held to be inconclusive. A reference to a broad region that includes Myanmar could not, by itself, prove that the goods originated in Myanmar.

    The Tribunal also relied on judicial precedents that question the evidentiary value of such reports where there is no recognised scientific or objective test capable of determining the territorial origin of betel nuts.

    2. Betel nuts are non-notified goods

    A central point in the ruling was that betel nuts are not notified under Section 123 of the Customs Act. As a result, the statutory burden does not shift to the person from whom the goods are seized. Instead, Customs must prove that the goods are smuggled.

    The Tribunal held that the Revenue could not meet this burden merely by relying on suspicion, a tentative expert opinion, or statements. Even if goods were assumed to be of foreign origin, that alone would not establish illegal importation; positive evidence of smuggling was still required.

    3. The seizure location and accompanying documents mattered

    The goods were intercepted in West Bengal, not at the Indo-Myanmar border. The trucks also carried invoices and other commercial transport documents identifying Mizoram-based suppliers and West Bengal consignees.

    The Tribunal held that these facts did not permit an automatic inference that the goods had crossed the border illegally. The documentary trail could not be displaced without cogent contrary evidence.

    4. Precedents required proof, not presumption

    The order relied on the Calcutta High Court’s ruling in Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise and Service Tax, Siliguri v. Subodh Das, which was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court. That line of authority establishes that, for non-notified betel nuts, Customs must discharge the burden of proving foreign origin and smuggled character.

    The Tribunal also referred to Maqsood Alam v. Commissioner of Customs, Lucknow and Maa Kamakhya Trader v. Commissioner of Customs (Preventive). These decisions emphasise that visual assessments, inconclusive opinions and strong suspicion cannot replace objective evidence of smuggling.

    Outcome: Confiscation and Penalties Quashed

    CESTAT concluded that the Revenue had failed to prove that the seized betel nuts were smuggled goods. It therefore set aside the confiscation of the 39.156 MT consignment and held that no penalties could be imposed on the appellants.

    The Tribunal allowed all connected appeals and overturned the Order-in-Appeal dated 23 February 2022.

    Key Legal Significance

    This ruling reinforces that customs enforcement actions involving non-notified goods must rest on clear, affirmative and legally reliable evidence. In particular:

    • A tentative report suggesting a possible regional origin is not proof of foreign origin.
    • Foreign origin, even if established, does not automatically prove that goods were illegally imported.
    • For non-notified goods, Customs bears the burden of proving smuggling.
    • Confiscation and penalties cannot be sustained on presumptions, suspicion or inadequately supported statements.

    The decision provides a significant restatement of evidentiary standards in betel-nut smuggling cases, particularly where seizures occur away from an international border and goods are accompanied by commercial documentation.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: CESTAT Kolkata

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Bombay HC: Trademark Registration Does Not Automatically Protect a Pharma Company from Infringement Proceedings

    Bombay HC: Trademark Registration Does Not Automatically Protect a Pharma Company from Infringement Proceedings

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 26.10.2026

    Bombay HC: Trademark Registration Does Not Automatically Protect a Pharma Company from Infringement Proceedings

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    The Bombay High Court granted Franco Indian Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. an interim injunction restraining Corona Remedies Pvt. Ltd. from using the mark STIMULET for pharmaceutical products, finding it deceptively similar to Franco Indian’s long-standing STIMULIV mark.

    The dispute at a glance

    The case concerned two pharmaceutical companies and competing marks:

    • Franco Indian Pharmaceuticals: owner of STIMULIV, an Ayurvedic liver-related preparation sold as syrup and tablets.
    • Corona Remedies: user of STIMULET, an allopathic product used in treatments relating to breast cancer disorders and infertility.

    Although the medicines served different therapeutic purposes, the Court held that the similarity of the names created an unacceptable risk in the pharmaceutical context.

    Why the Court found the marks similar

    The Court treated similarity as the threshold issue. Visually, the two marks share the same dominant portion, β€œSTIMUL,” and differ only in their last two letters: β€œIV” versus β€œET.” The Court concluded that this was not enough to create a reliable phonetic distinction, particularly in India, where English pronunciation may vary widely.

    The Court also rejected the argument that the products’ distinct uses eliminated the risk of confusion. Instead, it emphasized that even slight confusion should be avoided when medicines are involved, especially where one product concerns sensitive treatments such as cancer and infertility.

    Franco Indian’s stronger prior rights

    Franco Indian adopted STIMULIV on 28 June 1974 and obtained registration in 1976 for pharmaceutical preparations related to liver and allied disorders. Its mark was registered in Part A of the old trade mark register, which required distinctiveness.

    The Court found prima facie evidence of sustained and substantial use:

    • Invoices and documentation traced use of STIMULIV back decades.
    • STIMULIV sales reached Rs. 1,311.70 lakhs in 2019–20.
    • Franco Indian’s sales had continued without interruption and showed growth over time.

    By contrast, Corona Remedies claimed adoption of STIMULET in 2010. Its own records showed a multi-year gap in use after 2011–12, before sales resumed. The Court noted that Corona’s 2019–20 sales of approximately Rs. 346.51 lakhs were materially lower than Franco Indian’s sales.

    This evidence supported Franco Indian’s claim to stronger goodwill, reputation, and common-law rights as the prior and continuous user.

    Registration did not end the dispute

    Corona Remedies argued that, because both marks were registered, Franco Indian could not pursue an infringement action. The Court rejected that position.

    It held that a defendant’s registration does not bar an infringement suit. In a conflict between registered proprietors of similar marks, the Court may assess which party has better rights under common law, including priority, continuity of use, sales, and goodwill.

    On those factors, the Court found that Franco Indian’s position was substantially stronger: it had earlier registration, earlier use by decades, continuous sales, and a stronger commercial presence.

    A key inconsistency in Corona Remedies’ defence

    Corona Remedies contended that β€œSTIMUL” or similar expressions were common to the trade. But it had also sought registration for STIMULET and asserted that its own mark was distinctive and capable of identifying its goods.

    The Court found this position difficult to sustain. A party claiming distinctiveness for its own STIMULET mark could not persuasively deny the distinctiveness of the earlier STIMULIV mark on the basis that the shared element was generic or widely used.

    The Court’s order

    The Court made Franco Indian’s interim application absolute and restrained Corona Remedies from using STIMULET in relation to pharmaceutical products. It also dismissed Corona Remedies’ application seeking rejection of Franco Indian’s plaint, finding no fraud, suppression, or material concealment.

    No order as to costs was made.

    What this decision means

    The ruling reinforces the heightened caution applied to pharmaceutical trade marks. Differences in medical use, patient category, or prescription status may not defeat an injunction where the names are visually and phonetically close. In such disputes, priority of use, continuity, sales evidence, and goodwill can outweigh a later user’s registration of a similar mark.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Bombay High Court

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Bombay HC: Section 27A NDPS Cannot Be Invoked Merely for Paying for Drugs Intended for Personal Consumption

    Bombay HC: Section 27A NDPS Cannot Be Invoked Merely for Paying for Drugs Intended for Personal Consumption

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 24.10.2026

    Bombay HC: Section 27A NDPS Cannot Be Invoked Merely for Paying for Drugs Intended for Personal Consumption

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    The Bombay High Court granted bail to actor Rhea Chakraborty on 7 October 2020, holding that the material then available did not show her involvement in commercial-quantity drug offences or in financing illicit drug trafficking under Section 27A of the NDPS Act.

    Background of the case

    Rhea Chakraborty was arrested by the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) on 8 September 2020 in connection with Crime No. 16/2020. The case arose from an NCB investigation into an alleged drug-supply network. The agency alleged that Chakraborty had helped procure drugs for Sushant Singh Rajput, managed or contributed to payments, and was connected to deliveries involving his associates and her brother, Showik Chakraborty.

    The NCB relied on statements of co-accused persons, alleged WhatsApp communications, and claimed financial transactions. It argued that Chakraborty had facilitated drug deliveries and payments and was therefore liable for offences including financing illicit traffic and harbouring offenders under Section 27A of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.

    Chakraborty denied that Section 27A applied. Her defence emphasized that no contraband was recovered from her or from Rajput’s residence, that the allegations concerned procurement for alleged personal consumption, and that she had no connection with the commercial quantity of LSD recovered from another accused, Anuj Keshwani.

    NCB investigation was separate from the death investigation

    One preliminary issue was whether the NCB had authority to investigate because the Supreme Court had directed the CBI to investigate the death of Sushant Singh Rajput and related circumstances.

    The High Court rejected the challenge to the NCB’s jurisdiction. It found that the NCB inquiry began independently after information led to the arrest of Abbas Lakhani and later expanded through disclosures and recoveries involving multiple alleged drug suppliers. The court held that the drug-trafficking investigation was distinct from the inquiry into Rajput’s death, even though allegations regarding Rajput’s alleged drug use emerged during the investigation.

    All NDPS offences are non-bailable, court says

    The judgment examined whether offences involving small quantities under the NDPS Act could be treated as bailable under the Criminal Procedure Code.

    The court concluded that all offences under the NDPS Act are non-bailable. It relied on the Supreme Court’s interpretation in State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh, which described Section 37 as making all NDPS offences cognizable and non-bailable. The court distinguished between two issues:

    • Whether an offence is bailable: The court held that NDPS offences are non-bailable.
    • Whether Section 37’s stricter bail conditions apply: Those special restrictions apply to offences under Sections 19, 24 and 27A, and to offences involving commercial quantities.

    This distinction was important because a non-bailable offence does not automatically trigger the stringent β€œtwin conditions” of Section 37.

    What the court said about financing and harbouring

    The High Court’s central legal finding concerned Section 27A, which punishes financing illicit traffic and harbouring persons engaged in it.

    The court held that β€œfinancing” means more than paying money for a particular drug purchase. In its interpretation, financing requires providing funds or financial support that makes an illicit drug trade or business operational or sustains it. Treating every payment connected with a drug transaction as financing would erase the NDPS Act’s separate punishment framework based on quantity.

    Similarly, the court found that β€œharbouring” requires more than allowing a person to reside somewhere or providing ordinary support. It involves sheltering or concealing a person engaged in the prohibited activity, with the necessary mental element and in a manner connected to avoiding apprehension.

    Applying these principles, the court held that allegations that Chakraborty spent money to procure drugs for Rajput’s alleged consumption did not, by themselves, amount to financing illicit traffic. It also found no basis to say that she harboured him: he lived in his own house, no criminal case was pending against him at the relevant time, and there was no indication that he was being concealed from law enforcement.

    Why bail was granted

    The court noted that no contraband was recovered from Chakraborty or from Rajput’s residence. It also found that the investigation had not produced material showing that her alleged conduct involved a commercial quantity of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances.

    The court further observed that:

    • Chakraborty had no criminal antecedents.
    • The available allegations did not show that she was part of a chain of drug dealers.
    • There was no allegation that she forwarded drugs to others for monetary or other gain.
    • The NCB did not seek her custodial interrogation at her first remand, which the court treated as relevant to whether continued custody was necessary.
    • The concern that she would alert others or cause destruction of evidence had no identified factual basis.

    The court also rejected the argument that a celebrity or public figure should face a harsher approach to bail. It stated that everyone is equal before the law and that neither special privilege nor special liability should follow from a person’s status.

    Bail conditions

    The court directed Chakraborty’s release on a personal-recognizance bond of Rs. 1 lakh with one or two sureties of the same amount. It imposed several conditions, including:

    • depositing her passport with the investigating agency;
    • not leaving India without prior permission from the NDPS Special Court;
    • informing the investigating officer in advance before travelling outside Greater Mumbai;
    • reporting monthly to the investigating agency for six months;
    • attending court proceedings unless prevented by reasonable cause; and
    • not tampering with evidence or the investigation.

    She was initially allowed to furnish cash bail of Rs. 1 lakh for one month while arranging sureties. The court also required her to report to the nearest police station for ten days after release.

    Significance of the ruling

    The ruling is significant for its detailed interpretation of Section 27A of the NDPS Act. It draws a clear legal boundary between an allegation of paying for or arranging drugs for consumption and the far more serious accusation of financing an illicit drug-trafficking operation. The decision also reinforces that Section 37’s strict bail restrictions apply independently to Section 27A and commercial-quantity offences.

    However, the prosecution must first show material capable of connecting the accused to those specific offences. In Chakraborty’s case, the High Court found that threshold was not met at the bail stage, while making clear that its observations were confined to deciding bail rather than determining guilt at trial.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Bombay High Court

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  • Calcutta HC: Patent Applications Cannot Be Rejected on Public Health Grounds Without Scientific Evidence

    Calcutta HC: Patent Applications Cannot Be Rejected on Public Health Grounds Without Scientific Evidence

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 24.10.2026

    Calcutta HC: Patent Applications Cannot Be Rejected on Public Health Grounds Without Scientific Evidence

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    The Calcutta High Court has set aside the Patent Controller’s rejection of ITC Limited’s application for a β€œHeater Assembly to Generate Aerosol,” holding that the decision under Section 3(b) of the Patents Act lacked adequate reasons, misconstrued the invention, and breached principles of natural justice.

    Background of the dispute

    ITC’s patent application concerns a heater assembly designed for handheld aerosol-generating devices. Its stated technical purpose is to provide uniform heat distribution across an aerosol-forming substrate. The substrate may be solid or liquid and may, but need not, contain tobacco compounds.

    On 21 August 2024, the Controller of Patents rejected the application under Section 3(b) of the Patents Act, 1970. That provision excludes inventions whose primary or intended use, or commercial exploitation, would be contrary to public order or morality or seriously prejudice human, animal or plant life, health, or the environment.

    The Controller treated the invention as one exclusively connected with tobacco-containing substrates and concluded that it was harmful to human life and health. ITC appealed this decision before the Intellectual Property Rights Division of the Calcutta High Court.

    What the High Court decided

    In its judgment dated 20 May 2025, Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur set aside the rejection order and remanded the application to the Controller for a fresh decision. The Controller must reconsider the matter in accordance with law, after giving the parties a hearing, within three months of communication of the Court’s order.

    The Court did not grant the patent or decide the application’s merits. Instead, it found that the earlier decision-making process and reasoning were legally deficient.

    Key findings

    1. Section 3(b) requires an assessment of the invention’s actual primary or intended use

    The Court emphasized that Section 3(b) focuses on the primary or intended use or commercial exploitation of the specific invention. The inquiry cannot rest on an assumption that every possible use of a product associated with tobacco necessarily makes the invention unpatentable.

    The heater assembly was not limited to tobacco substrates. By treating the invention as necessarily and exclusively tobacco-based, the Controller fundamentally misunderstood its scope.

    2. A patent does not give permission to commercialize an invention

    A central point in the ruling is the distinction between a patent right and regulatory permission. A patent is an exclusionary or negative right: it enables the patentee to prevent others from making, using, selling, or exploiting the claimed invention without consent. It does not itself authorize the patent holder to manufacture, sell, market, or use the invention.

    The Court held that the Controller’s reasoning wrongly assumed that granting a patent would automatically permit commercialization of the product. Whether a product may lawfully be made, marketed, or sold is governed by other applicable laws and regulations, not by the patent grant alone.

    3. Health and morality objections need cogent reasoning and evidence

    The Court found that the conclusion that the invention caused serious prejudice to human life and health was unsupported by reasons or justification. Tobacco-related products are not, by themselves, categorically unpatentable in India.

    A refusal under Section 3(b) must show a clear connection between the invention’s actual intended use and the alleged harm, supported by cogent reasoning. The Court rejected a subjective or preconceived view that all tobacco-related products necessarily fall within the statutory exclusion, particularly where there is no independent scientific or technical evidence supporting the conclusion.

    4. β€œPublic order” and β€œmorality” cannot be applied as vague objections

    The Court held that the Controller’s finding that the invention was contrary to public order and morality was cryptic and unreasoned. It noted that Section 3(b) should not become a vehicle for refusing patents based solely on broad, subjective concerns about morality, public order, or health.

    In interpreting the provision, the Court referred to international patent-law concepts, including the notion of ordre public in TRIPS and the European Patent Convention. These materials indicate that the exclusion is directed at inventions likely to induce riot, public disorder, criminal conduct, or generally offensive behaviour, rather than at every invention that may raise a policy concern.

    5. New materials could not be relied on without giving ITC an opportunity to respond

    The Controller relied on three additional documents in the rejection order even though those documents had not been disclosed in the First Examination Report or hearing notices. ITC was therefore denied the opportunity to address them.

    The Court treated this as a serious procedural defect and a violation of natural justice. A patent applicant must have a fair opportunity to respond to material relied upon in a decision against it.

    6. The e-cigarette prohibition law did not justify the rejection order

    During the appeal, the Controller relied on the Prohibition of Electronic Cigarettes Act, 2019. However, the Court noted that this ground was not part of the original rejection order or the pleadings.

    The Court further observed that the 2019 legislation regulates activities such as production, manufacture, import, export, sale, distribution, storage, and advertising. It does not itself determine whether a patent should be granted. The Controller could not defend the rejection by adding new grounds after issuing the decision.

    7. Constitutional and public-health provisions were improperly invoked

    The Controller had relied on Article 47 of the Constitution, which directs the State to improve public health. The Court held that this reliance was misplaced in deciding patentability under Section 3(b). It also found that Section 83(e) of the Patents Act had been incorrectly applied on the assumption that a patent grant necessarily results in commercialization and public-health consequences.

    Why the ruling matters

    The decision reinforces several important limits on patent examination in India:

    • Patentability must be assessed on the claimed invention, not on assumptions about a particular product category.
    • Section 3(b) demands evidence-based and reasoned analysis, especially where an objection concerns health, public order, or morality.
    • A patent is not a regulatory licence. Granting a patent does not authorize commercial activity prohibited or regulated under other laws.
    • Procedural fairness is essential. Applicants must be informed of and allowed to answer the material used against their applications.
    • Post-hoc reasons cannot repair an invalid order. The Controller’s decision must stand or fall on the reasons contained in the order itself.

    Outcome

    The High Court set aside the Controller’s rejection of ITC’s patent application and returned the matter for fresh consideration. All substantive questions remain open, meaning the Controller must now reassess the application independently, give the parties a proper hearing, and issue a reasoned decision based on the law and the record.

    The ruling clarifies that Section 3(b) is a narrow, evidence-based safeguard against genuinely harmful or morally impermissible inventions, not a blanket basis for rejecting inventions merely because they may be associated with tobacco or aerosol-generating products.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Calcutta High Court

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  • Delhi High Court Refuses to Condone Customs Department’s Delay

    Delhi High Court Refuses to Condone Customs Department’s Delay

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 24.10.2026

    Delhi High Court Refuses to Condone Customs Department’s Delay

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    The Delhi High Court has dismissed the Customs Department’s appeal against Spectro Lab Equipments Pvt. Ltd. after finding that its 154-day delay was supported by no reasonable, specific, or substantiated explanation.

    The ruling, delivered on 15 October 2026 in Commissioner of Customs Air Cargo Complex (Import) v. Spectro Lab Equipments Pvt. Ltd., reinforces a settled principle: government departments are subject to limitation laws just like any other litigant. Internal file movement, procedural delay, or an unsupported allegation that prior counsel failed to act will not automatically establish β€œsufficient cause” for a delayed appeal.

    Background of the dispute

    The Commissioner of Customs, Air Cargo Complex (Import), sought to challenge a Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal order dated 29 January 2025. The appeal was brought under Section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962.

    The Department stated that it received the Tribunal’s order on 13 February 2025 but filed its High Court appeal only on 9 January 2026. Because the filing exceeded the prescribed period, the Department submitted an application seeking condonation of a 154-day delay.

    Its explanation was that the complete case file had been handed to an earlier counsel on 26 June 2025. According to the Department, that counsel neither filed the appeal nor informed it of any issue. The file was then said to have been assigned to present counsel on 16 October 2025, after which additional documents were obtained and the appeal was filed.

    Why the Court rejected the explanation

    The Division Bench of Justice Avneesh Jhingan and Justice Shail Jain found material deficiencies in the Department’s explanation.

    1. More than four months passed before the file was given to counsel

    The Department received the impugned order on 13 February 2025 but claimed to have handed the file to its earlier counsel only on 26 June 2025. The Court noted this substantial initial period of inactivity.

    No detailed explanation was offered for why the Department took over four months to transfer the matter for filing an appeal.

    2. The Department did not show that it followed up with earlier counsel

    After allegedly handing over the file on 26 June 2025, the Department did not plead that it had made any inquiry about the appeal’s status. It also did not state when the file was retrieved from the earlier counsel.

    The Court treated this lack of follow-up as significant. A party seeking condonation must show diligence in protecting its legal rights; it cannot merely assert that a file was given to a lawyer and then remain inactive.

    3. The allegation against earlier counsel was unsupported

    Although the Department blamed its former counsel, it did not disclose that counsel’s details or submit an affidavit from the counsel supporting the account. This was especially relevant because the Department had its own panel of counsel.

    The Court found the allegation vague and unsubstantiated rather than a reliable factual basis for excusing the delay.

    4. The explanation was internally inconsistent

    The pleadings stated that a β€œcomplete” file was supplied to earlier counsel. However, the Department’s counsel also argued that additional documents had to be obtained after the present counsel received the matter, contributing to the filing delay.

    The Court considered these positions contradictory. If the first counsel received a complete file, the later assertion that necessary documentation was still unavailable required a clear explanation. None was provided.

    Government departments cannot claim special treatment under limitation law

    The Court relied on established Supreme Court decisions holding that the law of limitation applies equally to the government.

    In Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd., the Supreme Court held that administrative negligence, routine file movement, and bureaucratic red tape do not constitute sufficient cause unless the department provides a reasonable and acceptable explanation and demonstrates bona fide efforts to act in time.

    The Delhi High Court also referred to State of Bihar v. Deo Kumar Singh, which confirms that delay cannot be condoned merely because of lethargic governmental functioning. It further cited Rajneesh Kumar v. Ved Prakash, where the Supreme Court cautioned that litigants cannot escape responsibility for a prolonged delay simply by shifting all blame to their advocates.

    The Court additionally relied on Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector (LA), emphasizing that a liberal or justice-oriented approach does not remove the threshold requirement of β€œsufficient cause.” Courts cannot mechanically revive stale claims where negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fides is apparent.

    The Court’s decision

    The High Court held that the condonation application was cursory, vague, and lacking in particulars. The period between 26 June 2025 and 15 October 2025 had effectively been left unexplained, apart from the unsupported attempt to blame earlier counsel.

    Finding no reasonable explanation for the 154-day delay, the Court dismissed the application for condonation. As a result, the Customs appeal itself was also disposed of.

    Key legal takeaway

    This decision is a clear reminder that condonation of delay is an exception, not an anticipated benefit for government litigants. A department seeking relief must present a coherent, evidence-based timeline showing prompt action, regular monitoring, and a genuine cause for missing the limitation period. General references to internal processing or counsel-related delay, without supporting facts, will not meet that standard.

    For litigants and public authorities alike, the ruling underscores that vigilance in pursuing appeals is essential: limitation periods are binding, and courts will not overlook unexplained inactivity simply because the appellant is a government department.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Delhi High Court

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Mumbai Customs Finds No BIS Violation in GE Vernova’s Imported Cable Harness following Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha’s Legal Representation

    Mumbai Customs Finds No BIS Violation in GE Vernova’s Imported Cable Harness following Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha’s Legal Representation

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 24.10.2026

    Mumbai Customs Finds No BIS Violation in GE Vernova’s Imported Cable Harness following Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha’s Legal Representation

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha, practising before the Delhi High Court, represented M/s GE Renewable R&D India Private Limited (GE Vernova) through virtual personal hearing proceedings before the Assistant Commissioner of Customs, Jawaharlal Nehru Custom House (JNCH), Nhava Sheva, Mumbai. His detailed legal submissions, supported by technical documentation and a comprehensive legal opinion, contributed to securing a favourable finding on the applicability of mandatory Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) certification to customised electrical cable harness assemblies under the relevant Quality Control Orders (QCOs).

    The matter concerned an imported OEM-specific control cable harness assembly designed for wind turbine applications, raising important questions regarding BIS certification, applicable Indian Standards and Customs Tariff classification.

    BIS Certification and HSN Classification: The Central Legal Issue

    The imported cable harness was initially declared under CTH 85447090, relating to optical-fibre cables. During assessment, the alternative classification under CTH 85444220, concerning insulated electrical conductors fitted with connectors, was examined.

    The principal legal issue was whether a customised, factory-assembled electrical harness automatically attracted mandatory BIS certification requirements applicable to conventional electrical cables.

    Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha emphasised that customs tariff classification and BIS/QCO applicability are independent legal determinations. Classification under a particular HSN code cannot, by itself, establish mandatory BIS certification requirements.

    Relevant BIS Standards and Technical Submissions

    The legal representation examined the scope and applicability of several Indian Standards, including:

    • IS 694: PVC-insulated electrical cables.
    • IS 1554 (Part 1): PVC-insulated heavy-duty electric cables.
    • IS 9968 (Part 1): Elastomer-insulated cables.
    • IS 9968 (Part 2): Elastomer-insulated cables for specified higher-voltage applications.
    • IS 17048:2018: Halogen-free, flame-retardant cables.
    • IS 7098: XLPE-insulated power cables under the relevant voltage categories.

    The submissions highlighted that the imported product was not a conventional standalone electrical cable but an integrated OEM assembly comprising power conductors, control wiring, CAT5 Ethernet cables, fibre-optic links and specialised connectors.

    It was further argued that product-specific exclusions, insulation materials, voltage ratings and technical specifications must be examined before applying mandatory BIS requirements.

    Favourable BIS/QCO Determination

    Following consideration of the technical documents, legal submissions and personal hearing representations, the adjudicating authority concluded that a violation of mandatory BIS requirements had not been established in respect of the imported cable harness assembly.

    The Order-in-Original recognised that the applicability of BIS/QCO requirements must be assessed with reference to the relevant product specifications and notified standards, rather than inferred solely from customs tariff classification.

    The goods were therefore not held liable to confiscation on BIS/QCO violation grounds.

    The order separately determined the applicable customs classification under CTH 85444220 and imposed consequential differential duty and penalties. Accordingly, the favourable outcome related specifically to the BIS/QCO issue and should not be construed as complete relief on all customs issues.

    Legal Significance for Industrial Importers

    This matter highlights the importance of technical and legal assessment when determining BIS applicability to customised industrial products.

    Importers of OEM cable harnesses, electrical assemblies, industrial automation components and specialised machinery should carefully examine the scope of applicable QCOs and Indian Standards before determining certification obligations.

    The presence of electrical conductors or connectors within a customised industrial assembly does not automatically establish mandatory BIS certification applicability.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services – BIS, Customs and Regulatory AdvisoryAadrikaa Legal Services (ALS) provides specialised legal assistance in Customs & Allied laws, customs tariff classification, import regulatory compliance, legal opinions, adjudication proceedings and representation before Customs authorities, DGFT, Ministry, DGFT office and any other related Govt agencies.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: DPIIT, CBIC

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  • Supreme Court: NDPS Conviction Can Rest on Reliable Police Testimony Even Without Independent Witnesses

    Supreme Court: NDPS Conviction Can Rest on Reliable Police Testimony Even Without Independent Witnesses

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 23.10.2026

    Supreme Court: NDPS Conviction Can Rest on Reliable Police Testimony Even Without Independent Witnesses

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    The Supreme Court of India upheld Sumit Tomar’s conviction and 10-year sentence for transporting a commercial quantity of poppy straw, holding that reliable police testimony can support an NDPS conviction even when an independent witness is not examined.

    Case at a glance

    In Sumit Tomar v. State of Punjab, decided on 19 October 2012, the Supreme Court dismissed criminal appeals challenging a conviction under Section 15(c) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act). The Court affirmed the decisions of the Special Court at Patiala and the Punjab and Haryana High Court.

    Tomar was sentenced to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment and fined Rs. 1 lakh, with an additional year of imprisonment in default of payment.

    The alleged recovery

    The prosecution case arose from a police checkpoint set up near Basantpur Bus Stand, Patiala, on 27 June 2004. Police signalled a silver Indica car to stop. According to the prosecution, the driver, Sumit Tomar, attempted to drive away but was stopped after the police blocked the route.

    On searching the car’s boot, officers recovered two plastic bags containing opium powder, described in the proceedings as poppy straw. The contents were mixed, two samples of 250 grams each were drawn, and the remaining material was sealed. The recovered quantity was measured at 69.50 kg after sampling.

    A forensic report later confirmed that the seized material was poppy straw, a prohibited substance under the NDPS Act.

    Main arguments raised in appeal

    Tomar challenged the conviction on two central grounds:

    • No independent witness testified: An individual named Kaur Singh was said to have been present during the recovery and to have signed relevant documents, but the prosecution did not examine him in court.
    • Improper sampling: The defence argued that mixing the contents of the two bags before drawing samples was an irregularity that undermined the prosecution’s case.

    The defence contended that, without independent corroboration and with allegedly flawed sampling, the conviction could not safely stand.

    Supreme Court’s reasoning

    Police witnesses can be relied upon

    The Court accepted that it is preferable for the prosecution to examine an independent witness in a case involving seizure of contraband. However, it ruled that the failure to examine such a witness does not automatically invalidate the prosecution case.

    Kaur Singh’s presence was considered natural because he was stated to have encountered the police while passing the checkpoint. His signatures appeared on the consent memo, recovery memo and arrest memo. The prosecution also stated that he had been summoned but failed to appear.

    Most importantly, the Court found no evidence that the official witnesses bore any animosity toward Tomar. It held that where police testimony is reliable and there is no demonstrated motive for false implication, a conviction may rest on that evidence.

    The Court also relied on testimony from the car owner, who stated that Tomar had requested the vehicle for personal use. It was undisputed that Tomar was driving the car in which the contraband was found.

    Mixing the contents did not cause prejudice

    The Court rejected the challenge to the mixing of material from the two bags before sampling. It found that the procedure did not prejudice the accused because the total recovered quantity remained well above the statutory threshold for a commercial quantity.

    Under Section 15 of the NDPS Act, punishment varies according to the quantity involved:

    • Small quantity: Up to 1,000 grams.
    • Commercial quantity: 50 kg or more.
    • Recovered quantity in this case: 69.50 kg after samples were drawn.

    Because the recovered material exceeded 50 kg, the Court held that it clearly fell within the commercial-quantity category. The argument that separate samples should have been drawn from each bag therefore did not alter the applicable punishment range or cause legal prejudice to Tomar.

    Outcome and legal significance

    The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and confirmed the conviction and sentence under Section 15(c) of the NDPS Act.

    The ruling reinforces two important principles in narcotics prosecutions:

    1. Independent witnesses are desirable but not indispensable. A court may rely on credible official witnesses when there is no evidence of bias, hostility or false implication.
    2. A procedural objection must show actual prejudice. Where the contraband quantity remains unmistakably commercial even after the disputed sampling process, mixing material from multiple bags will not necessarily defeat the prosecution case.

    The decision illustrates the Court’s approach to evaluating evidence under the NDPS Act: procedural safeguards matter, but a conviction will not be overturned for an alleged irregularity that does not materially affect the accused’s rights or the legal classification of the offence.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Supreme Court

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