ALS

𝐀𝐚𝐝𝐫𝐢𝐤𝐚𝐚 𝐋𝐞𝐠𝐚𝐥 𝐒𝐞𝐫𝐯𝐢𝐜𝐞𝐬 (𝐀𝐋𝐒)

Tag: #IndirectTaxLitigations

  • Karnataka HC Upholds Corruption Proceedings Against Retired BBMP Engineer; Rejects Sanction Objection

    Karnataka HC Upholds Corruption Proceedings Against Retired BBMP Engineer; Rejects Sanction Objection

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 22.09.2026

    Karnataka HC Upholds Corruption Proceedings Against Retired BBMP Engineer; Rejects Sanction Objection

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate G Sridharamurthy. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id sriadv3@gmail.com . 

    The Karnataka High Court has held that the 2018 amendment to Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, which extended the requirement of prior sanction to former public servants, cannot be invoked to reopen proceedings where the court had already taken cognizance of the alleged corruption offences before the amendment came into force on 26 July 2018.

    Justice H.P. Sandesh dismissed three criminal revision petitions filed by retired BBMP Executive Engineer B.G. Prakash Kumar, thereby allowing the criminal proceedings against him under Sections 13(1)(c) and 13(1)(d), read with Section 13(2), of the Prevention of Corruption Act to continue.

    Case Arose From Alleged Irregularities in BBMP Development Works

    • The prosecution case concerned alleged irregularities in developmental works undertaken by the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP).
    • B.G. Prakash Kumar had served as an Executive Engineer, Malleshwaram Division, BBMP, and supervised road improvement and asphalting works.
    • Following allegations concerning irregularities in execution of developmental works, the BBMP Commissioner directed the Technical Investigation Cell to conduct an inquiry. A complaint was thereafter lodged by the Additional Commissioner, BBMP, leading to registration of Crime No. 4/2011 for offences under the IPC and Prevention of Corruption Act.
    • Prakash Kumar retired from service on attaining superannuation on 30 July 2017. The investigating agency subsequently filed charge sheets before the competent court in 2018.

    Cognizance Was Taken Before PC Act Amendment

    • The dates on which cognizance was taken ultimately became crucial to the High Court’s decision.
    • The Special Court took cognizance on 23 May 2018 in Special C.C. Nos. 339/2018 and 338/2018 and on 16 February 2018 in Special C.C. No. 107/2018.
    • Thus, in all three cases, cognizance had already been taken before 26 July 2018, when the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018 came into force.

    Trial Court Initially Discharged Retired Executive Engineer

    • Prakash Kumar moved applications under Section 227 CrPC seeking discharge from both IPC and Prevention of Corruption Act offences.
    • The Trial Court initially discharged him and closed the proceedings by an order dated 20 September 2023, holding the prosecution case unsustainable in law.
    • However, the Karnataka High Court subsequently, by an order dated 22 March 2025, set aside that discharge order and remanded the matter to the Trial Court for fresh consideration.
    • After reconsideration, the Trial Court passed a fresh order on 24 February 2026.
    • This time, it discharged Prakash Kumar from the IPC offences under Sections 120B, 409, 465, 468 and 477A, but directed continuation of proceedings for offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act.
    • The retired officer therefore approached the High Court through the present revision petitions challenging the partial rejection of his discharge applications.

    Petitioner: Prior Sanction Mandatory Even for Retired Public Servant

    • The petitioner’s principal argument centred on the amendment made to Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act with effect from 26 July 2018.
    • The amended provision requires previous sanction before a court takes cognizance of specified corruption offences allegedly committed by a public servant and extends the statutory language to a person who “was at the time of commission of the alleged offence” employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or State, as applicable.
    • Counsel for Prakash Kumar argued that the amended provision protected retired officials as well and that sanction constituted a condition precedent for valid cognizance.
    • It was argued that after the earlier discharge order was set aside and the proceedings restored, the Trial Court was required to reconsider the matter afresh. According to the petitioner, continuation of the PC Act proceedings without a valid sanction under Section 19(1) was therefore impermissible.

    Earlier Cognizance Lost Effect After Discharge, Petitioner Argued

    • The petitioner further contended that once he had been discharged in 2023, the cognizance originally taken in 2018 had lost its legal efficacy.
    • Accordingly, after remand and restoration of proceedings, it was argued that the prosecution could not rely upon the original cognizance and continue without obtaining the sanction contemplated under the amended Section 19(1).
    • The petitioner also argued that because he was in service at the time of the alleged offences, the sanction requirement should relate back to the date of the alleged crime rather than merely the date on which cognizance was taken.

    State: Amendment Came After Cognizance Had Already Been Taken

    • The State opposed the petitions and argued that the 2018 amendment came into effect only on 26 July 2018, whereas Prakash Kumar had already retired in 2017 and cognizance had been taken before the amendment.
    • The Additional State Public Prosecutor relied, among other authorities, upon a Supreme Court decision concerning B.T. Ramesh, contending that prior sanction under the then-existing Section 19 was required only in relation to public servants who were in service when cognizance was taken and not those who had already retired.

    Karnataka HC: Amended Section 19 Protects Retired Public Servants Prospectively

    • The High Court acknowledged that after the 2018 amendment, prior sanction is required even in respect of former public servants in cases to which the amended provision applies.
    • The Court observed that subsequent to the amendment coming into force on 26 July 2018, sanction is a condition precedent for valid cognizance of the covered PC Act offences even in relation to retired public servants.
    • However, that proposition did not resolve Prakash Kumar’s case because the decisive question was whether the amended requirement could affect cognizance already taken before 26 July 2018.

    Cognizance Dates Became Decisive

    • The High Court found that the criminal cases had been registered, investigated and charge-sheeted before the amendment and, crucially, cognizance had also been taken before the amendment came into force.
    • The Court examined the cognizance orders and noted that the Special Court had considered the charge-sheet materials and taken cognizance of both IPC and PC Act offences before issuing summons to the accused.
    • Accordingly, Justice Sandesh held that the subsequent amendment “will not come to the aid of the petitioner”, because cognizance had already been taken before 26 July 2018.

    What Does “Taking Cognizance” Mean?

    • The petitioner relied upon the Supreme Court judgment in S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd. & Others, (2008) 2 SCC 492.
    • The High Court noted the principle that “cognizance” means taking judicial notice of an offence and occurs when the Court or Magistrate applies its mind to the suspected commission of the offence.
    • At the cognizance stage, the court examines whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the matter, rather than whether sufficient material exists for conviction.

    2018 PC Act Amendment Does Not Apply Retrospectively to Completed Cognizance

    • The High Court referred extensively to precedent dealing with the temporal application of the 2018 amendments.
    • It discussed Dr. Pilli Sambasiva Rao v. State of Telangana, 2022 SCC OnLine TS 3401, which in turn considered the Supreme Court’s decision in State of Telangana v. Managipet, (2019) 19 SCC 87.
    • The judgment noted the principle that the 2018 amendment cannot retrospectively govern offences and proceedings in the manner urged where the relevant criminal process had already commenced under the pre-amendment law.
    • The Court reproduced the reasoning from Managipet that offences committed before the 2018 amendment have to be examined in light of the statutory provisions as they existed before the amendment.

    Delhi High Court’s 2026 Ruling Relied Upon

    • Significantly, the Karnataka High Court also relied upon a recent Delhi High Court judgment dated 6 August 2026 in Criminal Reference No. 1/2019.
    • The Delhi High Court had held that the amended Section 19(1) introduced a new obligation to obtain sanction in respect of former public servants. However, where cognizance had already been taken before 26 July 2018, such cognizance would not be reopened merely because of the subsequent amendment.
    • Conversely, where cognizance had not yet been taken as of 26 July 2018, the amended protection could apply even though the alleged offence related to an earlier period.
    • The Karnataka High Court reproduced the crucial distinction: where cognizance already stood taken before 26 July 2018, “there would be no fresh requirement of prior sanction in such cases.”

    Benefit of Amended Section 19 Depends on Whether Cognizance Was Already Taken

    • After considering the authorities, the Karnataka High Court crystallised the applicable position.
    • It held that the benefit of the amended Section 19(1) is available where the Court had not already taken cognizance before the amendment became operative.
    • In Prakash Kumar’s cases, however, the FIRs had been registered, investigations completed, charge sheets filed and cognizance taken before the amendment.
    • The amended sanction requirement therefore could not invalidate or reopen the cognizance already taken.

    Trial Court Correctly Continued PC Act Proceedings

    • The High Court found no error in the Trial Court’s order dated 24 February 2026.
    • The Trial Court had discharged Prakash Kumar from the IPC offences but rejected his discharge plea concerning the PC Act offences. According to the High Court, the Trial Court correctly applied the governing principles because the amended Section 19 could not benefit the petitioner after cognizance had already been taken under the pre-amendment regime.
    • Accordingly, all three criminal revision petitions were dismissed.

    Key Takeaway

    The decision draws an important temporal line at 26 July 2018 for the amended sanction protection under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

    The Karnataka High Court’s reasoning indicates that while the amended provision extends sanction protection to former public servants where applicable, it does not require courts to reopen cognizance already validly taken before the amendment came into force.

    Thus, a retired public servant cannot secure discharge merely by invoking the amended Section 19(1) where cognizance of the PC Act offences had already been taken before 26 July 2018. In the present case, the High Court consequently upheld continuation of the corruption proceedings against B.G. Prakash Kumar while leaving the allegations to be determined at trial.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Karnataka High Court

    Disclaimer

    Handy Download:

    “Handy Order for Download”Download

    Write to us at office@aadrikaalaw.com

    Tel: +91-11-4999 2707

    www.aadrikaalaw.com

  • Calcutta High Court: Bona Fide Purchaser of Transferable DFIA Licence Cannot Be Saddled With Customs Duty for Exporter’s Fraud

    Calcutta High Court: Bona Fide Purchaser of Transferable DFIA Licence Cannot Be Saddled With Customs Duty for Exporter’s Fraud

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 22.09.2026

    Calcutta High Court: Bona Fide Purchaser of Transferable DFIA Licence Cannot Be Saddled With Customs Duty for Exporter’s Fraud

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    In a significant ruling concerning Duty Free Import Authorisation (DFIA) licences and the liability of bona fide transferees, the Calcutta High Court has held that a purchaser who acquires a transferable duty-free import licence for value and without notice of any fraud or irregularity committed by the original licence holder cannot be made liable for customs duty, interest and redemption fine when the licence has never been cancelled by the competent authority.

    A Division Bench comprising Justice Rajarshi Bharadwaj and Justice Sudip Deb allowed the appeal filed by Comet Overseas Pvt. Ltd. and quashed a customs duty demand of ₹22,87,654.95, the consequential interest and a ₹15 lakh redemption fine that had earlier been sustained by CESTAT.

    Comet Overseas Purchased Transferable DFIA Licence for ₹14.51 Lakh

    • Comet Overseas Pvt. Ltd., engaged in export-import bulk commodity trading, was a subsequent purchaser and transferee of DFIA Licence No. 0210100847 dated 16 May 2007.
    • The licence was one among 23 DFIA licences obtained by Gemini Overseas Ltd. from DGFT during 2007-08 and 2008-09 under Notification No. 40/2006-Cus dated 1 May 2006, permitting duty-free import of specified silk products.
    • Three of those licences were subsequently endorsed as transferable by the Regional Authority after certification of fulfilment of export obligation. Comet Overseas purchased the licence in question for ₹14,51,795 through proper banking channels, through Customs House Agent M/s S.K. Saha & Co.
    • Acting upon the licence, Comet imported Mulberry Raw Silk Yarn duty-free under Bill of Entry No. 437910 dated 22 October 2008 at Kolkata Port. The assessable value was approximately ₹74.03 lakh, while the customs duty foregone amounted to ₹22,87,654.95.

    DRI Investigation Found Fraud by Original Licence Holder

    • The controversy arose after intelligence gathered by the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) indicated irregularities in the manner in which Gemini Overseas had discharged its export obligation.
    • According to the judgment, Gemini Overseas had exported fabric made of Noil Yarn while declaring it as Natural Silk Fabric predominantly made of Mulberry Raw Silk.
    • Consignments were intercepted at N.S. Dock, Kolkata and at the factory of Eastern Silk Industries Ltd. in Falta SEZ in November 2008. Testing by the Central Silk Board indicated that the fabric consisted of Noil Yarn mixed with cotton.
    • Gemini Overseas subsequently admitted by letter dated 2 January 2009 that the description contained in its export documents was incorrect and that benefits not otherwise due could have been availed. It also expressed willingness to pay the duty foregone in relation to the three transferable licences.

    Customs Issued Show Cause Notice to Comet Overseas

    • A Show Cause Notice dated 11 May 2012 was issued jointly to Comet Overseas, Gemini Overseas and other persons.
    • Customs proposed recovery of ₹22,87,654.95 under the erstwhile proviso to Section 28(1), read with Section 28(4) of the Customs Act, 1962, along with interest. Confiscation was proposed under Section 111(o) and penalty under Section 112.
    • Importantly, the High Court noted that the SCN, insofar as Comet Overseas was concerned, did not contain any allegation of collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts on its part.
    • The Order-in-Original dated 28 February 2014 nevertheless confirmed the duty demand, imposed a ₹15 lakh redemption fine under Section 125, and imposed a penalty of ₹10 lakh under Section 112.

    CESTAT Removed Penalty but Sustained Duty and Redemption Fine

    • On appeal, CESTAT partly granted relief to Comet Overseas.
    • The Tribunal set aside the ₹10 lakh penalty after finding that Comet had no knowledge of the nature of the goods used and exported by Gemini Overseas/Eastern Silk Industries. However, CESTAT sustained the customs duty demand, interest and ₹15 lakh redemption fine.
    • Comet Overseas therefore approached the Calcutta High Court.

    Core Question: Can an Innocent Transferee Be Liable for Original Exporter’s Fraud?

    The High Court had admitted the appeal on the following substantial question of law:

    “Whether a bona fide purchaser of duty-free import licence for value can be required to pay duty, interest and redemption fine in respect of his import, when he has no notice of any irregularity on the part of the exporter who had obtained such licence and the licence is not cancelled by the authorities?”

    This placed the legal status of a bona fide transferee for value without notice at the centre of the dispute.

    Comet Overseas: Fraud Makes Licence Voidable, Not Automatically Void

    • The appellant argued that the DFIA licence had been genuinely issued by DGFT and the alleged fraud occurred later, at the stage of certification of fulfilment of export obligation by Gemini Overseas.
    • Relying on the Supreme Court judgments in East India Commercial Co. Ltd., Calcutta v. Collector of Customs, Calcutta and Collector of Customs, Bombay v. Sneha Sales Corporation, Comet argued that even a licence obtained through fraud is voidable rather than automatically void, and continues to operate until cancelled in accordance with law.
    • The appellant also relied upon Taparia Overseas (P) Ltd. v. Union of India to contend that a transferee who purchases a duty-free licence for valuable consideration through legitimate banking channels and without notice of the original holder’s fraud should not be saddled with duty, interest and redemption fine.

    Revenue: Fraud Went to Foundation of DFIA Benefit

    • Customs argued that Gemini Overseas’ fraud went to the foundation of the licence because the exporter had falsely declared the nature of goods exported for fulfilling its export obligation.
    • Revenue relied upon ICI India Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs (Port), Calcutta and Munjal Showa Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs & Central Excise (Delhi-IV) to contend that an instrument tainted by fraud could not confer exemption upon a subsequent holder merely because that holder was personally innocent.
    • Revenue also relied upon Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai on the extended period of limitation and Commissioner of Customs, Hyderabad v. Pennar Industries Ltd. on compliance with conditions of exemption notifications.

    Genuine Licence Different From Forged or Non-Existent Scrip: High Court

    • A crucial distinction drawn by the High Court was between a genuinely issued licence subsequently affected by fraud and an instrument that was forged and never issued by the competent authority at all.
    • The Court observed that ICI India and Munjal Showa involved forged instruments—DEPB scrips and Transfer Release Advices—which were never validly issued by the competent authority.
    • Comet Overseas’ case was materially different. The DFIA licence had been genuinely issued by DGFT and validly endorsed as transferable by the Regional Authority. The alleged fraud occurred in relation to the certification of export obligation by the original licence holder.
    • The High Court therefore declined to mechanically apply the proposition that “fraud vitiates everything” to an innocent subsequent purchaser.

    Fraudulent Licence Remains Effective Until Cancelled

    • The Court relied significantly upon the principles laid down in East India Commercial and Sneha Sales Corporation.
    • It held that a licence affected by fraud or misrepresentation is not automatically rendered non-est. Rather, such a licence remains effective in law until it is avoided or cancelled in the manner prescribed by law.
    • A decisive fact in Comet Overseas’ favour was that DFIA Licence No. 0210100847 had never been cancelled by DGFT or the Regional Authority.
    • The Court regarded this as a material and unrebutted circumstance demonstrating that the licence remained a valid and subsisting instrument when Comet made its import.

    Bona Fide Purchaser for Value Stands on Different Footing

    • The High Court also gave substantial weight to Comet Overseas’ status as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.
    • The company had paid ₹14,51,795 for the licence through banking channels. More importantly, CESTAT itself had already found that Comet had no knowledge of the irregularities committed by Gemini Overseas or Eastern Silk Industries. Revenue had not challenged that finding.
    • Applying Taparia Overseas, the High Court held that an innocent transferee stands on a different footing from the person who committed or participated in the fraud.
    • The Court observed that the maxim “fraud vitiates everything” does not, without more, extend to defeat the rights of such a transferee.

    Pennar Industries Distinguished

    • The High Court also rejected Revenue’s reliance upon Commissioner of Customs, Hyderabad v. Pennar Industries Ltd., (2015) 10 SCC 581 / 2015 (322) E.L.T. 402 (S.C.).
    • It explained that Pennar Industries concerned the original importer’s own failure to fulfil the conditions of an exemption notification.
    • It did not deal with the distinct question of whether liability arising from the default of a third party could subsequently be imposed upon an innocent transferee who purchased the licence for value without knowledge of that default.

    Tata Iron & Steel Decision Did Not Alter the Result

    • The Court similarly declined to treat Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai, 2015 (319) E.L.T. 546 (S.C.) as controlling.
    • It observed that the reported decision was a brief order and did not clearly disclose whether the transferee in that case occupied the same position as Comet Overseas—namely, a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.
    • The Court therefore regarded its precedential weight on the facts before it as limited and preferred the reasoning in East India Commercial, Sneha Sales Corporation and Taparia Overseas.

    Limitation Argument Not Independently Decided

    • Comet Overseas had also argued that the extended limitation period under Section 28 could not have been invoked because the SCN contained no allegation of collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression against it.
    • The High Court, however, noted that no substantial question of law concerning limitation had been framed when the appeal was admitted. It therefore declined to decide limitation as an independent ground at the final hearing.
    • Nevertheless, the Court expressly recorded that the SCN contained no allegation of collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression against Comet Overseas and treated that fact as relevant to its overall assessment, without independently adjudicating the limitation issue.

    Calcutta High Court Rules in Favour of Comet Overseas

    • The High Court ultimately held that because the DFIA licence had never been cancelled, and because the fraud attributable to Gemini Overseas arose at the export-obligation certification stage rather than at the original issuance of the licence, the licence had to be treated as voidable rather than void on the record before it.
    • Since Comet Overseas was an unimpeached bona fide purchaser for value without notice, the Court held that it could not be fastened with customs duty, interest and redemption fine arising from a third party’s fraud of which it had no knowledge.
    • The substantial question of law was accordingly answered in favour of Comet Overseas and against the Revenue.

    ₹22.87 Lakh Duty Demand and ₹15 Lakh Redemption Fine Quashed

    The High Court allowed Comet Overseas’ appeal and set aside CESTAT’s order dated 22 December 2015 to the extent that it had sustained:

    • Customs duty: ₹22,87,654.95
      Interest: Consequential interest on the duty demand
      Redemption fine: ₹15,00,000
    • All three were quashed.
    • CESTAT’s earlier decision setting aside the ₹10 lakh penalty under Section 112 of the Customs Act remained undisturbed because Revenue had not challenged that part of the Tribunal’s order.

    Key Takeaway

    The ruling provides important protection to bona fide purchasers of transferable DFIA licences. On the facts before it, the Calcutta High Court drew a clear distinction between a forged/non-existent instrument and a licence genuinely issued by DGFT and validly endorsed as transferable but subsequently affected by fraud attributable to the original exporter. Where the transferee purchased such a licence for value without notice of the irregularity, and the competent authority never cancelled the licence, the Court held that the transferee could not be saddled with the duty, interest and redemption fine arising from the original licence holder’s fraud.

    Listen to this on our #YouTube Channel

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Calcutta High Court

    Disclaimer

    Handy Download:

    “Handy Order for Download”Download

    Write to us at office@aadrikaalaw.com

    Tel: +91-11-4999 2707

    www.aadrikaalaw.com

    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Punjab & Haryana HC: Mere Presence with Co-Accused Does Not Establish Conscious Possession of Commercial Quantity of Opium

    Punjab & Haryana HC: Mere Presence with Co-Accused Does Not Establish Conscious Possession of Commercial Quantity of Opium

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 21.09.2026

    Punjab & Haryana HC: Mere Presence with Co-Accused Does Not Establish Conscious Possession of Commercial Quantity of Opium

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    The Punjab and Haryana High Court has granted regular bail to a man in an NDPS case involving the alleged recovery of 2.702 kg of opium, observing that the contraband was recovered from a bag carried by the co-accused and no contraband was alleged to have been recovered from the conscious possession of the petitioner.

    Justice Virinder Aggarwal observed that mere presence alongside the person from whom the contraband was recovered, in the absence of any specific recovery from the petitioner, is a matter requiring appreciation of evidence during trial.

    The ruling came in Anil Kumar v. State of Haryana, CRM-M-52368-2026, decided on September 18, 2026. The petition was filed under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), corresponding to Section 439 CrPC, seeking regular bail.

    Case Arose From Alleged Recovery of 2.702 Kg Opium

    • According to the prosecution, on March 20, 2026, officials of the Anti-Narcotics Cell, Karnal were conducting patrol and checking near NH-44 beneath Baldi Bypass Flyover, Karnal.
    • A secret informer allegedly told the police that Anil Kumar and Roshan Kumar, residents of District Chatra, Jharkhand, were involved in bringing opium from Jharkhand and supplying it in Haryana. The informer further claimed that the two had brought a large quantity of opium and were present near Karn Lake.
    • The information was reduced into writing and a report under Section 42 of the NDPS Act, 1985 was sent to the police station.

    Police Claimed Compliance With Section 50 NDPS Act

    • The prosecution stated that attempts were made to associate independent witnesses with the proceedings. Two persons allegedly declined, while another individual agreed to join as an independent witness.
    • When the police reached near Karn Lake, they allegedly saw two persons standing on the roadside with a black bag. The secret informer identified them as Anil Kumar and Roshan Kumar.
    • Both accused were served notices under Section 50 of the NDPS Act and opted to be searched in the presence of a Gazetted Officer.
    • A DSP thereafter reached the spot and directed the police officials to conduct the search.

    Opium Recovered From Bag Carried by Co-Accused Roshan Kumar

    • The critical factual circumstance noted by the High Court was the place of recovery.
    • The black shoulder bag was allegedly being carried by co-accused Roshan Kumar. During its search, police allegedly recovered a packet containing a black-coloured substance suspected to be opium.
    • The substance, together with its packing, weighed 2 kilograms and 702 grams.
    • The prosecution stated that the recovered material was sealed using the seals of the Investigating Officer and the DSP. The search proceedings were also allegedly videographed and uploaded on the e-Sakshya application.
    • However, the High Court specifically recorded that the alleged contraband was recovered from the bag carried by Roshan Kumar and not from Anil Kumar.

    Petitioner: Mere Association With Co-Accused Cannot Establish Conscious Possession

    • Anil Kumar argued that he had been falsely implicated and that no contraband was recovered from his conscious possession.
    • His counsel emphasised that although 2.702 kg of opium constituted commercial quantity, the recovery was made from the bag allegedly carried by co-accused Roshan Kumar.
    • It was argued that mere presence or association with a co-accused cannot, by itself, establish conscious possession of narcotic contraband.
    • The petitioner further submitted that the investigation had already been completed, the challan had been presented and no further recovery was required from him.
    • He also contended that material prosecution witnesses were yet to be examined, the trial was likely to take considerable time, and he had clean antecedents with no other NDPS or criminal case against him.

    Haryana Opposes Bail Citing Section 37 NDPS Act

    • The State opposed the bail application primarily on the ground that the recovery involved 2.702 kg of opium, which falls within commercial quantity.
    • It therefore argued that the stringent conditions contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act applied.
    • The State also pointed out that Anil Kumar had been apprehended along with Roshan Kumar pursuant to secret information and contended that his involvement was a matter to be determined during trial.
    • The case therefore raised the familiar tension between the stringent bail restrictions applicable to commercial-quantity NDPS prosecutions and the constitutional protection of personal liberty under Article 21.

    Right to Speedy Trial Is Integral to Article 21: High Court

    The High Court devoted a substantial part of its order to the constitutional right to speedy trial.

    Justice Aggarwal observed that:

    • “The right to a speedy trial is an integral facet of the fundamental right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21…”
    • The Court explained that the constitutional mandate does not merely require a fair trial. It also obligates the State to conclude criminal proceedings within a reasonable period so that the criminal process itself does not become punitive.

    Prolonged Pre-Trial Detention Cannot Become Punishment

    • The High Court relied on the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81, which recognised speedy trial as an essential and integral component of Article 21.
    • It also referred to the Constitution Bench decisions in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 and P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578.
    • The Court noted that these judgments recognise speedy trial as a fundamental right and require constitutional courts to intervene where inordinate and unexplained delay results in denial of substantive justice.

    Nature of Offence Does Not Eclipse Right to Speedy Trial

    • The High Court further relied upon Tapas Kumar Palit v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 322 and Arvind Dham v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 (2) SSC (Criminal) 271, as cited in the order.
    • Referring to these decisions, the Court stated that the right to speedy trial under Article 21 is not eclipsed by the nature of the offence.
    • Prolonged incarceration of an undertrial without commencement or reasonable progress of trial can effectively transform pre-trial detention into punishment before conviction.
    • The Court further recorded the principle that where the State or prosecuting agency cannot secure the accused’s fundamental right to a speedy trial, bail cannot be opposed merely by relying on the seriousness of the allegations where continued incarceration becomes oppressive.

    Section 37 NDPS Act Cannot Authorise Indefinite Incarceration

    • The High Court then considered the special restrictions contained in the NDPS Act.
    • It acknowledged that the NDPS Act is a stringent penal statute enacted to combat illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.
    • However, relying upon the Supreme Court judgment in Mohd. Muslim @ Hussain v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352, the Court observed that Section 37 cannot be interpreted so rigidly as to compel indefinite incarceration of an undertrial merely because the trial has not progressed.
    • The order records the principle that a literal application of Section 37 divorced from constitutional values could result in punitive detention before conviction.
    • The Court further referred to the proposition that when the State is unable to conclude trial within a reasonable time, the restrictions under Section 37 must be considered alongside the constitutional mandate of Article 21.

    Mere Presence With Person Carrying Contraband Requires Evidence at Trial

    • Turning specifically to Anil Kumar’s case, the High Court found it important that the 2.702 kg of opium was recovered from the black bag carried by Roshan Kumar.
    • No contraband was alleged to have been recovered from Anil Kumar’s conscious possession.

    The Court observed:

    • “mere presence along with the person from whom the recovery was effected, in the absence of any specific recovery from the petitioner, would require appreciation of evidence during trial.”
    • The challan had already been presented and Anil Kumar remained in custody. In these circumstances, the Court concluded that his further incarceration would serve no useful purpose.
    • Importantly, this is a bail-stage finding, not a final determination that the petitioner had no connection with the alleged contraband. The question of his involvement and the prosecution evidence remains subject to adjudication at trial.

    Punjab & Haryana HC Grants Regular Bail

    • The High Court accordingly allowed Anil Kumar’s petition and ordered his release on regular bail, subject to furnishing the requisite bail and surety bonds to the satisfaction of the concerned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Illaqa Magistrate or Duty Magistrate.
    • The bail was made subject to several conditions designed to protect the integrity of the trial.
    • Among other things, the petitioner was directed not to induce, threaten or make promises to persons acquainted with the case and not to tamper with evidence or influence prosecution witnesses.
    • He was also prohibited from leaving India without prior permission of the Trial Court.

    Court Imposes Detailed Disclosure Conditions

    • The High Court additionally imposed detailed identification and disclosure requirements.
    • The petitioner must provide his permanent and current correspondence addresses with supporting documents. The Investigating Officer has been directed to verify those addresses within 48 hours of acceptance of the bail bonds.
    • The Court also directed the petitioner to furnish his PAN, Aadhaar number, particulars of all operative bank accounts and a declaration concerning immovable properties, if any.
    • Providing false information or concealing material particulars can constitute a ground for seeking cancellation of bail.
    • The petitioner must further notify the Investigating Officer and Trial Court of any change in his residential address or mobile number within seven days.
    • He must not commit a similar offence and must attend the trial unless his personal appearance is specifically exempted. Breach of these conditions may result in cancellation of bail and issuance of coercive process, including warrants of arrest.

    Cases Referred to by the High Court

    The order expressly referred to several important Supreme Court judgments concerning speedy trial, personal liberty and bail:

    1. Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81 — speedy trial is an essential and integral component of Article 21.
    2. A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 — constitutional recognition of the right to speedy trial.
    3. P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578 — speedy trial flows from Article 21 and constitutional courts may intervene against inordinate delay.
    4. Tapas Kumar Palit v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 322 — referred to regarding prolonged pre-trial incarceration and the constitutional right to speedy trial.
    5. Arvind Dham v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 (2) SSC (Criminal) 271 — cited for the proposition that the right to speedy trial is not eclipsed by the nature of the offence.
    6. Mohd. Muslim @ Hussain v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352 — Section 37 NDPS Act cannot be applied so rigidly as to justify indefinite incarceration where the trial fails to progress within a reasonable time.

    Why the Judgment Is Significant

    • The ruling is important for NDPS bail jurisprudence, particularly in cases where the prosecution relies on recovery of commercial quantity but the contraband is not physically recovered from the applicant seeking bail.
    • The judgment does not dilute the stringent requirements of Section 37 as a general proposition. Instead, it illustrates that the Court must consider the specific role attributed to the accused, the circumstances of recovery, stage of investigation, progress of trial and constitutional protection of personal liberty.
    • It is also significant that the Court treated the question of whether mere association with a co-accused establishes conscious possession as an issue requiring evidence at trial rather than assuming possession solely from the petitioner’s presence at the place of recovery.

    Key Takeaway

    The Punjab and Haryana High Court has granted regular bail in a commercial-quantity NDPS case after noting that 2.702 kg of opium was recovered from a bag carried by the co-accused and not from the petitioner.

    The Court held at the bail stage that mere presence alongside the person from whom recovery was made, without a specific recovery from the petitioner, requires appreciation of evidence during trial. At the same time, the judgment reinforces the constitutional principle that the right to speedy trial under Article 21 remains relevant even in prosecutions governed by stringent special statutes such as the NDPS Act.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Punjab & Haryana High Court

    Disclaimer

    Handy Download:

    “Handy Order for Download”Download

    Write to us at office@aadrikaalaw.com

    Tel: +91-11-4999 2707

    www.aadrikaalaw.com

    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Punjab & Haryana High Court Refuses to Interfere with RERA Tribunal’s Interim Possession Order

    Punjab & Haryana High Court Refuses to Interfere with RERA Tribunal’s Interim Possession Order

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 21.09.2026

    Punjab & Haryana High Court Refuses to Interfere with RERA Tribunal’s Interim Possession Order

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id amitnaren@outlook.com .  

    The Punjab and Haryana High Court has dismissed an appeal filed by homebuyers challenging an interim order of the Haryana Real Estate Appellate Tribunal concerning possession of an apartment in the Ireo Victory Valley project, Sector 67, Gurugram.

    Justice Jagmohan Bansal held that the Appellate Tribunal had not stayed the handing over of possession. Rather, it had expressly directed the promoter to hand over possession to the allottees, subject to adjudication of Delayed Possession Charges (DPC) and any outstanding amount.

    Finding no factual or legal infirmity in the Tribunal’s interim order and no substantial question of law warranting interference under Section 58 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA), the High Court dismissed the appeal.

    The decision was delivered on September 17, 2026, in Anish Mukker & Anr. v. M/s Ireo Victory Valley Pvt. Ltd., RERA-APPL-207-2026.

    Apartment Purchased for ₹4.20 Crore in Ireo Victory Valley

    • The respondent, M/s Ireo Victory Valley Pvt. Ltd., is the promoter of the real estate project known as Ireo Victory Valley, situated in Sector 67, Gurugram.
    • An apartment in the project was allotted to the appellants for a total consideration of ₹4,20,39,519.
    • According to the High Court’s order, the appellants had already paid ₹4,12,82,599 towards the apartment.
    • The homebuyers subsequently approached the RERA Authority alleging delay in completion of the project and arbitrary demand of charges by the promoter.

    RERA Authority Awards 10.85% Interest for Delayed Possession

    The RERA Authority decided the complaint in favour of the allottees on April 18, 2024.

    It directed the promoter to:

    • pay interest at 10.85% per annum for the period of delay;
    • hand over possession of the apartment to the appellants; and
    • execute the conveyance deed in favour of the allottees.

    The promoter thereafter challenged the Authority’s order before the Haryana Real Estate Appellate Tribunal, Chandigarh.

    Promoter Makes ₹3.49 Crore Pre-Deposit Under Section 43(5) RERA

    • While filing the appeal, the promoter complied with the statutory pre-deposit requirement under Section 43(5) of the RERA Act.
    • The Tribunal’s order recorded that the requisite pre-deposit of ₹3,49,49,735 had been made by the promoter, which was also confirmed by the Registry.
    • Section 43(5) assumes considerable significance in promoter appeals under RERA because the statutory proviso imposes a pre-deposit requirement before an appeal filed by a promoter can be entertained.
    • In the present case, however, there was no dispute before the High Court that the respondent had complied with that requirement.

    RERA Tribunal Directs Promoter to Hand Over Possession

    • The matter before the Appellate Tribunal had originally been listed for July 22, 2026. On the promoter’s application, it was preponed to May 8, 2026.
    • Before the Tribunal, counsel for the promoter submitted that the company was prepared to hand over possession to the allottee, subject to the final outcome of the questions concerning computation of Delayed Possession Charges and outstanding dues.
    • The urgency arose because the Gurugram RERA Authority had passed an order dated April 22, 2026, directing a Bailiff to visit the site on May 8, 2026 at 2:00 PM and deliver possession.

    The Appellate Tribunal consequently ordered:

    • “We hereby direct that the possession may be handed over to the allottee subject to the adjudication of DPC and outstanding amount, if any.”
    • The matter was thereafter directed to be listed on May 19, 2026.

    Homebuyers Challenge Interim Order Before Punjab & Haryana HC

    • The allottees approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court by filing an appeal under Section 58 of the RERA Act.
    • They sought setting aside of the Tribunal’s interim order dated May 8, 2026.
    • Their principal grievance before the High Court was that, because of the manner in which the interim order had been framed, they believed that they could not take possession of the apartment.
    • The High Court, however, did not accept this interpretation of the Tribunal’s order.

    Tribunal Did Not Stay Possession: Punjab & Haryana High Court

    • Justice Jagmohan Bansal closely examined the operative portion of the Tribunal’s order and found that it actually directed the respondent promoter to hand over possession to the allottee.
    • The only qualification was that possession would remain subject to adjudication of the DPC and any outstanding amount.
    • The High Court categorically observed:
    • “The Appellate Tribunal has not stayed possession of the flat.”
    • The promoter’s appeal before the Appellate Tribunal remained pending and, notably, was itself listed for hearing on September 17, 2026, the same date on which the High Court decided the appeal.

    Dispute Over Outstanding Dues Can Be Raised Before RERA Appellate Tribunal

    • The High Court further clarified the remedy available to the homebuyers.
    • If the appellants believed that the effect of the interim order was that they could not obtain possession without first paying the outstanding dues claimed by the promoter, they were free to move an appropriate application before the Appellate Tribunal.
    • They could also raise all other issues concerning the dispute before the Tribunal, where the promoter’s substantive appeal remained pending.
    • Thus, the High Court did not adjudicate the correctness of the promoter’s alleged outstanding demands or finally determine the amount of DPC payable to the allottees.
    • Those issues remain subject to adjudication before the RERA Appellate Tribunal.

    No Factual or Legal Infirmity in Tribunal’s Interim Order

    The High Court found no basis for exercising its appellate jurisdiction against the interim order.

    Justice Bansal held:

    “There seems no factual or legal infirmity in the impugned order warranting interference of this Court.”

    More importantly for appeals under Section 58 RERA, the Court found that:

    “No question of law much less substantial question of law arises for the consideration of this Court.”

    This became the decisive ground for declining interference.

    Section 58 RERA Appeals and the “Substantial Question of Law” Requirement

    • The ruling is relevant to the scope of appeals from the Real Estate Appellate Tribunal to the High Court.
    • The present appeal had been specifically instituted under Section 58 of the RERA Act.
    • In dismissing the appeal, the High Court emphasised the absence of any question of law, much less a substantial question of law.
    • The order therefore illustrates the limited scope for High Court intervention where the challenge is directed merely against the manner in which an interim direction of the RERA Appellate Tribunal is understood or implemented and no qualifying legal question is demonstrated.

    High Court Dismisses Homebuyers’ Appeal

    • The Punjab and Haryana High Court ultimately concluded that the appeal deserved dismissal.
    • Accordingly, Anish Mukker & Anr. v. M/s Ireo Victory Valley Pvt. Ltd. was dismissed.
    • The result does not mean that the promoter succeeded on the merits of its underlying RERA appeal.
    • The promoter’s appeal concerning DPC and outstanding dues remained pending before the Haryana Real Estate Appellate Tribunal. Similarly, the High Court did not disturb the Tribunal’s direction permitting possession to be handed over to the allottees.
    • This distinction is important: the judgment is essentially concerned with whether the High Court should interfere with the interim order dated May 8, 2026, rather than the final merits of the delayed-possession dispute.

    Why the Judgment Is Significant

    • The decision is relevant for homebuyers, developers and RERA practitioners because it highlights three separate procedural aspects of real estate litigation.
    • First, the order demonstrates that a direction to hand over possession subject to adjudication of DPC and outstanding dues is not equivalent to staying possession. The language of an interim RERA order must therefore be read according to its actual terms.
    • Second, if an allottee believes that an interim order is being interpreted by the promoter as requiring payment of disputed outstanding dues before possession, the appropriate course may be to seek clarification or appropriate relief from the RERA Appellate Tribunal itself, particularly where the substantive appeal remains pending.
    • Third, the High Court’s observation concerning the absence of a substantial question of law reinforces the significance of the threshold governing Section 58 RERA appeals.

    Important Distinction: No Final Decision on DPC or Outstanding Dues

    • The ruling should not be reported as a final victory for either side on the underlying monetary dispute.
    • The RERA Authority had earlier awarded interest at 10.85% per annum for delayed possession and directed possession and execution of the conveyance deed. The promoter challenged that decision before the Appellate Tribunal after making the required pre-deposit.
    • The Appellate Tribunal had yet to finally adjudicate the issues concerning Delayed Possession Charges and alleged outstanding dues.
    • The Punjab and Haryana High Court merely declined to interfere with the Tribunal’s interim possession order.

    Key Takeaway

    The Punjab and Haryana High Court has clarified that an interim RERA Appellate Tribunal order directing a promoter to hand over possession subject to final adjudication of delayed-possession charges and outstanding dues does not amount to a stay on possession.

    Where homebuyers apprehend that possession is being made conditional upon payment of disputed dues, they may seek appropriate clarification or relief from the Appellate Tribunal.

    Since the High Court found no factual or legal infirmity and no substantial question of law, it declined to interfere under Section 58 of the RERA Act and dismissed the appeal.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Punjab & Haryana High Court

    Disclaimer

    Handy Download:

    “Handy Order for Download”Download

    Write to us at office@aadrikaalaw.com

    Tel: +91-11-4999 2707

    www.aadrikaalaw.com

  • Delhi High Court: Prior Emails Cannot Override Clear Terms of Final Signed Contract; Grants Anti-Arbitration Injunction Against London Arbitration

    Delhi High Court: Prior Emails Cannot Override Clear Terms of Final Signed Contract; Grants Anti-Arbitration Injunction Against London Arbitration

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 21.09.2026

    Delhi High Court: Prior Emails Cannot Override Clear Terms of Final Signed Contract; Grants Anti-Arbitration Injunction Against London Arbitration

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Arbitrator Shobhit Mallik. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id shobhit.Ica23@gmail.com .

    The Delhi High Court has held that once parties execute a clear and unambiguous final written agreement expressly superseding previous arrangements, earlier negotiations, emails or correspondence cannot ordinarily be relied upon to add to, vary or contradict its terms.

    A Division Bench of Justice Vivek Chaudhary and Justice Renu Bhatnagar, in SARR Freights Corporation & Anr. v. Argo Coral Maritime Ltd., allowed the appeal filed by SARR Freights and restrained Argo Coral Maritime Ltd. from continuing arbitration proceedings before the London Maritime Arbitrators Association (LMAA).

    The judgment was delivered on September 18, 2026, in FAO(OS) 40/2026.

    The Court ultimately held that no arbitration agreement existed between the parties under their final signed Booking Note and, therefore, the foundation for continuation of the London arbitration proceedings did not survive.

    Dispute Arose From Transportation of UN Peacekeeping Cargo to Sudan

    • The dispute originated from an arrangement for transportation of military cargo for the United Nations Peace Keeping Force from New Delhi to Sudan.
    • The cargo was to travel from New Delhi and thereafter be shipped from Nhava Sheva Port, Mumbai to Port Sudan.
    • During negotiations, the parties’ respective agents exchanged emails and a Fixture Recap dated April 4, 2023. Clause 23 of the Fixture Recap contemplated “English law and London arbitration.”
    • A final Booking Note dated April 4, 2023, however, was subsequently signed on April 5, 2023. The Booking Note specifically referred to additional rider Clauses 20–41.
    • The difficulty arose because the arbitration provision appeared only in Clause 43, which stated that the latest BIMCO Dispute Resolution Clause would apply, subject to English law and LMAA terms and procedures.
    • No bill of lading was ultimately issued.

    Sudan Crisis Led to Cancellation of Booking

    • On April 18, 2023, the United Nations issued an advisory declaring cargo movements through Sudanese ports unsafe.
    • SARR Freights consequently cancelled the Booking Note by invoking force majeure. Argo Coral Maritime thereafter invoked arbitration under Clause 43.
    • SARR participated subject to its right to dispute the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction.
    • The proceedings eventually resulted in two arbitration references, which were consolidated for consideration of common preliminary issues.

    LMAA Tribunal Majority Held Arbitration Agreement Existed

    • By a partial award dated October 18, 2025, a majority of the arbitral tribunal concluded that the parties had agreed to English law and London arbitration.
    • The majority treated the reference to rider Clauses “20–41” in the Booking Note as a typographical error that ought to have read “20–43.”
    • It therefore considered Clause 43 applicable and held that the BIMCO Law and Arbitration Clause London 2020 governed the dispute, providing for LMAA arbitration in London before a three-member tribunal under English law.
    • SARR Freights approached the Delhi High Court seeking an anti-arbitration injunction.

    Single Judge Refused to Stop Arbitration

    • The Single Judge rejected SARR’s interim anti-arbitration injunction application.
    • Reliance was placed principally on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Govind Rubber Ltd. v. Louis Dreyfus Commodities Asia Pvt. Ltd., (2015) 13 SCC 477, and Trimex International FZE Ltd., Dubai v. Vedanta Aluminium Ltd., India, (2010) 3 SCC 1.
    • The Single Judge considered the reference to Clauses 20–41 an inadvertent error and held that the intention emerging from the earlier Fixture Recap showed that the parties had agreed to arbitration.
    • SARR Freights then challenged that decision before the Division Bench.

    SARR: Final Booking Note Deliberately Excluded Arbitration Clause

    • SARR argued that the signed Booking Note constituted the final agreement between the parties and expressly stated that its terms would prevail over previous arrangements.
    • The Booking Note specifically incorporated only rider Clauses 20–41. Clause 43, which contained the arbitration provision, was therefore excluded.
    • SARR contended that a court or tribunal could not rewrite the contract by substituting “20–43” for “20–41” when the final written agreement contained no ambiguity.
    • It relied upon Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, among other provisions and precedents.

    Argo Coral: “20–41” Was Merely a Typographical Error

    • Argo Coral Maritime argued that the Fixture Recap and Booking Note had to be read together.
    • According to the respondent, Clause 23 of the Fixture Recap already recorded the parties’ agreement to English law and London arbitration, and the subsequent Booking Note was intended to carry forward that arrangement.
    • It argued that the reference to “20–41” was merely a typographical mistake and should be read as “20–43.”

    Delhi High Court Confirms Its Jurisdiction

    • The Division Bench first rejected the respondent’s objection regarding the Delhi High Court’s territorial jurisdiction.
    • The Court noted that SARR had its permanent office in Delhi, the Booking Note was signed in Delhi, and enforcement proceedings against SARR, if required, would also take place there.
    • It held that where a substantial part of the cause of action arose in Delhi, Delhi courts would have jurisdiction. The mere possibility that courts in Mumbai might also possess jurisdiction did not deprive Delhi courts of jurisdiction.
    • The Court further held that Indian courts can determine whether an arbitration agreement itself is void or a nullity, notwithstanding the competence-competence principle.

    Clear Written Contract Cannot Be Rewritten Using Earlier Negotiations

    • The central part of the judgment concerns the evidentiary and contractual effect of a final written agreement.
    • The Division Bench examined Sections 91, 92, 93, 94 and 95 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
    • It held that once contractual terms have been reduced to a signed document and those terms are clear and unambiguous, the agreement must ordinarily be proved and interpreted from that document itself.
    • Earlier negotiations, correspondence and communications cannot be used to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the final written terms.
    • The Court explained that surrounding circumstances may become relevant where contractual language is unclear, ambiguous or defective. But where the language is plain and accurately applies to the existing facts, the court must ordinarily give effect to that language.

    Court Cannot Create a New Contract for the Parties

    • The Bench relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation v. Diamond & Gem Development Corporation Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC 470.
    • The principle reiterated was that courts must interpret a contract according to the words actually used and cannot make a new contract for the parties merely because another interpretation may appear more reasonable.
    • The Court also referred to Annaya Kocha Shetty v. Laxmibai Narayan Satose, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 758, reiterating that contractual interpretation begins with the plain, ordinary and literal meaning of the words used.

    Indian Law Distinguished From English Common Law

    • An important feature of the judgment is the Court’s detailed distinction between Indian codified law and English common law on contractual rectification.
    • The respondent relied upon foreign decisions to contend that prior negotiations could be considered to determine whether the final written instrument incorrectly recorded the parties’ previously agreed intention.
    • The Delhi High Court observed that English common law may, in appropriate circumstances, permit a court to examine prior negotiations and communications to determine whether a written instrument accurately reflects a prior agreement and to rectify the instrument where a mistake is established.
    • However, the Court held that the position under Indian codified law is materially different.
    • Once parties reduce their terms into a clear and signed written agreement, prior negotiations or communications cannot be used to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from those terms unless the contractual language is ambiguous or defective.
    • The Bench also observed that where Indian law is clear and settled, there is no need to resort to foreign case law.

    Govind Rubber and Trimex Distinguished

    • The Court distinguished the Supreme Court judgments in Govind Rubber and Trimex International, which had been relied upon by the Single Judge.
    • In those cases, there was no final signed written agreement, and therefore correspondence between the parties could legitimately be examined to determine whether an agreement had been reached.
    • The present case was materially different because the parties had ultimately executed a signed written Booking Note that expressly provided that it would prevail over previous arrangements.
    • Accordingly, the principles from those cases could not be used to rewrite the Booking Note.

    Reference to “Clauses 20–41” Was Deliberate, Not Typographical Error

    The Division Bench then closely examined the Booking Note itself.

    It found that the Special Terms box expressly stated:

    • “As per additional rider clause 20–41 in attached.”
    • The Court observed that the parties had not mechanically adopted the standard form. They had specifically filled in and modified several special terms while retaining the reference to Clauses 20–41.
    • According to the Bench, this demonstrated that the parties consciously considered the special terms and that the arbitration clause was not among the provisions incorporated into their agreement.
    • The Court also noted that the parties had made several changes between the earlier Fixture Recap and the final Booking Note, including terms concerning the vessel and detention. This reinforced the conclusion that the Booking Note was not simply a reproduction of the earlier negotiations but a separately considered and finalised contract.

    Fixture Recap and Clause 43 Contained Different Arbitration Arrangements

    The Court identified another significant distinction.

    Clause 23 of the earlier Fixture Recap merely provided for:

    “English law and London arbitration.”

    Clause 43 of the additional riders, however, contemplated:

    • “Bimco Dispute Resolution Clause latest edition to apply, subject to English Law and LMAA Terms and Procedures.”
    • The latter therefore introduced a more specific arbitral framework that had not been expressed in the earlier Fixture Recap.

    Final Agreement Expressly Superseded Earlier Arrangements

    • The Booking Note also contained an express contractual stipulation providing that its terms would “prevail over any previous arrangements.”
    • The High Court treated this as significant.
    • It relied upon Union of India v. Kishorilal Gupta & Bros. and Young Achievers v. IMS Learning Resources (P) Ltd. for the proposition that where an earlier contract containing an arbitration clause is superseded by a later agreement, the arbitration clause in the earlier arrangement does not necessarily survive the superseding contract.
    • The Bench therefore concluded that once the parties executed the Booking Note expressly providing that it would prevail over previous arrangements, there was no occasion to return to the Fixture Recap to determine the terms of the final contract.

    Delhi High Court Holds No Arbitration Agreement Existed

    • On its examination of the Booking Note, the Division Bench found that the reference to Clauses 20–41 was clear and unambiguous.
    • Clause 43 was not incorporated merely because Clauses 41, 42 and 43 appeared on the same page or because the parties’ signatures appeared below Clause 43.
    • The Court consequently held that there was no mistake, ambiguity or defective language in the Booking Note and no arbitration agreement existed between the parties.
    • This reversed the conclusion reached by the Single Judge and the majority view of the arbitral tribunal.

    Anti-Arbitration Injunction Granted

    • Having found that no arbitration agreement existed, the High Court held that the very foundation for continuation of the LMAA proceedings disappeared.
    • The Court relied upon its earlier decisions in Mcdonald’s India Pvt. Ltd. v. Vikram Bakshi and Dr. Bina Modi v. Lalit Kumar Modi concerning the circumstances in which Indian courts may grant an anti-arbitration injunction.
    • The Bench treated a dispute over whether the parties ever consented to arbitration as one of the exceptional circumstances capable of justifying judicial intervention.

    Accordingly, the Division Bench:

    • allowed SARR Freights’ appeal;
    • set aside the Single Judge’s order dated March 13, 2026; and
    • granted an anti-arbitration injunction restraining Argo Coral Maritime Ltd. from continuing, pursuing or taking any steps in the LMAA arbitration titled Argo Coral Maritime Ltd. v. SARR Freights Ltd./SARR Freights Corporation.

    Thus, SARR Freights Corporation and SARR Freights Ltd. succeeded in the appeal, and the London arbitration was restrained.

    Why the Judgment Is Significant

    • The judgment carries broader significance for international commercial contracts, shipping agreements and cross-border arbitration clauses.
    • It underscores that an arbitration clause must ultimately rest upon party consent. Earlier negotiations referring to arbitration cannot automatically be imported into a subsequent final signed contract where that contract deliberately incorporates only specified provisions and expressly supersedes earlier arrangements.
    • The decision also draws an important line between using correspondence to establish a contract where no signed agreement exists and using prior correspondence to alter a later, complete and unambiguous written agreement.
    • For businesses engaged in international trade, shipping, freight forwarding and charter arrangements, the judgment highlights the importance of carefully reviewing incorporation clauses, rider clauses, governing-law provisions and arbitration provisions before signing the final contractual document.

    Key Takeaway

    The Delhi High Court’s ruling establishes a clear contractual principle: where parties deliberately reduce their bargain into a final, signed and unambiguous document that supersedes previous arrangements, earlier emails and negotiations cannot ordinarily be used to insert an arbitration clause that the final contract itself did not incorporate.

    In this case, the Booking Note incorporated rider Clauses 20–41, while the arbitration provision appeared in Clause 43. The Court refused to rewrite “20–41” as “20–43” and consequently found that no arbitration agreement existed.

    The ruling therefore resulted in the unusual but legally significant remedy of an anti-arbitration injunction restraining continuation of foreign LMAA proceedings.

    Connected Matter

    Supreme Court: Unsigned Arbitration Agreement Can Still Bind Parties If Correspondence Shows Consensus

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Delhi High Court

    Disclaimer

    Handy Download:

    “Handy Order for Download”Download

    Write to us at office@aadrikaalaw.com

    Tel: +91-11-4999 2707

    www.aadrikaalaw.com

  • Karnataka HC: Wildlife Offence Cannot Be Prosecuted Solely on Police Charge Sheet Without Section 55 Complaint

    Karnataka HC: Wildlife Offence Cannot Be Prosecuted Solely on Police Charge Sheet Without Section 55 Complaint

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 21.09.2026

    Karnataka HC: Wildlife Offence Cannot Be Prosecuted Solely on Police Charge Sheet Without Section 55 Complaint

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate G Sridharamurthy. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id sriadv3@gmail.com . 

    The Karnataka High Court has quashed criminal prosecution against four accused in a case involving the alleged hunting of a wild boar, holding that where offences under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 are invoked, the statutory requirement contained in Section 55 governing cognizance must be complied with.

    Justice H.P. Sandesh, while allowing the connected proceedings, held that although the police may register an FIR and investigate the matter, prosecution for offences under Sections 9 and 51 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act cannot proceed merely on the basis of the Investigating Officer’s charge sheet when the complaint contemplated under Section 55 has not been filed by a competent authorised person.

    The Court also dealt with the application for release of a .177 calibre air gun, holding that the air gun involved fell within a category that did not require an arms licence and directing its release subject to conditions.

    The common order was delivered on September 19, 2026, in Sri Ramesh N. v. State by Arakere Police Station, W.P. No. 9069 of 2023, connected with Criminal Petition No. 9420 of 2022.

    Allegation: Wild Boar Hunted With Sporting Rifle

    • According to the prosecution, the incident occurred during the early hours of August 25, 2019, at about 4:30 a.m.
    • The accused were alleged to have hunted a wild boar using a 30.06 sporting rifle bearing No. 176100134 RFI.IN.2017, along with cartridges, allegedly without the requisite permission.

    Following information received by the police, a raid was conducted, articles were seized and criminal proceedings were initiated. After investigation, the police filed a charge sheet alleging offences under:

    • Sections 3, 25(1) and 27 of the Arms Act, 1959;
    • Sections 9 and 51 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972; and
    • Sections 146 and 196 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

    The police also seized a goods vehicle allegedly belonging to accused No. 1, claiming that it did not have valid insurance.

    Petitioners: Sporting Rifle Was Licensed

    • The accused approached the High Court under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings.
    • Their principal argument under the Arms Act was that the ingredients of Sections 3, 25 and 27 were not attracted.
    • They argued that they had not engaged in the manufacture or sale of arms or ammunition and that the weapon in question was a licensed firearm.
    • The petitioners further contended that the wild boar was damaging the paddy crop of petitioner No. 2 and that the incident had taken place in a paddy field rather than a reserved forest or other restricted hunting area.
    • They also relied on Section 11(2) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act in support of their defence and referred to a notification concerning wild boars in neighbouring Ramanagara district.
    • The State opposed the petitions, arguing that even possession of a licensed weapon remains subject to the conditions attached to the licence and that there was no permission to hunt wild boar merely to protect crops.

    Karnataka HC: Sections 3, 25 and 27 Arms Act Not Properly Invoked

    • The High Court examined the statutory scheme of the Arms Act, 1959 in detail.
    • Section 3 prohibits a person from acquiring, possessing or carrying a firearm or ammunition without a licence issued in accordance with the Act and Rules.
    • However, in the present case, the Court found that a licence had in fact been issued by the competent authority for the SBBL rifle. The licence was initially within Bengaluru District and was subsequently extended to the jurisdiction of Karnataka State.
    • The High Court therefore observed that the existence of the licence was clear. Whether its conditions had been contravened was a matter to be considered separately.
    • Justice Sandesh further found that there was no allegation that the petitioners had engaged in the sale or manufacture of arms or ammunition.
    • Consequently, the Court held that there was force in the petitioners’ contention that invoking Sections 3, 25 and 27 of the Arms Act against them in the manner adopted by the prosecution was bad in law.

    Section 30 Arms Act Was Relevant to Breach of Licence Conditions

    • An important aspect of the judgment is the High Court’s reference to Section 30 of the Arms Act.
    • The Court noted that Section 30 deals with punishment for contravention of a condition of a licence, or a provision of the Act or Rules for which punishment has not otherwise been provided.
    • The High Court observed that the Investigating Agency had failed to consider Section 30 before invoking Sections 3, 25 and 27.
    • The distinction was important because the prosecution’s case involved a firearm for which a licence existed, rather than a straightforward case of possession of an unlicensed firearm.

    Section 27 Arms Act Is Confined to Contraventions of Sections 5 or 7

    • The High Court also relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Surinder Singh v. State (Union Territory of Chandigarh), (2021) 20 SCC 24.
    • Referring to that ruling, the Court noted that after amendment of Section 27 of the Arms Act, the provision is confined to violations connected with Sections 5 or 7 of the Arms Act.
    • The earlier concept of using a weapon for an “unlawful purpose” was no longer, by itself, an inseparable ingredient of Section 27 after the amendment.
    • The High Court further noted the Supreme Court’s observation that where a person is in authorised possession of a weapon, he cannot simply be treated as having used an unlicensed weapon prohibited under Section 5.
    • The Karnataka High Court also referred to the Kerala High Court’s decision in Joby and Others v. State of Kerala, where it was observed that Section 27 would be attracted where the use of arms or ammunition was in contravention of Section 5, and that use of a licensed gun for shooting a wild boar would not, merely for that reason, constitute an Arms Act offence under the provision.

    Section 55 Wildlife Act Becomes Decisive

    • The most consequential part of the ruling concerned Section 55 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972.
    • Sections 9 and 51 of the Act had been invoked against the accused. Section 9 prohibits hunting of specified wild animals except as permitted under the Act, while Section 51 prescribes penalties for contraventions.
    • Section 55, however, specifically regulates cognizance of offences under the Wildlife Act.
    • The High Court noted that a court cannot take cognizance of an offence under the Act except upon a complaint by the persons/statutory authorities specified in Section 55, including the designated wildlife authorities or other duly authorised persons.

    No Complaint Filed by Officer Specified Under Section 55

    • Applying the provision to the facts, the High Court found that no complaint had been lodged by an officer specified under Section 55.
    • Instead, the proceedings had arisen from police action, investigation and the subsequent filing of a charge sheet.
    • The Court recorded that the accused had allegedly been found in possession of wild boar meat and weapons, were arrested and subsequently released on bail. The rifle allegedly used in the incident had also already been released.
    • Justice Sandesh drew an important distinction: an FIR can be registered and the police can investigate, but when prosecution is sought for offences under Sections 9 and 51 of the special enactment, the requirement of a complaint by an authorised person under Section 55 must be satisfied.
    • The Court held that the Investigating Officer could make use of material gathered during investigation, but prosecution under the Wildlife Act could not proceed in the manner adopted without the statutorily required complaint.

    Supreme Court’s Murad Ali Khan Judgment Applied

    • The High Court relied significantly upon the Supreme Court’s decision in State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan & Others, (1988) 4 SCC 655.
    • In that case, the Supreme Court had examined Section 55 and held that cognizance of an offence under the Wildlife Act could be taken only upon the complaint of the statutory officer contemplated by the provision.
    • The Karnataka High Court reproduced the Supreme Court’s explanation that even if the jurisdictional police register a case concerning an alleged Wildlife Act offence, the statutory manner in which the court may take cognizance remains governed by Section 55.
    • The Court also relied on its earlier decision in Sri S. Bylaiah v. State of Bannerghatta Police, ILR 2008 KAR 1892, where proceedings had been quashed because the complainant was not an authorised person within the meaning of Section 55.
    • Ultimately, the Court found that the present proceedings had been initiated solely on the basis of registration of the police case rather than through the complaint required under Section 55.
    • It therefore held that there was a clear statutory bar to taking cognizance in the manner adopted.

    .177 Calibre Air Gun Did Not Require Licence

    • The connected writ petition raised another significant question concerning the seized PRECIHOLE SPORTS CAL. 4.5 (.177) air gun, Serial No. AH0-01581.
    • Ramesh N. sought release of the air gun, contending that it was an exempted weapon that did not require an arms licence.
    • The petitioner’s case was that an air rifle with muzzle energy below 20 joules or 15 ft-lbs and/or bore below .177 inch/4.5 mm fell within Category III(f)(ii) of the Arms Rules, 2016 and was not subject to licensing requirements.
    • The FSL examination recorded that the seized weapon was a .177 calibre air gun, was in working condition and had an effective range of approximately 25 yards.
    • The High Court ultimately found that the air gun fell within Category III(f)(ii) and therefore did not require an arms licence.
    • It also noted that the FSL report did not establish that the air gun had been used for hunting.

    Keeping Seized Air Gun Idle Would Cause Deterioration

    • The Trial Court had earlier refused release of the air gun, partly because of an apprehension that it could again be used for hunting or could be transferred or altered.
    • The High Court found this reasoning unsustainable.
    • Justice Sandesh observed that such apprehension could not by itself justify continued retention of the weapon. The Court also took into account that keeping the air gun idle could cause its condition and value to deteriorate.
    • Accordingly, it held that the Trial Court ought not to have rejected the application for release.

    Criminal Prosecution Quashed — But Fresh Complaint Permitted

    • The Karnataka High Court ultimately allowed Criminal Petition No. 9420 of 2022 and quashed the Trial Court’s taking of cognizance and the criminal prosecution in C.C. No. 1216/2021 because the proceedings violated Section 55 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act.
    • However, this is an important qualification: the Court did not permanently foreclose prosecution for the alleged wildlife offence.
    • The High Court expressly granted liberty to the prosecuting authority to invoke Section 55 through a competent officer and file a complaint invoking the appropriate offences.
    • Thus, the judgment is primarily a ruling on the legality of the mode of prosecution and cognizance, rather than a final factual determination that no wild boar was hunted.

    Air Gun Ordered to Be Released

    • The High Court also allowed W.P. No. 9069 of 2023, set aside the Trial Court’s order dated August 2, 2022 and allowed the application under Section 457 CrPC.
    • The Investigating Officer was directed to release the air gun after obtaining an indemnity bond of ₹1,00,000 with one surety.

    The release was made subject to conditions that the petitioner:

    • must not sell the air gun;
    • must not alter its nature; and
    • must produce it whenever required by the authority or the Court.

    Important Precedents Referred to by the High Court

    • The judgment referred to several decisions concerning the Arms Act, Wildlife Act and inherent powers of the High Court, including Deomuni Sharma v. State of Jharkhand, (2009) 16 SCC 80, on Section 27 of the Arms Act; Gulam Mustafa Malik v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 1577, concerning Section 55 of the Wildlife Act; Rajan & Others v. State of U.P., 2008 (2) AJHAR (NOC) 554 (All.), concerning sanction under the Arms Act; and State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, on the scope of Section 482 CrPC.
    • It further relied on State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan & Others, (1988) 4 SCC 655, Surinder Singh v. State (UT of Chandigarh), (2021) 20 SCC 24, Manish Bhupendrabhai Panwala v. State of Gujarat & Another, Joby & Others v. State of Kerala and Sri S. Bylaiah v. State of Bannerghatta Police, ILR 2008 KAR 1892.

    Why the Judgment Is Significant

    • The ruling draws an important distinction between police investigation and statutory cognizance under a special enactment.
    • The High Court did not hold that police are powerless to register an FIR or investigate alleged wildlife offences. Instead, it held that where prosecution is ultimately pursued for offences under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, the special procedure prescribed by Section 55 for taking cognizance cannot be bypassed by proceeding solely on a police charge sheet.
    • The judgment is also important for firearms law because it distinguishes between the use of a licensed firearm and offences specifically contemplated by Sections 3, 25 and 27 of the Arms Act. Where the allegation may concern breach of licence conditions, the appropriate statutory provision must be identified rather than mechanically invoking provisions dealing with unlicensed possession or other distinct Arms Act contraventions.
    • Finally, the ruling provides useful clarification regarding low-powered .177 calibre air guns under the Arms Rules, 2016, with the Court holding on the facts before it that the seized air gun fell within Category III(f)(ii) and was not subject to licensing requirements.

    Key Takeaway

    The Karnataka High Court has quashed the existing prosecution arising from the alleged wild boar hunting incident because cognizance under the Wild Life (Protection) Act had been taken without the complaint of a competent person contemplated by Section 55.

    At the same time, the ruling does not amount to a final acquittal on the factual allegation of hunting. The competent prosecuting authority has expressly been given liberty to institute proceedings afresh in accordance with Section 55 and invoke appropriate offences. The Court separately ordered release of the seized .177 calibre air gun, finding it to fall within a category not requiring an arms licence and subjecting its release to safeguards against sale, alteration or non-production when required.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Karnataka High Court

    Disclaimer

    Handy Download:

    “Handy Order for Download”Download

    Write to us at office@aadrikaalaw.com

    Tel: +91-11-4999 2707

    www.aadrikaalaw.com

  • Rajasthan High Court: Trademark Applications Cannot Remain Pending Indefinitely; Speedy Disposal Is a Right Protected Under Article 21

    Rajasthan High Court: Trademark Applications Cannot Remain Pending Indefinitely; Speedy Disposal Is a Right Protected Under Article 21

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 21.09.2026

    Rajasthan High Court: Trademark Applications Cannot Remain Pending Indefinitely; Speedy Disposal Is a Right Protected Under Article 21

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    The Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, has held that trademark registration proceedings cannot be kept pending indefinitely and that the right to a speedy and expeditious hearing and timely disposal of statutory applications is an inalienable right of every litigant.

    Justice Maneesh Sharma, allowing a writ petition filed by Mittal Commerce Classes Pvt. Ltd., directed the Registrar of Trade Marks, Ahmedabad to endeavour to decide the company’s pending trademark application along with the connected opposition expeditiously and preferably within four months from receipt of a certified copy of the order.

    The order was passed on September 14, 2026, in Mittal Commerce Classes Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors., S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9703/2026, Neutral Citation 2026:RJ-JP:36884.

    Trademark Application Pending Since 2018

    • Mittal Commerce Classes Pvt. Ltd., which provides educational coaching and training services, approached the High Court complaining of prolonged delay in adjudication of its trademark proceedings.
    • The company stated that it was already the registered proprietor of Trade Mark No. 2039137 dated October 18, 2010.
    • It subsequently filed Trademark Application No. 3944189 in Class 41 for the same/associated mark “Mittal Commerce Class” before the Trade Marks Registry, Ahmedabad on September 13, 2018.
    • Despite completion of pleadings and filing of evidence, the trademark application remained undecided.
    • The petitioner argued that this prolonged pendency was causing serious prejudice and was inconsistent with the statutory scheme contemplated under the Trade Marks Rules, 2017.

    Opposition Filed in 2020, But Proceedings Remained Undecided

    • The High Court examined the procedural history and found that Trademark Application No. 3944189 had been filed on September 13, 2018.
    • Opposition No. 1043339 was subsequently filed on May 4, 2020.
    • After completion of pleadings by both parties, the matter was posted for evidence. However, the Court noted that nothing further had transpired despite the passage of more than six years.
    • By the time the High Court considered the matter, the trademark application had remained pending for approximately eight years, while the opposition had been pending for more than six years.

    Petitioner Invokes Rule 50 of Trade Marks Rules, 2017

    • Mittal Commerce Classes relied principally upon Rule 50 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, which governs hearing and decision in trademark opposition proceedings.
    • The company sought a direction requiring the Registrar to hear and finally dispose of the pending application and connected opposition without unnecessary adjournments or further avoidable delay.
    • The petitioner initially sought disposal preferably within 30 days, although the High Court ultimately fixed a preferred period of four months.

    What Does Rule 50 Require?

    • The High Court reproduced Rule 50 in detail.
    • Under Rule 50(1), after closure of evidence, the Registrar is required to issue notice to the parties specifying the first date of hearing. That hearing must be fixed for a date at least one month after the date of the first notice.
    • Rule 50(2) allows a party to seek an adjournment for reasonable cause through Form TM-M, accompanied by the prescribed fee and filed at least three days before the hearing.

    Crucially, the proviso imposes limits on adjournments:

    No party can be granted more than two adjournments, and each adjournment cannot exceed 30 days.

    • Rule 50 further provides consequences for non-appearance. If the applicant fails to appear on the adjourned hearing date, the application may be treated as abandoned; if the opponent fails to appear, the opposition may be dismissed for want of prosecution and the application may proceed toward registration, subject to Section 19.
    • The Registrar must also consider written arguments submitted by the parties and communicate the final decision in writing.

    Rajasthan HC: Rule 50 Shows Legislative Intent for Time-Bound Trademark Proceedings

    • The High Court interpreted the strict limits on adjournments under Rule 50 as reflecting a clear legislative intention.
    • Justice Sharma observed that the statutory restriction of a maximum of two adjournments, with each not exceeding 30 days, demonstrates that the Rules contemplate a complete and time-bound mechanism for expeditious disposal of trademark registration applications.
    • The Court held that the framework leaves “no room for unnecessary or avoidable delay.”
    • This observation is significant for applicants as well as opponents because prolonged pendency of trademark proceedings can create uncertainty regarding registration, enforcement and commercial exploitation of a mark.

    Registry: Petitioner Had Not Filed Rule 34 Application

    • The respondents opposed the writ petition.
    • They argued that a writ petition merely seeking expedition of pending proceedings was not maintainable in the form presented.
    • More importantly, they contended that Mittal Commerce Classes had not filed an application under Rule 34 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, and was therefore not entitled to seek the relief claimed before the High Court.
    • The High Court rejected this objection.

    Failure to File Rule 34 Application Cannot Be an Absolute Bar: Rajasthan HC

    Justice Sharma held that the petitioner’s failure to move a formal application seeking expedition under Rule 34 was merely a procedural omission and could not operate as an absolute bar against approaching the High Court for expeditious disposal of the trademark proceedings.

    The Court observed:

    “The mere procedural omission of not having moved a formal application for expediting the proceedings under Rule 34 cannot operate as an absolute bar…”

    • Accordingly, the Registry’s procedural objection was rejected.
    • This aspect of the ruling is particularly relevant because it prevents procedural technicalities from becoming a justification for continued and excessive delay in deciding statutory applications.

    Excessive Delay in Trademark Proceedings Can Violate Natural Justice

    • The Rajasthan High Court relied upon an earlier decision of its Coordinate Bench in Mrs. Nirmala Kabra v. The Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr., S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 18998/2022.
    • In that case, the Court had emphasised that excessive delays in deciding trademark registration applications undermine the very purpose for which such applications are filed.

    The judgment observed that prolonged proceedings can result in consequences including:

    • loss of evidence;
    • increased costs;
    • continuing uncertainty for businesses and litigants; and
    • erosion of public confidence in the fairness and efficiency of the statutory system.

    Most importantly, the Coordinate Bench had held that excessive delay in disposal of applications amounts to violation of principles of natural justice, because statutory procedures must be conducted fairly and within a reasonable timeframe.

    Speedy Disposal of Trademark Applications Protected Under Article 21

    • The most significant constitutional aspect of the ruling concerns Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
    • Quoting the earlier Nirmala Kabra decision, the Court reiterated that trademark registration applications cannot be allowed to remain pending for decades and that the Registrar of Trade Marks is not expected to keep such applications pending for an indefinite period.

    The earlier judgment had declared:

    “The right of speedy and expeditious disposal of these applications is one of the most valuable and cherished rights of the applicant guaranteed under Article 21…”

    • Justice Sharma applied that principle to the case before him.
    • The Court then independently observed that the right to a speedy and expeditious hearing and timely disposal of statutory applications is an inalienable right of every litigant.
    • Such a valuable right, it held, cannot be curtailed or defeated on the altar of procedural technicalities.

    Eight-Year Pendency Considered Unacceptable

    • The factual timeline played an important role in the Court’s decision.
    • The trademark application had been pending since September 13, 2018, while the opposition had remained pending since May 4, 2020.

    The High Court recorded that this amounted to approximately:

    ProceedingDatePendency noted by Court
    Trademark Application No. 3944189September 13, 2018About 8 years
    Opposition No. 1043339May 4, 2020More than 6 years
    ClassClass 41Educational/coaching services
    Order of Rajasthan HCSeptember 14, 2026Writ allowed

    The Court concluded that such prolonged pendency justified issuance of a direction to the Registrar.

    Registrar Directed to Decide Trademark Application Preferably Within Four Months

    • The Rajasthan High Court ultimately allowed the writ petition.
    • It directed the Registrar of Trade Marks, Ahmedabad to make an endeavour to decide Trademark Application No. 3944189 together with Opposition No. 1043339 expeditiously and preferably within four months from receipt of a certified copy of the High Court’s order.
    • All other pending applications in the writ proceedings were consequently disposed of.
    • Importantly, the High Court did not decide whether the “Mittal Commerce Classes” trademark should ultimately be registered or whether the opposition should succeed.
    • The judgment concerns the delay in adjudication and the petitioner’s right to obtain a timely decision. The merits of the trademark application and opposition remain for the Registrar to determine.

    Why the Judgment Is Important for Trademark Applicants and Opponents

    • The ruling has wider implications for parties facing long-pending proceedings before the Trade Marks Registry.
    • First, it reinforces that statutory trademark proceedings are expected to progress within a reasonable and time-bound framework, particularly once evidence has been completed and the matter has reached the hearing stage.
    • Second, the Court’s interpretation of Rule 50 emphasises that repeated adjournments cannot be used to indefinitely postpone adjudication. The Rules themselves cap both the number and duration of adjournments.
    • Third, the ruling indicates that failure to first file a procedural application seeking expedition under Rule 34 does not necessarily prevent a litigant from approaching the High Court where extraordinary delay has already occurred.
    • Finally, by connecting speedy disposal with Article 21 and principles of natural justice, the Rajasthan High Court has treated delay not merely as an administrative inconvenience but as an issue capable of affecting substantive procedural rights.

    Important Legal Distinction

    • The judgment should not be interpreted as granting Mittal Commerce Classes registration of its trademark.
    • The High Court has not adjudicated the merits of Trademark Application No. 3944189 or Opposition No. 1043339. It has instead directed the Registrar to bring the long-pending statutory proceedings to a timely conclusion.
    • The eventual question of whether the mark should be accepted or refused—and whether the opposition should succeed—remains within the jurisdiction of the Trade Marks Registry.

    Key Takeaway

    The Rajasthan High Court has sent a clear message against indefinite pendency of trademark applications and opposition proceedings.

    Where an application filed in 2018 and an opposition filed in 2020 remained unresolved despite completion of the procedural stages, the Court held that procedural technicalities such as failure to file a Rule 34 application could not defeat the litigant’s right to seek timely adjudication.

    The Court’s reliance on Rule 50 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, principles of natural justice and Article 21 of the Constitution makes the decision particularly relevant to trademark applicants and opponents facing prolonged delays before the Registry.

    Connected Matter

    Rajasthan High Court: 15-Year Delay in Trademark Application Violates Natural Justice

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Rajasthan High Court

    Disclaimer

    Handy Download:

    “Handy Order for Download”Download

    Write to us at office@aadrikaalaw.com

    Tel: +91-11-4999 2707

    www.aadrikaalaw.com

    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Drone Found With 500-Gram Heroin Packet: Punjab & Haryana HC Grants Bail to Accused After Year-Long Custody

    Drone Found With 500-Gram Heroin Packet: Punjab & Haryana HC Grants Bail to Accused After Year-Long Custody

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 19.09.2026

    Drone Found With 500-Gram Heroin Packet: Punjab & Haryana HC Grants Bail to Accused After Year-Long Custody

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    The Punjab and Haryana High Court has granted regular bail to an accused in an NDPS case involving the alleged recovery of 500 grams of heroin found alongside a drone, observing that the accused’s connection with the contraband and the admissibility of the disclosure statement relied upon by the prosecution are matters to be determined during trial.

    Justice Vikram Aggarwal, in Lovepreet Singh @ Labha v. State of Punjab, CRM-M-7640-2026 (O&M), passed the order on 17 September 2026.

    Drone and 500 Grams of Heroin Found in Riverbed

    • The case arose from FIR No. 22 dated 30 April 2025, registered at Police Station Narot Jaimal Singh, District Pathankot, under Section 21 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, along with Sections 10, 11 and 12 of the Aircraft Act, 1934.
    • According to the prosecution case recorded by the High Court, a drone was recovered from a riverbed on 30 April 2025. A packet was found alongside the drone, from which 500 grams of heroin was allegedly recovered.
    • Significantly, the order does not state that the heroin was physically recovered from Lovepreet Singh.

    Accused Linked to Recovery Through Later Disclosure Statement

    • The petitioner was subsequently apprehended in another case—FIR No. 92 dated 1 August 2025, registered at Police Station Taragarh under Sections 21 and 29 of the NDPS Act.
    • Another case, FIR No. 93 dated 2 August 2025, was also registered at the same police station under Sections 21 and 29 of the NDPS Act and Section 111 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.
    • The prosecution alleged that while involved in FIR No. 92, Lovepreet Singh made a disclosure statement on 31 August 2025, stating that the heroin recovered on 30 April 2025 belonged to him.
    • On that basis, he was arrested in the present case on 16 September 2025 and remained in custody thereafter.

    Defence: No Evidence Apart From Disclosure Statement

    • Counsel for Lovepreet Singh argued that the petitioner had been falsely implicated and could not otherwise be connected with the contraband recovered alongside the drone.
    • The defence specifically contended that, apart from the alleged disclosure statement, there was no other evidence linking the petitioner with the recovered heroin.
    • It was further submitted that the investigation had already been completed and the final report submitted, but charges had still not been framed. Of the 18 prosecution witnesses, none had been examined.
    • The defence therefore argued that the trial was likely to take considerable time and that continued incarceration would serve no useful purpose.

    Punjab Opposes Bail Citing Commercial Quantity

    • The State of Punjab opposed the regular bail application.
    • The State argued that the case involved a commercial quantity of heroin and relied upon the petitioner’s alleged statement that the recovered narcotic substance belonged to him.
    • The High Court, however, did not finally determine whether the disclosure statement was admissible or whether it sufficiently connected the petitioner with the contraband.

    Whether Disclosure Statement Is Admissible Must Be Decided at Trial: High Court

    • The High Court observed that the question of whether Lovepreet Singh could actually be linked with the recovered contraband could only be determined upon conclusion of the trial.
    • The Court noted that the recovery had taken place on 30 April 2025, whereas the petitioner, while already in custody in another case, was alleged to have subsequently made the disclosure statement regarding the heroin.

    Crucially, the Court observed:

    • “The admissibility of the same shall also be determined at the stage of trial.”
    • Thus, for purposes of the bail proceedings, the High Court did not treat the alleged disclosure statement as finally establishing the petitioner’s connection with the narcotic substance.

    One Year in Custody; Not a Single Witness Examined

    • The duration of custody and lack of progress in the trial also weighed with the High Court.
    • Lovepreet Singh had remained in custody since 16 September 2025, meaning that approximately one year had elapsed by the time his bail petition was decided.
    • The investigation was complete and the final report had already been submitted. Despite this, charges had not been framed and none of the 18 prosecution witnesses had been examined.
    • The Court consequently found it clear that the trial would take a “sufficiently long time” to conclude.
    • In those circumstances, Justice Aggarwal held that no useful purpose would be served by keeping the petitioner in custody any longer.

    High Court Orders Release on Regular Bail

    • The Punjab and Haryana High Court accordingly allowed the petition without expressing any opinion on the merits of the criminal case.
    • Lovepreet Singh was ordered to be released on regular bail upon furnishing the required bail and surety bonds to the satisfaction of the concerned Trial Court, Chief Judicial Magistrate or Duty Magistrate.
    • The order is therefore a bail decision and not an acquittal. The questions of the petitioner’s connection with the heroin, the evidentiary value and admissibility of the disclosure statement, and the prosecution allegations remain open for determination during trial.

    Why the Order Is Significant

    • The order highlights two considerations that can become important in NDPS bail proceedings: the nature of the material connecting an accused with the recovered contraband and the progress of the criminal trial during prolonged custody.
    • Here, the alleged heroin was found alongside a drone months before the petitioner was arrested in the case, while the link asserted against him was based on a subsequent disclosure statement allegedly made while he was already in custody in another matter. The High Court expressly left the admissibility of that statement to be determined at trial.
    • At the same time, the Court took into account that the petitioner had spent a year in custody, investigation was over, the final report had been filed, charges remained unframed and 0 out of 18 witnesses had been examined.
    • The order should, however, be read on its own facts and does not contain a general ruling that every disclosure-statement-based NDPS case automatically entitles an accused to bail.

    Key Takeaway

    The Punjab and Haryana High Court granted regular bail to Lovepreet Singh in the 500-gram heroin case after noting that the narcotic substance had been recovered alongside a drone months before his arrest, while his alleged connection to it arose through a later disclosure statement whose admissibility remained a matter for trial.

    With the petitioner having spent around a year in custody, investigation completed, charges yet to be framed and none of the 18 witnesses examined, the Court concluded that continued incarceration would serve no useful purpose.

    The Court expressly refrained from commenting on the merits of the prosecution case.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Punjab & Haryana High Court

    Disclaimer

    Handy Download:

    “Handy Order for Download”Download

    Write to us at office@aadrikaalaw.com

    Tel: +91-11-4999 2707

    www.aadrikaalaw.com

    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Bombay High Court: Section 79 RERA Bars Civil Suit Where Reliefs Can Be Granted by RERA Authority

    Bombay High Court: Section 79 RERA Bars Civil Suit Where Reliefs Can Be Granted by RERA Authority

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 19.09.2026

    Bombay High Court: Section 79 RERA Bars Civil Suit Where Reliefs Can Be Granted by RERA Authority

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id amitnaren@outlook.com .  

    The Bombay High Court has held that where the relief sought by flat purchasers essentially concerns enforcement of a promoter’s statutory obligations in a RERA-registered project, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred by Section 79 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA) if the relief can be granted under the statutory mechanism created by RERA.

    In Mr. Yadavalli Venkata Gopalam & Anr. v. M/s Sai Siddhant Developers & Anr., the High Court dismissed an appeal challenging a City Civil Court order that had returned the purchasers’ plaint under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for presentation before the appropriate RERA forum.

    Justice Sandeep V. Marne pronounced the judgment on 4 November 2023, after reserving it on 23 October 2023. The decision is reported with neutral citation 2023:BHC-AS:33740.

    Flat Purchasers Approached Civil Court Against Developer and Society

    • The appellants had instituted S.C. Suit No. 964 of 2023 before the City Civil Court, Mumbai.
    • Their dispute concerned Flat No. 1105 on the 11th Floor, having a carpet area of 643 sq. ft. and built-up area of 772 sq. ft., in the building known as D.N. Nagar Shivneri CHS Ltd., Andheri West, Mumbai.
    • They sought a mandatory direction requiring the developer, M/s Sai Siddhant Developers, to adhere to the terms and conditions of the agreement concerning the flat and fulfil its statutory obligations under the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act, 1963 (MOFA).
    • They also sought an injunction restraining the defendants from selling, transferring, alienating or creating third-party rights in the flat.

    Society Invokes Section 79 of RERA

    • D.N. Nagar Shivneri Co-operative Housing Society filed a Notice of Motion seeking return of the plaint under Order VII Rule 10 CPC.
    • The Society argued that the Civil Court could not entertain the suit because its jurisdiction was barred by Section 79 of RERA.
    • The City Civil Court accepted the objection and, by an order dated 11 July 2023, returned the plaint for presentation before RERA. The purchasers challenged that decision before the Bombay High Court.

    Purchasers Argue Suit Was for Specific Performance

    • The purchasers argued before the High Court that their suit was actually one for specific performance of the Agreement for Sale dated 10 June 2015.
    • They contended that they had already paid a substantial portion of the agreed consideration but that the developer had failed to perform its contractual obligations.
    • They further alleged collusion between the developer and the Society and argued that RERA could not determine questions involving fraud and collusion.
    • The purchasers relied upon the Constitution Bench judgment in Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., AIR 1969 SC 78, to argue that exclusion of Civil Court jurisdiction should not be readily inferred.
    • They also relied upon State of A.P. v. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao & Ors., (2000) 3 SCC 689, which reiterates the general principle that Civil Courts possess jurisdiction over suits of a civil nature unless jurisdiction is expressly or impliedly excluded.

    Society: Suit Was Really About Enforcement of Promoter’s Statutory Obligations

    • The Society disputed the purchasers’ characterization of the suit.
    • It argued that the suit was not actually for specific performance of the Agreement for Sale. Instead, the purchasers were asking the developer to fulfil obligations arising under MOFA which, following registration of the project under RERA, could be enforced through the remedies available under the RERA framework.
    • The Society relied on Sections 11, 19, 34 and 79 of RERA, arguing that the Act provides an adequate mechanism for seeking completion of construction, possession and enforcement of the promoter’s statutory obligations.

    Bombay HC Examines Actual Prayers in the Plaint

    • A crucial part of the High Court’s analysis concerned the actual reliefs sought in the plaint, rather than the purchasers’ description of their case during arguments.
    • The principal prayer sought a mandatory direction requiring the developer to adhere to the agreement relating to Flat No. 1105 and fulfil its statutory obligations under MOFA.
    • The purchasers had also sought a permanent injunction against creation of third-party rights, appointment of a Court Receiver, and a direction requiring the developer to deposit ₹68,78,890 with 18% interest to secure the money paid by them.

    After examining those prayers, the High Court reached an important factual conclusion:

    • “Thus, there is no prayer for specific performance of the agreement for sale dated 10 June 2015.”
    • According to the Court, the suit instead sought adherence to the terms of the agreement and/or fulfilment of statutory obligations under MOFA.

    Court-Fee Valuation Also Showed Suit Was Not for Specific Performance

    • The High Court also examined how the purchasers themselves had valued their suit.
    • They had valued the proceeding under Section 6(iv)(j) of the Maharashtra Court Fees Act, stating that the relief was incapable of monetary valuation because what they sought was enforcement of the developer’s statutory obligations under MOFA.
    • The Court contrasted this with Section 6(xi) of the Court Fees Act, which specifically deals with suits for specific performance and, in the case of a contract of sale, requires valuation according to the amount of consideration.
    • The High Court therefore found that the purchasers’ own pleadings and court-fee valuation supported the conclusion that the suit was not a suit for specific performance.

    Mere Allegation of Fraud or Collusion Cannot Create Civil Court Jurisdiction

    • The purchasers also attempted to sustain the Civil Court’s jurisdiction by alleging fraud and collusion between the Society and the developer.
    • The High Court rejected this contention on the facts.
    • Justice Marne noted that the word “fraud” was not even pleaded in the suit, while references to “collusion” were unsupported by material particulars.
    • The Court relied upon the Supreme Court’s ruling in C.S. Ramaswamy v. V.K. Senthil & Ors., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1330, which emphasised that a mere allegation of fraud is insufficient and that fraud must be supported by specific pleadings explaining how it was committed.
    • Accordingly, unsupported references to fraud or collusion could not be used to alter the true character of the suit or avoid the statutory jurisdictional bar.

    RERA Project Registration Was Crucial

    • The High Court noted that under the first proviso to Section 3(1) of RERA, projects for which a completion certificate had not been issued when RERA commenced are required to be registered with the Authority.
    • In this case, the project had been registered with MahaRERA under Registration No. P51800004197 on 8 August 2017.
    • The Court therefore found that the purchasers could seek enforcement of the promoter’s obligations through the remedies created by RERA.
    • Those remedies included seeking refund with interest, fulfilment of the promoter’s obligations and possession of the flat under Section 19(3).

    Section 79 RERA Bars Civil Court Jurisdiction Over Matters RERA Can Determine

    • Section 79 provides that no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain a suit or proceeding concerning any matter which the RERA Authority, adjudicating officer or Appellate Tribunal is empowered under the Act to determine.
    • It also prohibits courts or other authorities from granting injunctions concerning action taken or proposed under powers conferred by RERA.
    • Applying this provision to the particular reliefs sought by the appellants, Justice Marne held that the City Civil Court had correctly concluded that its jurisdiction was barred.
    • The High Court stated that, in the circumstances before it, the bar under Section 79 was “absolute”, because an adequate mechanism existed under RERA for the purchasers to seek fulfilment of the developer/promoter’s obligations.

    Important Qualification: Court Leaves Broader Specific-Performance Question Open

    • An important qualification in the judgment should not be overlooked.
    • The Bombay High Court did not hold that every civil suit seeking specific performance of an agreement concerning a RERA-registered project is barred by Section 79.
    • During arguments, counsel for the Society fairly conceded that such an absolute proposition could not necessarily be advanced.
    • The Court expressly stated that the broader question—whether Civil Court jurisdiction is barred in every suit seeking specific performance of an agreement concerning a RERA project—was being left open for determination in an appropriate case.
    • The decision therefore turns substantially on the Court’s finding that the particular plaint before it was not actually a suit for specific performance.

    What Supreme Court’s Imperia Structures Decision Meant

    • The Society had also relied upon Imperia Structures Ltd. v. Anil Patni & Anr., (2020) 10 SCC 783.
    • The Bombay High Court observed that Imperia Structures principally concerned the relationship between remedies under RERA and those available before consumer fora.
    • The Supreme Court had recognised that Section 79 bars Civil Court jurisdiction over matters which the RERA Authority, adjudicating officer or Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine, while consumer remedies remain separately available in the circumstances considered in that case.
    • However, Justice Marne clarified that Imperia Structures did not resolve the broader issue of whether every specific-performance suit concerning a RERA agreement is barred.

    Appeal Dismissed; City Civil Court Order Upheld

    • The Bombay High Court ultimately found no patent error in the City Civil Court’s decision.
    • Accordingly, Appeal From Order No. 662 of 2023 was dismissed without costs.
    • As a consequence, the connected Interim Application No. 14511 of 2023 also did not survive and was disposed of.
    • Thus, the order returning the purchasers’ plaint for presentation before the appropriate RERA forum remained undisturbed.

    Key Takeaway

    The judgment demonstrates that the substance of the plaint and the actual reliefs claimed—not merely the label given to the suit—will be crucial when determining whether Section 79 RERA excludes Civil Court jurisdiction. Where a purchaser essentially seeks enforcement of obligations that the RERA Authority is empowered to enforce, the Civil Court may lack jurisdiction.

    At the same time, the Bombay High Court deliberately left open the broader question of whether a genuine suit for specific performance of an agreement for sale in a RERA-registered project is necessarily barred.

    Connected Matter

    Bombay HC: RERA Tribunal Cannot Grant Declaration, Permanent Injunction or Cancel Sanction Plan

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Bombay High Court

    Disclaimer

    Handy Download:

    “Handy Order for Download”Download

    Write to us at office@aadrikaalaw.com

    Tel: +91-11-4999 2707

    www.aadrikaalaw.com

  • Supreme Court: Section 29A Application Can Be Filed Even After Arbitrator’s Mandate Expires

    Supreme Court: Section 29A Application Can Be Filed Even After Arbitrator’s Mandate Expires

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 19.09.2026

    Supreme Court: Section 29A Application Can Be Filed Even After Arbitrator’s Mandate Expires

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Arbitrator Shobhit Mallik. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id shobhit.Ica23@gmail.com .

    The Supreme Court of India has clarified an important question concerning timelines in arbitration, holding that an application for extension of an arbitral tribunal’s mandate under Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 can be filed even after the tribunal’s mandate has expired.

    In M/s Ajay Protech Pvt. Ltd. v. General Manager & Anr., 2024 INSC 889, the Bench of Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Sandeep Mehta set aside the Gujarat High Court’s order refusing extension and extended the time for making the arbitral award until 31 December 2024. The Supreme Court also explained how the expression “sufficient cause” under Section 29A(5) should be understood.

    Dispute Arose From a Works Contract

    • The appellant, M/s Ajay Protech Pvt. Ltd., had entered into a works contract with Respondent No. 1. After disputes arose between the parties, the appellant invoked arbitration by issuing a notice on 12 February 2018.
    • The Gujarat High Court subsequently allowed the appellant’s application under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act for appointment of a sole arbitrator through orders dated 8 February 2019 and 15 February 2019.
    • The first meeting of the arbitral tribunal took place on 24 June 2019, and pleadings were completed on 9 October 2019.
    • Under Section 29A(1), the 12-month period for making the award therefore commenced from that date and would ordinarily have expired on 8 October 2020. With the additional six-month extension available by mutual consent under Section 29A(3), the 18-month period would ordinarily have extended until 9 April 2021.

    COVID-19 Interrupted the Arbitration Timeline

    • Before the statutory period expired, the COVID-19 pandemic intervened.
    • The Supreme Court had earlier, in In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, (2022) 3 SCC 117, directed that the period from 15 March 2020 to 28 February 2022 be excluded while computing various limitation periods, expressly including the periods prescribed under Sections 23(4) and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.
    • The arbitral proceedings, which had been adjourned because of the pandemic, resumed in 2022. Eventually, the hearing was concluded on 5 May 2023.
    • The parties recorded before the arbitral tribunal that they would approach the Court under Section 29A(4) for extension of time. Ajay Protech thereafter filed its extension application before the Gujarat High Court on 1 August 2023.

    Gujarat High Court Refused Extension

    • The Gujarat High Court dismissed the application on 3 November 2023.
    • It reasoned that the initial 12-month statutory period had expired on 8 October 2020 and, after the six-month consensual extension, the tribunal’s mandate had expired on 9 April 2021.
    • Since the Section 29A application was filed only in August 2023, the High Court treated the delay as exceeding two years and four months and held that the tribunal’s mandate had already terminated. It therefore dismissed the application as misconceived.
    • Ajay Protech challenged this decision before the Supreme Court.

    Two Questions Before the Supreme Court

    • The Supreme Court identified two principal issues:
    • First, can an application for extension under Section 29A(4) be entertained after the arbitral tribunal’s mandate has already expired?
    • Second, if such an application is maintainable, did the circumstances of this case constitute “sufficient cause” to justify extension?
    • The Court answered both questions in favour of Ajay Protech.

    Section 29A(4) Expressly Permits Post-Expiry Extension

    • The Supreme Court examined the language of Section 29A(4), which provides that if an award is not made within the period prescribed under Section 29A(1), or the extended period under Section 29A(3), the arbitrator’s mandate terminates unless the Court has “either prior to or after the expiry of the period so specified” extended the period.
    • The Court found this wording clear and explicit.
    • According to the Supreme Court, Section 29A(4) itself enables a court to extend the tribunal’s mandate after the expiry of the statutory and mutually extendable 18-month period.
    • Thus, expiry of the tribunal’s mandate does not permanently extinguish the Court’s jurisdiction to grant an extension.

    Supreme Court Relies on Rohan Builders

    • The Court relied heavily upon its recent judgment in Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2494.
    • Interestingly, the respondents themselves had relied on Rohan Builders to argue that the extension application had to be filed before the tribunal’s mandate expired. The Supreme Court held that the precedent actually decided the issue against the respondents.
    • The Court reiterated that Section 29A(4) empowers courts to extend the period for making an arbitral award either before or after expiry of the prescribed period.
    • It explained that although the tribunal’s mandate terminates upon expiry of the prescribed period, this termination is conditional in the sense that the statute still permits a party to approach the Court and seek revival/extension of the mandate.

    Accordingly, the Supreme Court held:

    An application under Section 29A(4) can be filed either before or after termination of the arbitral tribunal’s mandate upon expiry of the statutory and extendable period.

    Extension Is Not Automatic: ‘Sufficient Cause’ Must Be Shown

    • The Court simultaneously cautioned that merely filing an application after expiry does not create an automatic right to extension.
    • Under Section 29A(5), extension may be granted only when the Court is satisfied that there is “sufficient cause”.
    • The Supreme Court noted that this involves exercise of judicial discretion. Courts may also impose appropriate terms and conditions while granting extension.
    • Referring again to Rohan Builders, the Court observed that this requirement operates as a safeguard against frivolous or vexatious attempts to revive stale arbitrations.
    • Therefore, the ruling should not be understood as permitting indefinite or mechanical extensions merely because Section 29A(4) allows a post-expiry application.

    Gujarat High Court’s Calculation of Delay Was Erroneous

    • The Supreme Court found a fundamental error in the Gujarat High Court’s computation of delay.
    • Because the COVID exclusion period from 15 March 2020 to 28 February 2022 had to be removed from the calculation, the relevant Section 29A period did not expire in April 2021 in the manner assumed by the High Court.
    • The Supreme Court calculated that, after giving effect to the COVID exclusion, the applicable period would have expired on 31 March 2023.
    • Since Ajay Protech filed its application on 1 August 2023, the relevant period requiring explanation was therefore essentially from 31 March 2023 to 1 August 2023, rather than the two years and four months calculated by the High Court.
    • The Supreme Court consequently held that the High Court’s reasoning on the extent of delay was erroneous.

    Why the Supreme Court Found ‘Sufficient Cause’

    • Ajay Protech had placed several circumstances before the Court to explain why extension was necessary.
    • The arbitral tribunal had resumed online hearings in 2022 but proceedings had to be adjourned on several occasions at the request of the respondents’ counsel due to changes concerning the panel from which the arbitrator had been appointed.
    • The dispute also involved technical and legal questions, and the record was bulky. Ajay Protech further argued that the delay was attributable neither to the parties nor to the tribunal and that the tribunal had acted promptly and cautiously.
    • Most importantly, the hearing had already concluded and only the award remained to be delivered. Refusing extension at that stage would therefore cause hardship and potentially frustrate an arbitration that had substantially reached its conclusion.

    ‘Sufficient Cause’ Must Be Interpreted in Light of Arbitration’s Purpose

    • The judgment contains an important explanation of the expression “sufficient cause” under Section 29A(5).
    • The Supreme Court emphasised that efficiency and expeditious completion are integral to arbitration. At the same time, the Arbitration Act recognises the Court’s power to intervene where necessary to ensure that the agreed dispute-resolution process reaches its logical conclusion.
    • The Court held that:
    • “The meaning of ‘sufficient cause’ for extending the time to make an award must take colour from the underlying purpose of the arbitration process.”
    • It further explained that the primary objective is to resolve disputes through the dispute-resolution mechanism agreed upon by the parties. Consequently, “sufficient cause” should be interpreted in a manner that facilitates effective dispute resolution.
    • This observation gives the judgment significance beyond its particular facts, as it provides guidance for courts considering future Section 29A extension applications.

    Supreme Court Allows Ajay Protech’s Appeal

    Taking into account the COVID interruption and the parties’ agreement on 5 May 2023 to approach the Court for extension, the Supreme Court concluded that sufficient cause existed for extending the tribunal’s mandate.

    The Court accordingly:

    • allowed Ajay Protech’s civil appeal;
    • set aside the Gujarat High Court’s order dated 3 November 2023 in MCA No. 1 of 2023;
    • extended the period for making the arbitral award until 31 December 2024; and
    • directed the parties to bear their own costs.

    Thus, Ajay Protech Pvt. Ltd. succeeded before the Supreme Court on the Section 29A extension issue.

    Why This Judgment Is Important for Arbitration Proceedings

    • The judgment clarifies two important principles governing Section 29A.
    • First, expiry of an arbitral tribunal’s mandate does not by itself prevent a party from subsequently seeking extension from the Court. The statutory language expressly gives courts power to extend the period even after expiry.
    • Second, post-expiry extension is discretionary rather than automatic. The applicant must establish sufficient cause, and the Court must examine the circumstances of the particular arbitration.
    • The decision therefore attempts to balance two objectives of the Arbitration Act: ensuring that arbitration remains time-bound and efficient, while preventing procedural timelines from unnecessarily destroying an arbitration that can still effectively resolve the parties’ dispute.

    Key Takeaway

    The Supreme Court has made it clear that the termination of an arbitral tribunal’s mandate upon expiry of the Section 29A timeline is not an absolute bar to revival or extension. Courts retain jurisdiction under Section 29A(4) to extend the period even where the application is filed after expiry.

    However, such relief is not mechanical. Under Section 29A(5), the applicant must demonstrate sufficient cause, which the Court said should be understood in light of arbitration’s fundamental objective—effective resolution of disputes through the mechanism chosen by the parties.

    Connected Matter

    Bombay High Court: Arbitral Tribunal’s Mandate Can Be Extended Even After Expiry if “Sufficient Cause” Is Shown

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Supreme Court

    Disclaimer

    Handy Download:

    “Handy Order for Download”Download

    Write to us at office@aadrikaalaw.com

    Tel: +91-11-4999 2707

    www.aadrikaalaw.com