Tag: #LegalOpinion

  • Bombay High Court Protects Retiral Benefits After Post-Retirement Caste Certificate Invalidation

    Bombay High Court Protects Retiral Benefits After Post-Retirement Caste Certificate Invalidation

    Date: 21.10.2026

    The Bombay High Court has held that an employee who rendered 38 years of service cannot be denied pension, gratuity, and other retirement benefits solely because her Scheduled Tribe certificate was invalidated after she had retired.

    In Mangal Dagadu More v. State of Maharashtra & Others, decided on 19 October 2026, a Division Bench of Justices G. S. Kulkarni and Dr. Neela Gokhale set aside the Scheduled Tribe Scrutiny Committee’s order invalidating the petitioner’s claim and directed release of all retiral dues with 8% annual interest.

    Background of the case

    Mangal Dagadu More, a former peon at the Primary Health Centre in Ahire, Satara district, claimed to belong to the Thakar Scheduled Tribe. She received a caste certificate in 2009 and applied for its verification the same year.

    Her claim was supported by extensive historical material. The record included school and revenue documents concerning paternal blood relatives, with entries dating back to 1918 and continuing through several later years, consistently recording the family’s caste as Thakar. She also relied on the caste-validity certificate issued to her real brother after a vigilance inquiry.

    Despite this evidence, the Scrutiny Committee initially invalidated her certificate in 2019 on a technical ground: it was not issued in the prescribed Form C. She was allowed to obtain a fresh certificate and seek validation again. She obtained the fresh certificate in November 2020.

    By then, however, she had already retired on 31 May 2020 after 38 years of unblemished service. Because a validity certificate had not been issued, she was not considered for promotion during service, and her pensionary benefits, gratuity, and other retirement dues were withheld after retirement.

    Scrutiny Committee’s 2022 decision challenged

    The Committee referred the renewed claim to its vigilance cell in December 2021. Following a hearing on 9 February 2022, it invalidated More’s tribe claim two days later.

    More approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, arguing that the Committee had failed to properly consider the old documentary evidence and the validity certificate of her brother. She also explained that medical treatment and hospitalisation had delayed her challenge to the 2022 order.

    Court’s reasoning: long service cannot be ignored

    The High Court emphasized that the legal position on post-retirement denial of benefits is settled. Where an employee has been permitted to serve for years and retires without the employer taking action to terminate service under the applicable caste-verification law, retirement benefits cannot ordinarily be withheld merely because a caste claim is invalidated later.

    The Court noted several important factors:

    • Long and undisputed service: More completed 38 years of service. During that period, the absence of a caste-validity certificate had not led to disciplinary action or discharge from employment.
    • Post-retirement impact: The adverse consequences arose after retirement, when pension and gratuity were withheld.
    • Government policy: A Maharashtra Government Resolution dated 27 December 2019 recognized the hardship faced by Scheduled Tribe employees whose certificates were not validated or were invalidated after long service. It provided humanitarian protection through supernumerary posts in specified circumstances.
    • Consistent judicial approach: Earlier Bombay High Court decisions had recognized pension and family-pension rights even where caste claims were invalidated, particularly after substantial service. The Court also referred to a Supreme Court ruling that granted pensionary relief to an employee whose certificate was invalidated after superannuation.

    The Bench concluded that More could not be deprived of her retirement dues solely because the certificate was invalidated after she retired.

    Key directions issued by the High Court

    The Court allowed the writ petition and:

    1. Quashed and set aside the Scrutiny Committee’s order dated 11 February 2022.
    2. Directed the Primary Health Centre to release More’s pension, gratuity, and all other retiral benefits.
    3. Required payment within three weeks from the date the judgment is uploaded.
    4. Awarded interest at 8% per annum from the dates on which the payments became due.

    Why the ruling matters

    This ruling reinforces a humanitarian principle in public employment law: a worker who has provided decades of service should not be left without livelihood-related retirement benefits because of a caste-verification outcome reached only after retirement.

    The decision does not treat caste verification as unimportant. Instead, it distinguishes between verification issues and the separate question of whether long-serving, retired employees may be deprived of accrued pensionary entitlements. In cases involving prolonged service, no prior discharge action, and post-retirement invalidation, courts may protect retirement benefits to prevent unjust hardship.

    For employees and families facing withheld retirement dues in comparable circumstances, the judgment highlights the relevance of service history, the timing of the invalidation, employer conduct during service, applicable government policy, and established judicial protections for pensionary benefits.

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  • Karnataka High Court Quashes FIR and Charge Sheet Over Unsworn Section 156(3) CrPC Complaint

    Karnataka High Court Quashes FIR and Charge Sheet Over Unsworn Section 156(3) CrPC Complaint

    Date: 21.10.2026

    The Karnataka High Court has quashed an FIR and subsequent charge sheet against N.V. Babu Reddy, holding that the private complaint which triggered the criminal case suffered from a fundamental procedural defect: it was not supported by an affidavit.

    Background of the case

    The criminal petition arose from Crime No. 30/2020 of Mahalakshmipuram Police Station, Bengaluru. The FIR alleged offences under Sections 323, 324, 307 and 120B read with Section 511 of the Indian Penal Code, involving allegations of assault, threats and an alleged conspiracy.

    According to the complainant’s version, a dispute initially developed over non-payment for work completed. The complainant stated that he had earlier approached police regarding the payment issue. He further alleged that, after being asked to meet near Geleyara Balaga in Mahalakshmi Layout on December 17, 2019, he and another person, Prabhakar, were surrounded by a group that abused and attempted to physically attack them. The complainant claimed they escaped after Prabhakar allegedly saw someone taking weapons from an autorickshaw.

    The complaint also alleged continued threats to the complainant and his family. Police had received a later complaint and registered an NCR, but an acknowledgment reportedly described the dispute as civil in nature and advised the complainant to approach the court. The complainant then filed a private complaint before the Magistrate, who referred the matter for police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

    Petitioner’s challenge

    Babu Reddy sought to quash the proceedings under Section 482 of the CrPC. His principal argument was that the private complaint was not accompanied by an affidavit, contrary to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh.

    The petitioner also argued that the complaint was an abuse of criminal process in a dispute connected to money recovery. He referred to an earlier complaint that had already been quashed by the High Court.

    The State opposed the petition on the basis that the police had investigated the matter and filed a charge sheet on May 15, 2020.

    Court’s reasoning

    Justice H.P. Sandesh found that the absence of an affidavit was a fundamental defect. The Court noted that the Supreme Court’s decision in Priyanka Srivastava, followed in later judgments, requires a private complaint seeking action under Section 156(3) CrPC to be supported by an affidavit.

    The Court distinguished this issue from the petitioner’s separate objection about compliance with Sections 154(1) and 154(3) CrPC. Since police had received the complaint, issued an NCR and provided an acknowledgment, the Court held that there was no refusal by police requiring the complainant to first approach the Superintendent of Police.

    However, that did not cure the lack of an affidavit. The Court held that an unsupported private complaint could not be entertained, and that no legal value could attach to the complaint or to the charge sheet that followed from it.

    Outcome and legal significance

    The High Court allowed the criminal petition and quashed both the proceedings in Crime No. 30/2020 and the charge sheet against the petitioner. The ruling underscores that the affidavit requirement for private complaints referred for investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC is not a technical formality. Where that requirement is missing, the very initiation of criminal proceedings may be invalid, even if investigation has progressed to the filing of a charge sheet.

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  • Himachal Pradesh HC: Rigours of Section 37 NDPS Act Inapplicable Where Heroin Recovery Is Below Commercial Quantity

    Himachal Pradesh HC: Rigours of Section 37 NDPS Act Inapplicable Where Heroin Recovery Is Below Commercial Quantity

    Date: 19.10.2026

    The Himachal Pradesh High Court has granted regular bail to Prince Rana and Sudhanshu Soni in an NDPS case involving the recovery of 32.56 grams of heroin, while making clear that the order does not decide their guilt or innocence.

    The case at a glance

    Justice Rakesh Kainthla decided the connected bail petitions on 16 October 2026. The petitions arose from FIR No. 28 of 2026, registered at Baijnath Police Station in Kangra district under Sections 21, 25 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.

    According to the prosecution, police received information on 24 February 2026 that Prince Rana, Sudhanshu Soni and others were selling heroin from a house in Village Malehad. Officers recorded and forwarded the information to a superior officer before conducting a search. The search reportedly led to the recovery of a polythene packet containing 32.56 grams of heroin, concealed beneath a sofa-cum-bed.

    The prosecution said both petitioners were present at the house when the recovery was made. It also relied on statements allegedly made during the investigation concerning the procurement and delivery of the substance. A forensic report confirmed that the recovered material was diacetylmorphine, commonly known as heroin.

    Arguments before the Court

    The petitioners denied the allegations and said they had been falsely implicated. Their counsel stressed that they were first-time accused, had no other FIRs registered against them, and that the police investigation had already concluded. The charge sheet had been filed on 24 April 2026, meaning further custodial interrogation was not required, they argued.

    The State opposed bail, contending that the allegations concerned heroin sales and that the offence had serious consequences for society. It urged the Court not to show leniency.

    Why the High Court granted bail

    The Court considered established Supreme Court principles on bail, including the nature and gravity of the accusation, the evidence available at the preliminary stage, the possibility of absconding, the likelihood of witness interference, criminal antecedents and the need to protect the trial process.

    While the Court found that the petitioners’ presence at the house during the alleged recovery created a prima facie case, it identified several factors favouring release:

    • Quantity below the commercial threshold: The Court noted that the alleged recovery was less than a commercial quantity. Therefore, the stricter restrictions on bail under Section 37 of the NDPS Act were not applicable.
    • No stated criminal history: The petitioners’ assertion that they were first offenders was not disputed by the State in its status report. The Court observed that first offenders should have an opportunity for reform and that unnecessary continued detention could expose them to hardened criminals.
    • Local roots: Both petitioners were stated to be permanent residents of Kangra district. As this was not disputed, the Court found no substantial risk of absconding.
    • Investigation complete: Since the police had completed the investigation and filed the charge sheet, and did not claim that custodial interrogation remained necessary, the Court held that continued detention would serve no useful purpose.

    The decision reflects the general bail principle that personal liberty should ordinarily be protected unless circumstances indicate a real risk of flight, interference with justice, witness intimidation or repetition of offences.

    Bail terms imposed

    Prince Rana and Sudhanshu Soni were each directed to furnish a bail bond of β‚Ή1,00,000 with one surety in the same amount, to the satisfaction of the trial court. Their release is subject to conditions intended to safeguard the proceedings:

    1. They must not intimidate witnesses or influence evidence.
    2. They must attend every hearing and avoid seeking unnecessary adjournments.
    3. They cannot leave their present address for more than seven continuous days without providing details of the intended visit to the concerned SHO, police station and trial court.
    4. They must surrender any passports to the court.
    5. They must provide their mobile numbers and social-media contact details to the police and court, comply with notices sent through SMS, WhatsApp or social-media accounts, and report any change in these details within five days.

    The Court also stated that the prosecution may seek cancellation of bail if any condition is violated.

    What the order doesβ€”and does notβ€”decide

    This is a bail ruling, not a final verdict in the criminal case. The High Court expressly stated that its observations were limited to deciding the bail applications and would not affect the merits of the prosecution at trial.

    The trial court will determine the allegations based on the evidence presented during the proceedings.

    The ruling shows that, even in narcotics cases, courts assess bail on the specific facts: the statutory quantity involved, the accused’s prior record, their connection to the local community, the status of the investigation and the safeguards available to protect a fair trial.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Delhi HC: Composite Trademarks Must Be Evaluated as a Whole Under Section 11(1) of Trade Marks Act

    Delhi HC: Composite Trademarks Must Be Evaluated as a Whole Under Section 11(1) of Trade Marks Act

    Date: 19.10.2026

    The Delhi High Court has set aside the Trade Marks Registry’s refusal to register the word mark β€œKAMA CASA”, holding that the Registry wrongly split the composite mark into separate elements and compared them with distinct earlier device marks.

    Background of the dispute

    Modi Woodspace Private Limited applied on 29 August 2023 to register KAMA CASA as a proposed-to-be-used word mark in Classes 20 and 35. The Trade Marks Registry objected under Section 11(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which concerns the likelihood of confusion with earlier trademarks.

    After hearings, the Registrar refused the application on 21 May 2025. The refusal was based on earlier Class 20 registrations containing the terms β€œKAMA” and β€œCASA.” The Registrar concluded that combining those words in β€œKAMA CASA” could confuse consumers and traders about the commercial origin of the goods.

    Modi Woodspace appealed to the Delhi High Court under Section 91 of the Act.

    The key issue: Can a composite mark be broken into parts?

    The central issue was whether the Registrar could assess the applicant’s mark by isolating the words β€œKAMA” and β€œCASA” and comparing each part separately with different prior marks.

    The Court held that this approach was incorrect. It applied the anti-dissection rule, a settled trademark principle requiring a mark to be assessed as a whole rather than broken into individual components.

    According to the Court, KAMA CASA is a composite word mark and should have been evaluated in its entirety. The cited prior marks were device or label marks with their own visual and design elements. The Registry could not disregard those elements, extract the words β€œKAMA” and β€œCASA,” and use them separately to reject the composite word mark.

    Why the refusal was flawed

    The Court identified two material distinctions:

    • Different mark types: The applicant sought registration of a word mark, while the cited marks were device marks.
    • Improper comparison: The cited device marks could not be reduced to their word elements alone. Their overall visual presentation and device features formed part of the registered marks.

    The Court found it difficult to understand how the Registrar could conclude that the composite word mark β€œKAMA CASA” was deceptively similar to separate device marks containing β€œKAMA” and β€œCASA,” particularly when each cited mark had distinctive device elements.

    It further observed that the mere fact that the marks fell in the same class did not establish similarity or a likelihood of confusion.

    Relevance of other β€œCASA” registrations

    During the appeal, Modi Woodspace submitted a Trade Marks Registry search report showing numerous registrations containing the word β€œCASA” in the same or similar classes. Although this report had not been submitted to the Registrar during the original examination process, the Court considered it relevant.

    The presence of multiple registered marks containing β€œCASA” may be important when evaluating whether that word, in the relevant market context, can by itself justify refusal of a later composite mark. The Court therefore directed the Registrar to consider the search report in the renewed examination.

    Court’s decision

    In its judgment delivered on 22 April 2026, the Delhi High Court:

    • quashed the refusal order dated 21 May 2025;
    • revived trademark application No. 6087367 for KAMA CASA;
    • remitted the application to the Registrar of Trade Marks for a fresh, de novo consideration; and
    • required the Registrar to complete that reconsideration within four months.

    The Court clarified that its observations were made for the purpose of remand and should not be treated as a final finding that the mark must be registered.

    Significance for trademark applicants

    The ruling reinforces that trademark similarity assessments must be based on the overall commercial impression of competing marks. A registry or court should not artificially dissect a composite mark and assemble objections from separate earlier registrations unless the law and the facts justify that conclusion.

    For applicants, the decision also highlights the value of submitting marketplace and registry search evidence early. Evidence of numerous similar registrations may help place a disputed word or element in context, especially where the applicant’s mark combines common or widely used terms into a distinct overall expression.

    Ultimately, the case confirms that a Section 11(1) objection requires a careful comparison of the marks as consumers encounter them, not an isolated comparison of selected words taken out of their full visual and commercial context.

    Connected Matter

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Madras HC: Non-Parent Customs Commissioner Cannot Suspend Customs Broker Licence Under Regulation 16 of CBLR 2018

    Madras HC: Non-Parent Customs Commissioner Cannot Suspend Customs Broker Licence Under Regulation 16 of CBLR 2018

    Date: 19.10.2026

    The Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court has held that only the Customs authority that issued a Customs Broker’s licenceβ€”the β€œParent Commissionerate”—may suspend it under the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018.

    In M/s. Sasha Shipping Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, decided on 4 November 2025, Justice G.R. Swaminathan set aside orders by the Commissioner of Customs, Tuticorin suspending and continuing the suspension of Sasha Shipping’s Customs Broker Licence. The Court found that Tuticorin was not the licence-issuing authority and therefore lacked jurisdiction to invoke the suspension power.

    Background of the dispute

    Sasha Shipping Pvt. Ltd. received its Customs Broker Licence from the Principal Commissioner of Customs, Chennai, in 2011. It subsequently began operating within the jurisdiction of the Tuticorin Customs Commissionerate from 21 June 2022 through a Form C intimation.

    In August 2025, the Commissioner of Customs, Tuticorin formed the view that the company had committed irregularities relating to certain imports. On 20 August 2025, the Commissioner suspended Sasha Shipping’s licence with immediate effect under Regulation 16(1) of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018. A further order dated 3 September 2025 continued that suspension under Regulation 16(2).

    Sasha Shipping challenged both orders. Its central argument was that Tuticorin, being a non-parent commissionerate, could not suspend a licence issued by Chennai.

    The jurisdictional question before the Court

    The case turned on the distinction between two Customs authorities:

    • Parent Commissionerate: The Commissionerate that grants the Customs Broker Licence.
    • Non-Parent Commissionerate: A Commissionerate where the broker operates under a Form C intimation after obtaining its original licence elsewhere.

    The Court noted that a broker can transact business at Customs stations beyond its original Commissionerate, subject to the Form C process. However, Form C is only an intimation of the broker’s intention to operate at another station; it is not a fresh licence or an authorization issued by that non-parent Commissionerate.

    Initially, the Tuticorin order appeared to operate across all Customs stations. A corrigendum dated 14 October 2025 limited its reach to areas within the jurisdiction of the Tuticorin Custom House. Even after that correction, the principal issue remained: whether Tuticorin could suspend the licence at all.

    Regulation 15 and Regulation 16 serve different purposes

    The Court analysed the scheme of the 2018 Regulations, particularly Regulations 15, 16 and 17.

    Regulation 15: Local prohibition by a non-parent Commissionerate

    Regulation 15 allows a Commissioner other than the licence-issuing authority to prohibit a Customs Broker from working in one or more sections of the relevant Customs station if the broker has failed to meet its obligations. This is a limited local measure. The prohibition cannot continue for more than one month.

    According to the Court, this provision equips a non-parent Commissionerate to respond immediately to misconduct occurring within its own jurisdiction.

    Regulation 16: Suspension of the licence

    Regulation 16 permits suspension of a Customs Broker Licence where immediate action is necessary and an inquiry is pending or contemplated. The Court held that this power belongs only to the Parent Commissionerate because that authority issued the licence in the first place.

    The reasoning was straightforward: the authority that grants a licence has the inherent authority to amend, vary, rescind or suspend it. A non-parent Commissionerate, which has received only a Form C intimation, has not issued the licence and cannot suspend it.

    Regulation 17: Further disciplinary process

    Where suspension continues, Regulation 17 provides the procedure for notice, inquiry, evidence, representation and final action, including revocation or penalty. The Court read Regulations 15, 16 and 17 together as a coordinated framework:

    1. A non-parent Commissionerate may impose a temporary local prohibition.
    2. It should communicate the alleged violations to the Parent Commissionerate.
    3. The Parent Commissionerate may then initiate suspension, revocation or penalty proceedings under the applicable regulations.

    Why the Court rejected the Customs department’s argument

    The Customs department argued that Regulation 16 uses the broad phrase β€œPrincipal Commissioner or Commissioner of Customs,” unlike Regulation 15, which specifically refers to Commissioners other than those mentioned in Regulation 7. It contended that this wording allowed any Commissioner to suspend a broker’s licence.

    The Court did not accept that interpretation. It held that the regulations must be read as a whole, rather than treating Regulation 16 in isolation. The existence of Regulation 15 showed that the regulatory framework already gives non-parent Commissionerates a defined remedy: temporary prohibition within their own Customs station.

    Allowing a non-parent Commissionerate to suspend the licence itself would blur the statutory distinction between local prohibition and licence-level suspension.

    Reliance on the 2010 CBIC circular

    The Court also relied on CBIC Circular No. 9/2010-Cus., dated 8 April 2010. Although issued under the earlier Customs House Agents Licensing Regulations, 2004, the Court found it remained applicable because its principles were consistent with the 2018 Regulations and it had neither been superseded nor withdrawn.

    The circular states that where a Customs broker operating under Form C is found to have committed violations at another Customs station:

    • The Commissionerate at that station should report the violations to the Commissionerate that issued the licence.
    • The licence-issuing Commissionerate should initiate suspension or revocation action.
    • The non-parent Commissionerate may, in appropriate cases, prohibit the broker from working locally.

    This approach avoids duplicative proceedings and ensures uniform disciplinary action against Customs Brokers operating at multiple stations.

    Court’s decision

    The High Court concluded that the Commissioner of Customs, Tuticorin was a non-parent Commissionerate because Sasha Shipping’s licence had been issued by Chennai. Consequently, Tuticorin could not exercise the suspension power under Regulation 16.

    The Court set aside:

    • Order No. 15/2025 dated 20 August 2025, suspending Sasha Shipping’s Customs Broker Licence; and
    • Order No. 16/2025 dated 3 September 2025, continuing the suspension.

    Both writ petitions were allowed, with no order as to costs.

    Significance for Customs Brokers and Customs authorities

    The ruling clarifies the limits of regulatory authority where a Customs Broker operates across India through Form C intimations. A non-parent Commissionerate can address suspected wrongdoing at its station through a short-term local prohibition, but it cannot suspend the underlying licence.

    For licence suspension, revocation or broader disciplinary action, the matter must be taken up by the Commissionerate that originally issued the Customs Broker Licence.

    The decision reinforces a clear division of powers, supports procedural consistency and prevents multiple Customs formations from taking overlapping action against the same licence.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Delhi HC: Homebuyers Cannot Bypass RERA Proceedings by Filing Fresh Civil Suits Against Builders

    Delhi HC: Homebuyers Cannot Bypass RERA Proceedings by Filing Fresh Civil Suits Against Builders

    Date: 19.10.2026

    The Delhi High Court has dismissed Lalit Kumar’s appeal against the rejection of a wide-ranging civil suit brought by 12 homebuyers against E-Homes Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., holding that the claims were vague, time-barred in part, barred by prior proceedings in part, and improperly combined multiple independent disputes.

    Background of the dispute

    The case arose from allegations by purchasers of apartments in The Jewel of Noida, a group-housing project developed by E-Homes Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. The homebuyers alleged shortcomings in the project’s development, maintenance arrangements, owners’ association, electricity services, parking, charges, and contractual documentation.

    According to the plaintiffs, the developer had represented that the project would provide high-quality facilities and amenities. They later alleged a substantial mismatch between the apartments’ actual or carpet areas and the super areas on which charges were based. They also challenged several levies, including maintenance, club, electricity-meter, preferential-location, green-belt, lease-rent, tax, and parking charges.

    The plaintiffs further alleged that the developer had not transferred maintenance responsibilities to a lawful apartment owners’ association despite possession having been offered years earlier. They disputed the formation and functioning of the registered association, claiming that it was created through irregular procedures and without proper elections.

    Reliefs sought by the homebuyers

    The suit sought a broad set of remedies, including:

    • Restoration of essential services, including garbage collection and DG electricity supply;
    • Refunds for alleged excess area charges, maintenance charges, club charges, electricity-related charges, taxes, interest, parking charges, preferential-location charges, and green-belt charges;
    • Appointment of an independent architect, consultant, or court commissioner to measure carpet area, super area, and loading;
    • Directions concerning maintenance accounts and transfer of maintenance to an owners’ association;
    • Changes to allegedly one-sided provisions in the sub-lease deeds;
    • Adequate and independent parking arrangements; and
    • Compensation, punitive damages, and rendition of accounts.

    Why the civil suit was rejected

    The trial court dismissed the suit on 31 August 2024. On appeal, the High Court found no reason to interfere with that decision.

    1. Maintenance and electricity issues had already been pursued before RERA

    The court noted that disputes concerning electricity and maintenance charges were already before U.P. RERA and were subject to related proceedings. Under Section 79 of the RERA Act, civil courts cannot entertain matters that fall within the jurisdiction of the RERA authorities or appellate tribunal.

    The court therefore held that the plaintiffs could not use a civil suit to reopen or nullify adverse outcomes from the competent regulatory forum.

    2. Monetary recovery claims were beyond limitation

    The homebuyers’ refund claims were connected to purchases that had culminated in individual sale deeds. The suit was filed in 2024, while the relevant limitation period for recovery claims based on alleged misrepresentation or fraudulent sale was treated as three years.

    The court found that these claims were filed too late and were consequently barred by limitation.

    3. Earlier suits had been withdrawn

    The record showed that earlier civil suits concerning maintenance and electricity had been filed and later withdrawn. The High Court observed that where a suit is withdrawn without liberty to file afresh, Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code prevents a party from bringing another suit on the same cause of action.

    The plaintiffs had not specifically shown that permission had been obtained to preserve their right to refile those claims. The court also endorsed the trial court’s concern that repeated proceedings before different forums amounted to forum hunting.

    4. The suit combined distinct claims of 12 purchasers

    The court stressed that each of the 12 plaintiffs had an individual transaction and a separate cause of action. Their claims could not be treated as one consolidated dispute merely because they related to the same housing project.

    The pleading was therefore held to suffer from misjoinder of parties and causes of action. The claims were also viewed as unquantified, omnibus, and insufficiently specific, particularly because several refund demands were left to be determined later through a proposed local commissioner.

    High Court’s ruling

    Justice Neena Bansal Krishna dismissed Regular First Appeal No. 949/2025 on 11 May 2026. The court affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that the suit was an abuse of the legal process and upheld the dismissal with costs of Rs. 3,000 imposed on each plaintiff.

    Only Lalit Kumar pursued the appeal, while the other original plaintiffs were not parties to the appeal. The court found no merit in the challenge and disposed of the pending applications.

    Key legal takeaway

    The ruling shows that homebuyer grievances, even where numerous and connected to one project, must be pursued before the appropriate forum, within the applicable limitation period, and through precise, properly structured pleadings. A consolidated civil suit cannot be used to revisit matters already adjudicated or pending before RERA, nor to combine unquantified and legally distinct claims of multiple purchasers.

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    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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  • Himachal Pradesh High Court Sets Aside Arbitration Order Over Commercial Court Jurisdiction

    Himachal Pradesh High Court Sets Aside Arbitration Order Over Commercial Court Jurisdiction

    Date: 19.10.2026

    The Himachal Pradesh High Court has set aside a district court order in an arbitration dispute involving M/s Ech Ess Builders and the State of Himachal Pradesh, holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to decide the matter because it had not been constituted as a Commercial Court at the relevant time.

    Background of the construction dispute

    The dispute arose from a public works contract awarded in December 2005 to M/s Ech Ess Builders for a project valued at β‚Ή1.60 crore. The stipulated completion period was two years.

    According to the contractor, the work was disrupted when the site began sliding during the 2010 monsoon season. It said that the work was stopped, cracks developed in the area, and no further execution instructions were provided despite repeated communications. The contractor also alleged that designs and drawings were not made available in time, contributing to the delay.

    M/s Ech Ess Builders sought compensation for idle infrastructure and staff, additional overheads, unpaid work, price escalation, withheld security deposit, and earnest money. It also claimed costs and interest at 18% per annum.

    Arbitration award and court proceedings

    The arbitrator issued an award on 5 December 2019. Among other directions, the award granted simple interest at 8% per annum on:

    • β‚Ή4,46,039 from 27 November 2013 to 22 August 2019; and
    • β‚Ή2,52,492 from 27 November 2013 to 4 August 2017.

    Both the State authorities and the contractor challenged the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. On 9 August 2024, the District Judge, Kinnaur dismissed both sets of objections and upheld the arbitral award.

    The State then appealed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The High Court also condoned the delay in filing that appeal, accepting that it resulted from administrative processes rather than deliberate inaction.

    Why the High Court intervened

    Justice Sandeep Sharma held that this was a commercial dispute because it arose from a construction and infrastructure contract, which falls within the scope of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

    The decisive issue was jurisdiction. When the Section 34 objections were filed in July 2020, the District Judge was not notified or constituted as a Commercial Court under Section 3 of the Commercial Courts Act. Commercial Courts at the district level in Himachal Pradesh were notified only in May 2026.

    Relying on earlier High Court decisions, the Court concluded that a court not constituted as a Commercial Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over such commercial arbitration objections. As a result, the 2024 judgment was treated as having been passed without jurisdiction.

    Court’s order

    The High Court did not examine the merits of the contractor’s claims or the State’s objections to the arbitration award. Instead, it:

    • set aside the District Judge’s order dated 9 August 2024;
    • directed the District Judge to return the parties’ Section 34 objections for presentation before the appropriate forum under the Commercial Courts Act; and
    • ordered that the period from filing the appeal until the parties receive a certified copy of the High Court’s order will be excluded when calculating limitation.

    Legal significance

    The ruling reinforces that jurisdictional requirements under the Commercial Courts Act are mandatory in commercial arbitration matters. Even where a district court has considered an arbitral award in detail, its decision cannot stand if the court was not legally designated to hear commercial disputes when the case was instituted and decided.

    For parties to government construction contracts, the decision highlights the importance of filing arbitration challenges before the correctly constituted commercial forum. Procedural defects in forum selection can invalidate years of litigation without resolving the underlying contractual dispute.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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  • Karnataka High Court- False Promise of Marriage Cannot Be Treated as Consent

    Karnataka High Court- False Promise of Marriage Cannot Be Treated as Consent

    Date: 19.10.2026

    The Karnataka High Court has overturned a trial court’s acquittal and convicted an accused of rape, cheating and criminal intimidation, holding that a sexual relationship induced by a false promise of marriage cannot be treated as consensual merely because the parties were in a relationship.

    The case at a glance

    In Manjula v. Devaraju and State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 2047 of 2018), a Division Bench of Justices H.P. Sandesh and B. Pramod set aside the 2018 acquittal issued by the V Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tiptur. The High Court found that the trial court had failed to properly assess the complainant’s testimony, her original complaint, the DNA evidence, and allegations of threats.

    The accused was convicted under:

    • Section 417 IPC for cheating;
    • Section 376 IPC for rape; and
    • Section 506 IPC for criminal intimidation.

    He was sentenced to life imprisonment for rape, along with prison terms and fines for the other offences. The sentences are to run concurrently.

    Allegations and evidence before the Court

    The complainant stated that she and the accused had known each other since their school days and were in a relationship. According to her complaint and testimony, the accused repeatedly assured her that he would marry her, told her he would not marry anyone else, and continued sexual relations on the strength of that assurance.

    She alleged that after she became pregnant, the accused asked her to terminate the pregnancy. When she refused and pressed him to marry her, he allegedly refused and threatened her life. The complaint also referred to an earlier case and alleged that the accused had pressured her to withdraw it by continuing to promise marriage.

    The High Court placed particular weight on a DNA report establishing that the accused was the biological father of the complainant’s daughter. The judgment notes that the accused did not effectively challenge the DNA evidence. Medical and investigative evidence, including the pregnancy finding and potency report, was also before the trial court.

    Why the High Court rejected the acquittal

    The trial court had treated the case as one involving consensual sexual relations, largely because the complainant acknowledged a love affair and prior physical relationship with the accused. The High Court held that this approach was incomplete and legally flawed.

    The Court emphasized that the central issue was not simply whether the parties were in a relationship, but whether the complainant’s consent had been obtained through a promise of marriage that induced her to engage in sexual relations. It found that the trial court had not meaningfully considered:

    • the specific allegations in the original complaint;
    • the complainant’s testimony that the accused repeatedly promised marriage;
    • the allegation that he continued the relationship while asking her to withdraw an earlier complaint;
    • the DNA evidence confirming paternity; and
    • the accusation that he threatened her after she became pregnant and refused an abortion.

    According to the High Court, the absence of physical injuries did not undermine the prosecution case. Where consent is obtained on the basis of a promise of marriage, the Court reasoned, physical injuries are not an expected indicator of the offence. It held that a continuing sexual relationship based on such a promise could not automatically be categorised as consensual sex.

    Appellate court’s finding: material evidence was overlooked

    The High Court described the trial court’s assessment as perverse because it did not properly evaluate key oral and documentary evidence. It found that the acquittal had resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

    The Bench also noted that the trial court had not adequately addressed the elements of cheating under Section 417 or criminal intimidation under Section 506. The complaint and the complainant’s evidence contained specific allegations of deception and threats, but these were not substantively analysed in the acquittal judgment.

    Relying on Supreme Court principles concerning appellate interference with acquittals, the High Court held that an appellate court may reverse an acquittal where cogent evidence has not been properly appreciated and the result is a miscarriage of justice.

    Sentence and compensation directions

    After conviction, the Court imposed the following sentence:

    • Section 417 IPC: One year’s imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,00,000.
    • Section 376 IPC: Life imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5,00,000.
    • Section 506 IPC: Two years’ imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,00,000.

    The total fine is Rs. 7,00,000. If deposited, Rs. 5,00,000 is to be kept in a fixed deposit in the daughter’s name until she reaches adulthood. The remaining Rs. 2,00,000 is to be released to the complainant for her livelihood and for the child’s educational needs.

    The Court also directed the District Legal Services Authority, Tumkur, to award maximum compensation to the complainant and her child within four months. It noted that the trial court had failed to consider victim compensation under Section 357A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, even while the complainant and child were facing hardship.

    Maintenance order also noted

    During the appeal, the Court was informed that a maintenance order had directed the accused to pay Rs. 2,000 each per month to the complainant and her daughter. The complainant’s side stated that this amount had not been paid, and the accused did not dispute that assertion. The High Court considered this conduct while determining sentence and compensation.

    Broader legal significance

    The ruling underscores that the existence of a romantic relationship does not, by itself, resolve the question of consent in a criminal case. Courts must closely examine whether consent was given freely or was induced by deception, particularly where a complainant alleges that sexual relations occurred because of a promise of marriage.

    It also highlights the duty of trial courts to assess all material evidence, including the complaint, testimony, scientific evidence, and allegations of intimidation, rather than limiting their analysis to whether there was force or physical injury. The judgment further reinforces the importance of victim-compensation mechanisms, including in cases where a trial court initially records an acquittal.

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  • Bombay High Court Says Merchant Settlement Funds Cannot Be Treated as Payment Aggregator Assets

    Bombay High Court Says Merchant Settlement Funds Cannot Be Treated as Payment Aggregator Assets

    Date: 19.10.2026

    The Bombay High Court has set aside provisional GST attachments on 1Pay Mobileware Private Limited’s bank and escrow accounts, holding that the DGGI acted on suspicion without showing a specific GST liability or cogent material linking the payment aggregator to tax evasion.

    Court finds Section 83 power was used without the required foundation

    In 1Pay Mobileware Private Limited v. Union of India & Ors. (Writ Petition No. 4586 of 2026), decided on 16 October 2026, the Bombay High Court examined whether the Directorate General of GST Intelligence (DGGI) could freeze the accounts of an RBI-authorised payment aggregator during an investigation into alleged GST evasion by an online money-gaming syndicate.

    The Court concluded that the attachment orders did not meet the strict statutory conditions under Section 83 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. It therefore allowed the writ petition and quashed the impugned attachment orders, including the continuing restrictions under the partial de-freezing orders.

    Background: payment aggregator’s accounts frozen during gaming-syndicate investigation

    1Pay Mobileware is a company incorporated in 2019 and authorised by the Reserve Bank of India to operate as an online payment aggregator from May 2024. In June 2026, it also received authorisation to operate as an offline payment aggregator.

    On 10 August 2026, DGGI officers sealed the company’s Mumbai premises and provisionally attached several bank accounts under Section 83 of the CGST Act. These included current accounts and RBI-mandated escrow accounts maintained with HDFC Bank, ICICI Bank, Kotak Mahindra Bank and IDFC Bank.

    DGGI alleged that 1Pay may have played a role beyond that of a payment intermediary in an organised online money-gaming network. According to the department, fictitious or non-functional merchants may have been onboarded to route and layer funds generated from gaming activities without payment of applicable GST.

    The agency also relied on alleged non-cooperation in the investigation. It stated that the company’s registered and additional business premises were locked, records were unavailable, its server was empty, and certain information sought through summons had not been furnished. DGGI said that approximately 88 merchants identified from the company’s GSTR-1 data appeared to be non-existent or non-functional.

    1Pay argued that the freeze paralysed legitimate payment settlements

    The company contended that it was a regulated payment aggregator, comparable in function to other payment platforms, and that its escrow funds largely belonged to third-party merchants rather than to 1Pay itself. It submitted that the blanket freeze had disrupted settlement payments for government, public-sector and statutory bodies using its platform.

    Among the entities identified as having unsettled funds were IRCTC, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, LIC Housing Finance, HDFC Bank and Tamil Nadu Power Finance and Infrastructure Development Corporation. The company also highlighted disruptions to FASTag and National Electronic Toll Collection settlements.

    DGGI subsequently permitted limited settlement payments from one escrow account to specified government and PSU-linked entities. However, it continued the debit freeze over the accounts generally, stating that it was needed to safeguard revenue while the investigation continued.

    Why the High Court set aside the attachments

    The Court held that Section 83 authorises provisional attachment only after proceedings under the specified chapters of the CGST Act have been initiated and only where the Commissioner forms an opinion, based on tangible material, that attachment is necessary to protect government revenue.

    Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Radha Krishan Industries, the Court stressed that provisional attachment is a β€œdraconian” power. It cannot be used merely because attachment seems convenient, expedient or commercially useful. The authority must demonstrate a live link between credible material, the proposed attachment and the necessity to protect revenue.

    The Court identified several decisive deficiencies:

    • No identified GST liability of 1Pay: The attachment orders did not explain any tax liability attributable to the payment aggregator itself. The allegations broadly concerned suspected money laundering and GST evasion by unnamed third parties.
    • No particulars of alleged wrongful transactions: The orders did not identify the specific transactions, merchants, nature of GST evasion, or the company’s alleged role in it.
    • No basis for treating 1Pay as a person covered by Section 83: The material did not show that 1Pay was a taxable person with a relevant liability or a person falling within Section 122(1A) of the CGST Act.
    • Escrow money was not 1Pay’s property: The Court held that funds in the RBI-mandated escrow account were impressed with a trust and belonged to merchants and beneficiaries, not the payment aggregator. They could not be attached as the company’s property under Section 83.
    • Orders could not be repaired through later affidavits: The Court said the deficiencies in the original attachment orders could not be justified by explanations added in DGGI’s affidavit filed during the writ proceedings.
    • Suspicion was not enough: Although the department cited non-cooperation and suspected involvement with 88 merchants, it did not disclose their identities, transaction details, or evidence showing 1Pay’s involvement in any GST evasion.

    The Court also noted that 1Pay serviced several government entities and could not be treated as a β€œfly-by-night operator” on the material before it.

    Significance for payment aggregators and GST investigations

    This judgment reinforces that GST authorities must exercise provisional attachment powers with exceptional care. An investigation or a general suspicion of wrongdoing does not, by itself, justify freezing operational bank accounts, particularly where the accounts hold third-party settlement funds.

    For RBI-regulated payment aggregators, the ruling is especially significant because escrow accounts are designed to hold merchant funds pending settlement. Treating those balances as the payment aggregator’s attachable property can disrupt payments to merchants, government bodies, banks and consumers while exceeding the limits of Section 83.

    The decision also underlines three broader principles:

    1. Specificity is essential: Authorities must identify the taxpayer’s own alleged liability and the factual basis for attachment.
    2. Necessity and proportionality must be demonstrated: A freeze must be truly necessary to protect revenue, not simply useful for an ongoing inquiry.
    3. Third-party funds require distinct treatment: Funds held in escrow for merchant settlement cannot automatically be treated as assets belonging to the payment intermediary.

    Outcome

    The Bombay High Court allowed 1Pay Mobileware’s writ petition and quashed the challenged provisional attachment orders and continuing partial-freezing restrictions. No order as to costs was made. The ruling confirms that Section 83 cannot be used as an investigative shortcut: a provisional attachment requires credible, recorded material showing that the taxpayer’s own property must be frozen to protect a genuine revenue interest.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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  • Delhi High Court Upholds DMRC’s Refusal to Reimburse Rs.4.46 Crore in DVAT to L&T

    Delhi High Court Upholds DMRC’s Refusal to Reimburse Rs.4.46 Crore in DVAT to L&T

    Date: 18.10.2026

    The Delhi High Court has dismissed Larsen & Toubro Limited’s challenge to an arbitral award that denied reimbursement of Rs.4.46 crore in Delhi Value Added Tax (DVAT) from Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. (DMRC), holding that the relevant supplies were connected to inter-State trade and import transactions and therefore fell outside DVAT.

    The dispute: tax reimbursement under a metro contract

    The case arose from a 2008 DMRC contract awarded to a consortium comprising Larsen & Toubro (L&T) and Furrer + Frey AG. The contract concerned the design, supply, installation, testing and commissioning of a 25 kV rigid overhead contact system and related cabling for sections of Delhi Metro’s Phase-II network.

    The contract value was approximately Rs.43.37 crore, along with USD 2.02 million and Swiss Franc 5.49 million. It required the contractor to deliver and install equipment including contact wires, traction cables, sectioning posts, sub-sectioning posts, return conductors and associated systems.

    A key contractual clause provided that DMRC would reimburse DVAT or Uttar Pradesh trade tax, where applicable, on indigenous equipment upon proof of actual payment. L&T argued that it had paid DVAT of Rs.4,45,73,743 on the equipment and systems supplied to DMRC in Delhi and was entitled to reimbursement.

    Why L&T claimed DVAT reimbursement

    L&T procured high-voltage and low-voltage panels, cables and other components from suppliers outside Delhi. Some high-voltage panels were imported from Germany by an Indian supplier, while certain other materials were obtained through inter-State transactions.

    According to L&T, these components were not supplied to DMRC as standalone items. Instead, they were transported to project sites, assembled, integrated, installed and commissioned into sectioning and sub-sectioning posts and other bill-of-quantities items. L&T maintained that the completed systems were commercially distinct products supplied to DMRC in Delhi, making the transactions local sales subject to DVAT.

    L&T also relied on two aspects of DMRC’s conduct:

    • DMRC initially reimbursed one DVAT invoice, though it later recovered the amount from L&T’s running bills.
    • DMRC deducted works-contract tax at source from invoices, which L&T argued showed that DMRC had treated the supplies as local transactions.

    DMRC’s position: the supplies were exempt from DVAT

    DMRC argued that reimbursement was only available where DVAT was legally applicable. It contended that the goods were procured specifically for the metro project through imports and inter-State purchases, meaning that the transactions were exempt from DVAT under Section 7 of the DVAT Act.

    DMRC relied on facts showing a close contractual connection between the goods and the project:

    • DMRC prescribed technical specifications for the equipment.
    • It approved the suppliers, including the foreign supplier of the high-voltage panels.
    • It required pre-inspection of goods.
    • The goods were custom-made for the metro project.
    • DMRC issued customs and excise-duty exemption certificates.
    • The invoices and packaging identified DMRC as the consignee or stated that the goods were for the DMRC project.

    DMRC maintained that these facts established that the movement of goods into Delhi, whether from another State or from abroad, was occasioned by and integral to the underlying works contract.

    Arbitration award: no reimbursement due

    The arbitral tribunal rejected L&T’s claim in its entirety and issued a nil award. It concluded that the imported high-voltage panels and the materials procured from outside Delhi were directly connected with the DMRC contract.

    The tribunal found that the relevant domestic procurements were inter-State sales subject to Central Sales Tax, while the imported equipment was part of a transaction in the course of import. As these categories are excluded from DVAT under Section 7 of the DVAT Act, DMRC was not required to reimburse the tax paid by L&T.

    The tribunal also held that DMRC’s initial reimbursement of one invoice and later recovery of that amount was a rectifiable mistake, not an admission that DVAT was properly payable. Since the principal claim failed, the tribunal rejected L&T’s claims for interest and arbitration costs as well.

    High Court’s analysis: contractual tax disputes can be arbitrated

    Before addressing the tax issue, the Court considered L&T’s argument that an arbitral tribunal could not decide whether DVAT applied because taxability is a matter for statutory authorities.

    The Court rejected that objection. It drew a distinction between disputes that require a binding statutory tax determination and disputes between contracting parties over tax reimbursement or allocation of tax liability. The latter category is contractual and can be resolved through arbitration.

    Here, the dispute centred on whether DMRC was contractually obliged to reimburse DVAT under the relevant clause. The Court held that this was an arbitrable issue between the parties.

    ABB precedent was decisive

    The Court held that the case was squarely governed by the earlier decision in ABB Ltd., which had been affirmed by the Supreme Court. That precedent involved a DMRC works contract for electrical and traction systems and examined whether goods procured from outside Delhi or through import were subject to DVAT.

    The governing test is whether the movement of goods is integrally connected with the contract for their supply. An express contractual clause requiring inter-State movement is not necessary. It is enough if the movement is pursuant to, or incidental to, the contract.

    Applying this principle, the Court found a direct and continuing link between the procurement of the panels and other equipment and L&T’s obligations to DMRC. The fact that L&T integrated the input materials into sectioning and sub-sectioning posts did not break that connection.

    Limited judicial review under Section 34

    The Court emphasised that a Section 34 petition is not an appeal against an arbitral award. A court cannot reassess the evidence merely because another interpretation may be possible. Intervention is warranted only on narrow grounds, such as patent illegality going to the root of the matter.

    The tribunal had considered the relevant invoices, supplier approvals, customs exemptions, project specifications, consignment details and the parties’ submissions. Its conclusion that the supplies were linked to inter-State trade and import was therefore a plausible view supported by the record.

    Outcome and practical significance

    The Delhi High Court dismissed L&T’s petition, upheld the nil arbitral award and made no order on costs.

    The ruling reinforces two important principles for infrastructure and works-contract disputes:

    1. Tax reimbursement clauses depend on legal applicability. A contractual promise to reimburse VAT does not require reimbursement where the transaction is legally exempt from that State tax.
    2. The contractual nexus of goods movement is critical. In projects involving customized equipment, approved suppliers, import-duty exemptions and project-specific consignments, the movement of goods may remain an import or inter-State transaction even after installation or integration into a larger system.

    The decision also confirms that arbitrators may decide contractual disputes over which party must bear or reimburse tax, provided they are not purporting to replace the statutory tax authorities on matters that require a binding public-law tax determination.

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    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi