Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 10.09.2026
Karnataka High Court Upholds POCSO Conviction but Modifies Juvenileβs Sentence; Compensation Enhanced to βΉ3 Lakh
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate G Sridharamurthy. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id sriadv3@gmail.com.
The Karnataka High Court has upheld the conviction of a person who was a juvenile at the time of the offence in a case involving allegations under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) and the Indian Penal Code, while modifying the custodial sentence and enhancing the compensation payable to the victim from βΉ1 lakh to βΉ3 lakh.
The matter was decided by Justice H.P. Sandesh in Criminal Revision Petition No. 1262 of 2018. The revision challenged the appellate order dated 20 August 2018 and the Juvenile Justice Boardβs order dated 26 April 2018.
Background of the Case
The prosecution alleged that the petitioner, who was a juvenile at the relevant time, had sexually abused a four-year-old child. The case was registered after the childβs mother lodged a complaint, and the prosecution examined 12 witnesses, including the victim, her mother and medical witnesses.
The Juvenile Justice Board had convicted the petitioner under multiple provisions of the POCSO Act read with Sections 375 and 376 of the IPC and sentenced him to three years in a juvenile home, along with payment of βΉ1 lakh to the victim.
Contradictory Medical Evidence Considered
A major argument raised in revision concerned differences in the medical evidence.
One doctor who examined the child shortly after the incident reportedly noticed swelling, while another doctor at Vanivilasa Hospital, who examined the child later, did not find such swelling or injury. The defence relied on this discrepancy to argue that the prosecution case was doubtful.
The State, however, contended that the discrepancy was minor and that the immediate complaint, the testimony of the victim and her mother, and the first medical examination supported the prosecution case.
The Court also noted that the FSL report did not detect seminal stains. However, the allegation itself was not one of penile penetration.
Court Finds No Evidence of Penetrative Sexual Activity
While examining the evidence, the High Court observed that the medical and forensic materials did not suggest penetrative sexual activity.
The Court also took into account the petitionerβs status as a juvenile at the time of the offence, as well as the fact that he was by then married and had two children.
Instead of re-appreciating the entire evidence to disturb the conviction, the Court considered it appropriate to modify the sentence.
Sentence Modified; Compensation Increased to βΉ3 Lakh
The High Court modified the original sentence of three years.
The petitioner had already undergone 117 days in custody, and the Court gave him set-off for that period. In lieu of the remaining custodial sentence, the Court enhanced the compensation from βΉ1 lakh to βΉ3 lakh, while expressly confirming the conviction.
The petitioner had already deposited βΉ1 lakh before the Trial Court and was directed to deposit the balance βΉ2 lakh before the High Court.
Compensation to Be Secured for the Victim
The High Court further directed that both the existing βΉ1 lakh and the additional βΉ2 lakh be placed in fixed deposits in the name of the victim girl for three years or until she attained majority, whichever was earlier.
The victimβs mother was permitted to withdraw the quarterly interest on the fixed deposits for the childβs education.
Key Legal Takeaway
The decision is significant because the Court adopted a balanced approach: it did not overturn the conviction, but modified the sentence in view of the petitionerβs juvenile status and the evidentiary circumstances, while strengthening the compensatory relief available to the victim.
The judgment also shows that in revision proceedings involving juvenile offenders, courts may consider the rehabilitative dimension of juvenile justice while ensuring that the victimβs interests remain protected.
Conclusion
In Arunachalam @ Arun v. State of Karnataka & Anr., the Karnataka High Court confirmed the conviction but modified the sentence imposed upon the juvenile offender. The Court took note of the medical evidence, the absence of proof of penetrative sexual activity, the petitionerβs juvenile status and the period of custody already undergone.
The final result was that the custodial sentence was modified, 117 days of custody were given set-off, and compensation was enhanced from βΉ1 lakh to βΉ3 lakh, with the amount secured in fixed deposit for the victimβs benefit and education.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 09.09.2026
Punjab & Haryana High Court Clarifies RERA Jurisdiction: Non-Registration Does Not Defeat Homebuyersβ Remedies
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email idamitnaren@outlook.com.
The Punjab and Haryana High Court, in Parveen Gambhir and Others v. Union of India and Others, has delivered an important judgment examining the interface between the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (βRERAβ), the Haryana real-estate regulatory framework, town-planning legislation and apartment-ownership law.
The Division Bench comprising Justice Sureshwar Thakur and Justice Vikas Suri dismissed the writ petition and affirmed the impugned governmental directions and approval. The judgment is significant for three propositions: non-registration of a project under RERA does not by itself extinguish the remedies available to homebuyers; RERA authorities do not possess an independent statutory power to order demolition merely because construction deviates from sanctioned plans; and overlapping State and Central statutes can continue to operate in their respective fields unless there is a genuine inconsistency attracting Section 89 of RERA.
Background of the Dispute
The controversy concerned the group-housing project βWindchantsβ, situated in Sector 112, Gurugram. According to the petitioners, the project originally covered approximately 23.43 acres and was developed pursuant to licences obtained under the Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975. The petitioners had purchased flats after relying upon advertisements, marketing material and representations concerning the project.
The dispute subsequently developed around, among other things, the treatment of the project as different phases, the applicability of RERA to portions of the development, occupation certificates, alleged deviations from sanctioned plans and the construction of additional EWS dwelling units.
An additional 1.19 acres was subsequently purchased and a further licence was issued in September 2019. The petitioners alleged that the developer sought to avoid the consequences of RERA by treating portions of the development as separate phases even though occupation/completion certificates had not been obtained when the RERA regime became applicable.
The controversy also had an earlier consumer-law dimension. An allottee had challenged an additional demand arising from an alleged increase in sale area before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. The NCDRC quashed that demand in August 2020, and the developer’s civil appeals were subsequently dismissed by the Supreme Court in January 2021.
What Was Challenged Before the High Court?
The petitioners principally sought quashing of:
1. Directions dated 25 January 2021, issued by the State Government purportedly under Section 83 of RERA; and
2. An in-principle approval dated 4 March 2021 relating to the fourth Occupation Certificate.
They additionally sought directions for a fresh site inspection, compliance with sanctioned plans and quashing of amendments to the project alleged to be contrary to RERA. The judgment records that the petition was directed against the Section 83 directions as well as the in-principle approval.
The controversy therefore went considerably beyond an ordinary builder-buyer dispute. It required the High Court to determine the respective regulatory fields occupied by RERA, the Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975, the Haryana Apartment Ownership Act, 1983, and the applicable Haryana regulatory framework.
The Controversial Haryana Government Directions
One of the central challenges concerned the State Government’s directions of 25 January 2021.
Those directions prescribed a procedure for proposed additions or alterations to sanctioned layout/building plans. Among other things, the mechanism contemplated inviting objections from existing allottees, publication of proposed revisions, availability of original and revised plans for inspection, consideration of objections and hearings before the competent authority.
The directions also dealt with community and commercial facilities in licensed colonies. Importantly, they stated that, where the definition of βcommon areasβ under RERA conflicted with the Haryana Apartment Ownership Act, 1983, the definition under the State legislation would govern and contradictory provisions under RERA would be treated as redundant.
This became one of the principal constitutional and statutory issues before the Court.
Petitionersβ Case: RERA Must Prevail
The petitioners argued that the State Government had effectively accorded primacy to Haryana legislation over the Central RERA framework and thereby diluted the safeguards available under Section 14(2) of RERA.
They further argued that Section 83 merely empowers the appropriate Government to issue policy directions to the RERA Authority and cannot be employed to supplant the statutory authority or assume functions specifically entrusted to it.
Reliance was also placed on the Supreme Court’s decision in Forum for People’s Collective Efforts (FPCE) v. State of West Bengal, (2021) 8 SCC 599, and on Sections 88 and 89 of RERA, read with Article 254 of the Constitution.
Section 89 provides RERA with overriding effect where another law contains provisions inconsistent with it. The petitioners consequently argued that Haryana legislation could not be given precedence over the Parliamentary enactment.
Section 14 RERA: Promoters Must Adhere to Sanctioned Plans
The Court closely examined Section 14 of RERA.
Section 14 requires a promoter to develop and complete a project in accordance with sanctioned plans, layout plans and specifications approved by the competent authority.
For material alterations to sanctioned plans, layout plans or common areas, Section 14(2) requires the previous written consent of at least two-thirds of the allottees, excluding the promoter.
The statutory protection is important because βminor additions or alterationsβ do not extend to significant structural modifications. The provision excludes matters such as additions to area, changes in height, removal of part of a building and specified structural changes from the concept of minor alterations.
The High Court accordingly recognised a peremptory statutory requirement that promoters adhere to sanctioned plans, subject only to the limited alterations contemplated by Section 14.
This is an important protection for allottees: promoters cannot treat sanctioned plans as merely indicative documents capable of unilateral alteration.
Major Finding No. 1: Non-Registration of a Project Does Not Take Away a Homebuyer’s RERA Remedy
One of the most consequential portions of the judgment concerns the relationship between Section 3 and Section 31 of RERA.
Section 3 imposes the registration obligation upon promoters. Broadly, a promoter cannot advertise, market, book, sell or offer a real-estate project for sale without registration, subject to statutory exceptions. Ongoing projects for which completion certificates had not been issued were also brought within the registration mechanism.
But what happens if the promoter itself fails to register the project?
Can the promoter rely upon its own failure to argue that RERA has no jurisdiction over a homebuyer’s complaint?
The High Court’s answer is important: No.
Relying upon its earlier decision in Ramprastha Developers Pvt. Ltd., the Court held that the effect of non-registration under Section 3 would not be to bar homebuyers/allottees from invoking the remedy contemplated under Section 31 of RERA.
Section 31 grants an aggrieved person a statutory right to complain to the Authority or adjudicating officer regarding violations of RERA or the rules and regulations framed under it. The Court emphasised that adjudicatory competence is rooted more directly in this statutory remedy than in the promoter’s complianceβor non-complianceβwith Section 3.
Why this finding matters
This interpretation prevents an anomalous result.
If non-registration deprived RERA of jurisdiction, a promoter could potentially benefit from its own statutory default: the very failure for which RERA provides penalties could become a defence against proceedings initiated by an allottee.
The Court’s interpretation avoids that consequence.
Indeed, the judgment notes that Section 59 separately provides consequences for non-registration, including monetary penalties and further consequences for continuing violations.
Thus:
Failure to register is a statutory breach by the promoter; it is not ordinarily a jurisdictional shield against an aggrieved homebuyer.
Major Finding No. 2: RERA Has Broad Adjudicatory and Direction-Giving Powers
The judgment also refers to Section 37 of RERA.
Section 37 empowers the Authority, for discharging its statutory functions, to issue directions from time to time to promoters, allottees and real-estate agents, and such directions are binding upon those concerned.
Read together with Section 31, this reinforces the regulatory reach of RERA over complaints concerning statutory violations.
The Court therefore treated the homebuyer’s remedial rights and the Authority’s adjudicatory competence as distinct from the question whether the promoter had properly fulfilled the project-registration obligation.
Major Finding No. 3: RERA Authorities Cannot Themselves Order Demolition Under Section 14
This is perhaps the most practically important limitation identified in the judgment.
While Section 14 imposes a clear obligation upon promoters to adhere to sanctioned plans, the High Court held that the provision does not itself confer a power upon RERA authorities to order demolition of constructions that deviate from those plans.
The Court observed that even where gross deviations or excess construction are alleged, there must be a statutory source of authority empowering the particular regulator to order demolition. It found no such demolition power vested in the RERA authorities merely through Section 14.
This distinction is critical:
RERA can regulate the promoter’s obligations and adjudicate violations, but every remedial power cannot automatically be inferred merely from the existence of the underlying statutory obligation.
Who, Then, Can Order Demolition?
The High Court explained that the power to demolish construction deviating from sanctioned plans may lie with the Municipal Corporation, Town and Country Planning Department or another authority under the applicable functional statute, depending upon the location and statutory framework governing the construction.
The competent authority must therefore be identified by examining the statute governing planning, construction and municipal control over the particular property.
This creates an important jurisdictional distinction for litigants.
A homebuyer may have a valid grievance under RERA concerning deviations from sanctioned plans, but the specific relief of physical demolition may need to be pursued before the authority statutorily empowered to order demolition.
Major Finding No. 4: Sections 88 and 89 Must Be Read Together
Another important aspect of the decision is the Court’s interpretation of Sections 88 and 89 of RERA.
Section 88 provides that RERA operates in addition to and not in derogation of other laws.
Section 89 gives RERA overriding effect where there is an inconsistency with another law.
The Court therefore rejected an approach under which RERA would automatically displace every other statute touching upon real estate.
According to the judgment, overriding effect arises where there is an actual inconsistency. If another enactment operates in a separate regulatory field, both statutory regimes can coexist.
This is an application of the principle of harmonious statutory construction: the first task is to determine whether the statutes can operate together before resorting to the overriding provision.
RERA and Consumer Protection Remedies
The Court also addressed the relationship between RERA and the Consumer Protection Act, 2019.
It observed that Section 88 permits homebuyers to access remedies under RERA as well as under consumer law because the statutory frameworks can operate complementarily.
The judgment, however, states that the remedies are to be exercised before one or the other forum and not simultaneously before both. That proposition should be read in the specific context of the Court’s reasoning and the nature of the relief pursued.
The broader significance remains that RERA was not interpreted as automatically extinguishing other statutory remedies available to purchasers of real estate.
Major Finding No. 5: Different Statutes Occupy Different Regulatory Fields
The High Court ultimately concluded that the relevant legislative regimes did not necessarily suffer from repugnancy merely because they all touched upon aspects of real-estate development.
The Court identified different statutory fields: licensing and consequences of licensing breaches, regulation of land use and urban development, apartment ownership and transferability, and the separate protections and regulatory mechanisms created by RERA.
Accordingly, the Court reasoned that each legislation should be enforced within the field that it occupies, without one authority encroaching upon powers specifically vested in another.
This distinction explains why the Court simultaneously recognised strong RERA protections for homebuyers while declining to treat RERA authorities as universal authorities for every planning, licensing, demolition and ownership dispute arising from a real-estate project.
Occupation Certificates: Separate Statutory Remedy
The petitioners had also challenged matters relating to occupation certificates.
The Court held that if the petitioners were aggrieved by orders granting occupation certificates to the builder, they could pursue an appeal before the competent authority.
This again illustrates the jurisdictional approach adopted by the Court: the existence of RERA does not absorb every function of town-planning, licensing and building-control authorities.
Final Decision
Ultimately, the Division Bench found no merit in the writ petition.
The petition was dismissed, and the impugned annexures were maintained and affirmed.
Thus, despite the Court’s important exposition of homebuyer remedies, Section 14 compliance, non-registration and the limits of RERA’s demolition jurisdiction, the petitioners did not succeed in obtaining the quashing relief sought.
Key Legal Principles Emerging from the Judgment
Issue
Punjab & Haryana High Court’s finding
Non-registration under Section 3
Does not by itself deprive an aggrieved homebuyer/allottee of the remedy under Section 31.
Promoter’s duty under Section 14
Sanctioned plans must be followed; material changes are subject to statutory consent requirements.
Two-thirds consent
Section 14(2) requires previous written consent of at least two-thirds of the allottees for specified alterations/additions.
Power of RERA to order demolition
Section 14 does not itself confer demolition powers upon RERA authorities.
Unauthorised/deviating construction
Demolition may fall within the jurisdiction of municipal, town-planning or another statutorily empowered authority.
Sections 88 & 89
Must be harmoniously read; RERA overrides another law where there is actual inconsistency.
State laws and RERA
Can coexist where they occupy distinct regulatory fields.
Occupation Certificate challenge
Appropriate statutory appellate remedy before the competent authority remains available.
Final outcome
Writ petition dismissed; impugned annexures maintained and affirmed.
Practical Impact on Homebuyers
The judgment is particularly significant because it prevents the statutory registration requirement from being turned against homebuyers.
A developer’s alleged failure to register a project cannot automatically be used to say:
βBecause the project was never registered, RERA has no jurisdiction over the buyer’s grievance.β
The Court’s approach treats registration principally as a regulatory obligation imposed upon the promoter, while Section 31 provides the aggrieved person with the statutory route for complaining about violations.
At the same time, homebuyers must carefully identify the correct forum for the particular relief they seek. A claim for compensation, enforcement of RERA obligations or other statutory relief may properly fall within the RERA framework, whereas actual demolition of construction contrary to sanctioned plans may require proceedings before the competent municipal or town-planning authority.
Practical Impact on Developers and Promoters
The judgment should not be understood as diluting the obligation to register projects.
On the contrary, non-registration remains independently punishable under the RERA framework. More importantly, the judgment indicates that a promoter cannot necessarily rely on its own non-registration to defeat an allottee’s statutory remedy.
Developers must therefore separately ensure compliance with:
RERA registration requirements; sanctioned plans and Section 14; consent requirements for alterations; planning and licensing legislation; occupation/completion certificate requirements; and obligations imposed by municipal and town-planning authorities.
Compliance with one regulatory regime cannot automatically cure non-compliance with another where each statute occupies a separate field.
Significance of the Judgment for RERA Jurisprudence
Parveen Gambhir is significant not because it gives unlimited jurisdiction to RERA, but because it attempts to draw the boundaries of RERA jurisdiction.
The judgment essentially establishes a two-way principle.
On one side, the protective jurisdiction of RERA cannot easily be defeated by a promoter’s failure to register a project. On the other, RERA cannot be treated as an all-purpose planning and municipal authority merely because the dispute concerns a real-estate project.
That distinction is important for future litigation involving unregistered projects, deviations from sanctioned plans, occupation certificates, project alterations, common areas, planning permissions and overlapping regulatory statutes.
Conclusion
The Punjab and Haryana High Court’s decision in Parveen Gambhir & Others v. Union of India & Others reinforces an important feature of India’s real-estate regulatory framework: RERA is a protective and remedial statute, but its authorities must operate within the powers actually conferred by Parliament.
The judgment recognises that non-registration of a project does not automatically deprive homebuyers of their remedy under Section 31. At the same time, it distinguishes between RERA’s power to regulate and adjudicate promoter obligations and the statutory power to physically demolish unauthorised construction, which may vest in municipal or town-planning authorities.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 09.09.2026
Supreme Court Refuses Appointment of Arbitrator Where Claims Were Hopelessly Time-Barred: Bilateral Negotiations Cannot Indefinitely Extend Limitation
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Arbitrator Shobhit Mallik. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email idshobhit.Ica23@gmail.com.
The Supreme Court in M/s B and T AG v. Ministry of Defence delivered an important ruling on the interplay between limitation, pre-arbitration negotiations and the Courtβs jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
The case arose from a defence procurement contract between a Swiss arms manufacturer and the Ministry of Defence. The petitioner sought appointment of an arbitral tribunal in relation to disputes concerning the encashment of a warranty bank guarantee and deduction of liquidated damages. The Supreme Court, however, declined to refer the dispute to arbitration, holding that the claim was βhopelessly barredβ because the petitioner had slept over its rights for more than five years.
The judgment is significant for commercial parties because it makes clear that mere negotiations, correspondence or repeated requests for reconsideration do not indefinitely postpone the accrual of a cause of action or extend the limitation period for invoking arbitration.
Background of the Dispute
The petitioner, M/s B and T AG, was a Swiss company engaged in the manufacture of arms. It had entered into a contract dated 27 March 2012 with the Government of India through the Ministry of Defence pursuant to an urgent tender for procurement of sub-machine guns under the Fast Track Procedure.
The dispute arose after the Ministry of Defence directed encashment of a warranty bank guarantee and recovery of liquidated damages on account of delay in supply.
The respondent issued instructions on 16 February 2016 to encash the warranty bank guarantee for Euro 201,793.75. Subsequently, sanction was accorded for recovery of liquidated damages, and on 26 September 2016 the relevant amount was deducted and credited into the Government account.
According to the petitioner, however, bilateral discussions continued between the parties in an attempt to amicably resolve the dispute.
Arbitration Clause Under Article 21
The contract contained a detailed dispute resolution mechanism under Article 21.
Article 21.1 required all disputes or differences arising out of or in connection with the contract to first be settled through bilateral discussions.
If the dispute could not be settled amicably, Article 21.2 contemplated reference to a three-member arbitral tribunal within the prescribed contractual framework. The seat of arbitration was to be New Delhi or another place in India mutually agreed between the parties, and the proceedings were to be governed by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
The petitioner relied heavily on this mandatory pre-arbitration negotiation clause to argue that limitation could not begin running until the bilateral discussions had effectively broken down.
Petitionerβs Case: Limitation Began Only When Negotiations Reached a βBreaking Pointβ
The petitioner contended that the contractual dispute resolution clause required the parties to attempt settlement through bilateral discussions before arbitration could be invoked.
It argued that although the bank guarantee was encashed in 2016, discussions continued thereafter, including communications and meetings, and that the real βbreaking pointβ occurred only later.
The petitioner relied on Geo Miller & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Chairman, Rajasthan Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd. to contend that the period spent in bona fide settlement negotiations could, in an appropriate case, be excluded while calculating limitation.
The petitioner further argued that the Ministry of Defence’s communication dated 22 September 2017, declining reconsideration of its position, could be treated as the breaking point.
After the COVID limitation-extension orders were taken into account, the petitioner argued that its arbitration notice dated 8 November 2021 was still within time.
Ministry of Defenceβs Stand: Cause of Action Crystallised in September 2016
The Ministry of Defence opposed the petition on limitation.
Its position was that the dispute concerned deduction of liquidated damages through encashment of the bank guarantee and that the last deduction was made on 26 September 2016.
Accordingly, the cause of action arose on that date.
The petitioner, however, issued the arbitration notice only on 8 November 2021, more than five years later. The respondent therefore contended that both the underlying claims and the attempt to invoke arbitration were hopelessly time-barred.
Question Before the Supreme Court
The Court framed the central issue in substance as:
Can claims which are barred by limitation still be treated as βlive claimsβ capable of being referred to arbitration under Section 11(6)?
This required the Court to examine two distinct, though related, limitation questions:
limitation governing the underlying substantive claim; and
limitation governing the Section 11 application for appointment of an arbitrator.
The Court emphasised that these two questions should not be mixed up.
Section 11(6) Application and Article 137 of the Limitation Act
The Supreme Court noted that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act itself does not prescribe a specific limitation period for filing an application under Section 11(6).
Because such an application is filed before a High Court or the Supreme Court, the residual Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies.
Article 137 prescribes a limitation period of three years from the date when the right to apply accrues.
The Court therefore reiterated that a Section 11 application must ordinarily be filed within three years from the point at which the right to seek appointment of an arbitrator first arises.
At the same time, the Court separately examined whether the underlying claim itself had already become dead or stale before arbitration was validly invoked.
Distinction Between Limitation of the Claim and Limitation of the Section 11 Petition
One of the most useful aspects of the judgment is its clear recognition that these are two separate legal questions.
The Supreme Court observed that there is a βfine distinctionβ between:
a plea that the claims themselves are barred by limitation; and
a plea that the application seeking appointment of an arbitrator is barred by limitation.
For practitioners, this distinction is essential.
A Section 11 application may technically be filed within three years of failure to appoint an arbitrator, yet the underlying substantive claims may already have become time-barred before the notice invoking arbitration was even issued.
In such cases, the Court is not necessarily bound to appoint an arbitrator merely because the Section 11 application itself was filed promptly.
Cause of Action and βCause of Arbitrationβ
The Court examined the concept of cause of action in detail.
It observed that the relevant question is when the claimant first acquired a legally enforceable right and could have successfully maintained an action.
For arbitration, the same principle applies: the cause of arbitration arises when the claimant acquires the right to require the dispute to be referred to arbitration.
The Court noted that an arbitration clause does not ordinarily postpone the substantive accrual of the cause of action. The limitation period runs from the point at which the underlying claim would have arisen had there been no arbitration clause.
Important Principle: A Party Cannot Revive a Dead Claim Through Correspondence
The Supreme Court reiterated a long-standing principle from Major (Retd.) Inder Singh Rekhi v. Delhi Development Authority.
A dispute ordinarily arises when a claim is asserted by one party and denied or repudiated by the other. However, once the cause of action has accrued, a party cannot postpone limitation simply by continuing to write letters, representations or reminders.
The Court summarised the principle in clear terms: repeated correspondence and indefinite bilateral discussions do not save limitation once the cause of action has already arisen.
This is one of the most commercially important propositions in the judgment.
The βBreaking Pointβ Test from Geo Miller
The petitioner placed considerable reliance on Geo Miller, where the Supreme Court had recognised that in appropriate circumstances the time spent in bona fide settlement negotiations may be relevant to determining when limitation begins.
Under that line of reasoning, courts may examine the βbreaking pointβ at which a reasonable party would have abandoned settlement efforts and contemplated arbitration.
But the Supreme Court stressed that the benefit of this principle is not automatic.
The party relying on negotiations must specifically plead and place the entire negotiation history on record so that the Court can determine the actual breaking point.
A bare assertion that negotiations continued is insufficient.
Supreme Court Finds 2016 to Be the Real Breaking Point
On the facts of the case, the Supreme Court rejected the petitionerβs contention that negotiations in 2017 or 2019 postponed limitation.
The Court found that the decisive event was the actual encashment of the bank guarantee and recovery of liquidated damages in 2016.
It observed that the amount was finally deducted on 26 September 2016 and credited into the Government account. According to the Court, that was effectively βthe end of the matter.β
The Court therefore treated the 2016 action as the true breaking point for limitation.
It further observed that the respondent’s communication showed that the petitionerβs justification had already been considered and a final decision had been taken regarding encashment and liquidated damages.
Negotiations for 10 or 20 Years Cannot Suspend Limitation
The Court made a particularly strong observation on prolonged settlement discussions.
It held that negotiations may theoretically continue for ten years or even twenty years after a cause of action has arisen, but this does not mean limitation remains suspended throughout.
The statutory limitation period cannot be defeated merely because parties continue talking after the dispute has already crystallised.
This principle is especially relevant in commercial and government contracts, where parties frequently continue exchanging letters and attending meetings long after a final decision has been taken.
Reliance on BSNL v. Nortel Networks
The Supreme Court also relied significantly on Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. Nortel Networks India Pvt. Ltd.
In Nortel, the Court had held that where claims are ex facie time-barred, a referral court may decline to appoint an arbitrator under Section 11.
The Court reiterated that mere correspondence or settlement discussions do not extend limitation where the claim had already been finally rejected or deductions had been made.
A valid Section 21 notice must therefore be issued within the applicable limitation period.
βEye of the Needleβ Test at the Section 11 Stage
The Court also discussed the narrow but meaningful scrutiny that a referral court may undertake under Section 11.
Referring to NTPC Ltd. v. SPML Infra Ltd. and Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation, the Court noted that ordinarily the arbitral tribunal is the first authority to decide questions of non-arbitrability.
However, the referral court may reject a claim where it is manifestly and ex facie non-arbitrable, including where the claim is plainly dead or hopelessly barred by limitation.
The Court described this as the limited βeye of the needleβ scrutiny.
The Court should not conduct a full trial at the Section 11 stage, but neither should it mechanically send obviously dead disputes to arbitration.
Why Courts Need Not Refer Every Dispute to Arbitration
The judgment reiterates that the principle of minimal judicial interference does not mean that courts must automatically appoint arbitrators whenever an arbitration agreement exists.
Where there is not even a vestige of doubt that the claim is dead and non-arbitrable, the court can refuse reference.
The purpose is to avoid forcing parties into unnecessary arbitration where the outcome is foreclosed by a fundamental legal bar such as limitation, thereby saving both private and public resources.
Final Findings of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the claim had become hopelessly time-barred.
The key findings were:
the dispute had crystallised no later than 2016;
the bank guarantee had been encashed and the liquidated damages finally deducted;
continued negotiations thereafter did not suspend or restart limitation;
the petitioner had failed to establish a later legally relevant breaking point;
the arbitration notice was issued only in November 2021;
the petitioner had therefore slept over its rights for more than five years.
The Court accordingly rejected the arbitration petition.
Key Legal Principles Emerging from the Judgment
Issue
Supreme Court’s ruling
Section 11(6) limitation
Governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act in the absence of a specific statutory period
Period under Article 137
Three years from when the right to apply first accrues
Underlying claim limitation
Separate from limitation governing the Section 11 petition
Cause of arbitration
Arises when the claimant acquires the right to require arbitration
Repeated letters/reminders
Do not postpone limitation once cause of action has accrued
Bilateral negotiations
Do not automatically stop or extend limitation
Geo Miller βbreaking pointβ
May be relevant only where the negotiation history is specifically pleaded and genuinely shows continuing bona fide settlement efforts
Final deduction / encashment
Can crystallise the dispute and cause of action
Court’s Section 11 scrutiny
Narrow, but it can reject manifestly dead or ex facie time-barred claims
Outcome
Arbitration petition rejected as hopelessly barred
Practical Impact on Commercial Contracts
The judgment carries an important warning for parties involved in long-running negotiations.
A party should not assume that limitation is protected merely because discussions are continuing.
Where a counterparty has already taken a final adverse step β such as:
rejecting a monetary claim;
deducting liquidated damages;
invoking or encashing a bank guarantee;
rejecting a final bill;
terminating a contract; or
unequivocally denying liability,
the cause of action may already have crystallised.
Parties should therefore calculate limitation independently of ongoing commercial discussions.
Practical Impact on Government Contracts
The decision is particularly relevant in public procurement, defence contracts, infrastructure contracts and EPC arrangements.
Government contracts often contain multi-tier dispute resolution mechanisms requiring negotiations before arbitration.
This judgment demonstrates that such clauses do not necessarily permit parties to keep limitation open indefinitely.
Where the Government has already taken a final and unequivocal action affecting the contractor’s rights, later representations to ministries or departments may not revive limitation.
Importance for Drafting Arbitration Clauses
The ruling also has implications for contract drafting.
Parties should clearly specify:
whether pre-arbitration negotiations are mandatory;
how long those negotiations may continue;
when the negotiation phase is deemed exhausted;
the time within which arbitration must be invoked thereafter; and
whether any internal decision is treated as final for triggering arbitration.
Vague clauses requiring βamicable discussionsβ without a defined timeline create uncertainty and litigation over when limitation actually began.
A properly drafted escalation clause can significantly reduce disputes over the breaking point.
Strategic Lesson for Claimants
Once a claim is denied or a significant adverse contractual action is taken, the safest approach is not to rely exclusively on commercial negotiations.
A claimant may continue settlement efforts while simultaneously protecting limitation by issuing a properly drafted notice invoking arbitration under Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, where appropriate.
The Supreme Courtβs judgment demonstrates the danger of assuming that repeated correspondence will keep the claim alive.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s judgment in M/s B and T AG v. Ministry of Defence reinforces a fundamental principle of arbitration law: arbitration is not a mechanism for reviving claims that have already become dead by limitation.
Although bona fide pre-arbitration negotiations may, in an appropriate factual situation, be relevant to determining when a dispute reached its breaking point, the mere continuation of discussions cannot suspend limitation indefinitely.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 09.09.2026
Bombay High Court Ruled Statutory Interest on Refund Runs from Three Months After Original Refund Application, Not from Appellate Order
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Madhumita Jha. The views expressed are based on her interpretation of the law. She can be reached at her email idjhamadhumita27@gmail.com.
The Bombay High Court has delivered an important ruling on interest payable on delayed tax refunds under Section 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944, as made applicable to service tax matters through Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994. In Empire Industries Limited v. Union of India & Others, the Court held that statutory interest becomes payable after the expiry of three months from the date of the original refund application, and not from the date on which the assessee subsequently succeeds before the Appellate Tribunal.
The Division Bench of Justice M. S. Karnik and Justice Sandesh D. Patil quashed the denial of interest by the Department and directed payment of statutory interest on the refund amount of βΉ53,05,173 from 20 August 2015 until the date of actual refund.
This decision is particularly significant for assessees whose refund claims remain pending for years because of departmental rejection, appellate proceedings or litigation.
Background of the Case
Empire Industries Limited had filed a refund application under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 read with Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994 on 20 May 2015.
The refund claim was not immediately granted. The dispute travelled through the appellate mechanism and was eventually decided in favour of the petitioner by the Appellate Tribunal on 8 December 2025. Thereafter, the petitioner issued a communication dated 5 January 2026, seeking implementation of the appellate order and release of the refund.
The Department subsequently sanctioned the refund of βΉ53,05,173, which was actually paid on 23 June 2026. However, the Order-in-Original dated 24 March 2026 denied statutory interest for the period claimed by the petitioner.
The petitioner therefore approached the Bombay High Court challenging the denial of interest.
Core Issue Before the Bombay High Court
The principal legal question was:
From which date does interest under Section 11BB become payable when a refund application is initially rejected but ultimately succeeds before an appellate authority?
The competing positions were straightforward.
The petitioner argued that interest should run from the expiry of three months from the date of the original refund application, i.e. from 20 August 2015.
The Revenue, on the other hand, treated the petitioner’s communication dated 5 January 2026 as the relevant refund claim and contended that interest did not become payable from the original 2015 application.
The dispute therefore turned upon the correct interpretation of Sections 11B and 11BB.
Petitionerβs Argument: Interest Follows the Original Refund Application
Empire Industries relied upon the Supreme Court’s landmark judgment in Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. v. Union of India, 2011 (273) E.L.T. 3 (SC).
The petitioner argued that once a refund application has been properly filed under Section 11B, the statutory clock under Section 11BB begins to run from that application itself. If the refund is not made within three months, interest becomes payable after the expiry of that period.
The petitioner also contended that the letter dated 5 January 2026 was merely a continuation or reminder of the original refund claim of 20 May 2015 and could not be treated as a fresh refund application.
Accordingly, the petitioner sought interest from 20 August 2015, being three months after the original application, until actual payment of the refund on 23 June 2026.
Revenueβs Stand
The Revenue argued that the refund became payable only as a consequence of the favourable CESTAT order dated 8 December 2025.
According to the Department, the assessee’s letter dated 5 January 2026 should be regarded as the refund claim arising out of that appellate order.
The Revenue further relied upon Section 11BB to contend that interest would become payable only where the refund remained unpaid beyond the applicable statutory period.
The practical effect of the Revenue’s interpretation would have been to deny interest for the long period between 2015 and the appellate success in 2025.
Bombay High Court Relies on Ranbaxy Laboratories
The High Court rejected the Revenue’s interpretation.
The Court relied squarely upon the binding Supreme Court decision in Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. and reiterated the legal position that Section 11BB becomes operational when a refund sanctioned under Section 11B is not paid within three months from the date of receipt of the refund application.
The Court reproduced the principle that the statutory explanation deeming an appellate or court order to be an order under Section 11B(2) does not postpone the date from which interest becomes payable.
This is the central ratio of the judgment.
The Crucial Principle: Appellate Success Does Not Reset the Interest Clock
The Court specifically held that interest is payable:
from the expiry of three months from the date of filing the refund application until the date of actual refund, and not from the date of the favourable order of the Appellate Tribunal.
This distinction is extremely important.
Where an assessee files a valid refund claim and the Department rejects it, the subsequent appellate order merely establishes that the refund was legally due. It does not convert the appellate order into a fresh starting point for calculating interest.
In effect, if the Department wrongly retains money for years and the assessee ultimately succeeds in appeal, the period spent in litigation cannot automatically be excluded while calculating statutory interest.
5 January 2026 Letter Was Only a Reminder, Not a Fresh Refund Claim
The Bombay High Court also expressly rejected the Department’s attempt to treat the petitioner’s letter dated 5 January 2026 as a new refund claim.
The Court held that the original refund application had been filed on 20 May 2015, while the claim was ultimately allowed by the Appellate Tribunal on 8 December 2025.
The subsequent communication of 5 January 2026 was therefore only a continuation/reminder of the original refund claim and could not be treated as a separate refund application under Section 11B.
This finding is important for tax administration because departments sometimes treat post-appeal representations as fresh refund applications, thereby attempting to restart the statutory interest period.
The judgment makes clear that such an approach cannot be sustained where the refund arises from an earlier valid application.
How Section 11BB Operates
Section 11BB is a statutory compensation mechanism for delay in granting refund.
The Bombay High Court, following Ranbaxy Laboratories, treated the provision as creating a clear temporal rule:
Refund application received β three-month statutory period β interest starts thereafter if refund remains unpaid.
The fact that the refund claim may subsequently travel through adjudication, appeal or judicial proceedings does not alter the original date of application for the purpose of calculating interest.
The Court’s reasoning also reflects the purpose of Section 11BB: to compensate the taxpayer for the period during which money lawfully refundable remains with the State beyond the statutory time limit.
Why the Revenueβs Interpretation Was Rejected
The Department’s interpretation effectively sought to shift the starting point for interest from 2015 to 2026.
Had that argument succeeded, an assessee could theoretically wait several years for final appellate relief and still receive little or no interest for the period during which the Government retained the disputed amount.
The High Court found this inconsistent with the interpretation already settled by the Supreme Court.
The Court described the Department’s treatment of the 5 January 2026 communication as a refund claim as a βserious error.β
Final Order of the Bombay High Court
The Court allowed the writ petition.
It quashed the Order-in-Original dated 24 March 2026 to the extent that it denied statutory interest on the sanctioned refund amount of βΉ53,05,173.
The Assistant Commissioner was directed to pay the amount together with statutory interest:
from 20 August 2015 until the date of actual refund, and the payment was directed to be made within eight weeks from the date of the High Court’s order.
Key Legal Principles Emerging from the Judgment
Issue
Bombay High Court’s ruling
Original refund application
Filed on 20 May 2015
Statutory interest provision
Section 11BB of the Central Excise Act, 1944
Service tax applicability
Through Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994
When interest begins
After expiry of three months from receipt of original refund application
Relevant interest date in this case
20 August 2015
CESTAT order
8 December 2025
Effect of appellate order
Does not restart or postpone the interest period
Letter dated 5 January 2026
Merely a continuation/reminder, not a fresh refund application
Refund amount
βΉ53,05,173
High Court direction
Statutory interest from 20 August 2015 till actual refund
Time granted for compliance
Eight weeks
Governing precedent
Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. v. Union of India
Importance for Service Tax and Central Excise Refund Disputes
Although the dispute arose in the context of the erstwhile service tax regime, the judgment remains highly relevant to legacy indirect tax litigation.
A large number of service tax and central excise matters continue to remain in appellate proceedings even after the introduction of GST. In such cases, successful assessees frequently face a second round of dispute after winning the substantive appeal: the Department releases the principal refund but disputes the period for which interest is payable.
The Bombay High Court’s decision reinforces that interest is not dependent upon the date on which the Department finally accepts the assessee’s legal position.
Where the original refund application was validly filed, the statutory interest period must ordinarily be traced back to that application.
Importance of the Ranbaxy Laboratories Principle
The judgment is also a strong reaffirmation of the binding nature of Ranbaxy Laboratories.
The Supreme Court had already settled that the explanation to Section 11BB, which deems an appellate or court order to be an order under Section 11B(2), does not alter the starting date for interest.
The Bombay High Court applied that principle directly and rejected an administrative interpretation inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling.
For taxpayers, this significantly strengthens claims in cases where refunds are ultimately granted after appellate litigation.
Practical Takeaway for Assessees
Businesses pursuing refunds under legacy central excise or service tax provisions should carefully preserve:
the original refund application;
proof of the date on which it was received by the Department;
acknowledgement or diary number;
adjudication and appellate orders;
subsequent correspondence seeking implementation; and
proof of the actual date on which refund was credited.
The most critical document for Section 11BB purposes is often not the final appellate order, but the original refund application and its date of receipt.
That date can determine several years’ worth of statutory interest.
Practical Takeaway for Tax Authorities
The decision also serves as a reminder to tax authorities that a post-appeal implementation letter should not automatically be treated as a fresh refund claim.
Where the assessee had already filed a refund application and merely succeeds in getting that claim recognised through appeal, the subsequent letter ordinarily does not erase the original statutory timeline.
The refund machinery cannot be interpreted in a way that financially disadvantages an assessee merely because the Department’s initial rejection was subsequently overturned.
Broader Principle: The Government Cannot Benefit from Delayed Refund Adjudication
Beyond the wording of Section 11BB, the decision embodies a broader fiscal principle.
When money ultimately found refundable has remained with the Government beyond the statutory period, interest compensates the taxpayer for the delay.
If interest were calculated only from the date of the final appellate order, the State could retain funds throughout prolonged litigation without compensating the assessee for that period.
The Bombay High Court’s application of Ranbaxy Laboratories prevents that consequence and reinforces discipline in the administration of statutory refunds.
Conclusion
The Bombay High Court’s ruling in Empire Industries Limited v. Union of India & Others is an important reaffirmation of taxpayer rights in delayed refund cases.
The Court has made it clear that the statutory interest clock under Section 11BB ordinarily begins after three months from the date of the original refund application and does not wait for the assessee to ultimately succeed before the Appellate Tribunal.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 09.09.2026
Karnataka High Court Quashes Criminal Proceedings in Land Dispute
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate G Sridharamurthy. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id sriadv3@gmail.com.
The Karnataka High Court recently delivered a significant judgment in Criminal Petition No. 9587 of 2017, quashing criminal proceedings against five accused individuals in a long-standing land dispute. This article provides a detailed overview of the case, the legal arguments, and the implications of the court’s decision.
Background of the Case
The dispute centers around land bearing Survey Nos. 212/2B and 213/1 in Devigere village, Hassan District. The complainant, D.T. Krishnegowda, alleged that the accusedβK.S. Rathnamma and othersβcriminally trespassed onto the property, damaged coconut trees, and intimidated him with deadly weapons on June 22, 2014. The land in question was claimed to be owned by his sister, Jayalakshmamma, who had appointed him to manage it.
Legal Proceedings Timeline
Private Complaint Filed: The complainant filed a private complaint (PCR No. 249/2014) seeking legal action against the accused for offenses under Sections 427, 447, 392, 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
Investigation and ‘B’ Report: The trial court referred the matter for police investigation. The investigating officer found no substance in the allegations and filed a ‘B’ report (closure report).
Protest Petition: Dissatisfied, the complainant filed a protest petition and examined himself and two witnesses. The trial court rejected the protest petition and accepted the ‘B’ report.
Revision Petition: The complainant challenged this order in Revision Petition No. 187/2015. The revisional court set aside the trial court’s order, rejected the ‘B’ report, and issued summons to the accused.
High Court Petition: The accused approached the High Court, seeking to quash the proceedings.
Key Arguments Presented
For the Petitioners (Accused):
The complainant was not the owner of the property and had not sustained any injury.
The actual owner, Jayalakshmamma, neither filed the complaint nor appeared as a witness.
Previous civil litigation (OS No. 178/2005) filed by Jayalakshmamma for permanent injunction was ultimately dismissed in appeal (RA No. 100/2013), undermining the basis of the criminal complaint.
The evidence presented by the complainant and his witnesses was inconsistent and insufficient.
For the Respondents (State):
Serious allegations of criminal conduct were made, warranting legal proceedings.
The complainant, though not the owner, reported criminal acts committed by the accused.
High Court’s Analysis and Decision
Justice M.G. Uma, after reviewing the case, observed:
The complainant’s authority to file the complaint was questionable since he was not the owner and the actual owner did not participate in the proceedings.
The civil suit that formed the basis of the complaint had been dismissed, and the appeal was still pending after ten years.
The evidence from the complainant and his witnesses was either inconsistent or did not support the prosecution’s case.
The revisional court erred in issuing summons based solely on the complainant’s testimony.
Order:
The High Court allowed the criminal petition, set aside the revisional court’s order, and quashed the criminal proceedings against the accused.
Implications of the Judgment
Reinforces the Importance of Ownership: Only parties with a direct legal interest or injury can initiate criminal proceedings in property disputes.
Role of Evidence: Courts must rely on consistent and credible evidence before proceeding with criminal charges.
Civil vs. Criminal Remedies: The judgment underscores the distinction between civil disputes over property and criminal liability.
Conclusion
This judgment serves as a precedent for similar land dispute cases, emphasizing the need for clear ownership, credible evidence, and proper legal standing before invoking criminal law. It also highlights the judiciary’s role in preventing the misuse of criminal proceedings in civil disputes.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
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Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 08.09.2026
Supreme Court Clarifies RERA Applicability to Industrial Land
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email idamitnaren@outlook.com.
The Supreme Court of India recently delivered a significant judgment in the case of the Madhya Pradesh Real Estate Regulatory Authority (MPRERA) vs. M/S Malwa Vanaspati and Chemicals Co. Ltd., addressing the applicability of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA) to industrial land development. This decision has important implications for developers, regulators, and stakeholders in the real estate sector, especially those involved in industrial projects.
Background of the Case
Project Overview
M/S Malwa Vanaspati and Chemicals Co. Ltd. owned industrial land in Indore, earmarked for industrial use under the local development plan.
The company proposed a flatted industrial factory project, receiving necessary approvals from planning authorities and the municipal corporation.
Regulatory Action
MPRERA initiated proceedings against the company for not registering the project under RERA, following a complaint from the Collector, Indore.
A penalty of Rs. 2,27,98,800 was imposed, and restrictions were placed on booking and sale of units.
The company appealed, but the appellate tribunal required a pre-deposit of 30% of the penalty, which the company could not fulfill, leading to dismissal of the appeal.
High Court Proceedings
The company filed a writ petition, arguing that RERA does not apply to industrial plots.
During the hearing, the company undertook not to sell any plots for residential or commercial purposes and to develop only as an industrial project.
The High Court set aside the penalty and related orders, based on this undertaking.
Supreme Court’s Decision
The Supreme Court found the High Court’s approach legally impermissible, noting that the High Court should not have set aside the penalty solely based on the undertaking, especially when the statutory pre-deposit requirement was not met.
The Supreme Court restored the writ petition to its original status, allowing the company to contest jurisdictional issues before the High Court.
The MPRERA was permitted to assist the High Court regarding its jurisdiction under RERA.
The Supreme Court urged the High Court to expedite the matter, given its prolonged pendency.
Key Implications
Strict Compliance with RERA Procedures
The judgment reinforces that statutory requirements, such as pre-deposit for appeals, must be strictly followed.
Undertakings or subsequent compliance do not automatically absolve parties from penalties or procedural obligations.
Jurisdictional Clarity
The case highlights ongoing debates about RERA’s applicability to industrial projects, with the Supreme Court directing the High Court to address this jurisdictional question.
Guidance for Developers
Developers of industrial projects must be vigilant about RERA compliance, especially regarding registration and permissible land use.
Any deviation, even if rectified later, can attract significant penalties and regulatory scrutiny.
Conclusion
This Supreme Court judgment underscores the importance of adhering to statutory procedures under RERA and clarifies that undertakings alone cannot override legal requirements. The final determination of RERA’s applicability to industrial land now rests with the High Court, but the case sets a precedent for strict regulatory compliance in the real estate sector.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
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Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 08.09.2026
Appointment of Sole Arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: Disputes Arising from Licence Agreement
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Arbitrator Shobhit Mallik. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email idshobhit.Ica23@gmail.com.
This article examines the recent Delhi High Court judgment in the case of Flemingo (DFS) Private Limited versus Airports Authority of India (AAI), focusing on the arbitration and contractual disputes arising from the operation of duty-free shops at Amritsar Airport. The case highlights key legal principles regarding arbitration agreements, limitation periods, and the scope of judicial intervention at the referral stage.
Background of the Dispute
Parties Involved:
Flemingo (DFS) Private Limited: A company operating duty-free shops at airports.
Airports Authority of India (AAI): A statutory body managing civil aviation infrastructure in India.
Contractual Relationship:
In 2009, AAI awarded Flemingo the license to operate duty-free shops at Amritsar Airport, formalized by a Licence Agreement dated 30.09.2011 for five years.
Spaces allotted: 66.64 sqm (Arrival) and 46.58 sqm (Departure).
The agreement included an arbitration clause (Clause 57) for dispute resolution.
Emergence of Disputes:
Flemingo raised issues regarding excess rent and concession fees charged by AAI.
Multiple correspondences and reminders were exchanged from 2017 to 2021.
AAI formally rejected Flemingoβs claims on 28.09.2021 and 11.10.2021.
Flemingo invoked arbitration via legal notice on 14.03.2022.
Mediation was attempted but failed, leading to the present petition for appointment of an arbitrator.
Key Legal Issues
1. Limitation Period for Arbitration Petitions
AAIβs Argument: The petition was time-barred, as the first invocation of arbitration was in 2017, and the current petition was filed in 2025.
Flemingoβs Argument: The cause of action arose only after AAIβs formal rejection in October 2021. The period spent in mediation should be excluded from the limitation calculation.
2. Scope of Referral Court under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act
The courtβs role is limited to verifying the existence of a valid arbitration agreement and whether the petition is within the limitation period.
Detailed examination of whether claims are time-barred or arbitrable is reserved for the arbitrator.
3. Arbitrability of Claims
AAI contended that some claims (e.g., concession fee) were outside the scope of the original agreement.
The court held that such issues should be decided by the arbitrator, not at the referral stage.
Courtβs Analysis and Findings
Limitation Calculation:
The court found that the formal rejection of claims by AAI on 11.10.2021 was the breaking point for limitation.
Flemingoβs notice invoking arbitration (14.03.2022) and subsequent mediation (JuneβNovember 2023) were within the prescribed period.
The time spent in bona fide mediation was excluded from the limitation period, making the petition timely.
Nature of Prior Correspondence:
Earlier letters from Flemingo (2017β2018) were not formal notices invoking arbitration but requests for amicable resolution.
The actual invocation of arbitration occurred only after AAIβs formal rejection in 2021.
Referral Courtβs Limited Role:
The court reaffirmed that it should not conduct a detailed inquiry into the merits or arbitrability of claims at the Section 11 stage.
All such issues are to be determined by the appointed arbitrator.
Outcome and Directions
The court appointed Ms. Justice Shalinder Kaur (Retd.) as the Sole Arbitrator.
Arbitration will proceed under the Delhi International Arbitration Centre (DIAC) rules.
All rights and contentions of the parties, including arbitrability and merits, are left open for the arbitratorβs determination.
Significance of the Judgment
Clarifies Limitation Law: The judgment clarifies when the limitation period starts for arbitration petitions and the effect of mediation on limitation.
Reinforces Party Autonomy: Emphasizes minimal court interference in arbitration, supporting party autonomy and efficient dispute resolution.
Guidance for Future Disputes: Provides a template for handling similar contractual and arbitration disputes in the infrastructure and aviation sectors.
Conclusion
The Delhi High Courtβs decision in the Flemingo (DFS) vs. AAI case underscores the importance of clear contractual terms, timely invocation of arbitration, and the limited role of courts at the referral stage. The judgment ensures that substantive disputes are resolved by arbitrators, promoting efficiency and fairness in commercial dispute resolution.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 08.09.2026
Bombay High Court on Stamp Duty Valuation for Joint Development Agreements Involving Contingent Rights and Future Entitlements
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Madhumita Jha. The views expressed are based on her interpretation of the law. She can be reached at her email idjhamadhumita27@gmail.com.
The Bombay High Court recently delivered a significant judgment in the case of Wadhwa Constructions & Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra, addressing the complex issue of stamp duty assessment on a Joint Development Agreement (JDA) for a large land development project in Raigad. This article provides a detailed analysis of the dispute, the legal arguments, the Court’s findings, and the implications for real estate developers and authorities.
Background of the Dispute
Parties Involved:
Petitioners: Wadhwa Constructions & Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. and Navin Makhija
Respondents: State of Maharashtra and Stamp Authorities
Project: Development of land parcels in Panvel, Raigad, under a JDA with Valuable Properties Pvt. Ltd. (VPPL)
Key Dates:
JDA executed: 18 February 2014
Initial stamp duty paid: Rs. 15.67 crore
Authorities later demanded additional stamp duty, alleging a deficit of over Rs. 21.92 crore
Core Issues
Calculation of Stamp Duty:
Whether the authorities were correct in including future and contingent rights (such as additional FSI, revenue sharing, and development of additional land) in the present valuation for stamp duty.
Interpretation of the JDA:
Whether rights over the entire land (including a 50-acre parcel subject to a future ‘Swap Notice’) and potential future FSI should be valued as present rights.
Application of Valuation Guidelines:
Dispute over the use of conversion factors (1.5 vs. 1.2) and rates (construction cost vs. market sale price) for calculating the value of constructed area and parking.
Legal Arguments
Petitioners’ Stand
Only rights and entitlements actually created and operative on the date of execution should be considered for stamp duty.
Contingent rights (like the 50-acre parcel and additional FSI) should not be included until the relevant event (e.g., Swap Notice) occurs.
The correct conversion factor for carpet area to built-up area is 1.2 (not 1.5), and construction cost (Rs. 8,500/sq.m.) should be used instead of market sale price (Rs. 24,000/sq.m.).
State’s Stand
The JDA and applicable guidelines justify including all possible rights and entitlements, including those dependent on future events, in the present valuation.
The use of 1.5 as a conversion factor and market sale price is supported by the agreement’s definitions and the Annual Statement of Rates (ASR).
Court’s Analysis and Findings
Key Principles Established
Present vs. Contingent Rights:
Only rights and development potential actually available and operative on the date of execution can be included in stamp duty valuation.
Contingent rights (dependent on future events like Swap Notice or FSI increase) cannot be treated as present rights for valuation.
Conversion Factor and Valuation Rate:
The correct conversion factor for carpet area to built-up area is 1.2, as per ASR guidelines, not 1.5 as used in the agreement for internal calculations.
Construction cost (Rs. 8,500/sq.m.) should be used for constructed area, not the market sale price (Rs. 24,000/sq.m.).
Revenue Sharing:
Deferred revenue sharing can be considered as part of consideration, but only to the extent it relates to rights actually granted on the date of execution.
Parking Calculation:
Parking requirements must be based on the development area and entitlements available at the time of execution, not on future or contingent development.
Orders Passed
The Court quashed the orders of the Collector of Stamps and the Appellate Authority to the extent they included future/contingent rights and used incorrect valuation methods.
Directed a fresh determination of market value and stamp duty, strictly based on rights and entitlements operative on the date of execution, using the correct conversion factor and construction cost.
The 298 acres (First Schedule) are to be valued as present rights; the 50.23 acres (Second Schedule) are to be excluded unless and until the Swap Notice is exercised.
Implications for Real Estate and Stamp Duty Law
Clarity on Stamp Duty Assessment: The judgment clarifies that only present and operative rights can be considered for stamp duty, not hypothetical or contingent future rights.
Guidance for Drafting JDAs: Developers and landowners must clearly distinguish between present and contingent rights in agreements to avoid inflated stamp duty demands.
Role of ASR Guidelines: Authorities must apply the correct conversion factors and valuation rates as per statutory guidelines, not merely rely on contractual definitions.
Protection Against Arbitrary Valuation: The judgment protects parties from arbitrary and excessive stamp duty assessments based on speculative future events.
Conclusion
This Bombay High Court judgment sets a crucial precedent for the real estate sector, ensuring that stamp duty is levied only on actual, present rights and entitlements, and not on speculative or contingent future benefits. It reinforces the need for strict adherence to statutory guidelines and careful drafting of development agreements.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 08.09.2026
High Court of Karnataka Upholds Anticipatory Bail
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate G Sridharamurthy. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id sriadv3@gmail.com.
The Karnataka High Court recently delivered a significant order in a case involving serious allegations under the Indian Penal Code, including abetment of suicide, criminal intimidation, and extortion. The case, which has drawn attention due to its complex family dynamics and the gravity of the accusations, centered on petitions challenging the grant of anticipatory bail to several accused individuals.
Background of the Case
The dispute originated from a tragic incident where Smt. Shanti, wife of the petitioner, committed suicide on August 30, 2022. The petitioner, Mr. Gopinath Nagar Anthal, alleged that his daughter-in-law, Namrata Logi Shetty, and her family members were responsible for abetting the suicide. The case was registered as Crime No. 201/2022 at Marathahalli Police Station, Bengaluru, under Sections 306 (abetment of suicide), 506 (criminal intimidation), and 384 (extortion) of the IPC.
Following the registration of the FIR, several accused, including Namrata Logi Shetty and her relatives, sought anticipatory bail. The Sessions Court granted bail to accused Nos. 2 to 4 and 6, which the petitioner challenged before the High Court, arguing that the seriousness of the allegations was not adequately considered and that he was denied a fair opportunity to oppose the bail applications.
Key Legal Arguments
Petitioner’s Contentions
Gravity of Allegations: The petitioner argued that the Sessions Judge failed to appreciate the seriousness of the charges, especially since the deceased had left a death note implicating the accused.
Right to Be Heard: It was contended that the petitioner was not given a proper opportunity to present objections or argue against the anticipatory bail applications.
Criminal Antecedents: The petitioner highlighted that one of the accused had a history of criminal cases and was previously listed as a rowdy sheeter.
Respondents’ Defense
Prior Bail Orders: The defense pointed out that the main accused (Namrata Logi Shetty) had already been granted anticipatory bail by the High Court, and the Supreme Court had dismissed the petitioner’s challenge to that order.
Family Dispute Context: The respondents argued that the case stemmed from ongoing matrimonial disputes, including a pending divorce and cross-complaints of dowry harassment and cruelty.
Compliance with Bail Conditions: The accused had complied with all bail conditions, and proceedings against some had been stayed by a coordinate bench of the High Court.
Opportunity to Oppose: The defense demonstrated that the petitioner had, in fact, filed written submissions and documents and was given a chance to present his case before the Sessions Court.
High Court’s Analysis and Decision
Justice S. Vishwajith Shetty, after reviewing the records and hearing both sides, made several important observations:
Opportunity to Be Heard: The court found that the petitioner was given ample opportunity to oppose the bail applications, including submitting written arguments and supporting documents.
Nature of Allegations: While the allegations against the main accused were serious, the court noted that the involvement of the other accused (Nos. 2 to 4 and 6) was less direct, and proceedings against them had been stayed in related matters.
Criminal Antecedents: Citing Supreme Court precedent, the court held that prior criminal cases alone do not justify denial of bail if the current allegations are not grave.
Reasoned Bail Orders: The Sessions Judge had applied judicial mind and issued reasoned orders granting anticipatory bail, which the High Court found no grounds to overturn.
Outcome
The High Court dismissed both petitions seeking cancellation of anticipatory bail, affirming the lower court’s orders. The judgment underscores the importance of procedural fairness, the distinction between the gravity of allegations among co-accused, and the principle that bail should not be denied solely on the basis of past criminal records unless current charges warrant such action.
Legal Significance
This order reiterates key principles in bail jurisprudence:
Right to Oppose Bail: Complainants must be given a fair chance to present objections, but courts will look at the actual opportunity provided, not just procedural technicalities.
Individual Assessment: Courts must assess the role and allegations against each accused individually, especially in cases involving multiple family members.
Criminal Antecedents: Past criminal history is a factor but not the sole determinant for bail decisions.
Judicial Discretion: Higher courts are reluctant to interfere with reasoned bail orders unless there is clear non-application of mind or miscarriage of justice.
This case serves as a reference point for future matters involving anticipatory bail, especially in sensitive family disputes with overlapping criminal allegations.
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Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 07.09.2026
Madras High Court on Illegality of Construction Without Environmental Clearance, RERA Applicability, and Homebuyer Rights in Ongoing Real Estate Projects
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email idamitnaren@outlook.com.
The Madras High Court’s decision in the case of Subashini Thulasiram v. SPR & RG Constructions Pvt. Ltd. is a significant milestone in the fight against illegal real estate practices, environmental violations, and the protection of homebuyers’ rights under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA). This article provides a detailed overview of the case, its background, legal findings, and its broader implications for the real estate sector.
Background of the Case
Parties Involved:
Appellant: Subashini Thulasiram, a homebuyer.
Respondent: SPR & RG Constructions Pvt. Ltd., the developer.
2017: RERA Act comes into force (May 1); developer claims project completion (May 3) and applies for completion certificate (May 29).
2018: Environmental clearance obtained (June 27); revised completion certificate for increased units (September 6).
Legal Proceedings: Multiple complaints and appeals filed by the buyer, culminating in the High Court judgment.
Legal Findings and Analysis
1. Environmental Clearance is Mandatory
The court emphasized that environmental clearance must be obtained before starting construction, as per the 2006 Central Government notification.
The developer began construction without this clearance, making the entire project illegal until the certificate was belatedly obtained in 2018.
2. RERA Registration and Ongoing Projects
Under Section 3 of the RERA Act, projects without a completion certificate as of May 1, 2017, must register with RERA.
The developer applied for the completion certificate only on May 29, 2017, after the Act commenced, and received it much later.
The court held that the project was an “ongoing project” and not exempt from RERA registration, rejecting the developer’s reliance on state rules that conflicted with the central Act.
3. Deviation from Approved Plans
The developer increased the number of dwelling units from 950 to 1050 without informing or obtaining consent from existing buyers, reducing their undivided share of land and violating their rights.
The revised plan and completion certificate were obtained after construction was already completed, raising questions about regulatory oversight and possible collusion.
4. Accountability of Authorities
The judgment criticized the lack of proper inspection and due diligence by the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority (CMDA) and other officials.
It called for action against both the developer and responsible officials for approving and regularizing illegal constructions.
Directions Issued by the Court
The project must be treated as an ongoing project and registered under RERA.
The buyer’s complaint is maintainable and must be heard on merits.
The authorities are directed to expedite the hearing and resolution of the complaint and any subsequent appeals.
The developer’s actions in obtaining post-facto environmental clearance and revising plans without buyer consent are declared illegal.
Broader Implications
For Homebuyers: The judgment reinforces the rights of buyers to demand transparency, adherence to approved plans, and timely possession.
For Developers: Strict compliance with environmental and regulatory approvals is mandatory. Post-facto clearances do not legalize prior violations.
For Regulatory Authorities: The case highlights the need for vigilant oversight and accountability in granting approvals and monitoring construction.
Conclusion
The Subashini Thulasiram judgment is a landmark in ensuring accountability in the real estate sector. It upholds the supremacy of the RERA Act, mandates strict adherence to environmental laws, and protects the interests of homebuyers against unscrupulous practices. This case serves as a warning to developers and a reassurance to buyers that the law will protect their rights and interests.
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Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
