ALS

π€πšππ«π’π€πšπš π‹πžπ πšπ₯ π’πžπ«π―π’πœπžπ¬ (𝐀𝐋𝐒)

Tag: #LegalView

  • Karnataka HC Upholds Corruption Proceedings Against Retired BBMP Engineer; Rejects Sanction Objection

    Karnataka HC Upholds Corruption Proceedings Against Retired BBMP Engineer; Rejects Sanction Objection

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 22.09.2026

    Karnataka HC Upholds Corruption Proceedings Against Retired BBMP Engineer; Rejects Sanction Objection

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate G Sridharamurthy. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id sriadv3@gmail.com . 

    The Karnataka High Court has held that the 2018 amendment to Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, which extended the requirement of prior sanction to former public servants, cannot be invoked to reopen proceedings where the court had already taken cognizance of the alleged corruption offences before the amendment came into force on 26 July 2018.

    Justice H.P. Sandesh dismissed three criminal revision petitions filed by retired BBMP Executive Engineer B.G. Prakash Kumar, thereby allowing the criminal proceedings against him under Sections 13(1)(c) and 13(1)(d), read with Section 13(2), of the Prevention of Corruption Act to continue.

    Case Arose From Alleged Irregularities in BBMP Development Works

    • The prosecution case concerned alleged irregularities in developmental works undertaken by the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP).
    • B.G. Prakash Kumar had served as an Executive Engineer, Malleshwaram Division, BBMP, and supervised road improvement and asphalting works.
    • Following allegations concerning irregularities in execution of developmental works, the BBMP Commissioner directed the Technical Investigation Cell to conduct an inquiry. A complaint was thereafter lodged by the Additional Commissioner, BBMP, leading to registration of Crime No. 4/2011 for offences under the IPC and Prevention of Corruption Act.
    • Prakash Kumar retired from service on attaining superannuation on 30 July 2017. The investigating agency subsequently filed charge sheets before the competent court in 2018.

    Cognizance Was Taken Before PC Act Amendment

    • The dates on which cognizance was taken ultimately became crucial to the High Court’s decision.
    • The Special Court took cognizance on 23 May 2018 in Special C.C. Nos. 339/2018 and 338/2018 and on 16 February 2018 in Special C.C. No. 107/2018.
    • Thus, in all three cases, cognizance had already been taken before 26 July 2018, when the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018 came into force.

    Trial Court Initially Discharged Retired Executive Engineer

    • Prakash Kumar moved applications under Section 227 CrPC seeking discharge from both IPC and Prevention of Corruption Act offences.
    • The Trial Court initially discharged him and closed the proceedings by an order dated 20 September 2023, holding the prosecution case unsustainable in law.
    • However, the Karnataka High Court subsequently, by an order dated 22 March 2025, set aside that discharge order and remanded the matter to the Trial Court for fresh consideration.
    • After reconsideration, the Trial Court passed a fresh order on 24 February 2026.
    • This time, it discharged Prakash Kumar from the IPC offences under Sections 120B, 409, 465, 468 and 477A, but directed continuation of proceedings for offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act.
    • The retired officer therefore approached the High Court through the present revision petitions challenging the partial rejection of his discharge applications.

    Petitioner: Prior Sanction Mandatory Even for Retired Public Servant

    • The petitioner’s principal argument centred on the amendment made to Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act with effect from 26 July 2018.
    • The amended provision requires previous sanction before a court takes cognizance of specified corruption offences allegedly committed by a public servant and extends the statutory language to a person who β€œwas at the time of commission of the alleged offence” employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or State, as applicable.
    • Counsel for Prakash Kumar argued that the amended provision protected retired officials as well and that sanction constituted a condition precedent for valid cognizance.
    • It was argued that after the earlier discharge order was set aside and the proceedings restored, the Trial Court was required to reconsider the matter afresh. According to the petitioner, continuation of the PC Act proceedings without a valid sanction under Section 19(1) was therefore impermissible.

    Earlier Cognizance Lost Effect After Discharge, Petitioner Argued

    • The petitioner further contended that once he had been discharged in 2023, the cognizance originally taken in 2018 had lost its legal efficacy.
    • Accordingly, after remand and restoration of proceedings, it was argued that the prosecution could not rely upon the original cognizance and continue without obtaining the sanction contemplated under the amended Section 19(1).
    • The petitioner also argued that because he was in service at the time of the alleged offences, the sanction requirement should relate back to the date of the alleged crime rather than merely the date on which cognizance was taken.

    State: Amendment Came After Cognizance Had Already Been Taken

    • The State opposed the petitions and argued that the 2018 amendment came into effect only on 26 July 2018, whereas Prakash Kumar had already retired in 2017 and cognizance had been taken before the amendment.
    • The Additional State Public Prosecutor relied, among other authorities, upon a Supreme Court decision concerning B.T. Ramesh, contending that prior sanction under the then-existing Section 19 was required only in relation to public servants who were in service when cognizance was taken and not those who had already retired.

    Karnataka HC: Amended Section 19 Protects Retired Public Servants Prospectively

    • The High Court acknowledged that after the 2018 amendment, prior sanction is required even in respect of former public servants in cases to which the amended provision applies.
    • The Court observed that subsequent to the amendment coming into force on 26 July 2018, sanction is a condition precedent for valid cognizance of the covered PC Act offences even in relation to retired public servants.
    • However, that proposition did not resolve Prakash Kumar’s case because the decisive question was whether the amended requirement could affect cognizance already taken before 26 July 2018.

    Cognizance Dates Became Decisive

    • The High Court found that the criminal cases had been registered, investigated and charge-sheeted before the amendment and, crucially, cognizance had also been taken before the amendment came into force.
    • The Court examined the cognizance orders and noted that the Special Court had considered the charge-sheet materials and taken cognizance of both IPC and PC Act offences before issuing summons to the accused.
    • Accordingly, Justice Sandesh held that the subsequent amendment β€œwill not come to the aid of the petitioner”, because cognizance had already been taken before 26 July 2018.

    What Does β€œTaking Cognizance” Mean?

    • The petitioner relied upon the Supreme Court judgment in S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd. & Others, (2008) 2 SCC 492.
    • The High Court noted the principle that β€œcognizance” means taking judicial notice of an offence and occurs when the Court or Magistrate applies its mind to the suspected commission of the offence.
    • At the cognizance stage, the court examines whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the matter, rather than whether sufficient material exists for conviction.

    2018 PC Act Amendment Does Not Apply Retrospectively to Completed Cognizance

    • The High Court referred extensively to precedent dealing with the temporal application of the 2018 amendments.
    • It discussed Dr. Pilli Sambasiva Rao v. State of Telangana, 2022 SCC OnLine TS 3401, which in turn considered the Supreme Court’s decision in State of Telangana v. Managipet, (2019) 19 SCC 87.
    • The judgment noted the principle that the 2018 amendment cannot retrospectively govern offences and proceedings in the manner urged where the relevant criminal process had already commenced under the pre-amendment law.
    • The Court reproduced the reasoning from Managipet that offences committed before the 2018 amendment have to be examined in light of the statutory provisions as they existed before the amendment.

    Delhi High Court’s 2026 Ruling Relied Upon

    • Significantly, the Karnataka High Court also relied upon a recent Delhi High Court judgment dated 6 August 2026 in Criminal Reference No. 1/2019.
    • The Delhi High Court had held that the amended Section 19(1) introduced a new obligation to obtain sanction in respect of former public servants. However, where cognizance had already been taken before 26 July 2018, such cognizance would not be reopened merely because of the subsequent amendment.
    • Conversely, where cognizance had not yet been taken as of 26 July 2018, the amended protection could apply even though the alleged offence related to an earlier period.
    • The Karnataka High Court reproduced the crucial distinction: where cognizance already stood taken before 26 July 2018, β€œthere would be no fresh requirement of prior sanction in such cases.”

    Benefit of Amended Section 19 Depends on Whether Cognizance Was Already Taken

    • After considering the authorities, the Karnataka High Court crystallised the applicable position.
    • It held that the benefit of the amended Section 19(1) is available where the Court had not already taken cognizance before the amendment became operative.
    • In Prakash Kumar’s cases, however, the FIRs had been registered, investigations completed, charge sheets filed and cognizance taken before the amendment.
    • The amended sanction requirement therefore could not invalidate or reopen the cognizance already taken.

    Trial Court Correctly Continued PC Act Proceedings

    • The High Court found no error in the Trial Court’s order dated 24 February 2026.
    • The Trial Court had discharged Prakash Kumar from the IPC offences but rejected his discharge plea concerning the PC Act offences. According to the High Court, the Trial Court correctly applied the governing principles because the amended Section 19 could not benefit the petitioner after cognizance had already been taken under the pre-amendment regime.
    • Accordingly, all three criminal revision petitions were dismissed.

    Key Takeaway

    The decision draws an important temporal line at 26 July 2018 for the amended sanction protection under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

    The Karnataka High Court’s reasoning indicates that while the amended provision extends sanction protection to former public servants where applicable, it does not require courts to reopen cognizance already validly taken before the amendment came into force.

    Thus, a retired public servant cannot secure discharge merely by invoking the amended Section 19(1) where cognizance of the PC Act offences had already been taken before 26 July 2018. In the present case, the High Court consequently upheld continuation of the corruption proceedings against B.G. Prakash Kumar while leaving the allegations to be determined at trial.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Karnataka High Court

    Disclaimer

    Handy Download:

    “Handy Order for Download”Download

    Write to us at office@aadrikaalaw.com

    Tel: +91-11-4999 2707

    www.aadrikaalaw.com

  • Punjab & Haryana High Court Refuses to Interfere with RERA Tribunal’s Interim Possession Order

    Punjab & Haryana High Court Refuses to Interfere with RERA Tribunal’s Interim Possession Order

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 21.09.2026

    Punjab & Haryana High Court Refuses to Interfere with RERA Tribunal’s Interim Possession Order

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id amitnaren@outlook.com .  

    The Punjab and Haryana High Court has dismissed an appeal filed by homebuyers challenging an interim order of the Haryana Real Estate Appellate Tribunal concerning possession of an apartment in the Ireo Victory Valley project, Sector 67, Gurugram.

    Justice Jagmohan Bansal held that the Appellate Tribunal had not stayed the handing over of possession. Rather, it had expressly directed the promoter to hand over possession to the allottees, subject to adjudication of Delayed Possession Charges (DPC) and any outstanding amount.

    Finding no factual or legal infirmity in the Tribunal’s interim order and no substantial question of law warranting interference under Section 58 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA), the High Court dismissed the appeal.

    The decision was delivered on September 17, 2026, in Anish Mukker & Anr. v. M/s Ireo Victory Valley Pvt. Ltd., RERA-APPL-207-2026.

    Apartment Purchased for β‚Ή4.20 Crore in Ireo Victory Valley

    • The respondent, M/s Ireo Victory Valley Pvt. Ltd., is the promoter of the real estate project known as Ireo Victory Valley, situated in Sector 67, Gurugram.
    • An apartment in the project was allotted to the appellants for a total consideration of β‚Ή4,20,39,519.
    • According to the High Court’s order, the appellants had already paid β‚Ή4,12,82,599 towards the apartment.
    • The homebuyers subsequently approached the RERA Authority alleging delay in completion of the project and arbitrary demand of charges by the promoter.

    RERA Authority Awards 10.85% Interest for Delayed Possession

    The RERA Authority decided the complaint in favour of the allottees on April 18, 2024.

    It directed the promoter to:

    • pay interest at 10.85% per annum for the period of delay;
    • hand over possession of the apartment to the appellants; and
    • execute the conveyance deed in favour of the allottees.

    The promoter thereafter challenged the Authority’s order before the Haryana Real Estate Appellate Tribunal, Chandigarh.

    Promoter Makes β‚Ή3.49 Crore Pre-Deposit Under Section 43(5) RERA

    • While filing the appeal, the promoter complied with the statutory pre-deposit requirement under Section 43(5) of the RERA Act.
    • The Tribunal’s order recorded that the requisite pre-deposit of β‚Ή3,49,49,735 had been made by the promoter, which was also confirmed by the Registry.
    • Section 43(5) assumes considerable significance in promoter appeals under RERA because the statutory proviso imposes a pre-deposit requirement before an appeal filed by a promoter can be entertained.
    • In the present case, however, there was no dispute before the High Court that the respondent had complied with that requirement.

    RERA Tribunal Directs Promoter to Hand Over Possession

    • The matter before the Appellate Tribunal had originally been listed for July 22, 2026. On the promoter’s application, it was preponed to May 8, 2026.
    • Before the Tribunal, counsel for the promoter submitted that the company was prepared to hand over possession to the allottee, subject to the final outcome of the questions concerning computation of Delayed Possession Charges and outstanding dues.
    • The urgency arose because the Gurugram RERA Authority had passed an order dated April 22, 2026, directing a Bailiff to visit the site on May 8, 2026 at 2:00 PM and deliver possession.

    The Appellate Tribunal consequently ordered:

    • β€œWe hereby direct that the possession may be handed over to the allottee subject to the adjudication of DPC and outstanding amount, if any.”
    • The matter was thereafter directed to be listed on May 19, 2026.

    Homebuyers Challenge Interim Order Before Punjab & Haryana HC

    • The allottees approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court by filing an appeal under Section 58 of the RERA Act.
    • They sought setting aside of the Tribunal’s interim order dated May 8, 2026.
    • Their principal grievance before the High Court was that, because of the manner in which the interim order had been framed, they believed that they could not take possession of the apartment.
    • The High Court, however, did not accept this interpretation of the Tribunal’s order.

    Tribunal Did Not Stay Possession: Punjab & Haryana High Court

    • Justice Jagmohan Bansal closely examined the operative portion of the Tribunal’s order and found that it actually directed the respondent promoter to hand over possession to the allottee.
    • The only qualification was that possession would remain subject to adjudication of the DPC and any outstanding amount.
    • The High Court categorically observed:
    • β€œThe Appellate Tribunal has not stayed possession of the flat.”
    • The promoter’s appeal before the Appellate Tribunal remained pending and, notably, was itself listed for hearing on September 17, 2026, the same date on which the High Court decided the appeal.

    Dispute Over Outstanding Dues Can Be Raised Before RERA Appellate Tribunal

    • The High Court further clarified the remedy available to the homebuyers.
    • If the appellants believed that the effect of the interim order was that they could not obtain possession without first paying the outstanding dues claimed by the promoter, they were free to move an appropriate application before the Appellate Tribunal.
    • They could also raise all other issues concerning the dispute before the Tribunal, where the promoter’s substantive appeal remained pending.
    • Thus, the High Court did not adjudicate the correctness of the promoter’s alleged outstanding demands or finally determine the amount of DPC payable to the allottees.
    • Those issues remain subject to adjudication before the RERA Appellate Tribunal.

    No Factual or Legal Infirmity in Tribunal’s Interim Order

    The High Court found no basis for exercising its appellate jurisdiction against the interim order.

    Justice Bansal held:

    β€œThere seems no factual or legal infirmity in the impugned order warranting interference of this Court.”

    More importantly for appeals under Section 58 RERA, the Court found that:

    β€œNo question of law much less substantial question of law arises for the consideration of this Court.”

    This became the decisive ground for declining interference.

    Section 58 RERA Appeals and the β€œSubstantial Question of Law” Requirement

    • The ruling is relevant to the scope of appeals from the Real Estate Appellate Tribunal to the High Court.
    • The present appeal had been specifically instituted under Section 58 of the RERA Act.
    • In dismissing the appeal, the High Court emphasised the absence of any question of law, much less a substantial question of law.
    • The order therefore illustrates the limited scope for High Court intervention where the challenge is directed merely against the manner in which an interim direction of the RERA Appellate Tribunal is understood or implemented and no qualifying legal question is demonstrated.

    High Court Dismisses Homebuyers’ Appeal

    • The Punjab and Haryana High Court ultimately concluded that the appeal deserved dismissal.
    • Accordingly, Anish Mukker & Anr. v. M/s Ireo Victory Valley Pvt. Ltd. was dismissed.
    • The result does not mean that the promoter succeeded on the merits of its underlying RERA appeal.
    • The promoter’s appeal concerning DPC and outstanding dues remained pending before the Haryana Real Estate Appellate Tribunal. Similarly, the High Court did not disturb the Tribunal’s direction permitting possession to be handed over to the allottees.
    • This distinction is important: the judgment is essentially concerned with whether the High Court should interfere with the interim order dated May 8, 2026, rather than the final merits of the delayed-possession dispute.

    Why the Judgment Is Significant

    • The decision is relevant for homebuyers, developers and RERA practitioners because it highlights three separate procedural aspects of real estate litigation.
    • First, the order demonstrates that a direction to hand over possession subject to adjudication of DPC and outstanding dues is not equivalent to staying possession. The language of an interim RERA order must therefore be read according to its actual terms.
    • Second, if an allottee believes that an interim order is being interpreted by the promoter as requiring payment of disputed outstanding dues before possession, the appropriate course may be to seek clarification or appropriate relief from the RERA Appellate Tribunal itself, particularly where the substantive appeal remains pending.
    • Third, the High Court’s observation concerning the absence of a substantial question of law reinforces the significance of the threshold governing Section 58 RERA appeals.

    Important Distinction: No Final Decision on DPC or Outstanding Dues

    • The ruling should not be reported as a final victory for either side on the underlying monetary dispute.
    • The RERA Authority had earlier awarded interest at 10.85% per annum for delayed possession and directed possession and execution of the conveyance deed. The promoter challenged that decision before the Appellate Tribunal after making the required pre-deposit.
    • The Appellate Tribunal had yet to finally adjudicate the issues concerning Delayed Possession Charges and alleged outstanding dues.
    • The Punjab and Haryana High Court merely declined to interfere with the Tribunal’s interim possession order.

    Key Takeaway

    The Punjab and Haryana High Court has clarified that an interim RERA Appellate Tribunal order directing a promoter to hand over possession subject to final adjudication of delayed-possession charges and outstanding dues does not amount to a stay on possession.

    Where homebuyers apprehend that possession is being made conditional upon payment of disputed dues, they may seek appropriate clarification or relief from the Appellate Tribunal.

    Since the High Court found no factual or legal infirmity and no substantial question of law, it declined to interfere under Section 58 of the RERA Act and dismissed the appeal.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Punjab & Haryana High Court

    Disclaimer

    Handy Download:

    “Handy Order for Download”Download

    Write to us at office@aadrikaalaw.com

    Tel: +91-11-4999 2707

    www.aadrikaalaw.com

  • Bombay High Court Quashes FIR After Parties Reconcile Redevelopment Dispute

    Bombay High Court Quashes FIR After Parties Reconcile Redevelopment Dispute

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 21.09.2026

    Bombay High Court Quashes FIR After Parties Reconcile Redevelopment Dispute

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Madhumita Jha. The views expressed are based on her interpretation of the law. She can be reached at her email id jhamadhumita27@gmail.com .  

    The Bombay High Court has quashed an FIR arising from a dispute between a member of a co-operative housing society and persons allegedly involved with the new developer appointed for the society’s redevelopment, after the complainant and the accused reconciled their dispute and filed consent affidavits.

    Justice Milind N. Jadhav, while allowing a batch of six petitions, explained that Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) substantially reproduces the inherent powers earlier contained in Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) and enables High Courts to intervene to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice.

    The order was passed on September 18, 2026, with the lead matter being Mohammed Jasim Bhati v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., Criminal Writ Petition No. 4532 of 2026.

    Six Petitions Sought Quashing of Same FIR

    • The High Court was dealing with six petitions arising from FIR No. 0456 of 2026 registered with Versova Police Station, Mumbai.
    • The lead petition was filed by Mohammed Jasim Bhati. The connected petitions were filed by Rajeev Narayandas Bhathija, Samina Rayees Khan, Horace Poorekhorsandi, Abdul Kader Haji Noor Mohammed and Shakeel Ahmed Bhati.
    • All the petitions were filed under Section 528 BNSS seeking quashing of the FIR.

    FIR Arose From Society Redevelopment Dispute

    • The complainant was a member of a co-operative housing society and had a dispute concerning his gala premises in relation to the redevelopment undertaken by the society.
    • According to the order, the petitioners were accused by the complainant of having colluded with the new developer appointed by the society.
    • However, the Court specifically noted that the complainant’s grievance was restricted to his own gala premises.
    • The dispute subsequently took a different course when the complainant and petitioners reconciled and jointly sought to bring the criminal proceedings to an end.

    Former Developer Seeks to Intervene

    • An additional issue arose when the society’s former developer, whose Development Agreement had been terminated, sought to intervene in the criminal writ petitions.
    • Counsel appearing for the old developer argued that the FIR concerning the complainant’s gala also affected certain substantive rights of the former developer.
    • The Court was informed that several civil proceedings relating to the parties’ substantive rights were already pending before the High Court as well as in arbitration.
    • The old developer therefore sought time to intervene in the proceedings.

    Bombay HC Rejects Old Developer’s Intervention

    • The High Court rejected the intervention request outright.
    • Justice Jadhav observed that whatever substantive rights the old developer might have against the society concerning the terminated Development Agreement could be pursued in the appropriate proceedings available under law.
    • The Court noted that the former developer had already initiated civil proceedings before the High Court and arbitration proceedings.
    • His intervention in criminal petitions which the complainant and accused themselves wanted to have quashed by consent was therefore held to be not maintainable.
    • At the same time, the High Court protected the former developer’s position by expressly keeping open any rights he might have concerning his relationship with the society, the redevelopment or the terminated Development Agreement.
    • The Court made it clear that it was expressing no opinion on the merits of those substantive rights.

    Six Consent Affidavits Filed by Complainant

    • A decisive development was the filing of six consent affidavits dated September 12, 2026, one in each of the six petitions.
    • After examining the affidavits, the High Court recorded that the parties had β€œreconciled their dispute altogether.”
    • Justice Jadhav observed that the Court needed to intervene so that the β€œignominy of the criminal proceeding” concerning the complainant’s single gala was not carried forward after the underlying dispute had been resolved.
    • The Court therefore found it appropriate to allow the petitions.

    Section 528 BNSS Carries Forward Inherent Powers Under Section 482 CrPC

    The judgment is particularly relevant because it explains the relationship between Section 482 CrPC and Section 528 BNSS.

    The High Court observed that Section 482 CrPC conferred inherent powers upon High Courts to make orders necessary to:

    • Give effect to an order of the Court, prevent abuse of the process of any Court, or otherwise secure the ends of justice.
    • The Court then noted that under the BNSS, this power has been incorporated in Section 528, which substantially reproduces the language and intent of the former Section 482 CrPC.
    • The ruling therefore reinforces that the transition from the CrPC to the BNSS has not removed the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings in appropriate cases.

    Section 528 BNSS Remains a Discretionary Power

    • Justice Jadhav emphasised that the inherent power is not mechanical or automatic.
    • The Court observed that High Courts may intervene where proceedings have been instituted with mala fide motives, to harass an accused, or where continuation of proceedings would result in procedural harassment.
    • The provision can also enable the Court to terminate FIRs or criminal proceedings where the circumstances justify exercise of its inherent jurisdiction.
    • Importantly, however, the High Court stated that exercise of powers formerly under Section 482 CrPC and now under Section 528 BNSS remains discretionary and depends upon the facts of each case.

    Bombay HC Relies on Supreme Court’s Bhajan Lal Judgment

    • The High Court referred to the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 AIR 604.
    • The Court noted that Bhajan Lal laid down model categories and guidelines identifying circumstances in which FIRs may be quashed.
    • Justice Jadhav further observed that the Supreme Court had explained that the inherent power is an acknowledgment of powers already inherent in the High Court rather than the source of some additional jurisdiction.

    Even Non-Compoundable Offences May Be Quashed in Appropriate Cases

    • The Bombay High Court also reiterated an important distinction between compounding an offence and quashing criminal proceedings through the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction.
    • Referring to the principles discussed in Bhajan Lal, the Court observed that even non-compoundable offences may be quashed where necessary, with the High Court required to consider whether continuation of the prosecution would further or undermine the interests of justice.
    • At the same time, the Court specifically cautioned that grave offences such as murder, rape and dacoity ordinarily cannot be quashed merely because the parties have reached a settlement, since such offences carry wider societal implications.
    • The order therefore does not lay down that every criminal case must be quashed once the parties settle. Rather, the inherent jurisdiction remains dependent upon the nature of the controversy and the interests of justice.

    Private Nature of Redevelopment Dispute Considered

    • In the present case, the criminal proceedings arose from a dispute connected with a society member’s own gala in a redevelopment project.
    • The complainant’s allegations against the petitioners concerned their alleged collusion with the new developer, but the grievance remained confined to the complainant’s premises.
    • With the complainant and petitioners having subsequently reconciled their dispute and filed consent affidavits, the High Court concluded that continuation of the criminal proceedings was unnecessary.

    FIR No. 0456 of 2026 Quashed

    • The Bombay High Court ultimately allowed all six writ petitions in terms of their respective prayer clauses.
    • The petitions sought issuance of an appropriate writ calling for the records concerning FIR C.R. No. 0456 of 2026 registered with Versova Police Station, Mumbai, and quashing the FIR after examining its legality, validity and propriety.
    • The connected petitions contained substantially identical reliefs concerning the same FIR.
    • The High Court accordingly recorded:
    • β€œAll six Petitions are allowed and disposed.”
    • Thus, Mohammed Jasim Bhati and the petitioners in the five connected matters succeeded in having the FIR quashed.
    • What Happens to the Former Developer’s Claims?
    • The order contains an important qualification concerning the former developer.
    • Quashing of the criminal FIR does not adjudicate or extinguish the former developer’s independent civil or contractual rights.

    The High Court expressly left open whatever rights the former developer may have regarding:

    • his relationship with the co-operative housing society;
    • the redevelopment project;
    • termination of his Development Agreement; and
    • remedies otherwise available to him under law.

    Those questions may continue to be litigated in the already pending civil or arbitration proceedings, and the High Court expressly refrained from giving any opinion on their merits.

    This distinction is important: the judgment terminates the criminal proceedings arising from the complainant’s individual gala dispute, but it does not determine the broader redevelopment dispute involving the former developer.

    Why the Judgment Is Significant

    • The ruling has significance under the new criminal procedural regime introduced by the BNSS because it expressly recognises the continuity between Section 482 CrPC and Section 528 BNSS.
    • The Bombay High Court has confirmed that Section 528 substantially preserves the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction to intervene where necessary to prevent abuse of judicial process and secure the ends of justice.
    • The judgment also illustrates the distinction between criminal proceedings arising from an essentially private dispute and independent civil or contractual disputes involving third parties. Settlement of the former may justify quashing in an appropriate case, while the latter can remain open for adjudication in their proper forum.

    Key Takeaway

    The Bombay High Court’s ruling makes clear that Section 528 BNSS carries forward the inherent quashing jurisdiction previously exercised under Section 482 CrPC.

    Where a criminal proceeding arises from a private dispute, the parties have fully reconciled, and continuation of the prosecution would no longer advance the interests of justice, the High Court may exercise its inherent powers to bring the proceedings to an end. However, settlement is not an automatic ground for quashing every offence.

    The nature and gravity of the alleged offence and its impact on society remain material considerations, with serious offences ordinarily standing on a different footing.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Bombay High Court

    Disclaimer

    Handy Download:

    “Handy Order for Download”Download

    Write to us at office@aadrikaalaw.com

    Tel: +91-11-4999 2707

    www.aadrikaalaw.com

  • Delhi High Court: Prior Emails Cannot Override Clear Terms of Final Signed Contract; Grants Anti-Arbitration Injunction Against London Arbitration

    Delhi High Court: Prior Emails Cannot Override Clear Terms of Final Signed Contract; Grants Anti-Arbitration Injunction Against London Arbitration

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 21.09.2026

    Delhi High Court: Prior Emails Cannot Override Clear Terms of Final Signed Contract; Grants Anti-Arbitration Injunction Against London Arbitration

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Arbitrator Shobhit Mallik. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id shobhit.Ica23@gmail.com .

    The Delhi High Court has held that once parties execute a clear and unambiguous final written agreement expressly superseding previous arrangements, earlier negotiations, emails or correspondence cannot ordinarily be relied upon to add to, vary or contradict its terms.

    A Division Bench of Justice Vivek Chaudhary and Justice Renu Bhatnagar, in SARR Freights Corporation & Anr. v. Argo Coral Maritime Ltd., allowed the appeal filed by SARR Freights and restrained Argo Coral Maritime Ltd. from continuing arbitration proceedings before the London Maritime Arbitrators Association (LMAA).

    The judgment was delivered on September 18, 2026, in FAO(OS) 40/2026.

    The Court ultimately held that no arbitration agreement existed between the parties under their final signed Booking Note and, therefore, the foundation for continuation of the London arbitration proceedings did not survive.

    Dispute Arose From Transportation of UN Peacekeeping Cargo to Sudan

    • The dispute originated from an arrangement for transportation of military cargo for the United Nations Peace Keeping Force from New Delhi to Sudan.
    • The cargo was to travel from New Delhi and thereafter be shipped from Nhava Sheva Port, Mumbai to Port Sudan.
    • During negotiations, the parties’ respective agents exchanged emails and a Fixture Recap dated April 4, 2023. Clause 23 of the Fixture Recap contemplated β€œEnglish law and London arbitration.”
    • A final Booking Note dated April 4, 2023, however, was subsequently signed on April 5, 2023. The Booking Note specifically referred to additional rider Clauses 20–41.
    • The difficulty arose because the arbitration provision appeared only in Clause 43, which stated that the latest BIMCO Dispute Resolution Clause would apply, subject to English law and LMAA terms and procedures.
    • No bill of lading was ultimately issued.

    Sudan Crisis Led to Cancellation of Booking

    • On April 18, 2023, the United Nations issued an advisory declaring cargo movements through Sudanese ports unsafe.
    • SARR Freights consequently cancelled the Booking Note by invoking force majeure. Argo Coral Maritime thereafter invoked arbitration under Clause 43.
    • SARR participated subject to its right to dispute the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction.
    • The proceedings eventually resulted in two arbitration references, which were consolidated for consideration of common preliminary issues.

    LMAA Tribunal Majority Held Arbitration Agreement Existed

    • By a partial award dated October 18, 2025, a majority of the arbitral tribunal concluded that the parties had agreed to English law and London arbitration.
    • The majority treated the reference to rider Clauses β€œ20–41” in the Booking Note as a typographical error that ought to have read β€œ20–43.”
    • It therefore considered Clause 43 applicable and held that the BIMCO Law and Arbitration Clause London 2020 governed the dispute, providing for LMAA arbitration in London before a three-member tribunal under English law.
    • SARR Freights approached the Delhi High Court seeking an anti-arbitration injunction.

    Single Judge Refused to Stop Arbitration

    • The Single Judge rejected SARR’s interim anti-arbitration injunction application.
    • Reliance was placed principally on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Govind Rubber Ltd. v. Louis Dreyfus Commodities Asia Pvt. Ltd., (2015) 13 SCC 477, and Trimex International FZE Ltd., Dubai v. Vedanta Aluminium Ltd., India, (2010) 3 SCC 1.
    • The Single Judge considered the reference to Clauses 20–41 an inadvertent error and held that the intention emerging from the earlier Fixture Recap showed that the parties had agreed to arbitration.
    • SARR Freights then challenged that decision before the Division Bench.

    SARR: Final Booking Note Deliberately Excluded Arbitration Clause

    • SARR argued that the signed Booking Note constituted the final agreement between the parties and expressly stated that its terms would prevail over previous arrangements.
    • The Booking Note specifically incorporated only rider Clauses 20–41. Clause 43, which contained the arbitration provision, was therefore excluded.
    • SARR contended that a court or tribunal could not rewrite the contract by substituting β€œ20–43” for β€œ20–41” when the final written agreement contained no ambiguity.
    • It relied upon Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, among other provisions and precedents.

    Argo Coral: β€œ20–41” Was Merely a Typographical Error

    • Argo Coral Maritime argued that the Fixture Recap and Booking Note had to be read together.
    • According to the respondent, Clause 23 of the Fixture Recap already recorded the parties’ agreement to English law and London arbitration, and the subsequent Booking Note was intended to carry forward that arrangement.
    • It argued that the reference to β€œ20–41” was merely a typographical mistake and should be read as β€œ20–43.”

    Delhi High Court Confirms Its Jurisdiction

    • The Division Bench first rejected the respondent’s objection regarding the Delhi High Court’s territorial jurisdiction.
    • The Court noted that SARR had its permanent office in Delhi, the Booking Note was signed in Delhi, and enforcement proceedings against SARR, if required, would also take place there.
    • It held that where a substantial part of the cause of action arose in Delhi, Delhi courts would have jurisdiction. The mere possibility that courts in Mumbai might also possess jurisdiction did not deprive Delhi courts of jurisdiction.
    • The Court further held that Indian courts can determine whether an arbitration agreement itself is void or a nullity, notwithstanding the competence-competence principle.

    Clear Written Contract Cannot Be Rewritten Using Earlier Negotiations

    • The central part of the judgment concerns the evidentiary and contractual effect of a final written agreement.
    • The Division Bench examined Sections 91, 92, 93, 94 and 95 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
    • It held that once contractual terms have been reduced to a signed document and those terms are clear and unambiguous, the agreement must ordinarily be proved and interpreted from that document itself.
    • Earlier negotiations, correspondence and communications cannot be used to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the final written terms.
    • The Court explained that surrounding circumstances may become relevant where contractual language is unclear, ambiguous or defective. But where the language is plain and accurately applies to the existing facts, the court must ordinarily give effect to that language.

    Court Cannot Create a New Contract for the Parties

    • The Bench relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation v. Diamond & Gem Development Corporation Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC 470.
    • The principle reiterated was that courts must interpret a contract according to the words actually used and cannot make a new contract for the parties merely because another interpretation may appear more reasonable.
    • The Court also referred to Annaya Kocha Shetty v. Laxmibai Narayan Satose, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 758, reiterating that contractual interpretation begins with the plain, ordinary and literal meaning of the words used.

    Indian Law Distinguished From English Common Law

    • An important feature of the judgment is the Court’s detailed distinction between Indian codified law and English common law on contractual rectification.
    • The respondent relied upon foreign decisions to contend that prior negotiations could be considered to determine whether the final written instrument incorrectly recorded the parties’ previously agreed intention.
    • The Delhi High Court observed that English common law may, in appropriate circumstances, permit a court to examine prior negotiations and communications to determine whether a written instrument accurately reflects a prior agreement and to rectify the instrument where a mistake is established.
    • However, the Court held that the position under Indian codified law is materially different.
    • Once parties reduce their terms into a clear and signed written agreement, prior negotiations or communications cannot be used to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from those terms unless the contractual language is ambiguous or defective.
    • The Bench also observed that where Indian law is clear and settled, there is no need to resort to foreign case law.

    Govind Rubber and Trimex Distinguished

    • The Court distinguished the Supreme Court judgments in Govind Rubber and Trimex International, which had been relied upon by the Single Judge.
    • In those cases, there was no final signed written agreement, and therefore correspondence between the parties could legitimately be examined to determine whether an agreement had been reached.
    • The present case was materially different because the parties had ultimately executed a signed written Booking Note that expressly provided that it would prevail over previous arrangements.
    • Accordingly, the principles from those cases could not be used to rewrite the Booking Note.

    Reference to β€œClauses 20–41” Was Deliberate, Not Typographical Error

    The Division Bench then closely examined the Booking Note itself.

    It found that the Special Terms box expressly stated:

    • β€œAs per additional rider clause 20–41 in attached.”
    • The Court observed that the parties had not mechanically adopted the standard form. They had specifically filled in and modified several special terms while retaining the reference to Clauses 20–41.
    • According to the Bench, this demonstrated that the parties consciously considered the special terms and that the arbitration clause was not among the provisions incorporated into their agreement.
    • The Court also noted that the parties had made several changes between the earlier Fixture Recap and the final Booking Note, including terms concerning the vessel and detention. This reinforced the conclusion that the Booking Note was not simply a reproduction of the earlier negotiations but a separately considered and finalised contract.

    Fixture Recap and Clause 43 Contained Different Arbitration Arrangements

    The Court identified another significant distinction.

    Clause 23 of the earlier Fixture Recap merely provided for:

    β€œEnglish law and London arbitration.”

    Clause 43 of the additional riders, however, contemplated:

    • β€œBimco Dispute Resolution Clause latest edition to apply, subject to English Law and LMAA Terms and Procedures.”
    • The latter therefore introduced a more specific arbitral framework that had not been expressed in the earlier Fixture Recap.

    Final Agreement Expressly Superseded Earlier Arrangements

    • The Booking Note also contained an express contractual stipulation providing that its terms would β€œprevail over any previous arrangements.”
    • The High Court treated this as significant.
    • It relied upon Union of India v. Kishorilal Gupta & Bros. and Young Achievers v. IMS Learning Resources (P) Ltd. for the proposition that where an earlier contract containing an arbitration clause is superseded by a later agreement, the arbitration clause in the earlier arrangement does not necessarily survive the superseding contract.
    • The Bench therefore concluded that once the parties executed the Booking Note expressly providing that it would prevail over previous arrangements, there was no occasion to return to the Fixture Recap to determine the terms of the final contract.

    Delhi High Court Holds No Arbitration Agreement Existed

    • On its examination of the Booking Note, the Division Bench found that the reference to Clauses 20–41 was clear and unambiguous.
    • Clause 43 was not incorporated merely because Clauses 41, 42 and 43 appeared on the same page or because the parties’ signatures appeared below Clause 43.
    • The Court consequently held that there was no mistake, ambiguity or defective language in the Booking Note and no arbitration agreement existed between the parties.
    • This reversed the conclusion reached by the Single Judge and the majority view of the arbitral tribunal.

    Anti-Arbitration Injunction Granted

    • Having found that no arbitration agreement existed, the High Court held that the very foundation for continuation of the LMAA proceedings disappeared.
    • The Court relied upon its earlier decisions in Mcdonald’s India Pvt. Ltd. v. Vikram Bakshi and Dr. Bina Modi v. Lalit Kumar Modi concerning the circumstances in which Indian courts may grant an anti-arbitration injunction.
    • The Bench treated a dispute over whether the parties ever consented to arbitration as one of the exceptional circumstances capable of justifying judicial intervention.

    Accordingly, the Division Bench:

    • allowed SARR Freights’ appeal;
    • set aside the Single Judge’s order dated March 13, 2026; and
    • granted an anti-arbitration injunction restraining Argo Coral Maritime Ltd. from continuing, pursuing or taking any steps in the LMAA arbitration titled Argo Coral Maritime Ltd. v. SARR Freights Ltd./SARR Freights Corporation.

    Thus, SARR Freights Corporation and SARR Freights Ltd. succeeded in the appeal, and the London arbitration was restrained.

    Why the Judgment Is Significant

    • The judgment carries broader significance for international commercial contracts, shipping agreements and cross-border arbitration clauses.
    • It underscores that an arbitration clause must ultimately rest upon party consent. Earlier negotiations referring to arbitration cannot automatically be imported into a subsequent final signed contract where that contract deliberately incorporates only specified provisions and expressly supersedes earlier arrangements.
    • The decision also draws an important line between using correspondence to establish a contract where no signed agreement exists and using prior correspondence to alter a later, complete and unambiguous written agreement.
    • For businesses engaged in international trade, shipping, freight forwarding and charter arrangements, the judgment highlights the importance of carefully reviewing incorporation clauses, rider clauses, governing-law provisions and arbitration provisions before signing the final contractual document.

    Key Takeaway

    The Delhi High Court’s ruling establishes a clear contractual principle: where parties deliberately reduce their bargain into a final, signed and unambiguous document that supersedes previous arrangements, earlier emails and negotiations cannot ordinarily be used to insert an arbitration clause that the final contract itself did not incorporate.

    In this case, the Booking Note incorporated rider Clauses 20–41, while the arbitration provision appeared in Clause 43. The Court refused to rewrite β€œ20–41” as β€œ20–43” and consequently found that no arbitration agreement existed.

    The ruling therefore resulted in the unusual but legally significant remedy of an anti-arbitration injunction restraining continuation of foreign LMAA proceedings.

    Connected Matter

    Supreme Court: Unsigned Arbitration Agreement Can Still Bind Parties If Correspondence Shows Consensus

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Delhi High Court

    Disclaimer

    Handy Download:

    “Handy Order for Download”Download

    Write to us at office@aadrikaalaw.com

    Tel: +91-11-4999 2707

    www.aadrikaalaw.com

  • Karnataka HC: Wildlife Offence Cannot Be Prosecuted Solely on Police Charge Sheet Without Section 55 Complaint

    Karnataka HC: Wildlife Offence Cannot Be Prosecuted Solely on Police Charge Sheet Without Section 55 Complaint

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 21.09.2026

    Karnataka HC: Wildlife Offence Cannot Be Prosecuted Solely on Police Charge Sheet Without Section 55 Complaint

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate G Sridharamurthy. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id sriadv3@gmail.com . 

    The Karnataka High Court has quashed criminal prosecution against four accused in a case involving the alleged hunting of a wild boar, holding that where offences under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 are invoked, the statutory requirement contained in Section 55 governing cognizance must be complied with.

    Justice H.P. Sandesh, while allowing the connected proceedings, held that although the police may register an FIR and investigate the matter, prosecution for offences under Sections 9 and 51 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act cannot proceed merely on the basis of the Investigating Officer’s charge sheet when the complaint contemplated under Section 55 has not been filed by a competent authorised person.

    The Court also dealt with the application for release of a .177 calibre air gun, holding that the air gun involved fell within a category that did not require an arms licence and directing its release subject to conditions.

    The common order was delivered on September 19, 2026, in Sri Ramesh N. v. State by Arakere Police Station, W.P. No. 9069 of 2023, connected with Criminal Petition No. 9420 of 2022.

    Allegation: Wild Boar Hunted With Sporting Rifle

    • According to the prosecution, the incident occurred during the early hours of August 25, 2019, at about 4:30 a.m.
    • The accused were alleged to have hunted a wild boar using a 30.06 sporting rifle bearing No. 176100134 RFI.IN.2017, along with cartridges, allegedly without the requisite permission.

    Following information received by the police, a raid was conducted, articles were seized and criminal proceedings were initiated. After investigation, the police filed a charge sheet alleging offences under:

    • Sections 3, 25(1) and 27 of the Arms Act, 1959;
    • Sections 9 and 51 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972; and
    • Sections 146 and 196 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

    The police also seized a goods vehicle allegedly belonging to accused No. 1, claiming that it did not have valid insurance.

    Petitioners: Sporting Rifle Was Licensed

    • The accused approached the High Court under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings.
    • Their principal argument under the Arms Act was that the ingredients of Sections 3, 25 and 27 were not attracted.
    • They argued that they had not engaged in the manufacture or sale of arms or ammunition and that the weapon in question was a licensed firearm.
    • The petitioners further contended that the wild boar was damaging the paddy crop of petitioner No. 2 and that the incident had taken place in a paddy field rather than a reserved forest or other restricted hunting area.
    • They also relied on Section 11(2) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act in support of their defence and referred to a notification concerning wild boars in neighbouring Ramanagara district.
    • The State opposed the petitions, arguing that even possession of a licensed weapon remains subject to the conditions attached to the licence and that there was no permission to hunt wild boar merely to protect crops.

    Karnataka HC: Sections 3, 25 and 27 Arms Act Not Properly Invoked

    • The High Court examined the statutory scheme of the Arms Act, 1959 in detail.
    • Section 3 prohibits a person from acquiring, possessing or carrying a firearm or ammunition without a licence issued in accordance with the Act and Rules.
    • However, in the present case, the Court found that a licence had in fact been issued by the competent authority for the SBBL rifle. The licence was initially within Bengaluru District and was subsequently extended to the jurisdiction of Karnataka State.
    • The High Court therefore observed that the existence of the licence was clear. Whether its conditions had been contravened was a matter to be considered separately.
    • Justice Sandesh further found that there was no allegation that the petitioners had engaged in the sale or manufacture of arms or ammunition.
    • Consequently, the Court held that there was force in the petitioners’ contention that invoking Sections 3, 25 and 27 of the Arms Act against them in the manner adopted by the prosecution was bad in law.

    Section 30 Arms Act Was Relevant to Breach of Licence Conditions

    • An important aspect of the judgment is the High Court’s reference to Section 30 of the Arms Act.
    • The Court noted that Section 30 deals with punishment for contravention of a condition of a licence, or a provision of the Act or Rules for which punishment has not otherwise been provided.
    • The High Court observed that the Investigating Agency had failed to consider Section 30 before invoking Sections 3, 25 and 27.
    • The distinction was important because the prosecution’s case involved a firearm for which a licence existed, rather than a straightforward case of possession of an unlicensed firearm.

    Section 27 Arms Act Is Confined to Contraventions of Sections 5 or 7

    • The High Court also relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Surinder Singh v. State (Union Territory of Chandigarh), (2021) 20 SCC 24.
    • Referring to that ruling, the Court noted that after amendment of Section 27 of the Arms Act, the provision is confined to violations connected with Sections 5 or 7 of the Arms Act.
    • The earlier concept of using a weapon for an β€œunlawful purpose” was no longer, by itself, an inseparable ingredient of Section 27 after the amendment.
    • The High Court further noted the Supreme Court’s observation that where a person is in authorised possession of a weapon, he cannot simply be treated as having used an unlicensed weapon prohibited under Section 5.
    • The Karnataka High Court also referred to the Kerala High Court’s decision in Joby and Others v. State of Kerala, where it was observed that Section 27 would be attracted where the use of arms or ammunition was in contravention of Section 5, and that use of a licensed gun for shooting a wild boar would not, merely for that reason, constitute an Arms Act offence under the provision.

    Section 55 Wildlife Act Becomes Decisive

    • The most consequential part of the ruling concerned Section 55 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972.
    • Sections 9 and 51 of the Act had been invoked against the accused. Section 9 prohibits hunting of specified wild animals except as permitted under the Act, while Section 51 prescribes penalties for contraventions.
    • Section 55, however, specifically regulates cognizance of offences under the Wildlife Act.
    • The High Court noted that a court cannot take cognizance of an offence under the Act except upon a complaint by the persons/statutory authorities specified in Section 55, including the designated wildlife authorities or other duly authorised persons.

    No Complaint Filed by Officer Specified Under Section 55

    • Applying the provision to the facts, the High Court found that no complaint had been lodged by an officer specified under Section 55.
    • Instead, the proceedings had arisen from police action, investigation and the subsequent filing of a charge sheet.
    • The Court recorded that the accused had allegedly been found in possession of wild boar meat and weapons, were arrested and subsequently released on bail. The rifle allegedly used in the incident had also already been released.
    • Justice Sandesh drew an important distinction: an FIR can be registered and the police can investigate, but when prosecution is sought for offences under Sections 9 and 51 of the special enactment, the requirement of a complaint by an authorised person under Section 55 must be satisfied.
    • The Court held that the Investigating Officer could make use of material gathered during investigation, but prosecution under the Wildlife Act could not proceed in the manner adopted without the statutorily required complaint.

    Supreme Court’s Murad Ali Khan Judgment Applied

    • The High Court relied significantly upon the Supreme Court’s decision in State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan & Others, (1988) 4 SCC 655.
    • In that case, the Supreme Court had examined Section 55 and held that cognizance of an offence under the Wildlife Act could be taken only upon the complaint of the statutory officer contemplated by the provision.
    • The Karnataka High Court reproduced the Supreme Court’s explanation that even if the jurisdictional police register a case concerning an alleged Wildlife Act offence, the statutory manner in which the court may take cognizance remains governed by Section 55.
    • The Court also relied on its earlier decision in Sri S. Bylaiah v. State of Bannerghatta Police, ILR 2008 KAR 1892, where proceedings had been quashed because the complainant was not an authorised person within the meaning of Section 55.
    • Ultimately, the Court found that the present proceedings had been initiated solely on the basis of registration of the police case rather than through the complaint required under Section 55.
    • It therefore held that there was a clear statutory bar to taking cognizance in the manner adopted.

    .177 Calibre Air Gun Did Not Require Licence

    • The connected writ petition raised another significant question concerning the seized PRECIHOLE SPORTS CAL. 4.5 (.177) air gun, Serial No. AH0-01581.
    • Ramesh N. sought release of the air gun, contending that it was an exempted weapon that did not require an arms licence.
    • The petitioner’s case was that an air rifle with muzzle energy below 20 joules or 15 ft-lbs and/or bore below .177 inch/4.5 mm fell within Category III(f)(ii) of the Arms Rules, 2016 and was not subject to licensing requirements.
    • The FSL examination recorded that the seized weapon was a .177 calibre air gun, was in working condition and had an effective range of approximately 25 yards.
    • The High Court ultimately found that the air gun fell within Category III(f)(ii) and therefore did not require an arms licence.
    • It also noted that the FSL report did not establish that the air gun had been used for hunting.

    Keeping Seized Air Gun Idle Would Cause Deterioration

    • The Trial Court had earlier refused release of the air gun, partly because of an apprehension that it could again be used for hunting or could be transferred or altered.
    • The High Court found this reasoning unsustainable.
    • Justice Sandesh observed that such apprehension could not by itself justify continued retention of the weapon. The Court also took into account that keeping the air gun idle could cause its condition and value to deteriorate.
    • Accordingly, it held that the Trial Court ought not to have rejected the application for release.

    Criminal Prosecution Quashed β€” But Fresh Complaint Permitted

    • The Karnataka High Court ultimately allowed Criminal Petition No. 9420 of 2022 and quashed the Trial Court’s taking of cognizance and the criminal prosecution in C.C. No. 1216/2021 because the proceedings violated Section 55 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act.
    • However, this is an important qualification: the Court did not permanently foreclose prosecution for the alleged wildlife offence.
    • The High Court expressly granted liberty to the prosecuting authority to invoke Section 55 through a competent officer and file a complaint invoking the appropriate offences.
    • Thus, the judgment is primarily a ruling on the legality of the mode of prosecution and cognizance, rather than a final factual determination that no wild boar was hunted.

    Air Gun Ordered to Be Released

    • The High Court also allowed W.P. No. 9069 of 2023, set aside the Trial Court’s order dated August 2, 2022 and allowed the application under Section 457 CrPC.
    • The Investigating Officer was directed to release the air gun after obtaining an indemnity bond of β‚Ή1,00,000 with one surety.

    The release was made subject to conditions that the petitioner:

    • must not sell the air gun;
    • must not alter its nature; and
    • must produce it whenever required by the authority or the Court.

    Important Precedents Referred to by the High Court

    • The judgment referred to several decisions concerning the Arms Act, Wildlife Act and inherent powers of the High Court, including Deomuni Sharma v. State of Jharkhand, (2009) 16 SCC 80, on Section 27 of the Arms Act; Gulam Mustafa Malik v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 1577, concerning Section 55 of the Wildlife Act; Rajan & Others v. State of U.P., 2008 (2) AJHAR (NOC) 554 (All.), concerning sanction under the Arms Act; and State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, on the scope of Section 482 CrPC.
    • It further relied on State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan & Others, (1988) 4 SCC 655, Surinder Singh v. State (UT of Chandigarh), (2021) 20 SCC 24, Manish Bhupendrabhai Panwala v. State of Gujarat & Another, Joby & Others v. State of Kerala and Sri S. Bylaiah v. State of Bannerghatta Police, ILR 2008 KAR 1892.

    Why the Judgment Is Significant

    • The ruling draws an important distinction between police investigation and statutory cognizance under a special enactment.
    • The High Court did not hold that police are powerless to register an FIR or investigate alleged wildlife offences. Instead, it held that where prosecution is ultimately pursued for offences under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, the special procedure prescribed by Section 55 for taking cognizance cannot be bypassed by proceeding solely on a police charge sheet.
    • The judgment is also important for firearms law because it distinguishes between the use of a licensed firearm and offences specifically contemplated by Sections 3, 25 and 27 of the Arms Act. Where the allegation may concern breach of licence conditions, the appropriate statutory provision must be identified rather than mechanically invoking provisions dealing with unlicensed possession or other distinct Arms Act contraventions.
    • Finally, the ruling provides useful clarification regarding low-powered .177 calibre air guns under the Arms Rules, 2016, with the Court holding on the facts before it that the seized air gun fell within Category III(f)(ii) and was not subject to licensing requirements.

    Key Takeaway

    The Karnataka High Court has quashed the existing prosecution arising from the alleged wild boar hunting incident because cognizance under the Wild Life (Protection) Act had been taken without the complaint of a competent person contemplated by Section 55.

    At the same time, the ruling does not amount to a final acquittal on the factual allegation of hunting. The competent prosecuting authority has expressly been given liberty to institute proceedings afresh in accordance with Section 55 and invoke appropriate offences. The Court separately ordered release of the seized .177 calibre air gun, finding it to fall within a category not requiring an arms licence and subjecting its release to safeguards against sale, alteration or non-production when required.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Karnataka High Court

    Disclaimer

    Handy Download:

    “Handy Order for Download”Download

    Write to us at office@aadrikaalaw.com

    Tel: +91-11-4999 2707

    www.aadrikaalaw.com

  • Bombay High Court: Section 79 RERA Bars Civil Suit Where Reliefs Can Be Granted by RERA Authority

    Bombay High Court: Section 79 RERA Bars Civil Suit Where Reliefs Can Be Granted by RERA Authority

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 19.09.2026

    Bombay High Court: Section 79 RERA Bars Civil Suit Where Reliefs Can Be Granted by RERA Authority

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id amitnaren@outlook.com .  

    The Bombay High Court has held that where the relief sought by flat purchasers essentially concerns enforcement of a promoter’s statutory obligations in a RERA-registered project, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred by Section 79 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA) if the relief can be granted under the statutory mechanism created by RERA.

    In Mr. Yadavalli Venkata Gopalam & Anr. v. M/s Sai Siddhant Developers & Anr., the High Court dismissed an appeal challenging a City Civil Court order that had returned the purchasers’ plaint under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for presentation before the appropriate RERA forum.

    Justice Sandeep V. Marne pronounced the judgment on 4 November 2023, after reserving it on 23 October 2023. The decision is reported with neutral citation 2023:BHC-AS:33740.

    Flat Purchasers Approached Civil Court Against Developer and Society

    • The appellants had instituted S.C. Suit No. 964 of 2023 before the City Civil Court, Mumbai.
    • Their dispute concerned Flat No. 1105 on the 11th Floor, having a carpet area of 643 sq. ft. and built-up area of 772 sq. ft., in the building known as D.N. Nagar Shivneri CHS Ltd., Andheri West, Mumbai.
    • They sought a mandatory direction requiring the developer, M/s Sai Siddhant Developers, to adhere to the terms and conditions of the agreement concerning the flat and fulfil its statutory obligations under the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act, 1963 (MOFA).
    • They also sought an injunction restraining the defendants from selling, transferring, alienating or creating third-party rights in the flat.

    Society Invokes Section 79 of RERA

    • D.N. Nagar Shivneri Co-operative Housing Society filed a Notice of Motion seeking return of the plaint under Order VII Rule 10 CPC.
    • The Society argued that the Civil Court could not entertain the suit because its jurisdiction was barred by Section 79 of RERA.
    • The City Civil Court accepted the objection and, by an order dated 11 July 2023, returned the plaint for presentation before RERA. The purchasers challenged that decision before the Bombay High Court.

    Purchasers Argue Suit Was for Specific Performance

    • The purchasers argued before the High Court that their suit was actually one for specific performance of the Agreement for Sale dated 10 June 2015.
    • They contended that they had already paid a substantial portion of the agreed consideration but that the developer had failed to perform its contractual obligations.
    • They further alleged collusion between the developer and the Society and argued that RERA could not determine questions involving fraud and collusion.
    • The purchasers relied upon the Constitution Bench judgment in Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., AIR 1969 SC 78, to argue that exclusion of Civil Court jurisdiction should not be readily inferred.
    • They also relied upon State of A.P. v. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao & Ors., (2000) 3 SCC 689, which reiterates the general principle that Civil Courts possess jurisdiction over suits of a civil nature unless jurisdiction is expressly or impliedly excluded.

    Society: Suit Was Really About Enforcement of Promoter’s Statutory Obligations

    • The Society disputed the purchasers’ characterization of the suit.
    • It argued that the suit was not actually for specific performance of the Agreement for Sale. Instead, the purchasers were asking the developer to fulfil obligations arising under MOFA which, following registration of the project under RERA, could be enforced through the remedies available under the RERA framework.
    • The Society relied on Sections 11, 19, 34 and 79 of RERA, arguing that the Act provides an adequate mechanism for seeking completion of construction, possession and enforcement of the promoter’s statutory obligations.

    Bombay HC Examines Actual Prayers in the Plaint

    • A crucial part of the High Court’s analysis concerned the actual reliefs sought in the plaint, rather than the purchasers’ description of their case during arguments.
    • The principal prayer sought a mandatory direction requiring the developer to adhere to the agreement relating to Flat No. 1105 and fulfil its statutory obligations under MOFA.
    • The purchasers had also sought a permanent injunction against creation of third-party rights, appointment of a Court Receiver, and a direction requiring the developer to deposit β‚Ή68,78,890 with 18% interest to secure the money paid by them.

    After examining those prayers, the High Court reached an important factual conclusion:

    • β€œThus, there is no prayer for specific performance of the agreement for sale dated 10 June 2015.”
    • According to the Court, the suit instead sought adherence to the terms of the agreement and/or fulfilment of statutory obligations under MOFA.

    Court-Fee Valuation Also Showed Suit Was Not for Specific Performance

    • The High Court also examined how the purchasers themselves had valued their suit.
    • They had valued the proceeding under Section 6(iv)(j) of the Maharashtra Court Fees Act, stating that the relief was incapable of monetary valuation because what they sought was enforcement of the developer’s statutory obligations under MOFA.
    • The Court contrasted this with Section 6(xi) of the Court Fees Act, which specifically deals with suits for specific performance and, in the case of a contract of sale, requires valuation according to the amount of consideration.
    • The High Court therefore found that the purchasers’ own pleadings and court-fee valuation supported the conclusion that the suit was not a suit for specific performance.

    Mere Allegation of Fraud or Collusion Cannot Create Civil Court Jurisdiction

    • The purchasers also attempted to sustain the Civil Court’s jurisdiction by alleging fraud and collusion between the Society and the developer.
    • The High Court rejected this contention on the facts.
    • Justice Marne noted that the word β€œfraud” was not even pleaded in the suit, while references to β€œcollusion” were unsupported by material particulars.
    • The Court relied upon the Supreme Court’s ruling in C.S. Ramaswamy v. V.K. Senthil & Ors., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1330, which emphasised that a mere allegation of fraud is insufficient and that fraud must be supported by specific pleadings explaining how it was committed.
    • Accordingly, unsupported references to fraud or collusion could not be used to alter the true character of the suit or avoid the statutory jurisdictional bar.

    RERA Project Registration Was Crucial

    • The High Court noted that under the first proviso to Section 3(1) of RERA, projects for which a completion certificate had not been issued when RERA commenced are required to be registered with the Authority.
    • In this case, the project had been registered with MahaRERA under Registration No. P51800004197 on 8 August 2017.
    • The Court therefore found that the purchasers could seek enforcement of the promoter’s obligations through the remedies created by RERA.
    • Those remedies included seeking refund with interest, fulfilment of the promoter’s obligations and possession of the flat under Section 19(3).

    Section 79 RERA Bars Civil Court Jurisdiction Over Matters RERA Can Determine

    • Section 79 provides that no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain a suit or proceeding concerning any matter which the RERA Authority, adjudicating officer or Appellate Tribunal is empowered under the Act to determine.
    • It also prohibits courts or other authorities from granting injunctions concerning action taken or proposed under powers conferred by RERA.
    • Applying this provision to the particular reliefs sought by the appellants, Justice Marne held that the City Civil Court had correctly concluded that its jurisdiction was barred.
    • The High Court stated that, in the circumstances before it, the bar under Section 79 was β€œabsolute”, because an adequate mechanism existed under RERA for the purchasers to seek fulfilment of the developer/promoter’s obligations.

    Important Qualification: Court Leaves Broader Specific-Performance Question Open

    • An important qualification in the judgment should not be overlooked.
    • The Bombay High Court did not hold that every civil suit seeking specific performance of an agreement concerning a RERA-registered project is barred by Section 79.
    • During arguments, counsel for the Society fairly conceded that such an absolute proposition could not necessarily be advanced.
    • The Court expressly stated that the broader questionβ€”whether Civil Court jurisdiction is barred in every suit seeking specific performance of an agreement concerning a RERA projectβ€”was being left open for determination in an appropriate case.
    • The decision therefore turns substantially on the Court’s finding that the particular plaint before it was not actually a suit for specific performance.

    What Supreme Court’s Imperia Structures Decision Meant

    • The Society had also relied upon Imperia Structures Ltd. v. Anil Patni & Anr., (2020) 10 SCC 783.
    • The Bombay High Court observed that Imperia Structures principally concerned the relationship between remedies under RERA and those available before consumer fora.
    • The Supreme Court had recognised that Section 79 bars Civil Court jurisdiction over matters which the RERA Authority, adjudicating officer or Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine, while consumer remedies remain separately available in the circumstances considered in that case.
    • However, Justice Marne clarified that Imperia Structures did not resolve the broader issue of whether every specific-performance suit concerning a RERA agreement is barred.

    Appeal Dismissed; City Civil Court Order Upheld

    • The Bombay High Court ultimately found no patent error in the City Civil Court’s decision.
    • Accordingly, Appeal From Order No. 662 of 2023 was dismissed without costs.
    • As a consequence, the connected Interim Application No. 14511 of 2023 also did not survive and was disposed of.
    • Thus, the order returning the purchasers’ plaint for presentation before the appropriate RERA forum remained undisturbed.

    Key Takeaway

    The judgment demonstrates that the substance of the plaint and the actual reliefs claimedβ€”not merely the label given to the suitβ€”will be crucial when determining whether Section 79 RERA excludes Civil Court jurisdiction. Where a purchaser essentially seeks enforcement of obligations that the RERA Authority is empowered to enforce, the Civil Court may lack jurisdiction.

    At the same time, the Bombay High Court deliberately left open the broader question of whether a genuine suit for specific performance of an agreement for sale in a RERA-registered project is necessarily barred.

    Connected Matter

    Bombay HC: RERA Tribunal Cannot Grant Declaration, Permanent Injunction or Cancel Sanction Plan

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Bombay High Court

    Disclaimer

    Handy Download:

    “Handy Order for Download”Download

    Write to us at office@aadrikaalaw.com

    Tel: +91-11-4999 2707

    www.aadrikaalaw.com

  • Supreme Court: Section 29A Application Can Be Filed Even After Arbitrator’s Mandate Expires

    Supreme Court: Section 29A Application Can Be Filed Even After Arbitrator’s Mandate Expires

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 19.09.2026

    Supreme Court: Section 29A Application Can Be Filed Even After Arbitrator’s Mandate Expires

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Arbitrator Shobhit Mallik. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id shobhit.Ica23@gmail.com .

    The Supreme Court of India has clarified an important question concerning timelines in arbitration, holding that an application for extension of an arbitral tribunal’s mandate under Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 can be filed even after the tribunal’s mandate has expired.

    In M/s Ajay Protech Pvt. Ltd. v. General Manager & Anr., 2024 INSC 889, the Bench of Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Sandeep Mehta set aside the Gujarat High Court’s order refusing extension and extended the time for making the arbitral award until 31 December 2024. The Supreme Court also explained how the expression β€œsufficient cause” under Section 29A(5) should be understood.

    Dispute Arose From a Works Contract

    • The appellant, M/s Ajay Protech Pvt. Ltd., had entered into a works contract with Respondent No. 1. After disputes arose between the parties, the appellant invoked arbitration by issuing a notice on 12 February 2018.
    • The Gujarat High Court subsequently allowed the appellant’s application under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act for appointment of a sole arbitrator through orders dated 8 February 2019 and 15 February 2019.
    • The first meeting of the arbitral tribunal took place on 24 June 2019, and pleadings were completed on 9 October 2019.
    • Under Section 29A(1), the 12-month period for making the award therefore commenced from that date and would ordinarily have expired on 8 October 2020. With the additional six-month extension available by mutual consent under Section 29A(3), the 18-month period would ordinarily have extended until 9 April 2021.

    COVID-19 Interrupted the Arbitration Timeline

    • Before the statutory period expired, the COVID-19 pandemic intervened.
    • The Supreme Court had earlier, in In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, (2022) 3 SCC 117, directed that the period from 15 March 2020 to 28 February 2022 be excluded while computing various limitation periods, expressly including the periods prescribed under Sections 23(4) and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.
    • The arbitral proceedings, which had been adjourned because of the pandemic, resumed in 2022. Eventually, the hearing was concluded on 5 May 2023.
    • The parties recorded before the arbitral tribunal that they would approach the Court under Section 29A(4) for extension of time. Ajay Protech thereafter filed its extension application before the Gujarat High Court on 1 August 2023.

    Gujarat High Court Refused Extension

    • The Gujarat High Court dismissed the application on 3 November 2023.
    • It reasoned that the initial 12-month statutory period had expired on 8 October 2020 and, after the six-month consensual extension, the tribunal’s mandate had expired on 9 April 2021.
    • Since the Section 29A application was filed only in August 2023, the High Court treated the delay as exceeding two years and four months and held that the tribunal’s mandate had already terminated. It therefore dismissed the application as misconceived.
    • Ajay Protech challenged this decision before the Supreme Court.

    Two Questions Before the Supreme Court

    • The Supreme Court identified two principal issues:
    • First, can an application for extension under Section 29A(4) be entertained after the arbitral tribunal’s mandate has already expired?
    • Second, if such an application is maintainable, did the circumstances of this case constitute β€œsufficient cause” to justify extension?
    • The Court answered both questions in favour of Ajay Protech.

    Section 29A(4) Expressly Permits Post-Expiry Extension

    • The Supreme Court examined the language of Section 29A(4), which provides that if an award is not made within the period prescribed under Section 29A(1), or the extended period under Section 29A(3), the arbitrator’s mandate terminates unless the Court has β€œeither prior to or after the expiry of the period so specified” extended the period.
    • The Court found this wording clear and explicit.
    • According to the Supreme Court, Section 29A(4) itself enables a court to extend the tribunal’s mandate after the expiry of the statutory and mutually extendable 18-month period.
    • Thus, expiry of the tribunal’s mandate does not permanently extinguish the Court’s jurisdiction to grant an extension.

    Supreme Court Relies on Rohan Builders

    • The Court relied heavily upon its recent judgment in Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2494.
    • Interestingly, the respondents themselves had relied on Rohan Builders to argue that the extension application had to be filed before the tribunal’s mandate expired. The Supreme Court held that the precedent actually decided the issue against the respondents.
    • The Court reiterated that Section 29A(4) empowers courts to extend the period for making an arbitral award either before or after expiry of the prescribed period.
    • It explained that although the tribunal’s mandate terminates upon expiry of the prescribed period, this termination is conditional in the sense that the statute still permits a party to approach the Court and seek revival/extension of the mandate.

    Accordingly, the Supreme Court held:

    An application under Section 29A(4) can be filed either before or after termination of the arbitral tribunal’s mandate upon expiry of the statutory and extendable period.

    Extension Is Not Automatic: β€˜Sufficient Cause’ Must Be Shown

    • The Court simultaneously cautioned that merely filing an application after expiry does not create an automatic right to extension.
    • Under Section 29A(5), extension may be granted only when the Court is satisfied that there is β€œsufficient cause”.
    • The Supreme Court noted that this involves exercise of judicial discretion. Courts may also impose appropriate terms and conditions while granting extension.
    • Referring again to Rohan Builders, the Court observed that this requirement operates as a safeguard against frivolous or vexatious attempts to revive stale arbitrations.
    • Therefore, the ruling should not be understood as permitting indefinite or mechanical extensions merely because Section 29A(4) allows a post-expiry application.

    Gujarat High Court’s Calculation of Delay Was Erroneous

    • The Supreme Court found a fundamental error in the Gujarat High Court’s computation of delay.
    • Because the COVID exclusion period from 15 March 2020 to 28 February 2022 had to be removed from the calculation, the relevant Section 29A period did not expire in April 2021 in the manner assumed by the High Court.
    • The Supreme Court calculated that, after giving effect to the COVID exclusion, the applicable period would have expired on 31 March 2023.
    • Since Ajay Protech filed its application on 1 August 2023, the relevant period requiring explanation was therefore essentially from 31 March 2023 to 1 August 2023, rather than the two years and four months calculated by the High Court.
    • The Supreme Court consequently held that the High Court’s reasoning on the extent of delay was erroneous.

    Why the Supreme Court Found β€˜Sufficient Cause’

    • Ajay Protech had placed several circumstances before the Court to explain why extension was necessary.
    • The arbitral tribunal had resumed online hearings in 2022 but proceedings had to be adjourned on several occasions at the request of the respondents’ counsel due to changes concerning the panel from which the arbitrator had been appointed.
    • The dispute also involved technical and legal questions, and the record was bulky. Ajay Protech further argued that the delay was attributable neither to the parties nor to the tribunal and that the tribunal had acted promptly and cautiously.
    • Most importantly, the hearing had already concluded and only the award remained to be delivered. Refusing extension at that stage would therefore cause hardship and potentially frustrate an arbitration that had substantially reached its conclusion.

    β€˜Sufficient Cause’ Must Be Interpreted in Light of Arbitration’s Purpose

    • The judgment contains an important explanation of the expression β€œsufficient cause” under Section 29A(5).
    • The Supreme Court emphasised that efficiency and expeditious completion are integral to arbitration. At the same time, the Arbitration Act recognises the Court’s power to intervene where necessary to ensure that the agreed dispute-resolution process reaches its logical conclusion.
    • The Court held that:
    • β€œThe meaning of ‘sufficient cause’ for extending the time to make an award must take colour from the underlying purpose of the arbitration process.”
    • It further explained that the primary objective is to resolve disputes through the dispute-resolution mechanism agreed upon by the parties. Consequently, β€œsufficient cause” should be interpreted in a manner that facilitates effective dispute resolution.
    • This observation gives the judgment significance beyond its particular facts, as it provides guidance for courts considering future Section 29A extension applications.

    Supreme Court Allows Ajay Protech’s Appeal

    Taking into account the COVID interruption and the parties’ agreement on 5 May 2023 to approach the Court for extension, the Supreme Court concluded that sufficient cause existed for extending the tribunal’s mandate.

    The Court accordingly:

    • allowed Ajay Protech’s civil appeal;
    • set aside the Gujarat High Court’s order dated 3 November 2023 in MCA No. 1 of 2023;
    • extended the period for making the arbitral award until 31 December 2024; and
    • directed the parties to bear their own costs.

    Thus, Ajay Protech Pvt. Ltd. succeeded before the Supreme Court on the Section 29A extension issue.

    Why This Judgment Is Important for Arbitration Proceedings

    • The judgment clarifies two important principles governing Section 29A.
    • First, expiry of an arbitral tribunal’s mandate does not by itself prevent a party from subsequently seeking extension from the Court. The statutory language expressly gives courts power to extend the period even after expiry.
    • Second, post-expiry extension is discretionary rather than automatic. The applicant must establish sufficient cause, and the Court must examine the circumstances of the particular arbitration.
    • The decision therefore attempts to balance two objectives of the Arbitration Act: ensuring that arbitration remains time-bound and efficient, while preventing procedural timelines from unnecessarily destroying an arbitration that can still effectively resolve the parties’ dispute.

    Key Takeaway

    The Supreme Court has made it clear that the termination of an arbitral tribunal’s mandate upon expiry of the Section 29A timeline is not an absolute bar to revival or extension. Courts retain jurisdiction under Section 29A(4) to extend the period even where the application is filed after expiry.

    However, such relief is not mechanical. Under Section 29A(5), the applicant must demonstrate sufficient cause, which the Court said should be understood in light of arbitration’s fundamental objectiveβ€”effective resolution of disputes through the mechanism chosen by the parties.

    Connected Matter

    Bombay High Court: Arbitral Tribunal’s Mandate Can Be Extended Even After Expiry if β€œSufficient Cause” Is Shown

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Supreme Court

    Disclaimer

    Handy Download:

    “Handy Order for Download”Download

    Write to us at office@aadrikaalaw.com

    Tel: +91-11-4999 2707

    www.aadrikaalaw.com

  • Bombay HC Clarifies 2026 IBC Amendment: Section 96(4) Extends to Pending Personal Insolvency Proceedings

    Bombay HC Clarifies 2026 IBC Amendment: Section 96(4) Extends to Pending Personal Insolvency Proceedings

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 19.09.2026

    Bombay HC Clarifies 2026 IBC Amendment: Section 96(4) Extends to Pending Personal Insolvency Proceedings

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Madhumita Jha. The views expressed are based on her interpretation of the law. She can be reached at her email id jhamadhumita27@gmail.com .  

    In a significant ruling concerning personal guarantors, secured creditors and recovery proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC), the Bombay High Court has held that the newly introduced Section 96(4) of the IBC operates retroactively and therefore applies even to applications under Sections 94 and 95 that were already pending when the amendment came into force on May 26, 2026.

    The Division Bench of Justice Manish Pitale and Justice Shreeram V. Shirsat delivered the judgment on September 18, 2026, in a batch of petitions led by Indian Bank v. Shabbir Abbas Patel & Ors., Writ Petition No. 2819 of 2026. The judgment bears neutral citation 2026:BHC-OS:20542-DB.

    The ruling has potentially wide implications for banks, financial institutions and other creditors facing recovery obstacles because of interim moratoriums triggered by personal insolvency applications against guarantors.

    The Central Question Before the Bombay High Court

    • The core issue was whether Section 96(4), introduced into the IBC with effect from May 26, 2026, applies only to fresh applications filed after that date or whether it also affects applications already filed and pending.
    • The Court framed the issue specifically as whether the amendment operates retroactively, so that the exclusion introduced by Section 96(4) applies to pending personal-guarantor insolvency proceedings as well.
    • This question arose because, before the amendment, filing an application under Sections 94 or 95 could trigger an interim moratorium under Section 96, affecting legal actions or proceedings concerning debts.
    • The petitioning creditors argued that the amendment was introduced to address misuse of this mechanism and must therefore apply to pending cases. The opposing parties contended that the amendment was prospective and could affect only applications filed after May 26, 2026.

    Why Section 96 Was Amended

    • A major part of the creditors’ case concerned what they described as the misuse of the interim moratorium by debtors and personal guarantors.
    • The petitioners relied upon the report of the Select Committee on the IBC (Amendment) Bill, 2025, contending that stakeholders, including members of the NCLT, had highlighted misuse of Sections 94, 95 and 96 by debtors to obstruct legitimate creditor action.
    • Reliance was also placed on the Bombay High Court’s earlier decision in Rozina Firoz Hajiani v. Union of India, where the Court had taken judicial notice of concerns surrounding misuse of the interim moratorium.
    • The creditors consequently argued that restricting the amendment only to future applications would allow the very problem sought to be remedied to continue in all applications that happened to be pending on May 26.

    Creditors Argue Amendment Is Curative and Retroactive

    • The banks and financial institutions argued that the amendment was remedial or curative in nature.
    • They relied upon Supreme Court authorities dealing with retrospective and retroactive operation of statutory amendments, including BCCI v. Kochi Cricket Pvt. Ltd., (2018) 6 SCC 287, and M. Rajendran v. KPK Oils and Proteins India Pvt. Ltd., (2026) 3 SCC 505.
    • It was also argued that the interim moratorium was not a vested right of the debtor or guarantor. Decisions including Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, (2020) 9 SCC 1 and SEBI v. Rajkumar Nagpal, (2023) 8 SCC 274 were relied upon while explaining the concept of retroactive operation.

    Personal Guarantors Oppose Retroactive Application

    • The contesting respondents argued that the normal presumption is that legislation operates prospectively unless retrospective operation is expressly stated or follows by necessary implication.
    • They emphasised the wording of Section 96(4), particularly the expression β€œshall not apply where an application is filed”, contending that it points towards prospective application from May 26, 2026.
    • The respondents further argued that an interim moratorium provides a debtor with significant statutory protection from creditor action and that this protection should not be taken away in already pending proceedings.
    • Reliance was placed, among other authorities, on Rakesh Bhanot v. Gurdas Agro Pvt. Ltd., (2025) 6 SCC 781, concerning the importance of the interim moratorium under Section 96.

    Bombay High Court: Amendment Is Retroactive

    • After examining the statutory language, legislative background, object of the amendment and principles governing retroactive legislation, the Division Bench rejected the argument that Section 96(4) could operate only against applications filed after May 26, 2026.
    • The Court held that the amendment β€œmust operate retroactively” and consequently applies not merely to proceedings initiated on or after May 26, 2026, but also to proceedings already pending on that date.
    • The Court reasoned that the purpose of the amendmentβ€”to address the identified misuse of the interim moratoriumβ€”would be fully achieved only by applying the new provision to pending proceedings as well.
    • It also concluded that the respondents did not possess a vested right to the interim moratorium during the procedural stage governed by Sections 94 to 99 of the IBC.

    Section 96(4) Applies Even to Pending Sections 94 and 95 Proceedings

    • The Court ultimately answered the central question in categorical terms.
    • It held that Section 96(4), introduced with effect from May 26, 2026, applies retroactively and therefore extends to pending proceedings. Although the amendment operates from May 26, 2026 onwards, its effect extends to proceedings under Sections 94 and 95 that were already pending on that date.
    • The Division Bench also agreed with the approach previously adopted by a Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in Tata Capital Financial Services Ltd. v. Neel Motors LLP & Ors., as well as the Delhi High Court’s order in IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd. v. Manish Jain & Ors.
    • This ruling therefore settles, at least for the batch before the Bombay High Court, the dispute over whether pre-amendment personal-guarantor applications can continue to enjoy the earlier Section 96 interim-moratorium protection after May 26, 2026.

    Indian Bank’s Case: DRT Restraint Set Aside

    • The consequences of this interpretation were directly applied in Indian Bank v. Shabbir Abbas Patel.
    • Indian Bank had challenged orders dated October 3, 2024 and March 13, 2026 passed by DRT-I, Mumbai, restraining the Bank from proceeding with an auction. The restraint was linked to the interim moratorium arising from personal insolvency proceedings.
    • An earlier Section 95 petition had been dismissed by the NCLT on February 18, 2026. The respondents, however, relied upon a subsequent Section 95 petition filed on February 19, 2026 and registered on May 6, 2026.
    • Applying its interpretation of the amended law, the High Court held that even the interim moratorium triggered by the subsequent Section 95 proceeding ceased to operate from May 26, 2026.

    Court Finds Repeated Insolvency Proceedings Highlighted the Mischief

    • The Division Bench considered the facts of the Indian Bank matter to illustrate the problem that the legislative amendment sought to address.
    • The Court observed that allowing the interim moratorium to continue because of the subsequent Section 95 petition would be contrary to the legal position after the amendment and would permit repeated reliance on insolvency proceedings to obstruct creditor action.
    • Accordingly, Writ Petition No. 2819 of 2026 filed by Indian Bank was allowed.

    Auction and Sale Certificate Upheld

    • The High Court granted substantial relief to Indian Bank.
    • The DRT-I orders dated October 3, 2024 and March 13, 2026 were quashed and set aside, resulting in the restraint on the Bank ceasing to operate.
    • The Court further held that the Bank’s action in confirming the sale pursuant to the auction conducted on September 30, 2024, as well as issuance of the sale certificate dated February 25, 2026 and its registration on February 27, 2026, were validly taken in the circumstances.
    • The Court Commissioner was permitted to proceed in accordance with law for taking possession of the secured asset. The police authorities were directed to provide appropriate protection and assistance so that possession could be obtained and handed over to the Bank for delivery to the auction purchaser.
    • The underlying Securitisation Application No. 115 of 2024 was directed to be decided expeditiously by DRT-I, Mumbai.

    Other Banks and Financial Institutions Also Before the Court

    • The judgment did not concern Indian Bank alone. It disposed of a batch of petitions involving several secured creditors and financial institutions, including RBL Bank Ltd., Godrej Finance Ltd., Asset Reconstruction Company (India) Ltd. and Apna Sahakari Bank Ltd.
    • In the ARCIL matter, for example, the Court held that the pending Section 95 petition did not prevent the DRAT from hearing the creditors’ appeals, because Section 96(4) meant that the interim moratorium was no longer operating after May 26, 2026.
    • The judgment therefore has significance beyond the facts of a single borrower-creditor dispute.

    Significance for Banks and Secured Creditors

    • The ruling is important for secured-creditor enforcement because the Court has clarified that the May 2026 amendment cannot be avoided merely because a personal insolvency application was filed before the amendment took effect.
    • Where Section 96(4) applies to a personal guarantor to a corporate debtor, a pending Section 94 or Section 95 application cannot continue to provide the earlier interim-moratorium protection merely on the basis of its pre-May 26 filing date.
    • This can have direct consequences for SARFAESI proceedings, DRT/DRAT proceedings, auctions, recovery proceedings and possession of secured assets where creditors had previously faced objections founded upon Section 96.
    • The judgment, however, does not eliminate every remedy available to personal guarantors or decide the merits of their insolvency applications. Its central holding concerns the effect of Section 96(4) on the interim moratorium from May 26, 2026.

    Key Legal Principle

    The principle emerging from the judgment can be stated as follows:

    • Section 96(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, introduced with effect from May 26, 2026, operates retroactively. Therefore, its effect extends to applications under Sections 94 and 95 that were already pending on May 26, 2026, and the excluded interim-moratorium protection cannot continue merely because the personal insolvency proceeding was instituted before the amendment.
    • This interpretation, according to the Bombay High Court, gives effect to the legislative object of preventing misuse of the interim moratorium while not taking away any vested right, because no such vested right exists in the Section 96 interim moratorium during the procedural stage of Sections 94 to 99.

    Key Takeaway

    The Bombay High Court’s ruling substantially clarifies the effect of the 2026 amendment to Section 96 of the IBC. A personal guarantor cannot claim continuation of the earlier Section 96 interim moratorium after May 26, 2026 merely because the Section 94 or 95 proceeding was filed before that date.

    For Indian Bank, this meant the DRT restraint was set aside, the relevant auction and sale certificate were sustained, and steps for obtaining physical possession of the secured asset were permitted to proceed.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Bombay High Court

    Disclaimer

    Handy Download:

    “Handy Order for Download”Download

    Write to us at office@aadrikaalaw.com

    Tel: +91-11-4999 2707

    www.aadrikaalaw.com

  • Karnataka High Court: Non-Compoundable Offences Can Be Quashed Under Section 482 CrPC After Amicable Settlement

    Karnataka High Court: Non-Compoundable Offences Can Be Quashed Under Section 482 CrPC After Amicable Settlement

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 19.09.2026

    Karnataka High Court: Non-Compoundable Offences Can Be Quashed Under Section 482 CrPC After Amicable Settlement

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate G Sridharamurthy. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id sriadv3@gmail.com . 

    The Karnataka High Court has quashed criminal proceedings involving allegations under Sections 498A, 323, 448, 341, 504, 506, 143 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) after noting that the underlying matrimonial and family dispute had been amicably settled.

    Justice S. Vishwajith Shetty, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ramgopal and Another v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reiterated that notwithstanding the restrictions contained in Section 320 CrPC, a High Court exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC can quash proceedings involving non-compoundable offences depending upon the nature of the case, relationship between the parties and gravity of the alleged offences.

    The decision was delivered on 29 June 2026 in Smt. Thuya Mani & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Anr., Criminal Petition No. 8571 of 2022, bearing neutral citation 2026:KHC:32279.

    Relatives of Accused Husband Approach High Court

    • The petition was filed by Thuya Mani and Velamkani/Velangani, who were arrayed as Accused Nos. 4 and 5.
    • They approached the Karnataka High Court under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of proceedings in C.C. No. 51695 of 2019, pending before the XXIX Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru.
    • The proceedings arose from Crime No. 11 of 2018, registered at Vivek Nagar Police Station, Bengaluru, for alleged offences punishable under Sections 143, 448, 498A, 341, 323, 504, 506 read with Section 149 IPC.

    Matrimonial Dispute Amicably Settled

    • When the matter came before the High Court, advocates representing the contesting private parties informed the Court that the dispute between the husband and wife had been amicably settled.
    • The Court was also informed that the criminal proceedings against Accused Nos. 1 to 3 had already been quashed by a Coordinate Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Criminal Petition No. 8383 of 2026, decided on 24 June 2026.
    • The present petitioners were relatives of Accused No. 1. They filed a joint application supported by a joint affidavit under Section 320 CrPC seeking permission to compound the offences and bring the criminal dispute to an end.

    Settlement Voluntary and Without Coercion

    • The parties stated before the Court that the settlement had been reached with the intervention of elders, well-wishers, family members and other responsible persons.
    • Respondent No. 2, Susainathan, informed the Court that he no longer intended to proceed with the criminal case against the petitioners.

    The joint application specifically recorded that the compromise was:

    • voluntary, lawful and genuine;
    • entered into without force, threat or coercion;
    • free from undue influence, pressure or misrepresentation; and
    • intended to finally resolve the personal, matrimonial and family disputes between the parties.

    Respondent No. 2 expressly stated that he had no objection to quashing the criminal proceedings against the two petitioners.

    The parties further submitted that no surviving grievance remained between them and that continuing the criminal prosecution despite settlement would serve no useful purpose and would amount to an abuse of the process of law.

    Can Non-Compoundable Criminal Offences Be Quashed After Settlement?

    • The important legal issue arose because not every criminal offence can be formally compounded under Section 320 CrPC.
    • The High Court therefore considered whether it could nevertheless use its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to terminate the proceedings once the private dispute had been genuinely resolved.

    For this purpose, Justice Shetty relied upon the Supreme Court’s judgment in:

    Ramgopal and Another v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in (2022) 14 SCC 531.

    • The Karnataka High Court noted that the Supreme Court had recognised the High Court’s power to quash criminal proceedings involving non-compoundable offences, notwithstanding the restrictions under Section 320 CrPC.

    Section 320 Does Not Completely Restrict High Court’s Section 482 Powers

    Referring to Ramgopal, the Court observed that the power under Section 482 can be exercised depending upon factors such as:

    the nature of the case, the relationship between the parties and the gravity of the alleged offences.

    • Therefore, the fact that an offence is technically non-compoundable under Section 320 does not, by itself, prevent the High Court from examining whether the continuation of criminal proceedings would serve any legitimate purpose after a genuine settlement.
    • This distinction is significant: the High Court was not simply treating every non-compoundable offence as compoundable. Rather, it exercised its separate inherent power of quashing under Section 482 CrPC in light of the nature and circumstances of the dispute.

    Matrimonial and Family Nature of Dispute Considered

    • The underlying controversy arose from a personal and matrimonial dispute, and the parties themselves informed the Court that their differences had been completely resolved.
    • The petitioners were relatives of Accused No. 1, while proceedings against Accused Nos. 1 to 3 had already been quashed following the settlement.
    • Against that background, the High Court concluded that the parties should be permitted to β€œput an end to the dispute.”
    • The decision reflects the distinction courts draw between offences having an overwhelmingly private or personal character and serious crimes involving broader public interest. The Court’s reliance on Ramgopal makes clear that the nature of the offence and gravity of the allegations remain relevant considerations rather than settlement automatically resulting in quashing.

    Criminal Proceedings Quashed Against Accused Nos. 4 and 5

    • The Karnataka High Court ultimately allowed Criminal Petition No. 8571 of 2022.
    • It quashed the entire proceedings in C.C. No. 51695 of 2019 pending before the XXIX Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru, arising from Crime No. 11 of 2018 registered by Vivek Nagar Police Station, insofar as the two petitioners were concerned.
    • Accordingly, the criminal prosecution against Thuya Mani and Velamkani/Velangani (Accused Nos. 4 and 5) came to an end.

    Supreme Court Precedent Relied Upon

    • The principal judicial precedent expressly relied upon in the order was:
    • Ramgopal and Another v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2022) 14 SCC 531.
    • The Karnataka High Court relied on the judgment for the proposition that High Courts can, in appropriate circumstances, exercise their inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC to quash criminal proceedings involving non-compoundable offences despite the limitations under Section 320 CrPC.

    Why the Judgment Is Significant

    • The order reinforces the legal distinction between compounding an offence under Section 320 CrPC and quashing criminal proceedings through the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC.
    • A criminal offence that is not statutorily compoundable does not necessarily mean that proceedings must continue irrespective of a subsequent settlement. In an appropriate case, particularly where the controversy is essentially personal or matrimonial in character, the High Court may examine whether continuation of prosecution would serve any meaningful purpose.
    • At the same time, the ruling does not establish that every non-compoundable criminal case can be quashed merely because the parties have reached a compromise. The Court expressly referred to the nature of the case, relationship between the parties and gravity of the alleged offences as relevant considerations.

    Key Takeaway

    The Karnataka High Court has reiterated that the restrictions governing statutory compounding under Section 320 CrPC do not completely curtail the High Court’s inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC.

    Where parties have genuinely settled a personal or matrimonial dispute, the High Court may quash even proceedings involving non-compoundable offences after considering the nature of the case, relationship between the parties and gravity of the offences.

    In the present case, with the matrimonial and family disputes amicably resolved and the complainant having no objection to quashing, the Court concluded that the proceedings against Accused Nos. 4 and 5 should be brought to an end.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Karnataka High Court

    Disclaimer

    Handy Download:

    “Handy Order for Download”Download

    Write to us at office@aadrikaalaw.com

    Tel: +91-11-4999 2707

    www.aadrikaalaw.com

  • Bombay HC: RERA Tribunal Cannot Grant Declaration, Permanent Injunction or Cancel Sanction Plan

    Bombay HC: RERA Tribunal Cannot Grant Declaration, Permanent Injunction or Cancel Sanction Plan

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 18.09.2026

    Bombay HC: RERA Tribunal Cannot Grant Declaration, Permanent Injunction or Cancel Sanction Plan

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id amitnaren@outlook.com .  

    In a significant ruling concerning the interface between RERA and the jurisdiction of civil courts, the Bombay High Court has dismissed a revision application filed by Macrotech Developers Limited, holding that the bar under Section 79 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 does not extend to reliefs that the RERA authorities are not empowered to grant.

    Justice Milind N. Jadhav held that a dispute involving a cooperative housing society’s substantive rights over an existing clubhouse and internal roads, coupled with prayers for declaration, permanent injunction and cancellation of a sanctioned development plan, could be adjudicated by the Civil Court because RERA does not empower its authorities to grant such reliefs.

    The High Court consequently upheld the Trial Court’s refusal to reject the suit under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure and dismissed Macrotech Developers’ Civil Revision Application.

    Dispute Relates to Lodha Belmondo Project in Pune

    • Macrotech Developers Limited was the promoter of the Lodha Belmondo development project at Village Gahunje, Taluka Maval, District Pune. The project comprised multiple towers and villas over a large parcel of land.
    • Saint Andrews Co-operative Housing Society represented flat owners in various towers and villas situated within an area described as β€œThe Reserve” in the Lodha Belmondo project.
    • According to the Society, the project had been marketed from around 2012–2013 and agreements for sale had been entered into with purchasers. Its case was that Towers B, C and D and Villas 1–28, along with other towers, were integral parts of β€œThe Reserve.”

    Multiple Sanction Plans and Clubhouse at Centre of Dispute

    • The judgment records a series of sanctioned development plans.
    • A third sanctioned plan dated April 30, 2013 showed six buildings and 28 villas as part of β€œThe Reserve”. A fifth sanctioned plan dated June 22, 2018 specifically referred to a clubhouse for members of β€œThe Reserve”. A subsequent seventh sanctioned plan dated September 20, 2021, however, showed the clubhouse near Tower No. 26 as proposed to be demolished.
    • Members of the Society had received possession of their flats in 2017 following issuance of an Occupation Certificate, while the Society itself was registered in March 2021.
    • The dispute escalated in October 2022 when Macrotech’s workers allegedly prevented Society members from entering and using the clubhouse on the ground that the existing facility was to be demolished and replaced.

    Society Approaches Civil Court

    • The Society instituted a civil suit seeking, among other things, a declaration regarding the clubhouse situated behind Tower No. 26 and an injunction restraining the developer and its representatives from preventing members from accessing the clubhouse.
    • It also sought to prevent demolition or additional construction pursuant to changes made in the layout and the seventh sanctioned plan.
    • The Trial Court rejected Macrotech Developers’ application under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC seeking rejection of the plaint as barred by law.
    • Macrotech thereafter approached the Bombay High Court by way of the present Civil Revision Application challenging that order.

    Macrotech: Section 79 RERA Bars Civil Court Jurisdiction

    • Macrotech argued that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction because Section 79 of RERA expressly bars Civil Courts from entertaining matters that fall within the jurisdiction of the authorities constituted under RERA.
    • The developer contended that once a project is registered under RERA, disputes arising out of or incidental to that project must be pursued before the competent forum under the statute.
    • Macrotech also relied upon Section 149 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act and argued that the suit was barred under that enactment as well.
    • It relied, inter alia, on the Supreme Court’s ruling in New Tech Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1044, to contend that RERA applies to ongoing projects which had not received completion certificates before the legislation came into force.
    • Macrotech also relied on Imperia Structures Ltd. v. Anil Patni & Anr., (2020) 10 SCC 783, and argued that the Society could pursue appropriate remedies before the RERA forum or Consumer Forum rather than the Civil Court.

    Society: RERA Cannot Grant the Declaratory Reliefs Sought

    • The Society opposed the revision and argued that it was itself a separate legal entity registered under the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 and was not an individual β€œallottee” within the meaning of RERA.
    • It further argued that Section 79 could not operate as a blanket exclusion of Civil Court jurisdiction in disputes between a cooperative housing society and a promoter.
    • More importantly, the Society contended that it had sought declaratory and other civil reliefs that RERA authorities could not grant.
    • According to the Society, Civil Courts retain jurisdiction over civil disputes unless expressly or impliedly barred, and the nature of the relief sought was therefore crucial in deciding jurisdiction.

    Bombay HC Explains Test Under Order VII Rule 11(d)

    • The High Court reiterated that while considering rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11, the Court must examine the averments contained in the plaint along with its annexures as a whole.
    • At this stage, material outside the plaint cannot be added or subtracted to determine whether the suit is barred by law.
    • The Court observed that rejection under Order VII Rule 11(d) is justified only when the plaint itself discloses that the action is legally barred.
    • In the present case, the Society sought a declaration that the clubhouse behind Tower No. 26 was an integral part of β€œThe Reserve”, a permanent injunction against its demolition, and a declaration challenging the September 20, 2021 sanction plan to the extent it contemplated demolition of the existing clubhouse and construction of another structure in its place.

    Section 79 RERA Is Not a Blanket Bar Against Civil Suits

    • The High Court then examined Sections 79, 88 and 89 of RERA.
    • Section 79 bars Civil Courts from entertaining suits or proceedings concerning matters that the RERA Authority, Adjudicating Officer or Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine.
    • However, Section 88 expressly provides that RERA operates β€œin addition to, and not in derogation of” other laws, while Section 89 gives RERA overriding effect where inconsistency exists.
    • Reading these provisions together, the High Court held that RERA is not the sole remedy for every dispute between allottees and promoters/developers.
    • The Section 79 bar applies only to those matters that the authorities constituted under RERA are actually empowered to determine.

    Can RERA Authority Grant the Same Relief as a Civil Court? Bombay HC Applies Supreme Court Test

    • The High Court relied upon the Supreme Court’s judgment in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, (1985) 4 SCC 10.
    • The principle applied was that even where a special statute creates a tribunal and accords finality to its decisions, exclusion of Civil Court jurisdiction depends materially upon whether the statutory tribunal is capable of granting the relief that a Civil Court would ordinarily grant.
    • Where the specialised forum does not possess the power to grant such relief, exclusion of Civil Court jurisdiction cannot readily be inferred.
    • This became the decisive principle in the case.

    RERA Tribunal Cannot Grant Declaration, Permanent Injunction and Cancellation of Sanction Plan: Bombay HC

    Applying the above principle, Justice Jadhav held that the dispute involved the Society’s substantive right to use an existing clubhouse and its challenge to a subsequent sanctioned plan allegedly validated without its approval.

    The Court specifically found an β€œapparent and glaring absence” of provisions under RERA empowering its authorities to adjudicate reliefs in the nature of:

    • declaration;
    • permanent injunction; and
    • cancellation of a sanction plan approved by the Planning Authority.

    Consequently, such a dispute could not be said to fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the authorities constituted under RERA.

    Society’s Right to Use Clubhouse Had β€œCrystallized”

    • The High Court also took note of the factual history of the clubhouse.
    • The clubhouse had appeared in the fifth sanctioned plan dated June 22, 2018, had subsequently been constructed, and was being used by members of the Society.
    • The seventh sanctioned plan dated September 20, 2021 proposed its demolition. The Court noted that the Society’s consent had admittedly not been obtained before the seventh plan was validated or proposed.
    • The Court observed that the Society members’ right to use the clubhouse had already β€œstood crystallized and in place since inception and on construction of the Clubhouse.”
    • The dispute also involved internal roads that were allegedly proposed to be constructed upon pursuant to the seventh sanctioned plan without the Society’s consent.

    Civil Court Alone Can Grant Appropriate Relief in Such Circumstances

    • The High Court concluded that the substantive rights claimed by the Society could be protected through the civil suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
    • It rejected Macrotech Developers’ contention that the Society’s remedy lay before the RERA Tribunal and held that, in the circumstances before it, the Civil Court could entertain the dispute and grant appropriate reliefs.
    • Accordingly, the Court upheld the Trial Court’s order refusing to reject the plaint and dismissed Macrotech Developers’ Civil Revision Application.

    Important Clarification: Merits of Society’s Suit Not Finally Decided

    • The ruling should not be read as a final determination that the seventh sanctioned plan is invalid or that the Society has conclusively established all of the substantive rights asserted in its suit.
    • The High Court expressly clarified that its findings were prima facie and restricted to the revision proceedings, and that they should not influence the ultimate adjudication of the underlying suit. The parties’ other contentions and remedies were kept open.
    • Thus, Saint Andrews Co-operative Housing Society succeeded on the jurisdiction/maintainability issue, while the underlying civil dispute remains to be adjudicated on merits.

    Key Legal Takeaway

    The judgment reinforces that Section 79 of RERA does not create a universal bar against Civil Court jurisdiction merely because a dispute concerns a RERA-registered real estate project.

    The decisive inquiry is whether the particular matter and relief sought are within the statutory powers of the RERA Authority, Adjudicating Officer or Appellate Tribunal. Where the dispute requires relief such as a civil declaration, permanent injunction or cancellation of a sanctioned development plan that the RERA forum is not empowered to grant, the Civil Court’s jurisdiction may remain available.

    Connected Matter

    Bombay High Court: Section 79 RERA Bars Civil Suit Where Reliefs Can Be Granted by RERA Authority

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Bombay High Court

    Disclaimer

    Handy Download:

    “Handy Order for Download”Download

    Write to us at office@aadrikaalaw.com

    Tel: +91-11-4999 2707

    www.aadrikaalaw.com