Tag: #MinistryofFinance

  • Himachal Pradesh HC: Rigours of Section 37 NDPS Act Inapplicable Where Heroin Recovery Is Below Commercial Quantity

    Himachal Pradesh HC: Rigours of Section 37 NDPS Act Inapplicable Where Heroin Recovery Is Below Commercial Quantity

    Date: 19.10.2026

    The Himachal Pradesh High Court has granted regular bail to Prince Rana and Sudhanshu Soni in an NDPS case involving the recovery of 32.56 grams of heroin, while making clear that the order does not decide their guilt or innocence.

    The case at a glance

    Justice Rakesh Kainthla decided the connected bail petitions on 16 October 2026. The petitions arose from FIR No. 28 of 2026, registered at Baijnath Police Station in Kangra district under Sections 21, 25 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.

    According to the prosecution, police received information on 24 February 2026 that Prince Rana, Sudhanshu Soni and others were selling heroin from a house in Village Malehad. Officers recorded and forwarded the information to a superior officer before conducting a search. The search reportedly led to the recovery of a polythene packet containing 32.56 grams of heroin, concealed beneath a sofa-cum-bed.

    The prosecution said both petitioners were present at the house when the recovery was made. It also relied on statements allegedly made during the investigation concerning the procurement and delivery of the substance. A forensic report confirmed that the recovered material was diacetylmorphine, commonly known as heroin.

    Arguments before the Court

    The petitioners denied the allegations and said they had been falsely implicated. Their counsel stressed that they were first-time accused, had no other FIRs registered against them, and that the police investigation had already concluded. The charge sheet had been filed on 24 April 2026, meaning further custodial interrogation was not required, they argued.

    The State opposed bail, contending that the allegations concerned heroin sales and that the offence had serious consequences for society. It urged the Court not to show leniency.

    Why the High Court granted bail

    The Court considered established Supreme Court principles on bail, including the nature and gravity of the accusation, the evidence available at the preliminary stage, the possibility of absconding, the likelihood of witness interference, criminal antecedents and the need to protect the trial process.

    While the Court found that the petitioners’ presence at the house during the alleged recovery created a prima facie case, it identified several factors favouring release:

    • Quantity below the commercial threshold: The Court noted that the alleged recovery was less than a commercial quantity. Therefore, the stricter restrictions on bail under Section 37 of the NDPS Act were not applicable.
    • No stated criminal history: The petitioners’ assertion that they were first offenders was not disputed by the State in its status report. The Court observed that first offenders should have an opportunity for reform and that unnecessary continued detention could expose them to hardened criminals.
    • Local roots: Both petitioners were stated to be permanent residents of Kangra district. As this was not disputed, the Court found no substantial risk of absconding.
    • Investigation complete: Since the police had completed the investigation and filed the charge sheet, and did not claim that custodial interrogation remained necessary, the Court held that continued detention would serve no useful purpose.

    The decision reflects the general bail principle that personal liberty should ordinarily be protected unless circumstances indicate a real risk of flight, interference with justice, witness intimidation or repetition of offences.

    Bail terms imposed

    Prince Rana and Sudhanshu Soni were each directed to furnish a bail bond of β‚Ή1,00,000 with one surety in the same amount, to the satisfaction of the trial court. Their release is subject to conditions intended to safeguard the proceedings:

    1. They must not intimidate witnesses or influence evidence.
    2. They must attend every hearing and avoid seeking unnecessary adjournments.
    3. They cannot leave their present address for more than seven continuous days without providing details of the intended visit to the concerned SHO, police station and trial court.
    4. They must surrender any passports to the court.
    5. They must provide their mobile numbers and social-media contact details to the police and court, comply with notices sent through SMS, WhatsApp or social-media accounts, and report any change in these details within five days.

    The Court also stated that the prosecution may seek cancellation of bail if any condition is violated.

    What the order doesβ€”and does notβ€”decide

    This is a bail ruling, not a final verdict in the criminal case. The High Court expressly stated that its observations were limited to deciding the bail applications and would not affect the merits of the prosecution at trial.

    The trial court will determine the allegations based on the evidence presented during the proceedings.

    The ruling shows that, even in narcotics cases, courts assess bail on the specific facts: the statutory quantity involved, the accused’s prior record, their connection to the local community, the status of the investigation and the safeguards available to protect a fair trial.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Delhi HC: Composite Trademarks Must Be Evaluated as a Whole Under Section 11(1) of Trade Marks Act

    Delhi HC: Composite Trademarks Must Be Evaluated as a Whole Under Section 11(1) of Trade Marks Act

    Date: 19.10.2026

    The Delhi High Court has set aside the Trade Marks Registry’s refusal to register the word mark β€œKAMA CASA”, holding that the Registry wrongly split the composite mark into separate elements and compared them with distinct earlier device marks.

    Background of the dispute

    Modi Woodspace Private Limited applied on 29 August 2023 to register KAMA CASA as a proposed-to-be-used word mark in Classes 20 and 35. The Trade Marks Registry objected under Section 11(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which concerns the likelihood of confusion with earlier trademarks.

    After hearings, the Registrar refused the application on 21 May 2025. The refusal was based on earlier Class 20 registrations containing the terms β€œKAMA” and β€œCASA.” The Registrar concluded that combining those words in β€œKAMA CASA” could confuse consumers and traders about the commercial origin of the goods.

    Modi Woodspace appealed to the Delhi High Court under Section 91 of the Act.

    The key issue: Can a composite mark be broken into parts?

    The central issue was whether the Registrar could assess the applicant’s mark by isolating the words β€œKAMA” and β€œCASA” and comparing each part separately with different prior marks.

    The Court held that this approach was incorrect. It applied the anti-dissection rule, a settled trademark principle requiring a mark to be assessed as a whole rather than broken into individual components.

    According to the Court, KAMA CASA is a composite word mark and should have been evaluated in its entirety. The cited prior marks were device or label marks with their own visual and design elements. The Registry could not disregard those elements, extract the words β€œKAMA” and β€œCASA,” and use them separately to reject the composite word mark.

    Why the refusal was flawed

    The Court identified two material distinctions:

    • Different mark types: The applicant sought registration of a word mark, while the cited marks were device marks.
    • Improper comparison: The cited device marks could not be reduced to their word elements alone. Their overall visual presentation and device features formed part of the registered marks.

    The Court found it difficult to understand how the Registrar could conclude that the composite word mark β€œKAMA CASA” was deceptively similar to separate device marks containing β€œKAMA” and β€œCASA,” particularly when each cited mark had distinctive device elements.

    It further observed that the mere fact that the marks fell in the same class did not establish similarity or a likelihood of confusion.

    Relevance of other β€œCASA” registrations

    During the appeal, Modi Woodspace submitted a Trade Marks Registry search report showing numerous registrations containing the word β€œCASA” in the same or similar classes. Although this report had not been submitted to the Registrar during the original examination process, the Court considered it relevant.

    The presence of multiple registered marks containing β€œCASA” may be important when evaluating whether that word, in the relevant market context, can by itself justify refusal of a later composite mark. The Court therefore directed the Registrar to consider the search report in the renewed examination.

    Court’s decision

    In its judgment delivered on 22 April 2026, the Delhi High Court:

    • quashed the refusal order dated 21 May 2025;
    • revived trademark application No. 6087367 for KAMA CASA;
    • remitted the application to the Registrar of Trade Marks for a fresh, de novo consideration; and
    • required the Registrar to complete that reconsideration within four months.

    The Court clarified that its observations were made for the purpose of remand and should not be treated as a final finding that the mark must be registered.

    Significance for trademark applicants

    The ruling reinforces that trademark similarity assessments must be based on the overall commercial impression of competing marks. A registry or court should not artificially dissect a composite mark and assemble objections from separate earlier registrations unless the law and the facts justify that conclusion.

    For applicants, the decision also highlights the value of submitting marketplace and registry search evidence early. Evidence of numerous similar registrations may help place a disputed word or element in context, especially where the applicant’s mark combines common or widely used terms into a distinct overall expression.

    Ultimately, the case confirms that a Section 11(1) objection requires a careful comparison of the marks as consumers encounter them, not an isolated comparison of selected words taken out of their full visual and commercial context.

    Connected Matter

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Madras HC: Non-Parent Customs Commissioner Cannot Suspend Customs Broker Licence Under Regulation 16 of CBLR 2018

    Madras HC: Non-Parent Customs Commissioner Cannot Suspend Customs Broker Licence Under Regulation 16 of CBLR 2018

    Date: 19.10.2026

    The Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court has held that only the Customs authority that issued a Customs Broker’s licenceβ€”the β€œParent Commissionerate”—may suspend it under the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018.

    In M/s. Sasha Shipping Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, decided on 4 November 2025, Justice G.R. Swaminathan set aside orders by the Commissioner of Customs, Tuticorin suspending and continuing the suspension of Sasha Shipping’s Customs Broker Licence. The Court found that Tuticorin was not the licence-issuing authority and therefore lacked jurisdiction to invoke the suspension power.

    Background of the dispute

    Sasha Shipping Pvt. Ltd. received its Customs Broker Licence from the Principal Commissioner of Customs, Chennai, in 2011. It subsequently began operating within the jurisdiction of the Tuticorin Customs Commissionerate from 21 June 2022 through a Form C intimation.

    In August 2025, the Commissioner of Customs, Tuticorin formed the view that the company had committed irregularities relating to certain imports. On 20 August 2025, the Commissioner suspended Sasha Shipping’s licence with immediate effect under Regulation 16(1) of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018. A further order dated 3 September 2025 continued that suspension under Regulation 16(2).

    Sasha Shipping challenged both orders. Its central argument was that Tuticorin, being a non-parent commissionerate, could not suspend a licence issued by Chennai.

    The jurisdictional question before the Court

    The case turned on the distinction between two Customs authorities:

    • Parent Commissionerate: The Commissionerate that grants the Customs Broker Licence.
    • Non-Parent Commissionerate: A Commissionerate where the broker operates under a Form C intimation after obtaining its original licence elsewhere.

    The Court noted that a broker can transact business at Customs stations beyond its original Commissionerate, subject to the Form C process. However, Form C is only an intimation of the broker’s intention to operate at another station; it is not a fresh licence or an authorization issued by that non-parent Commissionerate.

    Initially, the Tuticorin order appeared to operate across all Customs stations. A corrigendum dated 14 October 2025 limited its reach to areas within the jurisdiction of the Tuticorin Custom House. Even after that correction, the principal issue remained: whether Tuticorin could suspend the licence at all.

    Regulation 15 and Regulation 16 serve different purposes

    The Court analysed the scheme of the 2018 Regulations, particularly Regulations 15, 16 and 17.

    Regulation 15: Local prohibition by a non-parent Commissionerate

    Regulation 15 allows a Commissioner other than the licence-issuing authority to prohibit a Customs Broker from working in one or more sections of the relevant Customs station if the broker has failed to meet its obligations. This is a limited local measure. The prohibition cannot continue for more than one month.

    According to the Court, this provision equips a non-parent Commissionerate to respond immediately to misconduct occurring within its own jurisdiction.

    Regulation 16: Suspension of the licence

    Regulation 16 permits suspension of a Customs Broker Licence where immediate action is necessary and an inquiry is pending or contemplated. The Court held that this power belongs only to the Parent Commissionerate because that authority issued the licence in the first place.

    The reasoning was straightforward: the authority that grants a licence has the inherent authority to amend, vary, rescind or suspend it. A non-parent Commissionerate, which has received only a Form C intimation, has not issued the licence and cannot suspend it.

    Regulation 17: Further disciplinary process

    Where suspension continues, Regulation 17 provides the procedure for notice, inquiry, evidence, representation and final action, including revocation or penalty. The Court read Regulations 15, 16 and 17 together as a coordinated framework:

    1. A non-parent Commissionerate may impose a temporary local prohibition.
    2. It should communicate the alleged violations to the Parent Commissionerate.
    3. The Parent Commissionerate may then initiate suspension, revocation or penalty proceedings under the applicable regulations.

    Why the Court rejected the Customs department’s argument

    The Customs department argued that Regulation 16 uses the broad phrase β€œPrincipal Commissioner or Commissioner of Customs,” unlike Regulation 15, which specifically refers to Commissioners other than those mentioned in Regulation 7. It contended that this wording allowed any Commissioner to suspend a broker’s licence.

    The Court did not accept that interpretation. It held that the regulations must be read as a whole, rather than treating Regulation 16 in isolation. The existence of Regulation 15 showed that the regulatory framework already gives non-parent Commissionerates a defined remedy: temporary prohibition within their own Customs station.

    Allowing a non-parent Commissionerate to suspend the licence itself would blur the statutory distinction between local prohibition and licence-level suspension.

    Reliance on the 2010 CBIC circular

    The Court also relied on CBIC Circular No. 9/2010-Cus., dated 8 April 2010. Although issued under the earlier Customs House Agents Licensing Regulations, 2004, the Court found it remained applicable because its principles were consistent with the 2018 Regulations and it had neither been superseded nor withdrawn.

    The circular states that where a Customs broker operating under Form C is found to have committed violations at another Customs station:

    • The Commissionerate at that station should report the violations to the Commissionerate that issued the licence.
    • The licence-issuing Commissionerate should initiate suspension or revocation action.
    • The non-parent Commissionerate may, in appropriate cases, prohibit the broker from working locally.

    This approach avoids duplicative proceedings and ensures uniform disciplinary action against Customs Brokers operating at multiple stations.

    Court’s decision

    The High Court concluded that the Commissioner of Customs, Tuticorin was a non-parent Commissionerate because Sasha Shipping’s licence had been issued by Chennai. Consequently, Tuticorin could not exercise the suspension power under Regulation 16.

    The Court set aside:

    • Order No. 15/2025 dated 20 August 2025, suspending Sasha Shipping’s Customs Broker Licence; and
    • Order No. 16/2025 dated 3 September 2025, continuing the suspension.

    Both writ petitions were allowed, with no order as to costs.

    Significance for Customs Brokers and Customs authorities

    The ruling clarifies the limits of regulatory authority where a Customs Broker operates across India through Form C intimations. A non-parent Commissionerate can address suspected wrongdoing at its station through a short-term local prohibition, but it cannot suspend the underlying licence.

    For licence suspension, revocation or broader disciplinary action, the matter must be taken up by the Commissionerate that originally issued the Customs Broker Licence.

    The decision reinforces a clear division of powers, supports procedural consistency and prevents multiple Customs formations from taking overlapping action against the same licence.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Delhi High Court Upholds DMRC’s Refusal to Reimburse Rs.4.46 Crore in DVAT to L&T

    Delhi High Court Upholds DMRC’s Refusal to Reimburse Rs.4.46 Crore in DVAT to L&T

    Date: 18.10.2026

    The Delhi High Court has dismissed Larsen & Toubro Limited’s challenge to an arbitral award that denied reimbursement of Rs.4.46 crore in Delhi Value Added Tax (DVAT) from Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. (DMRC), holding that the relevant supplies were connected to inter-State trade and import transactions and therefore fell outside DVAT.

    The dispute: tax reimbursement under a metro contract

    The case arose from a 2008 DMRC contract awarded to a consortium comprising Larsen & Toubro (L&T) and Furrer + Frey AG. The contract concerned the design, supply, installation, testing and commissioning of a 25 kV rigid overhead contact system and related cabling for sections of Delhi Metro’s Phase-II network.

    The contract value was approximately Rs.43.37 crore, along with USD 2.02 million and Swiss Franc 5.49 million. It required the contractor to deliver and install equipment including contact wires, traction cables, sectioning posts, sub-sectioning posts, return conductors and associated systems.

    A key contractual clause provided that DMRC would reimburse DVAT or Uttar Pradesh trade tax, where applicable, on indigenous equipment upon proof of actual payment. L&T argued that it had paid DVAT of Rs.4,45,73,743 on the equipment and systems supplied to DMRC in Delhi and was entitled to reimbursement.

    Why L&T claimed DVAT reimbursement

    L&T procured high-voltage and low-voltage panels, cables and other components from suppliers outside Delhi. Some high-voltage panels were imported from Germany by an Indian supplier, while certain other materials were obtained through inter-State transactions.

    According to L&T, these components were not supplied to DMRC as standalone items. Instead, they were transported to project sites, assembled, integrated, installed and commissioned into sectioning and sub-sectioning posts and other bill-of-quantities items. L&T maintained that the completed systems were commercially distinct products supplied to DMRC in Delhi, making the transactions local sales subject to DVAT.

    L&T also relied on two aspects of DMRC’s conduct:

    • DMRC initially reimbursed one DVAT invoice, though it later recovered the amount from L&T’s running bills.
    • DMRC deducted works-contract tax at source from invoices, which L&T argued showed that DMRC had treated the supplies as local transactions.

    DMRC’s position: the supplies were exempt from DVAT

    DMRC argued that reimbursement was only available where DVAT was legally applicable. It contended that the goods were procured specifically for the metro project through imports and inter-State purchases, meaning that the transactions were exempt from DVAT under Section 7 of the DVAT Act.

    DMRC relied on facts showing a close contractual connection between the goods and the project:

    • DMRC prescribed technical specifications for the equipment.
    • It approved the suppliers, including the foreign supplier of the high-voltage panels.
    • It required pre-inspection of goods.
    • The goods were custom-made for the metro project.
    • DMRC issued customs and excise-duty exemption certificates.
    • The invoices and packaging identified DMRC as the consignee or stated that the goods were for the DMRC project.

    DMRC maintained that these facts established that the movement of goods into Delhi, whether from another State or from abroad, was occasioned by and integral to the underlying works contract.

    Arbitration award: no reimbursement due

    The arbitral tribunal rejected L&T’s claim in its entirety and issued a nil award. It concluded that the imported high-voltage panels and the materials procured from outside Delhi were directly connected with the DMRC contract.

    The tribunal found that the relevant domestic procurements were inter-State sales subject to Central Sales Tax, while the imported equipment was part of a transaction in the course of import. As these categories are excluded from DVAT under Section 7 of the DVAT Act, DMRC was not required to reimburse the tax paid by L&T.

    The tribunal also held that DMRC’s initial reimbursement of one invoice and later recovery of that amount was a rectifiable mistake, not an admission that DVAT was properly payable. Since the principal claim failed, the tribunal rejected L&T’s claims for interest and arbitration costs as well.

    High Court’s analysis: contractual tax disputes can be arbitrated

    Before addressing the tax issue, the Court considered L&T’s argument that an arbitral tribunal could not decide whether DVAT applied because taxability is a matter for statutory authorities.

    The Court rejected that objection. It drew a distinction between disputes that require a binding statutory tax determination and disputes between contracting parties over tax reimbursement or allocation of tax liability. The latter category is contractual and can be resolved through arbitration.

    Here, the dispute centred on whether DMRC was contractually obliged to reimburse DVAT under the relevant clause. The Court held that this was an arbitrable issue between the parties.

    ABB precedent was decisive

    The Court held that the case was squarely governed by the earlier decision in ABB Ltd., which had been affirmed by the Supreme Court. That precedent involved a DMRC works contract for electrical and traction systems and examined whether goods procured from outside Delhi or through import were subject to DVAT.

    The governing test is whether the movement of goods is integrally connected with the contract for their supply. An express contractual clause requiring inter-State movement is not necessary. It is enough if the movement is pursuant to, or incidental to, the contract.

    Applying this principle, the Court found a direct and continuing link between the procurement of the panels and other equipment and L&T’s obligations to DMRC. The fact that L&T integrated the input materials into sectioning and sub-sectioning posts did not break that connection.

    Limited judicial review under Section 34

    The Court emphasised that a Section 34 petition is not an appeal against an arbitral award. A court cannot reassess the evidence merely because another interpretation may be possible. Intervention is warranted only on narrow grounds, such as patent illegality going to the root of the matter.

    The tribunal had considered the relevant invoices, supplier approvals, customs exemptions, project specifications, consignment details and the parties’ submissions. Its conclusion that the supplies were linked to inter-State trade and import was therefore a plausible view supported by the record.

    Outcome and practical significance

    The Delhi High Court dismissed L&T’s petition, upheld the nil arbitral award and made no order on costs.

    The ruling reinforces two important principles for infrastructure and works-contract disputes:

    1. Tax reimbursement clauses depend on legal applicability. A contractual promise to reimburse VAT does not require reimbursement where the transaction is legally exempt from that State tax.
    2. The contractual nexus of goods movement is critical. In projects involving customized equipment, approved suppliers, import-duty exemptions and project-specific consignments, the movement of goods may remain an import or inter-State transaction even after installation or integration into a larger system.

    The decision also confirms that arbitrators may decide contractual disputes over which party must bear or reimburse tax, provided they are not purporting to replace the statutory tax authorities on matters that require a binding public-law tax determination.

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    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Rules of Origin vs. Rules of Customs: Constitutional Authority, Treaty Enforcement and the New CBIC Clarification

    Rules of Origin vs. Rules of Customs: Constitutional Authority, Treaty Enforcement and the New CBIC Clarification

    Date: 17.10.2026

    From Article 253 of the Constitution to Section 28DA of the Customs Act: Understanding how international trade commitments become enforceable rights under Indian law.

    Introduction: When International Trade Commitments Meet Domestic Customs Administration

    India’s expanding network of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements (CEPAs) has transformed the legal framework governing international trade. These agreements offer preferential market access, reduced Customs duties and enhanced commercial opportunities. However, their effective implementation depends upon a fundamental constitutional question: Can domestic Customs authorities impose conditions that dilute or defeat the benefits negotiated under a bilateral Trade Agreement?

    This question has acquired renewed importance following CBIC Circular No. 43/2026-Customs, dated 24 September 2026. The Circular clarifies the relationship between Section 28DA of the Customs Act, 1962, the Customs (Administration of Rules of Origin under Trade Agreements) Rules, 2020 (CAROTAR), and the Rules of Origin contained in India’s Trade Agreements.

    Its significance extends beyond routine Customs administration. It raises questions concerning constitutional treaty-making powers, legislative competence, delegated legislation, administrative discretion and the enforceability of international obligations within India’s domestic legal system.

    The Circular specifically addresses two recurring disputes: the insistence upon Form-I for preferential tariff claims under the India–UK Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), and the automatic denial of preferential treatment to subsequent consignments following an earlier adverse origin determination.

    By reiterating that agreement-specific Rules of Origin prevail over conflicting CAROTAR provisions, CBIC has reinforced an essential legal distinction between the authority to verify preferential claims and the power to impose additional substantive conditions.

    To appreciate the Circular’s wider significance, it is necessary to examine the constitutional foundation of India’s bilateral trade agreements, the mechanism through which international obligations acquire domestic legal effect, and the judicial principles governing Customs exemptions and administrative interpretation.

    I. Constitutional Foundation of Bilateral Trade Agreements in India

    The Constitution of India does not contain a single provision exclusively governing Free Trade Agreements. Instead, India’s treaty-making and treaty-implementation powers arise from several interconnected constitutional provisions.

    Article 51(c): Respect for International Law and Treaty Obligations

    Article 51(c), contained in Part IV of the Constitution, directs the State to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in dealings between organised peoples. This provision reflects India’s constitutional commitment to international cooperation and the observance of treaty obligations.

    However, Article 51(c) forms part of the Directive Principles of State Policy. By virtue of Article 37, these principles are not directly enforceable by courts, although they remain fundamental to governance. Consequently, Article 51(c) does not independently transform an international trade agreement into an enforceable domestic statute.

    Its principal significance lies in guiding constitutional interpretation and encouraging consistency between domestic law and India’s international commitments.

    Article 73: Executive Authority to Negotiate and Conclude Trade Agreements

    Article 73 defines the extent of the Union’s executive power. Read with Articles 53 and 246 and the relevant Union List entries, it provides the constitutional foundation for the Union executive’s authority in international relations.

    Accordingly, the Central Government may negotiate and conclude bilateral and multilateral trade agreements within its constitutional competence. Such agreements may cover tariff concessions, market access, Rules of Origin, investment protection, services, intellectual property, technical barriers to trade and dispute-settlement arrangements.

    However, an important distinction must be maintained between concluding an international agreement and giving its provisions enforceable domestic legal effect. An international agreement may bind India at the international level without automatically creating enforceable rights or obligations against private parties under Indian municipal law.

    Where implementation requires alteration of existing legislation, restriction of legal rights or imposition of domestic obligations, appropriate legislative authority becomes necessary.

    Article 253: Parliament’s Power to Implement International Agreements

    Article 253 is the central constitutional provision concerning domestic implementation of international treaties. It empowers Parliament to legislate for implementing treaties, agreements and conventions with foreign countries, notwithstanding the ordinary distribution of legislative powers between the Union and States.

    Its importance is twofold. First, it enables Parliament to implement international obligations through domestic legislation. Second, it permits Parliament to legislate even upon matters ordinarily falling within State legislative competence when implementing an international agreement.

    Therefore, Article 253 acts as a constitutional bridge between international commitments and domestic legislative authority. However, Article 253 is an enabling provision. It does not automatically make every provision of a bilateral trade agreement directly enforceable in Indian courts.

    The Supreme Court’s decision in Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel v. Union of India, AIR 1969 SC 783, remains particularly important in understanding this distinction.

    Article 246 and the Seventh Schedule: Legislative Competence Over Foreign Trade

    Article 246 distributes legislative competence between Parliament and State Legislatures.

    Several entries in List I of the Seventh Schedule are directly relevant to bilateral trade agreements.

    Constitutional provisionSubject matterRelevance to international trade
    Union List, Entry 10Foreign affairs and matters concerning the Union’s relations with foreign countriesInternational economic relations and trade negotiations
    Union List, Entry 14Entering into treaties and agreements with foreign countries and implementing themConstitutional legislative foundation for treaty implementation
    Union List, Entry 41Trade and commerce with foreign countries; import and export across Customs frontiersImport-export regulation and foreign trade administration
    Union List, Entry 83Duties of Customs, including export dutiesCustoms tariff legislation and duty concessions
    Article 253Legislation implementing international agreementsParliamentary authority extending beyond ordinary federal legislative limitations

    These provisions collectively explain why international trade negotiations, Customs tariff legislation and foreign trade regulation principally fall within Union competence.

    Articles 265 and 14: Constitutional Controls Over Customs Administration

    Article 265 provides that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law.

    This principle is central to Customs taxation. An international agreement does not, merely through its execution, independently amend the Customs tariff or authorise Customs authorities to collect duties contrary to domestic law.

    Preferential tariff treatment must be implemented through a legally valid domestic mechanism. Conversely, once a preferential concession has been lawfully implemented, its administration must remain within the governing statute and notification.

    Article 14 introduces another constitutional limitation. Administrative decisions must not be arbitrary, discriminatory or unsupported by legally relevant considerations. Accordingly, Customs officers exercising powers under Section 28DA and CAROTAR remain subject to constitutional standards of legality, reasonableness and non-arbitrariness.

    II. How Are Bilateral Trade Agreements Enforced Domestically in India?

    India broadly follows a dualist approach to international treaties. Under this approach, international obligations and domestic legal rights operate in related but distinct legal spheres.

    The execution of an international agreement does not necessarily make all its provisions directly enforceable against individuals or authorities. Domestic implementation may occur through legislation, statutory notifications, delegated legislation or executive action supported by existing law.

    The Domestic Implementation Mechanism

    1. Negotiation and conclusion of a Trade Agreement

    Union executive authority under the Constitution

    2. Identification of domestic legal requirements

    Articles 246 and 253; relevant Union List entries

    3. Implementation through Indian law

    Customs Act, Customs Tariff Act, notifications and Rules of Origin

    4. Administration of preferential tariff claims

    Section 28DA, CAROTAR and the applicable Trade Agreement

    5. Judicial review and statutory remedies

    Customs appeals and constitutional remedies, where maintainable:-

    In the Customs context, Section 5 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 enables the Central Government to make rules for determining the origin of goods under Trade Agreements. Preferential tariff concessions are generally implemented through notifications issued under the relevant statutory powers, including Section 25 of the Customs Act.

    Section 28DA and CAROTAR then regulate the administration and verification of preferential claims. Thus, an FTA’s tariff commitments do not ordinarily operate as an independent substitute for India’s Customs legislation. Their domestic enforceability must be examined through the applicable implementing law.

    III. Landmark Constitutional Precedent: Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel v. Union of India

    Case: Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel v. Union of India Citation: AIR 1969 SC 783; (1969) 3 SCC 400 Court: Supreme Court of India Date: 9 January 1969

    The dispute arose from the implementation of an international boundary determination involving India and Pakistan. The Supreme Court considered the constitutional powers of the Union executive to enter into international agreements and the circumstances requiring parliamentary legislation. The Court recognised that the executive could conclude international agreements within its constitutional authority.

    However, it distinguished international obligations from their domestic legal consequences. Where implementation affects enforceable private rights or modifies existing domestic law, legislative support is required. The Court also explained the significance of Article 253 and Parliament’s authority to implement international agreements.

    Commentary

    Although the judgment concerned an international boundary dispute rather than an FTA, its constitutional reasoning remains directly relevant to trade agreements. It establishes that the Union executive’s treaty-making authority and Parliament’s treaty-implementation authority are legally distinct.

    Consequently, a bilateral trade agreement cannot automatically override an inconsistent Indian statute merely because India has accepted the agreement internationally. The legally enforceable rights of importers must be identified through the applicable domestic implementing provisions, interpreted in light of the Trade Agreement where the law permits or requires such interpretation.

    IV. Section 28DA of the Customs Act: The Statutory Framework for Preferential Origin

    Section 28DA, introduced through the Finance Act, 2020, establishes the responsibilities of importers claiming preferential Customs duty under Trade Agreements.

    The provision was intended to strengthen verification of originating status and prevent the misuse of preferential tariff concessions. Under Section 28DA(1), importers must declare that imported goods qualify as originating goods, possess sufficient supporting information, furnish prescribed particulars and exercise reasonable care regarding the accuracy of origin claims.

    Section 28DA(2) makes it clear that the mere submission of a Certificate of Origin does not discharge the importer’s responsibility to exercise reasonable care. However, this provision cannot be interpreted in isolation.

    Section 28DA(3) contemplates requests for further information consistent with the relevant Trade Agreement. This qualification is important because different agreements prescribe different documentary and verification procedures.

    Section 28DA also establishes mechanisms for origin verification, suspension of preferential treatment, provisional clearance and denial of preferential benefits in specified circumstances. Subsection (11) addresses subsequent imports of identical goods following an earlier adverse origin determination. Importantly, the statutory framework does not confer unrestricted authority upon Customs to disregard agreement-specific origin procedures.

    V. CAROTAR, 2020: Procedural Compliance and the Limits of Delegated Legislation

    CAROTAR, 2020 was notified through Notification No. 81/2020-Customs (N.T.), dated 21 August 2020, and came into effect on 21 September 2020.

    The Rules provide a domestic administrative mechanism for implementing Section 28DA. Rule 3 governs preferential tariff claims at the Bill of Entry stage. Rule 4 addresses the information importers must possess, including origin-related information identified in Form-I.

    Rule 5 governs requests for further information. Rule 6 provides for verification through the prescribed authorities, while Rule 7 addresses identical goods and earlier adverse origin determinations.

    Rule 8 deals with additional administrative matters, including consequences of non-compliance.

    Rule 8(3): The Most Important Provision

    Rule 8(3) expressly provides that where CAROTAR conflicts with the Rules of Origin under the relevant Trade Agreement, the latter shall prevail. This creates a specific rule of precedence within the domestic regulatory framework.

    Its legal effect should be carefully understood. Rule 8(3) does not establish that every international treaty automatically overrides Indian legislation. Rather, it is a domestic legal provision expressly recognising the precedence of agreement-specific Rules of Origin over conflicting CAROTAR requirements.

    The distinction is constitutionally significant. The authority of the Trade Agreement’s Rules of Origin in this context flows through the statutory framework enacted and notified under Indian law. Accordingly, Customs officers cannot disregard Rule 8(3) while administering preferential tariff claims.

    VI. CBIC Circular No. 43/2026: Five Major Legal Clarifications

    1. Valid Origin Declaration Under India–UK CETA

    Paragraph 2.1.1 recognises an Origin Declaration completed by the UK exporter or producer in the prescribed manner as proof of origin.

    Therefore, a claim supported by a valid Origin Declaration must be processed without requiring Form-I. This clarification protects importers from an additional routine documentary requirement. However, the declaration must satisfy the applicable agreement’s conditions, and the goods must qualify under the relevant Rules of Origin.

    2. Form-I Cannot Be a Routine Precondition

    Paragraph 2.1.2 clarifies that Form-I is not required to be submitted with the Bill of Entry. Customs cannot treat its submission as a mandatory precondition for preferential tariff treatment. Nevertheless, the Circular does not abolish Form-I or eliminate lawful requests for origin-related information.

    3. Requests for Form-I Information Are Restricted

    Paragraph 2.1.3 identifies two cumulative conditions for seeking relevant Form-I information under the clarification concerning India–UK CETA.

    The Bill of Entry must have been interdicted by the National Risk Management System for origin-related checks, and the proper officer must have reason to believe that the applicable origin criteria have not been satisfied. The words used in the Circular limit routine administrative discretion. However, other verification powers lawfully available under the governing framework remain subject to their respective statutory conditions.

    4. Confidential Commercial Information Is Protected

    Paragraph 2.1.4 clarifies that India–UK CETA importers need not obtain confidential information from exporters or producers.

    Failure to furnish such information cannot, by itself, justify denial of preferential treatment. The importer must nevertheless provide information made available by the exporter or producer. Where the information remains insufficient, verification may be undertaken through the exporting Party’s Verification Authority in accordance with the Trade Agreement.

    5. Subsequent Imports Require Independent Consideration

    Paragraphs 2.2.1 to 2.2.3 address Section 28DA(11).

    The Circular rejects the assumption that goods are identical merely because they share an HSN classification, description, exporter, producer or technical characteristics.

    Before applying an earlier adverse determination, Customs must provide the importer an opportunity to furnish additional information. Where material origin-related facts differ, the current claim must be independently examined. This safeguard is particularly relevant to industrial imports involving changing suppliers, production arrangements, originating inputs and manufacturing processes.

    VII. Supreme Court Judgments from 2025: Their Relevance to Customs Exemptions and Administrative Powers

    The following decisions were delivered within the preceding two years. Their holdings are relevant to the broader legal principles involved, although neither directly adjudicates Circular No. 43/2026.

    A. M/s L.G. Electronics India Private Limited v. Commissioner of Customs

    Court: Supreme Court of India Decision: 10 September 2025 Proceedings: Civil Appeal Nos. 10349–10350 of 2024

    The Supreme Court allowed LG Electronics India Pvt. Ltd.’s customs appeals concerning the import classification of G Watch smartwatches.

    While it did not decide the classification dispute, the Court held that LG was eligible for the Korea-origin duty exemption based on the Certificate of Origin, set aside the CESTAT and original orders, and directed refund of the duty paid with applicable interest within two months.

    Legal commentary: The Supreme Court rightly distinguished tariff classification from entitlement to a preferential-origin exemption, holding that an incorrect claimed classification cannot defeat a substantive benefit otherwise established by a valid Certificate of Origin. While leaving the smartwatch classification issue open, the ruling reinforces that customs adjudication must prioritize proven statutory conditions over technical errors made in good faith.

    B. Noble Resources and Trading India Private Limited v. Union of India & Others

    Citation: 2025 INSC 684 Court: Supreme Court of India Decision: 14 May 2025 Proceedings: Civil Appeal No. 2572 of 2025

    The dispute concerned an exemption claimed on imported crude degummed soyabean oil under the applicable Duty Free Credit Entitlement framework.

    The Department relied upon a Customs circular to extend an exclusion concerning agricultural and dairy products to certain manufactured products derived from agricultural commodities. The Supreme Court rejected the enlarged interpretation and held that the departmental circular could not expand the exclusion beyond the governing notification.

    The Court allowed the importer’s appeal.

    Legal commentary: This decision reinforces the principle that executive circulars cannot alter the substantive scope of statutory exemptions. Although the case did not concern Section 28DA or FTA origin verification, its reasoning is relevant where departmental instructions purport to impose restrictions beyond the governing legal instrument. The decision also demonstrates the importance of distinguishing a statutory condition from an administrative interpretation.

    C. The Constitutional Connection

    The decisions in Maganbhai, L.G. Electronics and Noble Resources operate at different levels. Maganbhai addresses the constitutional relationship between international agreements and domestic legislation.

    L.G. Electronics concerns the examination of preferential Customs exemption entitlement. Noble Resources addresses the limits of departmental circulars in interpreting statutory exemptions.

    Taken together, these authorities support the proposition that Customs administration must operate within the authority conferred by Indian law. They do not establish an unrestricted supremacy of FTAs over Parliament’s legislation. Instead, they reinforce lawful implementation, proper statutory interpretation and limitations on executive action.

    VIII. Constitutional and Administrative Limitations on Customs Discretion

    The Circular raises several questions concerning the lawful exercise of Customs powers. Under Article 265, Customs duty must have legal authority. Consequently, tariff concessions and their withdrawal must be examined within the applicable statutory framework.

    Article 14 requires administrative action to satisfy constitutional standards against arbitrariness. Article 19(1)(g), subject to Article 19(6), protects the right of citizens to practise professions and carry on occupations, trade or business. This does not eliminate lawful import restrictions, but it may be relevant where administrative action unjustifiably interferes with protected commercial activity.

    Article 226 empowers High Courts to exercise judicial review over unlawful administrative action, subject to principles governing the availability of alternative statutory remedies.

    Therefore, Customs action concerning preferential tariff claims may raise constitutional issues where it exceeds statutory authority, disregards mandatory procedures or violates principles of natural justice. However, not every disagreement concerning an origin determination constitutes a constitutional violation.

    Ordinary disputes involving documentary sufficiency, factual origin criteria or assessment may appropriately fall within the Customs Act’s statutory appellate framework. The constitutional remedy becomes particularly relevant where the challenge concerns jurisdictional error, procedural illegality, violation of natural justice or the validity of subordinate legislation.

    IX. Inclusions, Exclusions, Limitations and Discretions: A Consolidated Legal Position

    CategoryLegal position
    Constitutional inclusionArticles 73 and 253 provide distinct foundations for treaty-making and legislative implementation.
    Legislative inclusionCustoms Act and Customs Tariff Act provisions provide mechanisms for domestic administration of trade commitments.
    Preferential origin inclusionValid agreement-prescribed origin documents support preferential claims.
    Procedural exclusionForm-I cannot be imposed routinely as a prerequisite under the India–UK CETA clarification.
    Confidentiality exclusionIndia–UK CETA importers need not obtain confidential exporter or producer information.
    Statutory limitationImporters must exercise reasonable care and satisfy substantive origin requirements.
    Treaty limitationInternational agreements do not automatically override inconsistent Indian primary legislation.
    Administrative limitationCAROTAR cannot override conflicting Rules of Origin under the applicable Trade Agreement, as recognised by Rule 8(3).
    Customs discretionOrigin-related information and verification may be sought within the prescribed conditions.
    Identical-goods safeguardEarlier adverse determinations cannot be applied mechanically without considering relevant origin facts and additional information.
    Judicial safeguardUnlawful administrative action may be challenged through statutory remedies or constitutional judicial review, as appropriate.

    X. A Constitutional Question for Future Litigation

    One of the most significant questions emerging from this framework is whether a delegated rule, administrative instruction or Customs assessment can impose requirements inconsistent with the Rules of Origin incorporated into India’s domestic legal framework.

    The answer requires identifying the precise legal source of each obligation. Where an agreement-specific rule has been implemented under the Customs Tariff Act, the officer must consider that rule alongside Section 28DA and CAROTAR. Where CAROTAR itself expressly gives precedence to the Trade Agreement’s Rules of Origin, administrative authorities must respect that prescribed hierarchy.

    Where a conflict arises between an international commitment and primary parliamentary legislation, the analysis is different. The international agreement does not automatically invalidate or override the statute. The constitutional distinction is fundamental.

    The enforceability of preferential trade benefits in India rests not merely upon diplomatic commitments but upon their lawful incorporation and administration under the Indian legal system.

    Consequently, future litigation may increasingly examine whether origin-verification demands are supported by statutory authority, whether they comply with the applicable Trade Agreement, and whether administrative discretion has been exercised for a legitimate legal purpose.

    XI. The Role of Aadrikaa Legal Services in Corporate Legal Support and Case Research

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS) assists large corporates, in-house legal departments, law firms and professional advisory organisations with specialised paralegal support and legal research relating to Customs, GST, Foreign Trade Policy, international trade compliance and regulatory disputes. Its support may include case-law research, statutory interpretation, preparation of legal research notes, compilation of judicial precedents, document examination, litigation chronologies, drafting assistance, regulatory compliance reviews and preparation of case briefs for counsel.

    By combining legal research with domain-specific knowledge of Customs and trade regulations, ALS aims to support corporate legal teams and law firms in managing complex regulatory matters, developing litigation strategies and preparing well-researched submissions before statutory and judicial forums.

    XII. Conclusion: The Constitution Sets the Boundary, Parliament Creates the Framework, and Customs Must Follow the Law

    CBIC Circular No. 43/2026-Customs is more than a procedural clarification concerning Form-I and Rules of Origin. It highlights the constitutional relationship between India’s international trade commitments and their domestic implementation.

    Articles 73 and 253 establish the foundations of treaty-making and legislative implementation. Articles 246 and 265 define the relevant legislative and taxation framework, while Article 14 imposes constitutional limitations upon administrative action.

    Section 28DA and CAROTAR provide the domestic machinery for administering preferential tariff claims. However, Rule 8(3) expressly recognises that conflicting CAROTAR provisions must yield to the applicable Trade Agreement’s Rules of Origin.

    The Supreme Court’s decisions in Maganbhai, L.G. Electronics and Noble Resources illuminate the constitutional and statutory principles that govern this relationship. The essential legal conclusion is that Customs authorities retain the power to verify originating status, prevent misuse of preferential concessions and protect public revenue.

    What they cannot do is transform procedural authority into an independent power to impose substantive conditions unsupported by the governing law.

    For importers, the Circular provides meaningful procedural protection. For Customs authorities, it reinforces the requirement of agreement-consistent administration. For legal practitioners, it offers a framework for examining origin disputes through statutory interpretation, delegated legislation and constitutional principles.

    Ultimately, India’s international trade commitments can deliver their intended commercial benefits only when their domestic implementation remains legally coherent, transparent and consistent with the constitutional rule of law.

    About the Author

    Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha is a New Delhi-based legal professional practising in matters involving Customs, indirect taxation, constitutional law, international trade and regulatory compliance, including matters before the Delhi High Court and statutory tribunals.

    With approximately two decades of experience in international trade, regulatory advisory and supply-chain compliance, his professional work encompasses Customs classification and valuation, Free Trade Agreements, Rules of Origin, DGFT and Foreign Trade Policy matters, BIS and Quality Control Orders, trade remedies, and Customs litigation.

    He holds an LL.M. in Constitutional Law and is associated with Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS), which provides legal advisory, litigation, research and regulatory support to corporate clients and professional organisations.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Supreme Court: Conscious Possession Must Be Established for Conviction Under Section 15 of NDPS Act

    Supreme Court: Conscious Possession Must Be Established for Conviction Under Section 15 of NDPS Act

    Date: 17.10.2026

    The Supreme Court of India dismissed the State of Punjab’s appeal against the acquittal of Hari Singh and other accused, holding that a failure to question them on the central allegation of conscious possession under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) materially weakened the prosecution’s case.

    Case at a glance

    In State of Punjab v. Hari Singh & Ors., the respondents had initially been convicted under Section 15 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act). The trial court sentenced each accused to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment and imposed a fine of Rs. 1,00,000.

    The prosecution alleged that police officers found the accused sitting on 16 gunny bags of poppy husk, each weighing 30 kilograms, near sugarcane fields on 9 July 1999. The accused were arrested after the bags were searched in the presence of a Deputy Superintendent of Police, following their request for the presence of a Gazetted Officer.

    The Punjab and Haryana High Court later acquitted the accused. The State challenged that acquittal before the Supreme Court.

    The central legal issue: conscious possession

    Section 15 of the NDPS Act penalizes unlawful possession of poppy straw. The Court emphasized that possession in this context is not limited to physical custody. For criminal liability, the prosecution must establish conscious possession: possession coupled with awareness and the required mental element.

    The judgment explains that β€œpossession” can take different forms depending on the circumstances. It may be:

    • Physical possession, where a person directly holds or carries an article; or
    • Constructive possession, where a person has the power and control to deal with the article even if it is not physically on them.

    The Court noted that the evidence in this case, including the allegation that the accused were sitting on the bags, was relevant to conscious possession. Under Sections 35 and 54 of the NDPS Act, statutory presumptions may arise once possession is established. A person claiming that possession was not conscious may need to explain circumstances particularly within their knowledge.

    However, proving or relying on possession was not enough by itself. The accused had to be given a fair opportunity to respond to that allegation.

    Why the Section 313 CrPC examination was decisive

    The Supreme Court found that the accused were not asked any question during their examination under Section 313 CrPC about possession or conscious possession of the contraband.

    Section 313 requires the court, after the prosecution evidence closes, to question the accused so they can personally explain circumstances appearing against them. This is a core safeguard in a criminal trial, not a procedural formality.

    The Court reaffirmed several principles:

    • Every material incriminating circumstance should be put to the accused. This allows a meaningful explanation or defence.
    • A circumstance not put to the accused ordinarily cannot be used against them.
    • The purpose is fairness. The provision gives effect to the natural-justice principle that a person must have an opportunity to answer the case against them.
    • Prejudice matters. An omission does not automatically invalidate every trial, but a conviction cannot safely rest on a vital fact that the accused were never asked to explain.

    Here, conscious possession was the essence of the accusation under the NDPS Act. Because that crucial issue was omitted from the Section 313 examination, the omission was held to have a vital effect on the prosecution case.

    The Court’s guidance on personal appearance under Section 313

    The judgment also discussed when an accused must personally appear to answer Section 313 questions. The general rule is that the accused should be personally examined, particularly in cases more serious than summons cases.

    Still, the Court endorsed a limited practical exception for genuine hardship. If an accused already exempted from personal appearance cannot attend because of substantial expense, physical incapacity, or another justified difficulty, the court may permit written answers through a questionnaire.

    This alternative requires safeguards, including:

    1. A written application supported by the accused’s own affidavit explaining the difficulty.
    2. An assurance that the accused will not suffer prejudice from the arrangement.
    3. An undertaking not to challenge the exemption later.
    4. Personally authenticated answers, signed by the accused on every page and returned within the deadline fixed by the court.

    The Court stressed that this is an exceptional arrangement. It cannot become a way for counsel to substitute their own answers for the accused’s statement.

    Outcome of the appeal

    The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s acquittal and dismissed the State of Punjab’s appeal. It concluded that, despite evidence bearing on conscious possession, the failure to put that essential allegation to the accused under Section 313 CrPC justified refusing to interfere with the acquittal.

    The Court did remove one part of the High Court’s order: directions to initiate action against certain officials were expunged because such directions should not have been issued while deciding the criminal appeal.

    Key takeaway

    This decision shows that even in serious NDPS prosecutions, procedural fairness remains indispensable: a conviction cannot rely on a decisive incriminating circumstance, such as conscious possession, unless the accused has been given a proper opportunity to explain it under Section 313 CrPC.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Delhi HC: ROC Approval Does Not Validate a Corporate Name That Violates Companies Act

    Delhi HC: ROC Approval Does Not Validate a Corporate Name That Violates Companies Act

    Date: 17.10.2026

    The Delhi High Court directed Mondelez India Private Limited to adopt a different corporate name after finding that its use of β€œMondelez” was deceptively similar to the pre-existing name of Mondelez Foods Private Limited.

    Background of the dispute

    Mondelez Foods Private Limited, incorporated on 28 May 2012, challenged the Registrar of Companies’ approval of a name change by Nonstop Logistics India Private Limited to β€œMondelez India Private Limited.” The new certificate of incorporation was issued on 11 September 2012.

    The petitioner argued that β€œMondelez” was a distinctive and coined term associated with the Mondelez group and its trademark rights. It stated that it was authorized to use the name and that the later adoption by the other company was intended to exploit the established reputation connected with the word.

    Documents submitted for the name-change request recorded that the company sought the new name because its directors considered it β€œlucky for business transactions.” The petitioner also noted that the company applied to register a β€œMondelez” logo for similar goods.

    Earlier action and rejection by the Regional Director

    Before approaching the High Court, Mondelez Foods Private Limited sent legal notices and filed a rectification representation under Section 22 of the Companies Act, 1956. The Regional Director rejected the representation on two principal grounds:

    • The petitioner was not itself the registered proprietor of the β€œMondelez” trademark.
    • More than 12 months had passed since the registration of the changed corporate name.

    Separately, Intercontinental Great Brands, LLC, formerly known as Kraft Foods Global Brands, LLC, and Mondelez Foods Private Limited obtained a decree in a civil suit on 24 July 2014. That decree restrained the company and related defendants from using β€œMondelez” as a trademark, trade name, corporate name, or part of a corporate name.

    Court’s findings

    Justice Vibhu Bakhru observed that the respondent company did not appear to contest the petition. As a result, the petitioner’s allegations about the respondent’s conduct and intent remained uncontroverted.

    The Court held that the adoption of β€œMondelez” was dishonest and mala fide. It emphasized that β€œMondelez” is a coined and distinctive word, as well as a prominent part of both companies’ names. The Court therefore found the names deceptively similar.

    Under Section 20 of the Companies Act, 1956, a company cannot be registered under an undesirable name. A name may be considered undesirable if it is identical with or too nearly resembles the name of an existing company or a registered trademark. The Court found that the respondent’s name fell within this prohibition and should not have been registered by the Registrar of Companies.

    Effect of the Companies Act, 2013

    The Court noted uncertainty in the wording of Section 22 of the 1956 Act, particularly concerning the 12-month period for a direction to change a company name. However, it considered the newer Companies Act, 2013, which empowers the Central Government to direct a company to change a name that is identical with or too nearly resembles a previously registered company name.

    Because β€œMondelez India Private Limited” too closely resembled β€œMondelez Foods Private Limited,” the Court concluded that the Regional Director had the authority to require a correction.

    Final order

    On 7 July 2017, the Delhi High Court directed the Regional Director to issue the necessary instructions requiring Mondelez India Private Limited to change its name. The replacement name must not be identical with or resemble the petitioner’s name or that of any other existing company.

    The company and its directors were also expressly directed to ensure compliance with the name-change requirement.

    Why the ruling matters

    The decision reinforces that company-name registration is not a mere administrative formality. A distinctive pre-existing corporate identity can be protected where a later name is confusingly similar, particularly when the record indicates dishonest adoption. It also illustrates the interaction between company-name law and trademark protection in preventing misleading corporate identities.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Rajasthan HC Grants Bail Where Samples Were Drawn from Just One of Five Bags

    Rajasthan HC Grants Bail Where Samples Were Drawn from Just One of Five Bags

    Date: 26.09.2026

    The Rajasthan High Court has granted bail to an accused in an NDPS case involving an alleged recovery of 79.400 kg of Doda Chura (poppy straw), after finding that samples for forensic examination were taken from only one out of five bags allegedly recovered from him.

    Justice Ganesh Ram Meena held that since no samples were drawn from the remaining four bags, only the material contained in the sampled bag could, at this stage, be treated as the alleged contraband. That bag weighed 19.80 kg, which was below the commercial quantity threshold. Consequently, the stringent restrictions governing bail under Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 were not attracted in the circumstances considered by the Court.

    Case Arose From Alleged Recovery of 79.400 Kg Doda Chura

    • Sitaram alias Udham Meena filed his second bail application under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS).
    • The proceedings arose from FIR No. 94/2025, registered at Police Station Harnavda Shahji, District Baran, Rajasthan, for offences under Sections 8, 15 and 25 of the NDPS Act.
    • The petitioner’s first bail application had earlier been dismissed as withdrawn by the High Court on 8 May 2026.
    • According to the FIR, the alleged contrabandβ€”Doda Churaβ€”was recovered from the petitioner’s possession in five separate bags, having a combined weight of 79.400 kg.

    Samples Drawn From Only Bag β€˜C’

    • The petitioner’s principal argument concerned the manner in which the samples were drawn.
    • According to the inventory report prepared before the Judicial Officer, two samples were taken only from the packet/bag marked β€˜C’. No samples were taken from the remaining four bags for examination by the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL).
    • The defence therefore argued that there was no forensic material to establish that the substances contained in bags A, B, D and E were also contraband.
    • It was submitted that only the contents of bag C could be treated as alleged contraband for the purpose of considering bail.
    • Crucially, bag C weighed only 19.80 kg. The petitioner argued that this was below commercial quantity and hence the restrictions contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act would not apply.

    State: All Five Bags Contained Similar Material

    • The Public Prosecutor opposed the second bail application.
    • The State argued that samples were taken from only one bag because the material found in the other bags appeared to be the same or similar.
    • It further contended that the total alleged recovery was above commercial quantity and therefore the restrictions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act continued to apply.
    • The High Court, however, did not accept that contention for the purpose of deciding the bail application.

    Court Examines Inventory and Judicial Officer’s Certificate

    • The High Court examined the record and found that the alleged recovery made on 31 May 2025 had been packed in five separate bags marked A, B, C, D and E.
    • The inventory report and certificate issued by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate No. 2, Chhabra, Baran on 6 June 2025 showed that only two samples, marked F and G, were drawn from bag C.
    • No sample was drawn from bags A, B, D or E.
    • This factual circumstance became decisive for the bail determination.

    Unsampled Bags Could Not Be Treated as Contraband at Bail Stage

    • The High Court held that in the absence of samples from the other four bags, the material contained in bag C alone could be treated as the alleged contraband for the purpose under consideration.

    The Court recorded:

    • β€œthe material which has been found to be in bag marked as-C can only be treated to be alleged contraband”
    • Since bag C weighed 19.80 kg, the quantity attributable to the sampled material was below commercial quantity.
    • The ruling is significant because the total physical recovery alleged by the prosecution was 79.400 kg. However, for the bail assessment, the Court did not aggregate the contents of the four bags from which no sample had been taken with the sampled bag merely because the substances appeared similar.

    Rajasthan HC Relies on Hariram v. State of Rajasthan

    • The petitioner relied upon the Rajasthan High Court’s recent order in Hariram v. State of Rajasthan, S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. 741/2026, decided on 20 April 2026.
    • In Hariram, six bags were allegedly recovered containing Doda Chura. However, samples had been drawn from only two bagsβ€”marked A and E.
    • The combined weight of those two sampled bags was 45.400 kg, below the commercial quantity of 50 kg applicable to poppy straw.
    • The Court in Hariram observed that because no samples had been taken or sent to the FSL from the remaining bags, those bags could not be treated as containing contraband merely on assumption, particularly when there was nothing on record showing that the entire recovered material had first been mixed and thereafter sampled.
    • The same reasoning was applied in Sitaram’s case.

    Supreme Court’s Puranmal Jat Decision Considered

    The Hariram order, reproduced in the present judgment, also relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in:

    • Puranmal Jat v. State of Rajasthan, Criminal Appeal No. 3394/2023 arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 10670/2023, decided on 2 November 2023.
    • In that case, the alleged recovery was approximately 35 kg and 150 grams of Doda Posh/poppy straw, while the commercial quantity was 50 kg.
    • The Supreme Court observed that because the recovered quantity was below commercial quantity, the restriction on grant of bail under Section 37 of the NDPS Act did not apply. The accused had also remained in custody for more than seven months and the charge sheet had already been filed.

    Section 37 NDPS Act Not Attracted to 19.80 Kg Sampled Bag

    • Applying the above reasoning, the Rajasthan High Court treated 19.80 kg in bag C as the relevant alleged contraband quantity for the bail consideration.
    • Because this was below commercial quantity, the defence contention was that the special restrictions under Section 37 were not attracted, and the Court’s reasoning proceeded on that basis.
    • This distinction was particularly important because Section 37 imposes stringent conditions for release on bail in cases involving commercial quantity.
    • The order, however, is a bail-stage determination and does not finally adjudicate the nature or quantity of the entire seized material.

    More Than One Year in Custody

    • The Court also took into consideration the period of incarceration.
    • Sitaram had remained in custody since 31 May 2025, meaning that by the date of the order on 25 September 2026, he had spent more than one year in custody.
    • Considering the sampling issue, the quantity of the sampled bag and the period of custody, the High Court found it just and proper to enlarge him on bail.
    • Importantly, the Court expressly stated that it was doing so without expressing any opinion on the merits or demerits of the case.

    Second Bail Application Allowed

    • The Rajasthan High Court accordingly allowed the second bail application.

    The Court directed Sitaram alias Udham Meena to be released upon furnishing:

    • a personal bond of β‚Ή1,00,000; and
    • two sureties of β‚Ή50,000 each,

    to the satisfaction of the Trial Court.

    He was also directed to remain present before the Trial Court, or any court to which the proceedings may be transferred, on subsequent hearing dates and whenever required.

    Bail Can Be Cancelled for Similar Future Offence

    • The High Court imposed an additional safeguard.
    • It directed that if the petitioner is found involved in any other criminal case of a similar nature in the future, the prosecution would be at liberty to move an application seeking cancellation of his bail. Sitaram Alias Udham Meena RHC
    • Thus, the order grants liberty to the accused pending trial but leaves the prosecution free to seek cancellation if the stipulated condition is breached.

    Cases Referred

    Two decisions were central to the reasoning recorded in the order:

    1. Hariram v. State of Rajasthan, S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. 741/2026, decided on 20 April 2026 β€” relied upon for the principle that where multiple bags are separately seized but only some are sampled, unsampled bags cannot automatically be treated as contraband in the absence of FSL examination or evidence that the entire material was mixed before sampling.
    2. Puranmal Jat v. State of Rajasthan, Criminal Appeal No. 3394/2023 arising from SLP (Crl.) No. 10670/2023, decided on 2 November 2023 β€” Supreme Court decision noting that where recovered poppy straw was below the stipulated commercial quantity, the Section 37 restriction did not apply.

    Key Takeaway

    The ruling underscores the importance of representative sampling and forensic examination in multi-bag NDPS recoveries, particularly when the prosecution seeks to rely upon the combined weight to invoke the stringent commercial-quantity bail restrictions under Section 37.

    Where five separate bags were allegedly recovered but the inventory showed that samples were taken from only one bag, the Rajasthan High Court treated only the 19.80 kg contained in that sampled bag as the alleged contraband for the purpose of deciding bail. Since that quantity was below commercial quantity and the accused had spent more than a year in custody, the Court granted bail.

    The ruling should nevertheless be read in its procedural context: the High Court did not acquit the accused or finally hold that the remaining four bags contained no contraband.

    Its determination was confined to the second bail application, and the Court expressly refrained from expressing any opinion on the merits of the prosecution case.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • CESTAT Mumbai Allows Customs Duty Exemption on Dowtherm Heat Transfer Fluid Under SHIS Scheme

    CESTAT Mumbai Allows Customs Duty Exemption on Dowtherm Heat Transfer Fluid Under SHIS Scheme

    Date: 26.09.2026

    The Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), Mumbai has held that Dowtherm RP Heat Transfer Fluid/Dowtherm A Heat Transfer Fluid, used for the initial charging and continuous operation of a Continuous Polycondensation (CP) Plant for manufacturing polyester products, falls within the definition of β€œcapital goods” and is consequently eligible for Customs duty exemption under Notification No. 104/2009-Customs dated 14 September 2009.

    Setting aside the Commissioner’s order, the Tribunal held that the thermic fluids fulfilled the statutory requirements of the Status Holders Incentive Scrip (SHIS) Scheme under the Foreign Trade Policy and that Customs was not justified in denying the exemption merely because the goods were chemicals falling under Chapter 29 or were described as inputs under SION.

    Background of the Dispute

    • Wellknown Polyesters Limited was engaged in manufacturing Polyester Filament Yarn (PFY), Polyester Oriented Yarn (POY), Fully Drawn Yarn (FDY), Draw Textured Yarn (DTY) and polyester chips at its Daman manufacturing facility.
    • For its manufacturing operations, the company had imported a Continuous Polycondensation Plant from Oerlikon Barmag under an EPCG authorisation during April–July 2012. The plant was imported without thermic fluid.
    • Subsequently, the company imported 3,01,296 kg of Dowtherm RP Heat Transfer Fluid/Dowtherm A Heat Transfer Fluid, valued at approximately β‚Ή9.86 crore, through Bills of Entry filed in October 2012. Customs duty involved was approximately β‚Ή2.55 crore.
    • Instead of paying the duty in cash, Wellknown Polyesters utilised eight SHIS scrips issued by the DGFT under the Status Holders Incentive Scrip Scheme and claimed exemption under Notification No. 104/2009-Customs. The goods were initially cleared by Customs extending the exemption.

    DRI Objects to SHIS Benefit

    • The Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), Ahmedabad Zonal Unit subsequently initiated an investigation on the ground that Notification No. 104/2009-Customs permitted duty-free import of capital goods, whereas Dowtherm heat-transfer fluid was, according to the Department, not capital goods.
    • DRI also relied upon the Standard Input Output Norms (SION), under which Dowtherm/Therminol and heat-transfer oil were identified as permitted inputs for manufacture of Polyester Partially Oriented Yarn and Polyester Filament Yarn. The Department therefore treated the material as an input rather than capital goods.
    • A Show Cause Notice dated 14 May 2013 consequently demanded approximately β‚Ή2.55 crore Customs duty with interest under Section 28(1) of the Customs Act, 1962, besides proposing confiscation under Section 111(o) and penalty under Section 112(a).
    • The Commissioner confirmed the duty demand and interest but refrained from confiscating the goods because they were no longer physically available and did not impose the proposed penalty. Wellknown Polyesters challenged that order before CESTAT.

    Appellant: Thermic Fluid Was Integral to Continuous Polycondensation Plant

    • The appellant argued that although the CP Plant and thermic fluid had been imported separately, both were required to operate together.
    • The thermic fluid was charged into the heaters, piping and vessels and thereafter continuously circulated in a closed loop between the heaters and reactors. The polyester polycondensation process required temperatures of approximately 270Β°C–300Β°C under high vacuum, making the thermic fluid critical for providing precise high-temperature heat while maintaining low system pressure.
    • The appellant relied upon the definition of β€œcapital goods” under the Foreign Trade Policy and Notification No. 104/2009-Customs, arguing that it was broad enough to cover goods required directly or indirectly for manufacture, including items necessary for the initial setting up and functioning of plant and machinery.
    • It also relied upon CBEC’s earlier clarification concerning transformer oil, under which oil required for filling/topping up a transformer was considered part of the equipment because the transformer could not function without it.

    Revenue: Chemical Falling Under Chapter 29 Cannot Be Capital Goods

    • The Department maintained that the imported thermic fluid was a chemical classifiable under Chapter 29 and therefore could not be regarded as plant, machinery, equipment or an accessory.
    • The Commissioner’s reasoning was that even though the chemical was indirectly used in manufacturing, its nature did not change into that of plant, machinery, equipment or accessories. The Department also relied upon the fact that SION treated Dowtherm as an input/raw material for polyester production.
    • CESTAT was therefore required to decide whether denial of the exemption under Notification No. 104/2009-Customs for the October 2012 imports was legally sustainable.

    CESTAT Examines SHIS Scheme and Definition of β€˜Capital Goods’

    • The Tribunal examined the Foreign Trade Policy 2009–2014 and observed that the objective of the SHIS Scheme was to promote investment in technology upgradation.
    • Paragraph 3.17.5 of the FTP permitted Duty Credit Scrips to be used for import of inputs or goods, including capital goods, subject to the stipulated conditions. More importantly, the FTP defined β€œcapital goods” broadly as plant, machinery, equipment or accessories required directly or indirectly for manufacture or production, including specified items such as refractories for initial lining and catalysts for initial charge.
    • Notification No. 104/2009-Customs, issued under Section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1962, similarly exempted capital goods and specified components/spares/parts imported against SHIS Duty Credit Scrips from Customs duties, subject to its conditions.
    • CESTAT found the definition of β€œcapital goods” under the Customs notification and the FTP to be substantially identical.

    Thermic Fluid Critical to Functioning of CP Plant

    • The Tribunal accepted the technical evidence concerning the role played by Dowtherm in the Continuous Polycondensation Plant.
    • It observed that the thermic fluid enabled the plant to provide precise high-temperature heat while maintaining low pressure, thereby permitting efficient continuous polycondensation and energy-efficient manufacture of high molecular weight polyester.
    • On that basis, CESTAT concluded that the imported goods fulfilled the statutory requirements of the SHIS Scheme.
    • A particularly important factual finding arose from the Chartered Engineer’s Certificate. Out of the total 3,01,296 kg of imported thermic fluid, 2,92,920 kgβ€”approximately 97.2%β€”was used as a one-time/initial charge in the CP Plant’s Electric Thermal Oil Heater Boiler.
    • The fluid thereafter enabled continuous high-temperature operation at very low pressure for the polycondensation process.
    • The technical diagrams reproduced on pages 13–15 of the order further illustrate the closed-loop recirculation of Dowtherm between the thermic-fluid heater and CP Plant, the stages of polyester manufacture where heat transfer is required, and the Electric Thermal Oil Heater Boiler arrangement.

    Capitalisation in Books Also Supported Appellant

    • CESTAT additionally noted that the imported thermic fluid had been capitalised in Wellknown Polyesters’ books of account, as certified by its Chartered Accountants on 29 May 2026.
    • The Tribunal regarded this financial treatment as further evidence supporting the appellant’s case that the imported goods were treated as capital goods.

    Accordingly, the Bench held:

    • β€œthe impugned goods are covered under the definition of β€˜capital goods’”
    • and were therefore eligible for exemption under Notification No. 104/2009-Customs.

    CESTAT Relies on Reliance Communications Infrastructure

    • The Tribunal found support in Reliance Communications Infrastructure v. Commissioner of Customs, 2009 (240) E.L.T. 461 (Tri.-Bang.).
    • In that case, a Gas Suppression System included HFC 227 EA gas. The Tribunal had held that Customs could not dissect an integrated system and treat the gas required for its functioning as a mere consumable when the EPCG licence covered the complete system.
    • CESTAT applied the same reasoning to the thermic fluid, observing that where a material is essential to the functioning of the plant, its character cannot be determined merely by isolating it from the system in which it operates.

    Transformer Oil Analogy Applied to Dowtherm

    • CESTAT also referred to CBEC Circular No. 344/60/97-CX dated 22 October 1997, concerning transformer oil.
    • The circular recognised that a transformer cannot function without transformer oil and that the equipment cannot be regarded as complete without the oil filled into it.
    • Applying the same analogy, CESTAT held that if the Continuous Polycondensation Plant cannot function without thermic fluid, the fluid has to be treated as part of the plant, notwithstanding the absence of a specific Customs clarification concerning thermic fluid.

    Cases Cited by Wellknown Polyesters

    The appellant relied upon several judicial authorities in support of its interpretation of capital goods:

    S. No.CaseCitation
    1Reliance Communications Infrastructure v. Commissioner of Customs2009 (240) E.L.T. 461 (Tri.-Bang.)
    2Commissioner of Central Excise, Coimbatore v. Jawahar Mills2001 (132) E.L.T. 3 (S.C.)
    3Bharti Airtel Limited v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune2025 (391) E.L.T. 3 (S.C.)
    4Chief Commissioner of Central Goods and Service Tax & Ors. v. Safari Retreats Private Limited & Ors.2024 SCC OnLine SC 2691
    5Scientific Engineering House (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Andhra Pradesh(1986) 1 SCC 11
    • These authorities are expressly recorded in the appellant’s submissions.
    • Of these, the final reasoning expressly discusses and applies Reliance Communications Infrastructure.

    Final Decision: Wellknown Polyesters Wins Appeal

    CESTAT concluded that the Commissioner’s order denying the benefit of Notification No. 104/2009-Customs dated 14 September 2009 by refusing to treat Dowtherm RP/Dowtherm A Heat Transfer Fluid as capital goods β€œdoes not stand the scrutiny of law.”

    The Tribunal consequently set aside the Order-in-Original dated 7 October 2016 and allowed Wellknown Polyesters’ appeal in its favour.

    The ruling is significant for the interpretation of capital goods under export-promotion schemes, particularly where a material may chemically resemble an input or consumable but is technically required as an initial charge and thereafter continuously circulates as an integral part of plant operation.

    It also demonstrates that classification of an item as a chemical under Chapter 29, or its description as an β€œinput” under SION for a different regulatory purpose, is not by itself determinative of whether it can qualify as capital goods under the specific language and objective of an exemption notification.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Delhi High Court: Trademark Refusal Must Be Based on Reasoned Analysis, Not Mere Similarity of Marks

    Delhi High Court: Trademark Refusal Must Be Based on Reasoned Analysis, Not Mere Similarity of Marks

    Date: 25.09.2026

    The Delhi High Court has set aside the refusal of Lucy Group Ltd.’s application for registration of the trademark β€œGEMINI” in Class 09, holding that the Registrar of Trademarks failed to consider crucial factual and legal submissions placed before it.

    Justice Jyoti Singh held that the Registrar’s order was β€œunreasoned, non-speaking and reflects non-application of mind”, observing that a quasi-judicial authority is legally required to consider all relevant contentions and issues raised by the parties before arriving at its decision.

    The High Court, however, did not decide whether GEMINI was ultimately entitled to registration. Instead, it remanded the trademark application to the Registrar for fresh consideration and directed a decision within 10 weeks after hearing Lucy Group.

    Background: Lucy Group’s β€˜GEMINI’ Trademark Application

    • Lucy Group Ltd. filed the appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, challenging the Registrar’s order dated 17 April 2025, which had refused registration of its trademark under Application No. 5247072 dated 14 December 2021 in Class 09.
    • According to the company, it first used the GEMINI mark in India at the Elecrama trade event in Bengaluru on 13 February 2016, where it promoted and displayed products to potential customers and business associates.
    • Lucy Group subsequently filed a convention trademark application in Great Britain on 16 June 2021 and, on 14 December 2021, applied to register GEMINI in India as a convention application.

    Trademark Registry Cites Four Earlier β€˜GEMINI’ Marks

    • On 4 January 2022, the Registry issued an Examination Report raising an objection under Section 11(1) of the Trade Marks Act.
    • Four earlier marks were cited on the ground that Lucy Group’s proposed GEMINI mark was identical or similar to marks already appearing on the Register in respect of identical or similar goods.
    • Following hearings and written submissions, the Registrar refused registration on 17 April 2025. Lucy Group thereafter filed Form TM-M on 15 May 2025 seeking detailed grounds for refusal, but according to the appeal, those grounds were never supplied.

    Lucy Group: Registrar Failed to Compare the Actual Goods

    • Lucy Group’s principal grievance was that the Registrar had merely noted the existence of four earlier registrations and concluded that there was a likelihood of confusion because of the allegedly similar goods.
    • The company argued that the Registrar had failed to undertake a meaningful comparative analysis of the nature and function of the goods, their trade channels and the relevant consumers.
    • It also challenged the Registrar’s finding that adoption of GEMINI was not bona fide, arguing that this was not a ground of refusal under Section 11(1).

    Lucy Group’s GEMINI Products Are Industrial SCADA and RTU Systems

    • A central aspect of Lucy Group’s case was the highly specialised nature of the products for which registration was sought.
    • The application covered industrial-grade products including SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems and GEMINI RTUs (Remote Terminal Units).
    • The RTUs were described as multipurpose units intended for advanced feeder automation and for controlling and monitoring pole- and ground-mounted medium-voltage switchgear.
    • Lucy Group relied on product catalogues, technical specifications and its corporate profile to show that it operated in the specialised field of power automation, grid monitoring and infrastructure control systems.
    • The company also claimed continuous and extensive use of GEMINI in India since February 2016 and argued that the specialised nature, application and trade channels of its goods distinguished them from the products covered by the cited registrations.

    Cited Mark 1: β€˜Wires and Cables’

    • The first cited GEMINI registration, No. 728627 in Class 09, covered β€œwires and cables.”
    • Lucy Group argued that wires and cables were basic electrical transmission components, whereas its SCADA systems, RTUs and industrial switchgear were advanced control systems integrated with software and supplied as part of specialised engineering projects.
    • It further claimed that the two marks had co-existed in the Indian market since 2016 without reported confusion and that GEMINI had acquired secondary distinctiveness among its customers.

    Cited Mark 2: Television Broadcasting and Entertainment Products

    • The second cited registration, No. 953168, was also for GEMINI in Class 09 and belonged to Sun TV Network Limited.
    • Lucy Group argued that the goods associated with this registration related to the television broadcasting and entertainment sector, whereas its own products concerned industrial power-distribution and control solutions.
    • According to Lucy Group, the nature, purpose and consumer base of the respective goods were entirely different. It also informed the Court that it had filed a rectification petition on the ground of non-use against the second cited mark on 30 July 2022, which remained pending.

    Third Mark Abandoned; Fourth Filed on β€˜Proposed to Be Used’ Basis

    • Lucy Group also raised specific objections regarding the remaining two cited marks.
    • It submitted that Registration No. 3164101 for GEMINI in Class 09 had been abandoned before the date of the impugned order.
    • As regards the fourth mark, Application No. 3939124, Lucy Group pointed out that it had been filed on a β€œproposed to be used” basis and that its filing was later than Lucy Group’s claimed first use of GEMINI.
    • The detailed comparison reproduced on pages 5–9 of the High Court order further contrasted Lucy Group’s specialised industrial products with the goods associated with each cited mark, including wires and cables, broadcasting/electronic goods, consumer electronics and portable spectroscopic instruments.

    Same Trademark Class Does Not Automatically Mean Goods Are Similar: Lucy Group’s Argument

    • Lucy Group argued that goods cannot be treated as similar merely because they fall within the same Nice Classification class.
    • According to the company, the correct enquiry was whether the respective goods were commercially and functionally similar, rather than whether there was a theoretical or broad overlap in their classification.
    • It also emphasised that Section 11 requires consideration of likelihood of confusion β€œon the part of the public”, yet the Registrar had not identified the relevant public or adequately examined the consumers involved.

    Registrar Defends Refusal Under Section 11

    • The Registrar defended the order, arguing that the GEMINI application was barred by earlier identical marks appearing on the Trade Marks Register.
    • It contended that Lucy Group’s mark was phonetically, visually and structurally identical to the cited marks and that the relevant goods were similar or identical, creating a likelihood of confusion under Section 11(1).
    • In particular, the Registrar argued that electrical goods such as wires, cables and switchgear may travel through the same trade channels and reach common classes of consumers such as electricians, contractors and engineers.
    • According to the Registrar, treating specialised industrial products as wholly different from cables created an artificial distinction because cables and switchgear could be closely connected in the modern electrical industry.

    Delhi High Court Finds Crucial Submissions Were Ignored

    • After examining the Examination Report, Lucy Group’s reply and its detailed written submissions, the High Court found a fundamental defect in the Registrar’s decision-making process.
    • Justice Jyoti Singh observed that none of the crucial submissions had been considered.
    • The registration had essentially been refused because the applied-for mark was considered phonetically and visually similar to the cited marks and the goods were treated as similar.
    • However, the Registrar had not examined the distinctions Lucy Group sought to establish regarding the nature and function of the competing goods.

    Registrar Failed to Consider Abandoned and Later-Filed Marks

    The Court specifically noted that the Registrar had also failed to consider Lucy Group’s submissions that:

    • the third cited mark had been abandoned; and
    • the fourth cited mark was filed on a β€œproposed to be used” basis much after Lucy Group’s claimed first use.

    The High Court observed that these crucial facts and legal issues were not even referred to in the impugned order.

    Significantly, the Court stated that had these matters been considered and adjudicated, the decision might have been different.

    Quasi-Judicial Authorities Must Deal With Relevant Contentions

    • The Court then reiterated an important principle governing administrative and quasi-judicial decision-making.
    • It held that even a quasi-judicial authority is under a legal obligation to consider all contentions and issues raised by the parties, insofar as they are relevant, before taking a decision.

    Viewed against that requirement, the Registrar’s order was held to be:

    • β€œclearly unreasoned, non-speaking and reflects non-application of mind.”
    • This became the decisive basis for judicial interference.

    High Court Does Not Decide Trademark Registration on Merits

    • Importantly, the Delhi High Court expressly stated that it was not entering into the merits of Lucy Group’s claim for registration.
    • The Court therefore did not finally rule that the cited GEMINI marks were dissimilar, that there was no likelihood of confusion, or that Lucy Group was necessarily entitled to registration.
    • Instead, it remanded the matter to the Registrar for a fresh decision.
    • This distinction is significant because Lucy Group secured a procedural appellate victory, while the substantive question of whether GEMINI should ultimately be registered remains for reconsideration by the Trademark Registry.

    Fresh Decision Within 10 Weeks

    The High Court directed the Registrar to freshly consider Application No. 5247072 after hearing Lucy Group and taking into account all the points raised in response to the Examination Report.

    The Registrar was specifically directed to consider documents already on record, including the:

    • priority documents;
    • user affidavit;
    • written submissions dated 6 August 2024;
    • written submissions dated 17 February 2025; and
    • written submissions dated 15 March 2025.

    The fresh decision must be taken within 10 weeks from 27 March 2026. The Court also directed that no new documents would be permitted before the Registrar during the reconsideration.

    The appeal was accordingly allowed and disposed of.

    Why the Judgment Matters for Trademark Examination

    • The ruling highlights an important procedural safeguard in trademark registration proceedings. The existence of an identical or similar earlier mark may trigger scrutiny under Section 11, but a refusal order must still demonstrate that the Registrar has considered the material factual and legal submissions placed by the applicant.
    • Where an applicant specifically distinguishes the competing goods by their function, market, consumer base and trade channelsβ€”or raises issues concerning abandonment, priority and claimed prior useβ€”those contentions cannot simply be ignored.
    • At the same time, the judgment should not be understood as establishing a general rule that goods within the same class are necessarily dissimilar merely because their applications differ. The High Court deliberately left the merits open for the Registrar’s fresh determination.

    Key Takeaway

    The Delhi High Court’s decision reinforces that trademark refusal orders must be reasoned, speaking orders reflecting consideration of relevant evidence and contentions.

    A mechanical conclusion based on similarity of marks and broadly stated similarity of goods, without addressing material objections raised by the applicant, may not withstand appellate scrutiny.

    For Lucy Group, the judgment reopens the path to registration of GEMINI in Class 09, but does not itself grant the trademark registration. The Registrar must now reconsider the application on its merits within the timeline fixed by the Court.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi