Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 03.11.2026
Punjab and Haryana High Court Rejects Repeated RERA Claims
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his mob no- +91 8800860662 and email idamitnaren@outlook.com.
The Punjab and Haryana High Court has dismissed a homebuyersβ appeal against Tata Housing Development Company Ltd., holding that repeated complaints arising from the same apartment dispute could not be pursued in successive proceedings.
Case at a glance
In Ashok Kumar Soni and others v. M/s Tata Housing Development Company Limited, decided on 2 September 2026, the High Court upheld the Haryana Real Estate Appellate Tribunalβs decision to reject the appellantsβ challenge. The case concerned an apartment in Tata Housingβs Premanti project in Sector 72, Gurugram.
The apartment had been allotted to the appellants for βΉ2,77,74,702, under an Apartment Buyerβs Agreement dated 16 August 2014. Possession was offered on 28 June 2017.
Homebuyersβ allegations
The buyers had raised several grievances concerning the apartment and the project. They alleged that the developer had overcharged them after learning that 10 apartments of the same size had reportedly been sold to Oriental Bank of Commerce for βΉ2.18 crore each. They initially sought a refund of βΉ66 lakh.
Their complaints also referred to delayed possession, deficiencies in promised facilities, alleged changes to the projectβs site plan, and a claimed change in the main entrance of Tower II. They sought compensation for financial loss, mental agony, and physical loss.
History of repeated proceedings
The dispute had already gone through several rounds before the Haryana RERA Authority, the Adjudicating Officer, and the Appellate Tribunal:
The first complaint resulted in possession and delayed-possession charges being granted.
An appeal against that order was withdrawn, while reserving the buyersβ right to seek compensation for alleged non-availability of facilities.
A later compensation complaint was dismissed by the Adjudicating Officer on 15 September 2021.
The buyersβ appeal from that decision was also withdrawn on 31 March 2023, without liberty to file another case.
A second compensation complaint was then filed, alleging material changes in the site plan and deficiencies in facilities. It was dismissed on 13 January 2025.
The Adjudicating Officer found that the buyers had not produced evidence supporting the alleged site-plan changes or road-access issues. Neither the purported original or revised site plan nor other proof of the asserted changes was placed on record.
Why the appeal failed
The High Court concluded that the buyers had been aware of their grievances when they initiated the earlier proceedings but had nonetheless pursued sequential complaints regarding the same apartment and substantially connected claims.
The Court held that such repeated litigation was barred by the principles of res judicata and Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. These principles prevent parties from re-litigating matters that have already been decided, or from splitting claims arising from the same cause of action across multiple cases.
The Court also examined Sections 88 and 89 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016. While RERA has overriding effect in case of conflict, Section 88 preserves the operation of other laws where they do not conflict with the Act. The Court therefore found that relevant procedural principles of the CPC could apply to RERA proceedings.
Courtβs key observation
The Court stressed that permitting multiple complaints based on known, connected grievances would be contrary to public policy. It found no factual or legal defect in the Appellate Tribunalβs order and dismissed the appeal as lacking merit.
Significance for RERA disputes
The ruling reinforces that homebuyers and developers should present all known claims relating to a transaction in the appropriate proceeding, supported by documentary evidence. A party cannot ordinarily revive or divide claims through successive complaints after earlier proceedings have been decided or withdrawn without permission to refile.
For site-plan or amenity-related claims in particular, the case highlights the importance of filing concrete evidence, such as sanctioned plans, revised plans, contractual representations, correspondence, photographs, and other records demonstrating the alleged deviation.
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Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 24.10.2026
Punjab & Haryana HC Denies Anticipatory Bail in LLP Partnership Dispute Involving Alleged Forgery
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email idamitnaren@outlook.com.
The Punjab and Haryana High Court has declined anticipatory bail to two partners of M/s GLK Homes LLP in a case involving allegations of forged retirement documents, unpaid settlement amounts, and an alleged attempt to remove a partner from the business.
Background of the dispute
The case arose from a dispute within M/s GLK Homes LLP, a firm incorporated in June 2020. The complainant, Devender Singh, alleged that he had joined the firm as a partner and contributed to its business and management. According to the complaint, disagreements later developed between the partners, after which the accused allegedly conspired to exclude him from the firm and deny him his share in its capital, profits, and goodwill.
The complainant alleged that the accused had offered to dissolve the business arrangement by paying him βΉ13.50 crore. While βΉ50 lakh was transferred through RTGS, he claimed that the remaining amount was not paid. Three cheques dated 1 April 2022 were allegedly issued for the balance, but the account from which they were drawn had been closed.
He further alleged that a retirement deed was fabricated to show that he had voluntarily retired from the LLP after receiving a full and final settlement. The allegedly forged document was submitted to the Registrar of Companies to create a record that he had left the firm.
Petitionersβ defence
The petitioners argued that the matter was essentially a delayed commercial dispute concerning land transactions and partnership arrangements. They maintained that βΉ50 lakh had been paid to the complainant because it represented his agreed capital contribution to the LLP, not a settlement of βΉ13.50 crore.
Their case was that the alleged larger payment arrangement was oral, undocumented, and implausible. They also contended that the complainant had resigned voluntarily in September 2020 and that his entitlement to payment depended on conditions relating to acquisition of land and regulatory approvals.
The petitioners relied on a video recording which they claimed showed voluntary execution of the relevant documents. They also stressed that they had cooperated with the investigation and that the disputed original documents were already in the investigating agencyβs possession.
Land transaction context
The dispute was connected with approximately 11.26 acres of land in Village Sihi, Faridabad. The petitioners described a sequence of earlier agreements involving landowners, M/s Bonanza Promoters Pvt. Ltd., M/s Crown Township Pvt. Ltd., and entities associated with the complainant.
According to their submissions, M/s GLK Homes LLP acquired the land in July 2020 through registered transactions worth more than βΉ47 crore. The petitioners claimed that they had arranged substantial funds for the transaction after the complainant and another associate were unable to finance the project.
They also referred to a separate dispute involving M/s Shail Developers Ltd., which had advanced βΉ2.50 crore. That amount was later returned by M/s GLK Homes LLP under a compromise arrangement.
Forensic findings weighed heavily with the Court
The State and the complainant opposed anticipatory bail, relying on findings of the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, Bhondsi. The forensic examination reportedly found the compromise deed, retirement deed, and board-meeting minutes to be forged.
Most significantly, the Court noted that the complainantβs signatures on the disputed retirement documents were found to have been lifted from another document. The Court also found that the petitionersβ video-recording claim did not displace the forensic material at the bail stage.
The Court observed that it appeared doubtful that the complainant would have resigned shortly after sale deeds were executed in the LLPβs favour in July 2020 merely in exchange for βΉ50 lakh, particularly given the scale of the underlying land transaction and the complainantβs asserted financial involvement.
Courtβs decision
Justice Shalini Singh Nagpal held that anticipatory bail is an extraordinary form of protection and cannot be claimed as a matter of right. While the Court acknowledged that custodial interrogation might not be necessary solely because the petitioners had previously joined the investigation, it held that this was not enough to justify pre-arrest bail.
The seriousness of the alleged forgery, the forensic findings, and the petitionersβ attributed role were treated as decisive factors. The Court concluded that no strong or exceptional circumstances had been shown to warrant anticipatory bail.
The petition was therefore dismissed.
Key legal takeaway
The decision illustrates that in allegations of business-partnership fraud, the existence of documentary evidence does not automatically favour anticipatory bail. Where forensic material indicates that signatures or corporate records may have been fabricated, courts may treat the allegations as serious enough to deny pre-arrest protection even if the dispute also has commercial and civil dimensions.
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Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 26.09.2026
Punjab & Haryana HC: Development Authority Is a βPromoterβ Under RERA and Liable for Delayed Possession
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email idamitnaren@outlook.com.
The Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that a Development Authority falls within the definition of βpromoterβ under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA) and cannot escape the statutory consequences of delayed possession merely because a commercial site was auctioned on an βas is where isβ basis or because the allotment terms contained a deemed-possession clause.
Dismissing two appeals filed by the Bathinda Development Authority, Justice Harkesh Manuja upheld the order of the Real Estate Appellate Tribunal, Punjab granting interest under Section 18 of the RERA Act to allottee Leela Gupta for delayed possession of two SCO sites.
Background: SCO Sites Purchased Through Auction and Transfer
The dispute concerned two SCO sites situated at Civil Lines, Power House Road, Bathinda.
Leela Gupta purchased SCO Site No. 1 through an open auction conducted by the Bathinda Development Authority on 5 August 2015. An allotment letter was issued on 1 December 2015 after payment of 20% of the principal amount along with 2% cancer cess.
Under the allotment letter, possession was required to be delivered within 90 days.
SCO Site No. 2 was not originally allotted to Gupta. She subsequently acquired it by transfer from the original allottees on 4 August 2017. Her grievance was that despite payment according to schedule, possession of the sites was not handed over in time because the necessary development work had not been completed.
Earlier Proceedings Before PUDA and RERA
Gupta initially sought relief from the Estate Officer, Bathinda, contending that interest should not be charged for the period during which the sites were not ready for possession.
After her representation was rejected, she approached the High Court through CWP No. 24881 of 2018. The High Court permitted her to submit an appeal-cum-representation to the Chief Administrator, PUDA for a speaking decision.
The Chief Administrator subsequently rejected her claim for waiver of interest on instalments but extended the moratorium period for construction, noting that development works in the commercial pocket had been completed on 16 June 2017.
Gupta thereafter approached the Real Estate Regulatory Authority, Punjab seeking three reliefs: refund of interest charged on instalments, extension of the non-construction period, and interest under Section 18 of RERA.
The Authority dismissed her complaints. On appeal, however, she restricted her claim only to interest for delayed possession under Section 18.
RERA Appellate Tribunal Awards Interest for Delayed Possession
The Real Estate Appellate Tribunal, Punjab allowed Gupta’s appeals on 12 May 2022.
For SCO Site No. 1, it awarded interest for delayed possession from 1 March 2016 to 19 October 2017.
For SCO Site No. 2, it awarded interest from 4 August 2017 to 19 October 2017 on the amount deposited up to that date, applying Rule 16 of the Punjab State Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Rules, 2017.
Bathinda Development Authority challenged those orders before the Punjab and Haryana High Court.
Development Authority Questions Maintainability of RERA Proceedings
The Authority argued that the dispute arose from allotments governed by the Punjab Regional and Town Planning and Development Act, 1995 (PRTPD Act).
According to it, after the Chief Administrator passed the order dated 27 May 2019 in exercise of appellate powers under Section 45 of the PRTPD Act, Gupta’s appropriate remedy was to file a revision before the State Government under Section 45(8) rather than initiating proceedings under RERA.
The High Court rejected this contention.
It noted that Gupta had relinquished her other claims and restricted the dispute before the RERA authorities to the statutory remedy of interest under Section 18 of RERA. Her claim was therefore independently founded on the RERA Act.
The Court also noted that the maintainability objection had not been raised by the Development Authority before either the RERA Authority or the Appellate Tribunal and was being advanced for the first time at a belated stage.
Section 18 RERA Creates Statutory Right to Interest for Delay
The High Court examined Section 18 of the RERA Act, which provides remedies where a promoter fails to complete or give possession of an apartment, plot or building according to the agreed terms.
Where the allottee does not wish to withdraw from the project, the proviso to Section 18(1) requires the promoter to pay interest for every month of delay until possession is handed over, at the prescribed rate.
The issue therefore turned on whether Bathinda Development Authority was a βpromoterβ and whether there had actually been delay in making the sites ready for possession.
Development Authority Expressly Covered by Definition of βPromoterβ
The High Court referred to Section 2(zk)(iii) of the RERA Act, which expressly includes a development authority or other public body within the definition of βpromoterβ in relation to specified buildings, apartments and plots.
The Court therefore held that there was βno doubtβ that Bathinda Development Authority was covered within the statutory definition of promoter.
This finding is important because it confirms that a public development authority cannot seek exemption from RERA’s promoter obligations merely because it is a statutory or State authority rather than a private developer.
βAs Is Where Isβ Clause Does Not Excuse Delayed Development
Bathinda Development Authority relied heavily on two provisions in the allotment letter.
First, the plot had been offered on an βas is where isβ basis. Second, the allotment letter stated that possession would be given within 90 days and, if the allottee did not take possession within that period, possession would be deemed to have been handed over on the due date.
The High Court was not persuaded.
It reasoned that if the βas is where isβ clause completely absolved the Authority from carrying out development, there would have been no reason for the Authority itself to spend resources and time undertaking development work.
The record showed that development of the site was, in fact, the Authority’s responsibility.
The Court importantly observed that:
βMere physical possession without any basic amenities would serve no purposeβ
because construction and commercial activity could not practically be carried out without the necessary basic infrastructure.
Electricity Is a Basic Amenity; Site Was Ready Only on 19 October 2017
The date on which the sites could genuinely be treated as ready for possession became a central issue.
An RTI response showed that:
civil and public health works were completed on 16 June 2017;
electrical works were completed on 28 April 2017;
transformers were installed on 1 March 2017; and
electricity supply became available only on 19 October 2017.
The Chief Administrator had treated 16 June 2017 as the completion date, apparently without treating actual electricity supply as essential.
The High Court disagreed.
It held that electricity was a basic amenity necessary for construction activity, particularly because machinery used at a construction site requires power. It therefore affirmed the Appellate Tribunal’s conclusion that the sites were actually ready for possession only on 19 October 2017.
Extension of Construction Moratorium Was an Indirect Admission of Delay
The Court also identified what it considered an inconsistency in the Authority’s stand.
The Chief Administrator had extended the three-year moratorium period for construction on the ground that the commercial pocket became ready only after development work was completed.
According to the High Court, if there had genuinely been no delay on the Authority’s part, there would have been no need to extend the construction moratorium.
The extension was therefore treated as an indirect admission through the Authority’s own conduct that delay had occurred.
Allottee Cannot Face Penalty for Delay While Promoter Faces No Consequence
The High Court also addressed the imbalance that would arise if the Authority’s interpretation were accepted.
It observed that an allottee could be required to pay penalty charges for failing to complete construction within the stipulated period. It would therefore be anomalous if there were no corresponding consequences for the promoter’s delay in providing possession, especially when Section 18 of RERA expressly provides a statutory remedy for such delay.
Supreme Court’s Arifur Rahman Khan v. DLF Southern Homes Applied
The High Court relied on the Supreme Court’s judgment in:
Wg. Cdr. Arifur Rahman Khan and Aleya Sultana v. DLF Southern Homes Pvt. Ltd., (2020) 16 SCC 512.
The Court referred to the Supreme Court’s recognition that agreements between developers and purchasers often do not operate on an equal footing: stringent obligations imposed on purchasers are frequently not mirrored by equivalent obligations on developers to meet timelines.
Bathinda Development Authority argued that Gupta had participated in the auction with her βeyes wide open.β
The High Court rejected this reasoning, observing that participation in an open auction could not mean that the allottee should have anticipated that the Authority itself would delay development work.
The fact that the site had been allotted through an auction did not confer any right upon the Authority to delay development. Once delay occurred, the statutory consequences under RERA had to follow.
State Development Authority Cannot Claim Preferential Treatment Over Private Promoter
The High Court made another significant observation concerning public development authorities.
It held that no concession could be claimed by a State Development Authority merely because it was a public body rather than a private promoter.
Indeed, the Court observed that the obligation upon the State was greater because it was itself a law-enforcement agency, particularly where it had maximised revenue by disposing of property through an open auction.
The ruling therefore places public development authorities squarely within the accountability framework established by RERA where the statutory definition of promoter is attracted.
Earlier PUDA Order Did Not Bar Section 18 Claim
The Authority further argued that the Chief Administrator’s order dated 27 May 2019 had never been challenged and continued to remain in force.
The High Court rejected this objection because the earlier proceeding concerned a different relief.
The Chief Administrator had rejected Gupta’s request that interest should not be charged on her instalments during the development period.
The RERA proceedings, by contrast, concerned her affirmative statutory entitlement to receive interest from the promoter for delayed possession under Section 18.
The two issues were therefore legally distinct.
Other Allottees Taking Possession Earlier Does Not Defeat Statutory Right
The Authority also claimed that similarly situated allottees had taken possession earlier.
The High Court noted that no material had been placed on record to substantiate this assertion. More importantly, even assuming it to be factually correct, the conduct of other allottees could not extinguish Gupta’s rights arising from the statutory provisions.
Final Decision: Bathinda Development Authority’s Appeals Dismissed
The Punjab and Haryana High Court found no reason to interfere with the Real Estate Appellate Tribunal’s order.
Both RERA Appeal No. 6 of 2023 and RERA Appeal No. 12 of 2023 filed by Bathinda Development Authority were dismissed.
Consequently, Leela Gupta succeeded, and the Appellate Tribunal’s award of delayed-possession interest remained intact:
SCO Site
Period for Which Interest Was Awarded
SCO Site No. 1
1 March 2016 to 19 October 2017
SCO Site No. 2
4 August 2017 to 19 October 2017
The interest was to operate on the deposited amount in accordance with the applicable RERA framework and Rule 16 of the Punjab State Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Rules, 2017.
Key Takeaway
The judgment establishes three important RERA principles. A Development Authority is expressly covered within the definition of βpromoterβ under Section 2(zk); an βas is where isβ or deemed-possession clause cannot automatically defeat the statutory entitlement under Section 18 where the site was not practically ready for possession; and essential infrastructure such as actual electricity supply may be relevant in determining when a commercial site became genuinely ready for possession.
Most importantly, the High Court made clear that State development authorities cannot claim a more favourable standard than private promoters when RERA obligations apply.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 22.09.2026
Punjab & Haryana HC: Serious Real Estate Fraud Allegations Cannot Be Treated as Mere Civil Dispute Under RERA
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email idamitnaren@outlook.com.
The Punjab and Haryana High Court has refused regular bail to an accused in an alleged real estate fraud concerning the commercial project βRoselyn Squareβ, holding that the allegations went beyond a simple dispute over delayed possession or non-payment of assured returns and prima facie involved fabrication and alteration of documents, cheating, criminal breach of trust and conspiracy.
Justice Virinder Aggarwal dismissed the regular bail petition filed by Bhupinder Singla, while expressly clarifying that the Court was not expressing any final opinion on the merits of the criminal case.
Regular Bail Sought in Roselyn Square Fraud Case
Bhupinder Singla approached the High Court under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, corresponding to Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking regular bail during trial.
The proceedings arose from FIR No. 228 dated 4 May 2026, registered at Police Station Zirakpur, District S.A.S. Nagar (Mohali), Punjab, for offences under Sections 61(2), 316(2), 318(4), 336(2), 338 and 336(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The judgment identifies their corresponding IPC provisions as Sections 120-B, 406, 420, 465, 467 and 468.
The FIR followed a complaint by Ashok Kumar Loomba against several persons associated with the Roselyn Square project, including Bhupinder Singla. The allegations concerned conspiracy, cheating, criminal breach of trust and related financial fraud in connection with investments in the commercial real estate project.
Investors Allegedly Induced by 15% Assured Returns
According to the prosecution case recorded in the judgment, the complainant and co-investor Anil Kumar Syal were allegedly induced to invest substantial sums in Roselyn Square on the basis of various representations.
They were allegedly promised assured returns at 15% per annum, payable quarterly in advance until possession, followed by lease rental of βΉ100 per square foot of super area after possession.
The units were also allegedly promised to be delivered in a fully furnished condition by 1 January 2024.
The judgment records alleged investments of βΉ1.19 crore for Unit No. 121 and βΉ2.125 crore each for Unit Nos. 123 and 124, besides βΉ8,38,870 towards GST, taking the alleged aggregate investment to approximately βΉ5.44 crore.
Allegation of βΉ1.43 Crore Outstanding Assured Returns
The complainants alleged that despite receipt of the basic sale consideration, the accused neither executed the requisite Buyer’s Agreement nor delivered possession.
According to the complaint, assured returns were initially paid but subsequently discontinued. As of June 2025, the alleged outstanding assured returns were stated to be βΉ31,23,750 for Unit No. 121, βΉ56,63,806 for Unit No. 123 and βΉ55,78,125 for Unit No. 124, aggregating to approximately βΉ1.43 crore.
The prosecution further alleged that although the actual sale consideration was substantially higher, agreements reflected a nominal consideration of βΉ55 lakh per unit and that the remaining amount was allegedly dealt with through off-record transactions.
These remained prosecution allegations at the bail stage and were not finally adjudicated by the High Court.
Partial Completion Certificate Allegedly Projected as Final
The complaint also alleged that the project remained incomplete and that a Partial Completion Certificate dated 21 July 2023 had been projected as though it were a final Completion Certificate.
There were further allegations regarding alienation of common areas and attempts to commercially exploit or sell parking spaces contrary to applicable statutory provisions and regulatory norms.
A preliminary inquiry was conducted following the complaint, after which the FIR was registered.
Petitioner: Dispute Is Civil and Commercial in Nature
Senior Counsel appearing for Bhupinder Singla argued that the dispute arose essentially from a real estate transaction and was civil and commercial in nature, but had been given an unwarranted criminal colour.
The defence contended that Agreements to Sell had been duly executed and that the complainant himself had failed to pay the complete agreed consideration, with substantial amounts allegedly still outstanding.
It was also submitted that Roselyn Square was duly registered under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA) and possessed statutory approvals, including an Occupancy Certificate dated 21 July 2023.
The petitioner further claimed that his wife was the promoter/proprietor of the project and that he was merely a Director of M/s Robus Landcorp Pvt. Ltd., without a direct role in the project’s day-to-day management.
Defence Disputed βΉ5.44 Crore Investment Claim
The petitioner also disputed the prosecution’s financial allegations.
His counsel argued that the claim of an investment of βΉ5.44 crore was unsupported by documentary evidence and asserted that only approximately βΉ1.53 crore had been received through banking channels, while more than βΉ55 lakh allegedly remained recoverable from the complainant.
It was further argued that the petitioner had cooperated with the investigation even before registration of the FIR and supplied relevant documents.
According to the defence, no further recovery was required, the investigation had substantially progressed and continued incarceration would serve no meaningful investigative purpose. Counsel invoked the general principle that βbail is the rule and jail is the exception.β
State: Allegations Reveal Planned Economic Fraud
The State and the complainant strongly opposed bail.
They contended that the allegations disclosed a well-planned conspiracy to defraud investors of substantial amounts. The Court was informed that Bhupinder Singla had been arrested on 6 May 2026, while co-accused Rosy Singla remained absconding and was allegedly concealing incriminating documents and proceeds of the alleged offence.
The prosecution also maintained that the complainant and co-investors had been cheated of approximately βΉ5.44 crore, besides an alleged outstanding liability of βΉ2,11,65,681 towards assured returns.
It claimed to possess documentary evidence relating to payments through banking channels as well as alleged cash transactions.
The prosecution further disputed the petitioner’s reliance upon the project’s completion-related documents.
It contended that information obtained under the Right to Information Act contradicted the petitioner’s characterization of the relevant Occupancy Certificate and that the No Objection Certificate relied upon by the petitioner had already expired.
Of particular significance, the High Court noted the prosecution’s case that a substantial portion of the sale consideration had allegedly been received in cash.
Although the petitioner denied receiving cash payments, the investigating agency claimed to have collected electronic chat communications allegedly acknowledging and corroborating receipt of those amounts. The High Court carefully clarified that the evidentiary value of this material would be examined during trial.
Not a Simple RERA Dispute: High Court
The High Court rejected, at the bail stage, the attempt to characterize the allegations merely as a civil dispute relating to real estate.
Justice Virinder Aggarwal observed that this was βnot a simpliciter case of delayed delivery of possession or non-payment of assured returns by a developerβ for which the complainant could simply have invoked the statutory remedy under Section 31 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016.
Instead, the allegations prima facie disclosed serious offences involving fabrication and alteration of documents, cheating, criminal breach of trust and conspiracy.
The ruling is therefore significant in distinguishing between an ordinary builder-buyer dispute capable of being pursued under RERA and allegations containing an additional criminal element such as fraud, forgery or conspiracy.
Absconding Co-Accused Weighed Against Bail
Another major factor was the status of co-accused Rosy Singla.
The Court recorded that she had not been apprehended despite repeated efforts by the investigating agency and, according to the prosecution, was absconding while allegedly concealing incriminating documents and proceeds of the offence.
In these circumstances, the High Court held that if Bhupinder Singla were released at that stage, the possibility of his absconding or otherwise frustrating the course of investigation could not be ruled out.
Punjab & Haryana High Court Refuses Regular Bail
Taking into account the gravity and nature of the allegations, stage of investigation, role attributed to the petitioner, abscondence of the co-accused and material collected by the investigating agency, the High Court concluded that no case had been made out for grant of regular bail.
The petition was accordingly dismissed.
Crucially, the Court expressly stated that it was not expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, so that neither side would be prejudiced during trial. Thus, the order represents a refusal of bail and not a final determination of the petitioner’s guilt.
Key Legal Takeaway
The decision demonstrates that the availability of a remedy under RERA does not, by itself, convert every dispute connected with a real estate project into an exclusively civil or regulatory matter.
Where the allegations prima facie extend beyond delayed possession or assured returns and include matters such as forged or altered documents, fraudulent inducement, alleged cash transactions, cheating, criminal breach of trust and conspiracy, criminal proceedings may stand on a different footing from the remedies available under Section 31 of RERA.
At the same time, because the present proceeding concerned regular bail, the High Court did not finally determine whether those allegations were true. Their evidentiary worth and the petitioner’s criminal liability remain matters for investigation and trial.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 21.09.2026
Punjab & Haryana High Court Refuses to Interfere with RERA Tribunalβs Interim Possession Order
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email idamitnaren@outlook.com.
The Punjab and Haryana High Court has dismissed an appeal filed by homebuyers challenging an interim order of the Haryana Real Estate Appellate Tribunal concerning possession of an apartment in the Ireo Victory Valley project, Sector 67, Gurugram.
Justice Jagmohan Bansal held that the Appellate Tribunal had not stayed the handing over of possession. Rather, it had expressly directed the promoter to hand over possession to the allottees, subject to adjudication of Delayed Possession Charges (DPC) and any outstanding amount.
Finding no factual or legal infirmity in the Tribunal’s interim order and no substantial question of law warranting interference under Section 58 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA), the High Court dismissed the appeal.
The decision was delivered on September 17, 2026, in Anish Mukker & Anr. v. M/s Ireo Victory Valley Pvt. Ltd., RERA-APPL-207-2026.
Apartment Purchased for βΉ4.20 Crore in Ireo Victory Valley
The respondent, M/s Ireo Victory Valley Pvt. Ltd., is the promoter of the real estate project known as Ireo Victory Valley, situated in Sector 67, Gurugram.
An apartment in the project was allotted to the appellants for a total consideration of βΉ4,20,39,519.
According to the High Court’s order, the appellants had already paid βΉ4,12,82,599 towards the apartment.
The homebuyers subsequently approached the RERA Authority alleging delay in completion of the project and arbitrary demand of charges by the promoter.
RERA Authority Awards 10.85% Interest for Delayed Possession
The RERA Authority decided the complaint in favour of the allottees on April 18, 2024.
It directed the promoter to:
pay interest at 10.85% per annum for the period of delay;
hand over possession of the apartment to the appellants; and
execute the conveyance deed in favour of the allottees.
The promoter thereafter challenged the Authority’s order before the Haryana Real Estate Appellate Tribunal, Chandigarh.
Promoter Makes βΉ3.49 Crore Pre-Deposit Under Section 43(5) RERA
While filing the appeal, the promoter complied with the statutory pre-deposit requirement under Section 43(5) of the RERA Act.
The Tribunal’s order recorded that the requisite pre-deposit of βΉ3,49,49,735 had been made by the promoter, which was also confirmed by the Registry.
Section 43(5) assumes considerable significance in promoter appeals under RERA because the statutory proviso imposes a pre-deposit requirement before an appeal filed by a promoter can be entertained.
In the present case, however, there was no dispute before the High Court that the respondent had complied with that requirement.
RERA Tribunal Directs Promoter to Hand Over Possession
The matter before the Appellate Tribunal had originally been listed for July 22, 2026. On the promoter’s application, it was preponed to May 8, 2026.
Before the Tribunal, counsel for the promoter submitted that the company was prepared to hand over possession to the allottee, subject to the final outcome of the questions concerning computation of Delayed Possession Charges and outstanding dues.
The urgency arose because the Gurugram RERA Authority had passed an order dated April 22, 2026, directing a Bailiff to visit the site on May 8, 2026 at 2:00 PM and deliver possession.
The Appellate Tribunal consequently ordered:
βWe hereby direct that the possession may be handed over to the allottee subject to the adjudication of DPC and outstanding amount, if any.β
The matter was thereafter directed to be listed on May 19, 2026.
Homebuyers Challenge Interim Order Before Punjab & Haryana HC
The allottees approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court by filing an appeal under Section 58 of the RERA Act.
They sought setting aside of the Tribunal’s interim order dated May 8, 2026.
Their principal grievance before the High Court was that, because of the manner in which the interim order had been framed, they believed that they could not take possession of the apartment.
The High Court, however, did not accept this interpretation of the Tribunal’s order.
Tribunal Did Not Stay Possession: Punjab & Haryana High Court
Justice Jagmohan Bansal closely examined the operative portion of the Tribunal’s order and found that it actually directed the respondent promoter to hand over possession to the allottee.
The only qualification was that possession would remain subject to adjudication of the DPC and any outstanding amount.
The High Court categorically observed:
βThe Appellate Tribunal has not stayed possession of the flat.β
The promoter’s appeal before the Appellate Tribunal remained pending and, notably, was itself listed for hearing on September 17, 2026, the same date on which the High Court decided the appeal.
Dispute Over Outstanding Dues Can Be Raised Before RERA Appellate Tribunal
The High Court further clarified the remedy available to the homebuyers.
If the appellants believed that the effect of the interim order was that they could not obtain possession without first paying the outstanding dues claimed by the promoter, they were free to move an appropriate application before the Appellate Tribunal.
They could also raise all other issues concerning the dispute before the Tribunal, where the promoter’s substantive appeal remained pending.
Thus, the High Court did not adjudicate the correctness of the promoter’s alleged outstanding demands or finally determine the amount of DPC payable to the allottees.
Those issues remain subject to adjudication before the RERA Appellate Tribunal.
No Factual or Legal Infirmity in Tribunalβs Interim Order
The High Court found no basis for exercising its appellate jurisdiction against the interim order.
Justice Bansal held:
βThere seems no factual or legal infirmity in the impugned order warranting interference of this Court.β
More importantly for appeals under Section 58 RERA, the Court found that:
βNo question of law much less substantial question of law arises for the consideration of this Court.β
This became the decisive ground for declining interference.
Section 58 RERA Appeals and the βSubstantial Question of Lawβ Requirement
The ruling is relevant to the scope of appeals from the Real Estate Appellate Tribunal to the High Court.
The present appeal had been specifically instituted under Section 58 of the RERA Act.
In dismissing the appeal, the High Court emphasised the absence of any question of law, much less a substantial question of law.
The order therefore illustrates the limited scope for High Court intervention where the challenge is directed merely against the manner in which an interim direction of the RERA Appellate Tribunal is understood or implemented and no qualifying legal question is demonstrated.
High Court Dismisses Homebuyersβ Appeal
The Punjab and Haryana High Court ultimately concluded that the appeal deserved dismissal.
Accordingly, Anish Mukker & Anr. v. M/s Ireo Victory Valley Pvt. Ltd. was dismissed.
The result does not mean that the promoter succeeded on the merits of its underlying RERA appeal.
The promoter’s appeal concerning DPC and outstanding dues remained pending before the Haryana Real Estate Appellate Tribunal. Similarly, the High Court did not disturb the Tribunal’s direction permitting possession to be handed over to the allottees.
This distinction is important: the judgment is essentially concerned with whether the High Court should interfere with the interim order dated May 8, 2026, rather than the final merits of the delayed-possession dispute.
Why the Judgment Is Significant
The decision is relevant for homebuyers, developers and RERA practitioners because it highlights three separate procedural aspects of real estate litigation.
First, the order demonstrates that a direction to hand over possession subject to adjudication of DPC and outstanding dues is not equivalent to staying possession. The language of an interim RERA order must therefore be read according to its actual terms.
Second, if an allottee believes that an interim order is being interpreted by the promoter as requiring payment of disputed outstanding dues before possession, the appropriate course may be to seek clarification or appropriate relief from the RERA Appellate Tribunal itself, particularly where the substantive appeal remains pending.
Third, the High Court’s observation concerning the absence of a substantial question of law reinforces the significance of the threshold governing Section 58 RERA appeals.
Important Distinction: No Final Decision on DPC or Outstanding Dues
The ruling should not be reported as a final victory for either side on the underlying monetary dispute.
The RERA Authority had earlier awarded interest at 10.85% per annum for delayed possession and directed possession and execution of the conveyance deed. The promoter challenged that decision before the Appellate Tribunal after making the required pre-deposit.
The Appellate Tribunal had yet to finally adjudicate the issues concerning Delayed Possession Charges and alleged outstanding dues.
The Punjab and Haryana High Court merely declined to interfere with the Tribunal’s interim possession order.
Key Takeaway
The Punjab and Haryana High Court has clarified that an interim RERA Appellate Tribunal order directing a promoter to hand over possession subject to final adjudication of delayed-possession charges and outstanding dues does not amount to a stay on possession.
Where homebuyers apprehend that possession is being made conditional upon payment of disputed dues, they may seek appropriate clarification or relief from the Appellate Tribunal.
Since the High Court found no factual or legal infirmity and no substantial question of law, it declined to interfere under Section 58 of the RERA Act and dismissed the appeal.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 19.09.2026
Drone Found With 500-Gram Heroin Packet: Punjab & Haryana HC Grants Bail to Accused After Year-Long Custody
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
The Punjab and Haryana High Court has granted regular bail to an accused in an NDPS case involving the alleged recovery of 500 grams of heroin found alongside a drone, observing that the accused’s connection with the contraband and the admissibility of the disclosure statement relied upon by the prosecution are matters to be determined during trial.
Justice Vikram Aggarwal, in Lovepreet Singh @ Labha v. State of Punjab, CRM-M-7640-2026 (O&M), passed the order on 17 September 2026.
Drone and 500 Grams of Heroin Found in Riverbed
The case arose from FIR No. 22 dated 30 April 2025, registered at Police Station Narot Jaimal Singh, District Pathankot, under Section 21 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, along with Sections 10, 11 and 12 of the Aircraft Act, 1934.
According to the prosecution case recorded by the High Court, a drone was recovered from a riverbed on 30 April 2025. A packet was found alongside the drone, from which 500 grams of heroin was allegedly recovered.
Significantly, the order does not state that the heroin was physically recovered from Lovepreet Singh.
Accused Linked to Recovery Through Later Disclosure Statement
The petitioner was subsequently apprehended in another caseβFIR No. 92 dated 1 August 2025, registered at Police Station Taragarh under Sections 21 and 29 of the NDPS Act.
Another case, FIR No. 93 dated 2 August 2025, was also registered at the same police station under Sections 21 and 29 of the NDPS Act and Section 111 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.
The prosecution alleged that while involved in FIR No. 92, Lovepreet Singh made a disclosure statement on 31 August 2025, stating that the heroin recovered on 30 April 2025 belonged to him.
On that basis, he was arrested in the present case on 16 September 2025 and remained in custody thereafter.
Defence: No Evidence Apart From Disclosure Statement
Counsel for Lovepreet Singh argued that the petitioner had been falsely implicated and could not otherwise be connected with the contraband recovered alongside the drone.
The defence specifically contended that, apart from the alleged disclosure statement, there was no other evidence linking the petitioner with the recovered heroin.
It was further submitted that the investigation had already been completed and the final report submitted, but charges had still not been framed. Of the 18 prosecution witnesses, none had been examined.
The defence therefore argued that the trial was likely to take considerable time and that continued incarceration would serve no useful purpose.
Punjab Opposes Bail Citing Commercial Quantity
The State of Punjab opposed the regular bail application.
The State argued that the case involved a commercial quantity of heroin and relied upon the petitioner’s alleged statement that the recovered narcotic substance belonged to him.
The High Court, however, did not finally determine whether the disclosure statement was admissible or whether it sufficiently connected the petitioner with the contraband.
Whether Disclosure Statement Is Admissible Must Be Decided at Trial: High Court
The High Court observed that the question of whether Lovepreet Singh could actually be linked with the recovered contraband could only be determined upon conclusion of the trial.
The Court noted that the recovery had taken place on 30 April 2025, whereas the petitioner, while already in custody in another case, was alleged to have subsequently made the disclosure statement regarding the heroin.
Crucially, the Court observed:
βThe admissibility of the same shall also be determined at the stage of trial.β
Thus, for purposes of the bail proceedings, the High Court did not treat the alleged disclosure statement as finally establishing the petitioner’s connection with the narcotic substance.
One Year in Custody; Not a Single Witness Examined
The duration of custody and lack of progress in the trial also weighed with the High Court.
Lovepreet Singh had remained in custody since 16 September 2025, meaning that approximately one year had elapsed by the time his bail petition was decided.
The investigation was complete and the final report had already been submitted. Despite this, charges had not been framed and none of the 18 prosecution witnesses had been examined.
The Court consequently found it clear that the trial would take a βsufficiently long timeβ to conclude.
In those circumstances, Justice Aggarwal held that no useful purpose would be served by keeping the petitioner in custody any longer.
High Court Orders Release on Regular Bail
The Punjab and Haryana High Court accordingly allowed the petition without expressing any opinion on the merits of the criminal case.
Lovepreet Singh was ordered to be released on regular bail upon furnishing the required bail and surety bonds to the satisfaction of the concerned Trial Court, Chief Judicial Magistrate or Duty Magistrate.
The order is therefore a bail decision and not an acquittal. The questions of the petitioner’s connection with the heroin, the evidentiary value and admissibility of the disclosure statement, and the prosecution allegations remain open for determination during trial.
Why the Order Is Significant
The order highlights two considerations that can become important in NDPS bail proceedings: the nature of the material connecting an accused with the recovered contraband and the progress of the criminal trial during prolonged custody.
Here, the alleged heroin was found alongside a drone months before the petitioner was arrested in the case, while the link asserted against him was based on a subsequent disclosure statement allegedly made while he was already in custody in another matter. The High Court expressly left the admissibility of that statement to be determined at trial.
At the same time, the Court took into account that the petitioner had spent a year in custody, investigation was over, the final report had been filed, charges remained unframed and 0 out of 18 witnesses had been examined.
The order should, however, be read on its own facts and does not contain a general ruling that every disclosure-statement-based NDPS case automatically entitles an accused to bail.
Key Takeaway
The Punjab and Haryana High Court granted regular bail to Lovepreet Singh in the 500-gram heroin case after noting that the narcotic substance had been recovered alongside a drone months before his arrest, while his alleged connection to it arose through a later disclosure statement whose admissibility remained a matter for trial.
With the petitioner having spent around a year in custody, investigation completed, charges yet to be framed and none of the 18 witnesses examined, the Court concluded that continued incarceration would serve no useful purpose.
The Court expressly refrained from commenting on the merits of the prosecution case.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 19.09.2026
Punjab & Haryana HC: Trade Mark Search & Seizure Cannot Be Conducted by Officer Below DSP Rank
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
The Punjab and Haryana High Court has quashed a criminal prosecution under Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, holding that the mandatory safeguards prescribed under Section 115(4) were violated because the search and seizure was conducted by an officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police and without obtaining the prior opinion of the Registrar of Trade Marks.
In Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab & Anr., CRM-M-12823-2021 (O&M), Justice Jasjit Singh Bedi held that the statutory procedure had been breached on two counts and that there was consequently a βclear statutory embargoβ on the initiation and continuation of the criminal proceedings.
The judgment was delivered on 10 January 2023.
Allegations of Selling Duplicate βNorth Faceβ and βJansportβ Bags
The proceedings originated from a complaint submitted by Vishal Joshi, described as an Enforcement Officer of United Overseas Trade Mark Company.
The complainant alleged that Ashok Kumar, proprietor of Amar Bag House, was manufacturing, selling and supplying duplicate bags bearing the marks βNorth Faceβ and βJansport.β
On the basis of the complaint, FIR No. 10 dated 1 February 2019 was registered at Police Station Mahilpur, District Hoshiarpur, initially under Sections 63 and 65 of the Copyright Act, 1957.
136 Allegedly Fake Bags Recovered During Raid
During the investigation, the police raided the petitionerβs shop.
According to the judgment, the search resulted in recovery of 60 black bags carrying the βNorth Faceβ mark and 76 bags carrying the βJansportβ mark, totalling 136 bags.
A wooden board carrying a βJansportβ company sticker was also recovered. The recovered bags were alleged to be fake and were taken into police possession.
However, the legality of the manner in which this search and seizure was carried out ultimately became decisive before the High Court.
Copyright Charges Deleted; Trade Marks Act Invoked
After investigation, the police initially prepared the final report under Sections 63 and 65 of the Copyright Act.
The matter was thereafter sent to the District Attorney, Hoshiarpur, who opined that offences under Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 were made out. Consequently, the Copyright Act offences were deleted and the report under Section 173(2) CrPC was presented under Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act.
Charges were subsequently framed against Ashok Kumar under those provisions on 1 February 2021.
The petitioner then approached the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, seeking quashing of the FIR, the order framing charges and all consequential proceedings.
Petitioner Challenges Search and Seizure Under Section 115(4)
Ashok Kumarβs principal argument was that the investigation had failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 115(4) of the Trade Marks Act.
He raised two specific objections.
First, the search and seizure had been conducted by officers of the rank of Sub-Inspector/Assistant Sub-Inspector, whereas Section 115(4) authorises warrantless search and seizure by a police officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police or equivalent.
Second, the police had not obtained the opinion of the Registrar of Trade Marks before conducting the search and seizure, as required by the proviso to Section 115(4).
The petitioner therefore argued that the entire search and seizure stood vitiated and the resulting criminal prosecution could not legally continue.
What Section 115(4) of the Trade Marks Act Requires
The High Court reproduced Section 115 of the Trade Marks Act and closely examined its statutory safeguards.
Under Section 115(3), offences under Sections 103, 104 and 105 are cognizable.
However, Section 115(4) provides that a police officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police or equivalent may conduct a warrantless search and seizure where satisfied that an offence referred to in Section 115(3) has been, is being, or is likely to be committed.
Crucially, the proviso further states that before conducting any search and seizure, the police officer shall obtain the opinion of the Registrar on the facts involved in the offence relating to the trade mark and shall abide by that opinion.
Thus, the Court treated the statutory scheme as imposing substantive procedural safeguards upon police action in such trademark prosecutions.
Search by Sub-Inspector Violated Section 115(4)
The High Court found from the recovery memo and the final report under Section 173(2) CrPC that the search and seizure had in fact been conducted by an officer of the rank of Sub-Inspector.
Justice Bedi held that this directly violated Section 115(4), because the raid and consequential search and seizure were required to be undertaken by an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police or equivalent.
The Court consequently held that the proceedings emanating from the FIR were liable to be quashed on this ground.
Prior Opinion of Registrar of Trade Marks Was Also Mandatory
There was a second and independent statutory violation.
The Court found that no opinion of the Registrar of Trade Marks had been obtained before the search and seizure.
The Sub-Inspector who conducted the search was therefore not only below the statutorily prescribed rank but had also proceeded without complying with the proviso to Section 115(4).
The High Court held that the proceedings were liable to be quashed on this ground as well.
State Argues Objections Should Be Decided During Trial
The State opposed the quashing petition.
It argued that after registration of the FIR, the police had completed investigation and presented the report under Section 173(2) CrPC. Charges had also been framed.
According to the State, the grounds raised by the petitioner could therefore be adjudicated during the trial rather than being used to quash the prosecution at the threshold.
However, the State also conceded that its reply contained no specific denial of the petitionerβs contentions concerning the alleged statutory violations.
The High Court ultimately rejected the argument that the petitioner should be relegated to trial because the defect concerned violation of the statutory conditions governing the very search and seizure underlying the prosecution.
Mandatory Procedure Under Trade Marks Act Cannot Be Ignored
The High Court relied on its earlier decisions in Anil Kumar v. State of Punjab & Anr. and Satpal & Anr. v. State of Punjab & Ors..
In Anil Kumar, the Court had held that Section 115(4) does not permit an officer below the rank of DSP to conduct the relevant search and seizure. It had further held that obtaining the Registrarβs opinion before such action was mandatory, observing that use of the word βshallβ indicated the mandatory nature of the requirement.
Similarly, in Satpal, the Court held that where the search was conducted by a Sub-Inspector without obtaining the Registrarβs opinion, the proceedings stood vitiated. It emphasised that where a statute creating an offence also prescribes a procedure, authorities cannot simply ignore that procedure.
Other High Court Precedents Support Mandatory Compliance
The judgment also referred to the Madhya Pradesh High Court decision in Kasim Ali v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., where prosecution under the Trade Marks Act was found unsustainable because the mandatory Section 115 procedure had not been followed.
That decision similarly recognised that a search under Section 115(4) must be conducted by the prescribed rank of police officer and only after obtaining the Registrarβs opinion.
The Punjab and Haryana High Court also considered Pitambra Industries v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., in which the Madhya Pradesh High Court treated obtaining the Registrarβs opinion before search and seizure as a sine qua non and held that compliance with Section 115(4) was mandatory.
The Court further referred to the Bombay High Courtβs ruling in Shrenik Shantilal Dhadiwal v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., where investigation by an Assistant Police Inspector without the Registrarβs opinion was found contrary to Section 115(4).
Bhajan Lal Principles Applied
The petitioner also relied upon the Supreme Courtβs landmark judgment in State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335.
Among the recognised categories for exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC is a situation where there exists an express legal bar under the Code or the concerned statute to the institution or continuation of criminal proceedings.
Applying this principle, the High Court found that Section 115(4) had been violated in two material respects:
the search and seizure was undertaken by an officer below the rank of DSP, and the proceedings were initiated without obtaining the opinion of the Registrar of Trade Marks.
The Court therefore concluded that there was a clear statutory embargo on the initiation and continuation of the proceedings.
FIR, Charges and Entire Criminal Proceedings Quashed
Having found both statutory violations established, the Punjab and Haryana High Court allowed Ashok Kumarβs petition.
It quashed:
FIR No. 10 dated 1 February 2019 under Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act at Police Station Mahilpur, District Hoshiarpur;
the order dated 1 February 2021 framing charges against the petitioner; and
all subsequent proceedings arising from the FIR.
Thus, Ashok Kumar succeeded before the High Court, and the prosecution arising from the allegedly counterfeit βNorth Faceβ and βJansportβ bags was brought to an end because the mandatory statutory procedure governing search and seizure had not been followed.
Key Takeaway
The judgment underscores that the procedural safeguards contained in Section 115(4) of the Trade Marks Act cannot be bypassed in criminal enforcement actions involving offences under Sections 103, 104 and 105.
Where a warrantless search and seizure is undertaken under Section 115(4), the judgment treats two requirements as critical: the officer conducting the statutory search must be not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police or equivalent, and the prescribed opinion of the Registrar of Trade Marks must be obtained before the search and seizure. In Ashok Kumar, failure to satisfy both requirements was sufficient for the High Court to hold that continuation of the prosecution was legally impermissible and to quash the FIR, charge-framing order and all consequential proceedings.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 10.09.2026
Failure to Register Project Under Section 3 Does Not Oust RERAβs Adjudicatory Jurisdiction Under Section 31
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email idamitnaren@outlook.com.
In an important ruling concerning the jurisdiction of the Real Estate Regulatory Authority (RERA) and the rights of homebuyers, the Punjab & Haryana High Court has held that a promoter cannot defeat an allotteeβs remedy under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 merely by contending that the concerned project was not registered with RERA.
A Division Bench comprising Justice Sureshwar Thakur and Justice Vikas Suri rejected the jurisdictional challenge raised by M/s Ramprastha Developers Pvt. Ltd. and others against an order passed by the Haryana Real Estate Regulatory Authority, Gurugram. The Court ultimately dismissed the writ petition and held that the petitioners could pursue the statutory appellate remedy available under the RERA Act.
Background of the Dispute
The writ petition challenged an order dated 26 July 2024 passed by the Haryana Real Estate Regulatory Authority, Gurugram on complaints instituted by Yuvraj Arora and Vivek Arora.
An important document before the Court was a receipt issued by Ramprastha Developers recording payment of βΉ2,49,37,500 in connection with a request for tentative registration of 6,500 square yards in its future potential projects.
The developers principally argued that RERA lacked jurisdiction because the subject project had not been registered under Section 3 of the RERA Act. According to them, registration of the project was a mandatory prerequisite before the provisions of the RERA Act could apply.
Developers Challenge RERAβs Jurisdiction
The petitioners contended that the RERA order suffered from an inherent jurisdictional defect and was effectively coram non judice.
Their argument was that no requisite registration/licence existed in respect of the project and, therefore, RERA could not entertain the complaints. They also questioned whether a payment relating to a prospective or future project could confer enforceable rights upon the complainants under the RERA Act.
The respondents, on the other hand, raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petition because Section 43(5) of the RERA Act provides a statutory appeal before the Real Estate Appellate Tribunal against an order of the Authority or adjudicating officer.
High Court Examines Section 3 of the RERA Act
The Court considered Section 3, which generally prohibits a promoter from advertising, marketing, booking, selling or offering property in a real estate project without registration with the Real Estate Regulatory Authority.
The High Court, however, rejected the proposition that the promoterβs failure to secure the relevant registration could itself extinguish the rights of homebuyers to approach RERA.
The Court observed that non-issuance or absence of the relevant registration does not restrict the right of homebuyers to access remedies contemplated under the RERA Act.
This distinction became central to the judgment: the promoterβs statutory obligation to register a project cannot be converted into a jurisdictional defence against an aggrieved allottee.
Section 31 Is the Source of RERAβs Adjudicatory Jurisdiction
The High Court placed considerable emphasis on Section 31 of the RERA Act.
Section 31 permits any aggrieved person to file a complaint before the Authority or adjudicating officer for violation or contravention of the Act, rules or regulations against a promoter, allottee or real estate agent.
The Court held that the question of RERA’s adjudicatory jurisdiction is more directly governed by this statutory right to file a complaint than by whether every requirement relating to project registration under Section 3 had first been fulfilled.
The Court consequently reasoned that compliance with Section 3, or even action by the competent authority under the provisos to Section 3, is not a statutory precursor to the vesting of adjudicatory jurisdiction in RERA.
Promoter Cannot Benefit From Non-Registration
The judgment has an important consumer-protection consequence.
If non-registration of a project were treated as sufficient to oust RERA jurisdiction, a promoter could potentially rely upon its own failure to comply with registration requirements to prevent an aggrieved purchaser or allottee from approaching the regulatory authority.
The High Court’s interpretation avoids such a result.
The Court read the provisions of the RERA Act harmoniously and concluded that the statutory framework confers adjudicatory competence upon RERA to entertain complaints concerning alleged violations by promoters.
It therefore held that neither the filing of the complaints nor RERA’s exercise of jurisdiction suffered from an inherent jurisdictional defect or the vice of coram non judice.
RERAβs Powers Under Section 37
The Court also referred to Section 37 of the RERA Act, which authorises the Regulatory Authority to issue directions to promoters, allottees and real estate agents for the purpose of discharging its functions under the Act, Rules and Regulations.
The provision states that such directions are binding on all concerned.
This reinforced the Court’s conclusion regarding the breadth of RERA’s regulatory and adjudicatory authority.
Prospective Allottee Can Also Have Locus to Approach RERA
Another significant issue concerned the complainants’ status as allottees.
The developers argued that the complainant had merely paid money in respect of prospective projects and that no such project had actually been floated at the relevant stage. On this basis, they questioned whether any cause of action or locus standi existed.
The High Court rejected this contention.
It reasoned that the statutory concept of an allottee could encompass potential or prospective allottees in relation to projects proposed to be undertaken in the future, and considered the receipt/documentary arrangement sufficient in the circumstances to reject the challenge to the complainants’ locus.
This aspect of the judgment may have particular significance in cases involving advance bookings, pre-launch payments, tentative registrations and payments made for future projects.
Alternative Remedy Under Section 43(5)
Having concluded that RERA had not exercised jurisdiction that was inherently non-existent, the High Court addressed the developers’ attempt to invoke writ jurisdiction directly.
The Court found no merit in the argument that the statutory appellate remedy was ineffective merely because the petitioners alleged that RERA’s original order was without jurisdiction.
Since the jurisdiction assumed by RERA was neither non-est nor coram non judice, the developers were required to pursue the statutory remedy of appeal against the impugned order.
Section 43(5) is particularly significant for promoters because an appeal by a promoter is subject to the statutory pre-deposit requirement prescribed by the proviso to that provision.
Relief Regarding Limitation for Statutory Appeal
While dismissing the writ petition, the High Court provided an important procedural safeguard.
It observed that if the statutory appeal filed by the petitioners was time-barred, they could file an application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
The appellate body was directed to pass a reasoned decision on such application and thereafter, where appropriate, register and decide the appeal after hearing all affected parties.
Key Principles Emerging From the Judgment
The judgment establishes several important propositions for RERA disputes:
First, non-registration of a real estate project does not, by itself, deprive an aggrieved homebuyer or allottee of the statutory remedy available under RERA.
Second, the promoter’s obligation to register a project under Section 3 must be distinguished from RERA’s adjudicatory jurisdiction under Section 31.
Third, failure to comply with project-registration requirements cannot automatically be used by the promoter to defeat a complaint brought by an aggrieved person.
Fourth, RERA enjoys statutory powers under Section 37 to issue binding directions to promoters, allottees and real estate agents.
Fifth, the Court recognised, in the factual setting before it, the standing of a person who had paid substantial consideration towards a prospective project to pursue remedies under the Act.
Sixth, where RERA possesses jurisdiction, a promoter challenging its order should ordinarily pursue the statutory appeal under Section 43(5) instead of bypassing that remedy through a writ petition.
Significance for Homebuyers and Developers
The ruling strengthens the remedial character of the RERA framework.
For homebuyers, it indicates that a developer’s failure to complete statutory registration formalities does not necessarily leave purchasers without a remedy under RERA. This is especially relevant to disputes involving pre-launch bookings, tentative allotments, advance payments and projects whose regulatory status is disputed.
For developers, the judgment highlights that non-registration cannot safely be treated as a jurisdictional shield. The obligation to register and the jurisdiction of RERA to address grievances operate within the broader statutory framework and must be interpreted harmoniously.
Conclusion
In M/s Ramprastha Developers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., the Punjab & Haryana High Court rejected the developers’ contention that absence of RERA registration deprived the Authority of jurisdiction over the homebuyers’ complaints.
The Court held that the statutory right of an aggrieved person to approach RERA under Section 31 is central to the Authority’s adjudicatory competence, while non-compliance with Section 3 does not automatically extinguish that remedy. Finding no inherent jurisdictional defect in the proceedings before Haryana RERA, the High Court dismissed the writ petition, leaving the developers to pursue their statutory appellate remedy. It also permitted them to seek the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act if limitation became an issue before the appellate forum.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 09.09.2026
Punjab & Haryana High Court Clarifies RERA Jurisdiction: Non-Registration Does Not Defeat Homebuyersβ Remedies
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email idamitnaren@outlook.com.
The Punjab and Haryana High Court, in Parveen Gambhir and Others v. Union of India and Others, has delivered an important judgment examining the interface between the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (βRERAβ), the Haryana real-estate regulatory framework, town-planning legislation and apartment-ownership law.
The Division Bench comprising Justice Sureshwar Thakur and Justice Vikas Suri dismissed the writ petition and affirmed the impugned governmental directions and approval. The judgment is significant for three propositions: non-registration of a project under RERA does not by itself extinguish the remedies available to homebuyers; RERA authorities do not possess an independent statutory power to order demolition merely because construction deviates from sanctioned plans; and overlapping State and Central statutes can continue to operate in their respective fields unless there is a genuine inconsistency attracting Section 89 of RERA.
Background of the Dispute
The controversy concerned the group-housing project βWindchantsβ, situated in Sector 112, Gurugram. According to the petitioners, the project originally covered approximately 23.43 acres and was developed pursuant to licences obtained under the Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975. The petitioners had purchased flats after relying upon advertisements, marketing material and representations concerning the project.
The dispute subsequently developed around, among other things, the treatment of the project as different phases, the applicability of RERA to portions of the development, occupation certificates, alleged deviations from sanctioned plans and the construction of additional EWS dwelling units.
An additional 1.19 acres was subsequently purchased and a further licence was issued in September 2019. The petitioners alleged that the developer sought to avoid the consequences of RERA by treating portions of the development as separate phases even though occupation/completion certificates had not been obtained when the RERA regime became applicable.
The controversy also had an earlier consumer-law dimension. An allottee had challenged an additional demand arising from an alleged increase in sale area before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. The NCDRC quashed that demand in August 2020, and the developer’s civil appeals were subsequently dismissed by the Supreme Court in January 2021.
What Was Challenged Before the High Court?
The petitioners principally sought quashing of:
1. Directions dated 25 January 2021, issued by the State Government purportedly under Section 83 of RERA; and
2. An in-principle approval dated 4 March 2021 relating to the fourth Occupation Certificate.
They additionally sought directions for a fresh site inspection, compliance with sanctioned plans and quashing of amendments to the project alleged to be contrary to RERA. The judgment records that the petition was directed against the Section 83 directions as well as the in-principle approval.
The controversy therefore went considerably beyond an ordinary builder-buyer dispute. It required the High Court to determine the respective regulatory fields occupied by RERA, the Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975, the Haryana Apartment Ownership Act, 1983, and the applicable Haryana regulatory framework.
The Controversial Haryana Government Directions
One of the central challenges concerned the State Government’s directions of 25 January 2021.
Those directions prescribed a procedure for proposed additions or alterations to sanctioned layout/building plans. Among other things, the mechanism contemplated inviting objections from existing allottees, publication of proposed revisions, availability of original and revised plans for inspection, consideration of objections and hearings before the competent authority.
The directions also dealt with community and commercial facilities in licensed colonies. Importantly, they stated that, where the definition of βcommon areasβ under RERA conflicted with the Haryana Apartment Ownership Act, 1983, the definition under the State legislation would govern and contradictory provisions under RERA would be treated as redundant.
This became one of the principal constitutional and statutory issues before the Court.
Petitionersβ Case: RERA Must Prevail
The petitioners argued that the State Government had effectively accorded primacy to Haryana legislation over the Central RERA framework and thereby diluted the safeguards available under Section 14(2) of RERA.
They further argued that Section 83 merely empowers the appropriate Government to issue policy directions to the RERA Authority and cannot be employed to supplant the statutory authority or assume functions specifically entrusted to it.
Reliance was also placed on the Supreme Court’s decision in Forum for People’s Collective Efforts (FPCE) v. State of West Bengal, (2021) 8 SCC 599, and on Sections 88 and 89 of RERA, read with Article 254 of the Constitution.
Section 89 provides RERA with overriding effect where another law contains provisions inconsistent with it. The petitioners consequently argued that Haryana legislation could not be given precedence over the Parliamentary enactment.
Section 14 RERA: Promoters Must Adhere to Sanctioned Plans
The Court closely examined Section 14 of RERA.
Section 14 requires a promoter to develop and complete a project in accordance with sanctioned plans, layout plans and specifications approved by the competent authority.
For material alterations to sanctioned plans, layout plans or common areas, Section 14(2) requires the previous written consent of at least two-thirds of the allottees, excluding the promoter.
The statutory protection is important because βminor additions or alterationsβ do not extend to significant structural modifications. The provision excludes matters such as additions to area, changes in height, removal of part of a building and specified structural changes from the concept of minor alterations.
The High Court accordingly recognised a peremptory statutory requirement that promoters adhere to sanctioned plans, subject only to the limited alterations contemplated by Section 14.
This is an important protection for allottees: promoters cannot treat sanctioned plans as merely indicative documents capable of unilateral alteration.
Major Finding No. 1: Non-Registration of a Project Does Not Take Away a Homebuyer’s RERA Remedy
One of the most consequential portions of the judgment concerns the relationship between Section 3 and Section 31 of RERA.
Section 3 imposes the registration obligation upon promoters. Broadly, a promoter cannot advertise, market, book, sell or offer a real-estate project for sale without registration, subject to statutory exceptions. Ongoing projects for which completion certificates had not been issued were also brought within the registration mechanism.
But what happens if the promoter itself fails to register the project?
Can the promoter rely upon its own failure to argue that RERA has no jurisdiction over a homebuyer’s complaint?
The High Court’s answer is important: No.
Relying upon its earlier decision in Ramprastha Developers Pvt. Ltd., the Court held that the effect of non-registration under Section 3 would not be to bar homebuyers/allottees from invoking the remedy contemplated under Section 31 of RERA.
Section 31 grants an aggrieved person a statutory right to complain to the Authority or adjudicating officer regarding violations of RERA or the rules and regulations framed under it. The Court emphasised that adjudicatory competence is rooted more directly in this statutory remedy than in the promoter’s complianceβor non-complianceβwith Section 3.
Why this finding matters
This interpretation prevents an anomalous result.
If non-registration deprived RERA of jurisdiction, a promoter could potentially benefit from its own statutory default: the very failure for which RERA provides penalties could become a defence against proceedings initiated by an allottee.
The Court’s interpretation avoids that consequence.
Indeed, the judgment notes that Section 59 separately provides consequences for non-registration, including monetary penalties and further consequences for continuing violations.
Thus:
Failure to register is a statutory breach by the promoter; it is not ordinarily a jurisdictional shield against an aggrieved homebuyer.
Major Finding No. 2: RERA Has Broad Adjudicatory and Direction-Giving Powers
The judgment also refers to Section 37 of RERA.
Section 37 empowers the Authority, for discharging its statutory functions, to issue directions from time to time to promoters, allottees and real-estate agents, and such directions are binding upon those concerned.
Read together with Section 31, this reinforces the regulatory reach of RERA over complaints concerning statutory violations.
The Court therefore treated the homebuyer’s remedial rights and the Authority’s adjudicatory competence as distinct from the question whether the promoter had properly fulfilled the project-registration obligation.
Major Finding No. 3: RERA Authorities Cannot Themselves Order Demolition Under Section 14
This is perhaps the most practically important limitation identified in the judgment.
While Section 14 imposes a clear obligation upon promoters to adhere to sanctioned plans, the High Court held that the provision does not itself confer a power upon RERA authorities to order demolition of constructions that deviate from those plans.
The Court observed that even where gross deviations or excess construction are alleged, there must be a statutory source of authority empowering the particular regulator to order demolition. It found no such demolition power vested in the RERA authorities merely through Section 14.
This distinction is critical:
RERA can regulate the promoter’s obligations and adjudicate violations, but every remedial power cannot automatically be inferred merely from the existence of the underlying statutory obligation.
Who, Then, Can Order Demolition?
The High Court explained that the power to demolish construction deviating from sanctioned plans may lie with the Municipal Corporation, Town and Country Planning Department or another authority under the applicable functional statute, depending upon the location and statutory framework governing the construction.
The competent authority must therefore be identified by examining the statute governing planning, construction and municipal control over the particular property.
This creates an important jurisdictional distinction for litigants.
A homebuyer may have a valid grievance under RERA concerning deviations from sanctioned plans, but the specific relief of physical demolition may need to be pursued before the authority statutorily empowered to order demolition.
Major Finding No. 4: Sections 88 and 89 Must Be Read Together
Another important aspect of the decision is the Court’s interpretation of Sections 88 and 89 of RERA.
Section 88 provides that RERA operates in addition to and not in derogation of other laws.
Section 89 gives RERA overriding effect where there is an inconsistency with another law.
The Court therefore rejected an approach under which RERA would automatically displace every other statute touching upon real estate.
According to the judgment, overriding effect arises where there is an actual inconsistency. If another enactment operates in a separate regulatory field, both statutory regimes can coexist.
This is an application of the principle of harmonious statutory construction: the first task is to determine whether the statutes can operate together before resorting to the overriding provision.
RERA and Consumer Protection Remedies
The Court also addressed the relationship between RERA and the Consumer Protection Act, 2019.
It observed that Section 88 permits homebuyers to access remedies under RERA as well as under consumer law because the statutory frameworks can operate complementarily.
The judgment, however, states that the remedies are to be exercised before one or the other forum and not simultaneously before both. That proposition should be read in the specific context of the Court’s reasoning and the nature of the relief pursued.
The broader significance remains that RERA was not interpreted as automatically extinguishing other statutory remedies available to purchasers of real estate.
Major Finding No. 5: Different Statutes Occupy Different Regulatory Fields
The High Court ultimately concluded that the relevant legislative regimes did not necessarily suffer from repugnancy merely because they all touched upon aspects of real-estate development.
The Court identified different statutory fields: licensing and consequences of licensing breaches, regulation of land use and urban development, apartment ownership and transferability, and the separate protections and regulatory mechanisms created by RERA.
Accordingly, the Court reasoned that each legislation should be enforced within the field that it occupies, without one authority encroaching upon powers specifically vested in another.
This distinction explains why the Court simultaneously recognised strong RERA protections for homebuyers while declining to treat RERA authorities as universal authorities for every planning, licensing, demolition and ownership dispute arising from a real-estate project.
Occupation Certificates: Separate Statutory Remedy
The petitioners had also challenged matters relating to occupation certificates.
The Court held that if the petitioners were aggrieved by orders granting occupation certificates to the builder, they could pursue an appeal before the competent authority.
This again illustrates the jurisdictional approach adopted by the Court: the existence of RERA does not absorb every function of town-planning, licensing and building-control authorities.
Final Decision
Ultimately, the Division Bench found no merit in the writ petition.
The petition was dismissed, and the impugned annexures were maintained and affirmed.
Thus, despite the Court’s important exposition of homebuyer remedies, Section 14 compliance, non-registration and the limits of RERA’s demolition jurisdiction, the petitioners did not succeed in obtaining the quashing relief sought.
Key Legal Principles Emerging from the Judgment
Issue
Punjab & Haryana High Court’s finding
Non-registration under Section 3
Does not by itself deprive an aggrieved homebuyer/allottee of the remedy under Section 31.
Promoter’s duty under Section 14
Sanctioned plans must be followed; material changes are subject to statutory consent requirements.
Two-thirds consent
Section 14(2) requires previous written consent of at least two-thirds of the allottees for specified alterations/additions.
Power of RERA to order demolition
Section 14 does not itself confer demolition powers upon RERA authorities.
Unauthorised/deviating construction
Demolition may fall within the jurisdiction of municipal, town-planning or another statutorily empowered authority.
Sections 88 & 89
Must be harmoniously read; RERA overrides another law where there is actual inconsistency.
State laws and RERA
Can coexist where they occupy distinct regulatory fields.
Occupation Certificate challenge
Appropriate statutory appellate remedy before the competent authority remains available.
Final outcome
Writ petition dismissed; impugned annexures maintained and affirmed.
Practical Impact on Homebuyers
The judgment is particularly significant because it prevents the statutory registration requirement from being turned against homebuyers.
A developer’s alleged failure to register a project cannot automatically be used to say:
βBecause the project was never registered, RERA has no jurisdiction over the buyer’s grievance.β
The Court’s approach treats registration principally as a regulatory obligation imposed upon the promoter, while Section 31 provides the aggrieved person with the statutory route for complaining about violations.
At the same time, homebuyers must carefully identify the correct forum for the particular relief they seek. A claim for compensation, enforcement of RERA obligations or other statutory relief may properly fall within the RERA framework, whereas actual demolition of construction contrary to sanctioned plans may require proceedings before the competent municipal or town-planning authority.
Practical Impact on Developers and Promoters
The judgment should not be understood as diluting the obligation to register projects.
On the contrary, non-registration remains independently punishable under the RERA framework. More importantly, the judgment indicates that a promoter cannot necessarily rely on its own non-registration to defeat an allottee’s statutory remedy.
Developers must therefore separately ensure compliance with:
RERA registration requirements; sanctioned plans and Section 14; consent requirements for alterations; planning and licensing legislation; occupation/completion certificate requirements; and obligations imposed by municipal and town-planning authorities.
Compliance with one regulatory regime cannot automatically cure non-compliance with another where each statute occupies a separate field.
Significance of the Judgment for RERA Jurisprudence
Parveen Gambhir is significant not because it gives unlimited jurisdiction to RERA, but because it attempts to draw the boundaries of RERA jurisdiction.
The judgment essentially establishes a two-way principle.
On one side, the protective jurisdiction of RERA cannot easily be defeated by a promoter’s failure to register a project. On the other, RERA cannot be treated as an all-purpose planning and municipal authority merely because the dispute concerns a real-estate project.
That distinction is important for future litigation involving unregistered projects, deviations from sanctioned plans, occupation certificates, project alterations, common areas, planning permissions and overlapping regulatory statutes.
Conclusion
The Punjab and Haryana High Court’s decision in Parveen Gambhir & Others v. Union of India & Others reinforces an important feature of India’s real-estate regulatory framework: RERA is a protective and remedial statute, but its authorities must operate within the powers actually conferred by Parliament.
The judgment recognises that non-registration of a project does not automatically deprive homebuyers of their remedy under Section 31. At the same time, it distinguishes between RERA’s power to regulate and adjudicate promoter obligations and the statutory power to physically demolish unauthorised construction, which may vest in municipal or town-planning authorities.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 01.09.2026
Punjab & Haryana HC Sets Aside Dismissals for Non-Prosecution and Restores Appeals for Hearing on Merits
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email idamitnaren@outlook.com.
The Punjab and Haryana High Court recently delivered a significant judgment in the case of Komal Gupta vs. Real Estate Appellate Tribunal, Punjab and another. This case highlights the importance of fair hearing, the responsibilities of legal professionals, and the rights of litigants in real estate disputes.
Background of the Case
Komal Gupta, the petitioner, had booked two units in the commercial project ‘Chandigarh City Centre’ on VIP Road, Zirakpur. Dissatisfied with the actions of the developer (respondent no. 2), she filed a complaint before the Real Estate Regulatory Authority (RERA), Punjab. However, her complaint was dismissed by RERA on 18 June 2021.
Unhappy with this outcome, Komal Gupta filed two appeals before the Real Estate Appellate Tribunal. Unfortunately, due to repeated non-appearance by her counsel, the appeals, subsequent restoration applications, and review applications were all dismissed for non-prosecution between April 2022 and February 2023.
Key Issues and Court Proceedings
1. Non-Appearance and Dismissal
The appeals and applications were dismissed because neither the petitioner nor her counsel appeared before the Appellate Authority on multiple occasions.
The Tribunal expressed its displeasure, noting a lack of respect for court procedures and repeated defaults in appearance.
2. Petitionerβs Plight
Komal Gupta argued that she suffered irreparable loss due to her counsel’s negligence.
She claimed she was not informed about the dismissals in time, as her husbandβs Army postings kept her away from the city, and she relied on telephonic updates from her counsel.
The petitioner asserted she was misled by her legal representatives and pleaded for her case to be heard on merits.
3. Tribunalβs Observations
The Tribunal noted inconsistencies in the signatures on the Power of Attorney documents and criticized the conduct of the counsels involved.
It acknowledged that the petitioner appeared to be a victim of irresponsible legal professionals, which caused significant harm to her case.
High Courtβs Decision
After reviewing the entire file and hearing the petitioner, the High Court found no fault with the Appellate Authorityβs earlier orders, as the repeated non-appearance left the Tribunal with no choice but to dismiss the matters. However, the Court recognized that the petitioner suffered for no fault of her own and that the interests of justice required a remedy.
Key Orders by the High Court:
The writ petition was allowed.
The orders dismissing the appeals, restoration applications, and review applications were set aside.
The appeals were restored to their original numbers.
The Appellate Tribunal was requested to hear and decide the appeals on merits.
The petitioner was directed to appear before the Appellate Authority on 13 May 2024 at 11:00 a.m.
Significance of the Judgment
Protection of Litigant Rights: The judgment underscores the judiciaryβs commitment to ensuring that litigants are not penalized for the lapses of their legal representatives.
Professional Responsibility: It serves as a reminder to legal professionals about their duty to diligently represent their clients and maintain respect for court procedures.
Access to Justice: The decision reinforces the principle that justice must not only be done but must also be seen to be done, especially when procedural lapses threaten to deny a party their day in court.
Conclusion
The Punjab and Haryana High Courtβs intervention in Komal Guptaβs case sets an important precedent for similar disputes. It highlights the need for vigilance, both on the part of litigants and their legal counsel, and reaffirms the judiciaryβs role in safeguarding the right to a fair hearing.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
