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  • Karnataka High Court: Non-Compoundable Offences Can Be Quashed Under Section 482 CrPC After Amicable Settlement

    Karnataka High Court: Non-Compoundable Offences Can Be Quashed Under Section 482 CrPC After Amicable Settlement

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 19.09.2026

    Karnataka High Court: Non-Compoundable Offences Can Be Quashed Under Section 482 CrPC After Amicable Settlement

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate G Sridharamurthy. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id sriadv3@gmail.com . 

    The Karnataka High Court has quashed criminal proceedings involving allegations under Sections 498A, 323, 448, 341, 504, 506, 143 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) after noting that the underlying matrimonial and family dispute had been amicably settled.

    Justice S. Vishwajith Shetty, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Ramgopal and Another v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reiterated that notwithstanding the restrictions contained in Section 320 CrPC, a High Court exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC can quash proceedings involving non-compoundable offences depending upon the nature of the case, relationship between the parties and gravity of the alleged offences.

    The decision was delivered on 29 June 2026 in Smt. Thuya Mani & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Anr., Criminal Petition No. 8571 of 2022, bearing neutral citation 2026:KHC:32279.

    Relatives of Accused Husband Approach High Court

    • The petition was filed by Thuya Mani and Velamkani/Velangani, who were arrayed as Accused Nos. 4 and 5.
    • They approached the Karnataka High Court under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of proceedings in C.C. No. 51695 of 2019, pending before the XXIX Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru.
    • The proceedings arose from Crime No. 11 of 2018, registered at Vivek Nagar Police Station, Bengaluru, for alleged offences punishable under Sections 143, 448, 498A, 341, 323, 504, 506 read with Section 149 IPC.

    Matrimonial Dispute Amicably Settled

    • When the matter came before the High Court, advocates representing the contesting private parties informed the Court that the dispute between the husband and wife had been amicably settled.
    • The Court was also informed that the criminal proceedings against Accused Nos. 1 to 3 had already been quashed by a Coordinate Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Criminal Petition No. 8383 of 2026, decided on 24 June 2026.
    • The present petitioners were relatives of Accused No. 1. They filed a joint application supported by a joint affidavit under Section 320 CrPC seeking permission to compound the offences and bring the criminal dispute to an end.

    Settlement Voluntary and Without Coercion

    • The parties stated before the Court that the settlement had been reached with the intervention of elders, well-wishers, family members and other responsible persons.
    • Respondent No. 2, Susainathan, informed the Court that he no longer intended to proceed with the criminal case against the petitioners.

    The joint application specifically recorded that the compromise was:

    • voluntary, lawful and genuine;
    • entered into without force, threat or coercion;
    • free from undue influence, pressure or misrepresentation; and
    • intended to finally resolve the personal, matrimonial and family disputes between the parties.

    Respondent No. 2 expressly stated that he had no objection to quashing the criminal proceedings against the two petitioners.

    The parties further submitted that no surviving grievance remained between them and that continuing the criminal prosecution despite settlement would serve no useful purpose and would amount to an abuse of the process of law.

    Can Non-Compoundable Criminal Offences Be Quashed After Settlement?

    • The important legal issue arose because not every criminal offence can be formally compounded under Section 320 CrPC.
    • The High Court therefore considered whether it could nevertheless use its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to terminate the proceedings once the private dispute had been genuinely resolved.

    For this purpose, Justice Shetty relied upon the Supreme Court’s judgment in:

    Ramgopal and Another v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in (2022) 14 SCC 531.

    • The Karnataka High Court noted that the Supreme Court had recognised the High Court’s power to quash criminal proceedings involving non-compoundable offences, notwithstanding the restrictions under Section 320 CrPC.

    Section 320 Does Not Completely Restrict High Court’s Section 482 Powers

    Referring to Ramgopal, the Court observed that the power under Section 482 can be exercised depending upon factors such as:

    the nature of the case, the relationship between the parties and the gravity of the alleged offences.

    • Therefore, the fact that an offence is technically non-compoundable under Section 320 does not, by itself, prevent the High Court from examining whether the continuation of criminal proceedings would serve any legitimate purpose after a genuine settlement.
    • This distinction is significant: the High Court was not simply treating every non-compoundable offence as compoundable. Rather, it exercised its separate inherent power of quashing under Section 482 CrPC in light of the nature and circumstances of the dispute.

    Matrimonial and Family Nature of Dispute Considered

    • The underlying controversy arose from a personal and matrimonial dispute, and the parties themselves informed the Court that their differences had been completely resolved.
    • The petitioners were relatives of Accused No. 1, while proceedings against Accused Nos. 1 to 3 had already been quashed following the settlement.
    • Against that background, the High Court concluded that the parties should be permitted to β€œput an end to the dispute.”
    • The decision reflects the distinction courts draw between offences having an overwhelmingly private or personal character and serious crimes involving broader public interest. The Court’s reliance on Ramgopal makes clear that the nature of the offence and gravity of the allegations remain relevant considerations rather than settlement automatically resulting in quashing.

    Criminal Proceedings Quashed Against Accused Nos. 4 and 5

    • The Karnataka High Court ultimately allowed Criminal Petition No. 8571 of 2022.
    • It quashed the entire proceedings in C.C. No. 51695 of 2019 pending before the XXIX Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru, arising from Crime No. 11 of 2018 registered by Vivek Nagar Police Station, insofar as the two petitioners were concerned.
    • Accordingly, the criminal prosecution against Thuya Mani and Velamkani/Velangani (Accused Nos. 4 and 5) came to an end.

    Supreme Court Precedent Relied Upon

    • The principal judicial precedent expressly relied upon in the order was:
    • Ramgopal and Another v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2022) 14 SCC 531.
    • The Karnataka High Court relied on the judgment for the proposition that High Courts can, in appropriate circumstances, exercise their inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC to quash criminal proceedings involving non-compoundable offences despite the limitations under Section 320 CrPC.

    Why the Judgment Is Significant

    • The order reinforces the legal distinction between compounding an offence under Section 320 CrPC and quashing criminal proceedings through the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC.
    • A criminal offence that is not statutorily compoundable does not necessarily mean that proceedings must continue irrespective of a subsequent settlement. In an appropriate case, particularly where the controversy is essentially personal or matrimonial in character, the High Court may examine whether continuation of prosecution would serve any meaningful purpose.
    • At the same time, the ruling does not establish that every non-compoundable criminal case can be quashed merely because the parties have reached a compromise. The Court expressly referred to the nature of the case, relationship between the parties and gravity of the alleged offences as relevant considerations.

    Key Takeaway

    The Karnataka High Court has reiterated that the restrictions governing statutory compounding under Section 320 CrPC do not completely curtail the High Court’s inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC.

    Where parties have genuinely settled a personal or matrimonial dispute, the High Court may quash even proceedings involving non-compoundable offences after considering the nature of the case, relationship between the parties and gravity of the offences.

    In the present case, with the matrimonial and family disputes amicably resolved and the complainant having no objection to quashing, the Court concluded that the proceedings against Accused Nos. 4 and 5 should be brought to an end.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Karnataka High Court

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  • Punjab & Haryana HC: Trade Mark Search & Seizure Cannot Be Conducted by Officer Below DSP Rank

    Punjab & Haryana HC: Trade Mark Search & Seizure Cannot Be Conducted by Officer Below DSP Rank

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 19.09.2026

    Punjab & Haryana HC: Trade Mark Search & Seizure Cannot Be Conducted by Officer Below DSP Rank

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    The Punjab and Haryana High Court has quashed a criminal prosecution under Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, holding that the mandatory safeguards prescribed under Section 115(4) were violated because the search and seizure was conducted by an officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police and without obtaining the prior opinion of the Registrar of Trade Marks.

    In Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab & Anr., CRM-M-12823-2021 (O&M), Justice Jasjit Singh Bedi held that the statutory procedure had been breached on two counts and that there was consequently a β€œclear statutory embargo” on the initiation and continuation of the criminal proceedings.

    The judgment was delivered on 10 January 2023.

    Allegations of Selling Duplicate β€œNorth Face” and β€œJansport” Bags

    • The proceedings originated from a complaint submitted by Vishal Joshi, described as an Enforcement Officer of United Overseas Trade Mark Company.
    • The complainant alleged that Ashok Kumar, proprietor of Amar Bag House, was manufacturing, selling and supplying duplicate bags bearing the marks β€œNorth Face” and β€œJansport.”
    • On the basis of the complaint, FIR No. 10 dated 1 February 2019 was registered at Police Station Mahilpur, District Hoshiarpur, initially under Sections 63 and 65 of the Copyright Act, 1957.

    136 Allegedly Fake Bags Recovered During Raid

    • During the investigation, the police raided the petitioner’s shop.
    • According to the judgment, the search resulted in recovery of 60 black bags carrying the β€œNorth Face” mark and 76 bags carrying the β€œJansport” mark, totalling 136 bags.
    • A wooden board carrying a β€œJansport” company sticker was also recovered. The recovered bags were alleged to be fake and were taken into police possession.
    • However, the legality of the manner in which this search and seizure was carried out ultimately became decisive before the High Court.

    Copyright Charges Deleted; Trade Marks Act Invoked

    • After investigation, the police initially prepared the final report under Sections 63 and 65 of the Copyright Act.
    • The matter was thereafter sent to the District Attorney, Hoshiarpur, who opined that offences under Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 were made out. Consequently, the Copyright Act offences were deleted and the report under Section 173(2) CrPC was presented under Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act.
    • Charges were subsequently framed against Ashok Kumar under those provisions on 1 February 2021.
    • The petitioner then approached the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, seeking quashing of the FIR, the order framing charges and all consequential proceedings.

    Petitioner Challenges Search and Seizure Under Section 115(4)

    • Ashok Kumar’s principal argument was that the investigation had failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 115(4) of the Trade Marks Act.
    • He raised two specific objections.
    • First, the search and seizure had been conducted by officers of the rank of Sub-Inspector/Assistant Sub-Inspector, whereas Section 115(4) authorises warrantless search and seizure by a police officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police or equivalent.
    • Second, the police had not obtained the opinion of the Registrar of Trade Marks before conducting the search and seizure, as required by the proviso to Section 115(4).
    • The petitioner therefore argued that the entire search and seizure stood vitiated and the resulting criminal prosecution could not legally continue.

    What Section 115(4) of the Trade Marks Act Requires

    • The High Court reproduced Section 115 of the Trade Marks Act and closely examined its statutory safeguards.
    • Under Section 115(3), offences under Sections 103, 104 and 105 are cognizable.
    • However, Section 115(4) provides that a police officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police or equivalent may conduct a warrantless search and seizure where satisfied that an offence referred to in Section 115(3) has been, is being, or is likely to be committed.
    • Crucially, the proviso further states that before conducting any search and seizure, the police officer shall obtain the opinion of the Registrar on the facts involved in the offence relating to the trade mark and shall abide by that opinion.
    • Thus, the Court treated the statutory scheme as imposing substantive procedural safeguards upon police action in such trademark prosecutions.

    Search by Sub-Inspector Violated Section 115(4)

    • The High Court found from the recovery memo and the final report under Section 173(2) CrPC that the search and seizure had in fact been conducted by an officer of the rank of Sub-Inspector.
    • Justice Bedi held that this directly violated Section 115(4), because the raid and consequential search and seizure were required to be undertaken by an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police or equivalent.
    • The Court consequently held that the proceedings emanating from the FIR were liable to be quashed on this ground.

    Prior Opinion of Registrar of Trade Marks Was Also Mandatory

    • There was a second and independent statutory violation.
    • The Court found that no opinion of the Registrar of Trade Marks had been obtained before the search and seizure.
    • The Sub-Inspector who conducted the search was therefore not only below the statutorily prescribed rank but had also proceeded without complying with the proviso to Section 115(4).
    • The High Court held that the proceedings were liable to be quashed on this ground as well.

    State Argues Objections Should Be Decided During Trial

    • The State opposed the quashing petition.
    • It argued that after registration of the FIR, the police had completed investigation and presented the report under Section 173(2) CrPC. Charges had also been framed.
    • According to the State, the grounds raised by the petitioner could therefore be adjudicated during the trial rather than being used to quash the prosecution at the threshold.
    • However, the State also conceded that its reply contained no specific denial of the petitioner’s contentions concerning the alleged statutory violations.
    • The High Court ultimately rejected the argument that the petitioner should be relegated to trial because the defect concerned violation of the statutory conditions governing the very search and seizure underlying the prosecution.

    Mandatory Procedure Under Trade Marks Act Cannot Be Ignored

    • The High Court relied on its earlier decisions in Anil Kumar v. State of Punjab & Anr. and Satpal & Anr. v. State of Punjab & Ors..
    • In Anil Kumar, the Court had held that Section 115(4) does not permit an officer below the rank of DSP to conduct the relevant search and seizure. It had further held that obtaining the Registrar’s opinion before such action was mandatory, observing that use of the word β€œshall” indicated the mandatory nature of the requirement.
    • Similarly, in Satpal, the Court held that where the search was conducted by a Sub-Inspector without obtaining the Registrar’s opinion, the proceedings stood vitiated. It emphasised that where a statute creating an offence also prescribes a procedure, authorities cannot simply ignore that procedure.

    Other High Court Precedents Support Mandatory Compliance

    • The judgment also referred to the Madhya Pradesh High Court decision in Kasim Ali v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., where prosecution under the Trade Marks Act was found unsustainable because the mandatory Section 115 procedure had not been followed.
    • That decision similarly recognised that a search under Section 115(4) must be conducted by the prescribed rank of police officer and only after obtaining the Registrar’s opinion.
    • The Punjab and Haryana High Court also considered Pitambra Industries v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., in which the Madhya Pradesh High Court treated obtaining the Registrar’s opinion before search and seizure as a sine qua non and held that compliance with Section 115(4) was mandatory.
    • The Court further referred to the Bombay High Court’s ruling in Shrenik Shantilal Dhadiwal v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., where investigation by an Assistant Police Inspector without the Registrar’s opinion was found contrary to Section 115(4).

    Bhajan Lal Principles Applied

    • The petitioner also relied upon the Supreme Court’s landmark judgment in State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335.
    • Among the recognised categories for exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC is a situation where there exists an express legal bar under the Code or the concerned statute to the institution or continuation of criminal proceedings.
    • Applying this principle, the High Court found that Section 115(4) had been violated in two material respects:
    • the search and seizure was undertaken by an officer below the rank of DSP, and the proceedings were initiated without obtaining the opinion of the Registrar of Trade Marks.
    • The Court therefore concluded that there was a clear statutory embargo on the initiation and continuation of the proceedings.

    FIR, Charges and Entire Criminal Proceedings Quashed

    Having found both statutory violations established, the Punjab and Haryana High Court allowed Ashok Kumar’s petition.

    It quashed:

    • FIR No. 10 dated 1 February 2019 under Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act at Police Station Mahilpur, District Hoshiarpur;
    • the order dated 1 February 2021 framing charges against the petitioner; and
    • all subsequent proceedings arising from the FIR.

    Thus, Ashok Kumar succeeded before the High Court, and the prosecution arising from the allegedly counterfeit β€œNorth Face” and β€œJansport” bags was brought to an end because the mandatory statutory procedure governing search and seizure had not been followed.

    Key Takeaway

    The judgment underscores that the procedural safeguards contained in Section 115(4) of the Trade Marks Act cannot be bypassed in criminal enforcement actions involving offences under Sections 103, 104 and 105.

    Where a warrantless search and seizure is undertaken under Section 115(4), the judgment treats two requirements as critical: the officer conducting the statutory search must be not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police or equivalent, and the prescribed opinion of the Registrar of Trade Marks must be obtained before the search and seizure. In Ashok Kumar, failure to satisfy both requirements was sufficient for the High Court to hold that continuation of the prosecution was legally impermissible and to quash the FIR, charge-framing order and all consequential proceedings.

    Connected Matter

    Gujarat HC Quashes Copyright FIR Over Alleged Counterfeit Apple Accessories; Says Trademark Dispute Cannot Be Camouflaged as Copyright Offence to Bypass Statutory Safeguards

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Punjab & Haryana High Court

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Gujarat High Court: Customs Refund Limitation Cannot Run Until Final Assessment Is Communicated to Importer; Mere ICEGATE Upload Not Enough

    Gujarat High Court: Customs Refund Limitation Cannot Run Until Final Assessment Is Communicated to Importer; Mere ICEGATE Upload Not Enough

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 19.09.2026

    Gujarat High Court: Customs Refund Limitation Cannot Run Until Final Assessment Is Communicated to Importer; Mere ICEGATE Upload Not Enough

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    The Gujarat High Court has held that merely uploading an order finalising provisional assessment on the Customs electronic portal is not sufficient to start the limitation period for claiming refund under Section 27(1B)(c) of the Customs Act, 1962. The final assessment must be communicated to the assessee before the statutory one-year period can operate against it.

    The Division Bench of Justice Bhargav D. Karia and Justice Niral R. Mehta, in Principal Commissioner, Customs, Ahmedabad Commissionerate v. M/s GAIL (India) Ltd., R/Tax Appeal No. 211 of 2024, dismissed the Revenue’s appeal on 13 June 2024, finding no infirmity in CESTAT’s decision in favour of GAIL. The judgment carries neutral citation 2024:GUJHC:30963-DB.

    Dispute Over Refund of Excess Customs Duty on Imported LNG

    • GAIL (India) Ltd. was engaged in the import of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). It filed 16 Bills of Entry, which were initially assessed provisionally under Section 18 of the Customs Act upon execution of a bond. After production of the original documents, the Bills of Entry were subsequently finalised.
    • The table reproduced by the High Court on pages 3 and 4 of the judgment records the provisional and finally assessed quantities, Customs duty paid and the refund claimed for each Bill of Entry. The aggregate excess duty claimed as refund was β‚Ή7,78,98,646.
    • GAIL eventually filed its refund application on 26 October 2016. It also submitted a Chartered Accountant’s certificate dated 7 September 2016 concerning unjust enrichment, stating that the excess Customs duty had been reflected as a receivable in its books and had not been passed on to customers.

    Customs Department Rejected Refund as Time-Barred

    • The adjudicating authority rejected GAIL’s refund claim on limitation.
    • According to Customs, the 16 Bills of Entry had been finally assessed between 7 October 2015 and 20 October 2015. Since the refund application was filed on 26 October 2016, the Department treated it as having been filed beyond the one-year limitation prescribed under Section 27(1B)(c).
    • The Department’s case was essentially that Section 27(1B)(c), where duty has been provisionally paid under Section 18, computes the limitation period from the date of adjustment of duty after final assessment or, in the case of reassessment, from the date of reassessment.

    CESTAT Allowed GAIL’s Appeal

    • GAIL challenged the rejection before CESTAT.
    • The Tribunal allowed the appeal by relying upon Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., 2014 (308) E.L.T. 169, holding that the relevant point for limitation was the date of service of the finalisation of provisional assessment.
    • The precedent emphasised that where an order gives rise to a remedial right, the date on which the order is served upon the person concerned assumes significance for exercising that remedy.
    • CESTAT consequently rejected the Department’s contention that the importer should simply have discovered the finalisation through ICEGATE.

    Revenue Approaches Gujarat High Court

    • The Principal Commissioner of Customs challenged the Tribunal’s order before the Gujarat High Court under Section 130 of the Customs Act.
    • The principal question proposed by Revenue was whether CESTAT was correct in treating the date of service of the finalisation order as the relevant date for limitation when Section 27(1B)(c) refers to the date of adjustment of duty after final assessment or the date of reassessment.
    • Revenue argued that the final assessments had already been uploaded on the ICEGATE system and that GAIL was required to take notice of the assessments made available on the portal. On this basis, Customs contended that the refund application was beyond limitation.

    Section 27(1B)(c): One-Year Limitation After Finalisation

    • The High Court examined Sections 18 and 27 of the Customs Act, 1962.
    • Section 27(1B)(c) provides that where duty has been paid provisionally under Section 18, the one-year limitation is computed from the date of adjustment of duty after final assessment, or, in the case of reassessment, from the date of reassessment.
    • The High Court accepted that once provisional assessment is completed and an assessee becomes entitled to refund, the refund application has to be made within the period prescribed under Section 27 read with Section 27(1B).
    • The crucial question, however, was whether limitation could operate against an assessee before the final assessment had actually been communicated to it.

    GAIL’s August 2016 Letter Became Crucial

    • A significant factual circumstance was GAIL’s letter dated 19 August 2016.
    • The adjudicating authority itself had recorded that this letter requested the Department to finalise the Customs duty/final assessment. Customs rejected GAIL’s argument that this letter itself should be treated as a refund claim, observing that it was merely a request for early finalisation and was unrelated to a refund application.
    • But that finding had another consequence.
    • The Gujarat High Court observed that the very fact that GAIL was requesting finalisation on 19 August 2016 indicated that, until then, the assessee was not aware that the final assessments had already been completed.
    • This became an important factual basis for rejecting Revenue’s limitation argument.

    Mere Upload on Customs Portal Is Not Sufficient Communication

    The most important part of the judgment is the High Court’s finding concerning electronic uploading of the assessment order.

    The Court held:

    • β€œMerely because the Custom Department has uploaded the final assessment orders on portal is not sufficient compliance of intimation to the assessee…”
    • The Court treated communication of the final assessment as a condition sine qua non for the assessee to exercise the statutory right of seeking refund within one year under Section 27(1B)(c).
    • It further held that CESTAT had correctly considered the documents showing when the finalisation of provisional assessments was actually communicated to GAIL.
    • The decision therefore draws an important distinction between an order merely being available electronically on a departmental portal and the order being communicated to the person whose statutory remedy depends upon knowledge of that order.

    Gujarat High Court Dismisses Revenue’s Appeal

    • The High Court found no infirmity in CESTAT’s order and held that no question of law, much less any substantial question of law, arose for consideration.
    • The Revenue’s appeal was therefore dismissed as being devoid of merit.
    • Thus, GAIL (India) Ltd. succeeded before the Gujarat High Court on the limitation dispute concerning its Customs refund claim.

    Why the Judgment Is Important for Importers

    • The decision has considerable practical importance for importers whose Bills of Entry have been provisionally assessed under Section 18 and who subsequently become entitled to refund following finalisation.
    • The judgment establishes that the Department cannot necessarily rely only upon the internal date of final assessment or the fact that the assessment was uploaded on ICEGATE when the importer was not shown to have been duly informed of the finalisation.
    • For refund disputes under Section 27(1B)(c), evidence relating to communication or service of the final assessment can therefore become critical in determining whether the refund application is within limitation.
    • The judgment is particularly relevant where Customs argues that the importer should have independently monitored the portal even though no effective communication of the final assessment was established.

    Key Legal Principle

    The principle emerging from the judgment can be stated succinctly:

    Where refund arises following finalisation of provisional assessment under Section 18 of the Customs Act, the statutory limitation under Section 27(1B)(c) cannot effectively be invoked against the assessee merely on the basis that the final assessment was uploaded on the Customs portal. Communication of the final assessment to the assessee is essential before limitation can operate against the refund claim.

    The ruling therefore reinforces the procedural importance of actual communication of Customs assessment orders, particularly where commencement of a limitation period affects an importer’s substantive right to claim refund.

    Connected Matter

    CESTAT Chennai: Refund Limitation Cannot Begin Before Final Assessment Order Is Communicated to Importer

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Gujarat High Court

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Supreme Court Acquits Man Sentenced to 10 Years; Finds Serious Lapses in NDPS Sampling Procedure

    Supreme Court Acquits Man Sentenced to 10 Years; Finds Serious Lapses in NDPS Sampling Procedure

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 18.09.2026

    Supreme Court Acquits Man Sentenced to 10 Years; Finds Serious Lapses in NDPS Sampling Procedure

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    The Supreme Court has acquitted a man sentenced to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment in an NDPS case after finding serious deficiencies in the seizure and sampling process, including failure to draw representative samples in the presence of a Magistrate and non-compliance with the procedure contemplated under Section 52A of the NDPS Act.

    In Nadeem Ahamed v. State of West Bengal, the Court held that the cumulative procedural lapses made the integrity of the seizure and sampling process doubtful. It further held that the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report could not be read in evidence, leaving no acceptable evidence to establish that the substance allegedly recovered from the appellant was heroin. The conviction was consequently set aside and Nadeem Ahamed was acquitted.

    Trial Court Had Sentenced Accused to 10 Years’ Rigorous Imprisonment

    • Nadeem Ahamed had been convicted by the Special Court under the NDPS Act at Alipore, West Bengal, for offences punishable under Sections 21(c) and 29 of the NDPS Act.
    • By its judgment dated August 24, 2021 and sentencing order dated August 26, 2021, the Trial Court sentenced him to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of β‚Ή1 lakh, with a further six months’ rigorous imprisonment in default of payment of the fine.
    • His appeal before the Calcutta High Court was filed with a delay of 1,183 days. The High Court declined to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal without examining the conviction on merits.

    Alleged Recovery of 125 Grams of Heroin

    • According to the prosecution, on July 16, 2018, police received information that two men would arrive near Pragati Maidan Police Station in Kolkata to supply heroin.
    • A raiding team intercepted Nadeem Ahamed and co-accused Amit Dutta alias Rakesh. The accused opted to be searched in the presence of a Gazetted Officer.
    • The prosecution claimed that approximately 130 grams of suspected heroin was recovered from Amit Dutta, while 125 grams was recovered from Nadeem.
    • The combined weight of the substances was 255 grams, and the prosecution treated the recovery as commercial quantity. One sample weighing 10 grams was drawn from each packet and marked S1 and S2.
    • The samples were subsequently sent to the FSL, which reported that both tested positive for heroin.

    Supreme Court Says High Court Was Wrong to Dismiss Appeal Solely on Delay

    • Before considering the merits, the Supreme Court strongly disagreed with the Calcutta High Court’s decision to dismiss the criminal appeal merely because it had been filed late.
    • The Court noted that Nadeem had remained incarcerated since his initial apprehension and did not have the financial means to file his appeal within time.
    • It held that rejecting his statutory appeal solely on delay was β€œtoo harsh and unjustified”. The High Court ought to have condoned the delay and decided the appeal on merits.
    • Instead of remanding the caseβ€”which would have caused further delayβ€”the Supreme Court itself examined the merits of the conviction.

    Two Separate Recoveries Could Not Automatically Be Clubbed Together

    • A major error identified by the Supreme Court concerned the treatment of the two recoveries as one combined commercial quantity.
    • The Court held that merely because Nadeem and Amit Dutta were walking side-by-side, were apprehended simultaneously and were individually carrying suspected narcotics did not establish that either knew about the substance carried by the other.
    • Such circumstances could create suspicion, but the Court reiterated that β€œsuspicion… cannot take place of proof.”
    • To invoke conspiracy under Section 29 and club the quantities recovered from two separate individuals, the prosecution was required to produce positive and tangible evidence demonstrating prior knowledge or conspiracy.
    • The Supreme Court found no such evidence. Apart from the allegation that the two men were walking together and were searched one after another, there was no material establishing a prior conspiracy.

    125 Grams and 130 Grams Could Not Be Clubbed to Cross Commercial-Quantity Threshold

    • The Trial Court had combined the alleged recoveries of 125 grams and 130 grams, resulting in a total of 255 grams, and treated this as exceeding the commercial-quantity threshold of 250 grams.
    • The Supreme Court found this approach legally unsustainable in the absence of evidence proving conspiracy between the two accused.
    • Relying upon Amarsingh Ramjibhai Barot v. State of Gujarat, (2005) 7 SCC 550, the Court held that the Trial Court had committed a grave factual error by clubbing the heroin allegedly recovered from two distinct individuals merely to bring the total above the commercial-quantity threshold.

    Serious Defects Found in Sampling Procedure

    • The Supreme Court then examined the manner in which the alleged contraband was sampled and found several significant deficiencies.
    • The seizure officer had collected only one sample from each packet. The Court noted that this was contrary to Clause 2.2 of Standing Order No. 1 of 1989 dated June 13, 1989, issued by the Anti-Smuggling Unit, Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance.
    • The Standing Order contemplated that samples from seized narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances should be drawn in duplicate at the spot of recovery, in the presence of the panch witnesses and the person from whom the substance was recovered.
    • The Court referred to Noor Aga v. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 417, where the Supreme Court had emphasised compliance with such guidelines, particularly in penal proceedings.

    Accused’s Signatures Missing From Sample and Mother Packets

    • Another serious discrepancy concerned the signatures on the seized material.
    • The seizure officer claimed that the accused, Gazetted Officer and witnesses had signed the seizure list and labels. However, when the sample packets were opened during trial, the Court found that the labels did not bear the accused-appellant’s signatures.
    • After examining the evidence, the Supreme Court recorded that neither the mother packet nor the sample packets bore Nadeem’s signatures when they were opened and exhibited before the Trial Court.
    • This discrepancy further undermined the reliability and integrity of the sampling process.

    No Separate Sample Seizure List, Test Memo or Weighment Chart

    • The Court identified additional gaps in the prosecution evidence.
    • No separate seizure list had been prepared for the samples drawn from the appellant. There was also no test memo or weighment chart prepared at the spot, and no specimen seal memo was proved during the seizure officer’s evidence.
    • Although two independent witnesses had allegedly participated in the proceedings, only one was examined by the prosecution, without explaining why the other was withheld.

    Complete Failure to Follow Section 52A Procedure

    • The most significant deficiency identified by the Supreme Court concerned Section 52A(2) of the NDPS Act.
    • The record showed that neither the seizure officer nor the officer-in-charge undertook the statutory procedure concerning inventory and sampling in the presence of a Magistrate.
    • The Trial Court itself had noted that the seizure officer could not even state whether an inventory list had been prepared at the time of the raid.
    • The Supreme Court consequently held that there had been a β€œcomplete and unexplained failure” to adhere to Section 52A.
    • Neither representative samples were drawn in the presence of a Magistrate nor was an inventory prepared and certified as contemplated by law.
    • According to the Court, these lapses went to the root of the prosecution case and rendered the integrity of the seizure and sampling process wholly doubtful.

    Section 52A Not Mandatory Per Se, But Cumulative Lapses Proved Fatal

    • Importantly, the Supreme Court did not hold that every breach of Section 52A automatically results in acquittal.
    • The Court expressly clarified that the procedure under Section 52A had not been considered mandatory by the Supreme Court.
    • However, in the present case, the failure to draw samples in accordance with Standing Order No. 1 of 1989, when considered together with the complete non-compliance with Section 52A, made the seizure and sampling procedure unreliable.
    • The Court went so far as to describe the cumulative procedure as a β€œtotal farce” and β€œunworthy of credence.”
    • This qualification is particularly important: the decision turns on the combined effect of multiple serious procedural defects, rather than laying down a rule of automatic acquittal for every Section 52A irregularity.

    FSL Report Loses Evidentiary Significance

    • The consequence of the defective sampling procedure was decisive.
    • The Supreme Court held that the FSL report lost significance because of the flawed manner in which samples had been collected, coupled with the total failure to comply with Section 52A.
    • It ultimately held that the FSL report could not be read in evidence. Once the forensic report was excluded, there was no acceptable evidence proving that the substance allegedly recovered from Nadeem was heroin within the meaning of the NDPS Act.

    Conviction Set Aside; Nadeem Ahamed Acquitted

    • The Supreme Court consequently set aside the impugned judgments and acquitted Nadeem Ahamed of the charges.
    • It directed that he be released from custody forthwith, unless his detention was required in any other case.
    • The appeals were accordingly allowed.

    Key Takeaway

    The ruling underscores two important safeguards in NDPS prosecutions.

    First, narcotics allegedly recovered separately from two accused cannot automatically be aggregated to reach commercial quantity merely because they were apprehended together. Where the prosecution relies on Section 29 conspiracy to combine the quantities, it must establish conspiracy through positive and tangible evidence rather than suspicion or conjecture.

    Second, although the Supreme Court did not treat Section 52A compliance as invariably mandatory in every case, serious and cumulative deficiencies in sampling, sealing, identification, inventory and Magistrate-supervised procedures can undermine the integrity of the alleged contraband itself.

    Where those deficiencies render the sampling process unreliable, even a positive FSL report may cease to provide a safe evidentiary foundation for conviction.

    Connected Matter

    Supreme Court Acquits Two in NDPS Case Over Broken Chain of Custody: Says FSL Report Cannot Survive Serious Gaps in Sample Integrity

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Supreme Court

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  • Bombay HC: RERA Tribunal Cannot Grant Declaration, Permanent Injunction or Cancel Sanction Plan

    Bombay HC: RERA Tribunal Cannot Grant Declaration, Permanent Injunction or Cancel Sanction Plan

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 18.09.2026

    Bombay HC: RERA Tribunal Cannot Grant Declaration, Permanent Injunction or Cancel Sanction Plan

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id amitnaren@outlook.com .  

    In a significant ruling concerning the interface between RERA and the jurisdiction of civil courts, the Bombay High Court has dismissed a revision application filed by Macrotech Developers Limited, holding that the bar under Section 79 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 does not extend to reliefs that the RERA authorities are not empowered to grant.

    Justice Milind N. Jadhav held that a dispute involving a cooperative housing society’s substantive rights over an existing clubhouse and internal roads, coupled with prayers for declaration, permanent injunction and cancellation of a sanctioned development plan, could be adjudicated by the Civil Court because RERA does not empower its authorities to grant such reliefs.

    The High Court consequently upheld the Trial Court’s refusal to reject the suit under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure and dismissed Macrotech Developers’ Civil Revision Application.

    Dispute Relates to Lodha Belmondo Project in Pune

    • Macrotech Developers Limited was the promoter of the Lodha Belmondo development project at Village Gahunje, Taluka Maval, District Pune. The project comprised multiple towers and villas over a large parcel of land.
    • Saint Andrews Co-operative Housing Society represented flat owners in various towers and villas situated within an area described as β€œThe Reserve” in the Lodha Belmondo project.
    • According to the Society, the project had been marketed from around 2012–2013 and agreements for sale had been entered into with purchasers. Its case was that Towers B, C and D and Villas 1–28, along with other towers, were integral parts of β€œThe Reserve.”

    Multiple Sanction Plans and Clubhouse at Centre of Dispute

    • The judgment records a series of sanctioned development plans.
    • A third sanctioned plan dated April 30, 2013 showed six buildings and 28 villas as part of β€œThe Reserve”. A fifth sanctioned plan dated June 22, 2018 specifically referred to a clubhouse for members of β€œThe Reserve”. A subsequent seventh sanctioned plan dated September 20, 2021, however, showed the clubhouse near Tower No. 26 as proposed to be demolished.
    • Members of the Society had received possession of their flats in 2017 following issuance of an Occupation Certificate, while the Society itself was registered in March 2021.
    • The dispute escalated in October 2022 when Macrotech’s workers allegedly prevented Society members from entering and using the clubhouse on the ground that the existing facility was to be demolished and replaced.

    Society Approaches Civil Court

    • The Society instituted a civil suit seeking, among other things, a declaration regarding the clubhouse situated behind Tower No. 26 and an injunction restraining the developer and its representatives from preventing members from accessing the clubhouse.
    • It also sought to prevent demolition or additional construction pursuant to changes made in the layout and the seventh sanctioned plan.
    • The Trial Court rejected Macrotech Developers’ application under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC seeking rejection of the plaint as barred by law.
    • Macrotech thereafter approached the Bombay High Court by way of the present Civil Revision Application challenging that order.

    Macrotech: Section 79 RERA Bars Civil Court Jurisdiction

    • Macrotech argued that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction because Section 79 of RERA expressly bars Civil Courts from entertaining matters that fall within the jurisdiction of the authorities constituted under RERA.
    • The developer contended that once a project is registered under RERA, disputes arising out of or incidental to that project must be pursued before the competent forum under the statute.
    • Macrotech also relied upon Section 149 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act and argued that the suit was barred under that enactment as well.
    • It relied, inter alia, on the Supreme Court’s ruling in New Tech Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1044, to contend that RERA applies to ongoing projects which had not received completion certificates before the legislation came into force.
    • Macrotech also relied on Imperia Structures Ltd. v. Anil Patni & Anr., (2020) 10 SCC 783, and argued that the Society could pursue appropriate remedies before the RERA forum or Consumer Forum rather than the Civil Court.

    Society: RERA Cannot Grant the Declaratory Reliefs Sought

    • The Society opposed the revision and argued that it was itself a separate legal entity registered under the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 and was not an individual β€œallottee” within the meaning of RERA.
    • It further argued that Section 79 could not operate as a blanket exclusion of Civil Court jurisdiction in disputes between a cooperative housing society and a promoter.
    • More importantly, the Society contended that it had sought declaratory and other civil reliefs that RERA authorities could not grant.
    • According to the Society, Civil Courts retain jurisdiction over civil disputes unless expressly or impliedly barred, and the nature of the relief sought was therefore crucial in deciding jurisdiction.

    Bombay HC Explains Test Under Order VII Rule 11(d)

    • The High Court reiterated that while considering rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11, the Court must examine the averments contained in the plaint along with its annexures as a whole.
    • At this stage, material outside the plaint cannot be added or subtracted to determine whether the suit is barred by law.
    • The Court observed that rejection under Order VII Rule 11(d) is justified only when the plaint itself discloses that the action is legally barred.
    • In the present case, the Society sought a declaration that the clubhouse behind Tower No. 26 was an integral part of β€œThe Reserve”, a permanent injunction against its demolition, and a declaration challenging the September 20, 2021 sanction plan to the extent it contemplated demolition of the existing clubhouse and construction of another structure in its place.

    Section 79 RERA Is Not a Blanket Bar Against Civil Suits

    • The High Court then examined Sections 79, 88 and 89 of RERA.
    • Section 79 bars Civil Courts from entertaining suits or proceedings concerning matters that the RERA Authority, Adjudicating Officer or Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine.
    • However, Section 88 expressly provides that RERA operates β€œin addition to, and not in derogation of” other laws, while Section 89 gives RERA overriding effect where inconsistency exists.
    • Reading these provisions together, the High Court held that RERA is not the sole remedy for every dispute between allottees and promoters/developers.
    • The Section 79 bar applies only to those matters that the authorities constituted under RERA are actually empowered to determine.

    Can RERA Authority Grant the Same Relief as a Civil Court? Bombay HC Applies Supreme Court Test

    • The High Court relied upon the Supreme Court’s judgment in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, (1985) 4 SCC 10.
    • The principle applied was that even where a special statute creates a tribunal and accords finality to its decisions, exclusion of Civil Court jurisdiction depends materially upon whether the statutory tribunal is capable of granting the relief that a Civil Court would ordinarily grant.
    • Where the specialised forum does not possess the power to grant such relief, exclusion of Civil Court jurisdiction cannot readily be inferred.
    • This became the decisive principle in the case.

    RERA Tribunal Cannot Grant Declaration, Permanent Injunction and Cancellation of Sanction Plan: Bombay HC

    Applying the above principle, Justice Jadhav held that the dispute involved the Society’s substantive right to use an existing clubhouse and its challenge to a subsequent sanctioned plan allegedly validated without its approval.

    The Court specifically found an β€œapparent and glaring absence” of provisions under RERA empowering its authorities to adjudicate reliefs in the nature of:

    • declaration;
    • permanent injunction; and
    • cancellation of a sanction plan approved by the Planning Authority.

    Consequently, such a dispute could not be said to fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the authorities constituted under RERA.

    Society’s Right to Use Clubhouse Had β€œCrystallized”

    • The High Court also took note of the factual history of the clubhouse.
    • The clubhouse had appeared in the fifth sanctioned plan dated June 22, 2018, had subsequently been constructed, and was being used by members of the Society.
    • The seventh sanctioned plan dated September 20, 2021 proposed its demolition. The Court noted that the Society’s consent had admittedly not been obtained before the seventh plan was validated or proposed.
    • The Court observed that the Society members’ right to use the clubhouse had already β€œstood crystallized and in place since inception and on construction of the Clubhouse.”
    • The dispute also involved internal roads that were allegedly proposed to be constructed upon pursuant to the seventh sanctioned plan without the Society’s consent.

    Civil Court Alone Can Grant Appropriate Relief in Such Circumstances

    • The High Court concluded that the substantive rights claimed by the Society could be protected through the civil suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
    • It rejected Macrotech Developers’ contention that the Society’s remedy lay before the RERA Tribunal and held that, in the circumstances before it, the Civil Court could entertain the dispute and grant appropriate reliefs.
    • Accordingly, the Court upheld the Trial Court’s order refusing to reject the plaint and dismissed Macrotech Developers’ Civil Revision Application.

    Important Clarification: Merits of Society’s Suit Not Finally Decided

    • The ruling should not be read as a final determination that the seventh sanctioned plan is invalid or that the Society has conclusively established all of the substantive rights asserted in its suit.
    • The High Court expressly clarified that its findings were prima facie and restricted to the revision proceedings, and that they should not influence the ultimate adjudication of the underlying suit. The parties’ other contentions and remedies were kept open.
    • Thus, Saint Andrews Co-operative Housing Society succeeded on the jurisdiction/maintainability issue, while the underlying civil dispute remains to be adjudicated on merits.

    Key Legal Takeaway

    The judgment reinforces that Section 79 of RERA does not create a universal bar against Civil Court jurisdiction merely because a dispute concerns a RERA-registered real estate project.

    The decisive inquiry is whether the particular matter and relief sought are within the statutory powers of the RERA Authority, Adjudicating Officer or Appellate Tribunal. Where the dispute requires relief such as a civil declaration, permanent injunction or cancellation of a sanctioned development plan that the RERA forum is not empowered to grant, the Civil Court’s jurisdiction may remain available.

    Connected Matter

    Bombay High Court: Section 79 RERA Bars Civil Suit Where Reliefs Can Be Granted by RERA Authority

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Bombay High Court

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  • Bombay High Court: Arbitral Tribunal’s Mandate Can Be Extended Even After Expiry if β€œSufficient Cause” Is Shown

    Bombay High Court: Arbitral Tribunal’s Mandate Can Be Extended Even After Expiry if β€œSufficient Cause” Is Shown

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 18.09.2026

    Bombay High Court: Arbitral Tribunal’s Mandate Can Be Extended Even After Expiry if β€œSufficient Cause” Is Shown

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Arbitrator Shobhit Mallik. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id shobhit.Ica23@gmail.com .

    The Bombay High Court has allowed a petition filed by SAP India Private Limited seeking extension of the mandate of an arbitral tribunal constituted by the Supreme Court, holding that where arbitral proceedings could not conclude for reasons beyond the control of the party or tribunal, and the delay was not attributable to wilful or deliberate default, refusing an extension despite sufficient cause could defeat the purpose of arbitration.

    Justice Arif S. Doctor, in SAP India Private Limited v. Cox and Kings Limited, Commercial Arbitration Petition No. 865 of 2026, pronounced the judgment on September 10, 2026. The Court extended the time available to the arbitral tribunal to make its award by one year from the date on which the High Court’s order was uploaded.

    Dispute Between SAP India and Cox & Kings

    • The dispute arose from a contract between SAP India and Cox & Kings for the provision of business software and related implementation services. Clause 15.7 of the General Terms and Conditions provided for arbitration.
    • SAP claimed that certain amounts remained outstanding under the contractual arrangement and moved an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
    • By an order dated January 2, 2019, the Supreme Court constituted a three-member arbitral tribunal. The tribunal was presided over by former Supreme Court judge Justice Madan B. Lokur, and was referred to in the judgment as the β€œJustice Lokur Tribunal.” SAP was the claimant before this tribunal.
    • SAP filed its Statement of Claim on March 22, 2019, seeking approximately β‚Ή17.98 crore from Cox & Kings. Cox & Kings subsequently filed its Statement of Defence and Counter-claim on July 31, 2019, claiming approximately β‚Ή45.99 crore from SAP.

    CIRP Moratorium Brought Arbitration to a Halt

    • A major turn occurred on October 22, 2019, when the National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai admitted Cox & Kings into the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP).
    • Consequently, the statutory moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) came into operation, staying legal proceedings against the company.
    • Because of the moratorium, the Justice Lokur Tribunal informed the parties on November 5, 2019 that the arbitral proceedings stood adjourned sine die.
    • Cox & Kings was subsequently ordered into liquidation by the NCLT on December 16, 2021. SAP lodged its claim with the Liquidator in February 2022, and the Liquidator admitted it at a nominal value of Re. 1, recording that the liability could not be quantified because of the ongoing arbitration proceedings.

    Second Arbitration Added Another Layer to the Dispute

    • Meanwhile, Cox & Kings had issued a fresh arbitration notice against SAP India and its parent company, SAP SE.
    • On September 9, 2024, the Supreme Court appointed former Bombay High Court Chief Justice Justice Mohit Shah as sole arbitrator to adjudicate those disputes. The High Court referred to this as the β€œJustice Shah Tribunal.”
    • Cox & Kings initially claimed β‚Ή45.99 crore before the Justice Shah Tribunal and subsequently amended its claim to β‚Ή45,99,71,097.
    • SAP argued that this amount was virtually identical to the counter-claim Cox & Kings had already raised before the Justice Lokur Tribunal. SAP consequently challenged the jurisdiction of the Justice Shah Tribunal under Section 16 of the Arbitration Act, but its objections were rejected.
    • SAP pursued the jurisdictional issue before the Bombay High Court and then the Supreme Court. Its Special Leave Petition was ultimately dismissed on January 23, 2026.

    SAP Sought Revival of Original Arbitration

    • Soon after the Supreme Court proceedings ended, SAP approached the Justice Lokur Tribunal on February 2, 2026, seeking resumption and continuation of its original arbitration.
    • Cox & Kings opposed the request, contending that the Justice Lokur Tribunal had become functus officio and no longer possessed jurisdiction to revive the proceedings. It also pointed to the existence of the Justice Shah Tribunal and SAP’s claim in the liquidation process.
    • The Justice Lokur Tribunal ultimately directed SAP to approach the Bombay High Court for an extension of time. SAP accordingly filed the present petition under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

    SAP: Delay Was Caused by Circumstances Beyond Its Control

    • SAP argued that it had diligently pursued its claims and that the original arbitration could not proceed because of circumstances outside its control.
    • It relied on the commencement of CIRP, the statutory moratorium, the COVID-19 limitation exclusion period and Cox & Kings’ subsequent pursuit of another arbitration involving substantially the same subject matter.
    • SAP therefore argued that it had established β€œsufficient cause” under Section 29A(5) for extending the Justice Lokur Tribunal’s mandate.

    Cox & Kings Opposed Extension, Alleging Unexplained Delay

    • Cox & Kings argued that Section 29A(5) does not permit extension as a matter of course and that SAP had failed to explain a substantial intervening period.
    • It contended that SAP could have sought extension much earlier and characterised SAP’s conduct as β€œfence-sitting”, alleging that SAP attempted to revive the Justice Lokur arbitration only after its challenges to the Justice Shah Tribunal had failed.
    • Cox & Kings also argued that reviving the Justice Lokur Tribunal would serve little purpose because it was already in liquidation and SAP’s claim had been admitted in the liquidation process.
    • Another concern raised was the possibility of parallel arbitrations producing inconsistent or conflicting findings, because the claims before the two tribunals arose from the same contractual framework.

    Bombay High Court: Section 29A Extension Can Be Granted Even After Mandate Expires

    • The High Court rejected the proposition that the application must fail merely because the tribunal’s mandate had already expired.
    • Relying upon Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Ltd., the Court reiterated that time for completing arbitral proceedings can be extended even after expiry of the initial 12-month period or the extended six-month period.
    • The real question was therefore not simply when the application was filed, but whether SAP had demonstrated sufficient cause under Section 29A(5).

    β€œSufficient Cause” Must Be Examined in Context of Purpose of Arbitration

    • The Court emphasised that Section 29A is intended to ensure expeditious arbitral proceedings, but the power of extension requires examination of the particular facts and circumstances.
    • Referring to C. Velusamy v. K. Indhera and Ajay Protech Pvt. Ltd. v. General Manager & Anr., the High Court observed that β€œsufficient cause” must be understood in the context of arbitration’s underlying purposeβ€”the resolution of disputes through the mechanism chosen by the parties.
    • The Court held, in substance, that where arbitration does not conclude within the prescribed timeline because of circumstances beyond the parties’ or tribunal’s control, and the delay is not caused by wilful default or a deliberate attempt to delay proceedings by the party seeking extension, it would be unjust to refuse condonation where sufficient cause is otherwise demonstrated.

    Length of Delay Alone Is Not Decisive

    • An important principle emerging from the judgment is that a long delay does not, by itself, automatically defeat a Section 29A petition.
    • The Court distinguished decisions relied upon by Cox & Kings where extensions had been refused because the intervening delay was not satisfactorily explained.
    • According to the High Court, the decisive consideration in those cases was the absence of sufficient cause, rather than merely the length of time that had passed.
    • This distinction is important for Section 29A applications because it requires courts to examine why the arbitration was delayed, rather than applying an inflexible rule based solely on the duration of the delay.

    SAP Was Justified in Pursuing Jurisdictional Challenge

    • The Court also rejected the contention that SAP had simply sat on its rights.
    • When the Supreme Court appointed the Justice Shah Tribunal in 2024, it had kept open SAP’s rights and contentions to raise its jurisdictional objections before that tribunal.
    • The Bombay High Court therefore found that SAP was justified in pursuing its challenge to the jurisdiction of the Justice Shah Tribunal.
    • After the Supreme Court dismissed SAP’s SLP on January 23, 2026, SAP approached the Justice Lokur Tribunal on February 2, 2026β€”within a short periodβ€”to seek resumption of its original arbitration.
    • The High Court considered this conduct inconsistent with any suggestion that SAP had abandoned the Justice Lokur proceedings.

    β€œFence-Sitter” Argument Rejected

    • The Court consequently rejected Cox & Kings’ characterisation of SAP as a β€œfence sitter”.
    • It noted that the original proceedings had stopped after Cox & Kings entered CIRP and the Section 14 IBC moratorium became operative. Cox & Kings subsequently initiated another arbitration involving a claim virtually identical to the counter-claim it had raised before the Justice Lokur Tribunal.
    • Against this factual background, SAP’s pursuit of jurisdictional remedies before the Justice Shah Tribunal and higher courts could not be treated simply as abandonment or negligent inactivity.

    Liquidation Does Not By Itself Defeat Section 29A Extension

    • Cox & Kings had also argued that extending the tribunal’s mandate would be futile because the company was already in liquidation.
    • The Court did not accept this as a reason to refuse the Section 29A extension.
    • It noted, among other things, SAP’s reliance on Regulation 29 of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016, concerning mutual credits and set-off. The Court clarified that questions relating to the effect of liquidation and objections concerning SAP’s claim could be raised before the arbitral tribunal and did not have to be finally determined while deciding the Section 29A application.

    Court Finds β€œSufficient Cause” for Extension

    • After considering the unusual procedural history, the Bombay High Court concluded that SAP had established sufficient cause for extension of the Justice Lokur Tribunal’s mandate.
    • Crucially, the Court found that the delay in completion of the arbitration could not, in the circumstances, be attributed to any deliberate, wilful or negligent default on the part of SAP, much less to the tribunal.
    • The Court reasoned that allowing the mandate to lapse without giving SAP an opportunity to have its pending claim adjudicated would defeat rather than advance the underlying object of the arbitral process.

    Justice Lokur Tribunal Gets One-Year Extension

    • Accordingly, the Bombay High Court allowed SAP India’s petition and extended the time available to the Justice Lokur Tribunal to make its award by one year.
    • The one-year extended period will run from the date on which a copy of the High Court’s order was uploaded.
    • The Court made no order as to costs.
    • Thus, SAP India succeeded in obtaining the Section 29A extension. Importantly, however, the ruling does not decide the merits of SAP’s underlying β‚Ή17.98 crore contractual claim against Cox & Kings; it permits that pending claim to proceed before the arbitral tribunal.

    Key Legal Takeaway

    The judgment reinforces that Section 29A is not an inflexible limitation mechanism under which expiry of an arbitral tribunal’s mandate automatically forecloses an extension.

    A post-expiry application can be entertained, but the applicant must establish β€œsufficient cause”. In assessing that requirement, courts may consider the entire procedural history, whether circumstances outside the applicant’s control interrupted the arbitration, whether the applicant acted diligently once those impediments ended, and whether the delay resulted from wilful or negligent conduct.

    The ruling also demonstrates that the mere passage of a substantial period is not necessarily determinative. The central enquiry remains whether the delay has been satisfactorily explained in the factual circumstances of the particular arbitration.

    Connected Matter

    Supreme Court: Section 29A Application Can Be Filed Even After Arbitrator’s Mandate Expires

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Bombay High Court

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  • Gujarat HC Quashes Copyright FIR Over Alleged Counterfeit Apple Accessories; Says Trademark Dispute Cannot Be Camouflaged as Copyright Offence to Bypass Statutory Safeguards

    Gujarat HC Quashes Copyright FIR Over Alleged Counterfeit Apple Accessories; Says Trademark Dispute Cannot Be Camouflaged as Copyright Offence to Bypass Statutory Safeguards

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 18.09.2026

    Gujarat HC Quashes Copyright FIR Over Alleged Counterfeit Apple Accessories; Says Trademark Dispute Cannot Be Camouflaged as Copyright Offence to Bypass Statutory Safeguards

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    In an important ruling concerning the overlap between copyright and trademark enforcement in counterfeit-goods cases, the Gujarat High Court has quashed an FIR registered against a shopkeeper following the seizure of alleged counterfeit Apple-branded electronic accessories worth approximately β‚Ή15.11 lakh.

    Justice P. M. Raval held that commercial hardware such as AirPods, cables, power adapters and smartwatches does not, merely by being counterfeit or bearing a registered brand, constitute a literary or artistic work for the purpose of attracting criminal liability under Section 63 of the Copyright Act.

    The Court further held that the authorities could not subsequently sustain the case under the Trade Marks Act because the raid itself had been conducted without complying with the mandatory safeguards under Section 115(4)β€”including obtaining the prior opinion of the Registrar of Trade Marks and having the search and seizure conducted by an officer of the statutorily prescribed rank.

    FIR Registered Under Copyright Act Following Raid on Ahmedabad Shop

    • The petitioner, Jitendrabhai Mohanbhai Kriplani, approached the High Court under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of FIR C.R. No. 11191026220492 of 2022, registered on October 19, 2022 at Kalupur Police Station, Ahmedabad City.
    • The FIR invoked Sections 51, 63 and 64 of the Copyright Act, 1957.
    • The complainant was a manager of Griffin Intellectual Property Service Pvt. Ltd., which, according to the FIR, had been authorised by Apple Inc. to take legal action against persons allegedly infringing Apple’s rights or selling counterfeit iPhones, iPads, MacBooks, mobile phones and accessories.
    • Acting on information concerning alleged counterfeit Apple products being sold in shops in the Kalupur area, the complainant approached the police. A raid was subsequently conducted at β€œRaj Cover House”, where the petitioner was present.

    β‚Ή15.11 Lakh Worth of Alleged Counterfeit Apple Products Seized

    • According to the FIR, the authorities recovered several categories of allegedly counterfeit Apple-branded products, including AirPods, USB cables, power adapters, a smartwatch and different kinds of Apple-branded stickers and barcode/MRP labels.
    • The FIR placed the aggregate value of the seized items at β‚Ή15,11,193.
    • The key question before the High Court was whether allegations concerning the possession or sale of such duplicate commercial products could legally sustain criminal proceedings for copyright infringement.

    Petitioner: Counterfeit Hardware Is Not a Copyrightable β€œWork”

    • The petitioner argued that the seized goods did not fall within the categories of works protected under Section 13 of the Copyright Act.
    • His case was that AirPods, cables, adapters, smartwatches and similar electronic products were commercial articles rather than literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works.
    • Accordingly, the ingredients necessary for invoking Sections 63 and 64 of the Copyright Act were absent.
    • The petitioner further argued that if the allegation was actually one of misuse of Apple’s trademark on counterfeit goods, the case would fall under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, rather than being converted into a copyright prosecution.

    Gujarat HC: Commercial Hardware Is Not Literary or Artistic Work

    • The High Court accepted the central distinction advanced by the petitioner.
    • It held that copyright protection under Section 13 read with Section 2(c) is confined to protected categories of works, whereas hardware components, cables, power adapters and electronic devices are commercial industrial products.
    • The Court observed that misuse of a brand name or manufacture of duplicate hardware bearing a trademark would ordinarily constitute trademark falsification punishable under Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act, rather than an offence under the Copyright Act.
    • It consequently held that mere possession or sale of counterfeit commercial goods or accessories bearing brand labels does not, by itself, satisfy the requirements of Sections 13 and 63 of the Copyright Act.

    FIR Failed to Identify Any Specific Copyrighted Literary or Artistic Work

    • The Court then examined whether the stickers, seals, packaging labels and other material allegedly recovered could independently support the copyright prosecution.
    • It noted that the FIR merely described the seized articles as goods infringing Apple’s copyright and bearing Apple’s trademark.
    • Crucially, however, the FIR did not identify any specific copyrighted literary workβ€”such as an instruction sheet or user manualβ€”or any specific artistic work such as an original graphical layout or packaging design whose copyright had allegedly been infringed.
    • The Court stressed that copyright is a statutory right, and an FIR invoking Section 63 must set out how the material allegedly infringed satisfies the statutory definition of a protected work under Sections 2 and 13.

    No User Manuals or Instruction Manuals Were Actually Seized

    • The complainant argued that product literature, packaging, labels and instruction manuals constituted original literary or artistic works belonging to Apple.
    • The High Court, however, examined the investigation papers and found that no instruction manual or user leaflet had actually been recovered or seized from the petitioner’s shop.
    • The Court said a new factual foundation could not be introduced during oral arguments when it was absent from the police recovery memo.
    • The recovery panchnama was also silent regarding any user or instruction manual. Photographs produced later through an affidavit-in-reply, which were not part of the investigation papers, could not be relied upon to cure that deficiency.

    MRP Tags and Barcodes Are Functional Data, Not Automatically Literary Works

    • The Court also addressed the argument that stickers, MRP labels and barcodes constituted literary works.
    • It held that an inclusive definition of β€œliterary work” cannot be stretched so far as to convert every commercial label or container into a literary work.
    • An MRP price tag, standard barcode or technical model sticker contains essentially functional and factual information, the Court observed, and cannot automatically be treated as an original literary work of authorship.
    • This distinction was central to the Court’s conclusion that the alleged counterfeit hardware and functional labels could not sustain the criminal copyright case as framed in the FIR.

    β€œCannot Camouflage a Trademark Dispute as a Copyright Offence”

    • One of the most significant observations in the judgment concerns attempts to invoke copyright law where the substance of the allegation is trademark counterfeiting.
    • The Court found that the primary allegation was the sale of counterfeit Apple hardware and accessories, a subject that fell within Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act.
    • It held that the complainant could not camouflage a trademark dispute as a copyright offence in a manner that bypassed the procedural safeguards prescribed for trademark searches and seizures under Section 115 of the Trade Marks Act.

    Could the Case Continue Under the Trade Marks Act?

    • Having found Section 63 of the Copyright Act unsustainable, the High Court considered the respondents’ alternative submission.
    • The complainant and State argued that even if the Copyright Act provisions were incorrectly invoked, the allegations nevertheless disclosed offences under Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
    • In other words, it was argued that incorrect labelling of the statutory provision in the FIR should not prevent the investigation from proceeding under the appropriate law.
    • The High Court rejected this argument because the Trade Marks Act contains its own mandatory safeguards governing search and seizure.

    Prior Opinion of Registrar Under Section 115(4) Is a Statutory Condition Precedent

    • Section 115(4) of the Trade Marks Act requires the police officer, before conducting search and seizure, to obtain the opinion of the Registrar on the facts involved in the offence relating to the trademark and abide by that opinion.
    • The High Court found from the FIR and police record that no prior written opinion had been sought or obtained from the Registrar of Trade Marks before the raid on Raj Cover House.
    • Justice Raval described this requirement as a β€œstatutory condition precedent” rather than a technical formality.
    • The Court viewed the safeguard as designed to prevent arbitrary police raids on commercial establishments at the instance of private corporate entities.
    • The Court consequently held that a search and seizure conducted in total defiance of Section 115(4) was vitiated.

    Raid Conducted by Officers Below Statutorily Required Rank

    • There was another fundamental procedural defect.
    • The Court noted that Section 115(4) provides that no police officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police or equivalent shall search and seize without warrant in such cases.
    • Although the initial application had been forwarded by the DCP Zone-03 to Kalupur Police Station, the actual raid, search and seizure were carried out under a Police Inspector along with head constables and police constables.
    • The High Court found these officers to be below the statutorily prescribed rank of DSP/ACP and consequently held that they lacked the requisite authority to conduct the search and seizure under the Trade Marks Act.

    Court Finds β€œColourable Exercise of Power”

    • The High Court went further and described the record as demonstrating a β€œclear pattern of colourable exercise of power.”
    • According to the Court, the complainant-company was aware that proceeding under the Trade Marks Act required the Registrar’s prior opinion and execution of the raid by an appropriately ranked police officer.
    • The Court found that what was essentially a trademark dispute had instead been presented as copyright infringement, thereby enabling an immediate raid through local police officers without satisfying those statutory safeguards.
    • The Court held that permitting the prosecution subsequently to fall back upon trademark charges would effectively sanction an evasion of the statutory mandate.
    • It reiterated that the FIR and seizure memo did not disclose recovery of original literary works or user manuals and that the controversy essentially concerned alleged falsification of a registered trademark on commercial accessories.

    Complainant’s Authority to Lodge FIR Was Upheld

    • Importantly, the High Court did not accept every contention raised by the petitioner.
    • The petitioner had challenged the complainant’s locus and authority to institute the proceedings.
    • On examining the authorisation documents, however, the Court found that authority had been given to the agency and, in turn, to its authorised person to lodge the FIR.
    • The petitioner’s objection regarding the complainant’s lack of locus was therefore rejected.
    • Thus, the FIR was not quashed because the complainant lacked authority. It was quashed because the Copyright Act provisions were found inapplicable to the allegations as framed and the statutory requirements necessary for a Trade Marks Act prosecution had not been followed.

    Gujarat HC Quashes FIR and All Consequential Proceedings

    • Summarising its conclusions, the Gujarat High Court held that the allegations did not satisfy the statutory ingredients of Sections 13 and 63 of the Copyright Act, since the commercial hardware in question did not constitute literary or artistic works for the purposes of the prosecution as framed.
    • It further held that Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act could not simply be substituted to save the proceedings because the search, raid and seizure had been conducted in breach of Section 115(4)β€”both because the Registrar’s prior opinion had not been obtained and because the operation was carried out by officers below the prescribed rank.
    • Continuation of the proceedings, the Court concluded, would amount to an abuse of the process of Court and cause grave miscarriage of justice.
    • Accordingly, the High Court allowed Jitendrabhai Kriplani’s petition and quashed FIR C.R. No. 11191026220492 of 2022 dated October 19, 2022 and all consequential proceedings insofar as the petitioner was concerned.

    Why This Judgment Matters

    • The ruling draws an important boundary between copyright enforcement and trademark counterfeiting.
    • The judgment does not hold that counterfeit branded electronic goods are lawful. Rather, it holds that allegations of counterfeiting must be prosecuted under the correct statutory framework, and the procedural safeguards attached to that legislation cannot be avoided by characterising a trademark dispute as copyright infringement.
    • The decision is especially significant for intellectual-property enforcement agencies, brand-protection companies, police authorities, retailers and businesses because it stresses that the choice of statute directly affects the legality of search, seizure and prosecution.
    • Where the substance of an allegation concerns falsification of trademarks on commercial products, authorities cannot use the Copyright Act merely to circumvent the safeguards specifically prescribed by Section 115(4) of the Trade Marks Act.

    Key Takeaway

    Counterfeit commercial hardware bearing a registered brand does not automatically constitute copyright infringement. Where the allegations essentially concern trademark falsification, the Trade Marks Act must be followedβ€”including its mandatory search-and-seizure safeguards. A trademark dispute cannot be dressed up as a copyright case merely to bypass those statutory requirements.

    Connected Matter

    Punjab & Haryana HC: Trade Mark Search & Seizure Cannot Be Conducted by Officer Below DSP Rank

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Gujarat High Court

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  • Karnataka HC Quashes Section 420 Case; Says Commercial Payment Dispute Cannot Be Given Criminal Colour

    Karnataka HC Quashes Section 420 Case; Says Commercial Payment Dispute Cannot Be Given Criminal Colour

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 18.09.2026

    Karnataka HC Quashes Section 420 Case; Says Commercial Payment Dispute Cannot Be Given Criminal Colour

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate G Sridharamurthy. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id sriadv3@gmail.com . 

    In a significant ruling on the misuse of criminal proceedings in commercial disputes, the Karnataka High Court has quashed a cheating case under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 against Deepak Raheja, holding that a dispute predominantly arising from non-payment for work executed in the course of a commercial transaction cannot be converted into a criminal prosecution merely to exert pressure for recovery of money.

    Justice Ravi V. Hosmani held that continuation of the criminal proceedings against the petitioner would amount to an abuse of the process of law, and consequently quashed the proceedings pending before the VIII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru, insofar as Deepak Raheja was concerned.

    Background of the Dispute

    • The case arose from a complaint lodged on December 29, 2014 with the Sanjaynagar Police in Bengaluru by Tanveer Ahmed Haidary, proprietor of M/s TAH & Company.
    • According to the complaint, Haidary was engaged in the business of civil and interior contracting and supply work in Mumbai, Bengaluru, Delhi and other parts of India.
    • Deepak Raheja was stated to be the Managing Director of Pebble Bay Developers Pvt. Ltd. The complainant alleged that he had been assigned interior work relating to the Pebble Bay apartment complex at Dollars Colony, Sanjaynagar, Bengaluru.

    Contractor Alleged Non-Payment Despite Completion of Work

    • The complainant alleged that although he had carried out the entrusted work, the payments received were not commensurate with the bills raised.
    • It was further alleged that despite demands for payment, Raheja assured the complainant that the outstanding amount would be cleared within two months but subsequently failed to do so.
    • The complainant alleged that Raheja had dishonestly induced him to complete the work and thereafter misappropriated the amounts for personal gain. There was also an allegation that TDS had been deducted up to 2013 despite the alleged non-payment.
    • On the basis of the complaint, Crime No. 292/2014 was registered by Sanjaynagar Police.
    • Following investigation, the police filed a charge-sheet, and on July 15, 2016, the VIII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru took cognizance of the alleged offence punishable under Section 420 IPC in C.C. No. 16189/2016.

    Deepak Raheja Approaches High Court Under Section 482 CrPC

    • Raheja approached the Karnataka High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeking quashing of the Magistrate’s cognizance order, the charge-sheet and all consequential criminal proceedings.
    • His principal argument was that the complaint itself demonstrated that the controversy concerned unpaid dues arising out of commercial transactions.
    • Accordingly, it was argued that resorting to criminal proceedings for such a dispute was unjustified and amounted to an abuse of the criminal justice process.

    Petitioner: Essential Ingredients of Section 420 IPC Were Missing

    • Raheja also contended that the essential ingredients required to constitute an offence of cheating under Section 420 IPC were not disclosed.
    • His counsel relied upon the Supreme Court’s ruling in A.M. Mohan v. State, (2024) 12 SCC 181, in support of the argument that the criminal proceedings deserved to be quashed where the ingredients of Section 420 were absent.
    • It was additionally argued that the order taking cognizance was cryptic and failed to demonstrate application of mind by the Magistrate. For this proposition, reliance was placed on the Delhi High Court’s ruling in Sanjit Bakshi v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2022 SCC OnLine Del 3614.

    Company Not Made an Accused

    • Another argument raised by Raheja was that he was a director of a company and that the company itself had not been arrayed as an accused.
    • Reliance in this regard was placed on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Sanjay Dutt & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Anr., 2025 INSC 34.
    • The Karnataka High Court, however, did not accept non-arraignment of the company as independently fatal in the facts of the case.
    • The Court observed that the complaint did not indicate that the interior-decoration work had been assigned to the complainant by the company. Therefore, prima facie, failure to array the company itself as an accused was not necessarily fatal to the prosecution.
    • This distinction is important because the ultimate quashing was based primarily on the predominantly civil nature of the underlying transaction and absence of the necessary criminal element, rather than simply on non-joinder of the company.

    State Opposed Quashing of Charge-Sheet

    • The State opposed the petition and argued that the police had conducted an investigation and filed the charge-sheet after finding sufficient material to put the accused on trial.
    • The complainant did not have representation at the hearing, although objections had been filed on his behalf.

    High Court: Dispute Predominantly Arises From a Civil Transaction

    • After examining the complaint and charge-sheet, the High Court found that the alleged offence arose predominantly from a civil transaction involving failure to make payment for work already executed.
    • The Court identified the principal grounds urged for quashing as the absence of the essential ingredients of Section 420 IPC, the civil nature of the dispute, failure to array the company as an accused and the allegedly cryptic cognizance order.
    • The nature of the underlying transaction ultimately became decisive.

    Civil Dispute Cannot Be Criminalised to Pressure Accused for Payment

    • The High Court relied on a settled line of Supreme Court authority holding that criminal law cannot be deployed as a mechanism to recover money arising from a civil or commercial dispute.
    • The Court referred to Commissioner of Police & Ors. v. Devender Anand & Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 834 of 2017, decided on August 8, 2019; Sachin Garg v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., (2024) 11 SCC 687; and Vesa Holdings (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2015) 8 SCC 293.
    • The Court noted that these decisions establish that a civil dispute cannot be permitted to be converted into a criminal case to exert pressure upon an accused for recovery of money.

    Allegation of Criminal Breach of Trust Could Not Save Section 420 Proceedings

    • In the objections before the High Court, the complainant sought to project the dispute as involving criminal breach of trust.
    • However, the Court noted that the charge-sheet filed by the police and the Magistrate’s cognizance order concerned Section 420 IPC alone.
    • The attempt to characterise the dispute differently in objections therefore did not overcome the fundamental problem identified by the High Courtβ€”that the controversy was predominantly civil and lacked the criminal element necessary to justify continuation of the Section 420 proceedings.

    Continuation of Criminal Case Would Amount to Abuse of Process

    • Having examined the allegations and the authorities cited, Justice Hosmani concluded that continuation of the proceedings against Deepak Raheja would constitute an abuse of the process of law.
    • The High Court accordingly allowed the petition and ordered that the proceedings in C.C. No. 16189/2016, pending before the VIII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru, be quashed insofar as Deepak Raheja was concerned.
    • Thus, Deepak Raheja succeeded before the Karnataka High Court, with the criminal proceedings against him being quashed.

    Cases Referred to in the Judgment

    The judgment refers to several authorities concerning the distinction between civil disputes and criminal offences and the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process:

    1. Commissioner of Police & Ors. v. Devender Anand & Ors. β€” Criminal Appeal No. 834/2017, decided on August 8, 2019.
    2. Rohit Jawa v. State of Karnataka & Anr. β€” Criminal Petition No. 8536/2023, decided on July 3, 2025; 2025:KHC:23989.
    3. Sanjay Dutt & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Anr. β€” 2025 INSC 34.
    4. A.M. Mohan v. State β€” (2024) 12 SCC 181.
    5. Sanjit Bakshi v. State (NCT of Delhi) β€” 2022 SCC OnLine Del 3614.
    6. Sachin Garg v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. β€” (2024) 11 SCC 687.
    7. Vesa Holdings (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala β€” (2015) 8 SCC 293.

    Why the Judgment Matters

    The decision reiterates an important boundary between civil liability and criminal culpability in commercial dealings.

    Mere failure to pay an amount allegedly due under a commercial transaction does not, without the necessary criminal ingredients, automatically transform the dispute into cheating under Section 420 IPC. Criminal proceedings cannot be used simply as additional leverage to compel payment of disputed commercial dues.

    At the same time, the judgment should not be read as laying down that every contractual or payment dispute is immune from criminal prosecution.

    Where the complaint independently establishes the necessary ingredients of a criminal offenceβ€”such as dishonest intention or deception satisfying the statutory requirementsβ€”a criminal case may stand on a different footing. In the present case, however, the Karnataka High Court found that the complaint and charge-sheet disclosed a dispute predominantly involving non-payment for work executed, making continuation of the Section 420 prosecution an abuse of process.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Karnataka High Court

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  • CESTAT Chennai: Refund Limitation Cannot Begin Before Final Assessment Order Is Communicated to Importer

    CESTAT Chennai: Refund Limitation Cannot Begin Before Final Assessment Order Is Communicated to Importer

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 18.09.2026

    CESTAT Chennai: Refund Limitation Cannot Begin Before Final Assessment Order Is Communicated to Importer

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    In an important ruling concerning the limitation period for Customs refunds arising from provisional assessments, the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), Chennai has held that the one-year limitation under Section 27(1B)(c) of the Customs Act, 1962 must be reckoned from the date on which the order finalising the provisional assessment is communicated to the person entitled to claim the refund, and not merely from the date on which the order is passed.

    The Tribunal dismissed the Revenue’s appeal against Tamilnadu Newsprint and Papers Ltd. (TNPL) and upheld the Commissioner (Appeals)’ finding that TNPL’s refund claim was not time-barred.

    Background: β‚Ή75.50 Lakh Refund Arising From Provisional Assessment

    • TNPL had imported non-coking coal under Bill of Entry No. 3551653 dated October 17, 2013. The Bill of Entry was provisionally assessed because original documents and the test report were unavailable at the time of assessment.
    • After the relevant documents were produced, the Assistant Commissioner of Customs, Nagapattinam finalised the assessment through Order-in-Original No. 35/2014 dated April 30, 2014. The finalisation resulted in a finding that TNPL had paid excess Customs duty of β‚Ή75,50,539, which was ordered to be refunded.
    • TNPL subsequently filed its refund claim dated May 13, 2015, received by Customs on May 15, 2015. After the Department issued a deficiency memo, the claim was resubmitted on June 4, 2015 and received on June 9, 2015.

    Customs Department Rejected Refund as Time-Barred

    • The Department took the position that the limitation period had commenced on April 30, 2014, when the provisional assessment was finalised.
    • According to Customs, Section 27(1B)(c) specifically provides that where duty has been paid provisionally under Section 18, the one-year limitation period is computed from the date of adjustment of duty after final assessment.
    • On that reasoning, even TNPL’s original filing in May 2015 was beyond one year from April 30, 2014. The adjudicating authority therefore rejected the refund as time-barred by Order No. 37/2015 dated September 2, 2015.

    Commissioner (Appeals) Allowed TNPL’s Appeal

    • The Commissioner (Appeals), however, set aside the rejection.
    • It held that under Section 153 of the Customs Act, an order has to be communicated in the prescribed manner and that the relevant date for pursuing a remedial measure is the date on which the order is communicated to the affected person.
    • The appellate authority relied upon CESTAT’s decision in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, 2014 (308) E.L.T. 169 (Tri.-Del.).
    • TNPL had also produced a postal cover bearing the postal authority’s seal and stamp as evidence regarding receipt of the finalisation order. The Department, on the other hand, could not establish an earlier date of communication. The Commissioner (Appeals) consequently directed the refund claim to be considered, prompting Revenue to approach CESTAT.

    Core Question Before CESTAT

    • The Tribunal identified the central issue as whether TNPL’s refund claim relating to duty paid provisionally under Section 18 was filed within the one-year limitation prescribed under Section 27(1B)(c).
    • The Department argued for a literal construction: the statute refers to the date of adjustment following final assessment and does not expressly use the word β€œcommunication.”
    • CESTAT, however, held that the provision could not be interpreted in isolation from the settled principles governing limitation where an affected person has to pursue a legal remedy.

    Limitation Cannot Begin Before Party Knows About the Order

    • The Tribunal placed significant reliance on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Collector of Central Excise, Madras v. M.M. Rubber & Co., 1991 (55) E.L.T. 289 (SC).
    • CESTAT explained that the Supreme Court had distinguished between two situations.
    • Where a statutory authority is required to exercise its own power within a prescribed period, limitation may run from the date the order is made because the authority cannot claim ignorance of its own action. But where limitation governs the right of an aggrieved person to pursue a remedy, actual or constructive knowledge of the order becomes essential.
    • Applying that principle, CESTAT observed that TNPL was not the author of the final assessment order. It was the person required to act upon that order to recover excess duty. It would therefore be incongruous for the limitation period to begin running even before the order was communicated to it.

    Gujarat High Court’s GAIL Ruling Followed

    • The Tribunal found substantial support in Principal Commissioner of Customs, Ahmedabad v. GAIL (India) Ltd., (2024) 20 Centax 516 (Guj.).
    • The Gujarat High Court had considered essentially the same question: whether the β€œdate of service” of an order finalising provisional assessment is relevant for calculating limitation under Section 27(1B)(c), despite the statutory language referring to adjustment of duty after final assessment.
    • The High Court decided the issue against Revenue and held that communication of the finalisation order to the assessee is a condition sine qua non for filing the refund claim within the prescribed period.
    • Importantly, CESTAT also noted the Gujarat High Court’s finding that mere uploading of an assessment order on the Department’s portal, without more, would not satisfy the requirement of communication.
    • CESTAT consequently held that the issue was no longer res integra.

    One-Year Period Runs From Communication of Final Assessment Order

    • The Chennai Bench crystallised the legal position in clear terms.
    • It held that the one-year limitation prescribed under Section 27(1B)(c), for refund of duty paid provisionally under Section 18, runs from the date on which the order finalising the assessment is communicated to the person entitled to the refund, rather than from the bare date on which the finalisation order is passed.
    • This distinction is significant for importers whose provisional assessments are finalised but where the resulting order is communicated after a delay.

    Mere Dispatch Is Not Enough; Customs Must Prove Service

    • CESTAT went further and examined what amounts to valid communication under Section 153 of the Customs Act.
    • The Tribunal held that the Department must demonstrate actual communication in accordance with the prescribed statutory mechanism. Mere assertion that an order was dispatched is insufficient.
    • It relied upon the Larger Bench ruling in Margra Industries Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, New Delhi, 2006 (202) E.L.T. 244 (Tri.-LB), which held that dispatch by post without proof of delivery does not constitute sufficient compliance where the special statute itself prescribes the manner of service.
    • The Bench also relied upon the Madras High Court’s decision in Schiller Healthcare India Pvt. Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Customs, 2021-TIOL-1357-HC-MAD-CUS, where the Court dealt with the hierarchy of modes of service contemplated under Section 153.

    Burden of Proving Communication Lies on Revenue

    • Another important principle emerging from the ruling concerns the burden of proof.
    • Referring to its earlier ruling in Rane (Madras) Ltd. v. Commissioner of GST and Central Excise, Chennai South Commissionerate, along with the Chhattisgarh High Court’s decision in Vijay Pratap and the Supreme Court’s ruling in Saral Wire Craft Pvt. Ltd., the Tribunal held that the prescribed statutory method of service must be strictly followed.
    • CESTAT stated that the burden of proving that an order adversely affecting an assessee has been served through the prescribed method rests on Revenue.

    Section 153 Applies to Assessment Orders Too

    • Revenue could also not escape the communication requirement merely because the order in question finalised a provisional assessment rather than being an adjudication order in the conventional sense.
    • The Tribunal noted that Section 153 speaks of an β€œorder or decision” without restricting its operation to adjudication orders.
    • Further, provisional assessment falls within the definition of β€œassessment” under Section 2(2) of the Customs Act.
    • Relying upon Commissioner of Customs (Export), Mumbai v. Goodwill Sales Pvt. Ltd., 2016 (343) E.L.T. 1193 (Tri.-Mumbai), CESTAT observed that although assessment and adjudication are conceptually distinct, both constitute orders or decisions for purposes of the Customs Act.

    Revenue Failed to Prove Earlier Service

    • On the facts, the Department could not produce evidence demonstrating that the finalisation order had been dispatched to TNPL by registered post, speed post or another method contemplated under Section 153, much less evidence establishing delivery on an earlier date.
    • TNPL, in contrast, had produced the postal cover bearing the seal and stamp of the postal department.
    • The Department’s suggestion that the postal cover might have contained some other correspondence was rejected by the Tribunal as a bare surmise unsupported by evidence.

    Refund Claim Held Within Limitation

    • After adopting the date of communication as the relevant starting point, the Tribunal found TNPL’s refund claim to be within the statutory limitation.
    • The order records that, reckoned from the accepted date of communication, the one-year period expired on June 10, 2015. TNPL’s refund claim dated May 13, 2015 and received on May 15, 2015 was therefore within time.
    • Even its resubmission after curing the deficiencyβ€”made on June 4 and received by Customs on June 9, 2015β€”fell within the one-year period.

    Revenue’s Appeal Dismissed

    • CESTAT ultimately found no error in the Commissioner (Appeals)’ conclusion that TNPL’s refund claim was not barred by limitation.
    • Accordingly, the Tribunal dismissed the Revenue’s appeal and upheld Order-in-Appeal No. 91/16-TRY(CUS) dated April 5, 2016, with consequential relief in accordance with law. Thus, Tamilnadu Newsprint and Papers Ltd. succeeded before CESTAT on the limitation issue.

    Why the Ruling Matters for Importers

    The judgment has practical significance beyond TNPL’s individual refund claim. It reinforces that an importer cannot ordinarily be deprived of a statutory remedy by allowing limitation to run from an order that has not been properly communicated to it.

    The decision is particularly relevant in cases involving provisional assessment under Section 18, refund applications under Section 27, and disputes regarding service or communication under Section 153 of the Customs Act.

    The ruling also underscores a crucial evidentiary point for Customs proceedings: where Revenue relies on an earlier date of service to defeat a claim on limitation, the burden of establishing proper communication through the statutorily prescribed mode rests upon the Department.

    Connected Matter

    Gujarat High Court: Customs Refund Limitation Cannot Run Until Final Assessment Is Communicated to Importer; Mere ICEGATE Upload Not Enough

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: CESTAT Chennai

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  • Delhi High Court Sets Aside Rejection of β€œELMENTIN” Trademark; Says Phonetic Similarity Must Be Assessed by Look, Sound and Surrounding Circumstances

    Delhi High Court Sets Aside Rejection of β€œELMENTIN” Trademark; Says Phonetic Similarity Must Be Assessed by Look, Sound and Surrounding Circumstances

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 17.09.2026

    Delhi High Court Sets Aside Rejection of β€œELMENTIN” Trademark; Says Phonetic Similarity Must Be Assessed by Look, Sound and Surrounding Circumstances

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    The Delhi High Court has set aside the Trade Marks Registry’s refusal to register the pharmaceutical word mark β€œELMENTIN”, holding that it could not be regarded as phonetically similar to the earlier registered mark β€œELEMENTAL” merely because both marks related to medicinal and pharmaceutical products.

    In Elyon Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. v. The Registrar of Trademarks, C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 153/2021, Justice C. Hari Shankar held that ELMENTIN and ELEMENTAL have distinctly different sounds, syllabic structures and meanings. The Court also observed that differences in the pharmaceutical composition of competing products may constitute an additional mitigating factor while assessing likelihood of confusion.

    Trademark Registry Had Rejected β€œELMENTIN”

    • Elyon Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. had filed Application No. 2668081 seeking registration of the word mark β€œELMENTIN” for a pharmaceutical composition containing Amoxycillin and Clavulanic Acid.
    • The Examiner of Trade Marks rejected the application by an order dated August 27, 2018, invoking Section 11(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
    • The objection was based on an earlier registered trademark, β€œELEMENTAL”, registered in favour of Juggat Pharma Pvt. Ltd. for medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations in Class 5. The Registry considered ELMENTIN deceptively similar to ELEMENTAL and found a potential likelihood of confusion.
    • Elyon Pharmaceuticals challenged the rejection before the Delhi High Court.

    Elyon Pharmaceuticals: ELMENTIN and ELEMENTAL Sound Different

    • Counsel for Elyon Pharmaceuticals argued that the two marks could not properly be regarded as phonetically similar and, therefore, the basis for refusing registration was unsustainable.
    • The Registrar defended the decision, arguing that the phonetic difference between the two expressions was minimal and that ELEMENTAL already stood registered for medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations in the same class.
    • After examining the rival contentions, however, the High Court disagreed with the Registry.

    Delhi HC: The Two Words Have β€œDistinctly Different Sounds”

    • Justice Hari Shankar observed that, when properly articulated, ELMENTIN and ELEMENTAL have distinctly different sounds.
    • The Court specifically noted that even the concluding syllables of the two expressions were different.
    • This distinction was important because trademark similarity cannot be determined merely by identifying common letters or portions of competing marks. The marks must be considered from the perspective of their overall visual and phonetic impression and the circumstances in which consumers encounter them.

    Court Applies the Classic β€œPianotist” Test

    • The Delhi High Court relied upon the well-established test laid down in In re Pianotist Co.’s Application, [1906] 23 RPC 774.
    • Under that approach, competing marks must be assessed by considering their look and sound, the goods to which they are applied, the nature of likely consumers, the surrounding circumstances and what is likely to happen if both marks are used normally in the marketplace.
    • The Court noted that the Pianotist test had received approval from the Supreme Court in Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satya Deo Gupta, AIR 1963 SC 449, and Khoday Distilleries v. Scotch Whisky Association, (2008) 10 SCC 723.

    β€œELMENTIN” Is a Coined Word; β€œELEMENTAL” Is an Ordinary English Expression

    • Applying that test, the Court found substantial differences between the marks.
    • β€œELEMENTAL” was described as a word of common English usageβ€”an adjective associated with β€œelement” and synonymous with β€œfundamental.”
    • β€œELMENTIN,” on the other hand, was a coined expression having no etymological meaning.
    • The Court also compared the syllabic structures. ELMENTIN contains three syllables, while ELEMENTAL contains four. Their concluding syllables were also different.
    • These distinctions led the Court to conclude that it was difficult to sustain the Examiner’s finding that use of the two marks for pharmaceutical preparations was likely to confuse the public.

    Coined and Arbitrary Marks Entitled to Greater Protection

    • The Court further observed that ELMENTIN, being a meaningless, arbitrary and coined word, was entitled to additional trademark protection.
    • For this proposition, the judgment referred to Kirorimal Kashiram Marketing & Agencies Ltd. v. Shree Sita Chawal Udyog Mill, (2010) 44 PTC 293 (DB), and South India Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. General Mills Marketing Inc., (2015) 61 PTC 231 (DB).
    • The ruling therefore reinforces the significance of invented or arbitrary terminology when examining distinctiveness and competing trademark claims.

    Different Pharmaceutical Compositions Can Reduce Likelihood of Confusion

    • One of the most significant observations in the judgment concerns the composition of pharmaceutical products.
    • The High Court noted that the record did not establish whether the pharmaceutical composition sold under the earlier ELEMENTAL mark was the same as the composition for which Elyon Pharmaceuticals sought registration of ELMENTIN.
    • Justice Hari Shankar observed that if the two pharmaceutical compositions were different, that would constitute an additional mitigating factor against the likelihood of confusion among the public.
    • The observation is important because it indicates that the likelihood-of-confusion inquiry in pharmaceutical trademarks is not necessarily confined to comparing the words in isolation. The nature and composition of the underlying products may also be relevant to the overall factual assessment.

    Section 11(1)(b) Rejection Set Aside

    • Section 11(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Act deals with situations where similarity with an earlier trademark, coupled with identity or similarity of the relevant goods or services, creates a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, including likelihood of association with the earlier mark.
    • After applying the phonetic, visual and contextual comparison, the High Court held that the Examiner’s conclusion that ELMENTIN was disentitled to registration because of the pre-existing ELEMENTAL mark could not be sustained.
    • The rejection order was accordingly set aside.

    Application Remanded to Trade Marks Registry for Fresh Consideration

    • Importantly, the Delhi High Court did not itself finally order registration of ELMENTIN.
    • Instead, Application No. 2668081 was remitted to the concerned officer of the Trade Marks Registry for de novo consideration.
    • The Registry was directed to consider the application on its own merits, but it was specifically restrained from rejecting the application on the grounds contained in Sections 11(1)(a) or 11(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Act.
    • The appeal was accordingly allowed to that extent, with no order as to costs.

    Cases Referred to by the Delhi High Court

    The judgment expressly refers to four authorities while explaining the applicable principles of trademark comparison:

    1. In re Pianotist Co.’s Application, [1906] 23 RPC 774 β€” the classic test requiring marks to be compared by look, sound, goods, consumers and surrounding circumstances.
    2. Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satya Deo Gupta, AIR 1963 SC 449 β€” Supreme Court approval of the Pianotist approach.
    3. Khoday Distilleries v. Scotch Whisky Association, (2008) 10 SCC 723 β€” also cited as approving the Pianotist standard.
    4. Kirorimal Kashiram Marketing & Agencies Ltd. v. Shree Sita Chawal Udyog Mill, (2010) 44 PTC 293 (DB), and South India Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. General Mills Marketing Inc., (2015) 61 PTC 231 (DB) β€” relied upon concerning protection available to arbitrary and coined marks.

    Why the Judgment Matters for Pharmaceutical Trademarks

    • The ruling provides a useful framework for examination of allegedly similar pharmaceutical marks. It indicates that similarity should not be determined simply because two marks share some letters or are registered in the same class.
    • Instead, the decision requires consideration of the overall appearance, pronunciation, syllabic structure, meaning, nature of the products, relevant consumers and surrounding commercial circumstances.
    • It is equally important that the Court did not treat different pharmaceutical compositions as automatically eliminating confusion. Rather, it described such difference as an additional mitigating factor, meaning it forms part of the broader likelihood-of-confusion assessment.

    Key Takeaway

    The Delhi High Court’s ruling establishes that ELMENTIN could not be refused merely on the ground that it was allegedly phonetically similar to ELEMENTAL.

    The Court found meaningful differences in sound, syllables, meaning and overall impression and set aside the Section 11(1)(b) rejection. At the same time, the judgment should not be read as a final grant of trademark registration.

    The application was sent back to the Registry for fresh consideration on its own merits, subject to the Court’s direction that it could not again be rejected under Sections 11(1)(a) or 11(1)(b).

    Connected Matter

    Gujarat High Court: Trademark Application Cannot Be Denied Advertisement Merely Due to Section 11(1) Objection

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Delhi High Court

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi