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Tag: #TaxLitigations

  • CESTAT Delhi- Packaging Material Cannot Be Treated at Par with Imported Input Under Advance Authorisation

    CESTAT Delhi- Packaging Material Cannot Be Treated at Par with Imported Input Under Advance Authorisation

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 16.09.2026

    CESTAT Delhi- Packaging Material Cannot Be Treated at Par with Imported Input Under Advance Authorisation

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    The Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), New Delhi has allowed an appeal filed by M/s N.V. Distilleries and Breweries Ltd., setting aside an adjudication order that had sought recovery of customs duty on the allegation that the company violated the conditions of Notification No. 96/2009-Cus dated 11 September 2009 while fulfilling export obligations under the Advance Authorisation Scheme.

    The Principal Bench comprising Dr. Rachna Gupta, Officiating President, and Ms. Hemambika R. Priya, Member (Technical) delivered Final Order No. 51464/2026 on 15 September 2026 in Customs Appeal No. 50064 of 2020.

    The Tribunal drew an important distinction between an input physically incorporated in the exported product and packaging materials used for packing that product, holding that bottles, caps and labels could not be placed at par with the imported Vatted Malt Scotch used in manufacturing Indian Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL).

    The Dispute: Advance Authorisation and Rule 19(2) Benefits

    • N.V. Distilleries was engaged in the manufacture of Indian Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL), Country Liquor, PET bottles and un-denatured spirit. The dispute originated from intelligence received by the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), Chandigarh Regional Unit concerning alleged violation of the conditions governing Advance Authorisations.
    • The Department alleged that the appellant had violated the condition contained in Notification No. 96/2009-Cus because, while using duty-free imported inputs under Advance Authorisations, it had also used domestically procured bottles, caps and labels under Rule 19(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 in the exported IMFL.
    • According to the Department, exports manufactured using such domestically procured duty-free materials could not be counted towards discharge of the export obligation under the Advance Authorisations.

    Show Cause Notice Proposed Substantial Customs Duty Recovery

    • A Show Cause Notice dated 20 October 2016 proposed, among other things, recovery of β‚Ή1,93,62,179 in customs duty by invoking the bonds executed at the time of duty-free imports and Section 28(4) of the Customs Act, 1962, along with interest under Section 28AA.
    • A further customs duty demand of β‚Ή94,20,905 was proposed in respect of two Advance Authorisations on the allegation of failure to fulfil export obligations. The notice also proposed appropriation of amounts already deposited and penalties under Sections 114A and 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962.
    • The proposals in the Show Cause Notice were subsequently confirmed through Order-in-Original No. 14/2019 dated 30 August 2019, leading N.V. Distilleries to approach CESTAT.

    Appellant: Imported VMS and Domestic Packaging Were Different Materials

    • The appellant’s central argument was that the essence of the Advance Authorisation Scheme is that the imported input must be physically incorporated in the resultant export product.
    • In the present case, the appellant had imported Vatted Malt Scotch (VMS) under Advance Authorisation, which was incorporated into the IMFL subsequently exported.
    • However, the bottles, caps and labels were domestically procured under Annexure-45 and Rule 19(2) of the Central Excise Rules. Therefore, according to the appellant, there was no overlapping or double benefit because the imported material and the domestically procured materials were entirely different.
    • The appellant further argued that the Government’s export incentive framework is intended to neutralise domestic taxes and duties so that taxes are not exported. According to it, Advance Authorisation was availed for imported VMS, whereas Annexure-45 was utilised for domestically procured glass bottles, caps and labels, with the duty benefit being claimed only once in each case.
    • Reliance was placed upon the Punjab and Haryana High Court’s decision in R.P. International v. Union of India, 2017 (353) E.L.T. 307 (P&H).

    Revenue: Exemption Notification Must Be Strictly Construed

    1. The Revenue defended the adjudication order by contending that Condition (viii) of Notification No. 96/2009-Cus prohibited counting exports involving inputs sourced under Annexure-45 towards fulfilment of Advance Authorisation obligations.
    2. It alleged that the appellant had simultaneously used domestically sourced duty-free goods and imported duty-free material and had therefore breached the exemption conditions.
    3. The Department also relied upon the Supreme Court decisions in CCE, Chandigarh-I v. Mahaan Dairies, (2004) 11 SCC 798 and Commissioner of Customs (Import), Mumbai v. Dilip Kumar & Company, 2018 (361) E.L.T. 577 (S.C.) to argue that exemption notifications must be strictly interpreted and their conditions strictly complied with.

    CESTAT Examines Meaning of β€œMaterials”

    • The Tribunal identified the principal question as whether the importer had failed to fulfil its export obligations and violated Notification No. 96/2009-Cus, thereby attracting customs duty, interest and penalties under Sections 114A and 114AA.
    • CESTAT examined the Advance Authorisation framework and noted that the scheme permits duty-free import of inputs physically incorporated in the manufactured or resultant product that is required to be exported.

    Significantly, the Tribunal examined the definition of β€œmaterials” under the notification. It noted that the definition separately identifies:

    • raw materials, components, intermediates, consumables, catalysts and parts required for manufacture of the resultant product; and
    • packaging materials required for packing the resultant product.

    This statutory distinction became central to the outcome.

    Packaging Material Is Different From Manufacturing Input: CESTAT

    • CESTAT held that the notification itself differentiates between goods required for manufacture of the resultant product and goods merely used for packaging.
    • In this case, the raw material imported for manufacture of the resultant IMFL was VMS. Bottles, caps and labels, on the other hand, constituted packaging materials domestically procured under Annexure-45.
    • The Tribunal therefore held that the relevant condition of Notification No. 96/2009-Cus would apply to the imported material used in manufacturing the resultant product and that the packaging materials could not simply be equated with VMS.

    R.P. International Decision Relied Upon

    • CESTAT also relied on R.P. International v. Union of India to explain the distinction between the DFIA Scheme and the Advance Authorisation Scheme.
    • The Punjab and Haryana High Court had explained that while DFIA permits duty-free import of inputs β€œrequired for production of export product”, Advance Authorisation concerns inputs that are β€œphysically incorporated in the export product.”
    • Applying that distinction, CESTAT found that in the case of Advance Authorisation, the relevant imported input was the material physically incorporated into the resultant exported product.
    • The Tribunal consequently held that the packaging material had been wrongly placed at par with the imported VMS used in manufacturing IMFL. Since the packaging material was not physically incorporated in the IMFL itself, the exports were wrongly alleged to violate the Advance Authorisation conditions. The findings contained in the Order-in-Original were therefore liable to be set aside.

    DRI Jurisdiction Objection Rejected

    • The appellant also challenged the jurisdiction of DRI officers to initiate proceedings under Section 28 of the Customs Act.
    • CESTAT referred to the Supreme Court litigation concerning the competence of DRI officers to issue demand notices. It noted that although the earlier Supreme Court decision had held against DRI’s jurisdiction, the subsequent review judgment held that DRI officers, when appointed as customs officers and assigned the relevant functions of a β€œproper officer,” are competent to issue Show Cause Notices under Section 28.
    • The Tribunal therefore rejected N.V. Distilleries’ jurisdictional objection.
    • This aspect of the decision is important: the importer did not succeed on the DRI jurisdiction ground. Its appeal succeeded on the substantive merits of the Advance Authorisation dispute.

    CESTAT Sets Aside Order-in-Original and Allows Appeal

    Ultimately, CESTAT held that although the preliminary issue concerning DRI jurisdiction was decided against the appellant, the appellant succeeded on merits.

    The Tribunal accordingly set aside the Order-in-Original dated 30 August 2019 and allowed the appeal of N.V. Distilleries and Breweries Ltd.

    Significance for Advance Authorisation Holders

    The ruling is significant for exporters operating under the Advance Authorisation Scheme because it emphasises that the nature and role of each material must be examined before alleging violation of an exemption condition.

    The Tribunal’s reasoning distinguishes an imported input that is physically incorporated into the resultant export product from materials used for its packaging.

    The mere use of domestically procured packaging materials under another duty-relief mechanism cannot, on the reasoning adopted in this case, automatically justify treating those packaging materials at par with the imported manufacturing input. At the same time, the decision should not be read as permitting non-compliance with conditions attached to Advance Authorisations generally.

    The ruling turns on the wording of Notification No. 96/2009-Cus and the Tribunal’s finding that VMS and the domestically procured bottles, caps and labels occupied materially different roles in relation to the exported IMFL.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: CESTAT Delhi

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  • Delhi High Court Acquits NDPS Accused Over Three-Month Delay in Sending Drug Sample for Testing; Raises Doubt Over Safe Custody

    Delhi High Court Acquits NDPS Accused Over Three-Month Delay in Sending Drug Sample for Testing; Raises Doubt Over Safe Custody

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 15.09.2026

    Delhi High Court Acquits NDPS Accused Over Three-Month Delay in Sending Drug Sample for Testing; Raises Doubt Over Safe Custody

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    The Delhi High Court has held that an unexplained delay in sending a seized narcotic sample for forensic examination can prove fatal to the prosecution where the evidence fails to establish that the sample remained in proper and safe custody during the intervening period.

    In Rishi Dev @ Onkar Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), CRL.A. No. 757 of 2000, the High Court set aside the appellant’s conviction under Section 21 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) and acquitted him after finding serious deficiencies in the prosecution’s handling and preservation of the seized sample. The judgment was delivered by Justice S. Muralidhar on 1 May 2008.

    The Court held that where there is doubt whether the sample ultimately tested by the forensic laboratory was the very sample recovered from the accused, the benefit of that doubt must necessarily go to the accused.

    Trial Court Had Sentenced Accused to 10 Years’ Rigorous Imprisonment

    • The appeal arose from a judgment dated 25 November 2000 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, convicting Rishi Dev in FIR No. 290/90 for allegedly possessing 300 grams of smack.
    • The trial court had sentenced him to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment and imposed a fine of β‚Ή1 lakh, with a further six months’ rigorous imprisonment in default of payment.
    • According to the prosecution, police personnel were checking passers-by near Tejab Mill, Bhola Nath Nagar, Shahdara, when the appellant allegedly attempted to move away and subsequently ran on being asked to stop.
    • After he was apprehended, the police claimed to have recovered a packet containing brown-coloured powder from his clothing. The substance was allegedly weighed at the spot and found to be 300 grams, from which a 50-gram sample was separated for forensic testing. The laboratory report subsequently stated that the sample tested positive for smack.

    Accused Challenged Chain of Custody and Delay in Forensic Testing

    • Before the Delhi High Court, the appellant raised several objections to the prosecution case.
    • These included alleged non-compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act, absence of independent public witnesses, questions regarding the weighing of the contraband, handling of seals, the presence of the FIR number on documents allegedly prepared before registration of the FIR, and significant delay in sending the sample for forensic analysis.
    • A particularly serious objection concerned the delay between seizure and forensic examination.
    • The sample had been collected in December 1999, but the first attempt to send it to the forensic laboratory was made only on 1 March 2000. The appellant argued that there was no satisfactory explanation for what happened to the sample during this lengthy intervening period.

    Delhi HC Notes NCB’s 72-Hour Requirement

    • The High Court referred to Parminder Singh v. State of Haryana, in which the Punjab and Haryana High Court had considered the Narcotics Control Bureau instructions requiring sealed sample parcels to be deposited with the Chemical Examiner within 72 hours.
    • Justice Muralidhar described the requirement as salutary because tampering with a sample recovered from an accused can have fatal consequences for the prosecution case.
    • The Court stressed the need for strict compliance with safeguards concerning the preservation and prompt forwarding of samples.
    • The Court also referred to Matloob v. State (Delhi Administration) and the Delhi High Court Rules requiring articles intended for chemical examination to be forwarded without the least possible delay.

    Evidence Raised Serious Doubts About What Happened to Sample

    • After examining the prosecution witnesses, the High Court found considerable uncertainty regarding the handling of the seized material.
    • The Court observed that for more than two months no attempt was made to send the sample for chemical examination. The first attempt occurred on 1 March 2000 when the sample was taken to Chandigarh.
    • It was subsequently returned and redeposited in the malkhana on 3 March. Another entry indicated that the sample was eventually sent to the FSL at Malviya Nagar on 15 March 2000.
    • More importantly, the evidence indicated that the investigating officer had put the FIR number on the parcels and recovery memo at the police station, but no entry was made regarding removal of the case property from the malkhana for that purpose.
    • These circumstances assumed particular importance because the sample remained within the control of police authorities for a considerable period before forensic testing.

    Delay Alone Is Not Always Fatal

    • The Delhi High Court clarified an important legal distinction: mere delay in sending a narcotic sample for testing is not automatically fatal in every NDPS prosecution.
    • Referring to the Supreme Court decision in Valsala v. State of Kerala, the Court explained that a delayed sample can still be relied upon if the prosecution satisfactorily proves that the seized material remained in proper custody and proper form throughout the intervening period.
    • What is critical is the integrity of the chain linking the seized substance with the sample ultimately examined by the forensic laboratory.
    • The Court also referred to State of Gujarat v. Ismail U Haji Patel, where the Supreme Court emphasised that the decisive question is not simply delay but whether the prosecution establishes that the seized articles remained in proper custody and that the samples examined by the chemical analyst actually related to the seized articles.

    Prosecution Failed to Establish Safe Custody

    • Applying these principles, the High Court found that the prosecution evidence merely disclosed dates on which the sample entered or left the malkhana.
    • It did not satisfactorily explain the nearly three-month delay or establish what happened to the sample during the intervening period.
    • The Court therefore concluded that it was not satisfied that the sample remained in proper and safe custody or that the material eventually sent for forensic testing was necessarily the same sample recovered from the appellant.

    Trial Court’s β€˜Practical Approach’ Rejected

    • The trial court had sought to explain the forensic delay by referring generally to the heavy workload of laboratories and the possibility that laboratory officials might refuse to accept samples because of overcrowding.
    • The Delhi High Court expressly disagreed with that approach.
    • It held that the case record should contain written entries demonstrating that an attempt was made to send the sample for testing within the prescribed period. Strict compliance was important because a sample retained in a police malkhana under seals belonging to police officers remained under police control, giving rise to the possibility of tampering and resealing.
    • The Court further held that where the prosecution seeks to explain a delay on the ground that the forensic laboratory could not accept the sample, the record must demonstrate a genuine attempt to dispatch it promptly and its return for reasons beyond the prosecution’s control.

    Such a deficiency in the documentary record cannot subsequently be cured merely through oral evidence.

    Doubt Over Sample Integrity Must Benefit Accused

    • The High Court emphasised that the reliability of a forensic report ultimately depends upon proof that the sample examined was actually the sample recovered from the accused.
    • Where safe custody itself becomes doubtful, the evidentiary value of the laboratory result is correspondingly undermined.

    The Court held:

    β€œIf there is doubt as to the safe custody of the sample that is recovered from the accused, then the benefit of such doubt, must obviously enure to the accused.”

    Three-Month Delay Held Fatal; Accused Acquitted

    • On the facts of the case, the Delhi High Court found that the prosecution had β€œfailed miserably” to satisfy the legal requirements concerning preservation and safe custody of the sample.
    • The nearly three-month delay was held fatal because the prosecution failed to establish that the seized sample had been properly preserved throughout that period and that the sample eventually tested was the same material originally seized.
    • Since the appeal succeeded on this ground alone, the High Court found it unnecessary to examine the appellant’s remaining objections.
    • Accordingly, the Court set aside the conviction dated 25 November 2000 and sentence dated 27 November 2000, acquitted Rishi Dev of the offence under Section 21 of the NDPS Act and directed that he be released forthwith unless required in another case.

    Significance of the Judgment

    The judgment is an important authority on the chain of custody and forensic integrity of seized narcotic samples in NDPS prosecutions.

    It does not establish that every delay beyond 72 hours automatically invalidates an NDPS prosecution. Rather, its central principle is that where there is substantial delay, the prosecution must be able to demonstrate through reliable evidence and contemporaneous records that the seized sample was properly sealed, preserved and safely kept and that the sample ultimately tested was the same sample recovered from the accused.

    In prosecutions carrying severe penal consequences, the forensic chain cannot rest upon assumptions. If an unexplained gap creates reasonable doubt about the identity or integrity of the sample, that doubt may go to the root of the prosecution case.

    Connected Matter

    Delhi High Court Grants Bail Under NDPS Act Over 51-Day Delay in Sampling

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Delhi High Court

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  • Delhi HC Cancels Deceptively Similar β€˜ROCKPAPA’ Trademark; Holds Prior User Has Superior Rights Over Registered Proprietor

    Delhi HC Cancels Deceptively Similar β€˜ROCKPAPA’ Trademark; Holds Prior User Has Superior Rights Over Registered Proprietor

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 15.09.2026

    Delhi HC Cancels Deceptively Similar β€˜ROCKPAPA’ Trademark; Holds Prior User Has Superior Rights Over Registered Proprietor

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    The Delhi High Court has ordered removal of a deceptively similar β€˜ROCKPAPA’ device mark from the Trade Marks Register, holding that the rights of a prior user can prevail over those of a subsequent user even where the latter has obtained trademark registration.

    In Kia Wang v. Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr., C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 2/2021, Justice Jyoti Singh allowed a rectification petition filed by Kia Wang and directed the Registrar of Trade Marks to remove the impugned device mark registered under Trademark No. 4400360 in Class 09. The judgment was delivered on 15 September 2023.

    The Court found the rival marks strikingly similar and concluded that the respondent’s adoption was tainted by bad faith and dishonest intention, aimed at encashing upon the goodwill associated with the petitioner’s mark.

    Dispute Over β€˜ROCKPAPA’ Device Mark

    • Kia Wang claimed that he and his wife founded the ROCKPAPA brand in 2014, primarily for products aimed at children, including headphones, pencil boxes and school bags, as well as audio-related products such as headphones, earphones, loudspeakers and portable media players.
    • According to the petition, the brand operated internationally, including in Australia, Canada, Europe, the United States and India. The domain name for ROCKPAPA was registered on 9 April 2014, and the products were also marketed through e-commerce platforms.
    • The petitioner also relied upon trademark registrations obtained abroad, including in the United Kingdom, Australia, United States, Japan and Canada.

    Respondent Obtained Registration in India in 2020

    • Respondent No. 2, Sachin Garg, proprietor of Pooja Creations, applied for registration of the impugned device mark on 7 January 2020. It was subsequently registered in Class 09 for mobile phones and accessories, including chargers, adaptors, batteries, screen protectors, power banks, mobile covers, memory cards, card readers and handsfree devices.
    • Kia Wang claimed that he discovered the registration only in June 2021 and thereafter approached the Delhi High Court seeking rectification of the Register under Sections 47, 57 and 125 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
    • Respondent No. 2 did not appear despite service and was eventually proceeded against ex parte. The Registrar did not file a counter-affidavit, though written submissions were placed before the Court.

    Prior User Rights Can Override Subsequent Registration

    • One of the central issues before the Court was the petitioner’s claim of being the prior adopter and prior user of the ROCKPAPA mark.
    • The Court relied upon the Supreme Court decisions in Milmet Oftho Industries v. Allergan Inc., (2004) 12 SCC 624; S. Syed Mohideen v. P. Sulochana Bai, (2016) 2 SCC 683; and Neon Laboratories Ltd. v. Medical Technologies Ltd., (2016) 2 SCC 672.
    • Referring to these authorities, the High Court reiterated that the β€œfirst in the market” test assumes significance where competing trademarks are similar.

    It observed that the β€œfirst user” rule is a seminal feature of trademark law and held that:

    A prior user’s rights will override those of a subsequent user even though the subsequent user’s trademark may have obtained registration.

    On the evidence before it, the Court accepted Kia Wang’s claim of use since 2014. His prior use, overseas registrations and continuous use of the mark established that the trademark had become distinctive of his goods and associated with him.

    Court Finds Rival Marks Strikingly Similar

    • The judgment contains a side-by-side visual comparison of the two device marks on page 15. Both use a substantially similar stylised face/hair/moustache device together with the word β€œRockpapa”.
    • The Court observed that the similarity between the two marks was β€œwrit large on a bare perusal.”
    • It held that the similarity of the marks, coupled with identity of the competing goods, created a likelihood of consumer confusion and could adversely affect the petitioner’s reputation and goodwill.

    Bad-Faith Trademark Registration Can Be Cancelled

    • The Court then examined Section 11(10)(ii) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which requires the Registrar to take into consideration the bad faith involved either on the part of the applicant or opponent while dealing with trademark registration.
    • Relying particularly upon BPI Sports LLC v. Saurabh Gulati, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2424, the Court explained that β€œbad faith” essentially involves the absence of honest intention and may include dishonest commercial conduct, fraud, deception or an attempt to appropriate another party’s trademark.
    • Applying this principle, the Court found β€œlittle doubt” that Respondent No. 2 had acted with dishonest intention in adopting a similar mark for identical goods, including copying important visual characteristics of the petitioner’s device mark.
    • The Court concluded that the intention was to encash upon the goodwill of the petitioner’s trademark. It also noted that Respondent No. 2 had chosen not to contest the proceedings or rebut the petitioner’s claim of prior use.

    Maintaining β€˜Purity of the Register’ Is a Matter of Public Interest

    • The High Court went beyond the private dispute between the parties and emphasised the broader public-interest function of trademark rectification.
    • It referred to Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Scotch Whisky Association, (2008) 10 SCC 723, where the Supreme Court stressed the importance of maintaining the purity of the Trade Marks Register and considering the likelihood of deception or confusion.
    • The Court also relied on Hardie Trading Ltd. v. Addisons Paint & Chemicals Ltd., (2003) 11 SCC 92, while considering who qualifies as a β€œperson aggrieved” entitled to seek rectification.
    • The Court held that Kia Wang qualified as a β€œperson aggrieved” because the respondent’s registration operated as a restraint upon legal rights flowing from the petitioner’s prior, long, continuous and uninterrupted use of the mark.

    Important Finding on Section 11(1) and Well-Known Trademark Claim

    • An important nuance in the judgment is that the Court did not accept every ground advanced by the petitioner.
    • Kia Wang had argued that the impugned registration violated Sections 11(1) and 11(2) because ROCKPAPA was an earlier and well-known trademark.
    • The Court rejected this particular argument. It observed that, for purposes of Section 11, the petitioner’s mark did not qualify as an β€œearlier trade mark” because it was neither registered in India nor covered by the specified categories of Indian/international/convention applications. The Court also found that the material and pleadings were insufficient to classify ROCKPAPA as a well-known trademark under Section 2(1)(zg) read with Section 11(6).
    • This makes the judgment particularly significant: the petition succeeded principally on prior-user rights, deceptive similarity, bad-faith adoption and the need to maintain purity of the Registerβ€”not because ROCKPAPA was judicially declared a well-known trademark.

    Delhi High Court Orders Trademark Removed Within Four Weeks

    • Ultimately, the Court allowed the rectification petition and directed the Registrar of Trade Marks to remove Trademark No. 4400360, registered on 7 January 2020 in Class 09, from the Register.
    • The Registrar was directed to complete the rectification within four weeks from receipt of the judgment.

    Key Legal Principle

    The judgment reinforces three significant principles of Indian trademark law: prior user rights may prevail over subsequent registration; bad-faith adoption of a deceptively similar mark can justify cancellation; and rectification jurisdiction serves the wider public interest of maintaining the purity of the Trade Marks Register.

    At the same time, the decision demonstrates that foreign registrations or international popularity alone do not automatically make a mark an β€œearlier trade mark” or a β€œwell-known trademark” in India for the purposes of Section 11.

    Connected Matter

    Delhi High Court: Prior Formal Declaration Not Required to Claim Protection as a Well-Known Trademark Under Section 11(2)

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Delhi High Court

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Supreme Court: Developer Cannot Be Penalised for NOIDA’s Failure to Provide Promised 45-Metre Access Road

    Supreme Court: Developer Cannot Be Penalised for NOIDA’s Failure to Provide Promised 45-Metre Access Road

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 15.09.2026

    Supreme Court: Developer Cannot Be Penalised for NOIDA’s Failure to Provide Promised 45-Metre Access Road

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id amitnaren@outlook.com .  

    The Supreme Court has dismissed appeals filed by the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA) and upheld the grant of β€œZero Period” benefit to M/s Sunshine Trade Tower Pvt. Ltd., holding that a development authority cannot deny contractual and policy relief to a developer when its own failure to provide adequate and legitimate access materially prevents development of the allotted commercial plot.

    In New Okhla Industrial Development Authority & Ors. v. M/s Sunshine Trade Tower Private Limited & Anr., Civil Appeal Nos. 10900-10902 of 2025, 2026 INSC 975, a Bench comprising Justices Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Alok Aradhe upheld the Allahabad High Court judgment granting Zero Period benefit to the developer. The Supreme Court delivered its judgment on 8 September 2026.

    The Court importantly held that a policy such as NOIDA’s Zero Period Policy should not be interpreted in the same manner as a statute. Its provisions must instead be construed in light of the policy’s purpose and broader objective.

    β‚Ή133.86 Crore Commercial Plot Allotted in Noida

    • The dispute arose from a scheme launched by NOIDA on 22 September 2011 for allotment of commercial plots to builders and developers.
    • Sunshine Trade Tower emerged as the successful developer, following which a lease deed dated 11 January 2012 was executed for Plot No. 5-A, Sector 94, Noida, for a total consideration of approximately β‚Ή133.86 crore. Possession was handed over on the same date.
    • Under the approved site plan, the commercial plot had a 45-metre-wide Front Road and a 24-metre-wide Side Road. The developer was to construct a commercial complex comprising facilities such as shopping malls, showrooms, retail outlets, hotels, restaurants and offices.
    • The developer, however, claimed that proper construction could not proceed because the 45-metre Front Road was encroached upon while the 24-metre Side Road was sandy, unpaved and non-motorable.

    NGT Order Also Stopped Construction Near Okhla Bird Sanctuary

    • Another obstacle emerged in September 2013 when the National Green Tribunal directed stoppage of construction within 10 kilometres of the Okhla Bird Sanctuary.
    • Since Sunshine Trade Tower’s plot was located within approximately 600 metres of the sanctuary boundary, construction was stopped.
    • The restriction continued until the Central Government issued a notification on 19 August 2015 specifying the relevant eco-sensitive limits. Even after removal of this restriction, however, the developer contended that full-fledged construction remained impossible because the 45-metre road continued to be encroached and the 24-metre road remained incomplete.

    What Is NOIDA’s β€˜Zero Period Policy’?

    • NOIDA formulated its Zero Period Policy on 28 March 2016 to deal with projects that could not progress because of circumstances beyond the developer’s control.
    • Among other situations, Clause 5 contemplated relief where possession and lease had been completed but there was no access road to the allotted land, preventing construction or development.
    • The policy also provided for rescheduling instalments falling within the Zero Period and stipulated that penal interest would not be charged for the relevant period.
    • Sunshine consequently sought Zero Period benefits both for the NGT restraint and for NOIDA’s failure to provide proper access roads.
    • NOIDA initially granted limited benefit relating to the NGT restriction but did not accept the developer’s wider claim concerning access to the plot.

    NOIDA’s Own Tehsildar Found 45-Metre Road Blocked

    • A crucial piece of evidence was a report submitted by NOIDA’s Tehsildar on 14 February 2019.
    • The report found that the land earmarked for the 45-metre road fell in Khasra No. 684, was recorded as Abadi land, had not been acquired by NOIDA and continued to be occupied by villagers.
    • The Tehsildar consequently recorded that the access road to the commercial plot was blocked.
    • Despite this report, NOIDA rejected the developer’s request for Zero Period benefit, maintaining that adequate access was available.

    UPRERA Also Recorded NOIDA’s Failure to Provide 45-Metre Road

    • The dispute subsequently reached UPRERA. Although the developer’s complaint was rejected as not maintainable and it was asked to pursue other statutory remedies, UPRERA’s technical inspection recorded important factual findings.
    • It found that the 24-metre road was completed only in 2020, nearly eight years after allotment, while the promised 45-metre road had still not been constructed because of existing habitation.
    • UPRERA recorded that NOIDA had failed to provide the 45-metre-wide approach road contemplated under the lease arrangement.

    State Government Partly Granted Relief

    • The matter thereafter went through revisional proceedings before the Uttar Pradesh Government.
    • In its second revisional order dated 14 September 2022, the State Government found that the 45-metre road was blocked by encroachment and that its non-availability affected the project’s commercial viability.
    • It granted the developer waiver of penal interest and a one-year COVID-related extension and directed NOIDA to take consequential steps.
    • The State Government specifically recognised that the commercial project had been designed on the assumption that the 45-metre road would constitute the principal access/frontage. Its absence meant that the project’s layout and commercial attractiveness would have to be reconsidered.

    NOIDA Raised β‚Ή100.39 Crore Demand

    • The dispute continued, and NOIDA ultimately issued a demand notice dated 23 February 2024 seeking payment of approximately β‚Ή100.39 crore towards principal and premium, without interest.
    • The developer challenged this demand as well as NOIDA’s refusal to sanction its revised building plan before the Allahabad High Court.
    • The High Court held that the cumulative circumstances prevented adequate access to the plot and concluded that Sunshine Trade Tower was entitled to Zero Period benefit.
    • It directed NOIDA to make a fresh calculation after granting Zero Period relief, raise a revised demand, and thereafter approve the revised building plan subject to statutory formalities.
    • NOIDA challenged that judgment before the Supreme Court.

    NOIDA: Some Access Was Available, So Zero Period Could Not Apply

    • Before the Supreme Court, NOIDA argued that Clause 5 of the Zero Period Policy should be interpreted strictly.
    • According to the Authority, relief was available only where there was absolutely no physical access to the allotted land and construction was therefore impossible.
    • NOIDA maintained that Sunshine had some access through the 24-metre road and portions of the 45-metre road and had even undertaken construction activity. It also contended that the developer’s own excavation contributed to the delay in completion of the side road.
    • The developer countered that the real issue was not whether it could somehow physically reach the property from one corner, but whether the commercial project could be developed in accordance with the sanctioned plan.
    • The promised 45-metre road was the project’s principal frontage. Its permanent non-availability required fundamental alterations to the building’s frontage, orientation, setbacks, entry and exit points and overall configuration.

    Supreme Court: Policy Cannot Be Interpreted Like a Statute

    • Rejecting NOIDA’s narrow construction, the Supreme Court laid down an important principle concerning interpretation of government and development policies.
    • The Court held that provisions of a policy such as the Zero Period Policy β€œare not to be interpreted like the provisions of a statute.”
    • Instead, courts must consider both the immediate purpose of the particular clause and the broader objective of the policy.
    • The Supreme Court found that Clause 5 was intended to ensure that a developer received easy, effective and legitimate access to the allotted property so that construction could meaningfully proceed.
    • The mere fact that the developer could somehow obtain limited access could therefore not absolve NOIDA of its obligation.
    • The Court held that where adequate access had not been provided for reasons attributable to NOIDA, Zero Period benefit could not be denied merely because β€œsome access was available.”

    Supreme Court Finds NOIDA Failed to Provide Promised 45-Metre Road

    • The Supreme Court examined five important official documents: the Tehsildar’s report, UPRERA order, Additional CEO’s inspection report, State Government’s revisional order and Deputy Collector’s report.
    • The cumulative effect of these documents, the Court said, left β€œno doubt” that the 45-metre Front Road was never made available to Sunshine by NOIDA.
    • The Court further observed that NOIDA, as the statutory development authority, possessed the means to remove encroachments and open the access road but had failed to do so.

    Frontage Is Not Merely an Architectural Issue

    • The judgment contains significant observations concerning the commercial importance of frontage, accessibility and elevation in real-estate development.
    • The Supreme Court observed that frontage and elevation are not merely architectural aesthetics; they are important determinants of a property’s commercial value and marketability.
    • For commercial developments in particular, visibility and accessibility directly affect footfall, branding and business prospects.
    • Uncertainty concerning frontage can therefore affect project viability, investor confidence and the expectations of purchasers and commercial occupants.

    Changing From 45-Metre to 24-Metre Frontage Fundamentally Affected Project

    • Applying those principles, the Court observed that Sunshine’s original sanctioned plan treated the 45-metre road as the project’s principal frontage.
    • Since that road could no longer realistically be provided, the 24-metre Side Road would have to become the new frontage.
    • This was not a minor internal modification. It required reconsideration of setbacks, building orientation, entry and exit points, permissible configuration and other planning parameters.
    • The Court held that changing the frontage from 45 metres to 24 metres directly affected the development potential and commercial attractiveness of the property.

    Developer Cannot Be Made Liable for NOIDA’s Own Failure

    • The Supreme Court ultimately held that Sunshine could neither be expected to proceed under the original site plan nor be burdened with liability arising from NOIDA’s failure to provide the promised 45-metre road.
    • It characterised NOIDA’s denial of Zero Period relief and its continuing refusal to sanction a revised site plan as β€œunreasonable and untenable in law.”

    Supreme Court Dismisses NOIDA’s Appeals

    • Finding no error in the Allahabad High Court’s judgment, the Supreme Court dismissed all three civil appeals filed by NOIDA and upheld the relief granted to Sunshine Trade Tower.
    • The Court did not find it necessary to examine the developer’s additional pleas concerning discrimination or comparison with other similarly situated developers.
    • The developer also gave a statement before the Supreme Court that the project would be completed within four years from approval of the revised site plan and that amounts due would be paid in eight instalments.
    • The Supreme Court directed NOIDA to take note of this statement and issue necessary directions for commencement of the project with revised schedules. No order as to costs was passed.

    Why the Judgment Matters

    The ruling is significant for real-estate developers dealing with government development authorities. It establishes that policy benefits cannot necessarily be denied through an excessively literal interpretation when the very purpose of the policy would thereby be defeated.

    More importantly, where a statutory authority promises infrastructure forming an essential component of an allotment and sanctioned development plan, it cannot ordinarily impose financial consequences upon the developer for delays materially attributable to the authority’s own failure.

    The judgment also recognises the commercial reality that access and frontage are integral to the viability of a commercial real-estate project.

    The existence of some physical means of reaching a plot is not necessarily equivalent to providing the effective and legitimate access contemplated by the allotment and sanctioned plan.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Supreme Court

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  • Supreme Court: High Court Cannot Refuse Appointment of Arbitrator by Deciding Limitation at Pre-Reference Stage

    Supreme Court: High Court Cannot Refuse Appointment of Arbitrator by Deciding Limitation at Pre-Reference Stage

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 15.09.2026

    Supreme Court: High Court Cannot Refuse Appointment of Arbitrator by Deciding Limitation at Pre-Reference Stage

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Arbitrator Shobhit Mallik. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id shobhit.Ica23@gmail.com .

    The Supreme Court has held that an objection concerning limitation is a jurisdictional issue involving mixed questions of fact and law and must ordinarily be decided by the arbitral tribunal under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, rather than by the High Court at the pre-reference stage under Section 11.

    In M/s Uttarakhand Purv Sainik Kalyan Nigam Limited v. Northern Coal Field Limited, SLP (C) No. 11476 of 2018, a Bench comprising Justices Indu Malhotra and Ajay Rastogi set aside a High Court order which had refused appointment of an arbitrator on the ground that the contractor’s claims were barred by limitation.

    The Supreme Court held that, under the post-2015 framework of Section 11(6A), the Court’s scrutiny at the appointment stage is confined to the existence of an arbitration agreement, while limitation and other jurisdictional objections are matters for the arbitral tribunal.

    Dispute Arose From Security Services Contract

    • The dispute originated from an agreement dated 21 December 2010 between Uttarakhand Purv Sainik Kalyan Nigam Limited, the contractor, and Northern Coal Field Limited (NCL).
    • Under the agreement, the contractor was required to provide round-the-clock security services on a need basis at agreed contractual rates. The agreement contained an arbitration clause requiring disputes arising out of or in connection with the contract to be referred to a sole arbitrator.
    • Disputes subsequently arose concerning payments under the contract and deductions of security amounts from running bills.
    • On 29 May 2013, the contractor issued a legal notice demanding approximately β‚Ή1.43 crore along with interest from NCL.

    Arbitration Invoked in March 2016

    • The contractor invoked arbitration through a notice dated 9 March 2016, calling upon NCL to nominate a sole arbitrator in accordance with the arbitration clause.
    • NCL did not respond. A further notice dated 30 May 2016 proposed the appointment of a retired Additional District Judge as sole arbitrator, but this notice also received no response.
    • Consequently, on 20 September 2016, the contractor approached the High Court under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking appointment of a sole arbitrator.
    • The High Court, however, rejected the application. It concluded that the contractor’s claims were barred by limitation and, therefore, declined to appoint an arbitrator.
    • The contractor then approached the Supreme Court.

    Supreme Court Examines Impact of 2015 Arbitration Amendment

    • The Supreme Court noted that under Section 21 of the Arbitration Act, arbitral proceedings commence when a request to refer the dispute to arbitration is received by the respondent.
    • Since the contractor invoked arbitration on 9 March 2016β€”after the 2015 Amendment Act came into force on 23 October 2015β€”the amended Section 11 governed the case.
    • This distinction became central to the Supreme Court’s decision.
    • The Court explained that the 2015 amendment significantly altered the scope of judicial scrutiny at the stage of appointment of an arbitrator.

    Earlier Law Allowed Wider Examination at Section 11 Stage

    • Before the 2015 amendment, the Supreme Court’s seven-Judge Constitution Bench decision in SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd., (2005) 8 SCC 618 permitted broader judicial scrutiny under Section 11.
    • The appointing court could consider not only whether a valid arbitration agreement existed but also threshold questions concerning jurisdiction, including whether the claim was a dead or time-barred claim or whether the transaction had already been concluded through satisfaction of mutual rights and obligations.
    • That approach was subsequently followed in decisions including National Insurance Co. v. Boghara Polyfab (P) Ltd., (2009) 1 SCC 267 and Union of India v. Master Construction Co., (2011) 12 SCC 349.

    Section 11(6A) Restricts Court’s Inquiry

    • The Supreme Court explained that the 2015 Amendment Act inserted Section 11(6A) to substantially restrict judicial intervention at the pre-reference stage.
    • Section 11(6A), as applicable to the dispute, required the Supreme Court or High Court dealing with an appointment application to confine itself to examining the existence of the arbitration agreement.
    • The Court held that the non-obstante clause contained in Section 11(6A) had legislatively overridden the broader approach adopted in Patel Engineering and Boghara Polyfab.
    • The Supreme Court also relied upon Duro Felguera S.A. v. Gangavaram Port Ltd., (2017) 9 SCC 729, where it had been held that at the Section 11(6A) stage, the Court β€œneed only look into” the existence of the arbitration agreement.

    Kompetenz-Kompetenz Principle Favours Arbitral Tribunal Deciding Its Own Jurisdiction

    • The judgment places significant emphasis on the Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle, embodied in Section 16 of the Arbitration Act.
    • Under this principle, an arbitral tribunal has competence to rule on its own jurisdiction, including jurisdictional objections concerning the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement.
    • The Supreme Court explained that the principle is intended to minimise judicial intervention and prevent the arbitral process from being obstructed at the threshold merely because one party raises a preliminary objection.
    • The Court further observed that the underlying legislative policy of the Arbitration Act favours party autonomy and minimal judicial intervention. Once the tribunal is constituted, issues and objections falling within its jurisdiction should ordinarily be decided by the tribunal itself.

    Limitation Is for the Arbitrator to Decide

    • The most important finding of the judgment concerns limitation.
    • The Supreme Court held that the issue of limitation is a jurisdictional issue and a mixed question of fact and law.
    • Accordingly, where the existence of the arbitration agreement is not disputed, the High Court should not decide limitation while considering an application for appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11. The issue should instead be left for determination by the arbitral tribunal under Section 16.
    • The Court relied upon ITW Signode India Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, (2004) 3 SCC 48, where limitation was recognised as involving a question of jurisdiction.
    • It also referred to NTPC v. Siemens Atkein Gesell Schaft, (2007) 4 SCC 451 and Indian Farmers Fertilizers Cooperative Ltd. v. Bhadra Products, (2018) 2 SCC 534, in support of the proposition that limitation may be adjudicated by the arbitral tribunal under Section 16.
    • If the tribunal concludes that a claim is dead or barred by limitation, it can decide the objection accordingly. If the jurisdictional plea is rejected and an award ultimately follows, the aggrieved party retains the statutory remedy of challenging the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.

    High Court Order Set Aside

    • Applying these principles, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order dated 11 January 2018, which had refused to appoint an arbitrator on limitation grounds.
    • The Court expressly directed that the issue of limitation be decided by the arbitral tribunal.
    • With the consent of the parties, the Supreme Court appointed Justice (Retd.) A.M. Sapre, former Judge of the Supreme Court, as the sole arbitrator, subject to the statutory declarations concerning independence and impartiality under Section 12 and the timeline prescribed under Section 29A.

    Singrauli Held to Be Seat of Arbitration

    • The Court also addressed the contractual stipulation that arbitration would take place at Singrauli, Madhya Pradesh.
    • It held that, consequently, the seat of arbitration was Singrauli, subject to modification by consent of the parties. The arbitrator was nevertheless given liberty to conduct proceedings at another convenient venue if required.
    • The parties were directed to share arbitration costs equally, with the arbitrator’s fees governed by the Fourth Schedule to the Arbitration Act.

    Key Legal Principle

    The ruling establishes, in the statutory context considered by the Court, that once the existence of an arbitration agreement is undisputed, the Section 11 court should not undertake a detailed adjudication of limitation. Limitation, being a mixed question of fact and law and a jurisdictional issue, should be decided by the arbitral tribunal under Section 16.

    The decision is an important exposition of the legislative objective behind the 2015 amendment: restrict judicial interference at the pre-reference stage and allow the arbitral tribunal to decide threshold and jurisdictional objections under the Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle. It is equally important that the Supreme Court did not hold that the contractor’s β‚Ή1.43 crore claim was within limitation.

    It only held that the High Court was not the proper forum to finally determine that objection at the Section 11 appointment stage; the limitation defence was left open for adjudication by the arbitrator.

    Connected Matter

    Supreme Court Restores β‚Ή2,782 Crore Arbitral Award in Delhi Airport Metro Dispute; Warns Courts Against Re-Appreciating Evidence Under Sections 34 and 37

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Supreme Court

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  • Dismissal of Criminal Complaint for Non-Prosecution Results in Acquittal; Revision Under Section 397 CrPC Not Maintainable

    Dismissal of Criminal Complaint for Non-Prosecution Results in Acquittal; Revision Under Section 397 CrPC Not Maintainable

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 15.09.2026

    Dismissal of Criminal Complaint for Non-Prosecution Results in Acquittal; Revision Under Section 397 CrPC Not Maintainable

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate G Sridharamurthy. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id sriadv3@gmail.com . 

    The Karnataka High Court has held that where a criminal complaint is dismissed for non-prosecution and the dismissal consequentially results in the acquittal of the accused, the appropriate remedy is an appeal and not a revision petition under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC).

    Justice Ravi V. Hosmani, deciding three connected criminal petitions filed by Ziaulla Sheriff, set aside orders of the Bengaluru Sessions Courts which had entertained revision petitions and restored the criminal proceedings. The High Court dismissed those revision petitions as not maintainable, while reserving liberty to the complainants to avail other remedies in accordance with law.

    The decision bears neutral citation 2026:KHC:40564 and arose from Criminal Petition Nos. 1117, 1116 and 1118 of 2019.

    Background of the Case

    • The connected petitions arose from private criminal complaints in which Ziaulla Sheriff was an accused. According to the petitioner, the complainants failed to appear despite being given sufficient opportunities. The trial court consequently dismissed the complaints for non-prosecution, resulting in consequential orders of acquittal.
    • Instead of challenging the acquittal orders through appeals, the complainants approached the District/Sessions Court by filing revision petitions under Section 397 CrPC.
    • Those revision petitions were allowed and the criminal proceedings were restored. The accused therefore approached the Karnataka High Court under Section 482 CrPC, challenging the revisional orders.

    Accused Argues Appeal, Not Revision, Was the Proper Remedy

    • The principal argument advanced on behalf of Ziaulla Sheriff was that dismissal of the complaints for non-prosecution had resulted in his acquittal.
    • Therefore, once an order of acquittal had come into existence, the complainants could not circumvent the appellate remedy by filing revision petitions under Section 397 CrPC.

    The petitioner relied upon three precedents:

    V.K. Bhat v. G. Ravi Kishore & Anr., (2016) 13 SCC 243; S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (Dead) by LRs & Ors., (2008) 5 SCC 535; and Prakash v. Raju, 2025 SCC OnLine Kar 11067.

    It was also argued that the underlying dispute was essentially civil in nature but had been given a criminal colour, and that resort to revision instead of appeal demonstrated an attempt to prolong the proceedings and constituted abuse of process.

    Complainants Defend Restoration of Criminal Proceedings

    • The complainants opposed the petitions, contending that the trial court had dismissed the proceedings merely because of their non-appearance and had not decided the complaints on merits.
    • Accordingly, once sufficient cause for non-appearance was demonstrated, the revisional court was justified in setting aside the dismissal and restoring the proceedings.
    • Alternatively, it was argued that if the High Court found the revisions not maintainable, liberty should be granted to pursue the appropriate appellate remedy.

    Karnataka High Court Examines Supreme Court and High Court Precedents

    • The High Court examined the judgments in V.K. Bhat, S. Rama Krishna and Prakash and found that they established a clear principle concerning the nature of an order dismissing a criminal complaint for non-prosecution.
    • The Court held that such dismissal β€œwould consequentially result in acquittal of accused” and is therefore an appealable order.
    • Consequently, a revision petition under Section 397 CrPC against such an order would not be maintainable.
    • This distinction was decisive. The High Court did not need to enter into the merits of the underlying criminal allegations because the revisional proceedings themselves had been pursued through an incorrect statutory remedy.

    Revision Cannot Substitute Statutory Appeal Against Acquittal

    • The ruling reinforces an important aspect of criminal procedure: the legal character and consequence of the trial court’s order determine the appropriate remedy, rather than merely the terminology used to describe the dismissal.
    • Where dismissal of a complaint for non-prosecution has the legal consequence of acquitting the accused, the complainant must pursue the remedy available against the acquittal. A revision under Section 397 cannot be used as a substitute for the prescribed appellate route.
    • On this ground alone, the High Court held that all three petitions filed by the accused deserved to be allowed.

    Revisional Orders Set Aside

    • Applying the above principle, the Karnataka High Court set aside three revisional orders:
    • the order dated 5 September 2018 in Criminal Revision Petition No. 400/2017; the order dated 5 September 2018 in Criminal Revision Petition No. 401/2017; and the order dated 23 October 2018 in Criminal Revision Petition No. 430/2017.
    • The corresponding revision petitions were dismissed as not maintainable.

    Liberty Granted to Complainants to Pursue Other Remedies

    • Importantly, the High Court did not permanently foreclose the complainants from pursuing remedies available under law.
    • Referring particularly to the approach followed in Prakash v. Raju, the Court reserved liberty to avail other remedies in accordance with law.
    • Thus, the judgment is principally a ruling on the maintainability of revision proceedings, rather than a final adjudication of the merits of the underlying allegations.

    Key Legal Principle

    The legal principle emerging from the judgment can be stated as:

    Where dismissal of a criminal complaint for non-prosecution consequentially results in acquittal of the accused, the order is appealable. A revision petition under Section 397 CrPC challenging such an acquittal is not maintainable, and the complainant must pursue the remedy available in appeal or such other remedy as may be permissible in law.

    The ruling also underlines that a revisional court cannot restore proceedings through a revision where the statutory scheme requires the acquittal order to be challenged through the appropriate appellate mechanism.

    Why the Judgment Matters

    The judgment provides useful guidance in private-complaint proceedings where complaints are dismissed because of the complainant’s absence. The procedural distinction between an appeal against acquittal and a criminal revision is substantive because the jurisdiction, statutory requirements and scope of scrutiny differ.

    The Karnataka High Court’s decision confirms that litigants cannot choose revision merely because the original dismissal occurred on account of non-prosecution rather than after a full trial on merits. What matters is that the dismissal resulted in acquittal.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Karnataka High Court

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  • Delhi High Court Quashes β‚Ή76.72 Lakh Excise Demand; Holds Adjudicating Authority Cannot Disregard Binding CESTAT Order

    Delhi High Court Quashes β‚Ή76.72 Lakh Excise Demand; Holds Adjudicating Authority Cannot Disregard Binding CESTAT Order

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 15.09.2026

    Delhi High Court Quashes β‚Ή76.72 Lakh Excise Demand; Holds Adjudicating Authority Cannot Disregard Binding CESTAT Order

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    The Delhi High Court has ruled in favour of Wellspring Universal, setting aside a β‚Ή76.72 lakh demand raised by the Central GST authorities after finding that the adjudicating authority had failed to give effect to an earlier CESTAT order which had already upheld the taxpayer’s entitlement to refund.

    A Division Bench comprising Justice Anil Kshetrapal and Justice Shail Jain, in Wellspring Universal v. Additional Commissioner of Central GST, W.P.(C) 11957/2025, set aside both the Demand-cum-Show Cause Notice dated 10 December 2019 and the consequential Order-in-Original dated 24 March 2025. The judgment was pronounced on 14 September 2026.

    The Court also directed refund of the petitioner’s β‚Ή7,67,200 statutory pre-deposit with applicable interest.

    Background of the Dispute

    • Wellspring Universal is a partnership firm engaged in manufacturing engineering products, particularly in the welding sector. It was registered as a 100% Export Oriented Unit (EOU) and also as a private bonded warehouse under Sections 58 and 65 of the Customs Act, 1962.
    • The dispute had a lengthy history involving CENVAT credit, excise duty paid on exports and subsequent refund proceedings.
    • Between April and December 2007, Wellspring exported goods through 36 consignments after paying excise duty of β‚Ή76,72,000. It initially sought rebate under Rule 18 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002. After the Department took the position that the EOU was not required to pay duty on exported goods, the petitioner repaid rebate already sanctioned and subsequently pursued its claim through the CENVAT credit/refund mechanism.
    • Earlier proceedings eventually culminated in an Order-in-Original dated 21 March 2017, whereby proceedings against the petitioner were dropped. That order was accepted by the competent reviewing authority and was not challenged.

    β‚Ή76.72 Lakh Refund Sanctioned

    • Following these proceedings, Wellspring filed a refund claim for β‚Ή76,72,000, which was sanctioned by the Assistant Commissioner, CGST, Janakpuri through Refund Order dated 6 May 2019.
    • The authority found, among other things, that the refund claim was within limitation and that the necessary documents evidencing export had been furnished.
    • The Department, however, reviewed the refund order and filed an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals). During the pendency of that appeal, a separate Demand-cum-Show Cause Notice dated 10 December 2019 was issued alleging that the β‚Ή76.72 lakh refund had been erroneously sanctioned and proposing recovery with interest.
    • The Commissioner (Appeals) subsequently allowed the Department’s appeal on 16 December 2019, including on the ground that the credit ought to have been transitioned through TRAN-1 and that cash refund could not be sustained.

    CESTAT Ultimately Upheld Wellspring’s β‚Ή76.72 Lakh Refund

    • Wellspring challenged the Commissioner (Appeals)’ order before CESTAT.
    • In Final Order No. 56215/2024 dated 1 August 2024, CESTAT allowed Wellspring’s appeal and set aside the Commissioner (Appeals)’ order.
    • Significantly, CESTAT did not decide the matter merely on a technical ground. It expressly held that Wellspring was entitled to refund of β‚Ή76,72,000 under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.
    • CESTAT further held that a substantive benefit could not be denied merely because the petitioner had quoted the wrong rule while claiming refund or because the Assistant Commissioner had sanctioned it with reference to an incorrect rule.
    • CESTAT also specifically examined the Department’s limitation objection and held that the refund claim was not barred by limitation.

    Department Still Confirmed β‚Ή76.72 Lakh Demand

    • Despite the CESTAT decision, the Additional Commissioner passed an Order-in-Original on 24 March 2025, confirming the β‚Ή76.72 lakh demand against Wellspring.
    • Among the grounds adopted were that earlier refund claims had been rejected and not challenged, that the subsequent refund applications constituted fresh claims barred by limitation, and that the 2019 Refund Order had been set aside by the Commissioner (Appeals).
    • This prompted Wellspring to approach the Delhi High Court.

    Delhi High Court: CESTAT’s Operative Order Could Not Be Ignored

    • The High Court found a fundamental flaw in the Department’s approach.
    • It observed that the Commissioner (Appeals)’ order dated 16 December 2019, on which the Additional Commissioner had relied, had itself already been set aside by CESTAT on 1 August 2024.
    • Therefore, the adjudicating authority could not proceed in March 2025 as though the Commissioner (Appeals)’ order continued to remain an operative determination against Wellspring.

    The Court emphasised a significant principle governing departmental adjudication:

    An adjudicating authority exercising statutory powers must take into account operative orders passed by appellate authorities having appellate jurisdiction over it and cannot disregard a subsequent appellate determination directly bearing upon the issue under adjudication.

    Limitation Issue Could Not Be Reopened Contrary to CESTAT Finding

    • The High Court also rejected the Department’s attempt to once again treat the refund as time-barred.
    • CESTAT had already specifically considered the limitation issue and decided it in Wellspring’s favour. The Additional Commissioner, therefore, could not simply treat the refund as a fresh application and reach a conclusion directly contrary to the Tribunal’s determination.
    • The High Court observed that the petitioner had specifically communicated CESTAT’s 2024 decision to the adjudicating authority on 24 February 2025. Thus, this was not a situation where the authority was unaware of the appellate decision.
    • Nevertheless, the Order-in-Original was passed on 24 March 2025 without dealing with its effect.

    Substantive Refund Benefit Cannot Be Denied Merely for Quoting Wrong Rule

    • Another important aspect of the case is CESTAT’s underlying finding, which the High Court treated as operative.
    • CESTAT had held that Wellspring was substantively entitled to the β‚Ή76.72 lakh refund under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, and that the benefit could not be denied merely because an incorrect rule had been quoted while filing or sanctioning the refund claim.
    • The High Court clarified that CESTAT’s order had not merely removed the Commissioner (Appeals)’ order on a procedural or technical basis; the Tribunal had actually examined and upheld Wellspring’s substantive entitlement to the refund.

    Delhi High Court Quashes SCN and Order-in-Original

    • The Court ultimately found that the Additional Commissioner had committed a β€œmanifest error” in confirming the β‚Ή76.72 lakh demand.
    • It held that the impugned adjudication was fundamentally unsustainable because it failed to give effect to CESTAT’s subsequent Final Order and proceeded on the basis of an appellate order that had already ceased to exist.

    Accordingly, the High Court:

    • allowed Wellspring Universal’s writ petition;
    • set aside the Demand-cum-Show Cause Notice dated 10 December 2019;
    • set aside the Order-in-Original dated 24 March 2025 confirming β‚Ή76.72 lakh demand; and
    • directed refund of β‚Ή7,67,200 deposited as statutory pre-deposit, together with applicable interest in accordance with law.

    Why the Judgment Is Significant

    • The ruling reinforces judicial and quasi-judicial discipline within the tax adjudication hierarchy. Once a competent appellate tribunal has conclusively decided an issue and its order has neither been stayed nor set aside, a subordinate adjudicating authority cannot effectively nullify that decision by deciding the same issue on a contrary premise.
    • The High Court specifically recorded that CESTAT’s Final Order dated 1 August 2024 had not been shown to have been stayed or set aside in subsequent proceedings.
    • The judgment is also significant for legacy Central Excise/CENVAT disputes transitioning into the GST era. It demonstrates that the existence of a separate demand proceeding cannot justify ignoring an operative appellate determination that directly decides the taxpayer’s entitlement and limitation issues.

    Key Legal Principle

    A statutory adjudicating authority cannot disregard an operative decision of the appellate authority having jurisdiction over it. Where CESTAT has already adjudicated the taxpayer’s substantive entitlement to refund and limitation, the adjudicating authority cannot subsequently confirm a demand on premises directly contrary to that binding appellate determination.

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    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Delhi High Court

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  • Delhi High Court: Prior Formal Declaration Not Required to Claim Protection as a Well-Known Trademark Under Section 11(2)

    Delhi High Court: Prior Formal Declaration Not Required to Claim Protection as a Well-Known Trademark Under Section 11(2)

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 14.09.2026

    Delhi High Court: Prior Formal Declaration Not Required to Claim Protection as a Well-Known Trademark Under Section 11(2)

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    In an important ruling on the protection of well-known trademarks across dissimilar classes of goods, the Delhi High Court has held that a trademark need not have already been formally declared a β€œwell-known trademark” before its proprietor can invoke Section 11(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 to oppose registration of an identical or similar mark for dissimilar goods.

    Justice Jyoti Singh delivered the ruling in an appeal filed by Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., challenging the Registrar of Trade Marks’ rejection of its opposition to registration of the mark β€œGHOST BUSTER” in Class 05. The Court did not itself finally declare GHOSTBUSTERS a well-known trademark or finally reject the rival mark. Instead, it remanded the matter to the Registrar for fresh consideration of Columbia Pictures’ well-known-mark and bad-faith objections.

    Columbia Pictures Opposed Registration of β€˜GHOST BUSTER’ in Class 05

    • The dispute arose after an application was filed for registration of β€œGHOST BUSTER” in Class 05 for pharmaceutical, veterinary and sanitary preparations, dietetic substances for medical use, food for babies, dressings, disinfectants, fungicides, herbicides and other specified products.
    • Columbia Pictures filed a notice of opposition on 18 April 2022. However, the Registrar rejected the opposition by an order dated 16 April 2025, prompting Columbia Pictures to approach the Delhi High Court under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act read with Rule 156 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017.

    Columbia Relied on Decades-Old GHOSTBUSTERS Franchise

    • Columbia Pictures asserted that it is an American film studio and production company and that GHOSTBUSTERS, first released in 1984, became one of the best-known supernatural comedy film franchises.
    • The judgment records that the franchise subsequently expanded through sequels, animated television series and later films, including Ghostbusters: Afterlife and Ghostbusters: Frozen Empire. In India, the movies have been released since 1985 and have also been made available through various streaming platforms.
    • Columbia also relied upon extensive merchandising, advertising and media coverage associated with the GHOSTBUSTERS name. The judgment records that merchandise bearing the markβ€”including apparel, toys, mugs, keychains, books and other productsβ€”was available in India.

    GHOSTBUSTERS Already Registered in India in Multiple Classes

    • There was no dispute that Columbia Pictures held Indian registrations for GHOSTBUSTERS in Classes 09 and 41, registered on 14 August 2012 with claimed use since 29 November 1985, and registrations in Classes 25 and 28 dated 25 October 2019.
    • The rival application for GHOST BUSTER, however, was filed on 1 December 2020 on a β€œproposed to be used” basis in Class 05.
    • This difference in classes became central to the controversy.

    Registrar Rejected Opposition Because Goods Were Dissimilar

    • The Registrar essentially rejected Columbia’s opposition because its GHOSTBUSTERS registrations related to Classes 09, 41, 25 and 28, whereas the rival GHOST BUSTER application concerned Class 05.
    • The Registrar reasoned that Columbia had not shown prior use of GHOSTBUSTERS specifically for Class 05 goods and therefore could not claim monopoly merely on the strength of registrations in other classes.
    • The Registrar also accepted the rival applicant’s explanation that β€œGHOST” referred to unexpected β€œghost peaks” appearing in chromatography and β€œBUSTER” referred to the product’s function of eliminating or removing impurities responsible for such peaks.

    Delhi HC Finds Registrar Failed to Consider a Crucial Section 11(2) Objection

    • The High Court found a fundamental flaw in this approach.
    • Justice Jyoti Singh observed that Columbia had specifically claimed that GHOSTBUSTERS was an earlier well-known trademark within the meaning of Section 11(2) and was consequently entitled to protection even against a nearly identical mark proposed for registration in a different class.
    • Yet the Registrar had failed to adjudicate this contention.
    • The Court described the non-consideration as a β€œglaring error”, noting that once such an opposition was raised, the Registrar was required to examine it and decide whether the earlier mark qualified for protection under Section 11(2).

    Section 11(2) Protects Well-Known Marks Even Against Dissimilar Goods

    • Section 11(2) assumes particular significance because it extends trademark protection beyond the conventional requirement that competing goods or services must be similar.
    • The provision contemplates refusal of registration where the later mark is identical or similar to an earlier trademark, even for dissimilar goods or services, if the earlier mark is a well-known trademark in India and use of the later mark without due cause would take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive character or reputation of the earlier mark.
    • Accordingly, if Columbia could establish that GHOSTBUSTERS satisfied the statutory threshold of a well-known trademark, the mere fact that the rival application fell in Class 05 could not, by itself, dispose of its opposition.

    Prior Formal Declaration as β€˜Well-Known’ Is Not Mandatory

    • The most important legal finding of the judgment concerns whether an opponent must first obtain a formal declaration of well-known status before relying on Section 11(2).
    • The Delhi High Court answered that question in the negative.
    • Justice Jyoti Singh held that Section 11(2) neither requires nor envisages that the earlier trademark must already have been formally declared a well-known trademark. Instead, the inquiry is whether the earlier mark satisfies the statutory threshold of being well known among the relevant segment of the public and enjoys the requisite reputation in India.
    • The Court emphasised the statutory phrase β€œentitled to protection as a well-known trademark” and held that β€œentitled” cannot simply be read as β€œdeclared”. The factors prescribed under Sections 11(6) and 11(7) are therefore relevant to determining whether the mark satisfies that threshold.

    Rule 124 Is Not the Only Route to Well-Known Mark Protection

    • The Registrar’s side argued that Columbia should first have invoked Rule 124 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, which provides a mechanism for determination of a trademark as well known.
    • The High Court rejected the proposition that Rule 124 constitutes a mandatory pre-condition for invoking Section 11(2) in opposition proceedings.
    • The Court pointed out that the legislation deliberately uses different expressionsβ€”β€œwell-known trademark” in Section 11(2) and β€œdetermined to be well known” in Section 11(8). It consequently held that there is no statutory prescription requiring the proprietor of an earlier mark first to secure a formal well-known trademark declaration before invoking Section 11(2).

    Registrar Can Determine Well-Known Character During Opposition Proceedings

    • The ruling has important procedural implications.
    • According to the High Court, when Section 11(2) is invoked in opposition proceedings, the Registrar is empowered to examine whether the earlier mark is well known by considering evidence against the statutory factors contained in Sections 11(6) and 11(7), read with Section 2(1)(zg).
    • Those factors may include the duration and extent of use, promotion, recognition among the relevant public, registrations and the record of successful enforcement of trademark rights.
    • The decision therefore distinguishes between requiring a pre-existing formal declaration and determining whether the mark qualifies for well-known protection in the course of an opposition.

    Dissimilarity of Goods Does Not End the Inquiry

    • The Court further held that if Columbia succeeds in establishing that GHOSTBUSTERS meets the statutory threshold under Section 2(1)(zg), read with Sections 11(6) and 11(7), it can oppose the nearly identical GHOST BUSTER mark under Section 11(2) despite the dissimilarity of goods and difference in classes.
    • The Registrar, however, had focused almost entirely on the fact that Columbia’s registrations and activities were in entertainment, media and allied goods and services, whereas the rival application concerned Class 05 products.
    • The High Court criticised this approach, observing that the Registrar had taken the β€œwrong path” by failing to examine the well-known-mark issue.

    Columbia Had Produced Extensive Evidence of GHOSTBUSTERS Reputation

    • Columbia had placed substantial material before the Registrar in support of its claim.
    • The evidence referred to the release of the first GHOSTBUSTERS film in India in 1985, subsequent sequels, worldwide revenues, merchandising, availability on OTT platforms, extensive advertising and promotion, media coverage and longstanding Indian trademark registrations.
    • It also relied on registration of the mark in more than 50 countries and prior enforcement activity concerning the mark.
    • Crucially, however, the High Court did not itself finally rule that GHOSTBUSTERS is a well-known trademark in India. It held that the Registrar had failed to perform the required statutory examination and must now do so on remand.

    Alleged Bad-Faith Adoption of β€˜GHOST BUSTER’ Must Also Be Examined

    • The High Court also found that Columbia’s allegation of bad-faith adoption had not been properly considered.
    • Columbia argued that the GHOSTBUSTERS mark was so well known that adoption of the nearly identical expression GHOST BUSTER could not be coincidental.
    • It also relied upon an earlier US proceeding involving Welch Materials Inc., described in the judgment as a sister concern of Respondent No.2. Welch had applied in the United States for GHOST BUSTER in June 2019. Columbia opposed the application; it was subsequently abandoned, and the USPTO passed an order refusing the application on 7 January 2020. The Indian GHOST BUSTER application was thereafter filed on 1 December 2020.
    • The High Court observed that the Registrar’s impugned order did not address this significant contention.

    Delhi HC Discusses Meaning of β€˜Bad Faith’ in Trademark Applications

    • The Court referred to its earlier decisions in BPI Sports LLC v. Saurabh Gulati and Kia Wang v. Registrar of Trademarks while discussing bad-faith trademark adoption.
    • The judgment noted that bad faith may include cases where an applicant intentionally submits wrong or misleading information to the Trade Marks Office as well as situations where registration is sought with the intention of laying hands on a third party’s trademark.
    • The question whether the present GHOST BUSTER application actually amounted to bad-faith adoption was nevertheless left for the Registrar to decide after proper consideration.

    Delhi High Court Remands Matter to Registrar for Fresh Decision

    • After examining the Registrar’s order, Columbia’s opposition, evidence and written submissions, the High Court concluded that the matter required fresh consideration by the Registrar of Trade Marks.
    • The Registrar was specifically directed to examine all relevant contentions and supporting documents, particularly Columbia’s allegations concerning bad faith and its claim that GHOSTBUSTERS is entitled to protection as a well-known trademark under Section 11(2), tested against Sections 2(1)(zg), 11(6) and 11(7) of the Trade Marks Act.
    • Thus, Columbia Pictures obtained a significant procedural and legal victory, but the judgment should not be read as a final declaration that GHOSTBUSTERS is already a well-known trademark in India or as a final refusal of the GHOST BUSTER application. Those questions are to be reconsidered by the Registrar.

    Significance of the Judgment

    • The ruling is particularly important for owners of famous brands because it clarifies that cross-class protection under Section 11(2) is not dependent upon obtaining a formal well-known-mark declaration in advance.
    • A proprietor can raise well-known status as a ground in trademark opposition proceedings and produce evidence demonstrating that the earlier mark satisfies the statutory requirements. The Registrar must then adjudicate that claim instead of dismissing the opposition merely because the competing goods fall in different classes.
    • At the same time, the decision does not create an automatic cross-class monopoly for every reputed trademark. The proprietor must still establish, through evidence, that its mark meets the statutory threshold for well-known protection and satisfies the requirements of Section 11(2).

    Key Takeaway

    The Delhi High Court has clarified that an earlier trademark does not need a prior formal declaration as a β€œwell-known trademark” before its proprietor can invoke Section 11(2) of the Trade Marks Act against an identical or similar mark covering dissimilar goods.

    What matters is whether the earlier mark can establish, on evidence, that it qualifies for such protection under the statutory criteria. In Columbia Pictures’ case, the Registrar’s failure to examine the claimed well-known character of GHOSTBUSTERS and the allegation of bad-faith adoption of GHOST BUSTER warranted reconsideration. The matter was therefore remanded for a fresh decision.

    Connected Matter

    Delhi HC Cancels Deceptively Similar β€˜ROCKPAPA’ Trademark; Holds Prior User Has Superior Rights Over Registered Proprietor

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Delhi High Court

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  • Madras High Court Grants Bail in NDPS Case Involving 862 Grams of Hydroponic Ganja; Says Further Incarceration Not Required

    Madras High Court Grants Bail in NDPS Case Involving 862 Grams of Hydroponic Ganja; Says Further Incarceration Not Required

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 14.09.2026

    Madras High Court Grants Bail in NDPS Case Involving 862 Grams of Hydroponic Ganja; Says Further Incarceration Not Required

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .  

    The Madras High Court has granted bail to Chandra Pratapray Nirankari in an NDPS case involving alleged possession of 862 grams of Hydroponic Ganja/Marijuana, holding that, considering the nature of the allegations, the period of incarceration already undergone and the fact that the quantity involved was treated as an intermediate quantity, further incarceration was not required.

    Justice N. Ramesh ordered the petitioner’s release on bail subject to execution of a bond of β‚Ή25,000 with two sureties for a like sum, along with reporting and other conditions.

    Petitioner Arrested Under NDPS Act

    • The petitioner had been arrested and remanded to judicial custody on 17 August 2026 in connection with O.S. No.535/2026-AIU-B and O.S. No.39 of 2026 INT-AIR.
    • The alleged offences were under Section 8(c) read with Sections 23, 28 and 29, and Section 20(b)(ii)(A) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.
    • The bail petition was filed under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

    Prosecution Alleged Possession of 862 Grams of Hydroponic Ganja

    • According to the prosecution, the petitioner was found in possession of 862 grams of Hydroponic Ganja/Marijuana.
    • Counsel for the petitioner argued that he had been falsely implicated and had not committed the alleged offence. It was also submitted that the quantity involved was not commercial quantity and that the petitioner was willing to comply with any conditions imposed by the Court.
    • The prosecution opposed bail, while also informing the Court that the petitioner had no previous case pending against him.

    High Court Treats Quantity as Intermediate

    After hearing both sides and examining the record, the Madras High Court took into account three principal factors:

    • the nature of the allegations,
    • the period of incarceration already undergone, and
    • the fact that the quantity involved was an intermediate quantity.

    On that basis, the Court concluded that further incarceration of the petitioner was not required and granted bail.

    The order is therefore significant as a bail ruling based on the circumstances of the case and the quantity involved. It does not amount to a finding on the petitioner’s guilt or innocence, which remains to be determined during investigation and trial.

    Bail Bond of β‚Ή25,000 With Two Sureties

    • The Court directed the petitioner to execute a bond for β‚Ή25,000, along with two sureties for a like sum, to the satisfaction of the Judicial Magistrate, Special Court for Customs at Alandur.
    • The sureties were also directed to affix their photographs and left thumb impressions in the prescribed surety application, with the Magistrate required to obtain an identity proof to verify their identities.

    Daily Reporting for 15 Days

    The High Court imposed a reporting condition requiring the petitioner to appear before the respondent authorities every day at 10:30 a.m. for 15 days, and thereafter whenever required for interrogation.

    The petitioner was also directed:

    • not to abscond during investigation or trial; and
    • not to tamper with evidence or witnesses.

    Trial Court Empowered to Act on Breach of Bail Conditions

    • The Court further made it clear that if any of the bail conditions are breached, the Magistrate or Trial Court would be entitled to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law.
    • For this proposition, the Madras High Court relied upon the Supreme Court decision in P.K. Shaji v. State of Kerala, (2005) 13 SCC 283.
    • The order also states that if the accused subsequently absconds, a fresh FIR may be registered under Section 269 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.

    Why the Order Is Significant

    • The ruling reinforces the principle that continued pre-trial detention is not automatic in every NDPS prosecution and that the Court must assess the circumstances of the individual case, including the quantity of contraband, period of custody and antecedents of the accused.
    • Here, the Court specifically recorded that the quantity involved was intermediate and that the petitioner had no previous pending case. These factors weighed in favour of bail.
    • At the same time, the Court balanced the grant of liberty with strict conditions requiring regular reporting, cooperation with the investigation, non-interference with witnesses and continued availability during proceedings.

    Key Takeaway

    The Madras High Court granted bail to the petitioner in an NDPS case involving 862 grams of Hydroponic Ganja/Marijuana, holding that further incarceration was unnecessary in view of the period already spent in custody and the intermediate quantity involved.

    The petitioner therefore succeeded in the bail petition, though the order does not decide the merits of the prosecution case.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Madras High Court

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  • Madras High Court Directs Payment of β‚Ή3.52 Crore Land Acquisition Compensation to Purchaser

    Madras High Court Directs Payment of β‚Ή3.52 Crore Land Acquisition Compensation to Purchaser

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration

    Date: 14.09.2026

    Madras High Court Directs Payment of β‚Ή3.52 Crore Land Acquisition Compensation to Purchaser

    This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id amitnaren@outlook.com .  

    The Madras High Court has allowed a writ petition filed by M/s RK Dhayu Real Estates LLP and directed the Tamil Nadu land acquisition authorities to release the compensation payable for land acquired out of a larger property purchased from the Sahara Group.

    The petitioner had challenged the proceedings dated 1 August 2024 refusing to disburse the land acquisition compensation and sought payment of the amount assessed at β‚Ή3,52,35,674, along with interest.

    Property Purchased From Sahara Group Under Supreme Court Monitoring

    • The dispute concerned property originally belonging to M/s Sahara City Homes, measuring a total extent of 69.5025 acres.
    • The judgment records that, because the Sahara Group owed money to various investors and proceedings were pending before the Supreme Court, sale of Sahara properties was being undertaken under the supervision of the Apex Court, with sale proceeds required to be deposited into a specially designated account.
    • RK Dhayu Real Estates LLP purchased the property through five registered sale deeds dated 6 January 2023, after obtaining concurrence in the context of the Supreme Court proceedings. The petitioner deposited nearly β‚Ή45 crore into the special account, and a compliance affidavit was filed before the Supreme Court regarding the transaction.

    2.5437 Acres Had Already Been Acquired by Highways Department

    • Out of the total 69.5025 acres purchased by RK Dhayu, approximately 2.5437 acres had already been acquired by the Tamil Nadu State Highways Department.
    • As a result, although the petitioner had paid consideration for the full extent of 69.5025 acres, it could not obtain possession and enjoyment of the acquired portion.
    • The sale deed itself contained a clause enabling the petitioner to receive the compensation fixed in respect of the acquired land.

    Sahara Group Assigned Compensation Rights to RK Dhayu

    1. A significant factor before the High Court was a communication dated 7 July 2024 issued by a representative of the Sahara Group to the Special Land Acquisition Officer.
    2. The communication recorded that the entire sale consideration had been received from RK Dhayu Real Estates LLP and deposited in the SEBI-Sahara Refund Account in accordance with the Supreme Court’s directions.
    3. More importantly, Sahara expressly confirmed that it had assigned all rights, including the right to claim compensation in respect of the subject property, in favour of RK Dhayu Real Estates LLP.
    4. The Sahara representative further stated that RK Dhayu was legally entitled to receive the compensation, that Sahara had no objection to such payment, and that Sahara would not itself make any claim for the compensation. The communication also contained an undertaking to indemnify the authorities against any loss arising from disbursement to RK Dhayu.

    Land Acquisition Authorities Refused Payment

    1. Despite the authorization and no-objection from Sahara, the Deputy Tahsildar issued proceedings dated 1 August 2024 refusing to release the compensation to RK Dhayu.
    2. The State’s concern was that the petitioner was not the awardee in the original land acquisition proceedings and that the relevant revenue records continued to reflect names of several entities connected with the Sahara Group.
    3. The authorities were also apprehensive because the broader Sahara matter remained under Supreme Court monitoring and involved claims of investors across India.
    4. The respondents therefore feared that disbursing the compensation directly to RK Dhayu could expose them to future disputes and contemplated referring the matter for determination of apportionment.

    High Court Finds Sale Was Properly Conducted Under Supreme Court Supervision

    • Justice N. Anand Venkatesh rejected the apprehension of the authorities after examining the documents placed on record.
    • The Court found that the entire sale transaction had taken place under the direct monitoring of the Supreme Court. It noted that the compliance affidavit filed before the Apex Court specifically referred to the sale in favour of RK Dhayu and confirmed that the entire consideration had been deposited into the designated special account.
    • The High Court therefore held that there was no difficulty in concluding that the sale in favour of the petitioner had been validly completed with proper disclosure before the Supreme Court.

    Purchaser Cannot Be Left Without Either Land or Compensation

    • The Court also took note of the practical consequence of the acquisition.
    • RK Dhayu had paid consideration for the entire 69.5025-acre property, but approximately 2.5437 acres were unavailable to it because they had already been acquired by the Highways Department.
    • The Court therefore observed that the only meaningful way of compensating the purchaser for that portion was to permit it to receive the land acquisition compensation fixed by the Highways Department.

    Sahara’s No-Objection Removed Any Real Risk to Authorities

    • The High Court further relied on the Sahara Group’s express no-objection and assignment of compensation rights.
    • The Court observed that the same representative who was involved when the sale deed was executed had issued the subsequent communication confirming that RK Dhayu could receive the entire compensation amount.
    • In these circumstances, payment of the compensation to the petitioner would not, in the Court’s view, expose the respondents to any genuine hardship or future liability.
    • The Court also noted that the sale deed itself contained a specific clause enabling the petitioner to receive the compensation and that the transaction had been disclosed in the compliance affidavit filed before the Supreme Court.

    Authorities Directed to Pay Compensation Within Six Weeks

    • The Madras High Court accordingly allowed the writ petition and directed the respondents to hand over the entire compensation amount to RK Dhayu Real Estates LLP within six weeks from receipt of a copy of the order.
    • The petitioner’s Senior Counsel also filed a memo containing the bank account details into which the compensation was to be credited, and the Court directed the first respondent to make payment into that account.
    • The Court clarified that if any dispute arose in the future concerning the compensation, the respondents would not be held responsible and such dispute would have to be handled by the petitioner.

    Significance of the Judgment

    The ruling is important in situations where land is acquired before or around the time of a subsequent property sale and the purchaser has expressly acquired the seller’s right to receive compensation.

    The judgment demonstrates that land acquisition authorities cannot refuse payment merely because the purchaser was not the original awardee where the documentary record clearly establishes:

    • a valid sale of the larger property,
    • an express assignment of compensation rights,
    • a no-objection from the original owner,
    • payment of the full sale consideration, and
    • judicial supervision of the underlying transaction.

    The case is also notable because the property formed part of the Sahara Group’s assets under Supreme Court monitoring, yet the Madras High Court found that this circumstance did not prevent release of compensation where the sale and payment structure had been properly disclosed before the Apex Court.

    Key Takeaway

    The Madras High Court effectively held that where a purchaser has paid for the entire property, a portion of that property has already been acquired by the Government, and the original owner has expressly assigned its compensation rights and given a no-objection, the purchaser cannot be denied the corresponding land acquisition compensation merely because it was not the original awardee. Accordingly, RK Dhayu Real Estates LLP succeeded in the writ petition, and the State authorities were directed to release the entire compensation amount within six weeks.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Source: Madras High Court

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