Tag: #Threads

  • Gujarat High Court- Administrative Circulars Cannot Curtail Statutory SAD Refunds

    Gujarat High Court- Administrative Circulars Cannot Curtail Statutory SAD Refunds

    Date: 23.10.2026

    The Gujarat High Court held that customs and trade authorities could not use administrative circulars or a public notice to curtail a statutory refund benefit available under a customs exemption notification.

    In Agarwalla Timbers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors., decided on 12 October 2022, the Gujarat High Court ruled in favour of importers who had paid Special Additional Duty (SAD) through DEPB and Reward Scheme scrips. The Court invalidated the restriction that prevented use of re-credited scrips after 30 September 2013 and directed that, where such scrips were no longer available, the refund must be paid electronically, with 6% interest.

    Background: Why SAD Refunds Matter

    SAD is an additional customs duty levied under Section 3(5) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. It is intended to create parity between imported goods and domestically purchased goods, since domestic transactions generally attract sales tax or VAT.

    Under Notification No. 102/2007-Cus dated 14 September 2007, an importer who subsequently sells imported goods in India and pays applicable sales tax or VAT can claim refund of SAD, subject to the conditions in the notification.

    Where SAD was paid in cash, the refund was ordinarily made in cash. Where it was paid by debit in DEPB or Reward Scheme scrips, departmental instructions contemplated a re-credit of the amount in the relevant scrip.

    The Dispute Before the Court

    Agarwalla Timbers imported timber and paid customs duties, including SAD. Some SAD payments were made through DEPB and Reward Scheme scrips acquired from the market. The company later sold the imported goods on payment of VAT/sales tax and filed SAD refund claims.

    The refund process was delayed because Customs disputed whether round logs, after being processed into sawn timber, retained the identity required for the refund. Earlier proceedings ultimately supported the importer’s position, and the Supreme Court had also issued an interim direction requiring refund upon a 50% bank guarantee.

    However, when Customs granted the refunds in May and June 2013, the authorities had introduced a new deadline. DGFT Public Notice No. 6(RE-2013)/2009-14 dated 18 April 2013 and CBEC Circular No. 18/2013-Cus dated 29 April 2013 provided that re-credited scrips could be used only up to 30 September 2013.

    The importer could not fully use the re-credited amount within that limited period. Its request to transfer the credit was rejected. The dispute before the High Court was therefore whether these administrative measures could lawfully deprive the importer of its refund benefit.

    The Court’s Decision

    The Court held that the 18 April 2013 public notice and the 29 April 2013 circular were invalid insofar as they denied SAD refund through DEPB or Reward Scheme scrips beyond 30 September 2013.

    It found that the petitioners had filed their refund claims properly and that the inability to use the credit arose because of delays by the authorities. The Court rejected the proposition that the department could rely on a cut-off date after its own delayed processing had made the benefit impracticable.

    The Court directed:

    • sanction of the refund relating to re-credited DEPB/Reward Scheme scrips;
    • payment through RTGS within 12 weeks if the relevant scrip mechanism was no longer available; and
    • interest at 6% from the date of receipt of the refund application until payment.

    Core Legal Principles Applied

    1. A circular cannot amend an exemption notification

    The central principle is that an exemption notification issued under Section 25(1) of the Customs Act has statutory force. If the government wishes to impose a new condition, restrict a benefit, or alter the terms of that exemption, it must do so through a fresh notification issued under the same statutory power.

    The Court held that a DGFT public notice and CBEC circular could not introduce a new restriction on the refund benefit under Notification No. 102/2007-Cus.

    2. Administrative instructions cannot override statutory rights

    Circulars may guide customs officers and help ensure consistent administration. They cannot, however, reduce, defeat, or impose harsher conditions than those contained in the governing statute or statutory notification.

    The 30 September 2013 deadline was not a condition in the exemption notification. By making refund availability dependent on using re-credited scrips before that date, the authorities effectively added a condition without statutory authority.

    3. Conditions for exemption must appear in the notification itself

    The Court reaffirmed that importers must be able to identify the conditions of an exemption from the notification that grants it. A condition cannot later be introduced through an executive instruction, guideline, press note, or circular.

    This principle protects legal certainty in customs administration. Businesses should not lose an existing fiscal benefit because an authority later changes procedure through a non-statutory instrument.

    4. The State cannot benefit from its own delay

    The Court found no fault on the part of the petitioners in filing their refund claims. The claims remained pending due to departmental action and disputes. Once refund was sanctioned, only a short period remained before the administrative cut-off expired.

    The authorities could not rely on that deadline to deny the benefit where their own delay had prevented meaningful use of the re-credit.

    5. Interest on delayed refunds runs from the refund application

    Relying on Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. v. Union of India, the Court held that interest is payable from the date of receipt of the refund application until payment. It did not accept that interest could be postponed until the date of a later refund order.

    The Court fixed the rate at 6%.

    Precedents Relied Upon

    The judgment follows an established line of authority against executive modification of statutory exemptions:

    • Allen Diesels India Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India: The Delhi High Court held that CBEC circulars could not add restrictions to SAD refund under Notification No. 102/2007-Cus.
    • Sandur Micro Circuits Ltd.: A circular cannot take away the effect of a statutory notification or narrow the exemption granted by it.
    • Inter Continental (India): The Gujarat High Court held that additional conditions cannot be read into an exemption notification and departmental circulars cannot override it.
    • Union of India v. Inter Continental (India): The Supreme Court affirmed that a circular cannot add a condition that restricts the scope of an exemption notification.
    • Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd.: Interest on delayed refund becomes payable after the prescribed period from receipt of the refund application.

    Significance for Importers and Exporters

    The ruling is significant because it reinforces the hierarchy of legal instruments in customs law. Statutory provisions and notifications issued under statutory authority prevail over administrative circulars and public notices.

    For businesses, the judgment confirms that:

    • a valid refund entitlement cannot be curtailed by a circular that adds a condition absent from the exemption notification;
    • procedural instructions cannot defeat substantive fiscal rights;
    • delayed departmental processing cannot be used to extinguish an accrued refund benefit; and
    • where an obsolete mechanism makes re-credit impossible, the refund should be provided through an effective alternative mode, such as electronic bank transfer.

    Conclusion

    The Gujarat High Court’s ruling protects importers from losing SAD refunds merely because administrative authorities imposed a non-statutory deadline or processed claims too late. Its key message is clear: an executive circular may administer a statutory exemption, but it cannot rewrite, narrow, or nullify it.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Bombay High Court: Newspaper Title Registration Does Not Invalidate Trademark Rights β€” Section 124 Stay Plea Rejected

    Bombay High Court: Newspaper Title Registration Does Not Invalidate Trademark Rights β€” Section 124 Stay Plea Rejected

    Date: 23.10.2026

    The Bombay High Court has refused to stay a trademark infringement suit over the name β€œPune Mirror,” finding that the defendants’ late challenge to the plaintiffs’ trademark registrations was procedurally defective and unsupported by the pleadings.

    The dispute

    The suit was brought by Metropolitan Media Company Ltd., Bennett Coleman and Company Ltd., and Lexicon Media Pvt. Ltd. against Kothrud Mitra Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. and its publisher, Sunnjoy Manohar Dahake.

    The plaintiffs claim registered rights in β€œPune Mirror” and β€œSunday Pune Mirror,” along with a broader group of β€œMirror” newspaper marks, including β€œMumbai Mirror,” β€œAhmedabad Mirror,” and Bangalore-related titles. They allege that the defendants’ use of β€œPune Mirror” and β€œKM Kothrud Mirror” infringes their registrations and is likely to cause public confusion. The suit seeks permanent injunctive relief and Rs. 100 crore in damages.

    The defendants maintain that they began publishing a fortnightly newspaper titled β€œPune Mirror” on 1 October 2010 and received a registration certificate from the Registrar of Newspapers for India (RNI) on 14 December 2010. They argued that the plaintiffs had not completed RNI-related compliance for their own titles, resulting in those titles being deblocked under the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867.

    Why the defendants sought a stay

    When the suit reached final arguments, the defendants relied on three rectification applications filed in 2023 and 2024. Those applications sought cancellation or rectification of certain plaintiff registrations on the basis of alleged non-use.

    They asked the court to stay the infringement suit under Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, until the rectification proceedings were decided. Alternatively, they sought framing of an issue on the validity of the plaintiffs’ registrations and time to bring a rectification challenge before the appropriate forum.

    The plaintiffs opposed the request as a delaying tactic. The suit had been filed in 2015; pleadings, issues, amendments, and evidence had already been completed, and both sides’ evidence closed in August 2025.

    The court’s ruling

    Justice Gauri Godse rejected the interim application. The court held that the defendants had not established a basis to either pause the suit or add an issue concerning trademark invalidity.

    Rectification applications were before the wrong forum

    The defendants’ rectification applications were pending before the Registrar of Trade Marks. The court held that, once an infringement suit is pending and validity of a registered mark is questioned, Section 125 of the Trade Marks Act requires the rectification issue to be pursued before the High Court.

    Because the applications had been filed before an authority that lacked jurisdiction in the circumstances, their pendency could not support a stay under Section 124.

    No pleaded challenge to trademark validity

    The defendants’ written statement relied mainly on their use of β€œPune Mirror,” their RNI registration, and allegations that the plaintiffs’ newspaper titles were deblocked. But it did not specifically challenge the validity of the plaintiffs’ trademark registrations under the Trade Marks Act.

    The court found that an issue on invalidity can be framed only where such an issue arises from the parties’ pleadings. A party cannot obtain a stay merely by later asserting in an application that a registered trademark is invalid.

    Press-title registration and trademark registration are distinct

    A central feature of the decision is the distinction between registration of a newspaper title under the Press and Registration of Books Act and registration of a trademark under the Trade Marks Act.

    The court held that RNI-related proceedings, including deblocking or registration of a newspaper title, do not automatically create a ground to cancel or invalidate a trademark registration. A non-use challenge must be expressly pleaded and assessed against the statutory requirements of trademark law.

    Section 124: a low threshold, but not no threshold

    The court considered the principles laid down in Patel Field Marshal Agencies v. P.M. Diesels and Franco India Pharmaceuticals v. Corona Remedies. These cases recognise that a court should frame an invalidity issue where the challenge is prima facie tenable, applying a relatively low threshold.

    But that threshold still requires a genuine, legally recognisable challenge. Courts may refuse to frame an issue where the proposed invalidity plea is false, frivolous, or untenable.

    Here, the court found that the defendants had not pleaded invalidity under the Trade Marks Act and had not made even a low-threshold prima facie case that the plaintiffs’ registrations were invalid. Their reliance on RNI proceedings did not fill that gap.

    Final outcome

    The Bombay High Court dismissed the defendants’ interim application and directed that the main trademark suit be listed for final arguments before the court having the appropriate assignment.

    Key legal implications

    • Trademark invalidity must be specifically raised: A challenge to a registered mark should be tied to grounds available under the Trade Marks Act, rather than general assertions about competing title registrations.
    • The correct forum matters: In a pending infringement suit, a rectification challenge to the relevant registration must be filed before the High Court as required by Section 125.
    • Separate legal regimes serve separate functions: Registration of a newspaper title under press law does not, by itself, determine trademark validity, ownership, or infringement.
    • Late procedural applications face close scrutiny: A stay request made after completion of evidence and at the final-arguments stage will not succeed without a clear legal foundation in the existing pleadings.

    The ruling preserves the distinction between newspaper-title regulation and trademark protection, while confirming that Section 124 cannot be used to interrupt an advanced infringement suit on the basis of an unpleaded and improperly filed validity challenge.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Bombay HC: RERA Appellate Tribunal Cannot Decide Merits of Complaint Rejected on Maintainability β€” Mandatory Remand to MahaRERA

    Bombay HC: RERA Appellate Tribunal Cannot Decide Merits of Complaint Rejected on Maintainability β€” Mandatory Remand to MahaRERA

    Date: 23.10.2026

    The Bombay High Court has held that where MahaRERA dismisses a complaint solely on maintainability, the Maharashtra Real Estate Appellate Tribunal must remand the matter for a merits decision if it reverses that finding; it cannot decide the dispute itself for the first time.

    Key ruling

    In Keyana Estate LLP v. Ashok D. Karwa and Another, decided on 21 October 2026, the Court set aside a MahaRERA Appellate Tribunal order that proposed to decide allottees’ complaint on merits after finding it maintainable despite an arbitration clause.

    The Court ruled that MahaRERA, as the original adjudicatory authority, must first determine the factual and legal merits of the complaint. The Tribunal’s role is appellate and corrective; it cannot replace the first-instance decision-making process where no merits determination has yet been made.

    Background of the dispute

    The allottees had filed a complaint before MahaRERA against Keyana Estate LLP. MahaRERA dismissed it at the threshold, holding that the agreement’s arbitration clause made the complaint not maintainable.

    The allottees appealed. The Appellate Tribunal disagreed with MahaRERA’s view on maintainability and held that the complaint could proceed notwithstanding the arbitration clause. However, rather than sending the matter back to MahaRERA, the Tribunal directed that it would decide the substantive merits itself.

    Keyana Estate LLP challenged that procedural course before the Bombay High Court.

    Why remand was necessary

    The High Court emphasized that an appeal is a statutory remedy and cannot be reduced by allowing an appellate forum to decide merits in the first instance. If the Tribunal were to determine the complaint’s merits without a prior MahaRERA decision, the affected party would lose a full appellate level on those merits and would be left to challenge the Tribunal’s first-instance findings only before the High Court.

    The Court described the proper sequence as follows:

    1. The original forum decides the complaint on merits.
    2. An appellate forum reviews that merits decision if challenged.
    3. A higher court may then consider a further appeal where legally available.

    When a case is dismissed only on a preliminary issue, and the appellate body overturns that preliminary ruling, the normal and appropriate course is to return the matter to the original forum for adjudication.

    Distinguishing routine-remand cases

    The respondents relied on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Nadakerappa v. Pillamma, which cautions that remand should not be ordered routinely where the lower court has already decided the matter on merits and the appellate court has the complete evidentiary record.

    The Bombay High Court distinguished that principle. It explained that the Supreme Court’s caution applies where a merits decision already exists. It does not apply where the original authority never considered the merits at all because it dismissed the matter on a preliminary ground.

    In this situation, remand is not an unnecessary procedural exercise. It protects the parties’ right to an adjudication at the first level and preserves the ordinary appellate structure.

    Court’s directions

    The High Court allowed the second appeal and:

    • set aside the Appellate Tribunal’s order dated 19 March 2025;
    • remanded Complaint No. CC0600000094344 to MahaRERA for a decision on merits;
    • directed MahaRERA to decide the complaint as expeditiously as possible, preferably within six weeks, noting that the complainants are senior citizens; and
    • kept all parties’ substantive contentions open.

    Practical significance for real-estate disputes

    The ruling reinforces an important procedural safeguard in MahaRERA litigation. An arbitration clause may be assessed at the maintainability stage, but if MahaRERA’s threshold dismissal is overturned, the merits ordinarily must go back to MahaRERA rather than being determined for the first time by the Appellate Tribunal.

    For promoters, allottees and practitioners, the decision confirms that procedural efficiency cannot override the statutory right to a first-instance merits ruling and a meaningful appeal from that ruling.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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  • Bombay HC: Arbitrators Cannot Travel Beyond Contractual Warranty Clauses While Awarding Compensation

    Bombay HC: Arbitrators Cannot Travel Beyond Contractual Warranty Clauses While Awarding Compensation

    Date: 23.10.2026

    The Bombay High Court has set aside an arbitral award requiring Forech India Limited to refund JSW Jaigarh Port Limited for conveyor belts, holding that the award disregarded material evidence, applied unequal standards to the parties’ witnesses, and went beyond the contractual warranty remedy.

    The dispute at a glance

    The dispute arose from two 2011 purchase orders under which Forech India Limited supplied EP conveyor belts for JSW Jaigarh Port Limited’s coal-handling system. The combined supply covered 3,490 metres of belting: 690 metres rated 800/4 and 2,800 metres rated 1250/4.

    Before dispatch, the parties carried out a joint inspection. After installation, JSW reported waviness, visible three-ply material at one belt edge, and later air pockets in portions of the belts. JSW contended that the defects were inherent manufacturing defects and invoked two performance bank guarantees. It subsequently commenced arbitration.

    In August 2015, the arbitral tribunal ordered Forech to pay Rs. 2,16,44,423, after accounting for the encashed bank guarantees, with 12% annual interest. The tribunal also rejected Forech’s counterclaim concerning the bank guarantees and damages.

    Why the award was challenged

    Forech challenged the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Its principal arguments were that:

    • the tribunal ignored joint-inspection records and test certificates said to show compliance with the agreed technical specifications;
    • the tribunal rejected Forech’s technical witnesses as in-house and non-expert, while relying on JSW’s own in-house witnesses;
    • there was no evidence that JSW replaced the entire supply or purchased replacement belts from other suppliers; and
    • the contractual warranty provided for free repair or replacement of defective parts, not a refund of the full contract price.

    JSW maintained that the belts were defective within the warranty period, that Forech had failed to replace them, and that the tribunal’s factual findings should not be re-examined in a Section 34 challenge.

    Court finds unequal treatment of evidence

    The High Court emphasized that courts do not sit in appeal over arbitral awards. However, an award may be set aside where patent illegality is apparent, including where vital evidence is ignored, the decision is perverse, or the tribunal acts contrary to the contract or substantive law.

    On the facts, the Court found that the tribunal had rejected Forech’s evidence about conveyor-system speed and operating parameters because its witnesses were in-house personnel and not specialist conveyor-system experts. Yet the tribunal accepted evidence from JSW’s similarly situated in-house witnesses.

    The Court held that Forech’s witnesses were technical personnel involved in conveyor-belt manufacture and supply and were competent to address the applicable standards. It also noted that the technical material indicated the conveyor system’s operating speed of 4.5 m/s could have been a contributing factor, while the applicable parameters were said to indicate a maximum speed of 3 m/s for the material and conditions involved.

    This one-sided treatment, the Court held, amounted to a failure to engage properly with Forech’s evidence and violated the equal-treatment requirement under Section 18 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

    Warranty remedy did not support a full refund

    A key issue was the extent of belt replacement. Of the 3,490 metres supplied, the record showed that 860 metres had been replaced:

    • 150 metres of the 800/4 belting; and
    • 710 metres of the 1250/4 belting.

    That left 2,630 metres that had not been shown to be replaced because of defects. The Court also found no evidence that JSW had purchased new belts from other suppliers to replace the entire supply, despite the tribunal’s finding to that effect.

    The purchase orders contained a warranty for free repair or replacement of β€œany part(s)” found defective or unserviceable within the stipulated period. JSW had accepted and continued to use the belts, replacing certain portions rather than rejecting the goods outright.

    The Court therefore held that the matter was one of breach of warranty, not a basis for treating the entire contract as repudiated. Under the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, acceptance and use of goods generally confine the buyer to a damages remedy for breach of warranty rather than a right to reject the goods and recover the entire purchase price.

    Outcome and legal significance

    The High Court concluded that the award suffered from patent illegality because it:

    • selectively discounted Forech’s evidence while accepting comparable evidence from JSW;
    • awarded relief inconsistent with the warranty clause; and
    • lacked evidence that the whole supply had been replaced or that replacement belts had been bought from third parties.

    The Court set aside both the arbitral award and the determination on Forech’s counterclaim. It left the parties to pursue remedies available in law and stated that, if a new arbitrator is appointed, the existing evidence may be used along with any additional evidence permitted.

    Key takeaway for commercial contracts

    The ruling underscores that an arbitral tribunal has wide latitude on facts, but it must evaluate comparable evidence even-handedly and remain within the parties’ contractual framework. Where a warranty is limited to repair or replacement of defective parts, a full-price refund requires clear contractual support and evidence of loss or replacement of the entire supply.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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  • Bombay HC: Proportionate Rights Share Allotment Below Market Value Does Not Automatically Create Taxable Income

    Bombay HC: Proportionate Rights Share Allotment Below Market Value Does Not Automatically Create Taxable Income

    Date: 23.10.2026

    The Bombay High Court has set aside reassessment proceedings against Grasim Industries Limited for AY 2020–21, holding that the Revenue’s notice was time-barred and that a proportionate rights-share allotment cannot be taxed merely because the issue price was below the assessed fair market value.

    The dispute: Vodafone Idea rights shares

    Grasim subscribed to 230,90,26,052 rights equity shares of Vodafone Idea Limited (VIL) during FY 2019–20 at Rs. 12.50 per share. The allotment was made proportionately to existing shareholders, and Grasim’s percentage holding in VIL remained unchanged.

    The Income Tax Department later alleged that the shares had a fair market value of Rs. 13.925 per share on the allotment date. On that basis, it treated the Rs. 1.425 per-share difference as a taxable benefit under Section 56(2)(x) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The proposed escaped income was Rs. 329.04 crore.

    Grasim challenged:

    • the show-cause notice issued on 24 March 2026 under Section 148A(1);
    • the order dated 30 June 2026 under Section 148A(3); and
    • the consequential reassessment notice issued under Section 148.

    Court’s first finding: the reassessment process was out of time

    The Court held that a valid Section 148A(1) notice must be accompanied by the information that suggests income has escaped assessment. Simply stating an amount allegedly representing escaped income is not enough.

    In this case, the initial notice did not explain:

    • the nature of the VIL rights-share transaction;
    • how the Rs. 329.04 crore figure had been calculated; or
    • that the Department intended to invoke Section 56(2)(x) based on the difference between the issue price and fair market value.

    Those essential particulars were supplied only on 27 May 2026. For AY 2020–21, the five-year limitation period for issuing the Section 148A notice expired on 31 March 2026. The Court ruled that information supplied after the deadline could not retrospectively cure an incomplete notice issued earlier.

    The judgment reinforces that the opportunity to respond under Section 148A must be meaningful, not a procedural formality. Tax authorities must disclose the transaction, legal basis and computation supporting an allegation of escaped income within the statutory time limit.

    Court’s second finding: Section 56(2)(x) did not apply to this rights issue

    The Court also rejected the substantive basis for reassessment. Section 56(2)(x) generally taxes property received for inadequate consideration where the shortfall from fair market value exceeds the prescribed threshold. However, the Court held that the provision could not be applied mechanically to Grasim’s proportionate rights-share allotment.

    The Court’s reasoning rested on three features of the transaction:

    1. Fresh shares arise on allotment. Rights shares issued by a company are created upon allotment; they are not necessarily pre-existing property transferred from another person.
    2. The allotment was proportionate. Grasim received shares in proportion to its existing holding, and its ownership percentage did not change. The Revenue did not identify any disproportionate gain.
    3. A market-price comparison alone does not establish taxable benefit. A rights issue at a lower subscription price affects the value of existing shares as well. Therefore, the difference between the issue price and a market value determined on allotment does not automatically represent income to the subscriber.

    The Court noted that the Income-tax Act separately provides rules for determining the cost of acquisition of rights shares. In particular, for rights shares subscribed to by an eligible shareholder, the statutory cost is generally the amount actually paid. These provisions support an assessment of the transaction’s legal and economic character rather than treating every below-market rights issue as taxable income.

    Why the ruling matters

    The decision provides important protection for taxpayers facing reassessment based on a rights issue:

    • Complete disclosure is mandatory. A reassessment notice must include the underlying information and material, not just a conclusion or a proposed addition.
    • Timing cannot be repaired later. If foundational information is provided after the limitation period expires, the original notice may be invalid.
    • Proportionate rights issues require contextual analysis. Taxability under Section 56(2)(x) cannot be based solely on a comparison between subscription price and fair market value.
    • No automatic taxable benefit arises where ownership remains unchanged. The Revenue must identify a real disproportionate advantage or another basis that fits the statutory conditions.

    Outcome

    The Bombay High Court allowed Grasim’s writ petition and set aside the Section 148A notice, the order determining that reassessment was warranted, and the consequential Section 148 notice. The Court did not examine Grasim’s other objections because the proceedings failed both on limitation and on the inapplicability of Section 56(2)(x) to the facts of the proportionate rights allotment.

    The ruling is confined to the facts before the Court, particularly the proportionate allotment and the absence of any identified disproportionate benefit. Its broader message is clear: reassessment must comply strictly with statutory notice requirements, and anti-abuse provisions cannot be applied without examining the true nature and effect of the transaction.

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    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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  • Karnataka HC: Delay in FIR Registration Due to Police Negligence Cannot Justify Bail in Serious Murder Case

    Karnataka HC: Delay in FIR Registration Due to Police Negligence Cannot Justify Bail in Serious Murder Case

    Date: 23.10.2026

    The Karnataka High Court has dismissed the bail appeal of G.M. Mohan, holding that the case record disclosed prima facie material connecting him to the alleged death of a young child and that the seriousness of the accusations weighed against releasing him on bail.

    Background of the case

    The appeal arose from a bail application rejected by the II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru Rural District. Mohan, identified as accused No. 1, challenged that rejection before the High Court under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

    The matter concerns the death of a child, Vennila, who was about six years old. Police initially registered an unnatural-death report after a complaint raised suspicions regarding Mohan and the child’s mother, Priyanka H., who was named as accused No. 2. The accused initially obtained anticipatory bail in relation to the unnatural-death proceedings.

    A later complaint led Kadugodi Police to register a criminal case and conduct a full investigation. The police subsequently filed a charge sheet alleging offences including murder, causing disappearance of evidence, common intention, conspiracy-related allegations, and an offence under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.

    Allegations considered by the Court

    According to the prosecution case recorded in the order, the child was with Mohan and her mother on the night of 24–25 March 2026. The charge sheet alleged that Mohan assaulted the child and obstructed her airway, resulting in her death. It also alleged efforts by the accused to portray the death as natural and to conceal or destroy evidence.

    The medical material was central to the prosecution’s case. The post-mortem report and a further forensic opinion stated that the death resulted from asphyxia caused by obstruction of the airway along with blunt trauma to the abdomen. The Court noted that the case did not have an eyewitness, but found that the investigation had yielded circumstantial and medical material requiring consideration at trial.

    Mohan’s arguments for bail

    Mohan’s counsel argued that he was innocent, that the investigation had concluded, and that a charge sheet had already been filed, meaning his continued custody was not needed for investigation. The defence also emphasized that Priyanka H. had been granted bail.

    The defence challenged the prosecution version on several grounds, including:

    • A delay of about 70 days before the criminal complaint was registered.
    • The absence of eyewitnesses and allegedly limited visible injuries noted during the inquest.
    • Claims that the post-mortem material had been manipulated.
    • The contention that matrimonial disputes between the child’s mother and the complainant had motivated a false case.
    • The argument that any statement attributed to a co-accused before the investigating officer could not be used against Mohan.

    Why the High Court refused bail

    The High Court found no legal or factual error in the lower court’s decision. It relied on the post-mortem report, inquest materials, statements, and police mahazars as showing prima facie material against Mohan.

    The Court also treated the alleged offence as exceptionally serious because it involved the death of a young child and carries the possibility of life imprisonment or the death penalty. It observed that the child was allegedly in the company of Mohan and her mother at the relevant time.

    On the 70-day delay, the Court accepted the prosecution’s explanation that police initially failed to register a crime despite the suspicions raised in the earlier complaint. The order records that the concerned investigating officer was suspended and a departmental inquiry was initiated. In those circumstances, the delay was not considered a sufficient reason to grant bail.

    Outcome and legal significance

    Justice G. Basavaraja dismissed Criminal Appeal No. 1460 of 2026. The ruling leaves intact the earlier order refusing bail to Mohan. The order does not decide guilt or innocence. It determines only that, at the bail stage, the available material was sufficient to justify continued custody while the criminal case proceeds. The allegations remain subject to proof through the trial process.

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  • Gujarat HC: Unjust Enrichment Principle Not Applicable to Pre-2006 Provisional Assessment Refunds

    Gujarat HC: Unjust Enrichment Principle Not Applicable to Pre-2006 Provisional Assessment Refunds

    Date: 22.10.2026

    The Gujarat High Court has dismissed the Revenue’s appeal and confirmed that the doctrine of unjust enrichment does not apply to refunds arising from the finalisation of provisional customs assessments completed before 13 July 2006.

    Case overview

    In Commissioner of Customs, Ahmedabad v. ArcelorMittal Nippon Steel India Private Limited (formerly Essar Steel Ltd.), the Court considered whether an importer seeking a refund after finalisation of a provisional assessment had to prove that it had not passed the duty burden on to another person.

    The appeal, brought under Section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962, challenged a 2011 CESTAT order that had ruled in favour of the assessee. The Gujarat High Court, in its judgment dated 23 September 2026, upheld that outcome.

    The legal issue

    The central question was:

    Does unjust enrichment apply to a refund resulting from finalisation of a provisional assessment when that assessment was pending before the 2006 amendment to Section 18 of the Customs Act?

    The Court answered this question in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

    Background: provisional assessments and refunds

    A provisional assessment is used when customs duty cannot be finally determined at the time goods are cleared, such as when relevant information or documentation is unavailable or requires verification. The importer pays duty provisionally, subject to later adjustment when the assessment is finalised.

    If the provisional duty paid exceeds the finally assessed duty, a refund becomes due. The dispute in this case was whether such a refund, for the pre-amendment period, was subject to the doctrine of unjust enrichment.

    Under that doctrine, a claimant may be denied direct receipt of a refund where the duty incidence has already been passed on to customers or another party. The objective is to prevent a windfall to a person who did not ultimately bear the duty burden.

    Why the Court rejected the Revenue’s position

    The Court found that the issue was no longer open to debate because the Supreme Court had settled it in Commissioner of Customs v. Hindustan Zinc Limited in 2023.

    The Gujarat High Court noted that, before the amendment effective from 13 July 2006, Section 18 did not incorporate the unjust-enrichment requirements contained in Section 27 of the Customs Act. Consequently, those requirements could not be imported into refunds that arose directly from finalisation of a provisional assessment under the earlier legal framework.

    The Court also relied on the established principle from Allied Photographics India Ltd. and its own earlier ruling in Commissioner of Customs v. Hindalco Industries Ltd.: refunds resulting from the adjustment of provisional duty upon final assessment are distinct from independent refund claims governed by the general refund provisions.

    Supreme Court guidance followed by the High Court

    The Supreme Court in Hindustan Zinc reaffirmed that refunds flowing directly from finalisation of a provisional assessment are not governed by the general refund provisions applicable to other claims. It endorsed the reasoning in Allied Photographics and clarified that a later decision in Sahakari Khand Udyog Mandal Ltd. should be confined to its own facts.

    The Supreme Court’s analysis draws an important distinction:

    • Automatic adjustment on final assessment: Where provisional duty is adjusted against final duty and an excess emerges, the resulting refund follows from the provisional-assessment mechanism itself.
    • Independent or appellate refund claim: Where a refund is claimed separately after the assessment process, including after an appeal or other challenge, the general refund provisions may apply.

    For the period before 13 July 2006, the first category was not subject to unjust enrichment under Section 18.

    Application to ArcelorMittal Nippon Steel India

    In this matter, the provisional assessment was finalised before 13 July 2006, and the assessee had also submitted letters claiming the relevant amounts before that date. The appellate authority had ruled for the assessee, referring to a Chartered Accountant’s certificate and concluding that unjust enrichment did not arise in relation to the refund generated by finalisation.

    CESTAT upheld that decision. The Gujarat High Court found no error in CESTAT’s approach, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s later confirmation of the governing legal position.

    Practical significance

    The decision provides clarity for customs disputes involving older provisional assessments. Its key implication is that the applicable legal regime depends on when the provisional assessment was finalised and when the refund entitlement arose.

    For refunds directly arising from finalisation of a provisional assessment before 13 July 2006, customs authorities cannot require the importer to satisfy the unjust-enrichment test merely by reading Section 27 requirements into the unamended Section 18 framework.

    The ruling also reinforces the need to distinguish between a refund that is a direct statutory consequence of final assessment and a separate refund claim pursued through other proceedings. That distinction can determine whether unjust enrichment is relevant.

    Conclusion

    By dismissing the Revenue’s appeal, the Gujarat High Court confirmed that pre-13 July 2006 provisional-assessment refunds are not subject to unjust enrichment when they arise directly upon finalisation of the assessment. The judgment aligns the Court’s position with the Supreme Court’s decisions in Allied Photographics and Hindustan Zinc, offering a settled rule for legacy customs refund matters.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Supreme Court: Twelve Years in Jail Without Trial Raises Grave Constitutional Concerns Under the NDPS Act

    Supreme Court: Twelve Years in Jail Without Trial Raises Grave Constitutional Concerns Under the NDPS Act

    Date: 22.10.2026

    In a landmark 2013 ruling, the Supreme Court granted bail to an NDPS undertrial imprisoned for more than 12 years before his trial even began and issued binding directions to curb systemic delays in narcotics cases.

    A case that exposed a wider problem

    Thana Singh v. Central Bureau of Narcotics began as a bail matter, but the Supreme Court treated it as evidence of a deeper failure in the administration of criminal justice under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act).

    Thana Singh had remained in custody for over 12 years while awaiting the commencement of his trial. The offence alleged against him carried a maximum sentence of 20 years. In other words, he had spent more than half of the maximum possible sentence in prison without a trial beginning. Bail had repeatedly been denied, including by the High Court.

    The Court held that this situation could not be reconciled with the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty and a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. It granted Thana Singh bail and used the case to examine the broader causes of delay in NDPS prosecutions across India.

    Why NDPS cases require special urgency

    Bail in NDPS matters is often difficult because Section 37 of the NDPS Act imposes stringent conditions. The Supreme Court noted that this makes timely trials especially important: when an accused is unlikely to receive bail easily, prolonged delay in starting or completing the trial can turn pre-trial detention into an effective punishment before guilt has been determined.

    The Court stressed that incarceration pending trial is not a minor hardship. It affects liberty, reputation, family life, and livelihood. It also aggravates prison overcrowding. The judgment therefore recognizes that strict drug-control laws must be administered alongside the fundamental right to a fair and expeditious criminal process.

    The Court’s central finding: delay can violate fundamental rights

    The Supreme Court described the prevailing state of NDPS trials as one that seriously undermined the right to speedy justice. It invoked Article 21 and exercised its constitutional authority to issue directions binding on all concerned authorities.

    The directions were expressly limited to NDPS proceedings. Their objective was practical: remove avoidable bottlenecks that delay investigation, evidence, forensic reports, prosecution, and trial management.

    Key directions issued by the Supreme Court

    1. Adjournments must be exceptional

    The Court found that frequent adjournments were a major source of delay. It directed NDPS courts not to grant an adjournment merely because a party requests one. An adjournment may be allowed only where circumstances are beyond that party’s control.

    The exception must remain narrow. Where a hearing date has already been fixed for the convenience of counsel, no adjournment should be granted. The purpose is to ensure that trial dates are meaningful rather than routinely postponed.

    2. Witnesses should be examined in continuous blocks

    The judgment directs courts to use β€œsession trials” for NDPS cases. This means assigning block dates, generally across three or four consecutive days, for examination and cross-examination of witnesses.

    This approach reduces repeated travel and expense for witnesses, limits the risk that memory fades over long gaps, and avoids fragmented recording of evidence over months. It is designed to make testimony more reliable while shortening the overall duration of the trial.

    3. Use affidavits for appropriate official evidence

    NDPS investigations may involve several agencies, including the Central Bureau of Narcotics, Narcotics Control Bureau, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Customs, Excise, and State law-enforcement bodies. Officials may return to their parent departments after investigation and become difficult to secure as witnesses.

    To save time, the Court directed trial courts to make effective use of Section 293 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under that provision, reports of specified government scientific experts may be used as evidence, subject to the court’s power to summon and examine the expert where necessary.

    4. Establish sufficient exclusive NDPS Special Courts

    The Court identified excessive judicial workload as another important cause of delay. It directed every State, in consultation with the High Court, to establish Special Courts dealing exclusively with NDPS offences. The number of courts must be sufficient for the volume of pending cases.

    Until exclusive NDPS courts are established, NDPS cases must receive priority over other matters. Once such courts exist, they should take other work only after clearing NDPS matters.

    The Court specifically noted high pendency of cases older than five years in Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, and Jammu & Kashmir.

    5. Strengthen forensic laboratories and staffing

    Forensic analysis is often central to proving or challenging an NDPS charge. Yet inadequate laboratory capacity, uneven geographic access, staff shortages, and delayed reports can stall cases for long periods.

    The Court directed the Centre to expand access to Central Forensic Science Laboratories, particularly for southern and eastern India, beyond facilities then operating at Chandigarh, Hyderabad, Kolkata, and Delhi. It also directed States to create adequate State and regional forensic laboratories according to their case backlog.

    Authorities were required to ensure adequate technical staff, equipment, resources, and prompt reporting. The Directorate of Forensic Science Services was also directed to standardize equipment across laboratories so that inconsistent testing methods do not create avoidable disputes over results.

    6. Restrict re-testing and re-sampling applications

    The Court observed that applications for re-testing or re-sampling were increasingly being filed at advanced stages of NDPS trials, creating further delay. The NDPS Act itself does not generally provide for re-testing or re-sampling as a routine right.

    The Court held that such requests must not be entertained as a matter of course. They may be permitted only in extremely exceptional circumstances, for cogent reasons recorded by the presiding judge. Any application must be made within 15 days of receiving the test report; applications filed later should not be entertained.

    This rule reflects a balance: exceptional cases can still be considered, but re-testing cannot become a routine tactic that interrupts or prolongs trial proceedings.

    7. Create a monitoring structure for every NDPS case

    The Court required all departments handling NDPS matters to appoint nodal officers of at least the rank of Superintendent of Police. These officers must monitor the progress of investigation and trial and prevent delays caused by missing documents, unavailable witnesses, or similar administrative failures.

    It also directed the appointment of a Pairvi Officer, or similar officer, for each court. That officer must report the day’s proceedings to the relevant nodal officer, helping close the information gap between the court and the prosecuting or investigating department.

    8. Improve the appointment process for prosecutors

    Recognizing that capable prosecutors are essential to efficient trials, the Court addressed the appointment of Special Public Prosecutors for the Central Bureau of Narcotics. It directed that the District and Sessions Judge make recommendations for these appointments in consultation with the Administrative Judge, Portfolio Judge, or Inspecting Judge responsible for the relevant Sessions Division.

    9. Supply charge-sheets and documents electronically

    Delays also arose from compliance with Section 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which requires that the accused receive copies of the police report and relevant documents.

    The Court directed that charge-sheets and accompanying documents be supplied electronically as well. Electronic provision is intended to simplify and accelerate the process, but it does not replace hard copies, which remain necessary for court proceedings.

    Why the judgment matters

    The decision does not weaken the NDPS Act or dilute the seriousness of narcotics offences. Instead, it insists that strong criminal laws must operate within constitutional limits. A strict bail regime creates a corresponding obligation on the State and courts to ensure that prosecutions move promptly.

    The judgment’s practical significance lies in its recognition that delay is not caused by a single factor. It can arise from adjournments, fragmented witness examinations, court overload, forensic backlogs, staffing gaps, late re-testing requests, weak case monitoring, and delays in providing documents. The Court’s response was therefore systemic rather than limited to the individual bail application.

    The broader constitutional principle

    At its core, Thana Singh confirms that an accused person remains entitled to constitutional protections even in prosecutions under stringent special statutes.

    The presumption of innocence and the right to a speedy trial retain real meaning only when courts and prosecuting agencies prevent pre-trial detention from becoming indefinite.

    The ruling is a clear reminder that justice in NDPS cases depends not only on the outcome of a prosecution, but also on the fairness, discipline, and speed of the process that leads to it.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Bombay HC: DGFT Cannot Retrospectively Apply Import Restrictions to Goods Shipped Before Notification

    Bombay HC: DGFT Cannot Retrospectively Apply Import Restrictions to Goods Shipped Before Notification

    Date: 21.10.2026

    The Bombay High Court has held that an import restriction cannot be applied to goods that were dispatched and had arrived in India before the restriction was published in the Official Gazette, even where the bills of entry were filed later.

    The dispute: a change from β€œFree” to β€œRestricted”

    In Heimerle Refinery Private Limited v. Union of India & Ors., the petitioner imported studded platinum jewellery under five airway bills dated 30 and 31 March 2026. The consignments reached India on 1 and 2 April 2026.

    The Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) had issued Notification No. 02/2026-27, dated 1 April 2026, changing the import policy for goods under Customs Tariff Heading 7113 from β€œFree” to β€œRestricted.” However, the notification was uploaded to the e-Official Gazette only on 2 April 2026 at approximately 8:52 p.m.

    Customs authorities declined clearance of certain consignments because the related bills of entry were filed after publication of the notification. The importer challenged this approach, arguing that the relevant import date under the Foreign Trade Policy was the date of shipment or dispatch, not the later date of filing or clearance of the bill of entry.

    The central legal issue

    The case turned on a narrow but important question: which date governs the applicability of an import-policy restriction under the Foreign Trade Policy?

    The authorities argued that goods not cleared for home consumption before the restriction came into force were subject to the revised β€œRestricted” policy. They relied on customs-law principles that treat clearance across the customs barrier as significant for determining the applicable rate of duty.

    The Court rejected that approach for this dispute. It distinguished between:

    • Customs duty issues, where the Customs Act may make the date of filing a bill of entry or clearance relevant; and
    • Import-policy restrictions under the Foreign Trade Policy, where the policy itself defines the date of import differently.

    Why the Court ruled for the importer

    The Court relied on paragraph 1.05(b) of the Foreign Trade Policy 2023, read with paragraphs 2.17(a) and 11.11 of the Handbook of Procedures. These provisions make the date of shipment or dispatch from the supplying country the relevant date for determining importability under the policy.

    For imports by air, paragraph 11.11 treats the relevant date as the date on the airway bill, provided it reflects when the goods left the last airport in the exporting country.

    Because the jewellery had been dispatched on 30 and 31 March 2026 and had arrived in India before the e-Gazette publication on 2 April 2026, the Court found that the later restriction could not apply to those consignments.

    The Court also emphasized that a notification gains legal force only upon publication in the Official Gazette. In the context of an e-Gazette, the specific upload time matters. The notification therefore could not operate retrospectively against goods already dispatched and imported before that publication.

    Customs clearance date was not decisive

    A key part of the judgment is its clarification that filing a bill of entry after a policy change does not, by itself, make the new import restriction applicable.

    The Court held that the date of filing a bill of entry is relevant to the rate of customs duty under Section 15 of the Customs Act. But the case did not concern a change in duty rate or valuation. It concerned a change in import policy under the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act and the Foreign Trade Policy.

    Applying customs-duty timing rules to a policy restriction, the Court said, would make the Foreign Trade Policy’s own definition of the date of import redundant.

    DGFT clarification could not override the policy

    The DGFT had issued an Office Memorandum on 13 May 2026 stating that consignments not cleared before 1 April 2026 would be governed by the revised restricted policy, regardless of their arrival date or bill-of-entry status.

    The Court held that this executive clarification had no statutory force and could not override the Foreign Trade Policy or alter its definition of the date of import. It also could not retrospectively expand the notification’s effect.

    In the Court’s view, changing the policy in that manner would require an amendment made through the legally prescribed statutory process, not an administrative memorandum.

    The outcome

    The Bombay High Court allowed the writ petition and directed the authorities to release the consignments covered by Bills of Entry Nos. 8590663, 8590666 and 8735308. It declared that Notification No. 02/2026-27 did not apply to goods that had arrived in India before its publication in the e-Official Gazette on 2 April 2026.

    The ruling aligns with earlier decisions of the Gujarat High Court in Enero Jewels and the Delhi High Court in Bright Metal Refiners, both of which had permitted clearance of goods imported before publication of a similar restriction despite post-notification bills of entry.

    Practical significance for importers

    This decision draws a clear line between the timing rules for customs duty and those for import-policy restrictions. Where the Foreign Trade Policy defines the date of import by shipment or dispatch, importers may rely on the airway bill or other prescribed transport document to establish that the goods were imported before a later policy restriction became legally effective.

    For goods transported by air, the airway bill date can therefore be critical evidence. The judgment also reinforces that an e-Gazette notification takes effect at the time it is actually published online, not merely on the date printed on the notification.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Delhi HC: Common Words in Earlier Registered Marks Do Not Automatically Bar New Trademark Applications

    Delhi HC: Common Words in Earlier Registered Marks Do Not Automatically Bar New Trademark Applications

    Date: 21.10.2026

    The Delhi High Court has set aside the Trade Marks Registry’s refusal to register β€œPlanet E School” for educational services, holding that the mark must be assessed as a whole rather than rejected merely because it contains common words such as β€œPlanet,” β€œE,” and β€œSchool.”

    Background of the dispute

    Grey Matters Educational Trust applied to register β€œPlanet E School” in Class 41 for educational services. The Trade Marks Registry refused the application on 25 January 2019, citing Sections 9 and 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

    Section 9 bars marks that lack distinctiveness, while Section 11 addresses marks that may conflict with earlier trademarks and create a likelihood of confusion. The Registry’s order, however, stated only that the application was objectionable under these provisions, without providing detailed reasons or dealing with the applicant’s response to the examination report.

    Grey Matters Educational Trust appealed to the Delhi High Court under Section 91 of the Act. It argued that its mark was visually, structurally and phonetically different from the cited marks, and that the phrase β€œPlanet E School” had to be considered in its full commercial form.

    Court rejects a fragmented comparison of trademarks

    The Court found that the cited registrations and the applied-for mark shared elements such as β€œPlanet” and β€œE.” But that commonality alone was not enough to establish deceptive similarity.

    The Court applied the anti-dissection rule, a central principle of trademark law. Under this rule, a composite trademark must be evaluated in its entirety. Courts should not split a mark into individual words or components and compare those isolated pieces with portions of another mark.

    The relevant question is the overall impression created for an ordinary consumer. In this case, the Court held that the cited marks, when viewed as whole marks, were not prima facie similar or deceptively similar to β€œPlanet E School.” The Section 11 objection was therefore found to lack merit.

    Generic words can form a distinctive combination

    The Court also addressed the distinctiveness objection under Section 9. It accepted that β€œPlanet,” β€œE,” and β€œSchool,” viewed individually, are generic or commonly used expressions. Yet it held that their combination in the phrase β€œPlanet E School” creates a distinctive and unique commercial identity.

    This distinction is important for trademark applicants. A mark does not necessarily fail because some or all of its individual elements are descriptive, ordinary or generic. The legal assessment must focus on whether the combination, taken as a whole, can distinguish one party’s services from those of others.

    The Registry’s one-line refusal was inadequate

    A significant feature of the judgment is the Court’s criticism of the refusal order itself. The Registry had issued a one-line rejection without explaining how the mark failed under Sections 9 and 11. It also did not address the detailed reply filed by the applicant in response to the First Examination Report.

    The decision reinforces that trademark refusals must be reasoned. Where an applicant has placed substantive arguments on record, the Registry must engage with those arguments rather than issue a conclusory order.

    Conditions attached to the registration process

    Although the Court allowed the appeal, it imposed two important qualifications:

    • No exclusive right over β€œPlanet” alone: Grey Matters Educational Trust cannot claim exclusive rights in the standalone word β€œPlanet.”
    • Punjab-only territorial restriction: Use of the β€œPlanet E School” mark is restricted to the State of Punjab.

    The Court directed the Trade Marks Registry to process the application and advertise the mark under the Trade Marks Act and Trade Marks Rules. Any opposition filed during the advertisement process must be decided on its own merits.

    Why the decision matters

    The ruling provides useful guidance for businesses, schools and brand owners seeking protection for composite marks:

    • A shared word does not automatically make two marks deceptively similar.
    • Composite marks should be judged by their overall visual, phonetic and structural impression.
    • Generic or common terms may still be registrable when their combination creates distinctiveness.
    • Trademark authorities must provide reasons and consider an applicant’s substantive response before refusing registration.

    In allowing the appeal, the Delhi High Court reaffirmed that trademark examination is not a word-by-word exercise: the decisive issue is the complete commercial impression a mark creates in the marketplace.

    Connected Matter

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi