Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 22.09.2026
Andhra Pradesh HC Grants Bail as Charge Sheet Not Filed Even After 180 Days
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has granted bail to an accused in an NDPS case involving an alleged 59.160 kg of ganja, taking note of his 201 days of judicial custody, substantial completion of investigation, absence of adverse antecedents, and the fact that the charge sheet had not been filed even after expiry of the statutory period of 180 days.
The order was passed by Dr. Justice Y. Lakshmana Rao in Pawan Kumar Yadav v. State of Andhra Pradesh, Criminal Petition No. 7886 of 2026, on September 21, 2026.
Bail Sought in Commercial Quantity NDPS Case
The petitioner, Pawan Kumar Yadav, arrayed as Accused No. 4, approached the High Court under Sections 480 and 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) seeking bail in Crime No. 41 of 2026 registered at Gokavaram Police Station, East Godavari District.
The case was registered for alleged offences punishable under Section 8(c) read with Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.
The Court recorded that the allegation against the petitioner concerned involvement in dealing with 59.160 kg of ganja, which constituted a commercial quantity.
Petitioner Claimed False Implication
Counsel for the petitioner contended that Pawan Kumar Yadav was innocent and had been falsely implicated by the police. It was further submitted that he was the sole earning member of his family and that his continued incarceration would cause undue hardship to his dependants.
The petitioner also undertook to comply with any conditions imposed by the High Court if released on bail.
State Opposed Bail
The prosecution strongly opposed the application, arguing that the investigation was still underway and that several material witnesses remained to be examined.
The Assistant Public Prosecutor contended that releasing the petitioner at that stage could create a risk of his absconding, thereby affecting the ongoing investigation and the process of law.
201 Days in Custody, But No Charge Sheet
A significant factor considered by the High Court was the length of the petitioner’s incarceration.
The petitioner had been arrested on March 4, 2026 and had remained in judicial custody for 201 days by the time the bail petition was considered.
The Court specifically recorded that although a substantial part of the investigation concerning the petitioner’s alleged role had been completed, the charge sheet had not been filed even after expiry of the statutory period of 180 days.
The Court further noted that:
no application seeking custodial interrogation of the petitioner had been filed;
the period for filing such an application had expired;
no application seeking extension of the period of judicial custody had been filed; and
no adverse antecedents had been reported against the petitioner.
Rajasthan Residence Not Sufficient to Deny Bail
The petitioner was a permanent resident of Rajasthan. Nevertheless, the High Court observed that he had a fixed abode and considered that stringent bail conditions could adequately address the prosecution’s apprehensions.
The Court found that, if released subject to such conditions, there was no likelihood of the petitioner absconding, threatening witnesses, tampering with evidence or hampering the further investigation.
High Court Grants Bail With Stringent Conditions
Considering the facts and circumstances, nature and gravity of the allegations, period of incarceration and stage of investigation, the High Court held that the petitioner could be enlarged on bail subject to stringent conditions.
The Court accordingly allowed the criminal petition and directed his release on a βΉ50,000 bond with two sureties for the like amount each, to the satisfaction of the I Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Rajamahendravaram.
The petitioner was also directed to appear before the concerned Station House Officer every Saturday between 10:00 AM and 5:00 PM until filing of the charge sheet, and not to leave the district without prior permission of the SHO.
He must cooperate with further investigation, make himself available for interrogation when required, refrain from influencing or threatening persons acquainted with the case, and surrender his passport, if any. If he does not possess a passport, he must furnish an affidavit to that effect.
Why the Decision Is Significant
The order is notable because the alleged quantity of ganja was expressly recorded as commercial quantity, yet the High Court considered the prolonged custody and procedural status of the investigation while deciding the bail application.
The particularly important factual circumstances recorded by the Court were the petitioner’s 201-day incarceration, failure to file the charge sheet after expiry of the 180-day period, substantial completion of investigation concerning his alleged role, absence of any application for extension of judicial custody, and lack of adverse antecedents.
The order, however, is only a bail decision. The High Court did not acquit the petitioner or finally determine whether the allegations under the NDPS Act were proved. Those questions remain matters for the criminal proceedings.
Key Takeaway
The Andhra Pradesh High Court granted bail to an accused allegedly involved in a 59.160 kg ganja case after finding that he had already spent 201 days in judicial custody, while the charge sheet remained unfiled beyond the 180-day statutory period and no application for extension of judicial custody had been made.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 22.09.2026
Punjab & Haryana HC: Serious Real Estate Fraud Allegations Cannot Be Treated as Mere Civil Dispute Under RERA
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email idamitnaren@outlook.com.
The Punjab and Haryana High Court has refused regular bail to an accused in an alleged real estate fraud concerning the commercial project βRoselyn Squareβ, holding that the allegations went beyond a simple dispute over delayed possession or non-payment of assured returns and prima facie involved fabrication and alteration of documents, cheating, criminal breach of trust and conspiracy.
Justice Virinder Aggarwal dismissed the regular bail petition filed by Bhupinder Singla, while expressly clarifying that the Court was not expressing any final opinion on the merits of the criminal case.
Regular Bail Sought in Roselyn Square Fraud Case
Bhupinder Singla approached the High Court under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, corresponding to Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking regular bail during trial.
The proceedings arose from FIR No. 228 dated 4 May 2026, registered at Police Station Zirakpur, District S.A.S. Nagar (Mohali), Punjab, for offences under Sections 61(2), 316(2), 318(4), 336(2), 338 and 336(3) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The judgment identifies their corresponding IPC provisions as Sections 120-B, 406, 420, 465, 467 and 468.
The FIR followed a complaint by Ashok Kumar Loomba against several persons associated with the Roselyn Square project, including Bhupinder Singla. The allegations concerned conspiracy, cheating, criminal breach of trust and related financial fraud in connection with investments in the commercial real estate project.
Investors Allegedly Induced by 15% Assured Returns
According to the prosecution case recorded in the judgment, the complainant and co-investor Anil Kumar Syal were allegedly induced to invest substantial sums in Roselyn Square on the basis of various representations.
They were allegedly promised assured returns at 15% per annum, payable quarterly in advance until possession, followed by lease rental of βΉ100 per square foot of super area after possession.
The units were also allegedly promised to be delivered in a fully furnished condition by 1 January 2024.
The judgment records alleged investments of βΉ1.19 crore for Unit No. 121 and βΉ2.125 crore each for Unit Nos. 123 and 124, besides βΉ8,38,870 towards GST, taking the alleged aggregate investment to approximately βΉ5.44 crore.
Allegation of βΉ1.43 Crore Outstanding Assured Returns
The complainants alleged that despite receipt of the basic sale consideration, the accused neither executed the requisite Buyer’s Agreement nor delivered possession.
According to the complaint, assured returns were initially paid but subsequently discontinued. As of June 2025, the alleged outstanding assured returns were stated to be βΉ31,23,750 for Unit No. 121, βΉ56,63,806 for Unit No. 123 and βΉ55,78,125 for Unit No. 124, aggregating to approximately βΉ1.43 crore.
The prosecution further alleged that although the actual sale consideration was substantially higher, agreements reflected a nominal consideration of βΉ55 lakh per unit and that the remaining amount was allegedly dealt with through off-record transactions.
These remained prosecution allegations at the bail stage and were not finally adjudicated by the High Court.
Partial Completion Certificate Allegedly Projected as Final
The complaint also alleged that the project remained incomplete and that a Partial Completion Certificate dated 21 July 2023 had been projected as though it were a final Completion Certificate.
There were further allegations regarding alienation of common areas and attempts to commercially exploit or sell parking spaces contrary to applicable statutory provisions and regulatory norms.
A preliminary inquiry was conducted following the complaint, after which the FIR was registered.
Petitioner: Dispute Is Civil and Commercial in Nature
Senior Counsel appearing for Bhupinder Singla argued that the dispute arose essentially from a real estate transaction and was civil and commercial in nature, but had been given an unwarranted criminal colour.
The defence contended that Agreements to Sell had been duly executed and that the complainant himself had failed to pay the complete agreed consideration, with substantial amounts allegedly still outstanding.
It was also submitted that Roselyn Square was duly registered under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA) and possessed statutory approvals, including an Occupancy Certificate dated 21 July 2023.
The petitioner further claimed that his wife was the promoter/proprietor of the project and that he was merely a Director of M/s Robus Landcorp Pvt. Ltd., without a direct role in the project’s day-to-day management.
Defence Disputed βΉ5.44 Crore Investment Claim
The petitioner also disputed the prosecution’s financial allegations.
His counsel argued that the claim of an investment of βΉ5.44 crore was unsupported by documentary evidence and asserted that only approximately βΉ1.53 crore had been received through banking channels, while more than βΉ55 lakh allegedly remained recoverable from the complainant.
It was further argued that the petitioner had cooperated with the investigation even before registration of the FIR and supplied relevant documents.
According to the defence, no further recovery was required, the investigation had substantially progressed and continued incarceration would serve no meaningful investigative purpose. Counsel invoked the general principle that βbail is the rule and jail is the exception.β
State: Allegations Reveal Planned Economic Fraud
The State and the complainant strongly opposed bail.
They contended that the allegations disclosed a well-planned conspiracy to defraud investors of substantial amounts. The Court was informed that Bhupinder Singla had been arrested on 6 May 2026, while co-accused Rosy Singla remained absconding and was allegedly concealing incriminating documents and proceeds of the alleged offence.
The prosecution also maintained that the complainant and co-investors had been cheated of approximately βΉ5.44 crore, besides an alleged outstanding liability of βΉ2,11,65,681 towards assured returns.
It claimed to possess documentary evidence relating to payments through banking channels as well as alleged cash transactions.
The prosecution further disputed the petitioner’s reliance upon the project’s completion-related documents.
It contended that information obtained under the Right to Information Act contradicted the petitioner’s characterization of the relevant Occupancy Certificate and that the No Objection Certificate relied upon by the petitioner had already expired.
Of particular significance, the High Court noted the prosecution’s case that a substantial portion of the sale consideration had allegedly been received in cash.
Although the petitioner denied receiving cash payments, the investigating agency claimed to have collected electronic chat communications allegedly acknowledging and corroborating receipt of those amounts. The High Court carefully clarified that the evidentiary value of this material would be examined during trial.
Not a Simple RERA Dispute: High Court
The High Court rejected, at the bail stage, the attempt to characterize the allegations merely as a civil dispute relating to real estate.
Justice Virinder Aggarwal observed that this was βnot a simpliciter case of delayed delivery of possession or non-payment of assured returns by a developerβ for which the complainant could simply have invoked the statutory remedy under Section 31 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016.
Instead, the allegations prima facie disclosed serious offences involving fabrication and alteration of documents, cheating, criminal breach of trust and conspiracy.
The ruling is therefore significant in distinguishing between an ordinary builder-buyer dispute capable of being pursued under RERA and allegations containing an additional criminal element such as fraud, forgery or conspiracy.
Absconding Co-Accused Weighed Against Bail
Another major factor was the status of co-accused Rosy Singla.
The Court recorded that she had not been apprehended despite repeated efforts by the investigating agency and, according to the prosecution, was absconding while allegedly concealing incriminating documents and proceeds of the offence.
In these circumstances, the High Court held that if Bhupinder Singla were released at that stage, the possibility of his absconding or otherwise frustrating the course of investigation could not be ruled out.
Punjab & Haryana High Court Refuses Regular Bail
Taking into account the gravity and nature of the allegations, stage of investigation, role attributed to the petitioner, abscondence of the co-accused and material collected by the investigating agency, the High Court concluded that no case had been made out for grant of regular bail.
The petition was accordingly dismissed.
Crucially, the Court expressly stated that it was not expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, so that neither side would be prejudiced during trial. Thus, the order represents a refusal of bail and not a final determination of the petitioner’s guilt.
Key Legal Takeaway
The decision demonstrates that the availability of a remedy under RERA does not, by itself, convert every dispute connected with a real estate project into an exclusively civil or regulatory matter.
Where the allegations prima facie extend beyond delayed possession or assured returns and include matters such as forged or altered documents, fraudulent inducement, alleged cash transactions, cheating, criminal breach of trust and conspiracy, criminal proceedings may stand on a different footing from the remedies available under Section 31 of RERA.
At the same time, because the present proceeding concerned regular bail, the High Court did not finally determine whether those allegations were true. Their evidentiary worth and the petitioner’s criminal liability remain matters for investigation and trial.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 22.09.2026
Supreme Court: Unsigned Arbitration Agreement Can Still Bind Parties If Correspondence Shows Consensus
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Arbitrator Shobhit Mallik. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email idshobhit.Ica23@gmail.com.
The Supreme Court has held that an arbitration agreement need not necessarily bear the signatures of both parties if their correspondence and conduct provide a written record demonstrating consensus on the arbitration arrangement. The Court emphasized that, while examining such an agreement, courts should determine whether the parties were ad idem, or of the same mind, regarding the contractual terms and arbitration mechanism.
In Govind Rubber Ltd. v. Louis Dreyfus Commodities Asia Pvt. Ltd., the Supreme Court upheld enforcement of a foreign arbitral award arising from commodity transactions governed by terms referring disputes to the Singapore Commodity Exchange, and dismissed Govind Rubber’s challenge.
Dispute Arose From International Rubber Supply Contracts
Govind Rubber Ltd., based in Mumbai, entered into commercial dealings with Singapore-based Louis Dreyfus Commodities Asia Pvt. Ltd. for the purchase of natural rubber.
One transaction involved 200 MT of Thai RSS-3 natural rubber at US$2,880 per MT, CIF Nhava Sheva, while another sales contract involved 201.6 MT of SIR20 at US$2,895 per MT, CIF Nhava Sheva. The respondent’s sales contracts stated the governing terms as the Singapore Commodity Exchange.
The dispute eventually went to arbitration before the Singapore Commodity Exchange.
Foreign Award Directed Govind Rubber to Pay US$716,283
During the arbitration proceedings, Govind Rubber raised objections to the jurisdiction of the Singapore Commodity Exchange and contended that jurisdiction lay in Mumbai.
At the same time, however, Govind Rubber lodged a counterclaim of US$3,734,036.25 and agreed to the nomination of the sole arbitrator.
The arbitral tribunal ultimately passed an award dated 18 December 2009, directing Govind Rubber to pay US$716,283 to Louis Dreyfus for breach of contract, along with arbitration costs and expenses of Singapore Dollar 20,330. The counterclaim was rejected.
Bombay High Court Permitted Enforcement of Foreign Award
Govind Rubber did not challenge the arbitral award itself. Instead, it subsequently instituted a suit against the respondent before the Bombay High Court seeking, among other reliefs, damages.
Louis Dreyfus thereafter filed proceedings for enforcement and execution of the foreign award.
The Bombay High Court allowed the enforcement petition, finding that Govind Rubber had failed to establish a ground for refusing enforcement. The High Court held that the foreign award was enforceable under Part II of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and binding upon the parties under Section 46.
Govind Rubber then approached the Supreme Court.
Govind Rubber: Sales Contract Containing Arbitration Clause Was Never Signed
The principal argument before the Supreme Court was that the sales contract containing the reference to arbitration before the Singapore Commodity Exchange had not been signed and returned by Govind Rubber.
The appellant argued that its own purchase order contained separate commercial terms, including exclusive jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court. It therefore contended that there was no consensus between the parties to submit their disputes to arbitration before the Singapore Commodity Exchange.
Govind Rubber also argued that merely making a counterclaim after receiving notice from the arbitrator did not amount to waiver of its jurisdictional objection.
Respondent: Parties Had Acted Upon the Sales Contract
Louis Dreyfus argued that the sales contract was a concluded commercial arrangement and that Govind Rubber had itself acted upon its terms.
The respondent pointed out that Govind Rubber had requested amendments to the payment terms contained in the sales contractβfrom 100% Letter of Credit to 10% advance by Telegraph Transfer and the remaining 90% by Documents Against Paymentβand those changes had been accepted.
The respondent therefore argued that the conduct and correspondence between the parties demonstrated consensus regarding the sales contract, including its dispute-resolution mechanism.
Supreme Court: Arbitration Agreement Need Not Always Be Signed
The Supreme Court examined Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, particularly Section 7(3), Section 7(4)(a)-(c) and Section 7(5).
The Court explained that while an arbitration agreement must be in writing, it does not invariably need to be contained in a document formally signed by both parties.
Section 7(4)(b), for example, recognizes an arbitration agreement evidenced through an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means of telecommunication providing a record of the agreement. Section 7(4)(c) also recognizes an agreement arising from an exchange of statements of claim and defence where its existence is alleged by one party and not denied by the other.
The Supreme Court consequently held that a written arbitration agreement βneed not be signed by the partiesβ where the requisite record of agreement is established through communications contemplated by Section 7.
The Court added that where the parties are prima facie shown to be ad idem, the mere fact that one party did not sign the agreement does not by itself absolve that party from its obligations.
E-Commerce and Electronic Communications Recognised
The judgment is particularly notable for recognizing the practical realities of modern commercial transactions.
The Supreme Court referred to internet purchases, tele-purchases, online ticket bookings and standard-form contracts, observing that where the parties’ identity is established and there is a record of their agreement, an arbitration agreement may arise if the arbitration clause reflects consensus between them.
The Court expressly stated that a signature is not a formal requirement under Sections 7(4)(b), 7(4)(c) or 7(5) of the Arbitration Act.
Commercial Agreements Should Be Interpreted to Give Them Effect
The Supreme Court further held that a commercial document containing an arbitration clause should be interpreted, where appropriate, in a manner that gives effect to the agreement rather than invalidating it.
It referred to Astro Vendeor Compania Naviera SA v. Mabanaft GmbH, (1970) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 267 and Paul Smith Ltd. v. H and S International Holdings Inc., (1991) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 127, in support of an approach that seeks to give effect to the parties’ intentions when construing arbitration agreements.
The Court also relied upon Union of India v. D.N. Revri & Co., AIR 1976 SC 2257, reiterating that commercial documents should receive a common-sense construction that gives efficacy to the contract rather than a narrow, pedantic or overly legalistic interpretation that defeats it.
Correspondence Showed Meeting of Minds
Applying those principles, the Supreme Court examined the parties’ actual communications.
The Court noted that Govind Rubber had itself requested amendments to the payment terms of the sales contract. Its communication specifically requested the respondent to βamend your sale contract accordinglyβ and send the amended sales contract and pro forma invoice.
The Court also found that invoices had been split at Govind Rubber’s request, that the relevant request referred to the sales contract, and that the parties proceeded on the terms contained in that contract.
From this correspondence, the Supreme Court concluded that there was a meeting of minds and that the parties were ad idem regarding the terms of the sales contract, which provided for dispute resolution through the Singapore Commodity Exchange.
Filing Counterclaim Also Showed Submission to Arbitration
Another important consideration was Govind Rubber’s conduct after commencement of arbitration.
The company responded to the arbitration proceedings by lodging a substantial counterclaim before the arbitral tribunal.
The Supreme Court held that by making the counterclaim, Govind Rubber had submitted to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator.
The Court referred in this context to Cairncross v. Lorimer, (1860) 7 Jur NS 149, Sarat Chunder Dey v. Gopal Chunder Laha, 19 IA 203, and Chowdhri Murtaza-Hossein v. Mt. Bibi Bechunnissa, 3 IA 209, while discussing the consequences of participating in arbitration despite having knowledge of a possible jurisdictional objection.
Supreme Court Upholds Foreign Award
The Court ultimately held that the material on record clearly showed that Govind Rubber had acted pursuant to the sales contract. Consequently, whether the contract itself had been formally signed was not decisive in the circumstances.
The Court also noted that Govind Rubber had never challenged the 18 December 2009 arbitral award before any court.
Finding no valid ground to oppose enforcement, the Supreme Court upheld the Bombay High Court’s conclusion that the foreign award was enforceable under Part II of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and binding upon the parties.
The appeal filed by Govind Rubber Ltd. was dismissed, with no order as to costs.
Key Takeaway
The decision establishes an important principle for commercial arbitration: absence of signatures does not automatically mean absence of an arbitration agreement.
Where the correspondence, electronic communications and conduct of the parties demonstrate that they were ad idem on contractual terms incorporating arbitration, the requirement of a written arbitration agreement under Section 7 can be satisfied even without a formally signed contract. At the same time, the judgment turns on the particular documentary record and conduct of the partiesβincluding Govind Rubber’s requests to amend the sales contract and its participation in arbitration through a counterclaimβrather than laying down that every unsigned arbitration clause is automatically binding.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 22.09.2026
Bombay HC Orders Return of Deposit and Discharge of Bank Guarantee
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Madhumita Jha. The views expressed are based on her interpretation of the law. She can be reached at her email idjhamadhumita27@gmail.com.
The Bombay High Court has permitted Kunal Sancheti Associates to withdraw the amount it had deposited before the Court pursuant to an interim stay order, along with accrued interest, if any, and has also ordered discharge of the corresponding bank guarantee after noting that the underlying recovery notice had already been declared illegal, null and void by the competent civil court.
Justice Gauri Godse held that once the decree was in favour of the applicant and the impugned recovery notice stood declared illegal, there was no surviving liability requiring the applicant to make payment to the State.
Dispute Originated From Section 48 Maharashtra Land Revenue Code Notice
The dispute originated from a notice issued against Kunal Sancheti Associates under Section 48 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966.
The firm challenged the notice by instituting a civil suit. However, the plaint was initially rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, following which the applicant preferred First Appeal No. 784 of 2010 before the Bombay High Court.
During the pendency of the first appeal, the High Court granted an interim stay subject to conditions requiring the applicant to deposit part of the amount covered by the notice and furnish a bank guarantee for another part of the amount. The applicant complied with those conditions, and both the deposit and bank guarantee remained with the Court.
Appeal Transferred to District Court; Suit Ultimately Restored
Subsequently, because of a change in pecuniary jurisdiction, the first appeal was transferred to the District Court.
The District Court allowed the appeal and restored the applicant’s civil suit. The litigation thereafter proceeded before the trial court.
Eventually, by a judgment and decree dated 20 October 2021, the suit was decreed in favour of Kunal Sancheti Associates.
The impugned notice was specifically declared βillegal, null and voidβ, and Defendant No. 3 was restrained from executing the order for recovery of the amount.
Deposit and Bank Guarantee Continued Despite Decree in Applicant’s Favour
Despite the decree, the amount deposited before the High Court and the bank guarantee furnished pursuant to the earlier interim order dated 12 January 2011 continued to remain with the Court.
Kunal Sancheti Associates therefore filed Interim Application No. 3183 of 2026, seeking permission to withdraw the deposited amount and requesting discharge and cancellation of the bank guarantee.
The applicant argued that because the recovery notice itself had already been declared illegal and the decree in its favour had not been challenged, there was no longer any justification for retaining either the deposited money or the bank guarantee.
State Unable to Confirm Any Challenge to Decree
The High Court recorded that the learned Assistant Government Pleader had been granted time on various occasions to verify whether the decree passed in favour of Kunal Sancheti Associates had been challenged.
However, the State’s counsel had no instructions as to whether any such challenge had been filed.
Counsel for Kunal Sancheti Associates stated that, to the applicant’s knowledge, the respondents had never challenged the decree.
No Liability Survives After Recovery Notice Declared Illegal: Bombay HC
After examining the application and the decree passed by the trial court, Justice Gauri Godse accepted the applicant’s submission.
The High Court held that, in view of the decree in the applicant’s favour, there was no liability upon Kunal Sancheti Associates to make payment to the respondents under the impugned notice, because that notice had already been declared illegal.
The Court also emphasised the purpose for which the money had originally been deposited. It had not been deposited as satisfaction of a final adjudicated liability; rather, the deposit was made as a condition for obtaining an interim stay against implementation of the disputed recovery notice.
Once the underlying notice itself ceased to have legal effect following the decree, the basis for continuing to retain the security also disappeared.
Bombay High Court Allows Withdrawal With Accrued Interest
The High Court accordingly allowed the interim application and permitted Kunal Sancheti Associates to withdraw the amount deposited pursuant to the order dated 12 January 2011, together with accrued interest, if any.
The Court further directed that the amount should be released in favour of the applicant upon production of an authenticated copy of the order.
This part of the order is particularly relevant in disputes where substantial sums remain deposited before courts for extended periods solely because of interim protection granted during litigation.
Bank Guarantee Stands Discharged
The Court also granted the second substantive relief sought by the applicant.
The bank guarantee furnished pursuant to the High Court’s order dated 12 January 2011 was declared discharged.
The Court directed that the bank guarantee be returned to Kunal Sancheti Associates so that it could be submitted to the concerned bank for cancellation.
The Interim Application was consequently allowed in these terms.
Legal Significance of the Order
The order illustrates an important procedural consequence when a litigant has furnished money or security merely as a condition for interim protection.
Where the underlying demand is subsequently adjudicated against the authority and declared illegal, continued retention of the security may lose its foundation. In the present case, the Bombay High Court expressly linked the applicant’s entitlement to withdrawal and cancellation of the bank guarantee to the fact that the recovery notice had been declared illegal and, consequently, no liability remained payable under that notice.
The ruling should, however, be understood in its procedural context. This order did not itself decide the original legality of the Section 48 notice. That issue had already been decided by the trial court through its decree dated 20 October 2021. The High Court’s order dealt specifically with the consequential release of the amount deposited and discharge of the bank guarantee.
Key Takeaway
The Bombay High Court’s order makes the position straightforward in this case: once the underlying recovery notice had been declared illegal, null and void, and the applicant consequently had no liability to make payment under that notice, the amount earlier deposited merely as a condition of interim stay could not continue to be retained.
Kunal Sancheti Associates was therefore permitted to recover its court deposit along with accrued interest, if any, while the bank guarantee furnished in 2011 was ordered to be discharged and returned for cancellation.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 22.09.2026
Karnataka HC Upholds Corruption Proceedings Against Retired BBMP Engineer; Rejects Sanction Objection
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate G Sridharamurthy. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id sriadv3@gmail.com.
The Karnataka High Court has held that the 2018 amendment to Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, which extended the requirement of prior sanction to former public servants, cannot be invoked to reopen proceedings where the court had already taken cognizance of the alleged corruption offences before the amendment came into force on 26 July 2018.
Justice H.P. Sandesh dismissed three criminal revision petitions filed by retired BBMP Executive Engineer B.G. Prakash Kumar, thereby allowing the criminal proceedings against him under Sections 13(1)(c) and 13(1)(d), read with Section 13(2), of the Prevention of Corruption Act to continue.
Case Arose From Alleged Irregularities in BBMP Development Works
The prosecution case concerned alleged irregularities in developmental works undertaken by the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP).
B.G. Prakash Kumar had served as an Executive Engineer, Malleshwaram Division, BBMP, and supervised road improvement and asphalting works.
Following allegations concerning irregularities in execution of developmental works, the BBMP Commissioner directed the Technical Investigation Cell to conduct an inquiry. A complaint was thereafter lodged by the Additional Commissioner, BBMP, leading to registration of Crime No. 4/2011 for offences under the IPC and Prevention of Corruption Act.
Prakash Kumar retired from service on attaining superannuation on 30 July 2017. The investigating agency subsequently filed charge sheets before the competent court in 2018.
Cognizance Was Taken Before PC Act Amendment
The dates on which cognizance was taken ultimately became crucial to the High Court’s decision.
The Special Court took cognizance on 23 May 2018 in Special C.C. Nos. 339/2018 and 338/2018 and on 16 February 2018 in Special C.C. No. 107/2018.
Thus, in all three cases, cognizance had already been taken before 26 July 2018, when the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018 came into force.
Prakash Kumar moved applications under Section 227 CrPC seeking discharge from both IPC and Prevention of Corruption Act offences.
The Trial Court initially discharged him and closed the proceedings by an order dated 20 September 2023, holding the prosecution case unsustainable in law.
However, the Karnataka High Court subsequently, by an order dated 22 March 2025, set aside that discharge order and remanded the matter to the Trial Court for fresh consideration.
After reconsideration, the Trial Court passed a fresh order on 24 February 2026.
This time, it discharged Prakash Kumar from the IPC offences under Sections 120B, 409, 465, 468 and 477A, but directed continuation of proceedings for offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act.
The retired officer therefore approached the High Court through the present revision petitions challenging the partial rejection of his discharge applications.
Petitioner: Prior Sanction Mandatory Even for Retired Public Servant
The petitioner’s principal argument centred on the amendment made to Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act with effect from 26 July 2018.
The amended provision requires previous sanction before a court takes cognizance of specified corruption offences allegedly committed by a public servant and extends the statutory language to a person who βwas at the time of commission of the alleged offenceβ employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or State, as applicable.
Counsel for Prakash Kumar argued that the amended provision protected retired officials as well and that sanction constituted a condition precedent for valid cognizance.
It was argued that after the earlier discharge order was set aside and the proceedings restored, the Trial Court was required to reconsider the matter afresh. According to the petitioner, continuation of the PC Act proceedings without a valid sanction under Section 19(1) was therefore impermissible.
Earlier Cognizance Lost Effect After Discharge, Petitioner Argued
The petitioner further contended that once he had been discharged in 2023, the cognizance originally taken in 2018 had lost its legal efficacy.
Accordingly, after remand and restoration of proceedings, it was argued that the prosecution could not rely upon the original cognizance and continue without obtaining the sanction contemplated under the amended Section 19(1).
The petitioner also argued that because he was in service at the time of the alleged offences, the sanction requirement should relate back to the date of the alleged crime rather than merely the date on which cognizance was taken.
State: Amendment Came After Cognizance Had Already Been Taken
The State opposed the petitions and argued that the 2018 amendment came into effect only on 26 July 2018, whereas Prakash Kumar had already retired in 2017 and cognizance had been taken before the amendment.
The Additional State Public Prosecutor relied, among other authorities, upon a Supreme Court decision concerning B.T. Ramesh, contending that prior sanction under the then-existing Section 19 was required only in relation to public servants who were in service when cognizance was taken and not those who had already retired.
Karnataka HC: Amended Section 19 Protects Retired Public Servants Prospectively
The High Court acknowledged that after the 2018 amendment, prior sanction is required even in respect of former public servants in cases to which the amended provision applies.
The Court observed that subsequent to the amendment coming into force on 26 July 2018, sanction is a condition precedent for valid cognizance of the covered PC Act offences even in relation to retired public servants.
However, that proposition did not resolve Prakash Kumar’s case because the decisive question was whether the amended requirement could affect cognizance already taken before 26 July 2018.
Cognizance Dates Became Decisive
The High Court found that the criminal cases had been registered, investigated and charge-sheeted before the amendment and, crucially, cognizance had also been taken before the amendment came into force.
The Court examined the cognizance orders and noted that the Special Court had considered the charge-sheet materials and taken cognizance of both IPC and PC Act offences before issuing summons to the accused.
Accordingly, Justice Sandesh held that the subsequent amendment βwill not come to the aid of the petitionerβ, because cognizance had already been taken before 26 July 2018.
What Does βTaking Cognizanceβ Mean?
The petitioner relied upon the Supreme Court judgment in S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd. & Others, (2008) 2 SCC 492.
The High Court noted the principle that βcognizanceβ means taking judicial notice of an offence and occurs when the Court or Magistrate applies its mind to the suspected commission of the offence.
At the cognizance stage, the court examines whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the matter, rather than whether sufficient material exists for conviction.
2018 PC Act Amendment Does Not Apply Retrospectively to Completed Cognizance
The High Court referred extensively to precedent dealing with the temporal application of the 2018 amendments.
It discussed Dr. Pilli Sambasiva Rao v. State of Telangana, 2022 SCC OnLine TS 3401, which in turn considered the Supreme Court’s decision in State of Telangana v. Managipet, (2019) 19 SCC 87.
The judgment noted the principle that the 2018 amendment cannot retrospectively govern offences and proceedings in the manner urged where the relevant criminal process had already commenced under the pre-amendment law.
The Court reproduced the reasoning from Managipet that offences committed before the 2018 amendment have to be examined in light of the statutory provisions as they existed before the amendment.
Delhi High Court’s 2026 Ruling Relied Upon
Significantly, the Karnataka High Court also relied upon a recent Delhi High Court judgment dated 6 August 2026 in Criminal Reference No. 1/2019.
The Delhi High Court had held that the amended Section 19(1) introduced a new obligation to obtain sanction in respect of former public servants. However, where cognizance had already been taken before 26 July 2018, such cognizance would not be reopened merely because of the subsequent amendment.
Conversely, where cognizance had not yet been taken as of 26 July 2018, the amended protection could apply even though the alleged offence related to an earlier period.
The Karnataka High Court reproduced the crucial distinction: where cognizance already stood taken before 26 July 2018, βthere would be no fresh requirement of prior sanction in such cases.β
Benefit of Amended Section 19 Depends on Whether Cognizance Was Already Taken
After considering the authorities, the Karnataka High Court crystallised the applicable position.
It held that the benefit of the amended Section 19(1) is available where the Court had not already taken cognizance before the amendment became operative.
In Prakash Kumar’s cases, however, the FIRs had been registered, investigations completed, charge sheets filed and cognizance taken before the amendment.
The amended sanction requirement therefore could not invalidate or reopen the cognizance already taken.
Trial Court Correctly Continued PC Act Proceedings
The High Court found no error in the Trial Court’s order dated 24 February 2026.
The Trial Court had discharged Prakash Kumar from the IPC offences but rejected his discharge plea concerning the PC Act offences. According to the High Court, the Trial Court correctly applied the governing principles because the amended Section 19 could not benefit the petitioner after cognizance had already been taken under the pre-amendment regime.
Accordingly, all three criminal revision petitions were dismissed.
Key Takeaway
The decision draws an important temporal line at 26 July 2018 for the amended sanction protection under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
The Karnataka High Court’s reasoning indicates that while the amended provision extends sanction protection to former public servants where applicable, it does not require courts to reopen cognizance already validly taken before the amendment came into force.
Thus, a retired public servant cannot secure discharge merely by invoking the amended Section 19(1) where cognizance of the PC Act offences had already been taken before 26 July 2018. In the present case, the High Court consequently upheld continuation of the corruption proceedings against B.G. Prakash Kumar while leaving the allegations to be determined at trial.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 22.09.2026
Calcutta High Court: Bona Fide Purchaser of Transferable DFIA Licence Cannot Be Saddled With Customs Duty for Exporterβs Fraud
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
In a significant ruling concerning Duty Free Import Authorisation (DFIA) licences and the liability of bona fide transferees, the Calcutta High Court has held that a purchaser who acquires a transferable duty-free import licence for value and without notice of any fraud or irregularity committed by the original licence holder cannot be made liable for customs duty, interest and redemption fine when the licence has never been cancelled by the competent authority.
A Division Bench comprising Justice Rajarshi Bharadwaj and Justice Sudip Deb allowed the appeal filed by Comet Overseas Pvt. Ltd. and quashed a customs duty demand of βΉ22,87,654.95, the consequential interest and a βΉ15 lakh redemption fine that had earlier been sustained by CESTAT.
Comet Overseas Purchased Transferable DFIA Licence for βΉ14.51 Lakh
Comet Overseas Pvt. Ltd., engaged in export-import bulk commodity trading, was a subsequent purchaser and transferee of DFIA Licence No. 0210100847 dated 16 May 2007.
The licence was one among 23 DFIA licences obtained by Gemini Overseas Ltd. from DGFT during 2007-08 and 2008-09 under Notification No. 40/2006-Cus dated 1 May 2006, permitting duty-free import of specified silk products.
Three of those licences were subsequently endorsed as transferable by the Regional Authority after certification of fulfilment of export obligation. Comet Overseas purchased the licence in question for βΉ14,51,795 through proper banking channels, through Customs House Agent M/s S.K. Saha & Co.
Acting upon the licence, Comet imported Mulberry Raw Silk Yarn duty-free under Bill of Entry No. 437910 dated 22 October 2008 at Kolkata Port. The assessable value was approximately βΉ74.03 lakh, while the customs duty foregone amounted to βΉ22,87,654.95.
DRI Investigation Found Fraud by Original Licence Holder
The controversy arose after intelligence gathered by the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) indicated irregularities in the manner in which Gemini Overseas had discharged its export obligation.
According to the judgment, Gemini Overseas had exported fabric made of Noil Yarn while declaring it as Natural Silk Fabric predominantly made of Mulberry Raw Silk.
Consignments were intercepted at N.S. Dock, Kolkata and at the factory of Eastern Silk Industries Ltd. in Falta SEZ in November 2008. Testing by the Central Silk Board indicated that the fabric consisted of Noil Yarn mixed with cotton.
Gemini Overseas subsequently admitted by letter dated 2 January 2009 that the description contained in its export documents was incorrect and that benefits not otherwise due could have been availed. It also expressed willingness to pay the duty foregone in relation to the three transferable licences.
Customs Issued Show Cause Notice to Comet Overseas
A Show Cause Notice dated 11 May 2012 was issued jointly to Comet Overseas, Gemini Overseas and other persons.
Customs proposed recovery of βΉ22,87,654.95 under the erstwhile proviso to Section 28(1), read with Section 28(4) of the Customs Act, 1962, along with interest. Confiscation was proposed under Section 111(o) and penalty under Section 112.
Importantly, the High Court noted that the SCN, insofar as Comet Overseas was concerned, did not contain any allegation of collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts on its part.
The Order-in-Original dated 28 February 2014 nevertheless confirmed the duty demand, imposed a βΉ15 lakh redemption fine under Section 125, and imposed a penalty of βΉ10 lakh under Section 112.
CESTAT Removed Penalty but Sustained Duty and Redemption Fine
On appeal, CESTAT partly granted relief to Comet Overseas.
The Tribunal set aside the βΉ10 lakh penalty after finding that Comet had no knowledge of the nature of the goods used and exported by Gemini Overseas/Eastern Silk Industries. However, CESTAT sustained the customs duty demand, interest and βΉ15 lakh redemption fine.
Comet Overseas therefore approached the Calcutta High Court.
Core Question: Can an Innocent Transferee Be Liable for Original Exporterβs Fraud?
The High Court had admitted the appeal on the following substantial question of law:
βWhether a bona fide purchaser of duty-free import licence for value can be required to pay duty, interest and redemption fine in respect of his import, when he has no notice of any irregularity on the part of the exporter who had obtained such licence and the licence is not cancelled by the authorities?β
This placed the legal status of a bona fide transferee for value without notice at the centre of the dispute.
Comet Overseas: Fraud Makes Licence Voidable, Not Automatically Void
The appellant argued that the DFIA licence had been genuinely issued by DGFT and the alleged fraud occurred later, at the stage of certification of fulfilment of export obligation by Gemini Overseas.
Relying on the Supreme Court judgments in East India Commercial Co. Ltd., Calcutta v. Collector of Customs, Calcutta and Collector of Customs, Bombay v. Sneha Sales Corporation, Comet argued that even a licence obtained through fraud is voidable rather than automatically void, and continues to operate until cancelled in accordance with law.
The appellant also relied upon Taparia Overseas (P) Ltd. v. Union of India to contend that a transferee who purchases a duty-free licence for valuable consideration through legitimate banking channels and without notice of the original holder’s fraud should not be saddled with duty, interest and redemption fine.
Revenue: Fraud Went to Foundation of DFIA Benefit
Customs argued that Gemini Overseas’ fraud went to the foundation of the licence because the exporter had falsely declared the nature of goods exported for fulfilling its export obligation.
Revenue relied upon ICI India Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs (Port), Calcutta and Munjal Showa Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs & Central Excise (Delhi-IV) to contend that an instrument tainted by fraud could not confer exemption upon a subsequent holder merely because that holder was personally innocent.
Revenue also relied upon Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai on the extended period of limitation and Commissioner of Customs, Hyderabad v. Pennar Industries Ltd. on compliance with conditions of exemption notifications.
Genuine Licence Different From Forged or Non-Existent Scrip: High Court
A crucial distinction drawn by the High Court was between a genuinely issued licence subsequently affected by fraud and an instrument that was forged and never issued by the competent authority at all.
The Court observed that ICI India and Munjal Showa involved forged instrumentsβDEPB scrips and Transfer Release Advicesβwhich were never validly issued by the competent authority.
Comet Overseas’ case was materially different. The DFIA licence had been genuinely issued by DGFT and validly endorsed as transferable by the Regional Authority. The alleged fraud occurred in relation to the certification of export obligation by the original licence holder.
The High Court therefore declined to mechanically apply the proposition that βfraud vitiates everythingβ to an innocent subsequent purchaser.
Fraudulent Licence Remains Effective Until Cancelled
The Court relied significantly upon the principles laid down in East India Commercial and Sneha Sales Corporation.
It held that a licence affected by fraud or misrepresentation is not automatically rendered non-est. Rather, such a licence remains effective in law until it is avoided or cancelled in the manner prescribed by law.
A decisive fact in Comet Overseas’ favour was that DFIA Licence No. 0210100847 had never been cancelled by DGFT or the Regional Authority.
The Court regarded this as a material and unrebutted circumstance demonstrating that the licence remained a valid and subsisting instrument when Comet made its import.
Bona Fide Purchaser for Value Stands on Different Footing
The High Court also gave substantial weight to Comet Overseas’ status as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.
The company had paid βΉ14,51,795 for the licence through banking channels. More importantly, CESTAT itself had already found that Comet had no knowledge of the irregularities committed by Gemini Overseas or Eastern Silk Industries. Revenue had not challenged that finding.
Applying Taparia Overseas, the High Court held that an innocent transferee stands on a different footing from the person who committed or participated in the fraud.
The Court observed that the maxim βfraud vitiates everythingβ does not, without more, extend to defeat the rights of such a transferee.
Pennar Industries Distinguished
The High Court also rejected Revenue’s reliance upon Commissioner of Customs, Hyderabad v. Pennar Industries Ltd., (2015) 10 SCC 581 / 2015 (322) E.L.T. 402 (S.C.).
It explained that Pennar Industries concerned the original importer’s own failure to fulfil the conditions of an exemption notification.
It did not deal with the distinct question of whether liability arising from the default of a third party could subsequently be imposed upon an innocent transferee who purchased the licence for value without knowledge of that default.
Tata Iron & Steel Decision Did Not Alter the Result
The Court similarly declined to treat Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai, 2015 (319) E.L.T. 546 (S.C.) as controlling.
It observed that the reported decision was a brief order and did not clearly disclose whether the transferee in that case occupied the same position as Comet Overseasβnamely, a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.
The Court therefore regarded its precedential weight on the facts before it as limited and preferred the reasoning in East India Commercial, Sneha Sales Corporation and Taparia Overseas.
Limitation Argument Not Independently Decided
Comet Overseas had also argued that the extended limitation period under Section 28 could not have been invoked because the SCN contained no allegation of collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression against it.
The High Court, however, noted that no substantial question of law concerning limitation had been framed when the appeal was admitted. It therefore declined to decide limitation as an independent ground at the final hearing.
Nevertheless, the Court expressly recorded that the SCN contained no allegation of collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression against Comet Overseas and treated that fact as relevant to its overall assessment, without independently adjudicating the limitation issue.
Calcutta High Court Rules in Favour of Comet Overseas
The High Court ultimately held that because the DFIA licence had never been cancelled, and because the fraud attributable to Gemini Overseas arose at the export-obligation certification stage rather than at the original issuance of the licence, the licence had to be treated as voidable rather than void on the record before it.
Since Comet Overseas was an unimpeached bona fide purchaser for value without notice, the Court held that it could not be fastened with customs duty, interest and redemption fine arising from a third party’s fraud of which it had no knowledge.
The substantial question of law was accordingly answered in favour of Comet Overseas and against the Revenue.
βΉ22.87 Lakh Duty Demand and βΉ15 Lakh Redemption Fine Quashed
The High Court allowed Comet Overseas’ appeal and set aside CESTAT’s order dated 22 December 2015 to the extent that it had sustained:
Customs duty: βΉ22,87,654.95 Interest: Consequential interest on the duty demand Redemption fine: βΉ15,00,000
All three were quashed.
CESTAT’s earlier decision setting aside the βΉ10 lakh penalty under Section 112 of the Customs Act remained undisturbed because Revenue had not challenged that part of the Tribunal’s order.
Key Takeaway
The ruling provides important protection to bona fide purchasers of transferable DFIA licences. On the facts before it, the Calcutta High Court drew a clear distinction between a forged/non-existent instrument and a licence genuinely issued by DGFT and validly endorsed as transferable but subsequently affected by fraud attributable to the original exporter. Where the transferee purchased such a licence for value without notice of the irregularity, and the competent authority never cancelled the licence, the Court held that the transferee could not be saddled with the duty, interest and redemption fine arising from the original licence holder’s fraud.
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Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 21.09.2026
Punjab & Haryana HC: Mere Presence with Co-Accused Does Not Establish Conscious Possession of Commercial Quantity of Opium
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
The Punjab and Haryana High Court has granted regular bail to a man in an NDPS case involving the alleged recovery of 2.702 kg of opium, observing that the contraband was recovered from a bag carried by the co-accused and no contraband was alleged to have been recovered from the conscious possession of the petitioner.
Justice Virinder Aggarwal observed that mere presence alongside the person from whom the contraband was recovered, in the absence of any specific recovery from the petitioner, is a matter requiring appreciation of evidence during trial.
The ruling came in Anil Kumar v. State of Haryana, CRM-M-52368-2026, decided on September 18, 2026. The petition was filed under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), corresponding to Section 439 CrPC, seeking regular bail.
Case Arose From Alleged Recovery of 2.702 Kg Opium
According to the prosecution, on March 20, 2026, officials of the Anti-Narcotics Cell, Karnal were conducting patrol and checking near NH-44 beneath Baldi Bypass Flyover, Karnal.
A secret informer allegedly told the police that Anil Kumar and Roshan Kumar, residents of District Chatra, Jharkhand, were involved in bringing opium from Jharkhand and supplying it in Haryana. The informer further claimed that the two had brought a large quantity of opium and were present near Karn Lake.
The information was reduced into writing and a report under Section 42 of the NDPS Act, 1985 was sent to the police station.
Police Claimed Compliance With Section 50 NDPS Act
The prosecution stated that attempts were made to associate independent witnesses with the proceedings. Two persons allegedly declined, while another individual agreed to join as an independent witness.
When the police reached near Karn Lake, they allegedly saw two persons standing on the roadside with a black bag. The secret informer identified them as Anil Kumar and Roshan Kumar.
Both accused were served notices under Section 50 of the NDPS Act and opted to be searched in the presence of a Gazetted Officer.
A DSP thereafter reached the spot and directed the police officials to conduct the search.
Opium Recovered From Bag Carried by Co-Accused Roshan Kumar
The critical factual circumstance noted by the High Court was the place of recovery.
The black shoulder bag was allegedly being carried by co-accused Roshan Kumar. During its search, police allegedly recovered a packet containing a black-coloured substance suspected to be opium.
The substance, together with its packing, weighed 2 kilograms and 702 grams.
The prosecution stated that the recovered material was sealed using the seals of the Investigating Officer and the DSP. The search proceedings were also allegedly videographed and uploaded on the e-Sakshya application.
However, the High Court specifically recorded that the alleged contraband was recovered from the bag carried by Roshan Kumar and not from Anil Kumar.
Petitioner: Mere Association With Co-Accused Cannot Establish Conscious Possession
Anil Kumar argued that he had been falsely implicated and that no contraband was recovered from his conscious possession.
His counsel emphasised that although 2.702 kg of opium constituted commercial quantity, the recovery was made from the bag allegedly carried by co-accused Roshan Kumar.
It was argued that mere presence or association with a co-accused cannot, by itself, establish conscious possession of narcotic contraband.
The petitioner further submitted that the investigation had already been completed, the challan had been presented and no further recovery was required from him.
He also contended that material prosecution witnesses were yet to be examined, the trial was likely to take considerable time, and he had clean antecedents with no other NDPS or criminal case against him.
Haryana Opposes Bail Citing Section 37 NDPS Act
The State opposed the bail application primarily on the ground that the recovery involved 2.702 kg of opium, which falls within commercial quantity.
It therefore argued that the stringent conditions contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act applied.
The State also pointed out that Anil Kumar had been apprehended along with Roshan Kumar pursuant to secret information and contended that his involvement was a matter to be determined during trial.
The case therefore raised the familiar tension between the stringent bail restrictions applicable to commercial-quantity NDPS prosecutions and the constitutional protection of personal liberty under Article 21.
Right to Speedy Trial Is Integral to Article 21: High Court
The High Court devoted a substantial part of its order to the constitutional right to speedy trial.
Justice Aggarwal observed that:
βThe right to a speedy trial is an integral facet of the fundamental right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21β¦β
The Court explained that the constitutional mandate does not merely require a fair trial. It also obligates the State to conclude criminal proceedings within a reasonable period so that the criminal process itself does not become punitive.
Prolonged Pre-Trial Detention Cannot Become Punishment
The High Court relied on the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81, which recognised speedy trial as an essential and integral component of Article 21.
It also referred to the Constitution Bench decisions in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 and P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578.
The Court noted that these judgments recognise speedy trial as a fundamental right and require constitutional courts to intervene where inordinate and unexplained delay results in denial of substantive justice.
Nature of Offence Does Not Eclipse Right to Speedy Trial
The High Court further relied upon Tapas Kumar Palit v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 322 and Arvind Dham v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 (2) SSC (Criminal) 271, as cited in the order.
Referring to these decisions, the Court stated that the right to speedy trial under Article 21 is not eclipsed by the nature of the offence.
Prolonged incarceration of an undertrial without commencement or reasonable progress of trial can effectively transform pre-trial detention into punishment before conviction.
The Court further recorded the principle that where the State or prosecuting agency cannot secure the accused’s fundamental right to a speedy trial, bail cannot be opposed merely by relying on the seriousness of the allegations where continued incarceration becomes oppressive.
The High Court then considered the special restrictions contained in the NDPS Act.
It acknowledged that the NDPS Act is a stringent penal statute enacted to combat illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.
However, relying upon the Supreme Court judgment in Mohd. Muslim @ Hussain v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352, the Court observed that Section 37 cannot be interpreted so rigidly as to compel indefinite incarceration of an undertrial merely because the trial has not progressed.
The order records the principle that a literal application of Section 37 divorced from constitutional values could result in punitive detention before conviction.
The Court further referred to the proposition that when the State is unable to conclude trial within a reasonable time, the restrictions under Section 37 must be considered alongside the constitutional mandate of Article 21.
Mere Presence With Person Carrying Contraband Requires Evidence at Trial
Turning specifically to Anil Kumar’s case, the High Court found it important that the 2.702 kg of opium was recovered from the black bag carried by Roshan Kumar.
No contraband was alleged to have been recovered from Anil Kumar’s conscious possession.
The Court observed:
βmere presence along with the person from whom the recovery was effected, in the absence of any specific recovery from the petitioner, would require appreciation of evidence during trial.β
The challan had already been presented and Anil Kumar remained in custody. In these circumstances, the Court concluded that his further incarceration would serve no useful purpose.
Importantly, this is a bail-stage finding, not a final determination that the petitioner had no connection with the alleged contraband. The question of his involvement and the prosecution evidence remains subject to adjudication at trial.
Punjab & Haryana HC Grants Regular Bail
The High Court accordingly allowed Anil Kumar’s petition and ordered his release on regular bail, subject to furnishing the requisite bail and surety bonds to the satisfaction of the concerned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Illaqa Magistrate or Duty Magistrate.
The bail was made subject to several conditions designed to protect the integrity of the trial.
Among other things, the petitioner was directed not to induce, threaten or make promises to persons acquainted with the case and not to tamper with evidence or influence prosecution witnesses.
He was also prohibited from leaving India without prior permission of the Trial Court.
Court Imposes Detailed Disclosure Conditions
The High Court additionally imposed detailed identification and disclosure requirements.
The petitioner must provide his permanent and current correspondence addresses with supporting documents. The Investigating Officer has been directed to verify those addresses within 48 hours of acceptance of the bail bonds.
The Court also directed the petitioner to furnish his PAN, Aadhaar number, particulars of all operative bank accounts and a declaration concerning immovable properties, if any.
Providing false information or concealing material particulars can constitute a ground for seeking cancellation of bail.
The petitioner must further notify the Investigating Officer and Trial Court of any change in his residential address or mobile number within seven days.
He must not commit a similar offence and must attend the trial unless his personal appearance is specifically exempted. Breach of these conditions may result in cancellation of bail and issuance of coercive process, including warrants of arrest.
Cases Referred to by the High Court
The order expressly referred to several important Supreme Court judgments concerning speedy trial, personal liberty and bail:
Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81 β speedy trial is an essential and integral component of Article 21.
A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225 β constitutional recognition of the right to speedy trial.
P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578 β speedy trial flows from Article 21 and constitutional courts may intervene against inordinate delay.
Tapas Kumar Palit v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 322 β referred to regarding prolonged pre-trial incarceration and the constitutional right to speedy trial.
Arvind Dham v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 (2) SSC (Criminal) 271 β cited for the proposition that the right to speedy trial is not eclipsed by the nature of the offence.
Mohd. Muslim @ Hussain v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352 β Section 37 NDPS Act cannot be applied so rigidly as to justify indefinite incarceration where the trial fails to progress within a reasonable time.
Why the Judgment Is Significant
The ruling is important for NDPS bail jurisprudence, particularly in cases where the prosecution relies on recovery of commercial quantity but the contraband is not physically recovered from the applicant seeking bail.
The judgment does not dilute the stringent requirements of Section 37 as a general proposition. Instead, it illustrates that the Court must consider the specific role attributed to the accused, the circumstances of recovery, stage of investigation, progress of trial and constitutional protection of personal liberty.
It is also significant that the Court treated the question of whether mere association with a co-accused establishes conscious possession as an issue requiring evidence at trial rather than assuming possession solely from the petitioner’s presence at the place of recovery.
Key Takeaway
The Punjab and Haryana High Court has granted regular bail in a commercial-quantity NDPS case after noting that 2.702 kg of opium was recovered from a bag carried by the co-accused and not from the petitioner.
The Court held at the bail stage that mere presence alongside the person from whom recovery was made, without a specific recovery from the petitioner, requires appreciation of evidence during trial. At the same time, the judgment reinforces the constitutional principle that the right to speedy trial under Article 21 remains relevant even in prosecutions governed by stringent special statutes such as the NDPS Act.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 21.09.2026
Punjab & Haryana High Court Refuses to Interfere with RERA Tribunalβs Interim Possession Order
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Narendra Singh. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email idamitnaren@outlook.com.
The Punjab and Haryana High Court has dismissed an appeal filed by homebuyers challenging an interim order of the Haryana Real Estate Appellate Tribunal concerning possession of an apartment in the Ireo Victory Valley project, Sector 67, Gurugram.
Justice Jagmohan Bansal held that the Appellate Tribunal had not stayed the handing over of possession. Rather, it had expressly directed the promoter to hand over possession to the allottees, subject to adjudication of Delayed Possession Charges (DPC) and any outstanding amount.
Finding no factual or legal infirmity in the Tribunal’s interim order and no substantial question of law warranting interference under Section 58 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA), the High Court dismissed the appeal.
The decision was delivered on September 17, 2026, in Anish Mukker & Anr. v. M/s Ireo Victory Valley Pvt. Ltd., RERA-APPL-207-2026.
Apartment Purchased for βΉ4.20 Crore in Ireo Victory Valley
The respondent, M/s Ireo Victory Valley Pvt. Ltd., is the promoter of the real estate project known as Ireo Victory Valley, situated in Sector 67, Gurugram.
An apartment in the project was allotted to the appellants for a total consideration of βΉ4,20,39,519.
According to the High Court’s order, the appellants had already paid βΉ4,12,82,599 towards the apartment.
The homebuyers subsequently approached the RERA Authority alleging delay in completion of the project and arbitrary demand of charges by the promoter.
RERA Authority Awards 10.85% Interest for Delayed Possession
The RERA Authority decided the complaint in favour of the allottees on April 18, 2024.
It directed the promoter to:
pay interest at 10.85% per annum for the period of delay;
hand over possession of the apartment to the appellants; and
execute the conveyance deed in favour of the allottees.
The promoter thereafter challenged the Authority’s order before the Haryana Real Estate Appellate Tribunal, Chandigarh.
Promoter Makes βΉ3.49 Crore Pre-Deposit Under Section 43(5) RERA
While filing the appeal, the promoter complied with the statutory pre-deposit requirement under Section 43(5) of the RERA Act.
The Tribunal’s order recorded that the requisite pre-deposit of βΉ3,49,49,735 had been made by the promoter, which was also confirmed by the Registry.
Section 43(5) assumes considerable significance in promoter appeals under RERA because the statutory proviso imposes a pre-deposit requirement before an appeal filed by a promoter can be entertained.
In the present case, however, there was no dispute before the High Court that the respondent had complied with that requirement.
RERA Tribunal Directs Promoter to Hand Over Possession
The matter before the Appellate Tribunal had originally been listed for July 22, 2026. On the promoter’s application, it was preponed to May 8, 2026.
Before the Tribunal, counsel for the promoter submitted that the company was prepared to hand over possession to the allottee, subject to the final outcome of the questions concerning computation of Delayed Possession Charges and outstanding dues.
The urgency arose because the Gurugram RERA Authority had passed an order dated April 22, 2026, directing a Bailiff to visit the site on May 8, 2026 at 2:00 PM and deliver possession.
The Appellate Tribunal consequently ordered:
βWe hereby direct that the possession may be handed over to the allottee subject to the adjudication of DPC and outstanding amount, if any.β
The matter was thereafter directed to be listed on May 19, 2026.
Homebuyers Challenge Interim Order Before Punjab & Haryana HC
The allottees approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court by filing an appeal under Section 58 of the RERA Act.
They sought setting aside of the Tribunal’s interim order dated May 8, 2026.
Their principal grievance before the High Court was that, because of the manner in which the interim order had been framed, they believed that they could not take possession of the apartment.
The High Court, however, did not accept this interpretation of the Tribunal’s order.
Tribunal Did Not Stay Possession: Punjab & Haryana High Court
Justice Jagmohan Bansal closely examined the operative portion of the Tribunal’s order and found that it actually directed the respondent promoter to hand over possession to the allottee.
The only qualification was that possession would remain subject to adjudication of the DPC and any outstanding amount.
The High Court categorically observed:
βThe Appellate Tribunal has not stayed possession of the flat.β
The promoter’s appeal before the Appellate Tribunal remained pending and, notably, was itself listed for hearing on September 17, 2026, the same date on which the High Court decided the appeal.
Dispute Over Outstanding Dues Can Be Raised Before RERA Appellate Tribunal
The High Court further clarified the remedy available to the homebuyers.
If the appellants believed that the effect of the interim order was that they could not obtain possession without first paying the outstanding dues claimed by the promoter, they were free to move an appropriate application before the Appellate Tribunal.
They could also raise all other issues concerning the dispute before the Tribunal, where the promoter’s substantive appeal remained pending.
Thus, the High Court did not adjudicate the correctness of the promoter’s alleged outstanding demands or finally determine the amount of DPC payable to the allottees.
Those issues remain subject to adjudication before the RERA Appellate Tribunal.
No Factual or Legal Infirmity in Tribunalβs Interim Order
The High Court found no basis for exercising its appellate jurisdiction against the interim order.
Justice Bansal held:
βThere seems no factual or legal infirmity in the impugned order warranting interference of this Court.β
More importantly for appeals under Section 58 RERA, the Court found that:
βNo question of law much less substantial question of law arises for the consideration of this Court.β
This became the decisive ground for declining interference.
Section 58 RERA Appeals and the βSubstantial Question of Lawβ Requirement
The ruling is relevant to the scope of appeals from the Real Estate Appellate Tribunal to the High Court.
The present appeal had been specifically instituted under Section 58 of the RERA Act.
In dismissing the appeal, the High Court emphasised the absence of any question of law, much less a substantial question of law.
The order therefore illustrates the limited scope for High Court intervention where the challenge is directed merely against the manner in which an interim direction of the RERA Appellate Tribunal is understood or implemented and no qualifying legal question is demonstrated.
High Court Dismisses Homebuyersβ Appeal
The Punjab and Haryana High Court ultimately concluded that the appeal deserved dismissal.
Accordingly, Anish Mukker & Anr. v. M/s Ireo Victory Valley Pvt. Ltd. was dismissed.
The result does not mean that the promoter succeeded on the merits of its underlying RERA appeal.
The promoter’s appeal concerning DPC and outstanding dues remained pending before the Haryana Real Estate Appellate Tribunal. Similarly, the High Court did not disturb the Tribunal’s direction permitting possession to be handed over to the allottees.
This distinction is important: the judgment is essentially concerned with whether the High Court should interfere with the interim order dated May 8, 2026, rather than the final merits of the delayed-possession dispute.
Why the Judgment Is Significant
The decision is relevant for homebuyers, developers and RERA practitioners because it highlights three separate procedural aspects of real estate litigation.
First, the order demonstrates that a direction to hand over possession subject to adjudication of DPC and outstanding dues is not equivalent to staying possession. The language of an interim RERA order must therefore be read according to its actual terms.
Second, if an allottee believes that an interim order is being interpreted by the promoter as requiring payment of disputed outstanding dues before possession, the appropriate course may be to seek clarification or appropriate relief from the RERA Appellate Tribunal itself, particularly where the substantive appeal remains pending.
Third, the High Court’s observation concerning the absence of a substantial question of law reinforces the significance of the threshold governing Section 58 RERA appeals.
Important Distinction: No Final Decision on DPC or Outstanding Dues
The ruling should not be reported as a final victory for either side on the underlying monetary dispute.
The RERA Authority had earlier awarded interest at 10.85% per annum for delayed possession and directed possession and execution of the conveyance deed. The promoter challenged that decision before the Appellate Tribunal after making the required pre-deposit.
The Appellate Tribunal had yet to finally adjudicate the issues concerning Delayed Possession Charges and alleged outstanding dues.
The Punjab and Haryana High Court merely declined to interfere with the Tribunal’s interim possession order.
Key Takeaway
The Punjab and Haryana High Court has clarified that an interim RERA Appellate Tribunal order directing a promoter to hand over possession subject to final adjudication of delayed-possession charges and outstanding dues does not amount to a stay on possession.
Where homebuyers apprehend that possession is being made conditional upon payment of disputed dues, they may seek appropriate clarification or relief from the Appellate Tribunal.
Since the High Court found no factual or legal infirmity and no substantial question of law, it declined to interfere under Section 58 of the RERA Act and dismissed the appeal.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 21.09.2026
Bombay High Court Quashes FIR After Parties Reconcile Redevelopment Dispute
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Madhumita Jha. The views expressed are based on her interpretation of the law. She can be reached at her email idjhamadhumita27@gmail.com.
The Bombay High Court has quashed an FIR arising from a dispute between a member of a co-operative housing society and persons allegedly involved with the new developer appointed for the societyβs redevelopment, after the complainant and the accused reconciled their dispute and filed consent affidavits.
Justice Milind N. Jadhav, while allowing a batch of six petitions, explained that Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) substantially reproduces the inherent powers earlier contained in Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) and enables High Courts to intervene to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice.
The order was passed on September 18, 2026, with the lead matter being Mohammed Jasim Bhati v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., Criminal Writ Petition No. 4532 of 2026.
Six Petitions Sought Quashing of Same FIR
The High Court was dealing with six petitions arising from FIR No. 0456 of 2026 registered with Versova Police Station, Mumbai.
The lead petition was filed by Mohammed Jasim Bhati. The connected petitions were filed by Rajeev Narayandas Bhathija, Samina Rayees Khan, Horace Poorekhorsandi, Abdul Kader Haji Noor Mohammed and Shakeel Ahmed Bhati.
All the petitions were filed under Section 528 BNSS seeking quashing of the FIR.
FIR Arose From Society Redevelopment Dispute
The complainant was a member of a co-operative housing society and had a dispute concerning his gala premises in relation to the redevelopment undertaken by the society.
According to the order, the petitioners were accused by the complainant of having colluded with the new developer appointed by the society.
However, the Court specifically noted that the complainantβs grievance was restricted to his own gala premises.
The dispute subsequently took a different course when the complainant and petitioners reconciled and jointly sought to bring the criminal proceedings to an end.
Former Developer Seeks to Intervene
An additional issue arose when the societyβs former developer, whose Development Agreement had been terminated, sought to intervene in the criminal writ petitions.
Counsel appearing for the old developer argued that the FIR concerning the complainantβs gala also affected certain substantive rights of the former developer.
The Court was informed that several civil proceedings relating to the partiesβ substantive rights were already pending before the High Court as well as in arbitration.
The old developer therefore sought time to intervene in the proceedings.
Bombay HC Rejects Old Developerβs Intervention
The High Court rejected the intervention request outright.
Justice Jadhav observed that whatever substantive rights the old developer might have against the society concerning the terminated Development Agreement could be pursued in the appropriate proceedings available under law.
The Court noted that the former developer had already initiated civil proceedings before the High Court and arbitration proceedings.
His intervention in criminal petitions which the complainant and accused themselves wanted to have quashed by consent was therefore held to be not maintainable.
At the same time, the High Court protected the former developerβs position by expressly keeping open any rights he might have concerning his relationship with the society, the redevelopment or the terminated Development Agreement.
The Court made it clear that it was expressing no opinion on the merits of those substantive rights.
Six Consent Affidavits Filed by Complainant
A decisive development was the filing of six consent affidavits dated September 12, 2026, one in each of the six petitions.
After examining the affidavits, the High Court recorded that the parties had βreconciled their dispute altogether.β
Justice Jadhav observed that the Court needed to intervene so that the βignominy of the criminal proceedingβ concerning the complainantβs single gala was not carried forward after the underlying dispute had been resolved.
The Court therefore found it appropriate to allow the petitions.
The judgment is particularly relevant because it explains the relationship between Section 482 CrPC and Section 528 BNSS.
The High Court observed that Section 482 CrPC conferred inherent powers upon High Courts to make orders necessary to:
Give effect to an order of the Court, prevent abuse of the process of any Court, or otherwise secure the ends of justice.
The Court then noted that under the BNSS, this power has been incorporated in Section 528, which substantially reproduces the language and intent of the former Section 482 CrPC.
The ruling therefore reinforces that the transition from the CrPC to the BNSS has not removed the High Courtβs inherent jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings in appropriate cases.
Section 528 BNSS Remains a Discretionary Power
Justice Jadhav emphasised that the inherent power is not mechanical or automatic.
The Court observed that High Courts may intervene where proceedings have been instituted with mala fide motives, to harass an accused, or where continuation of proceedings would result in procedural harassment.
The provision can also enable the Court to terminate FIRs or criminal proceedings where the circumstances justify exercise of its inherent jurisdiction.
Importantly, however, the High Court stated that exercise of powers formerly under Section 482 CrPC and now under Section 528 BNSS remains discretionary and depends upon the facts of each case.
Bombay HC Relies on Supreme Courtβs Bhajan Lal Judgment
The High Court referred to the Supreme Courtβs landmark decision in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 AIR 604.
The Court noted that Bhajan Lal laid down model categories and guidelines identifying circumstances in which FIRs may be quashed.
Justice Jadhav further observed that the Supreme Court had explained that the inherent power is an acknowledgment of powers already inherent in the High Court rather than the source of some additional jurisdiction.
Even Non-Compoundable Offences May Be Quashed in Appropriate Cases
The Bombay High Court also reiterated an important distinction between compounding an offence and quashing criminal proceedings through the High Courtβs inherent jurisdiction.
Referring to the principles discussed in Bhajan Lal, the Court observed that even non-compoundable offences may be quashed where necessary, with the High Court required to consider whether continuation of the prosecution would further or undermine the interests of justice.
At the same time, the Court specifically cautioned that grave offences such as murder, rape and dacoity ordinarily cannot be quashed merely because the parties have reached a settlement, since such offences carry wider societal implications.
The order therefore does not lay down that every criminal case must be quashed once the parties settle. Rather, the inherent jurisdiction remains dependent upon the nature of the controversy and the interests of justice.
Private Nature of Redevelopment Dispute Considered
In the present case, the criminal proceedings arose from a dispute connected with a society memberβs own gala in a redevelopment project.
The complainantβs allegations against the petitioners concerned their alleged collusion with the new developer, but the grievance remained confined to the complainantβs premises.
With the complainant and petitioners having subsequently reconciled their dispute and filed consent affidavits, the High Court concluded that continuation of the criminal proceedings was unnecessary.
FIR No. 0456 of 2026 Quashed
The Bombay High Court ultimately allowed all six writ petitions in terms of their respective prayer clauses.
The petitions sought issuance of an appropriate writ calling for the records concerning FIR C.R. No. 0456 of 2026 registered with Versova Police Station, Mumbai, and quashing the FIR after examining its legality, validity and propriety.
The connected petitions contained substantially identical reliefs concerning the same FIR.
The High Court accordingly recorded:
βAll six Petitions are allowed and disposed.β
Thus, Mohammed Jasim Bhati and the petitioners in the five connected matters succeeded in having the FIR quashed.
What Happens to the Former Developerβs Claims?
The order contains an important qualification concerning the former developer.
Quashing of the criminal FIR does not adjudicate or extinguish the former developerβs independent civil or contractual rights.
The High Court expressly left open whatever rights the former developer may have regarding:
his relationship with the co-operative housing society;
the redevelopment project;
termination of his Development Agreement; and
remedies otherwise available to him under law.
Those questions may continue to be litigated in the already pending civil or arbitration proceedings, and the High Court expressly refrained from giving any opinion on their merits.
This distinction is important: the judgment terminates the criminal proceedings arising from the complainantβs individual gala dispute, but it does not determine the broader redevelopment dispute involving the former developer.
Why the Judgment Is Significant
The ruling has significance under the new criminal procedural regime introduced by the BNSS because it expressly recognises the continuity between Section 482 CrPC and Section 528 BNSS.
The Bombay High Court has confirmed that Section 528 substantially preserves the High Courtβs inherent jurisdiction to intervene where necessary to prevent abuse of judicial process and secure the ends of justice.
The judgment also illustrates the distinction between criminal proceedings arising from an essentially private dispute and independent civil or contractual disputes involving third parties. Settlement of the former may justify quashing in an appropriate case, while the latter can remain open for adjudication in their proper forum.
Key Takeaway
The Bombay High Courtβs ruling makes clear that Section 528 BNSS carries forward the inherent quashing jurisdiction previously exercised under Section 482 CrPC.
Where a criminal proceeding arises from a private dispute, the parties have fully reconciled, and continuation of the prosecution would no longer advance the interests of justice, the High Court may exercise its inherent powers to bring the proceedings to an end. However, settlement is not an automatic ground for quashing every offence.
The nature and gravity of the alleged offence and its impact on society remain material considerations, with serious offences ordinarily standing on a different footing.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 21.09.2026
Delhi High Court: Prior Emails Cannot Override Clear Terms of Final Signed Contract; Grants Anti-Arbitration Injunction Against London Arbitration
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Arbitrator Shobhit Mallik. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email idshobhit.Ica23@gmail.com.
The Delhi High Court has held that once parties execute a clear and unambiguous final written agreement expressly superseding previous arrangements, earlier negotiations, emails or correspondence cannot ordinarily be relied upon to add to, vary or contradict its terms.
A Division Bench of Justice Vivek Chaudhary and Justice Renu Bhatnagar, in SARR Freights Corporation & Anr. v. Argo Coral Maritime Ltd., allowed the appeal filed by SARR Freights and restrained Argo Coral Maritime Ltd. from continuing arbitration proceedings before the London Maritime Arbitrators Association (LMAA).
The judgment was delivered on September 18, 2026, in FAO(OS) 40/2026.
The Court ultimately held that no arbitration agreement existed between the parties under their final signed Booking Note and, therefore, the foundation for continuation of the London arbitration proceedings did not survive.
Dispute Arose From Transportation of UN Peacekeeping Cargo to Sudan
The dispute originated from an arrangement for transportation of military cargo for the United Nations Peace Keeping Force from New Delhi to Sudan.
The cargo was to travel from New Delhi and thereafter be shipped from Nhava Sheva Port, Mumbai to Port Sudan.
During negotiations, the parties’ respective agents exchanged emails and a Fixture Recap dated April 4, 2023. Clause 23 of the Fixture Recap contemplated βEnglish law and London arbitration.β
A final Booking Note dated April 4, 2023, however, was subsequently signed on April 5, 2023. The Booking Note specifically referred to additional rider Clauses 20β41.
The difficulty arose because the arbitration provision appeared only in Clause 43, which stated that the latest BIMCO Dispute Resolution Clause would apply, subject to English law and LMAA terms and procedures.
No bill of lading was ultimately issued.
Sudan Crisis Led to Cancellation of Booking
On April 18, 2023, the United Nations issued an advisory declaring cargo movements through Sudanese ports unsafe.
SARR Freights consequently cancelled the Booking Note by invoking force majeure. Argo Coral Maritime thereafter invoked arbitration under Clause 43.
SARR participated subject to its right to dispute the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction.
The proceedings eventually resulted in two arbitration references, which were consolidated for consideration of common preliminary issues.
LMAA Tribunal Majority Held Arbitration Agreement Existed
By a partial award dated October 18, 2025, a majority of the arbitral tribunal concluded that the parties had agreed to English law and London arbitration.
The majority treated the reference to rider Clauses β20β41β in the Booking Note as a typographical error that ought to have read β20β43.β
It therefore considered Clause 43 applicable and held that the BIMCO Law and Arbitration Clause London 2020 governed the dispute, providing for LMAA arbitration in London before a three-member tribunal under English law.
SARR Freights approached the Delhi High Court seeking an anti-arbitration injunction.
Single Judge Refused to Stop Arbitration
The Single Judge rejected SARR’s interim anti-arbitration injunction application.
Reliance was placed principally on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Govind Rubber Ltd. v. Louis Dreyfus Commodities Asia Pvt. Ltd., (2015) 13 SCC 477, and Trimex International FZE Ltd., Dubai v. Vedanta Aluminium Ltd., India, (2010) 3 SCC 1.
The Single Judge considered the reference to Clauses 20β41 an inadvertent error and held that the intention emerging from the earlier Fixture Recap showed that the parties had agreed to arbitration.
SARR Freights then challenged that decision before the Division Bench.
SARR: Final Booking Note Deliberately Excluded Arbitration Clause
SARR argued that the signed Booking Note constituted the final agreement between the parties and expressly stated that its terms would prevail over previous arrangements.
The Booking Note specifically incorporated only rider Clauses 20β41. Clause 43, which contained the arbitration provision, was therefore excluded.
SARR contended that a court or tribunal could not rewrite the contract by substituting β20β43β for β20β41β when the final written agreement contained no ambiguity.
It relied upon Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, among other provisions and precedents.
Argo Coral: β20β41β Was Merely a Typographical Error
Argo Coral Maritime argued that the Fixture Recap and Booking Note had to be read together.
According to the respondent, Clause 23 of the Fixture Recap already recorded the parties’ agreement to English law and London arbitration, and the subsequent Booking Note was intended to carry forward that arrangement.
It argued that the reference to β20β41β was merely a typographical mistake and should be read as β20β43.β
Delhi High Court Confirms Its Jurisdiction
The Division Bench first rejected the respondent’s objection regarding the Delhi High Court’s territorial jurisdiction.
The Court noted that SARR had its permanent office in Delhi, the Booking Note was signed in Delhi, and enforcement proceedings against SARR, if required, would also take place there.
It held that where a substantial part of the cause of action arose in Delhi, Delhi courts would have jurisdiction. The mere possibility that courts in Mumbai might also possess jurisdiction did not deprive Delhi courts of jurisdiction.
The Court further held that Indian courts can determine whether an arbitration agreement itself is void or a nullity, notwithstanding the competence-competence principle.
Clear Written Contract Cannot Be Rewritten Using Earlier Negotiations
The central part of the judgment concerns the evidentiary and contractual effect of a final written agreement.
The Division Bench examined Sections 91, 92, 93, 94 and 95 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
It held that once contractual terms have been reduced to a signed document and those terms are clear and unambiguous, the agreement must ordinarily be proved and interpreted from that document itself.
Earlier negotiations, correspondence and communications cannot be used to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the final written terms.
The Court explained that surrounding circumstances may become relevant where contractual language is unclear, ambiguous or defective. But where the language is plain and accurately applies to the existing facts, the court must ordinarily give effect to that language.
Court Cannot Create a New Contract for the Parties
The Bench relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation v. Diamond & Gem Development Corporation Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC 470.
The principle reiterated was that courts must interpret a contract according to the words actually used and cannot make a new contract for the parties merely because another interpretation may appear more reasonable.
The Court also referred to Annaya Kocha Shetty v. Laxmibai Narayan Satose, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 758, reiterating that contractual interpretation begins with the plain, ordinary and literal meaning of the words used.
Indian Law Distinguished From English Common Law
An important feature of the judgment is the Court’s detailed distinction between Indian codified law and English common law on contractual rectification.
The respondent relied upon foreign decisions to contend that prior negotiations could be considered to determine whether the final written instrument incorrectly recorded the parties’ previously agreed intention.
The Delhi High Court observed that English common law may, in appropriate circumstances, permit a court to examine prior negotiations and communications to determine whether a written instrument accurately reflects a prior agreement and to rectify the instrument where a mistake is established.
However, the Court held that the position under Indian codified law is materially different.
Once parties reduce their terms into a clear and signed written agreement, prior negotiations or communications cannot be used to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from those terms unless the contractual language is ambiguous or defective.
The Bench also observed that where Indian law is clear and settled, there is no need to resort to foreign case law.
Govind Rubber and Trimex Distinguished
The Court distinguished the Supreme Court judgments in Govind Rubber and Trimex International, which had been relied upon by the Single Judge.
In those cases, there was no final signed written agreement, and therefore correspondence between the parties could legitimately be examined to determine whether an agreement had been reached.
The present case was materially different because the parties had ultimately executed a signed written Booking Note that expressly provided that it would prevail over previous arrangements.
Accordingly, the principles from those cases could not be used to rewrite the Booking Note.
Reference to βClauses 20β41β Was Deliberate, Not Typographical Error
The Division Bench then closely examined the Booking Note itself.
It found that the Special Terms box expressly stated:
βAs per additional rider clause 20β41 in attached.β
The Court observed that the parties had not mechanically adopted the standard form. They had specifically filled in and modified several special terms while retaining the reference to Clauses 20β41.
According to the Bench, this demonstrated that the parties consciously considered the special terms and that the arbitration clause was not among the provisions incorporated into their agreement.
The Court also noted that the parties had made several changes between the earlier Fixture Recap and the final Booking Note, including terms concerning the vessel and detention. This reinforced the conclusion that the Booking Note was not simply a reproduction of the earlier negotiations but a separately considered and finalised contract.
Fixture Recap and Clause 43 Contained Different Arbitration Arrangements
The Court identified another significant distinction.
Clause 23 of the earlier Fixture Recap merely provided for:
βEnglish law and London arbitration.β
Clause 43 of the additional riders, however, contemplated:
βBimco Dispute Resolution Clause latest edition to apply, subject to English Law and LMAA Terms and Procedures.β
The latter therefore introduced a more specific arbitral framework that had not been expressed in the earlier Fixture Recap.
Final Agreement Expressly Superseded Earlier Arrangements
The Booking Note also contained an express contractual stipulation providing that its terms would βprevail over any previous arrangements.β
The High Court treated this as significant.
It relied upon Union of India v. Kishorilal Gupta & Bros. and Young Achievers v. IMS Learning Resources (P) Ltd. for the proposition that where an earlier contract containing an arbitration clause is superseded by a later agreement, the arbitration clause in the earlier arrangement does not necessarily survive the superseding contract.
The Bench therefore concluded that once the parties executed the Booking Note expressly providing that it would prevail over previous arrangements, there was no occasion to return to the Fixture Recap to determine the terms of the final contract.
Delhi High Court Holds No Arbitration Agreement Existed
On its examination of the Booking Note, the Division Bench found that the reference to Clauses 20β41 was clear and unambiguous.
Clause 43 was not incorporated merely because Clauses 41, 42 and 43 appeared on the same page or because the parties’ signatures appeared below Clause 43.
The Court consequently held that there was no mistake, ambiguity or defective language in the Booking Note and no arbitration agreement existed between the parties.
This reversed the conclusion reached by the Single Judge and the majority view of the arbitral tribunal.
Anti-Arbitration Injunction Granted
Having found that no arbitration agreement existed, the High Court held that the very foundation for continuation of the LMAA proceedings disappeared.
The Court relied upon its earlier decisions in Mcdonald’s India Pvt. Ltd. v. Vikram Bakshi and Dr. Bina Modi v. Lalit Kumar Modi concerning the circumstances in which Indian courts may grant an anti-arbitration injunction.
The Bench treated a dispute over whether the parties ever consented to arbitration as one of the exceptional circumstances capable of justifying judicial intervention.
Accordingly, the Division Bench:
allowed SARR Freights’ appeal;
set aside the Single Judge’s order dated March 13, 2026; and
granted an anti-arbitration injunction restraining Argo Coral Maritime Ltd. from continuing, pursuing or taking any steps in the LMAA arbitration titled Argo Coral Maritime Ltd. v. SARR Freights Ltd./SARR Freights Corporation.
Thus, SARR Freights Corporation and SARR Freights Ltd. succeeded in the appeal, and the London arbitration was restrained.
Why the Judgment Is Significant
The judgment carries broader significance for international commercial contracts, shipping agreements and cross-border arbitration clauses.
It underscores that an arbitration clause must ultimately rest upon party consent. Earlier negotiations referring to arbitration cannot automatically be imported into a subsequent final signed contract where that contract deliberately incorporates only specified provisions and expressly supersedes earlier arrangements.
The decision also draws an important line between using correspondence to establish a contract where no signed agreement exists and using prior correspondence to alter a later, complete and unambiguous written agreement.
For businesses engaged in international trade, shipping, freight forwarding and charter arrangements, the judgment highlights the importance of carefully reviewing incorporation clauses, rider clauses, governing-law provisions and arbitration provisions before signing the final contractual document.
Key Takeaway
The Delhi High Court’s ruling establishes a clear contractual principle: where parties deliberately reduce their bargain into a final, signed and unambiguous document that supersedes previous arrangements, earlier emails and negotiations cannot ordinarily be used to insert an arbitration clause that the final contract itself did not incorporate.
In this case, the Booking Note incorporated rider Clauses 20β41, while the arbitration provision appeared in Clause 43. The Court refused to rewrite β20β41β as β20β43β and consequently found that no arbitration agreement existed.
The ruling therefore resulted in the unusual but legally significant remedy of an anti-arbitration injunction restraining continuation of foreign LMAA proceedings.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
