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  • Bombay HC Upholds Developer’s Cancellation of Flat Allotment After Buyer Failed to Pay Stamp Duty; Orders Refund With Interest

    Bombay HC Upholds Developer’s Cancellation of Flat Allotment After Buyer Failed to Pay Stamp Duty; Orders Refund With Interest

    Date: 24.09.2026

    In a significant ruling concerning the obligations of homebuyers and promoters under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA), the Bombay High Court has held that a developer was justified in terminating a flat allotment where the allottee failed to actually pay the requisite stamp duty and registration charges despite repeated opportunities to execute the Agreement for Sale.

    Justice Sandeep V. Marne held that MahaRERA and the Maharashtra Real Estate Appellate Tribunal had erred in directing JP Builders and Developers to execute a registered Agreement for Sale in favour of the allottee, Santosh Amarsingh Sandhu. The Court found that the promoter was ready and willing to execute the agreement, whereas the allottee had failed to complete the stamp-duty and registration formalities.

    At the same time, the High Court held that the developer could not retain the allottee’s booking amount of β‚Ή12.30 lakh despite the valid termination. It directed that the amount be refunded with interest at SBI MCLR + 2%, calculated from 12 July 2016 until actual repayment.

    Background: Flat Originally Booked in Proposed A-Wing

    • The dispute arose from a residential development at Airoli, Navi Mumbai. JP Builders and Developers had undertaken development of land belonging to Airoli Cooperative Housing Society Ltd.
    • The project involved issues concerning additional FSI. The developer initially contemplated a ground-plus-30-storey building, but the additional FSI expected by the society did not fully materialise. The construction plans were eventually scaled down to a ground-plus-19-floor building.
    • Flat No. A-502 had originally been allotted to Vandana Nagendra Kharatmol and Nagendra Piraji Kharatmol for β‚Ή48.75 lakh. They paid β‚Ή12.30 lakh but later lost interest in the purchase because construction could not commence while litigation concerning FSI remained pending.
    • Thereafter, a fresh allotment letter dated 11 July 2013 was issued in favour of Santosh Sandhu for the same flat at a consideration of β‚Ή48.75 lakh, recording payment of β‚Ή12.30 lakh by him.

    Original Flat Could Not Be Constructed

    • The originally contemplated Flat A-502 ultimately could not be constructed because the proposed 30-storey structure had to be reduced to 19 floors.
    • After receiving a revised Commencement Certificate on 26 April 2019, the developer asked Sandhu to select another flat. He selected Flat No. 1208 on the 12th floor, which the developer agreed to allot subject to floor-rise charges of β‚Ή1.75 lakh.
    • The developer then called upon him to pay stamp duty and registration charges so that the Agreement for Sale could be executed. The allottee, however, said he was facing financial difficulty and asked the promoter to bear the stamp duty, with a proposal to reimburse it through the home-loan disbursement.
    • The developer eventually terminated the transaction by notice dated 30 July 2019.

    MahaRERA Directed Developer to Execute Agreement for Sale

    • The allottee approached MahaRERA in November 2019.
    • By an interim order dated 6 March 2020, MahaRERA relied upon Section 13 of RERA, noting that more than 10% of the agreed consideration had been paid without execution of a registered Agreement for Sale. It directed the developer to execute an agreement for another flat of equal area as chosen by the allottee.
    • That direction was effectively confirmed by MahaRERA’s final order dated 8 October 2020.
    • The Maharashtra Real Estate Appellate Tribunal subsequently dismissed the promoter’s appeal and partly allowed the allottee’s appeal. In addition to maintaining the direction concerning the flat, it ordered JP Builders to pay interest on β‚Ή12.30 lakh at SBI MCLR + 2% from 12 July 2016 until possession, with the interest to be adjusted against the balance consideration.
    • The Tribunal also restrained the developer from creating third-party rights in the flat and from charging floor-rise charges.
    • Both sides therefore approached the Bombay High Court in cross-appeals.

    Key Question: Was Stamp Duty Actually Paid?

    • A central issue before the High Court was whether the allottee had actually paid the stamp duty and registration charges required for execution of the Agreement for Sale.
    • The allottee claimed that he had paid β‚Ή4.35 lakh towards stamp duty and β‚Ή30,000 towards registration charges and relied upon an email dated 9 July 2019, through which he claimed to have forwarded proof of payment to the developer.
    • However, the documentary record revealed a crucial problem.
    • The Court found that although β‚Ή4.65 lakh had been transferred to a Punjab National Bank account for the purpose of making the statutory payment, the amount was never actually credited to the Stamp Authority or Registration Authority.
    • A letter subsequently written by the allottee to the bank on 18 January 2020 itself indicated that the required challan and e-payment receipt had not been generated. The bank eventually reversed the amount and returned β‚Ή4.65 lakh to the allottee.

    Transferring Money to Bank Is Not Payment of Stamp Duty: Bombay HC

    • The High Court drew an important distinction between merely making funds available to a bank and actually paying statutory stamp duty.
    • Justice Marne observed that making provision for stamp duty and transferring money to the banker did not mean that the statutory charges had actually been paid.
    • There was no evidence showing that β‚Ή4.65 lakh was transferred to the accounts of the concerned government authorities. Nor were the necessary challans generated.
    • The Court consequently held that the allottee had not paid the stamp duty and registration charges before 30 July 2019, when the developer terminated the transaction.

    Developer Sent Repeated Notices for Registration

    • The High Court also examined the chronology leading to cancellation.
    • After the revised plans were sanctioned on 26 April 2019, JP Builders issued communications dated 3 May 2019, 28 May 2019 and 24 June 2019, asking the allottee to complete payment of stamp duty and registration charges and execute the registered Agreement for Sale.
    • In an email dated 30 June 2019, the allottee expressly stated that he did not then have the necessary cash to pay the stamp duty. He proposed either that the developer wait three months for him to arrange the funds or that the developer initially bear the statutory charges and recover them through his proposed home loan.
    • Further communications followed on 2 July and 9 July 2019. When no proof of actual statutory payment was produced, the developer terminated the allotment on 30 July 2019.

    MahaRERA Mechanically Applied Section 13: High Court

    • The High Court found fault with the approach adopted by MahaRERA and the Appellate Tribunal.
    • According to the Court, both authorities had mechanically relied upon Section 13 of RERA to hold the promoter responsible for non-execution of the Agreement for Sale without adequately examining the events preceding the termination.
    • The Court noted that once the revised construction plans became clear in April 2019, the promoter promptly asked the allottee to execute the registered agreement. It was the allottee who did not complete the necessary stamp-duty and registration formalities.
    • The Court therefore concluded that the promoter could not be blamed merely because an Agreement for Sale had not ultimately been registered.

    β€œPromoter Is Not Expected to Wait Endlessly”

    • The judgment records that even after the termination, the allottee did not promptly establish payment of the statutory charges. The β‚Ή4.65 lakh that had remained with the bank was eventually refunded to him, and the record did not show that he thereafter paid the stamp duty.
    • The Court held that the allottee himself was responsible for the failure to execute the Agreement for Sale and that the developer was ready and willing to execute it.
    • Accordingly, the Court found the termination dated 30 July 2019 to be valid, observing that the promoter was not expected to wait endlessly.
    • The High Court consequently held that MahaRERA and the Appellate Tribunal had erred in directing the developer to execute the registered Agreement for Sale.

    Buyer Still Entitled to Refund of Entire β‚Ή12.30 Lakh

    • The validity of termination, however, did not permit the promoter to retain the buyer’s money.
    • JP Builders had earlier sought to refund β‚Ή11.07 lakh after deducting β‚Ή1.23 lakh as earnest money deposit.
    • The High Court held that despite the valid termination, the promoter was not entitled to retain the β‚Ή12.30 lakh booking amount or deduct any amount towards EMD.
    • Accordingly, the entire β‚Ή12.30 lakh was required to be returned to the allottee.

    Interest at SBI MCLR + 2% Maintained

    • The Court also balanced the equities on interest.
    • Although the allottee was responsible for the failure of the transaction after 30 July 2019, he had been made to wait for a considerable period for construction of the flat.
    • The High Court therefore maintained the interest rate fixed by the Appellate Tribunal β€” SBI MCLR + 2% β€” but altered the nature of the relief. Instead of interest continuing until possession and being adjusted against the balance consideration, the interest would run on the refundable booking amount of β‚Ή12.30 lakh from 12 July 2016 until the date on which the amount is actually returned.

    Claim for Adjustment of Earlier Buyers’ β‚Ή12.30 Lakh Rejected

    • Sandhu separately contended that amounts paid by the original allottees, the Kharatmols, should also be treated as part of his payment to the developer.
    • The Appellate Tribunal had rejected this claim after finding that the Kharatmols’ β‚Ή12.30 lakh had been returned to them and that there was no sufficient documentary evidence to establish that Sandhu had paid the promoter more than his own booking amount of β‚Ή12.30 lakh.
    • The High Court agreed.
    • It noted that the fresh allotment letter dated 11 July 2013 recorded a total consideration of β‚Ή48.75 lakh and payment of only β‚Ή12.30 lakh by Sandhu. It contained no provision for adjusting the earlier allottees’ consideration.
    • The allottee’s own email of 30 June 2019, in which he stated that approximately β‚Ή33 lakh remained payable out of the β‚Ή48.75 lakh consideration, also undermined the assertion that β‚Ή28.75 lakh had already been paid.

    Significance of the Judgment

    The ruling is significant because it demonstrates that Section 13 of RERA cannot be applied in isolation from the conduct of the parties and the factual circumstances preventing execution of the Agreement for Sale.

    Where a promoter is demonstrably ready to execute the agreement and repeatedly calls upon an allottee to complete necessary statutory formalities, an allottee’s own failure to pay stamp duty and registration charges can become material in determining whether subsequent termination is justified. At the same time, the judgment makes an equally important distinction between valid termination of an allotment and entitlement to retain the buyer’s money. Even though JP Builders succeeded on the legality of the cancellation, the High Court did not permit it to forfeit the β‚Ή12.30 lakh booking amount and preserved interest in favour of the allottee.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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  • Bombay HC: Section 49 Purchase Notice Cannot Be Rejected for Want of Development Application Where Landowner Invokes Clauses (a) and (e) of MRTP Act

    Bombay HC: Section 49 Purchase Notice Cannot Be Rejected for Want of Development Application Where Landowner Invokes Clauses (a) and (e) of MRTP Act

    Date: 24.09.2026

    In an important ruling concerning land reservation and Purchase Notices under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (MRTP Act), the Bombay High Court has held that a Purchase Notice issued under Sections 49(1)(a) and 49(1)(e) cannot be rejected merely because the landowner had not first submitted a development application to the Planning Authority.

    The Division Bench of Justices R.I. Chagla and Firdosh P. Pooniwalla quashed the Director of Town Planning’s order dated 9 September 2024 rejecting the Purchase Notice issued by Devi Construction LLP and directed the authority to decide the notice afresh on merits, without insisting upon an application under Section 49(2).

    Dispute Over Land Reserved for Garden

    • Devi Construction LLP owns property bearing Bhumapan No. 107/B at Village Vadgaon, measuring approximately 2.10 hectares or 21,000 sq. metres.
    • On 28 February 2024, Vadgaon Nagar Panchayat, acting as the Planning Authority under the MRTP Act, published a Draft Development Plan under Section 26. Under the draft plan, 12,290 sq. metres of the petitioner’s property was reserved for a Garden under Reservation No. 40.
    • The developer objected to the reservation through a letter dated 12 March 2024. Three days later, on 15 March 2024, it issued a Purchase Notice under Section 49, specifically invoking Sections 49(1)(a) and 49(1)(e).

    Director of Town Planning Rejected Purchase Notice

    • The Director of Town Planning rejected the Purchase Notice on 9 September 2024.
    • The rejection was based on the view that Section 49(2) required the Purchase Notice to be accompanied by a copy of an application made to the Planning Authority along with any order or decision passed on such application.
    • Devi Construction challenged this interpretation before the Bombay High Court, contending that Section 49(2) had been incorrectly applied to a Purchase Notice founded upon Sections 49(1)(a) and (e).

    What Does Section 49 of the MRTP Act Provide?

    Section 49 creates a statutory mechanism enabling a landowner or affected person, in specified circumstances, to require the appropriate authority to purchase an interest in land affected by planning restrictions.

    Among the circumstances contemplated by Section 49(1):

    • Clause (a) concerns land designated by a plan as subject to compulsory acquisition.
    • Clause (e) applies where, because of the designation or allocation of land in a plan, the owner claims that the property cannot be sold except at a price lower than what could reasonably have been obtained had the designation or allocation not existed.
    • Section 49(2), meanwhile, states that the Purchase Notice shall be accompanied by a copy of any application made by the applicant to the Planning Authority and any order or decision of that authority or the State Government in respect of which the notice is given.
    • The dispute therefore centred on whether Section 49(2) makes such a prior application mandatory in every case under Section 49(1).

    Developer: Section 49(1) Contemplates Independent Situations

    • Devi Construction argued that the various situations contemplated under Sections 49(1)(a) to (e) are mutually exclusive and independent.
    • According to the petitioner, a prior development application becomes relevant where the Purchase Notice arises from a refusal of development permission or permission granted subject to conditions, as contemplated by Section 49(1)(d).
    • But where the landowner invokes Section 49(1)(e) because the planning reservation or designation has itself depressed the property’s saleability or value, no separate development application is required.
    • The petitioner also invoked Article 300A of the Constitution, arguing that the purpose of Section 49 is to prevent a landowner from being deprived of the enjoyment and value of property merely because of a planning reservation.

    State: Prior Application Was Mandatory

    • The State authorities defended the rejection.
    • They argued that a Purchase Notice under Section 49(1) must be accompanied by the documents referred to in Section 49(2). According to the State, Devi Construction was required to lodge a claim before the Municipal Council concerning its inability to obtain a reasonable price and submit a copy along with the Purchase Notice.
    • Since this had not been done, the authorities maintained that the Purchase Notice had been correctly rejected.

    Bombay HC: Issue Already Settled by Aone Land Developers

    • The High Court rejected the State’s interpretation and held that the issue was no longer res integra.
    • The Bench relied substantially upon Aone Land Developers v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 9845.
    • In Aone Land Developers, the Bombay High Court had interpreted Section 49(2) to mean that the requirement of accompanying a Purchase Notice with a prior application applies where such an application was actually made and resulted in an order or decision.
    • Section 49(2), therefore, cannot be mechanically extended to every independent contingency contained in Section 49(1).

    Each Contingency Under Section 49(1) Is Independent

    • The Court reiterated that Section 49(1) contains several independent circumstances capable of triggering the statutory right to issue a Purchase Notice.
    • The use of the word β€œor” between the different clauses supports a disjunctive reading of the provision.
    • In particular, Section 49(1)(e) creates an independent situation where the landowner claims that, because of designation or allocation under a plan, the land cannot be sold except at a lower price.
    • That situation does not depend upon the landowner first applying for development permission and having that permission refused or conditionally granted.

    Section 49(2) Does Not Create a Universal Prior-Application Requirement

    • The Court emphasized that Section 49(2) is not to be interpreted as imposing an independent requirement that every landowner must first make a development application before invoking Section 49.
    • The earlier Aone Land Developers judgment had specifically held that Section 49(2) applies to a situation where an application was made to the Planning Authority and an order or decision arose from that application.
    • It cannot be read as imposing the same requirement upon every contingency enumerated under Section 49(1).

    Court Also Relies on Gopal Kashinath Lad

    • The Division Bench also relied upon Gopal Kashinath Lad v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., in which the Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay High Court had followed Aone Land Developers.
    • That decision similarly held that where a Purchase Notice is based solely upon Section 49(1)(e), insisting upon a prior development application under Section 49(2) is unnecessary.
    • If no such application was made and consequently no decision exists, there is simply no question of annexing a non-existent application or decision to the Purchase Notice.
    • The Court quoted the earlier ruling to reiterate that the contingencies under Section 49(1)(e) and the documentary requirement under Section 49(2) operate independently in such circumstances.

    Purchase Notice Under Sections 49(1)(a) and (e) Was Maintainable Without Prior Application

    • Applying those principles to Devi Construction, the Bombay High Court noted that the Purchase Notice had specifically been issued under both Sections 49(1)(a) and 49(1)(e).
    • Section 49(1)(a) applies where land is designated by a plan as subject to compulsory acquisition, while Section 49(1)(e) addresses the situation where designation or allocation causes the owner to be unable to sell the property except at a lower price.
    • The Court held that neither situation required Devi Construction to first submit an application to the Planning Authority or obtain an order or decision on such application.
    • Accordingly, the Purchase Notice dated 15 March 2024 was not required to be accompanied by an application under Section 49(2).

    Director’s Rejection Held Incorrect

    • Since the Director of Town Planning had rejected the Purchase Notice specifically because it was not accompanied by an application contemplated under Section 49(2), the High Court held that the reason for rejection was legally incorrect.
    • The order dated 9 September 2024 was therefore quashed and set aside.

    Important: Court Did Not Itself Confirm the Purchase Notice

    • An important distinction in the judgment is that although Devi Construction succeeded in challenging the rejection order, the High Court did not itself finally confirm the Purchase Notice.
    • Instead, it directed the Director of Town Planning to reconsider and decide the Purchase Notice on its own merits under Sections 49(1)(a) and (e), without insisting upon a Section 49(2) application.
    • The authority has been directed to complete this exercise within six weeks from the date of uploading of the High Court’s order.
    • Thus, the judgment represents a clear procedural and statutory-interpretation victory for Devi Construction, while the substantive merits of its Purchase Notice remain for determination by the competent authority.

    What Happens After Confirmation of a Purchase Notice?

    • Section 49 itself contains an important consequence where a Purchase Notice is confirmed.
    • Under Section 49(7), if the appropriate authority fails within one year from confirmation of the Purchase Notice to make the required application to acquire the land under Section 126, the relevant reservation, designation, allotment, indication or restriction on development is deemed to lapse.
    • The land is then deemed released and becomes available to the owner for development otherwise permissible for adjacent land under the relevant plan.
    • That statutory consequence was part of the Section 49 framework considered by the Court; however, the present judgment does not hold that the Garden Reservation over Devi Construction’s property has already lapsed.

    Key Takeaway

    The Bombay High Court’s ruling clarifies that Section 49(2) of the MRTP Act does not impose a blanket requirement that every Purchase Notice must be preceded by a development application to the Planning Authority.

    Where a landowner invokes the independent contingencies under Sections 49(1)(a) and 49(1)(e), the Purchase Notice cannot be rejected merely because no such application or consequent order has been annexed. For landowners whose properties are affected by reservations or designations in development plans, the judgment is significant because it prevents authorities from imposing a procedural precondition that the Court found is not required by the statutory scheme.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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  • Supreme Court: State Cannot Raise New Defence at Award-Challenge Stage When It Was Never Taken Before Arbitrator

    Supreme Court: State Cannot Raise New Defence at Award-Challenge Stage When It Was Never Taken Before Arbitrator

    Date: 24.09.2026

    The Supreme Court of India, while deciding a dispute arising from the construction and operation of the Bharatpur bypass in Rajasthan, held that an arbitral tribunal cannot travel beyond its terms of reference and that a contractor cannot recover toll-based compensation for expenditure it never incurred.

    The Court recognised the contractor’s contractual right to collect tolls on the Bharatpur–Deeg section of the project. However, it also found that the contractor had failed to execute the second phase of the project and that this failure was material to determining its financial entitlement.

    Accordingly, the Supreme Court referred two issues back to the arbitral tribunal for reconsideration. It limited the contractor’s immediate entitlement to β‚Ή26.34 lakh, with 10% interest, for the delay in issuing the traffic-restriction notification, subject to adjustment or prior payment.

    Background: The Bharatpur Bypass BOT Project

    • The dispute originated in September 1997, when the Public Works Department of Rajasthan decided to construct a bypass connecting Bharatpur and Mathura to divert traffic away from the congested market area of Bharatpur.
    • The project was awarded on a Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) basis. It covered approximately 10.85 kilometres, comprising 9.6 kilometres of new construction and 1.25 kilometres of widening and strengthening of the existing Bharatpur–Deeg Road.
    • MSK Projects submitted a bid of β‚Ή13.25 crore, which the State accepted in February 1998. The parties subsequently entered into a concession agreement on 19 August 1998, granting the contractor the right to collect tolls during a concession period of 111 months, including construction.
    • The contractor completed the bypass on 10 April 2000 and began collecting tolls on 28 April 2000. However, agitation by local residents and difficulties in diverting commercial vehicles through the bypass affected toll collection.
    • The State issued a notification dated 1 September 2000 restricting the entry of vehicles into Bharatpur city, with effect from 1 October 2000. The contractor subsequently invoked arbitration, alleging delay in issuing and implementing the notification and disputing its entitlement to collect tolls from vehicles using the Bharatpur–Deeg section.

    Arbitral Tribunal Awarded β‚Ή9.90 Crore With 18% Interest

    • On 1 December 2003, the arbitral tribunal ruled in favour of MSK Projects.
    • It held that the State had delayed issuing and implementing the traffic-restriction notification and that the contractor was entitled to collect tolls from vehicles using the Bharatpur–Deeg portion of the road.
    • The tribunal directed the State to pay approximately β‚Ή9.90 crore for losses assessed up to 31 December 2003, together with interest at 18% from that date.
    • The State challenged the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The District Judge set it aside, holding, among other things, that the concession agreement did not expressly require the State to issue a notification prohibiting vehicles from entering Bharatpur city. The District Judge also reduced the interest rate from 18% to 10%.
    • On appeal, the Rajasthan High Court recognised the contractor’s right to collect tolls on the Bharatpur–Deeg section but rejected compensation based on an alleged obligation to issue the traffic-diversion notification. It maintained the reduced interest rate. Both parties subsequently approached the Supreme Court.

    Arbitrator Cannot Decide Matters Beyond the Reference

    • One of the principal questions before the Supreme Court concerned the limits of an arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction.
    • The Court explained that an arbitral tribunal derives its authority from the reference made to it. It cannot materially enlarge that reference or decide matters outside its jurisdiction.
    • At the same time, the Court distinguished between an error in interpreting a contract, which may fall within an arbitrator’s jurisdiction, and deciding a matter that the parties never referred to arbitration, which constitutes a jurisdictional error.
    • Applying those principles, the Supreme Court noted that Rajasthan had not raised, during arbitration, the defence that it had never agreed to issue the traffic-restriction notification. The dispute framed before the tribunal concerned the delay in issuing and implementing that notification.
    • The District Judge and the High Court had therefore erred in deciding the case on a defence that the State had not taken before the arbitral tribunal.

    Contractor Entitled to Collect Toll on Bharatpur–Deeg Section

    • The State separately argued that the 1.25-kilometre Bharatpur–Deeg stretch was not part of the tollable project because it was an existing road rather than a newly constructed bypass.
    • The Supreme Court rejected that argument.
    • It examined the bid documents, traffic-survey data, pre-bid clarifications and concession agreement. These established that the Bharatpur–Deeg stretch formed an integral part of the composite project.
    • The Court also noted that the contractor had widened and strengthened the existing road. It was not a temporary service road intended to provide free passage during construction.
    • Consequently, the contractor’s right to collect tolls from vehicles using this section was upheld.

    Toll Collection Must Remain Compensatory

    • The judgment also examined the legal character of toll collection.
    • Referring to the Indian Tolls Act, 1851 and the applicable statutory notification dated 10 February 1997, the Supreme Court explained that tolls are compensatory in nature. They are intended to recover the costs of constructing and maintaining infrastructure, together with permissible interest and collection expenses.
    • The Court emphasised that toll collection cannot become an unrestricted source of revenue unrelated to the costs of the project.
    • This distinction was particularly important because MSK Projects had undertaken to execute the project in two phases, but the second phase had never been completed.

    Failure to Execute Second Phase Was Material to Compensation

    • The project documents contemplated an investment of approximately β‚Ή10.45 crore in Phase I and β‚Ή3.55 crore in Phase II.
    • The second phase involved repairs, maintenance and laying an additional bitumen layer over the road. The Supreme Court noted that MSK Projects had admittedly not executed this phase.
    • The Court further observed that the contractor had recovered its first-phase investment, together with some profit, although the precise amount of toll revenue collected had not been disclosed.
    • In these circumstances, the contractor could not claim compensation calculated on the entire projected investment of β‚Ή13.25 crore when it had not actually incurred the expenditure contemplated for Phase II.
    • The State had raised the non-execution of Phase II in its counter-affidavit before the Supreme Court. The contractor responded that the issue had not formed part of the original arbitration proceedings. The Court noted that there was no specific denial of the underlying allegation that the second phase remained unexecuted.
    • Although the issue arose after the original arbitral award and could not have been determined within that reference, the Supreme Court considered it necessary to examine its financial consequences to avoid awarding compensation disconnected from the contractor’s actual investment.

    Interest Reduced From 18% to 10%

    • The contractor also challenged the reduction of interest from 18% to 10%, arguing that the contractual arrangements contemplated a higher interest rate.
    • The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the reduced rate.
    • Referring to the Interest Act, 1978 and its earlier decisions, the Court explained that interest must be determined with regard to the circumstances of the case and the prevailing economic environment. It noted that interest rates had changed substantially following economic reforms.
    • The Court therefore maintained the 10% interest rate fixed by the courts below.

    Supreme Court’s Final Decision

    The Supreme Court did not restore the original arbitral award of β‚Ή9.90 crore. Instead, it directed the arbitral tribunal to reconsider two specific questions:

    1. What amount could the contractor legitimately have recovered from vehicles using the Bharatpur–Deeg section?
    2. What was the effect on the concession agreement as a whole of the contractor’s failure to execute Phase II?

    The Court requested the tribunal to decide these questions expeditiously after giving both parties an opportunity to be heard.

    It further held that MSK Projects was entitled to β‚Ή26.34 lakh for the delay in issuing the traffic-restriction notification, together with 10% interest, unless already paid. The amount could also be adjusted in the final accounts.

    Both appeals were disposed of without costs.

    Legal Significance

    The judgment addresses two distinct principles relevant to infrastructure contracts and commercial arbitration.

    First, an arbitral tribunal must remain within the scope of the dispute referred to it. Equally, a party cannot ordinarily introduce an entirely new defence at the judicial challenge stage and seek to overturn an award on that basis.

    Second, compensation under a BOT concession must be examined in light of the governing contract, statutory framework and expenditure actually incurred. A contractor’s entitlement to collect tolls does not, by itself, establish entitlement to recover the cost of contractual works that were never executed.

    The decision also illustrates the distinction between recognising a contractor’s contractual right and determining the amount ultimately payable under that right. In this case, the Supreme Court upheld the right to collect tolls on the disputed road section while leaving the financial consequences of the unexecuted second phase for further adjudication.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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  • Karnataka High Court Grants Bail to Accused Who Missed Trial Dates; Says He Was β€œSufficiently Punished” by Return to Custody

    Karnataka High Court Grants Bail to Accused Who Missed Trial Dates; Says He Was β€œSufficiently Punished” by Return to Custody

    Date: 24.09.2026

    The Karnataka High Court has granted regular bail to an accused who had earlier been released on bail but was subsequently taken back into judicial custody after failing to appear before the Trial Court on regular hearing dates.

    Justice S. Vishwajith Shetty observed that the accused had already been granted bail on the merits of the criminal case and had no other criminal antecedents. Noting that he had remained in custody after his presence was secured before the Trial Court, the High Court held that β€œfor the mistake committed by the petitioner, he has been sufficiently punished” and ordered his release on bail subject to stringent conditions.

    Background of the Case

    • The petitioner, Mohammed Shahid, is Accused No. 8 in S.C. No. 5065/2025, pending before the IV Additional District and Sessions Judge, Shivamogga, sitting at Bhadravathi.
    • The prosecution arose from Crime No. 12/2025 registered by Paper Town Police Station, Shivamogga for offences punishable under Sections 132, 121(1), 109(1), 61 and 58(b) of the BNS, 2023, along with Sections 3 and 25(1B) of the Arms Act, 1959.
    • The present petition was filed under Section 483 of the BNSS, 2023, seeking regular bail. The petition’s introductory portion also records the proceeding as one under Section 439 CrPC, filed under Section 483 BNSS.

    Accused Had Already Been Granted Bail in 2025

    • A crucial factor in the High Court’s decision was that this was not the petitioner’s first application for bail on the merits.
    • Mohammed Shahid had been arrested at the crime stage on 27 February 2025. He subsequently approached the Karnataka High Court and was granted regular bail in Criminal Petition No. 9948/2025 by an order dated 20 August 2025.
    • Thus, his entitlement to bail on the merits of the underlying criminal case had already been considered by the High Court.

    Failure to Appear Before Trial Court Led to Fresh Custody

    • After obtaining bail, however, the petitioner failed to appear before the Trial Court on the regular dates fixed for hearing.
    • Consequently, coercive steps were initiated against him. His presence was ultimately secured before the Trial Court on 13 July 2026, following which he was remanded to judicial custody.
    • The petitioner then filed another bail application before the Trial Court in S.C. No. 5065/2025. That application was rejected on 11 August 2026, prompting him to once again approach the Karnataka High Court.

    No Other Criminal Antecedents

    • During the hearing, counsel appearing for Mohammed Shahid submitted that the petitioner had no other criminal antecedents.
    • Significantly, the High Court Government Pleader appearing for the State did not dispute this assertion.
    • The absence of other criminal antecedents became relevant when the Court considered whether continued incarceration was necessary merely because of the petitioner’s earlier non-appearance.

    Bail on Merits Had Already Been Granted

    • The High Court emphasised that Mohammed Shahid had already secured regular bail on the merits of the criminal case through the Court’s earlier order dated 20 August 2025.
    • His return to custody was therefore not because the Court had subsequently found him undeserving of bail on the substantive allegations. Rather, the immediate reason was his failure to attend the Trial Court regularly.

    Justice Shetty recorded:

    • β€œOnly for the reason that petitioner had not appeared before the Trial Court on the regular dates of hearing, he has now been arrested and remanded to judicial custody…”
    • The Court therefore distinguished the underlying merits of the bail claim from the petitioner’s subsequent breach concerning his appearance before the Trial Court.

    β€œFor the Mistake Committed, He Has Been Sufficiently Punished”: Karnataka HC

    • The central observation in the order came while considering whether the petitioner should continue to remain in judicial custody for his failure to appear.

    The High Court observed:

    • β€œFor the mistake committed by the petitioner, he has been sufficiently punished.”
    • On that basis, and taking into account the earlier grant of bail on merits and the absence of disputed criminal antecedents, the Court allowed the petition and directed that Mohammed Shahid be released on regular bail.
    • The ruling therefore does not excuse the petitioner’s previous failure to attend the Trial Court. Instead, the Court considered the period of renewed custody sufficient in the circumstances and restored his liberty subject to conditions specifically designed to ensure his future attendance and compliance.

    High Court Imposes β‚Ή1 Lakh Bond and Two Sureties

    • The grant of bail was accompanied by several conditions.
    • The petitioner was directed to execute a personal bond of β‚Ή1,00,000 with two sureties for the like sum, to the satisfaction of the jurisdictional court.
    • Given that his earlier non-appearance had resulted in his return to custody, the High Court expressly directed him to appear regularly on every date of hearing before the Trial Court, unless his personal appearance is exempted for valid reasons.
    • The Court further restrained him from directly or indirectly threatening or tampering with prosecution witnesses and directed that he should not involve himself in similar offences in the future.
    • Finally, he was prohibited from leaving the jurisdiction of the Trial Court without its permission until disposal of the criminal case.

    What the Order Means

    • The ruling is important in the context of bail cancellation, non-appearance and subsequent applications for restoration of liberty.
    • The order indicates that failure to attend trial dates can legitimately result in coercive steps and renewed custody. At the same time, where an accused had already been granted bail on merits, has no other criminal antecedents, and has undergone further incarceration because of the default, continued detention is not necessarily required indefinitely.
    • The High Court’s approach also shows that the consequences of earlier non-appearance can be addressed through stricter bail conditions, particularly a specific obligation to attend future hearings, restrictions on leaving the Trial Court’s jurisdiction and safeguards against witness intimidation.
    • Importantly, the order does not decide the guilt or innocence of Mohammed Shahid in the pending criminal case. The prosecution under the BNS and Arms Act continues before the Sessions Court; the High Court’s ruling is confined to his entitlement to regular bail.

    Final Order

    The Karnataka High Court allowed Criminal Petition No. 13175 of 2026 and directed that Mohammed Shahid be enlarged on bail in S.C. No. 5065/2025 arising from Crime No. 12/2025 of Paper Town Police Station. His release is subject to the β‚Ή1 lakh personal bond with two sureties and the conditions concerning regular attendance, witnesses, future conduct and restriction on leaving the Trial Court’s jurisdiction.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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  • CESTAT Chennai: Customs Cannot Reclassify 226 Auto Parts Without Product-Wise Evidence

    CESTAT Chennai: Customs Cannot Reclassify 226 Auto Parts Without Product-Wise Evidence

    Date: 24.09.2026

    In a significant ruling on customs classification, self-assessment, extended limitation and evidentiary standards in adjudication, the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), Chennai has allowed the appeal of Toyota Kirloskar Motor Pvt. Ltd. and set aside in entirety an adjudication order that had confirmed a differential customs duty demand of β‚Ή23.17 crore, imposed a β‚Ή17 crore redemption fine, and levied an equivalent penalty under Section 114A of the Customs Act, 1962.

    The Tribunal held that the Customs Department had β€œwholly failed” to discharge the burden of proving its proposed reclassification of 226 imported automobile parts. It further held that a quasi-judicial authority cannot proceed on a presumption of guilt or use material that was never properly placed on record and disclosed to the importer.

    The Dispute: Classification of Toyota’s Imported Automobile Parts

    • Toyota Kirloskar Motor Pvt. Ltd., the Indian subsidiary of Toyota Motor Corporation, Japan, imported various parts and accessories for passenger and multi-utility vehicles from Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines during 2017–2022.
    • The goods included items such as Guard Propeller Shaft, Panel Assy Instrument Panel Finish Lwr, Frame Assy RR, Tank Assembly Fuel and Battery Door Control. Toyota declared the goods principally under Customs Tariff Item (CTI) 87089900 and availed a concessional 5% Basic Customs Duty under S. No. 1478 of Notification No. 46/2011-Customs on the strength of Certificates of Origin under the ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement (AIFTA). Significantly, Customs did not question the genuineness of those certificates.
    • Following an investigation by the Special Intelligence and Investigation Branch (SIIB), Customs proposed reclassification of 226 parts, principally under CTI 87082900 as β€œparts and accessories of bodies” of motor vehicles, along with certain other headings.

    Commissioner Confirmed β‚Ή23.17 Crore Demand

    The Commissioner rejected Toyota’s self-assessment and ordered reassessment of the disputed goods. As a consequence of the reclassification, the benefit of Notification No. 46/2011-Customs was denied.

    The Commissioner confirmed:

    ParticularsAmount / Action
    Differential Customs Dutyβ‚Ή23,17,45,224
    InterestUnder Section 28AA
    Value of goods held liable to confiscationβ‚Ή170,37,12,914
    Redemption Fineβ‚Ή17,00,00,000
    PenaltyEquivalent to duty plus applicable interest under Section 114A
    ConfiscationSections 111(m) & 111(o)
    • The Department invoked the extended period under Section 28(4) on allegations of collusion, wilful misstatement and suppression of facts.
    • Toyota challenged the order before CESTAT.

    Revenue Bears the Burden of Proving Reclassification

    • The Tribunal placed considerable emphasis on the fundamental principle that where Customs seeks to reject an importer’s declared classification and substitute another tariff entry, the burden of establishing the proposed classification lies upon Revenue.
    • Referring to Supreme Court precedents including Hindustan Ferodo Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, H.P.L. Chemicals Ltd., Hindustan Lever Ltd. and D.L. Steels, CESTAT observed that the burden does not shift merely because an importer does not rebut the Department’s material. Revenue must first produce sufficient evidence capable of displacing the declared classification.
    • The Tribunal also reiterated that classification must begin with Rule 1 of the General Rules for Interpretation, by examining the terms of the tariff headings together with the relevant Section and Chapter Notes. HSN Explanatory Notes provide important guidance in resolving classification disputes.

    Examining 15 Parts Cannot Justify Reclassification of 226 Parts

    • A crucial defect identified by CESTAT was the manner in which the Department dealt with the 226 disputed articles.
    • According to the Tribunal, the adjudicating authority examined only about 15 articles and effectively extended those conclusions across the entire list of 226 goods.
    • CESTAT found no article-specific determination identifying the objective characteristics of each imported product, matching those characteristics with CTI 87082900 and explaining why the particular article constituted a β€œpart or accessory of a body” rather than a part or accessory of a motor vehicle generally.
    • The Tribunal memorably observed that merely listing parts against a proposed tariff item, placing them alongside technical write-ups and stating that their usage had been read on Toyota’s website amounted to a statement of the chargeβ€”not proof of the charge and not a substitute for adjudication.

    β‚Ή23 Crore Demand Cannot Rest on Website Material Never Placed on Record

    • CESTAT was particularly critical of the Department’s reliance on information allegedly appearing on Toyota’s website.
    • Neither the show-cause notice nor the adjudication order reproduced even a single line of the relied-upon website material. No screenshot, printout or certified copy was placed on record or included among the relied-upon documents.
    • Relying on the principle of natural justice laid down in Dhakeshwari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, the Tribunal held that a quasi-judicial authority must disclose material gathered against a person and give that person an opportunity to meet it.

    The Tribunal stated:

    • β€œA demand of Rs.23.17 crore cannot be founded upon a document which the authority has not reproduced, not exhibited and not put to the noticee.”
    • It further held that treating Toyota’s alleged failure to rebut undisclosed material as proof effectively inverted the legal burden resting upon Revenue.

    Quasi-Judicial Authority Cannot Begin With Presumption of Guilt

    • The Tribunal also objected to observations in the adjudication order concerning Toyota’s alleged non-appearance during investigation and the relationship between Toyota and its overseas supplier.
    • It held that no provision of the Customs Act treats non-appearance during investigation as an admission of the allegations.

    More importantly, CESTAT stated that:

    • β€œA quasi judicial authority is not at liberty to begin with a presumption of guilt and then treat the absence of exculpation as proof.”
    • The Tribunal emphasized that a person must be proceeded against on evidence and not suspicion.

    Toyota’s CTI 87089900 Classification Allowed to Stand

    • Having found that Revenue failed to establish its proposed classification, CESTAT held that Toyota’s declared classification under CTI 87089900 for the 226 articles in Annexure A would continue to hold the field.
    • The Tribunal clarified that it was not itself determining whether some third tariff heading might theoretically be more appropriate. On the evidentiary record before it, undertaking classification of 226 individual products for the first time at the appellate stage would amount to creating a case that had never been properly made by the Department.
    • CESTAT relied on the principle that where Revenue’s proposed alternative classification fails, the importer’s classification continues to operate in the absence of a properly established alternative.

    AIFTA Concessional Duty Benefit Restored

    • Since denial of the concessional rate under S. No. 1478 of Notification No. 46/2011-Customs dated 1 June 2011 was merely consequential to the Department’s proposed reclassification, that denial also collapsed.
    • Accordingly, CESTAT held that Toyota was entitled to the notification benefit in respect of the 226 Annexure A articles covered by its findings.
    • The Tribunal did not find it necessary to decide Toyota’s alternative arguments concerning the procedure under the AIFTA Rules of Origin or revenue neutrality of the IGST component.

    CESTAT Flags Judicial Indiscipline by Customs

    • Another significant aspect of the decision concerns judicial discipline within the Customs administration.
    • CESTAT noted that in an earlier dispute involving the same importer and the same tariff heading, it had already held that the burden of proving reclassification rested upon Revenue.
    • The impugned order was nevertheless passed by the same Commissionerate without distinguishingβ€”or even referring toβ€”the earlier Tribunal ruling.
    • Referring to the Supreme Court’s decision in Union of India v. Kamalakshi Finance Corporation Ltd., CESTAT reiterated that orders of appellate authorities are binding upon subordinate Revenue authorities. Ignoring such orders can lead to harassment of assessees and uncertainty in tax administration.
    • The Tribunal observed that independence of mind in adjudication β€œis not a licence to disregard a declaration of law by the forum to which one’s orders are amenable in appeal.”

    Extended Limitation Under Section 28(4) Rejected

    • The Department had invoked the extended limitation period alleging collusion, wilful misstatement and suppression.
    • CESTAT held that Section 28(4) is not a general recovery mechanism. Its extended period becomes available only when the statutory ingredientsβ€”such as collusion, wilful misstatement or suppressionβ€”are actually established.
    • The Tribunal found the Department’s case internally contradictory. The allegations were based substantially on technical write-ups and photographs supplied by Toyota itself and information said to have been published on Toyota’s own website. Material voluntarily furnished or publicly disclosed could not simultaneously be characterised as having been suppressed from Customs.
    • The Tribunal also held that where the goods are correctly described in the Bill of Entry, merely choosing a tariff classification subsequently disputed by Customs does not, by itself, constitute suppression or misdeclaration.

    Voluntary Duty Payment Cannot Be Treated as Evidence of Evasion

    • The Tribunal also criticised the adjudicating authority’s treatment of approximately β‚Ή3.84 crore voluntarily paid by Toyota.
    • Instead of appropriately reconciling and crediting the payments while quantifying the liability, the adjudicating authority had treated Toyota’s voluntary payment as further supporting the Department’s allegations.
    • CESTAT rejected this approach, observing that treating voluntary payment of duty as corroboration of an intention to evade would undermine the self-assessment system under Sections 17 and 46 of the Customs Act.

    Corrigendum Cannot Be Used to Enlarge a Show-Cause Notice

    • The dispute also involved a corrigendum dated 4 July 2024, which replaced Annexure C, altered invoice and product serial numbers, revised the demand and introduced 14 additional articles spread across 81 Bills of Entry.
    • CESTAT held that a corrigendum is intended to correct clerical or arithmetic mistakes; it cannot be used to enlarge the scope of a show-cause notice to the detriment of the noticee.
    • Where the corrigendum effectively introduces a fresh case, limitation must be reckoned from the date of the corrigendum. Consequently, clearances of the newly introduced articles before 4 July 2019 fell outside even the five-year outer limit.

    Confiscation Under Sections 111(m) and 111(o) Set Aside

    • CESTAT also rejected confiscation of the imported goods.
    • It held that Section 111(m) was not attracted because neither the description nor the value of the goods was alleged to be false. The dispute concerned the selection of the tariff item.
    • Similarly, Section 111(o) could not apply merely because Customs considered the goods ineligible for the exemption. The Certificates of Origin were never alleged to be non-genuine, and no specific condition of the exemption notification was shown to have been violated.

    β‚Ή17 Crore Redemption Fine Also Falls

    • Once the legal basis for confiscation disappeared, the β‚Ή17 crore redemption fine under Section 125 could not survive because redemption fine is imposed in lieu of confiscation.
    • The Tribunal additionally observed that even if confiscation had otherwise been valid, the quantum of β‚Ή17 crore was indefensible because the statutory ceiling under Section 125 depends upon the market price of the confiscated goods, whereas there had been no market-price enquiry.

    Section 114A Penalty and Section 28AA Interest Quashed

    • The penalty under Section 114A, equivalent to the duty determined together with interest, was also set aside.
    • Since CESTAT found that the demand itself could not survive and that the ingredients necessary for invoking the extended period were absent, the corresponding penalty necessarily failed.
    • The consequential interest demand under Section 28AA was also set aside.

    What About the 114 Articles in Annexure B?

    • The Tribunal drew an important distinction regarding another 114 articles listed in Annexure B.
    • For those goods, Toyota itself had proposed revised classification, Customs had accepted it, and Toyota had already paid differential duty with interest for part of the relevant period. Accordingly, CESTAT did not disturb their classification.
    • The surviving issue was essentially one of limitation, quantification and adjustment of amounts already paid.
    • While setting aside the existing demand, the Tribunal left it open to the proper officer to determine, subject to limitation, whether any short payment survives after verification and appropriation of amounts already paid and after giving Toyota an opportunity of hearing.

    Final Decision: Toyota Wins the Appeal

    CESTAT ultimately set aside Order-in-Original No. 109978/2024 dated 22 October 2024 in its entirety and allowed Toyota’s appeal with consequential reliefs in law.

    The principal consequences are:

    • Toyota’s declared CTI 87089900 classification for the 226 Annexure A articles holds the field, subject to the qualification recorded by the Tribunal;
    • Benefit of S. No. 1478 of Notification No. 46/2011-Customs is available for those imports;
    • β‚Ή23,17,45,224 differential duty demand set aside;
    • Section 28AA interest set aside;
    • confiscation under Sections 111(m) and 111(o) set aside;
    • β‚Ή17 crore redemption fine under Section 125 set aside; and
    • Section 114A penalty set aside.

    For the 114 Annexure B articles, however, the Department may determine any surviving short payment strictly in accordance with law and limitation after verifying and appropriating Toyota’s earlier payments.

    Why This Ruling Is Significant for Importers

    The decision reinforces several important principles governing customs adjudication. Self-assessment cannot be displaced merely by assertion; the burden of proving reclassification remains with Revenue. Technical evidence must be analysed product-by-product where classification depends upon individual characteristics. Material gathered from websites or elsewhere cannot be relied upon without putting it on record and giving the importer an opportunity to respond.

    Equally significant is CESTAT’s treatment of limitation: a classification dispute does not automatically become suppression, particularly when the description of the imported goods has been correctly declared and the Department’s own case rests on information supplied by the importer. The ruling also sends a clear message on judicial discipline: adjudicating authorities cannot simply disregard binding appellate decisions concerning the same issue and the same assessee.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Notice Under Section 132 Mandatory Before Treating Trademark Application as β€˜Abandoned’

    Notice Under Section 132 Mandatory Before Treating Trademark Application as β€˜Abandoned’

    Date: 23.09.2026

    The Delhi High Court has held that a trademark application cannot be treated as β€œabandoned” under Section 132 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 without first issuing a notice to the applicant requiring it to remedy the alleged default within a specified period.

    Justice Jyoti Singh allowed an appeal filed by RITES Limited, formerly Rail India Technical and Economic Service Limited, against an order of the Registrar of Trade Marks dated 25 November 2025, which had treated RITES’ trademark application as abandoned.

    The Court held that notice under Section 132 is a β€œsine qua non” before an application can be declared abandoned and found that the Registrar’s action in the present case was legally untenable because RITES had not been given the statutory opportunity to rectify the alleged default.

    RITES Sought Registration of Its Trademark in Class 37

    • According to the order, RITES commenced use of the trademark β€œRITES” on 26 March 2008 in relation to construction, infrastructure consultancy and allied services.
    • On 25 May 2023, the company filed Trademark Application No. 5951147 in Class 37 seeking registration of the mark.
    • A hearing notice was subsequently issued on 12 September 2025 and the matter came up before the Hearing Officer on 12 November 2025.
    • The dispute arose over the filing of additional documents intended to substantiate RITES’ claimed use of the mark from 26 March 2008.

    Hearing Officer Informally Indicated Filing of Additional Documents

    • RITES contended that during the hearing on 12 November 2025, the Hearing Officer had informally indicated that additional documents should be filed.
    • However, according to the High Court’s record, no written direction was passed and no timeline was fixed for filing those documents.
    • The very next day, on 13 November 2025, RITES uploaded the additional documents.
    • A technical/clerical error, however, resulted in those documents being uploaded against a related trademark application instead of the application presently under consideration.

    Registrar Treated Trademark Application as β€˜Abandoned’

    • On 25 November 2025, the Registrar of Trade Marks treated RITES’ application as abandoned.
    • The impugned order proceeded on the basis that RITES had been required to file documents supporting its claim of use from 26 March 2008 within two days, but had failed to do so even after 12 days.
    • RITES challenged that decision before the Delhi High Court under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

    RITES: Documents Were Filed Next Day, But Against Wrong Application

    • Before the High Court, RITES argued that the Registrar had wrongly treated its application as abandoned and had failed to give any cogent reason apart from the alleged non-filing of documents within two days.
    • The company maintained that it had, in fact, uploaded the user documents on 13 November 2025β€”the day immediately following the hearing.
    • The problem was that, due to a clerical oversight, the documents were inadvertently uploaded against Application No. 515449 rather than the trademark application involved in the present appeal.

    RITES Relied on Its Existing Registrations in Classes 37 and 42

    • RITES also argued that the Trade Marks Registry had itself previously recognised its proprietary rights in the mark RITES by granting multiple registrations of the same mark, including registrations in Classes 37 and 42.
    • According to the company, those registrations represented statutory recognition of its longstanding use and distinctiveness and supported its expectation of consistent treatment by the Registry.
    • The High Court’s order, however, ultimately turned on the procedural safeguards contained in Section 132 rather than finally determining RITES’ substantive entitlement to registration.

    Section 132 Is Not an Automatic or Punitive Provision, RITES Argued

    • RITES submitted that Section 132 is not intended to operate as a punitive mechanism.
    • Under the provision, the Registrar may treat an application as abandoned where, in the Registrar’s opinion, the applicant has defaulted in prosecuting its application.
    • But RITES emphasised that this power is accompanied by an express procedural safeguard: before declaring the application abandoned, the Registrar must issue a notice requiring the applicant to remedy the default within the period specified in the notice.
    • The applicant may also seek an opportunity of being heard.
    • Only when the applicant fails to remedy the default within the specified period can the application be treated as abandoned.
    • RITES argued that no such statutory notice had been issued in its case.

    Registrar Defended Abandonment Order

    • The Registrar of Trade Marks defended the impugned decision.
    • It was argued that despite RITES having been granted time to produce documents substantiating its claim of use from 26 March 2008, the company failed to furnish the required material.
    • The Registrar therefore maintained that there was no reason for the High Court to interfere with the abandonment order.

    Delhi HC: Section 132 Was Violated Rather Than Complied With

    • The High Court rejected the Registrar’s defence.
    • Justice Jyoti Singh observed that there was merit in RITES’ contention that the impugned order had been passed β€œmore in violation than in compliance of Section 132” of the Trade Marks Act.
    • The Court explained that although Section 132 empowers the Registrar to treat an application as abandoned where the applicant defaults in prosecution, the provision also mandates issuance of notice to the applicant.
    • That notice must require the applicant to remedy the default within a specified period. If desired, the applicant may also seek an opportunity of hearing.

    Notice Under Section 132 Is a β€˜Sine Qua Non’: Delhi HC

    The Court laid down the central proposition in clear terms:

    • β€œNotice under Section 132 to the defaulting applicant is a sine qua non before an action is taken.”
    • In other words, the Registrar cannot directly jump from an alleged procedural default to abandonment of the trademark application.
    • The statutory notice is a condition precedent to exercise of the abandonment power.
    • This finding is significant for trademark prosecution because abandonment can have serious consequences for applicants, particularly where the alleged default is capable of being readily cured.

    Technical Glitch Did Not Permit Registrar to Bypass Statutory Notice

    • The Court also examined the specific circumstances surrounding RITES’ documents.
    • The hearing had taken place on 12 November 2025, and RITES had uploaded the supporting documents on 13 November 2025, albeit against the wrong application.
    • The High Court held that even assuming this technical glitch amounted to a default in prosecution, the Registrar was still bound to issue notice to RITES requiring it to remedy the default and correctly upload the documents supporting its claim of use from 26 March 2008.
    • The mistake did not eliminate the protection conferred by Section 132.

    Abandonment Without Opportunity to Remedy Default Legally Untenable

    • The Court noted that no such notice was issued.
    • Instead, the application was directly declared abandoned through the order dated 25 November 2025.
    • Justice Jyoti Singh therefore held that without notice giving the applicant an opportunity to remedy the default, the abandonment order was legally untenable.
    • The judgment consequently reinforces an important distinction between the existence of a procedural default and the legal consequences that may follow from that default.
    • Even where a default exists, the Registrar must comply with the procedure prescribed by the Trade Marks Act before imposing the consequence of abandonment.

    Delhi HC Sets Aside Registrar’s Order

    • The High Court ultimately allowed RITES’ appeal and set aside the Registrar’s order dated 25 November 2025.
    • The Registrar was directed to give RITES an opportunity to furnish the requisite supporting documents substantiating its claimed use of the trademark.
    • A specific timeline is to be provided for filing those documents, after which the Registrar must proceed with the application in accordance with law.

    RITES Wins Procedural Relief, But Trademark Registration Not Yet Granted

    • An important qualification is that the Delhi High Court did not order registration of the RITES trademark.
    • Nor did it finally adjudicate the merits of the company’s claim regarding use, distinctiveness or registrability of the mark.
    • The Court expressly disposed of the appeal with β€œno expression on the merits of the case.”
    • Accordingly, RITES obtained a significant procedural victory: its application can no longer be treated as abandoned on the basis of the impugned order, and it must now be given an opportunity to furnish the required evidence.
    • The ultimate question of registration remains for the Trade Marks Registry to determine in accordance with law.

    Why the Judgment Matters for Trademark Applicants

    • The decision has practical significance for trademark prosecution before the Registry.
    • Applicants frequently face procedural issues relating to uploading evidence, filing user affidavits, responding to examination requirements and complying with directions issued during hearings. The RITES ruling makes clear that where the Registrar proposes to invoke Section 132 because of an alleged default in prosecution, the statutory safeguard cannot be bypassed.
    • The decision is particularly relevant where the alleged default arises from a clerical error, technical glitch or incorrect uploading of documents.
    • The Registrar retains the power to treat an application as abandoned, but only after the applicant has first been notified of the default and given the statutorily contemplated opportunity to cure it.

    Key Takeaway

    The Delhi High Court has clarified that notice under Section 132 of the Trade Marks Act is mandatory before a trademark application can be treated as abandoned for default in prosecution.

    Even where supporting documents were mistakenly uploaded against another application, the Registrar could not directly declare the application abandoned.

    The applicant first had to be given notice and an opportunity to remedy the default.

    The judgment therefore reinforces the broader principle that procedural mistakes capable of rectification cannot be converted into abandonment without following the safeguards expressly prescribed by the Trade Marks Act.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Bombay HC: Interest & Penalty Under RERA Recoverable as Land Revenue; Possession Through Civil Court

    Bombay HC: Interest & Penalty Under RERA Recoverable as Land Revenue; Possession Through Civil Court

    Date: 23.09.2026

    The Bombay High Court at Goa has clarified the two distinct mechanisms contemplated under Section 40 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 for enforcement of RERA ordersβ€”monetary directions for payment of interest, penalty or compensation are recoverable through the revenue machinery, whereas directions requiring a person to do or refrain from doing an act can be enforced in the manner prescribed for execution of such directions.

    A Division Bench of Justice Valmiki Menezes and Justice Amit S. Jamsandekar dismissed petitions filed by M/s Sunstar Homes, finding that the complainants had followed the correct routes for enforcing the different components of a composite Goa RERA order. The Court, however, expressly declined to decide the constitutional/statutory validity of Rule 4 of the Goa RERA Rules, holding that the issue had become academic in the facts of the case.

    Sunstar Homes Challenged Rule 4 of Goa RERA Rules

    • The principal challenge raised by Sunstar Homes concerned the vires of Rule 4 of the Goa Real Estate (Regulation and Development) (Recovery of Interest, Penalty, Compensation, Fine Payable, Forms of Complaints and Appeal, etc.) Rules, 2017.
    • Sunstar argued that Section 40 of RERA itself provides two different mechanisms for enforcing orders.
    • According to the developer, Section 40(1) governs recovery of interest, penalty or compensation, while Section 40(2) deals with enforcement of orders directing a person to perform an act or refrain from performing an act.
    • The developer contended that Rule 4 impermissibly prescribed a single method for executing both categories by treating RERA orders as if they were decrees of a civil court and providing for execution under the Code of Civil Procedure.

    RERA Had Directed Possession, Penalty and Interest

    • The dispute arose from a composite order passed against Sunstar Homes by the Goa Real Estate Regulatory Authority.
    • The order contained three principal directions: the developer was required to hand over possession of certain premises, pay penalty, and pay interest to the complainants.
    • Sunstar Homes challenged the order before the RERA Appellate Tribunal. However, the Tribunal dismissed its appeal, resulting in confirmation of the original RERA order.
    • This created the central issue before the High Court: how should different parts of a composite RERA order be enforced when some directions are monetary and others require performance of an act?

    Possession Order Executed Through Civil Court

    • The complainants approached the Civil Court under Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Rule 4 of the Goa Rules for enforcement of the portion of the RERA order directing delivery of possession.
    • By the time the matter came before the High Court, that execution had already been completed.
    • The Civil Court had handed over possession of the apartments to the concerned complainants, and therefore nothing further remained to be executed as regards the possession direction.

    Interest and Penalty Recovery Taken Before Revenue Authorities

    • The complainants followed a different route for the monetary component of the RERA order.
    • For recovery of the interest and penalty, proceedings were initiated before the Mamlatdar under the Goa Land Revenue Code, 1971.
    • The High Court recorded that the Revenue Authorities had quantified the interest and penalty amount and that those recovery proceedings were still pending.
    • This distinction became decisive in the High Court’s assessment.

    Section 40(1): Interest, Penalty and Compensation Recoverable as Arrears of Land Revenue

    • The High Court explained that Section 40(1) deals with monetary liabilities such as interest, penalty and compensation.
    • Such amounts are to be recovered through proceedings for recovery as arrears of land revenue.
    • Accordingly, the proceedings initiated before the revenue authorities for recovery of interest and penalty were within the statutory mechanism contemplated by Section 40(1).
    • The Court specifically found that the pending proceedings under the Goa Land Revenue Code were within the powers of the Revenue Authorities under Section 40(1) of RERA.

    Section 40(2): Possession Direction Can Be Executed Through Civil Court

    • The other component of the RERA order was materially different.
    • The direction requiring Sunstar Homes to hand over possession was not merely an order for payment of money. It required the developer to perform an act.
    • The High Court treated this as falling within Section 40(2).
    • The complainants had approached the Civil Court and sought enforcement through the CPC, and the possession order had already been successfully executed.
    • The Court held that the complainants had adopted the correct course by taking the possession component falling under Section 40(2) to the Civil Court, while pursuing the monetary component under Section 40(1) before the revenue authorities.

    One RERA Order Can Therefore Require Two Different Execution Routes

    • An important practical consequence of the judgment is that a single composite RERA order can contain directions that require different modes of enforcement.
    • Where an order simultaneously directs a promoter to hand over possession and pay interest, penalty or compensation, the entire order need not necessarily be enforced through one forum or procedure.
    • The nature of each direction determines its enforcement route.

    Thus, in the present case:

    Component of RERA OrderRelevant ProvisionEnforcement Route
    Handing over possessionSection 40(2)Civil Court/CPC mechanism prescribed under the Rules
    Payment of interestSection 40(1)Recovery as arrears of land revenue
    Payment of penaltySection 40(1)Recovery as arrears of land revenue

    The High Court found that this was precisely the course followed by the complainants.

    High Court Does Not Decide Validity of Rule 4

    • Although Sunstar Homes had mounted a direct challenge to the vires of Rule 4, the High Court did not adjudicate that larger question.
    • This is an important qualification to the judgment.
    • The possession portion of the RERA order had already been executed through the Civil Court, while the monetary recovery proceedings were validly pending before the Revenue Authorities under Section 40(1).
    • Consequently, deciding the vires of Rule 4 would have been merely academic in the circumstances of these petitions.
    • The Court therefore expressly left the validity challenge open to be considered in an appropriate future petition.
    • Accordingly, the judgment should not be read as either upholding or striking down Rule 4 of the Goa RERA Rules on its merits.

    Sunstar Homes’ Petitions Dismissed

    • The High Court ultimately declined to entertain the petitions insofar as they challenged Rule 4 and dismissed all the petitions without costs.
    • The Rule was discharged in each matter.
    • Thus, the execution already completed for delivery of possession remained undisturbed, while the revenue proceedings concerning recovery of interest and penalty could continue.

    Why This Judgment Matters for RERA Execution Proceedings

    • The ruling provides useful guidance on a recurring issue in RERA litigation: the distinction between enforcement of monetary awards and enforcement of non-monetary directions.
    • A RERA order may contain multiple forms of relief. The execution mechanism cannot necessarily be determined simply by calling the entire decision a β€œRERA order.” Instead, the nature of the particular relief being enforced must be examined.
    • For promoters, allottees and practitioners, the decision indicates that Section 40(1) and Section 40(2) operate in different fields. Monetary recovery of interest, penalty or compensation travels through the land-revenue recovery mechanism, whereas a direction such as handing over possession may be executed through the mechanism applicable to non-monetary directions.
    • At the same time, the judgment leaves an important legal question unresolved: whether Rule 4 of the Goa RERA Rules itself is valid in all its applications. The Bombay High Court deliberately left that question open for determination in a case where deciding it would have a live practical consequence.

    Key Takeaway

    The Bombay High Court’s ruling establishes, in the context of the Sunstar Homes dispute, that the complainants correctly used two separate enforcement routes for a composite RERA order: Civil Court execution for delivery of possession under Section 40(2), and revenue recovery proceedings for interest and penalty under Section 40(1). The Court did not adjudicate the vires of Rule 4 and therefore did not pronounce a general ruling validating or invalidating the Goa RERA execution rule.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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  • NPPA Cannot Apply Blanket Drug Price Ceiling Without Following DPCO Formula: Bombay HC Quashes Notifications and β‚Ή13-Crore-Plus Demand

    NPPA Cannot Apply Blanket Drug Price Ceiling Without Following DPCO Formula: Bombay HC Quashes Notifications and β‚Ή13-Crore-Plus Demand

    Date: 23.09.2026

    The Bombay High Court has delivered a significant ruling on pharmaceutical price control, holding that the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA) cannot bypass the statutory mechanism prescribed under the Drugs (Price Control) Order, 1995 (DPCO 1995) and impose a ceiling price upon a formulation merely because it contains a scheduled drug as one of its ingredients.

    Allowing a writ petition filed by Pharmed Limited, the Division Bench of Justice Manish Pitale and Justice Shreeram V. Shirsat struck down NPPA’s notification dated 30 January 2009 in its entirety, while quashing the notification dated 27 September 2007 to the extent it was sought to be applied to Pharmed’s β€œCartigen Forte” formulation. Consequently, the authorities were restrained from acting upon the impugned recovery demands against the company.

    The dispute had culminated in recovery proceedings demanding amounts running beyond β‚Ή13 crore, including alleged overcharging and interest. Earlier, a recovery notice dated 21 November 2016 had sought β‚Ή13,41,06,802 under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966.

    Dispute Over Price Control of Cartigen Forte

    • Pharmed Limited manufactures and markets pharmaceutical formulations. The dispute concerned its product β€œCartigen Forte Tablets”, a formulation used for treatment of osteoarthritis.
    • Pharmed’s central case was that the Government had never specifically fixed a ceiling price for Cartigen Forte, either for its formulation existing before January 2010 or for its altered composition thereafter.
    • The controversy arose under the DPCO 1995, issued by the Central Government in exercise of powers under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act. The statutory framework empowered the Government to fix, among other things, retail and ceiling prices of scheduled formulations.

    NPPA’s 2007 Notification Covered Multivitamin and Mineral Formulations

    • On 27 September 2007, NPPA issued a notification fixing ceiling prices for multivitamin and mineral tablets and capsules.
    • Pharmed contended that Cartigen Forte was not such a formulation and that the 2007 notification could not simply be extended to it. The company also challenged a subsequent NPPA notification dated 30 January 2009 as impermissibly broad and contrary to the DPCO itself.
    • The 2009 notification purported to provide that any formulation or composition not already covered in NPPA’s tables, but containing any scheduled drug as an ingredient, would become subject to the ceiling price mentioned against that ingredient in the relevant notification unless the manufacturer subsequently obtained a specific price from NPPA.
    • That blanket approach ultimately became central to the High Court’s ruling.

    Initial Overcharging Demand of β‚Ή10.97 Crore

    • NPPA issued a show-cause notice to Pharmed on 13 October 2010, alleging that Cartigen Forte had been sold above the applicable ceiling price.
    • The authority initially proposed recovery of approximately β‚Ή10.97 crore as estimated overcharging.
    • Pharmed replied on 31 January 2011, contending, among other things, that Cartigen Forte was not a multivitamin formulation, its composition had changed from January 2010, and NPPA could not impose a blanket ceiling in the manner proposed.

    Demand Continued to Escalate With Interest

    • In September 2014, NPPA recalculated the alleged overcharged amount at β‚Ή6,33,62,316 and added β‚Ή4,90,71,525 as interest, taking the amount to β‚Ή11,24,33,841.
    • A further demand dated 26 November 2014 called upon Pharmed to deposit β‚Ή11,42,82,631.
    • Subsequent recovery action under Section 267 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code demanded β‚Ή12,05,92,401 and threatened attachment proceedings. An earlier writ petition resulted in the matter being sent back to NPPA for reconsideration and a speaking order.
    • After remand, however, further demands followed: β‚Ή12,73,36,583 on 7 March 2016, β‚Ή12,93,41,609 on 12 May 2016, and eventually a recovery notice for β‚Ή13,41,06,802 on 21 November 2016.

    Bombay HC: Cartigen Forte Is Neither a Multivitamin Nor Mineral Tablet

    • A significant part of the Court’s analysis concerned the actual composition of Cartigen Forte.
    • Before January 2010, the formulation contained, among other ingredients, Glucosamine Sulfate Potassium Chloride, Chondroitin Sulfate Sodium, Methyl Sulfonyl Methane, Vitamin D3, Vitamin E and Vitamin C. From January 2010, its composition changed.
    • The Court observed that prior to January 2010, Vitamin C and Vitamin E were scheduled bulk drugs included in the First Schedule to DPCO 1995. However, those two ingredients were no longer present in the formulation from January 2010.
    • More importantly, the Court accepted Pharmed’s contention that the product’s active pharmaceutical ingredients for treatment of osteoarthritis were Glucosamine Sulfate Potassium Chloride, Chondroitin Sulfate Sodium and Methyl Sulfonyl Methane.
    • After examining the undisputed composition, the Bench agreed that Cartigen Forte was neither a multivitamin nor a mineral tablet/capsule.

    Presence of a Scheduled Ingredient Does Not Eliminate Statutory Price-Fixation Exercise

    • The Court did accept an important part of NPPA’s legal position.
    • It held that the authorities possess power under Paragraphs 4 and 11 of DPCO 1995 to fix a formulation’s price based on available information where a manufacturer fails to furnish the information or application required under the DPCO.
    • It also accepted that a formulation containing a bulk drug specified in the First Schedule could fall within the definition of a β€œscheduled formulation.”
    • But that did not end the statutory exercise.
    • The Court held that the Central Government or NPPA was still required to actually fix the ceiling price of the particular scheduled formulation, and while exercising power under Paragraph 9, the authority was required to do so in accordance with the formula prescribed by Paragraph 7.
    • Accordingly, merely establishing that a product contained a scheduled bulk drug could not substitute the statutory price-fixation process.

    Paragraph 7 Formula Must Be Applied

    The judgment places considerable emphasis on the pricing formula prescribed under Paragraph 7 of DPCO 1995:

    R.P. = (M.C. + C.C. + P.M. + P.C.) Γ— (1 + MAPE/100) + E.D.

    The calculation therefore required consideration of factors including:

    • Material Cost (M.C.)
    • Conversion Cost (C.C.)
    • Packing Material Cost (P.M.)
    • Packing Charges (P.C.)
    • Maximum Allowable Post-Manufacturing Expenses (MAPE)
    • Excise Duty (E.D.)

    The statutory provisions themselves contemplated that the Government would fix the retail price of a scheduled formulation in accordance with this formula.

    Similarly, Paragraph 9 contemplated fixation of a ceiling price for a scheduled formulation by notification in the Official Gazette in accordance with the Paragraph 7 formula.

    The High Court found that no such exercise had been undertaken specifically for Cartigen Forte.

    2007 Multivitamin Notification Could Not Be Applied to Cartigen Forte

    • The Court therefore rejected NPPA’s attempt to apply the notification dated 27 September 2007 to Pharmed’s product.
    • That notification had specifically fixed prices for multivitamin and mineral tablets/capsules. The Court found that Cartigen Forte was a different formulation and its ceiling price had not independently been calculated by applying the statutory formula.
    • The Court also noted the significant differences in composition. Before January 2010, Cartigen Forte contained Vitamin C and Vitamin E only in quantities lower than those specified in the multivitamin/mineral formulations covered by the 2007 notification. From January 2010, those ingredients were no longer present.
    • The High Court therefore held that the 2007 notification could not form the basis for treating Cartigen Forte as having breached a notified ceiling price.

    Specific Gazette Notification Required for the Formulation

    • The Court laid down an important principle concerning the structure of DPCO 1995.
    • Even where Paragraphs 4 and 11 empower the authorities to determine price on the basis of available information, the procedure prescribed by Paragraph 9 read with Paragraph 7 must still be followed.
    • A specific order by way of notification in the Official Gazette was required in respect of the formulation concerned before the authorities could assert that a particular ceiling price applied.
    • Since no such exercise was undertaken for Cartigen Forte, the Court found that the very foundation of NPPA’s allegation of overcharging disappeared.
    • Accordingly, the notification dated 27 September 2007 was liable to be set aside only insofar as NPPA sought to apply it to Pharmed’s Cartigen Forte formulation.

    2009 NPPA Notification Declared Ultra Vires DPCO 1995

    • The Court went considerably further with respect to the 30 January 2009 notification.
    • The notification essentially attempted to make a price ceiling fixed for a scheduled ingredient applicable to any formulation containing that ingredient, unless a specific price had subsequently been obtained.
    • The Bombay High Court found this approach fundamentally inconsistent with the DPCO 1995.
    • According to the Bench, the notification was β€œextremely widely worded” and effectively dispensed with the statutory formula under Paragraph 7.
    • The Court reasoned that if the ceiling price for a formulation could simply be deemed to exist because one of its ingredients was covered by another pricing notification, the entire statutory exercise of calculating a formulation-specific ceiling price under Paragraphs 7 and 9 would be bypassed.
    • The Court therefore held the notification dated 30 January 2009 to be ultra vires the DPCO 1995.

    Notification Was Overbroad and Beyond NPPA’s Power: Bombay HC

    • The High Court further characterised the 2009 notification as overbroad and expansive, operating contrary to the provisions of the DPCO itself.
    • The Bench found that it went beyond the power vested in NPPA and effectively amounted to an abdication of the responsibility imposed upon the Central Government and NPPA to specifically determine a ceiling price under Paragraph 9 by applying the rigorous formula prescribed under Paragraph 7.
    • The Court consequently held that NPPA’s exercise of power under Paragraphs 9 and 11 for issuing the 2009 notification was arbitrary and unsustainable.

    β‚Ή13-Crore-Plus Recovery Proceedings Lose Their Foundation

    • Once the Court found the two notifications incapable of supporting NPPA’s case, the consequential demands could not survive.
    • The Court reasoned that the very foundation of the allegation that Pharmed had overcharged customers for Cartigen Forte had been removed.
    • Consequently, the demand notices issued by NPPA and the recovery proceedings initiated by the Collector under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code were also liable to be quashed.
    • The Court held that there was no independent basis for the Collector to pursue recovery once NPPA’s underlying demand itself became unsustainable.

    Court Also Flags Interest Calculation

    • The High Court separately found substance in Pharmed’s challenge to the huge interest component.
    • It noted that considerable time had elapsed because of delay attributable to NPPA itself in granting a hearing, while earlier demand notices had also been set aside on natural justice grounds.
    • The Court held that time consumed because of the authority’s own fault could not operate to its advantage and to Pharmed’s detriment when calculating interest.
    • Relying on Franco Indian Remedies Private Limited & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr., 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 16344, the Court observed that, at worst, interest could have been calculated from the demand notice issued after the earlier proceedings were remanded.

    Natural Justice and SSI Exemption Issues Left Open

    • Pharmed had also raised questions regarding violation of natural justice, including the alleged failure to pass a proper speaking order after remand, as well as its entitlement and that of its contract manufacturer to a small-scale industrial unit exemption.
    • However, the High Court found it unnecessary to finally determine those issues.
    • Since the notifications forming the foundation of the alleged overcharging were themselves unsustainable, the writ petition could be decided on that basis alone.

    Final Order: Pharmed Wins; NPPA Notifications and Demands Set Aside

    • The Bombay High Court ultimately allowed Pharmed Limited’s writ petition.
    • Crucially, the Court drew a distinction between the two impugned notifications:
    • Notification dated 27 September 2007 was quashed only to the extent it was sought to be applied to Pharmed’s Cartigen Forte formulation.
    • Notification dated 30 January 2009 was quashed and set aside in its entirety.
    • As a consequence, the authorities were directed not to act upon the impugned demand notices against Pharmed.
    • Thus, Pharmed Limited succeeded in eliminating the legal foundation of the substantial overcharging and interest demands raised against it.

    Why the Judgment Matters for Pharmaceutical Price Control

    The ruling is significant because it distinguishes between two separate propositions under DPCO 1995.

    A formulation may qualify as a scheduled formulation because it contains a scheduled bulk drug. But that classification does not, by itself, permit NPPA to automatically import the ceiling price of some other formulation or ingredient and impose it on the manufacturer’s product.

    Where the DPCO requires the ceiling price of a formulation to be determined under Paragraph 9 in accordance with the Paragraph 7 pricing formula, the authority cannot replace that statutory calculation with a blanket deeming mechanism.

    The judgment therefore reinforces the principle that drug-price regulation must remain within the pricing methodology and statutory powers conferred by the DPCO itself.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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  • Karnataka HC: Courts Cannot Re-Appreciate Evidence to Find Patent Illegality in Arbitral Award

    Karnataka HC: Courts Cannot Re-Appreciate Evidence to Find Patent Illegality in Arbitral Award

    Date: 23.09.2026

    The Karnataka High Court has reaffirmed the limited scope of judicial interference with arbitral awards, holding that courts exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 cannot re-appreciate evidence or interfere merely because another interpretation of the contract may be possible.

    A Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Vibhu Bakhru and Justice C.M. Joshi dismissed an appeal filed by the State Project Director, Rashtriya Madhyamika Shikshana Abhiyana, thereby leaving undisturbed an arbitral award of β‚Ή60,24,774 towards price escalation, along with interest, in favour of Mycon Construction Ltd.

    Dispute Over Price Adjustment Clause in Government Construction Contract

    • The dispute arose from a tender floated for the construction of model schools and the upgrading and strengthening of existing Government High Schools across 30 districts of Karnataka.
    • Mycon Construction Ltd. emerged as the successful bidder for construction work under Package A-B. The parties consequently executed a construction agreement dated 15 May 2013, consisting of General Conditions of Contract and Special Conditions of Contract. Additional work was subsequently entrusted to Mycon, leading to a supplementary agreement dated 14 March 2017.
    • The controversy centred on Clause 39 β€” the Price Adjustment Clause.
    • Although the original tender material available on the e-procurement portal contained a note stating that the β€œprice adjustment clause may be treated as deleted,” the agreements actually executed by the parties in 2013 and 2017 continued to contain Clause 39.

    Arbitrator Awards β‚Ή60.24 Lakh Against Claim of β‚Ή1.22 Crore

    • During execution of the project, Mycon raised bills claiming amounts under the price adjustment mechanism. The State objected, eventually resulting in arbitration.
    • The Arbitral Tribunal adopted the fast-track procedure and delivered its award on 8 September 2023.
    • Against Mycon’s claim of β‚Ή1,22,81,956, the Tribunal partly allowed the claim and awarded β‚Ή60,24,774 along with interest, holding that the Price Adjustment Clause was valid.
    • The State challenged the award under Section 34, but the Commercial Court dismissed its petition on 2 December 2024. This led to the Section 37 appeal before the Karnataka High Court.

    State: Price Adjustment Clause Was Intended to Be Deleted

    • The State’s principal argument was that the tender/RFP had indicated that the Price Adjustment Clause was to be treated as deleted.
    • It contended that Clause 39 had found its way into the final agreement only because the agreement was erroneously signed by the State Project Engineer. According to the State, Mycon could therefore not claim any amount under that provision.
    • The State further argued that when the tender note expressly contemplated deletion of the Price Adjustment Clause, the authority signing the contract on behalf of the Government could not subsequently incorporate that clause into the agreement.
    • The State also invoked Article 299 of the Constitution, contending in effect that Clause 39 should be treated as non-existent because it had allegedly been incorporated without authority.

    Signed Contract Expressly Contained Clause 39

    • The High Court considered it significant that there was no dispute that the final agreement signed by the parties expressly contained Clause 39.
    • While the e-procurement portal carried the note that Clause 39 β€œmay be treated as deleted,” the agreement ultimately executed by the parties neither contained such a note nor had Clause 39 scored out.
    • The State did not dispute that the signed agreement contained the provision.
    • Clause 39 itself provided for adjustment of the contract price for increases or decreases in rates and prices of labour, materials, fuels and lubricants, subject to the contractual formula and conditions.
    • The High Court further recorded that there was no controversy regarding the calculation of the β‚Ή60,24,774 escalation amount in accordance with Clause 39. The dispute was essentially whether Clause 39 formed part of the parties’ agreement at all.

    Mycon: Bid Was Reduced Because Price Adjustment Protection Was Available

    • Mycon’s original bid was β‚Ή7,22,96,246.41, which was subsequently reduced during negotiations to β‚Ή6,70,56,696.
    • The contractor contended that it had agreed to the reduction because the contract contained a Price Adjustment Clause. It also claimed that during a meeting held on 13 February 2013, the concerned authorities had indicated that higher premiums were unnecessary because price adjustment protection was available.
    • Mycon additionally relied upon a Government Order dated 26 November 2004, under which a price adjustment clause was to be included in works contracts where the estimated cost put to tender was β‚Ή100 lakh or more and the completion period was 12 months or more.

    Tribunal Was Entitled to Interpret the Contract: High Court

    • The Arbitral Tribunal had rejected the State’s contention that the words β€œmay be treated as deleted” automatically meant that Clause 39 had ceased to form part of the contract.
    • The Tribunal instead relied upon the final signed agreement, which retained Clause 39 without any note stating that it should be deleted.
    • It therefore held that the executed agreement could not be read as excluding Clause 39 merely because of the note appearing in the RFP on the e-procurement portal.
    • The Tribunal had also rejected the State’s argument concerning lack of authority of the State Project Engineer. The State had neither rescinded nor rectified the contract and the contractor had executed the works between 2013 and 2018 without the Government taking steps to modify or rescind the agreement.
    • The High Court found that the real dispute was therefore not about the existence of the contract, but about the terms of that contract. Such a dispute fell squarely within the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal.

    Error in Contract Interpretation Is Ordinarily Within Arbitrator’s Jurisdiction

    • The Division Bench referred to the Supreme Court’s ruling in MSK Projects India (JV) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (2011) 10 SCC 573.
    • The principle highlighted by the Court was that an error committed by an arbitrator while construing a contract is an error within the arbitrator’s jurisdiction. A jurisdictional error arises when the arbitrator travels outside the contract and deals with matters not entrusted to arbitration.
    • The High Court also relied upon SAIL v. Gupta Brother Steel Tubes Ltd., (2009) 10 SCC 63, where the Supreme Court distinguished between an arbitrator travelling beyond the contract and an arbitrator merely interpreting the contractual provisions.
    • Where the arbitrator’s conclusion represents a possible view, courts should not interfere merely because another view may also be possible. Courts cannot examine the correctness of arbitral findings as though exercising appellate jurisdiction.

    Courts Cannot Substitute Their Own Interpretation of Contract

    • The Karnataka High Court further relied upon State of Rajasthan v. Puri Construction Co. Ltd., (1994) 6 SCC 485.
    • The Supreme Court had distinguished between an error within jurisdiction and an error in excess of jurisdiction, holding that courts cannot substitute their own evaluation of the facts or contractual interpretation merely because they might have reached a different conclusion.
    • Where the arbitrator’s interpretation of a contract represents a possible view, the award cannot be reopened simply to reassess the contractual materials and evidence.

    Construction of Contract Lies Within Province of Arbitral Tribunal

    • The Bench also referred to Assam SEB v. Buildworth (P) Ltd., (2017) 8 SCC 146, reiterating that questions concerning construction of contractual provisions ordinarily fall within the province of the Arbitral Tribunal.
    • Where the arbitrator’s interpretation is supported by relevant evidentiary material, courts cannot interfere merely because they might prefer another construction.

    Section 34 Courts Cannot Re-Appreciate Evidence

    • The High Court agreed with the Commercial Court that the Tribunal’s conclusions were based upon evidence and could not be characterised as patently illegal or contrary to the public policy of India.
    • It reiterated that courts cannot re-appreciate evidence while examining an arbitral award, and that interference must remain confined to the grounds expressly provided under Section 34.
    • The Bench relied upon Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd. v. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., AIR Online 2021 SC 78, where the Supreme Court emphasised that Section 34 courts must act strictly within the confines of the statutory provision and refrain from appreciation or re-appreciation of facts and evidence.

    Every Error of Law Is Not β€œPatent Illegality”

    • The High Court also reiterated the restrictive meaning of patent illegality under Section 34(2A).
    • An illegality must go to the root of the matter. Every legal error or erroneous application of law does not amount to patent illegality.
    • Interference may be justified where, among other circumstances, the arbitrator adopts a view that is not even a possible one, interprets a contractual clause in a manner no fair-minded or reasonable person could adopt, travels outside the contract, bases conclusions on no evidence, or ignores vital evidence.
    • Courts, however, cannot re-appreciate evidence merely to reach the conclusion that an award is patently illegal.

    Article 299 Argument Rejected

    • The State had relied on K.P. Chowdhry v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1967 SC 203 to challenge the contractual provision.
    • The Karnataka High Court found that decision inapplicable because it concerned a situation where no written agreement had been entered into after the auction.
    • In Mycon’s case, there was an undisputed signed agreement between the parties, and there was no dispute that the Government had awarded the works contract and that an agreement for execution of those works was authorised.
    • The controversy was therefore confined to whether Clause 39 formed part of the contractual terms, a question that the Arbitral Tribunal had already considered and decided in Mycon’s favour.
    • The Tribunal had also taken note of the State’s failure to rescind or rectify the executed agreement.

    Karnataka HC Dismisses State’s Appeal; Mycon’s Award Stands

    • The Division Bench ultimately held that the State’s challenge could not be sustained under either Section 34(2) or Section 34(2A) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.
    • Finding no ground to interfere with the arbitral award and no infirmity in the Commercial Court’s refusal to set it aside, the High Court dismissed the State’s appeal.
    • Accordingly, Mycon Construction Ltd. succeeded in defending the arbitral award of β‚Ή60,24,774 towards price escalation, along with interest, against the State’s Section 34 and Section 37 challenges.

    Key Takeaway

    The ruling reinforces a fundamental principle of Indian arbitration law: interpretation of contractual terms is primarily the domain of the arbitrator. A court exercising jurisdiction under Sections 34 or 37 cannot substitute its preferred contractual interpretation merely because another view is possible.

    Where an executed government contract expressly contains a price adjustment clause, and the arbitrator adopts a possible interpretation of that agreement based on the contractual documents and evidence, judicial interference cannot be justified simply by pointing to a conflicting note in the earlier tender material.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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  • Calcutta HC: Unexplained Increase in Seized Drug Weight Raises Doubt Over NDPS Investigation

    Calcutta HC: Unexplained Increase in Seized Drug Weight Raises Doubt Over NDPS Investigation

    Date: 23.09.2026

    The Calcutta High Court, Circuit Bench at Port Blair, has granted bail to David Johnson in a case involving the alleged recovery of 54.01 grams of methamphetamine, after finding substantial and arguable questions concerning the change in weight of the seized substance, chain of custody, compliance with Section 42(2) of the NDPS Act and the manner in which the safeguard under Section 50 was communicated.

    Justice Prasenjit Biswas held that, when these circumstances were considered cumulatively at the bail stage, the petitioner had established reasonable grounds sufficient to satisfy the first limb of the stringent twin conditions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The Court also found no material indicating that he was likely to commit a similar offence while on bail.

    Bail Sought in 54.01-Gram Methamphetamine Case

    • David Johnson approached the High Court under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) seeking bail in Special NDPS Case No. 05 of 2026, arising from FIR No. 03 of 2026 registered by Police Station Anti-Narcotics.
    • The case was registered under Section 22(c) of the NDPS Act, 1985.
    • The petitioner argued that despite the statutory embargo under Section 37, the material available on record gave rise to reasonable grounds for believing that he may not be guilty of the alleged offence and that he was not likely to commit an offence while on bail.

    Seized Methamphetamine Allegedly Increased From 54.01g to 54.11g

    • One of the most significant issues before the High Court concerned an apparent discrepancy in the weight of the alleged contraband.
    • According to the prosecution, 54.01 grams of methamphetamine had been seized from David Johnson. However, when the substance was subsequently weighed during sampling before the Magistrate, its total weight was recorded as 54.11 grams.
    • The defence questioned how the seized substance could have increased by 0.10 gram between seizure and subsequent sampling, particularly when the identity, quantity and integrity of the contraband were central to an NDPS prosecution.
    • The High Court found this discrepancy relevant. It observed that although the numerical difference might appear small, it could not be ignored altogether in an NDPS prosecution where the identity, quantity and integrity of the seized substance assume fundamental importance.
    • More importantly, the Court noted that no satisfactory explanation had been placed before it as to how the weight increased between seizure and sampling.

    Samples Not Sent Directly From Magistrate to Forensic Laboratory

    • The second major issue concerned the chain of custody.
    • The petitioner relied upon Rules 13 and 14 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Seizure, Storage, Sampling and Disposal) Rules, 2022.
    • Rule 13, as noted by the Court, contemplates that samples after certification by the Magistrate should be sent directly to the jurisdictional laboratory for chemical analysis without delay, while Rule 14 deals with expeditious testing and submission of the chemical analysis report.
    • However, the materials before the High Court prima facie indicated that after inventory and sampling proceedings before the Magistrate, the samples were not transmitted directly to the jurisdictional forensic laboratory.
    • Instead, they were first retained in the police malkhana and were thereafter forwarded to the CFSL.

    Chain of Custody Intended to Prevent Alteration, Substitution or Contamination: HC

    • The High Court stressed the purpose behind the prescribed procedure.
    • It observed that the requirement governing transmission of samples is intended to maintain their integrity and minimise the possibility of alteration, substitution, contamination or uncertainty regarding the identity of the material ultimately examined by the forensic laboratory.
    • The Court held that the relevant question was not simply whether the seized substance eventually reached the CFSL. It was also necessary to consider whether the prescribed chain of custody and safeguards governing its movement had been duly maintained.
    • The manner in which the material had been retained and transmitted, when coupled with the unexplained weight discrepancy, raised an arguable issue concerning the integrity of the seized substance and the sample subjected to chemical examination.

    Section 42(2) Compliance Also Questioned

    • The petitioner additionally alleged non-compliance with Section 42(2) of the NDPS Act, particularly in relation to the alleged secret information upon which the investigating agency had acted.
    • The High Court found prima facie substance in this argument.
    • Justice Biswas observed that the safeguards under Section 42 cannot be treated as empty formalities, especially considering the stringent penal consequences under the NDPS Act.
    • Where the prosecution acts upon prior secret information, the statutory requirement concerning the recording and communication of that information assumes significance. On the material then before the Court, strict compliance had not been satisfactorily demonstrated so as to completely dispel the doubt raised by the petitioner.

    Section 50 Notice Also Came Under Scrutiny

    • The State argued that Section 50 of the NDPS Act was not applicable to the search in question. Nevertheless, according to the State, a Section 50 notice had been served upon David Johnson as a matter of abundant precaution, and the petitioner had acknowledged it by signing the notice.
    • The High Court nevertheless examined the notice because the State itself relied upon it as evidence of compliance.
    • The Court observed that where a personal search is undertaken, the statutory safeguard under Section 50 assumes importance and the right contemplated by the provision must be communicated clearly and unambiguously.
    • Significantly, the notice placed before the High Court did not appear to contain the name or sufficient particulars of the Gazetted Officer before whom the petitioner was allegedly offered the option of being searched.
    • Prima facie, this raised a substantial question as to whether the petitioner had actually been made aware of the specific statutory safeguard available to him.

    Supreme Court’s Parmanand Judgment Relied Upon

    • The petitioner relied upon the Supreme Court judgment in State of Rajasthan v. Parmanand and Another, (2014) 5 SCC 345.
    • The High Court noted the Supreme Court’s emphasis that the right under Section 50 of the NDPS Act is not an empty formality, and its communication must be clear, individual and unambiguous.
    • The High Court also referred to Parmanand while examining the Section 50 notice in David Johnson’s case and reiterated the importance of the statutory safeguard.

    Earlier Calcutta HC NDPS Bail Orders Also Cited

    Apart from Parmanand, the petitioner relied upon orders passed by Coordinate Benches of the Calcutta High Court in:

    • Alok Kumar Mandal β€” CRM (NDPS) 8 of 2025
    • Shri Sandeep Bera β€” CRM (NDPS) 9 of 2025
    • Shri Raju Golder β€” CRM (NDPS) 5 of 2025

    These authorities were cited in support of the petitioner’s challenge to the procedural compliance in the NDPS investigation.

    State: Procedural Objections Should Be Tested at Trial

    • The State opposed bail and argued that the alleged discrepancies were matters that should properly be considered during trial after prosecution witnesses had been examined and subjected to cross-examination.
    • It maintained that the seizure memo recorded recovery of the contraband from the petitioner and that this fact could not be disregarded merely because of the discrepancies highlighted by the defence.
    • According to the State, the investigating agency had substantially followed the NDPS procedure, and the objections did not provide sufficient grounds for satisfying Section 37.

    Section 37 Does Not Require Mini-Trial at Bail Stage

    • The High Court clarified the standard applicable while considering bail under Section 37.
    • The Court stated that it was not required to conduct a meticulous appreciation of evidence or record a finding of acquittal. At the same time, Section 37 requires reasonable satisfaction, based on the presently available material, regarding whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and whether he is unlikely to commit an offence while on bail.
    • The Court explained that β€œreasonable grounds” requires something more substantial than a mere prima facie consideration, although it does not amount to a final adjudication of the prosecution case.

    Cumulative Procedural Defects Sufficient to Overcome Section 37 Embargo

    After examining the material, the High Court identified four circumstances which, when considered cumulatively, raised substantial and arguable questions:

    1. The unexplained increase in weight from 54.01 grams to 54.11 grams;
    2. The manner in which the samples were retained and subsequently transmitted to the forensic laboratory;
    3. The prima facie deficiency in compliance with Section 42(2); and
    4. The apparent infirmity in the notice purportedly issued under Section 50.
    5. According to the Court, these issues raised substantial questions concerning both the legality of the search and seizure and the integrity of the chain of custody.
    6. The Court consequently found reasonable grounds for the purposes of the first condition under Section 37.
    7. As regards the second condition, no material had been placed before the Court from which it could reasonably conclude that David Johnson, if released, was likely to commit a similar offence. The second limb of Section 37 could therefore also be satisfied by imposing appropriate conditions.

    Calcutta High Court Grants Bail to David Johnson

    • The High Court ultimately held that David Johnson had, at the present stage, overcome the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act and was entitled to bail.
    • He was directed to be released on furnishing a bail bond of β‚Ή20,000 with two sureties of the same amount, one of whom must be a local surety, to the satisfaction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Port Blair.
    • The Court imposed several conditions, including that Johnson must attend the concerned police station every alternate day, cooperate with the investigation, appear before the Trial Court on every hearing date unless exempted, and not leave the Islands without prior permission of the Trial Court.
    • He was also prohibited from influencing witnesses, tampering with evidence or obstructing the trial.

    Bail Order Does Not Amount to Acquittal

    • Importantly, the High Court expressly clarified that its observations were confined solely to consideration of the bail application and should not be construed as any final opinion on the merits of the prosecution case.
    • Thus, the Court’s prima facie observations concerning Sections 42 and 50, the weight discrepancy and chain of custody do not constitute a final determination that the investigation was illegal or that the petitioner is innocent. Those issues remain open for determination at trial.

    Key Takeaway

    The ruling demonstrates the importance of maintaining strict procedural safeguards in NDPS investigations, particularly where the stringent bail restrictions under Section 37 apply.

    In David Johnson’s case, the Calcutta High Court found that the unexplained increase in the weight of the alleged methamphetamine, intervening malkhana custody before transmission to CFSL, prima facie deficiency under Section 42(2), and apparent infirmity in the Section 50 notice, cumulatively created substantial and arguable questions sufficient at the bail stage to overcome the first limb of Section 37.

    With no material suggesting that the petitioner was likely to commit a similar offence while on bail, the Court found the second condition capable of being satisfied as well and granted conditional bail.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi