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  • Karnataka High Court: Civil Suit Cannot Be a Ground to Discharge Accused When Criminal Acts Are Alleged

    Karnataka High Court: Civil Suit Cannot Be a Ground to Discharge Accused When Criminal Acts Are Alleged

    Date: 26.09.2026

    The Karnataka High Court has held that the mere existence of an earlier civil suit arising from the dispute cannot be a ground to discharge an accused where the complaint and charge-sheet materials disclose prima facie allegations of independent criminal acts such as creation of documents, forgery and use of allegedly fabricated documents.

    Allowing a petition filed by M/s Varsha Cables Private Ltd. and its Chairman and Managing Director Puttaraju P. Gowda, Justice H.P. Sandesh set aside an order of the Revisional Court which had discharged the accused and restored the Trial Court’s order rejecting the discharge application under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

    The High Court emphasised that disputed defences cannot be adjudicated at the discharge stage and that questions surrounding allegedly created documents must be tested during trial.

    Background of the Dispute

    • The proceedings originated from a private complaint filed by the complainants alleging criminal acts against the second respondent, B. Kumar, proprietor of M/s Varsha Industries.
    • The private complaint was referred for investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC, following which the Vijayanagara Police registered an FIR, investigated the allegations and filed a charge sheet. An additional charge sheet was also filed invoking offences relating to forgery and use of forged documents. VARSHA CABLESL PRIVATE LTD. KHC
    • The dispute had its background in the relationship between the parties concerning Varsha Cables Private Ltd. According to the complaint, the accused had previously been a Director of the company and later started carrying on business through Varsha Industries.
    • The complainants alleged that Varsha Industries began manufacturing and dealing in products including PVC insulated copper conductors and PVC/rubber insulated and non-insulated products, replicating the business being carried on by Varsha Cables.

    Allegation of Misrepresentation to Customers

    • The complaint alleged that the accused represented to customers of Varsha Cables that the company had been restructured as M/s Varsha Industries and that its management had also been restructured.
    • Customers were allegedly requested to amend their vendor-registration records and direct fresh enquiries to Varsha Industries.
    • The complaint specifically referred to communications dated 24 October 2009 sent to customers including Cipla Limited, Goa and Jubilant Organosys Ltd., Mysore. According to the complainants, these representations resulted in prominent customers of Varsha Cables being diverted to Varsha Industries.
    • These remained allegations requiring adjudication at trial; the High Court did not make a final finding that the alleged acts had been proved.

    Alleged Fabrication of Board Meeting Minutes and Use of Company Letterhead

    • A significant aspect of the case concerned documents allegedly created after an agreement dated 9 October 2009 between the parties.
    • The additional charge sheet alleged that Varsha Cables’ letterhead was used in a communication dated 21 October 2009 for changing a Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) licence and that minutes of a purported Board meeting were created despite the allegation that no such meeting had taken place.
    • According to the additional charge sheet, the accused allegedly used the company’s letterhead after ceasing to be its Director with an intention to divert clients. The additional charge sheet consequently invoked Sections 468 and 471 IPC.
    • The High Court also recorded that letters dated 21 October and 4 November 2009 addressed to the Bureau of Indian Standards and minutes dated 12 October 2009 were among the documents relied upon by the complainants.

    Trial Court Refuses to Discharge Accused

    • The accused sought discharge under Section 239 CrPC.
    • The Trial Court rejected the application on 23 December 2017 after taking note of allegations contained in the original as well as additional charge sheets.
    • Among other things, it considered the allegation that Board resolutions had been created and used for changing BIS licences standing in the name of Varsha Cables. It also noted allegations concerning duplicate letterheads and changes relating to the company’s telephone number.
    • The accused thereafter approached the Revisional Court.

    Revisional Court Discharges Accused

    • The VII Additional Sessions Judge, Mysuru allowed Criminal Revision Petition No. 313 of 2018 on 21 March 2019 and discharged the accused.
    • The Revisional Court substantially treated the controversy as a civil dispute between the parties, taking into consideration the agreement and related civil proceedings.
    • Varsha Cables and its CMD then approached the Karnataka High Court under Section 482 CrPC, seeking restoration of the Trial Court’s refusal to discharge the accused.

    Accused Argues Criminal Complaint Was Replica of Civil Suit

    • Before the High Court, the accused argued that a civil suit had already been instituted and that the allegations in the private criminal complaint substantially replicated those made in the civil proceedings.
    • It was submitted that the civil suit had been dismissed and that first appeals were pending. The accused therefore maintained that the controversy was essentially civil in character and that criminal prosecution should not be used to pursue the same dispute.
    • The complainants, on the other hand, argued that specific allegations of forgery, cheating, criminal breach of trust, fabrication and use of documents had been investigated and formed part of the charge-sheet materials. They contended that the Revisional Court had effectively evaluated the defence at a stage when only a prima facie assessment was permissible.

    Karnataka HC: Revisional Court Went Beyond Scope of Discharge Proceedings

    • The High Court found fault with the manner in which the Revisional Court approached the case.
    • Justice Sandesh observed that the Revisional Court had extensively considered the terms of the agreement between the parties but had failed adequately to examine the allegations in the complaint, charge sheet and particularly the additional charge sheet concerning alleged creation and use of documents.
    • According to the High Court, the Revisional Court had effectively considered the accused’s defence while deciding whether discharge was justified.
    • That approach exceeded the permissible scope of the proceedings.

    Evidentiary Value Cannot Be Decided at Discharge Stage

    • The High Court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in State by Karnataka Lokayukta Police Station, Bengaluru v. M.R. Hiremath, (2019) 7 SCC 515, noting that entering into questions concerning the evidentiary value of prosecution material at the stage of deciding a discharge application is impermissible.
    • It also relied upon Srilekha Sentilkumar v. Deputy Superintendent of Police, CBI, ACB, Chennai, (2019) 7 SCC 82, where the Supreme Court recognised that disputed factual issues may be more appropriately adjudicated at trial after evidence is led by the parties.
    • In the present case, the High Court found sufficient charge-sheet material to permit the prosecution to proceed, particularly in relation to the accusations concerning creation of documents and alleged forgery.

    Civil Proceedings Do Not Automatically Wipe Out Criminal Allegations

    • One of the most important findings of the judgment concerns the overlap between civil and criminal proceedings.
    • The High Court acknowledged that the civil suit had been filed before the criminal complaint and that the contents of the civil plaint and complaint were alleged to overlap.
    • However, it noted that the criminal complaint contained allegations concerning conduct after the agreement dated 9 October 2009, including alleged creation of documents, purported Board meeting minutes and transfer of records. These matters had also been considered during police investigation and in the additional charge sheet.

    The Court therefore held that:

    • β€œthe very contention that civil suit was filed earlier and subsequently, criminal complaint was filed cannot be a ground to discharge”
    • where the record contains allegations of criminal acts that require adjudication.
    • Importantly, this does not amount to a finding that the accused committed forgery. The High Court held only that the allegations and materials were sufficient to require adjudication at trial.

    Defence Cannot Be Adjudicated Under Section 239 CrPC

    • The High Court reiterated that, while considering an application under Section 239 CrPC, the court must determine whether there is material to frame charges or whether the accusations are groundless.
    • The Revisional Court had, in the High Court’s view, gone beyond this exercise by evaluating the defence based on the parties’ agreement while failing adequately to account for the accusations regarding creation of documents.
    • The Court therefore concluded that the Revisional Court had exercised its revisional powers beyond their permissible limit.

    Complainant Has Right to Be Heard When Discharge May Terminate Criminal Proceedings

    • Another significant issue concerned the locus of the de facto complainant.
    • The accused relied upon M/s Kerala Transport Co. v. D.S. Soma Shekar & Others, arguing that after investigation and filing of the charge sheet, prosecution was primarily the responsibility of the State and the private complainant could not independently use criminal proceedings to pursue private vengeance.
    • The Karnataka High Court rejected the objection in the circumstances of this case.
    • It relied upon Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra & Another, (2014) 16 SCC 623, observing that while a complainant or informant does not have a vested right to directly conduct the prosecution, the complainant’s interest cannot simply be ignored when proceedings are likely to be terminated.
    • The Court also relied on J.K. International v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2001) 3 SCC 462, which recognised the complainant’s right to be heard when criminal proceedings initiated on the complaint are sought to be quashed.
    • The High Court reasoned that allowing a revision seeking discharge could effectively terminate the proceedings initiated by the first informant, making an opportunity of hearing material to the complainant’s interests.

    Supreme Court Precedents Considered

    The judgment discusses several authorities concerning discharge, revision and participation of a complainant, including:

    CaseCitation / ReferencePrinciple Discussed
    Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra(1977) 4 SCC 551Nature of orders concerning charge/discharge and revisional jurisdiction
    Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal(1979) 3 SCC 4Scope of judicial scrutiny at charge/discharge stage
    Pranab Kumar Mitra v. State of West BengalAIR 1959 SC 144Revisional jurisdiction
    Thakur Ram v. State of BiharAIR 1966 SC 911Role of State and private parties in criminal prosecution
    Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.(2014) 16 SCC 623Role and hearing of complainant/private party
    State by Karnataka Lokayukta v. M.R. Hiremath(2019) 7 SCC 515Evidentiary value cannot be assessed at discharge stage
    Srilekha Sentilkumar v. Deputy Superintendent of Police, CBI(2019) 7 SCC 82Disputed facts appropriately determined at trial
    J.K. International v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)(2001) 3 SCC 462Complainant’s opportunity of hearing where criminal proceedings are sought to be terminated
    Sanjay Kumar RaiCriminal Appeal No. 472/2021, decided 07.05.2021Scope of revision against charge/discharge orders

    These authorities were considered in determining the permissible scope of discharge/revisional proceedings and the complainant’s participation.

    Final Decision: Varsha Cables’ Petition Allowed

    • The Karnataka High Court ultimately allowed the criminal petition.
    • It set aside the order dated 21 March 2019 passed by the VII Additional Sessions Judge, Mysuru in Criminal Revision Petition No. 313/2018 and restored the Trial Court’s order dated 23 December 2017 in C.C. No. 126/2014 rejecting the accused’s discharge application under Section 239 CrPC.
    • Accordingly, the accused was not discharged and the criminal proceedings are to continue.
    • The High Court expressly clarified that the observations made while deciding the petition shall not influence the Trial Court when considering the matter on merits. Therefore, the ruling does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused; those issues remain for trial.

    Key Takeaway

    The ruling reinforces that the existence of a civil dispute or even an earlier civil suit does not automatically justify discharge from criminal proceedings where the complaint and investigation disclose separate prima facie allegations of criminal conduct.

    At the Section 239 CrPC stage, courts are not expected to conduct a full trial, adjudicate disputed defences or finally determine the evidentiary worth of competing documents.

    Where allegations concerning forgery, fabrication or use of allegedly created documents require evidence, those questions should ordinarily be determined during trial rather than through a discharge application.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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  • Delhi High Court: Trademark Refusal Must Be Based on Reasoned Analysis, Not Mere Similarity of Marks

    Delhi High Court: Trademark Refusal Must Be Based on Reasoned Analysis, Not Mere Similarity of Marks

    Date: 25.09.2026

    The Delhi High Court has set aside the refusal of Lucy Group Ltd.’s application for registration of the trademark β€œGEMINI” in Class 09, holding that the Registrar of Trademarks failed to consider crucial factual and legal submissions placed before it.

    Justice Jyoti Singh held that the Registrar’s order was β€œunreasoned, non-speaking and reflects non-application of mind”, observing that a quasi-judicial authority is legally required to consider all relevant contentions and issues raised by the parties before arriving at its decision.

    The High Court, however, did not decide whether GEMINI was ultimately entitled to registration. Instead, it remanded the trademark application to the Registrar for fresh consideration and directed a decision within 10 weeks after hearing Lucy Group.

    Background: Lucy Group’s β€˜GEMINI’ Trademark Application

    • Lucy Group Ltd. filed the appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, challenging the Registrar’s order dated 17 April 2025, which had refused registration of its trademark under Application No. 5247072 dated 14 December 2021 in Class 09.
    • According to the company, it first used the GEMINI mark in India at the Elecrama trade event in Bengaluru on 13 February 2016, where it promoted and displayed products to potential customers and business associates.
    • Lucy Group subsequently filed a convention trademark application in Great Britain on 16 June 2021 and, on 14 December 2021, applied to register GEMINI in India as a convention application.

    Trademark Registry Cites Four Earlier β€˜GEMINI’ Marks

    • On 4 January 2022, the Registry issued an Examination Report raising an objection under Section 11(1) of the Trade Marks Act.
    • Four earlier marks were cited on the ground that Lucy Group’s proposed GEMINI mark was identical or similar to marks already appearing on the Register in respect of identical or similar goods.
    • Following hearings and written submissions, the Registrar refused registration on 17 April 2025. Lucy Group thereafter filed Form TM-M on 15 May 2025 seeking detailed grounds for refusal, but according to the appeal, those grounds were never supplied.

    Lucy Group: Registrar Failed to Compare the Actual Goods

    • Lucy Group’s principal grievance was that the Registrar had merely noted the existence of four earlier registrations and concluded that there was a likelihood of confusion because of the allegedly similar goods.
    • The company argued that the Registrar had failed to undertake a meaningful comparative analysis of the nature and function of the goods, their trade channels and the relevant consumers.
    • It also challenged the Registrar’s finding that adoption of GEMINI was not bona fide, arguing that this was not a ground of refusal under Section 11(1).

    Lucy Group’s GEMINI Products Are Industrial SCADA and RTU Systems

    • A central aspect of Lucy Group’s case was the highly specialised nature of the products for which registration was sought.
    • The application covered industrial-grade products including SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems and GEMINI RTUs (Remote Terminal Units).
    • The RTUs were described as multipurpose units intended for advanced feeder automation and for controlling and monitoring pole- and ground-mounted medium-voltage switchgear.
    • Lucy Group relied on product catalogues, technical specifications and its corporate profile to show that it operated in the specialised field of power automation, grid monitoring and infrastructure control systems.
    • The company also claimed continuous and extensive use of GEMINI in India since February 2016 and argued that the specialised nature, application and trade channels of its goods distinguished them from the products covered by the cited registrations.

    Cited Mark 1: β€˜Wires and Cables’

    • The first cited GEMINI registration, No. 728627 in Class 09, covered β€œwires and cables.”
    • Lucy Group argued that wires and cables were basic electrical transmission components, whereas its SCADA systems, RTUs and industrial switchgear were advanced control systems integrated with software and supplied as part of specialised engineering projects.
    • It further claimed that the two marks had co-existed in the Indian market since 2016 without reported confusion and that GEMINI had acquired secondary distinctiveness among its customers.

    Cited Mark 2: Television Broadcasting and Entertainment Products

    • The second cited registration, No. 953168, was also for GEMINI in Class 09 and belonged to Sun TV Network Limited.
    • Lucy Group argued that the goods associated with this registration related to the television broadcasting and entertainment sector, whereas its own products concerned industrial power-distribution and control solutions.
    • According to Lucy Group, the nature, purpose and consumer base of the respective goods were entirely different. It also informed the Court that it had filed a rectification petition on the ground of non-use against the second cited mark on 30 July 2022, which remained pending.

    Third Mark Abandoned; Fourth Filed on β€˜Proposed to Be Used’ Basis

    • Lucy Group also raised specific objections regarding the remaining two cited marks.
    • It submitted that Registration No. 3164101 for GEMINI in Class 09 had been abandoned before the date of the impugned order.
    • As regards the fourth mark, Application No. 3939124, Lucy Group pointed out that it had been filed on a β€œproposed to be used” basis and that its filing was later than Lucy Group’s claimed first use of GEMINI.
    • The detailed comparison reproduced on pages 5–9 of the High Court order further contrasted Lucy Group’s specialised industrial products with the goods associated with each cited mark, including wires and cables, broadcasting/electronic goods, consumer electronics and portable spectroscopic instruments.

    Same Trademark Class Does Not Automatically Mean Goods Are Similar: Lucy Group’s Argument

    • Lucy Group argued that goods cannot be treated as similar merely because they fall within the same Nice Classification class.
    • According to the company, the correct enquiry was whether the respective goods were commercially and functionally similar, rather than whether there was a theoretical or broad overlap in their classification.
    • It also emphasised that Section 11 requires consideration of likelihood of confusion β€œon the part of the public”, yet the Registrar had not identified the relevant public or adequately examined the consumers involved.

    Registrar Defends Refusal Under Section 11

    • The Registrar defended the order, arguing that the GEMINI application was barred by earlier identical marks appearing on the Trade Marks Register.
    • It contended that Lucy Group’s mark was phonetically, visually and structurally identical to the cited marks and that the relevant goods were similar or identical, creating a likelihood of confusion under Section 11(1).
    • In particular, the Registrar argued that electrical goods such as wires, cables and switchgear may travel through the same trade channels and reach common classes of consumers such as electricians, contractors and engineers.
    • According to the Registrar, treating specialised industrial products as wholly different from cables created an artificial distinction because cables and switchgear could be closely connected in the modern electrical industry.

    Delhi High Court Finds Crucial Submissions Were Ignored

    • After examining the Examination Report, Lucy Group’s reply and its detailed written submissions, the High Court found a fundamental defect in the Registrar’s decision-making process.
    • Justice Jyoti Singh observed that none of the crucial submissions had been considered.
    • The registration had essentially been refused because the applied-for mark was considered phonetically and visually similar to the cited marks and the goods were treated as similar.
    • However, the Registrar had not examined the distinctions Lucy Group sought to establish regarding the nature and function of the competing goods.

    Registrar Failed to Consider Abandoned and Later-Filed Marks

    The Court specifically noted that the Registrar had also failed to consider Lucy Group’s submissions that:

    • the third cited mark had been abandoned; and
    • the fourth cited mark was filed on a β€œproposed to be used” basis much after Lucy Group’s claimed first use.

    The High Court observed that these crucial facts and legal issues were not even referred to in the impugned order.

    Significantly, the Court stated that had these matters been considered and adjudicated, the decision might have been different.

    Quasi-Judicial Authorities Must Deal With Relevant Contentions

    • The Court then reiterated an important principle governing administrative and quasi-judicial decision-making.
    • It held that even a quasi-judicial authority is under a legal obligation to consider all contentions and issues raised by the parties, insofar as they are relevant, before taking a decision.

    Viewed against that requirement, the Registrar’s order was held to be:

    • β€œclearly unreasoned, non-speaking and reflects non-application of mind.”
    • This became the decisive basis for judicial interference.

    High Court Does Not Decide Trademark Registration on Merits

    • Importantly, the Delhi High Court expressly stated that it was not entering into the merits of Lucy Group’s claim for registration.
    • The Court therefore did not finally rule that the cited GEMINI marks were dissimilar, that there was no likelihood of confusion, or that Lucy Group was necessarily entitled to registration.
    • Instead, it remanded the matter to the Registrar for a fresh decision.
    • This distinction is significant because Lucy Group secured a procedural appellate victory, while the substantive question of whether GEMINI should ultimately be registered remains for reconsideration by the Trademark Registry.

    Fresh Decision Within 10 Weeks

    The High Court directed the Registrar to freshly consider Application No. 5247072 after hearing Lucy Group and taking into account all the points raised in response to the Examination Report.

    The Registrar was specifically directed to consider documents already on record, including the:

    • priority documents;
    • user affidavit;
    • written submissions dated 6 August 2024;
    • written submissions dated 17 February 2025; and
    • written submissions dated 15 March 2025.

    The fresh decision must be taken within 10 weeks from 27 March 2026. The Court also directed that no new documents would be permitted before the Registrar during the reconsideration.

    The appeal was accordingly allowed and disposed of.

    Why the Judgment Matters for Trademark Examination

    • The ruling highlights an important procedural safeguard in trademark registration proceedings. The existence of an identical or similar earlier mark may trigger scrutiny under Section 11, but a refusal order must still demonstrate that the Registrar has considered the material factual and legal submissions placed by the applicant.
    • Where an applicant specifically distinguishes the competing goods by their function, market, consumer base and trade channelsβ€”or raises issues concerning abandonment, priority and claimed prior useβ€”those contentions cannot simply be ignored.
    • At the same time, the judgment should not be understood as establishing a general rule that goods within the same class are necessarily dissimilar merely because their applications differ. The High Court deliberately left the merits open for the Registrar’s fresh determination.

    Key Takeaway

    The Delhi High Court’s decision reinforces that trademark refusal orders must be reasoned, speaking orders reflecting consideration of relevant evidence and contentions.

    A mechanical conclusion based on similarity of marks and broadly stated similarity of goods, without addressing material objections raised by the applicant, may not withstand appellate scrutiny.

    For Lucy Group, the judgment reopens the path to registration of GEMINI in Class 09, but does not itself grant the trademark registration. The Registrar must now reconsider the application on its merits within the timeline fixed by the Court.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Calcutta High Court Grants Bail in NDPS Case Over Prolonged Detention; Says Section 37 Rigours Do Not Bar Bail for Trial Delay

    Calcutta High Court Grants Bail in NDPS Case Over Prolonged Detention; Says Section 37 Rigours Do Not Bar Bail for Trial Delay

    Date: 25.09.2026

    The Calcutta High Court granted bail to an accused facing prosecution under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, holding that prolonged incarceration coupled with little possibility of commencement of trial justified release on bail.

    Significantly, the Division Bench observed that a bail plea founded on delay in trial is not fettered by the restrictions contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, relying upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Rabi Prakash v. State of Odisha, (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1109.

    Background of the Case

    • The bail application was filed under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in connection with Kaliachak Police Station Case No. 875 of 2022 dated 12 August 2022.
    • The petitioner, Alok Kumar Mandal @ Alok Mandal, was facing proceedings for alleged offences under Sections 21(c), 27A and 29 of the NDPS Act.
    • Section 21(c) concerns contraventions involving a commercial quantity of manufactured drugs or preparations, while Section 27A deals with financing illicit traffic and harbouring offenders. Section 29 relates to abetment and criminal conspiracy.

    Accused in Custody for One Year and Eight Months

    • Counsel for the petitioner submitted that Mandal had already remained in custody for approximately one year and eight months.
    • More importantly, despite this period of incarceration, charges had still not been framed. The petitioner therefore sought bail primarily on the ground of delay in the criminal proceedings.

    Investigation Was Still Continuing

    • The State placed a report before the High Court.
    • The report showed that further investigation was still underway and forensic analysis of the mobile phone belonging to co-accused Devendra Ahuja was awaited.
    • The status of the investigation became particularly relevant because it indicated that commencement of the trial was not imminent.

    High Court Finds Little Possibility of Trial Commencing Soon

    • After considering the material on record, the Division Bench noted that there was β€œlittle possibility of commencement of trial.”
    • The Court also took into account the petitioner’s prolonged detention and concluded that he had made out a case for bail on the ground of delay in trial.
    • The case therefore turned substantially on the effect of prolonged pre-trial incarceration in an NDPS prosecution where the trial itself had yet to effectively commence.

    Section 37 NDPS Act Does Not Fetter Bail Based on Trial Delay: High Court

    • The most significant observation in the order concerns the stringent bail restrictions contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
    • Ordinarily, Section 37 imposes additional conditions for granting bail in cases involving specified serious NDPS offences and commercial quantity.

    However, the High Court held:

    • β€œBail prayer on the ground of delay in trial is not fettered by restrictions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act…”
    • The Court relied upon the Supreme Court judgment in Rabi Prakash v. State of Odisha, (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1109 for this proposition.
    • The ruling therefore distinguishes a bail claim based upon the merits of the prosecution from one arising because continued pre-trial incarceration has become prolonged while the trial remains unlikely to commence within a reasonable period.

    Reliance on Supreme Court’s Rabi Prakash Decision

    The only judicial precedent expressly cited in the short order is:

    Rabi Prakash v. State of Odisha, (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1109.

    • By relying on Rabi Prakash, the High Court treated prolonged detention and delay in trial as grounds capable of being considered notwithstanding the statutory restrictions governing ordinary bail under Section 37.

    Bail Granted on β‚Ή10,000 Bond

    • Having found sufficient grounds for release, the High Court directed that Alok Kumar Mandal be released on bail upon furnishing a bond of β‚Ή10,000 with two sureties of the like amount, one of whom must be a local surety.
    • The bond was required to be furnished to the satisfaction of the Judge, Special Court under the NDPS Act-cum-Additional District Judge, 4th Court, Malda.

    Conditions Imposed by the High Court

    • The grant of bail was subject to conditions intended to protect the trial process.
    • The petitioner was directed to appear before the Trial Court on every date of hearing until further orders. He was also prohibited from intimidating witnesses or tampering with evidence in any manner.
    • The High Court further clarified that if the petitioner failed to appear before the Trial Court without justifiable cause, the Trial Court would be at liberty to cancel the bail in accordance with law without further reference to the High Court.
    • The bail application was accordingly allowed.

    Why the Decision Is Significant

    • The order is important for NDPS bail jurisprudence because it reiterates that the stringent conditions prescribed by Section 37 cannot be considered in isolation from prolonged pre-trial detention and delay in commencement of trial.
    • The decision does not hold that Section 37 ceases to apply generally in NDPS prosecutions. Rather, the Court specifically dealt with a situation where the accused had remained incarcerated for one year and eight months, charges had not been framed, further investigation remained pending, and there was little prospect of the trial commencing soon.
    • The distinction is important: the relief was based on delay in trial and prolonged detention, not on a final determination concerning the merits of the NDPS allegations.

    Key Takeaway

    The Calcutta High Court has reaffirmed that prolonged incarceration and substantial delay in commencement of an NDPS trial can constitute an independent basis for bail, and a bail plea founded on such delay is not fettered by the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • CESTAT Chennai: Vitamin Feed Premixes Classifiable as Animal Feed Preparations Under CTH 2309

    CESTAT Chennai: Vitamin Feed Premixes Classifiable as Animal Feed Preparations Under CTH 2309

    Date: 25.09.2026

    In a significant ruling concerning the customs classification of feed-grade vitamins and animal nutrition preparations, the CESTAT Chennai has set aside a Customs order seeking to classify imported Vitamin E 50% Feed Grade, Vitamin B2 80% Feed Grade and Vitamin C 35% Feed Grade under CTH 2936 instead of CTH 2309.

    The Tribunal held that, in the absence of a chemical examiner’s report establishing that the imported products were pure chemicals or separate chemically defined organic compounds falling under Chapter 29, the Department had failed to discharge the burden necessary to sustain its proposed classification. Consequently, the benefit of classification was required to go to the importer, Provimi Animal Nutrition India Pvt. Ltd.

    The Classification Dispute: CTH 2309 vs CTH 2936

    Provimi imported goods described as:

    • Vitamin E 50% Feed Grade
    • Vitamin B2 80% Feed Grade
    • Vitamin C 35% Feed Grade
    • The importer classified these products under CTH 2309, covering β€œpreparations of a kind used in animal feeding.”
    • Customs disagreed. The Department considered CTH 2309 to be general in nature and took the view that CTH 2936, covering provitamins, vitamins and their derivatives, was the more specific heading under Rule 3(a) of the General Rules for Interpretation (GRI).
    • According to Revenue, CTH 2309 applies to products presented in a form suitable for use as animal food supplements, whereas the imported vitamins were essentially inputs or raw materials requiring further processing before being incorporated into aquatic, poultry or cattle feed.
    • The Department therefore proposed classification under CTH 2936, attracting 7.5% Basic Customs Duty under Sl. No. 185 of Notification No. 50/2017-Customs and 18% IGST under Sl. No. 40 of Schedule III of Notification No. 1/2017-IGST.

    Customs Raises β‚Ή58.83 Lakh Differential Duty Demand

    • A Show Cause Notice dated 8 March 2024 proposed rejection of Provimi’s classification, reclassification under CTH 2936, denial of the relevant notification benefits and recovery of β‚Ή58,83,019 as short-levied duty, along with confiscation and penalties.
    • The Commissioner of Customs (Audit), Chennai subsequently confirmed the proposals through Order-in-Original No. 108625/2024 dated 16 August 2024, leading Provimi to approach CESTAT.

    Provimi: Products Are Specifically Formulated for Animal Feed

    • Provimi argued that the imported goods were essentially animal-feed preparations and appropriately fell under Chapter Heading 2309.
    • The company relied upon the WCO’s HSN Explanatory Notes to Heading 23.09, particularly the category covering preparations used in making complete feeds or supplementary feeds.
    • It also argued that the goods were designed exclusively for animal use, contained specifically tailored additives, were labelled accordingly and were supplied only to businesses engaged in animal feed and animal husbandry.
    • The importer further contended that Chapter 29 primarily covers separate chemically defined compounds, whereas its imported products were not pure vitamins and contained additives intended to make them suitable specifically for animal nutrition.

    Department: High-Concentration Vitamins Are Raw Materials, Not Animal Feed

    • Revenue countered that the imported products contained vitamins in concentrations ranging from 35% to 80% and could not themselves be directly consumed by animals.
    • The Department argued that they were merely inputs/raw materials for manufacturing animal feed, rather than animal feed or feed supplements themselves.
    • It relied particularly on Commissioner of Customs CGO v. Sonam International Shop No. 9, 2020 (10) TMI 120 – Allahabad High Court, where the High Court considered high-concentration vitamins in the context of classification under Heading 2309.
    • Revenue also referred to the Constitution Bench decision in Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Dilip Kumar and Company & Ors., AIR 2018 SC 3606 in support of its position concerning the interpretation of exemption/classification jurisprudence and earlier reliance on Sun Export Corporation.

    CESTAT Applies Supreme Court’s 2026 Welkin Foods Ruling

    • A major feature of the Tribunal’s analysis was the Supreme Court’s recent judgment in Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Welkin Foods, 2026 INSC 19.
    • CESTAT noted that Welkin Foods comprehensively examined customs classification principles, including the role of:
    • GRI 1, tariff headings and statutory notes, HSN Explanatory Notes, the common/trade parlance test, and the relevance of end use.
    • The Supreme Court had emphasised that GRI 1 is the fundamental starting point for customs classification. Classification must first be determined according to the terms of the headings and the relevant Section and Chapter Notes.
    • Only where goods cannot be classified through GRI 1 and the applicable legal notes should the subsequent rules be considered sequentially.

    Common Parlance Test Cannot Override Technical Tariff Provisions

    • Provimi had argued that, in common and trade parlance, the products were understood as animal-feed supplements.
    • CESTAT, applying Welkin Foods, held that the common or trade parlance test has to be applied restrictively in the modern HSN-based classification system.
    • The Tribunal observed that the terminology employed in Chapters 23 and 29 is scientific and technical. Consequently, the tariff provisions must primarily be interpreted technically rather than simply according to the manner in which the goods are marketed or commercially described.
    • It further observed that an importer relying on a trade-parlance meaning must produce satisfactory evidence supporting that meaning.

    End Use, However, Was Relevant

    • While limiting the common-parlance argument, CESTAT found that end use could legitimately be considered in the present classification dispute.
    • Heading 2309 itself refers to preparations β€œof a kind used in animal feeding,” while Heading 2936 deals with vitamins and their derivatives used primarily as vitamins.
    • The language of the competing headings therefore permitted consideration of use or adaptation as part of the classification exercise.

    Chapter 23 Does Not Exclude Products Merely Because They Are of Chemical Origin

    • Revenue also argued that Heading 2309 covered products obtained from the processing of vegetable or animal materials, whereas Provimi’s products were chemicals.
    • CESTAT rejected a blanket exclusion on that basis.
    • The Tribunal held that the relevant Chapter Note is inclusive and does not exclude products of chemical origin if they otherwise satisfy the description compatible with Chapter 23.
    • This finding is important because it prevents the mere chemical origin of a product from automatically determining classification under Chapter 29.

    Crucial Evidentiary Gap: No Chemical Examiner’s Report

    The decisive weakness in Revenue’s case was the absence of technical evidence.

    CESTAT observed that it did not have the benefit of an expert chemical test report prepared at the time of import to establish whether the products were:

    separate chemically defined organic compounds, capable of classification under Chapter 29; or

    preparations of a kind used in animal feeding, falling under Chapter 23.

    • The Certificates of Analysis submitted by Provimi also did not contain the considered opinion of a technical expert capable of conclusively resolving this question.
    • Provimi maintained that the imported vitamins were not pure vitamins but were formulated with various additives specifically for animal-feed applications, altering their suitability and making them intended for animal nutrition.

    HSN Notes Recognise Premixes Under Heading 2309

    CESTAT then examined the HSN Explanatory Notes because it found the HSN and Customs Tariff entries under Chapter 23 to be sufficiently aligned.

    The HSN Notes divide the relevant Heading 23.09 preparations into three broad categories:

    HSN categoryDescription
    AComplete feed
    BPreparations supplementing/balancing farm-produced feeds
    CPreparations used in making complete or supplementary feeds
    • The Tribunal observed that the disputed goods were not complete feed or feed supplements falling within categories A or B. However, category C specifically concerns β€œpreparations” used in making such feeds, commonly known in trade as premixes.
    • This was significant because a product need not necessarily be directly fed to an animal in order to fall within the broader scope of Heading 2309.

    Government Circular Identified Products as β€œVitamin Premixes (Feed Grade)”

    • Provimi also relied upon a circular dated 21 December 2022 issued by the Department of Animal Husbandry and Dairying, Ministry of Fisheries, Animal Husbandry and Dairying.
    • The Tribunal recorded that the very products involved in the disputeβ€”Vitamin E 50% Feed Grade, Vitamin B2 80% Feed Grade and Vitamin C 35% Monophosphate Feed Gradeβ€”were expressly mentioned as β€œVitamin Premixes (Feed Grade)” in that document.

    CESTAT Also Examines Meaning of β€œPremix”

    • The Tribunal referred to the Customs Advance Ruling in In Re: BASF India Ltd., (2024) 24 Centax 401 (A.A.R.-Cus.-Mum.).
    • That ruling discussed premixes as complex mixtures of vitamins, minerals, trace elements and other feed additives incorporated into compound feed, and explained that such premixtures are not themselves intended for direct feeding to animals.
    • This was relevant to Revenue’s argument that the products could not fall under Heading 2309 merely because they were not capable of being directly consumed by animals.

    Burden to Establish Reclassification Lies on Customs

    • CESTAT ultimately treated the burden of proof as decisive.
    • Referring to Union of India v. Garware Nylons Ltd., 1996 (87) E.L.T. 12 (S.C.) and HPL Chemicals Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh, 2006 (197) E.L.T. 324 (S.C.), the Tribunal reiterated that when Revenue seeks a particular classification, it must establish that the goods are taxable under the classification proposed by it.
    • Because there was no Chemical Examiner’s certificate establishing whether the goods were pure chemicals, mixture concentrates or premixes, Revenue had failed to discharge that burden.
    • CESTAT therefore held that the benefit of classification must go to the appellant.

    B.V. Bio Corp Decision Supports Classification Under CTH 23099090

    • The Tribunal also relied on its coordinate-bench ruling in B.V. Bio Corp Private Limited v. Commissioner of Customs (NS-I), 2024 (4) TMI 1173 – CESTAT Mumbai.
    • That case concerned imported products containing vitamins and provitamins in concentrations ranging from 2.7% to 100%.
    • The Mumbai Bench had concluded that the goods were classifiable under Tariff Item 23099090 and that classification under Heading 2936 was not legally sustainable.
    • The judgment further records that the B.V. Bio Corp position was affirmed, with the goods being treated as animal-feed preparations appropriately classified under Tariff Item 23099090, having regard to Circular No. 188/22/96-CX dated 26 March 1996.

    Duty, Interest, Confiscation and Penalty Fall with Classification Demand

    • Once Revenue failed to sustain the proposed classification under CTH 2936, CESTAT held that the consequential duty demand, interest, fine and penalty could not survive.
    • Provimi had separately challenged confiscation and penalty under Sections 111, 125 and 114A of the Customs Act, 1962, arguing inter alia that a bona fide classification claim did not amount to misdeclaration.

    Final Decision: Provimi’s Appeal Allowed

    • CESTAT set aside the impugned Order-in-Original and allowed Provimi’s appeal to the limited extent decided in the classification proceedings, with consequential relief as available under law.
    • The Tribunal, however, made an important qualification regarding Provimi’s separate refund claim. Issues such as refund that were not part of the original proceedings were not adjudicated in this appeal and would have to be pursued separately in accordance with law.
    • Thus, while Provimi succeeded in overturning the Department’s reclassification and consequential demand, the order should not be read as having independently sanctioned the refund claimed by the company.

    Key Takeaway

    The ruling reinforces an important principle in customs classification disputes: Customs cannot sustain reclassification merely by asserting that an alternative tariff heading is more specific. When the proposed classification depends upon the chemical composition and technical character of imported goods, Revenue must produce adequate technical evidence to discharge its burden of proof.

    For feed-grade vitamins and premixes, the decision also recognises that Heading 2309 is not confined to products directly consumed by animals.

    Preparations used in making complete or supplementary feeds can fall within its scope, subject to their objective characteristics, composition, HSN guidance and supporting technical evidence.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Bombay High Court Condones 143-Day Delay in Homebuyers’ RERA Appeal; Says Tribunal Adopted Rigid Approach

    Bombay High Court Condones 143-Day Delay in Homebuyers’ RERA Appeal; Says Tribunal Adopted Rigid Approach

    Date: 25.09.2026

    In an important ruling concerning condonation of delay in appeals under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA), the Bombay High Court has set aside an order of the Maharashtra Real Estate Appellate Tribunal which had refused to condone a 143-day delay by two homebuyers in filing their appeal.

    Justice N.J. Jamadar held that the Appellate Tribunal had adopted a β€œslightly rigid approach” and failed to apply the justice-oriented principles governing the expression β€œsufficient cause”. The Court emphasised that the requirement of explaining each day’s delay cannot be stretched to demand β€œmathematical precision and exactitude”.

    The High Court accordingly condoned the 143-day delay, subject to payment of β‚Ή20,000 as costs, and directed the Appellate Tribunal to decide the homebuyers’ substantive appeal in accordance with law.

    Homebuyers Purchased Two Flats in β€˜Sodah Sadan’ Project

    • The appellants, Atul Hiralal Shah and another, had entered into two registered agreements on 4 October 2016 for purchase of two flats in a project known as β€œSodah Sadan”, promoted by the respondents.
    • Under the agreements, possession was to be delivered by 31 December 2018. According to the appellants, despite repeated extensions, the promoters failed to perform their obligations.
    • The homebuyers consequently approached the Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory Authority seeking possession, interest, compensation and other reliefs.

    MahaRERA Grants Delayed-Possession Interest but Rejects Possession Claim

    • By an order dated 30 June 2025, MahaRERA partly allowed the complaint.
    • Although the Authority rejected the claim for possession, it directed the promoters to pay interest for delayed delivery of the flats from 1 January 2019 until the date of offer of possession with Occupancy Certificate (OC).
    • The interest was directed to be calculated on the actual amount paid by the homebuyers towards the flat consideration at the rate of SBI’s Marginal Cost Lending Rate (MCLR) plus 2%, as prescribed under Section 18 of RERA and the applicable Rules.
    • However, the Authority further directed that the interest amount would become payable after the promoters obtained the full Occupancy Certificate. The promoters were also permitted to adjust the interest against outstanding consideration and interest thereon, if any.
    • This condition ultimately became important in the High Court’s consideration of why the homebuyers had delayed filing their appeal.

    Homebuyers Waited for Promoter to Obtain Occupancy Certificate

    • The appellants explained that after the MahaRERA order they genuinely believed that the promoters would obtain the full OC and comply with the direction for payment of delayed-possession interest.
    • They therefore continued pursuing the promoters for the Occupancy Certificate.
    • According to them, it eventually became apparent that there was no meaningful progress at the project site and no immediate possibility of obtaining the OC. They then decided to challenge the MahaRERA order before the Appellate Tribunal.
    • This resulted in a delay of 143 days, for which they sought condonation through Miscellaneous Application No. 117 of 2026.

    Appellate Tribunal Refuses to Condon 143-Day Delay

    • On 6 April 2026, the Maharashtra Real Estate Appellate Tribunal rejected the delay-condonation application.
    • The Tribunal acknowledged that a liberal and justice-oriented approach is ordinarily adopted in such matters, but held that this principle could not defeat the substantive law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
    • It concluded that the reasons advanced by the homebuyers did not amount to β€œsufficient cause”. It further held that the appellants had failed to account for each and every day’s delay and appeared negligent in not pursuing their appellate remedy within the prescribed time.
    • The homebuyers consequently approached the Bombay High Court in Second Appeal.

    Substantial Question of Law Before Bombay High Court

    • The High Court formulated the following substantial question of law:
    • β€œWhether the Appellate Tribunal did not apply correct principles in deciding the application for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal, and, thereby misdirected itself in rejecting the application for condonation of delay?”
    • Considering the nature of the controversy, the Court proceeded to finally decide the Second Appeal with the consent of the parties.

    Homebuyers: Tribunal Adopted an Unduly Rigid Approach

    • Senior Advocate Naushad Engineer, appearing for the appellants, argued that MahaRERA had placed the homebuyers in a peculiar position.
    • Although the Authority granted them delayed-possession interest, actual payment of that interest was deferred until the promoter obtained the Occupancy Certificate.
    • The homebuyers therefore had a legitimate reason to pursue the promoter for obtaining the OC so that the relief granted by MahaRERA could become enforceable.
    • It was further argued that 143 days was not an inordinate delay and that the Tribunal had adopted an excessively rigid standard instead of examining the explanation in the context of the object of RERA and the circumstances faced by the allottees.

    Promoter: Non-Compliance With an Order Cannot Justify Delayed Appeal

    • The promoters opposed the appeal.
    • They argued that non-compliance with the MahaRERA order might possibly explain delay in seeking its enforcement, but could not constitute sufficient cause for delaying an appeal against that very order.
    • According to the promoters, unless a satisfactory cause was shown for not approaching the appellate forum within limitation, neither the Tribunal nor the Court could exercise the power of condonation.
    • They also objected to documents which the homebuyers sought to rely upon before the High Court on the ground that those documents had not been produced before the Appellate Tribunal.

    High Court: Explanation Must Be Assessed in Context of Real-Life Circumstances

    • Justice Jamadar acknowledged that, viewed in a very strict sense, non-compliance with the MahaRERA order might not by itself constitute a satisfactory explanation for delay in appealing.
    • But the Court held that the explanation could not be assessed in isolation.
    • It had to be considered β€œin the light of the attendant facts of the case and the situation in life of the parties.”
    • This contextual approach became central to the High Court’s reasoning.

    β€˜Sufficient Cause’ Is Elastic and Cannot Be Put in a Straitjacket

    • The Court examined the principles underlying limitation law and noted that limitation statutes are sometimes described as β€œstatutes of peace” because public policy requires finality in litigation.
    • At the same time, the expression β€œsufficient cause” governing condonation of delay has traditionally received a liberal construction where doing so advances substantial justice and the party is not guilty of negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides.
    • The High Court observed that β€œsufficient cause” cannot be confined in a straitjacket and that no universal formula can determine whether a particular explanation is sufficient.

    Supreme Court Principles on Condonation of Delay Considered

    • The High Court relied upon Pundlik Jalan Patil v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448, concerning the public-policy rationale underlying limitation statutes.
    • It also extensively referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs. v. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, which in turn considered Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. v. Special Deputy Collector (LA), 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513.
    • The principles extracted by the Court recognise that while Section 3 of the Limitation Act must be applied strictly, Section 5 requires a more liberal construction. At the same time, a justice-oriented approach cannot be used to condone inordinate delay accompanied by negligence, lack of diligence or want of bona fides.
    • The Court emphasised that the inquiry must ultimately consider whether the explanation is real, bona fide and free from negligence, viewed contextually and having regard to the totality of circumstances.

    Appellate Tribunal Adopted a β€˜Slightly Rigid Approach’

    • Applying those principles, the High Court found that the Appellate Tribunal had been too rigid.

    The sufficiency of the explanation ought to have been examined on the touchstones of:

    reasonableness, bona fides and diligence, coupled with the necessary degree of justice-oriented flexibility.

    The High Court clarified that delay should not be condoned where there is gross negligence, deliberate inaction or blatant indifference to statutory timelines. But it expressly found:

    β€œThat is not the case at hand.”

    Waiting for Occupancy Certificate Was Not Wholly Unreasonable

    • A particularly important aspect of the judgment concerns the practical predicament faced by the allottees.
    • Possession had originally been promised by 31 December 2018, yet even when the matter reached the High Court, the promoters had neither offered possession nor obtained the full Occupancy Certificate.
    • The Court held that the allottees’ expectation that the promoter would comply with its statutory and contractual obligations and the MahaRERA order could not be described as wholly unreasonable.

    MahaRERA Order Made Interest Dependent on an Event Beyond Allottees’ Control

    • The High Court found the structure of the MahaRERA order itself significant.
    • Although delayed-possession interest had been granted, payment was deferred until the promoter obtained the Occupancy Certificate.
    • Thus, enforcement of the monetary relief granted to the allottees had effectively been made contingent upon an event which was outside their control and dependent upon the acts of the promoter.
    • In these circumstances, the allottees’ decision to pursue the promoter in the bona fide expectation that the OC would shortly be obtained could not properly be treated as negligence.

    β€˜Every Day’s Delay’ Rule Cannot Be Applied With Mathematical Precision

    The Bombay High Court then made an important observation concerning the frequently invoked requirement that a litigant explain β€œeach and every day’s delay”.

    The Court held that:

    • The principle that a party seeking condonation must account for each and every day’s delay cannot be stretched to the point of mathematical precision and exactitude.
    • It also found that a delay of 143 days was neither huge nor inordinate in the circumstances of the case.
    • This observation is likely to be particularly relevant in future delay-condonation disputes where tribunals adopt an overly mechanical day-by-day approach despite a coherent overall explanation.

    Occupancy Certificate Still Not Obtained

    • During the hearing, counsel for the promoters fairly informed the High Court that, according to his instructions, the Occupancy Certificate had still not been obtained.
    • The Court observed that if the allottees attempted to enforce the MahaRERA order in that situation, such proceedings could be termed premature because the liability to pay interest had itself been deferred until the uncertain future event of obtaining the OC.
    • Whether such a condition in the MahaRERA order was legally justified would therefore need to be examined by the Appellate Tribunal once the appeal was restored.

    Bombay High Court Allows Appeal and Condones Delay

    The High Court answered the substantial question of law in favour of the appellants and allowed the Second Appeal.

    It consequently:

    • quashed and set aside the Appellate Tribunal’s order dated 6 April 2026;
    • allowed the application seeking condonation of delay;
    • condoned the 143-day delay in filing the RERA appeal;
    • imposed β‚Ή20,000 costs, payable by the appellants to the respondents within four weeks from uploading of the order; and
    • requested the Maharashtra Real Estate Appellate Tribunal to decide the substantive appeal in accordance with law.

    Important: High Court Did Not Finally Decide the Homebuyers’ RERA Claims

    • The judgment must be understood within its procedural limits.
    • The Bombay High Court did not finally decide whether the homebuyers are entitled to possession, whether the manner in which MahaRERA deferred payment of interest until receipt of the OC is legally valid, or what substantive relief should ultimately be granted.
    • The Court’s ruling concerns the rejection of the delay-condonation application. Those substantive RERA issues will now be examined by the Maharashtra Real Estate Appellate Tribunal after restoration of the appeal.

    Why the Judgment Is Significant

    • The ruling reinforces that limitation law must strike a balance between finality of proceedings and substantial justice. Courts and tribunals cannot disregard statutory limitation periods, but neither should the concept of β€œsufficient cause” be applied through an excessively mechanical formula.
    • In RERA disputes particularly, the surrounding circumstances faced by homebuyersβ€”including dependence upon the promoter for completion, possession and Occupancy Certificatesβ€”may be relevant while assessing whether their conduct reflects negligence or a bona fide attempt to secure compliance.
    • The judgment also sends a clear message that the requirement to explain delay does not necessarily mean that a litigant must produce a mathematically precise explanation for every individual day where the overall conduct demonstrates reasonable diligence and bona fides.

    Key Takeaway

    A 143-day delay in filing a RERA appeal cannot be rejected through an excessively rigid application of limitation principles where the allottees acted bona fide and their explanation is consistent with the surrounding circumstances.

    The requirement to explain β€œeach and every day’s delay” cannot be stretched to mathematical precision.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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  • Supreme Court: Arbitrator Cannot Award Pre-Reference Interest When Contract Expressly Bars It

    Supreme Court: Arbitrator Cannot Award Pre-Reference Interest When Contract Expressly Bars It

    Date: 25.09.2026

    In an important ruling concerning interest in arbitration arising from public works contracts, the Supreme Court has held that where the parties have expressly agreed to a contractual clause barring interest on delayed payments, an Arbitral Tribunal cannot award pre-reference interest contrary to that bargain.

    Allowing the appeal filed by North Eastern Electric Power Corporation Limited (NEEPCO) against Astra Construction Private Limited, the Supreme Court set aside the Meghalaya High Court judgment to the extent that it had restored pre-reference interest awarded by the Arbitral Tribunal.

    The Court held that Clause 54 of the General Conditions of Contract (GCC) constituted an express contractual prohibition against such interest and therefore restricted the Tribunal’s power under Section 31(7)(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

    Background of the Dispute

    • NEEPCO had invited tenders on 12 June 1995 for civil works relating to the main plant and auxiliary building of a Gas Turbine Power Project at Ram Chandra Nagar, Tripura. Astra Construction’s tender was accepted and the parties executed a formal agreement on 23 May 1996.
    • The estimated contract value was approximately β‚Ή17.09 crore, and the work was stipulated to be completed by 26 March 1997.
    • Disputes subsequently arose and were referred to arbitration. By an award dated 5 June 2015, the Arbitral Tribunal found that the delay in execution of the project was attributable to NEEPCO.

    Four claims raised by Astra Construction were allowed and a principal amount of β‚Ή3.30 crore was awarded. In addition, the Tribunal granted:

    ComponentInterest awarded
    Pre-reference interest12% per annum
    Pendente lite interest9% per annum
    Future interest9% per annum

    The pre-reference interest at 12% was awarded on each of the claims allowed by the Tribunal.

    Commercial Court Interferes with Interest Component

    • NEEPCO challenged the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
    • The Commercial Court, by its judgment dated 15 February 2024, relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Sayeed Ahmed & Company v. State of U.P. and concluded that Clause 54 barred the grant of interest.
    • Accordingly, the Commercial Court set aside the grant of pre-suit and pendente lite interest on Claim Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5, while otherwise upholding the award.

    Meghalaya High Court Restores Arbitral Award

    • Astra Construction challenged the Commercial Court’s decision under Section 37 of the 1996 Act.
    • The Meghalaya High Court relied upon the Supreme Court’s earlier judgment in State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra & Co., (1999) 1 SCC 63.
    • It held that the contractual bar under Clause 54 was confined to interest claimed on money or balances withheld because of a dispute and did not extend to every other head of claim.
    • On that reasoning, the High Court restored the Arbitral Tribunal’s award in its entirety.
    • NEEPCO consequently approached the Supreme Court.

    NEEPCO Confines Supreme Court Challenge to Pre-Reference Interest

    • Before the Supreme Court, NEEPCO confined its challenge to the High Court’s restoration of pre-reference interest.
    • NEEPCO argued that the High Court had wrongly relied upon Harish Chandra, which arose under the Arbitration Act, 1940, without properly appreciating the later jurisprudence under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
    • NEEPCO relied particularly upon Sayeed Ahmed, Jai Prakash Associates Ltd. v. Tehri Hydro Development Corporation Ltd., Ferro Concrete Construction (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and ONGC v. G & T Beckfield Drilling Services Pvt. Ltd.
    • Astra Construction, on the other hand, argued that NEEPCO had not raised the Clause 54 objection before the Arbitral Tribunal and had therefore waived its right to raise the issue. It relied upon Union of India v. Susaka Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., (2018) 2 SCC 182.

    Supreme Court Explains Major Difference Between 1940 and 1996 Arbitration Laws

    • A significant part of the judgment explains the evolution of the law governing an arbitrator’s power to award interest.
    • Under the Arbitration Act, 1940, there was no express statutory provision empowering an arbitrator to award interest. The Supreme Court’s Constitution Bench in Secretary, Irrigation Department, Government of Orissa v. G.C. Roy, (1992) 1 SCC 508 developed the principle that where an agreement did not prohibit interest and the claim was referred to arbitration, interest could be treated as an implied term of the agreement.
    • The position changed materially under the 1996 Act.
    • Section 31(7)(a) expressly begins with the words β€œUnless otherwise agreed by the parties”. The Supreme Court held that these words give primacy to party autonomy: the statutory power of an arbitrator to award interest is subject to what the contracting parties have agreed.

    Contract Can Restrict Arbitrator’s Power to Award Interest

    • Referring to Pam Developments Private Limited v. State of West Bengal, (2024) 10 SCC 715, the Court explained that under the 1996 Act an express contractual bar can restrict the arbitrator’s power to award pre-reference and pendente lite interest.
    • Unlike the position under the 1940 Act, it is not necessary that the contractual provision specifically state that the β€œarbitrator” has no power to award interest. If the agreement itself bars payment of interest, Section 31(7)(a) respects that contractual arrangement.
    • The Court reiterated that Section 31(7)(a) reflects a deliberate legislative shift toward party autonomy.

    Pre-Reference and Pendente Lite Interest Are Legally Distinct

    The judgment also draws an important distinction between pre-reference interest and pendente lite interest.

    The Court reaffirmed that pendente lite interest is a matter of procedural law governed by Section 31(7)(a), whereas pre-reference interest is governed by substantive law.

    Consequently, entitlement to pre-reference interest cannot be derived solely from Section 31(7)(a). It must have a basis in:

    • an express or implied agreement between the parties;
    • a statutory provision such as Section 3 of the Interest Act, 1978; or
    • established mercantile usage.

    Clause 54 Was the Decisive Contractual Provision

    • Clause 54 of the NEEPCO contract was titled β€œNo Claim for Delayed Payment due to Dispute Etc.”
    • It provided that no claim for interest or damages would be entertained in respect of money or balances lying with NEEPCO because of a dispute, difference or misunderstanding, or in respect of delay by the Engineer-in-Charge in making periodical or final payments, or in any other respect whatsoever.
    • The central question was whether this clause resembled the provision interpreted in Harish Chandra or the broader contractual bars considered in Sayeed Ahmed and the later THDC decisions.

    Supreme Court’s Important Comparison of Contract Clauses

    • The Supreme Court itself provided a comparative table on page 13 of the judgment, placing Clause 54 alongside the clauses considered in Harish Chandra, Sayeed Ahmed and THDC-II.
    • The Court found an important drafting difference.
    • In Harish Chandra, the contractual restriction essentially dealt with money withheld because of a dispute. It did not create a separate and independent prohibition concerning money simply paid late where no underlying dispute existed.
    • That was why the Harish Chandra Bench had concluded that the provision did not generally prevent an arbitrator from awarding interest for delayed payment.

    Clause 54 Goes Further Than Harish Chandra Clause

    Clause 54 in the NEEPCO contract was materially different.

    The Supreme Court found that it covered two independent situations:

    1. money or balances lying with the Corporation because of a dispute, difference or misunderstanding; and
    2. delay by the Engineer-in-Charge in making periodical or final payments.

    The second limb was decisive.

    • By separately and expressly covering delayed payment, Clause 54 prohibited an interest claim arising from delay even where there was no dispute about the underlying payment.
    • The Court therefore concluded that the High Court had erred in treating Clause 54 as equivalent to the clause considered in Harish Chandra.

    Sayeed Ahmed and THDC Line of Cases Applies

    • The Supreme Court instead found Clause 54 materially similar to the clauses considered in Sayeed Ahmed and THDC-II.
    • In those cases, separate language dealing with delayed payment was treated as a complete contractual restriction on the arbitrator’s authority to grant interest for the relevant periods.
    • The Supreme Court expressly agreed with that reasoning and held that the Sayeed Ahmed line of decisionsβ€”not Harish Chandraβ€”governed the NEEPCO dispute.

    NEEPCO Had Not Waived the Contractual Objection

    • The Supreme Court also rejected Astra Construction’s contention that NEEPCO had waived its right to rely upon Clause 54 because the objection had allegedly not been taken before the Arbitral Tribunal.
    • The record showed that NEEPCO had specifically raised the plea in its Statement of Defence dated 23 August 2012 before the Tribunal. The waiver argument therefore failed on facts.

    Supreme Court’s Final Decision

    • The Supreme Court ultimately held that Clause 54 barred the grant of pre-reference interest.
    • It further held that the Arbitral Tribunal, by granting such interest despite the contractual prohibition, exceeded the bounds of its jurisdiction under Section 31(7)(a).
    • Accordingly, the Meghalaya High Court judgment was set aside to the extent it had restored pre-reference interest, and NEEPCO’s appeal was allowed without any order as to costs.
    • Importantly, NEEPCO had confined its Supreme Court challenge to the restoration of pre-reference interest. The judgment should therefore not be read as the Supreme Court setting aside the entire arbitral award or the β‚Ή3.30 crore principal amount.

    Why This Judgment Is Important for Government and Infrastructure Contracts

    • The judgment has considerable significance for EPC contracts, construction contracts, power projects, infrastructure agreements and government/public-sector works contracts containing β€œno-interest” clauses.
    • Its central message is that Section 31(7)(a) does not give an arbitrator an unrestricted power to award interest. The statutory power operates subject to the parties’ agreement.
    • The precise drafting of the contractual clause becomes critical. A clause limited merely to amounts withheld because of a dispute may have a different legal effect from a clause that independently and expressly prohibits interest for delayed periodical or final payments.
    • The decision therefore reinforces both party autonomy and the importance of carefully construing the actual words of the contract before determining whether pre-reference interest is legally recoverable.

    Key Takeaway

    Where a contract governed by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 expressly bars interest on delayed payments, an Arbitral Tribunal cannot override that bargain and award pre-reference interest under Section 31(7)(a). The wording of the contractual bar is decisive.

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  • Bombay High Court Awards β‚Ή8.14 Lakh Compensation to Parents of Passenger Who Fell From Train

    Bombay High Court Awards β‚Ή8.14 Lakh Compensation to Parents of Passenger Who Fell From Train

    Date: 25.09.2026

    The Bombay High Court has awarded β‚Ή8,14,641 as compensation to the parents of a 26-year-old railway passenger who died after falling from a local train, setting aside a Railway Claims Tribunal order that had treated the death as a case of trespassing on railway tracks.

    Justice Aarti Sathe held that entries in railway records may be admissible under Section 191 of the Railways Act, 1989, but they do not become conclusive proof merely because they form part of official railway records. Their reliability and evidentiary value must still be judicially tested, particularly when they conflict with independent evidence.

    The Court found that the Railway Claims Tribunal had ignored the inquest panchanama, relied heavily on a DRM report containing only a tentative conclusion, and reached a finding of trespassing despite there being no eyewitness or other evidence establishing that the deceased was crossing the railway tracks.

    Parents Challenge Rejection of Railway Compensation Claim

    • The appeal was filed by Waman Maruti Suryawanshi and Prabhavati Waman Suryawanshi, parents of deceased Rahul Waman Suryawanshi, challenging the Railway Claims Tribunal, Mumbai’s judgment dated 20 September 2019, which had dismissed their compensation claim.
    • The appeal was filed under Section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987.
    • At the relevant time, Rahul was employed with the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation (MIDC) and, according to his parents, was the sole breadwinner of the family. They claimed to have been financially dependent upon him.

    Parents Said Son Accidentally Fell From Moving Local Train

    • According to the appellants, on 22 March 2015, Rahul purchased a valid railway ticket at Ghansoli Railway Station and boarded a local train for Airoli.
    • Their case was that while the train was travelling between Ghansoli and Rabale railway stations, Rahul accidentally fell from the moving train, suffered serious injuries and died before he could be admitted to hospital.
    • The parents further claimed that a railway ticket was recovered from Rahul’s body and recorded in the inquest panchanama, though the ticket was subsequently misplaced by them.
    • They filed a compensation claim under Section 124A of the Railways Act, 1989 on 9 April 2015.

    Railways Claimed Deceased Was Trespassing

    • Central Railway disputed the claim.
    • Following a statutory investigation under the Railway Passengers (Manner of Investigation of Untoward Incident) Rules, 2003, the Divisional Railway Manager’s report concluded that Rahul had been trespassing on the railway track and was injured after being hit by a train.
    • The Railways relied, among other things, on a Station Master’s memo recording that an unknown person aged about 26 years had allegedly been hit by an unknown train while trespassing.
    • On that basis, the Railways denied that Rahul’s death constituted an β€œuntoward incident” under Section 123(c)(2) and also disputed that he was a bona fide passenger.

    Tribunal Found Him to Be a Bona Fide Passenger but Still Rejected Compensation

    • Significantly, the Railway Claims Tribunal itself found from the inquest panchanama that Rahul had been carrying a valid railway ticket and was therefore a bona fide passenger.
    • However, the Tribunal nevertheless concluded that the parents had failed to establish that Rahul had fallen from a local train.
    • It instead accepted the theory that he had been knocked down by an unknown train between Ghansoli and Rabale and consequently dismissed the compensation claim.
    • This apparent inconsistency became an important issue before the Bombay High Court.

    No Eyewitness Supported Railways’ Trespassing Theory

    • The High Court found the Tribunal’s conclusion erroneous.
    • Justice Sathe noted that there was β€œabsolutely no eyewitness” and no evidence led by the Railways to establish that Rahul was actually crossing or trespassing on the railway tracks.
    • The Tribunal had essentially relied upon the DRM report and Station Master’s memo without independently examining whether the factual conclusion recorded therein was correct.
    • More importantly, the office note forming part of the DRM report itself did not conclusively state that Rahul was trespassing. It merely stated that the incident β€œmight have taken place while the victim was crossing Railway Track.”
    • The High Court therefore found that a tentative departmental conclusion could not, without supporting evidence, establish trespassing.

    Inquest Panchanama Recorded Fall From Local Train and Recovery of Ticket

    • The High Court attached considerable significance to the inquest panchanama, which the Tribunal had failed to properly consider.
    • The document recorded that Rahul had β€œfallen down from unknown local train” and sustained injuries.
    • It also expressly recorded that when his body was checked, authorities found, among other belongings, a railway ticket.
    • The panchanama further recorded the conclusion that Rahul had died due to a fall from an unknown local train after sustaining serious injuries, subject to determination of the medical cause of death through post-mortem examination.
    • The High Court observed that the DRM report had been prepared while ignoring this crucial recording in the inquest panchanama.

    Railway Records Admissible, But Not Conclusive Proof

    • One of the most significant legal findings in the judgment concerns Section 191 of the Railways Act.
    • The Railways argued that the DRM report resulted from a statutory investigation and had sufficient evidentiary value under Section 191.
    • The High Court rejected the argument that this gave the report conclusive status.

    Justice Sathe held that Section 191 makes entries contained in railway records admissible in evidence, but:

    β€œthe same does not render them conclusive proof as facts stated therein.”

    • The credibility of such records must still be judicially tested for reliability and corroboration, particularly where the railway records conflict with independent evidence.
    • For this proposition, the Court also relied upon the Orissa High Court’s decision in Basanta Mangaraj & Anr. v. Union of India, F.A.O. No. 170 of 2025.

    Accidental Fall From Passenger Train Is an β€˜Untoward Incident’

    • Section 123(c)(2) of the Railways Act expressly includes within the definition of an β€œuntoward incident” the accidental falling of a passenger from a train carrying passengers.
    • The High Court noted that the Tribunal had already found Rahul to be a bona fide passenger carrying a valid ticket.
    • Once that finding existed, the Tribunal could not simply rely upon the Station Master’s memo and DRM report to conclude that there was no untoward incident, particularly in the absence of evidence establishing trespassing.

    Negligence of Passenger Does Not by Itself Defeat Compensation

    • The High Court relied upon the Supreme Court decisions in Jameela & Ors. v. Union of India, 2010 ACJ 2453 and Union of India v. Rina Devi, 2018 ACJ 1441.
    • The judgment reiterated that where a passenger falls from a running train during the journey, the incident constitutes an untoward incident and the Railways would be liable unless the case falls within one of the statutory exceptions under Section 124A.
    • The statutory exceptions include death or injury caused by suicide or attempted suicide, self-inflicted injury, the passenger’s own criminal act, intoxication or insanity, and specified natural or medical causes.
    • The Court referred to Jameela for the distinction between ordinary negligence and the β€œcriminal act” contemplated by the proviso to Section 124A. The Supreme Court had explained that even negligent or rash conduct, without more, does not necessarily amount to the criminal act contemplated by the statutory exception.

    Tribunal Cannot Act as Expert on Nature of Injuries

    • The High Court also criticised the Tribunal’s attempt to infer from the nature of Rahul’s injuries that he must have been knocked down or run over by a train rather than having fallen from one.
    • Justice Sathe held that the Tribunal was not an expert body competent to draw such a medical or technical conclusion without supporting evidence.
    • There was nothing on record establishing that the injuries were of a kind that could only have resulted from being struck by a train.
    • The Court therefore held that the Tribunal’s personal opinion regarding the nature of the injuries could not become the decisive basis for determining how the accident occurred.

    Railways Failed to Establish Section 124A Exception

    • The High Court further found that the Tribunal had failed to properly examine whether Rahul’s death actually fell within any of the exceptions contained in clauses (a) to (e) of the proviso to Section 124A.
    • In the absence of such a finding, denial of compensation was held to be legally unsustainable.
    • The Court accordingly concluded that the Tribunal’s judgment deserved to be set aside.

    Railways Act Is Beneficial Legislation and Must Receive Liberal Interpretation

    • Justice Sathe also emphasised the beneficial nature of the Railways Act.
    • Rahul’s father and mother were undisputedly his dependants within the meaning of Section 123(b).
    • The Court observed that where legislation is beneficial in nature, it should receive a liberal interpretation and, where two constructions are reasonably possible, the interpretation favouring the beneficiary should be preferred.
    • According to the High Court, the Tribunal had adopted a narrow and erroneous interpretation which deprived the deceased passenger’s family of the benefit intended by the legislation.

    Compensation: β‚Ή8 Lakh or β‚Ή4 Lakh Plus Interest?

    • The accident occurred on 22 March 2015, when the prescribed compensation for death was β‚Ή4 lakh.
    • However, by the time the Tribunal delivered its judgment on 20 September 2019, the Railway Accidents and Untoward Incidents (Compensation) Rules had been amended and compensation for death had been enhanced to β‚Ή8 lakh.
    • Applying the principle in Rina Devi, the High Court compared the enhanced statutory compensation with the original β‚Ή4 lakh amount together with applicable interest.
    • The Court applied interest at 9% per annum from the date of the accident, finding that β‚Ή4 lakh together with interest up to the date of its judgment came to β‚Ή8,14,641.
    • Since this was higher than the amended fixed compensation of β‚Ή8 lakh, the Court awarded the higher figure.

    Bombay High Court Awards β‚Ή8,14,641 to Parents

    • The High Court ultimately allowed the First Appeal and quashed the Railway Claims Tribunal’s judgment dated 20 September 2019.
    • The parents’ compensation claim was allowed for β‚Ή8,14,641, to be distributed equally between them.
    • Central Railway was directed to deposit the amount into their bank accounts within eight weeks from the date on which the appellants furnish their bank details to the Chief Claim Officer, Central Railway.
    • If the Railways fails to deposit the compensation within the stipulated period, the amount will carry further interest at 9% per annum until payment.

    Key Takeaway

    The judgment establishes an important evidentiary principle for railway compensation cases: departmental railway records such as DRM reports and Station Master memos may be admissible, but they are not conclusive proof of how an accident occurred.

    Where the Railways alleges trespassing, its internal records must still withstand judicial scrutiny and be tested against independent evidence. A tentative departmental statement that an accident β€œmight” have occurred while crossing railway tracks cannot automatically outweigh an inquest panchanama, the recovery of a valid railway ticket and the absence of any eyewitness supporting the trespassing theory.

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  • Karnataka High Court: Criminal Antecedents Alone Cannot Justify Rejection of Bail

    Karnataka High Court: Criminal Antecedents Alone Cannot Justify Rejection of Bail

    Date: 25.09.2026

    The Karnataka High Court has granted regular bail to a 23-year-old accused in a case concerning alleged preparation to commit dacoity, reiterating the Supreme Court’s principle that criminal antecedents cannot, by themselves, be the sole ground for rejecting bail when an accused is otherwise entitled to release.

    Justice S. Vishwajith Shetty allowed the petition after taking into account that the investigation had been completed, the charge sheet had already been filed, the petitioner had been granted bail in his earlier criminal cases, and he had undertaken to cooperate with the Trial Court for speedy disposal of the proceedings.

    Background of the Case

    • The petitioner, Sudeep, was arrayed as Accused No. 1 in S.C. No. 156/2025, pending before the VI Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tumakuru.
    • The proceedings arose from Crime No. 87/2025, registered by Hebburu Police Station, Tumakuru District, for offences punishable under Sections 310(4) and 310(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
    • Sudeep approached the Karnataka High Court seeking regular bail under Section 483 of the BNSS, 2023.
    • The criminal petition itself records the corresponding reference to Section 439 of the erstwhile Code of Criminal Procedure while seeking bail under the current BNSS framework.

    FIR Initially Registered Against Unknown Persons

    • The case originated from information received on 20 May 2025 from Byregowda G.S., a police officer attached to Hebburu Police Station.
    • On the basis of the information, the FIR was initially registered against four to five unknown persons.
    • Sudeep was arrested on the same day, 20 May 2025, and was thereafter remanded to judicial custody. Following completion of the investigation, police filed a charge sheet against five persons, with Sudeep shown as Accused No. 1.
    • His earlier bail application before the Trial Court in Criminal Miscellaneous No. 630/2026 was rejected on 20 May 2026, following which he approached the High Court.

    Allegation: Accused Were Preparing to Commit Dacoity

    • According to the prosecution case recorded in the order, the accused persons had allegedly prepared themselves to commit dacoity and were armed with weapons.
    • The first informant, acting upon credible information, registered the case against unknown persons. A raid was subsequently conducted at the location where the accused were allegedly preparing to commit the offence.
    • Five persons were apprehended during the raid, and Sudeep was one of them.
    • These allegations remain part of the pending criminal prosecution; the High Court’s bail order does not constitute a finding on their truth or otherwise.

    Investigation Completed and Charge Sheet Filed

    • An important consideration for the High Court was that the investigation had already been completed and the charge sheet filed.
    • The order also records that the petitioner had previous criminal cases against him. However, in those earlier cases, he was stated to have already been enlarged on bail.
    • The existence of those antecedents therefore led the High Court to consider the Supreme Court’s decision in Prabhakar Tewari v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2020) 11 SCC 648.

    Criminal Antecedents Cannot Be Sole Ground for Refusing Bail

    The Karnataka High Court specifically relied on Prabhakar Tewari for the proposition that:

    • a person’s criminal antecedents cannot be the sole ground to reject bail if the person is otherwise found entitled to it.
    • The principle was directly applied while considering Sudeep’s bail application.
    • The ruling is significant because it reiterates that the mere existence of earlier criminal cases does not automatically create an absolute bar against bail.
    • Criminal antecedents may remain a relevant consideration in deciding a bail application, but the High Court’s order makes clearβ€”following the Supreme Court precedentβ€”that they cannot operate as the sole reason for rejection where the overall circumstances otherwise justify release.

    Petitioner Undertakes to Cooperate With Trial

    • The High Court further recorded Sudeep’s undertaking that he would cooperate before the Trial Court for speedy disposal of the case.
    • Considering this undertaking along with the completion of investigation, filing of the charge sheet and the principle concerning criminal antecedents, Justice Shetty concluded that the petitioner’s prayer for regular bail deserved to be answered in the affirmative, subject to appropriate safeguards.
    • The petition was accordingly allowed.

    β‚Ή1 Lakh Personal Bond and Two Sureties

    • The High Court directed Sudeep to be released on regular bail in S.C. No. 156/2025, subject to several conditions.
    • He was required to execute a personal bond of β‚Ή1,00,000 with two sureties for the like amount to the satisfaction of the jurisdictional court.
    • The petitioner was also directed to appear regularly on all dates of hearing before the Trial Court unless his appearance was specifically exempted for valid reasons.

    Monthly Police Station Attendance for One Year

    • The High Court imposed additional safeguards while granting bail.
    • Sudeep was prohibited from directly or indirectly threatening or tampering with prosecution witnesses and was directed not to involve himself in similar offences in the future.
    • He was further prohibited from leaving the jurisdiction of the Trial Court without its permission until disposal of the criminal case.
    • Importantly, the Court directed him to appear before the Station House Officer, Hebburu Police Station, on the third Sunday of every month between 10:00 AM and 1:00 PM, and mark his attendance for one year from the date of his release.

    Supreme Court Judgment Relied Upon

    The principal judicial precedent expressly relied upon in the order is:

    • Prabhakar Tewari v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2020) 11 SCC 648 β€” cited for the proposition that criminal antecedents cannot be the sole basis for refusing bail where the accused is otherwise entitled to bail.

    Why the Decision Matters

    • The Karnataka High Court’s order reinforces an important principle in bail jurisprudence: criminal antecedents are relevant, but they are not necessarily determinative.
    • A bail court must examine the circumstances of the case as a whole. In the present matter, the Court considered the completion of investigation, filing of the charge sheet, the petitioner’s bail status in earlier cases and his undertaking to cooperate with the trial.
    • At the same time, the Court balanced the petitioner’s liberty against the interests of the prosecution by imposing stringent conditions concerning attendance, witnesses, territorial movement and monthly reporting to the police station.
    • The order should therefore not be read as holding that previous criminal cases are irrelevant to bail. Its narrower principle, drawn directly from Prabhakar Tewari, is that antecedents cannot constitute the sole ground for rejection when the accused is otherwise found entitled to bail.

    Key Takeaway

    The Karnataka High Court has reiterated that previous criminal antecedents, standing alone, cannot justify denial of regular bail. Where investigation is complete, the charge sheet has been filed and other circumstances support release, the accused may be granted bail subject to appropriate conditions designed to secure attendance and protect the trial.

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  • Supreme Court: Accused Must Be Clearly and Individually Informed of Section 50 Right Before Personal Search

    Supreme Court: Accused Must Be Clearly and Individually Informed of Section 50 Right Before Personal Search

    Date: 24.09.2026

    In an important judgment governing search and seizure under the NDPS Act, the Supreme Court held that the statutory right available to an accused under Section 50(1) must be communicated clearly, unambiguously and individually to each person who is about to be searched.

    The Court ruled that a joint notice to multiple accused is insufficient. It further held that an investigating officer cannot offer an accused a β€œthird option” of being searched before a gazetted officer who is himself a member of the raiding party, because Section 50 contemplates a search before the nearest Magistrate or nearest gazetted officer and the safeguard is intended to provide an element of independence.

    Upholding the Rajasthan High Court’s acquittal of Parmanand and Surajmal, the Supreme Court dismissed the State’s appeal and held that the breach of Section 50 had vitiated the search and consequently the conviction.

    Background of the Case

    • The prosecution case arose from information received by a Narcotics Department officer on 13 October 1997 that Parmanand and Surajmal would deliver approximately 10 kg of opium the following morning at Nangdi-Tiraha, Iklera, Chhipabaraud Road.
    • A raiding party headed by Superintendent J.S. Negi was constituted. At approximately 4:25 a.m., the two accused arrived and were intercepted. Parmanand was carrying a white gunny bag.
    • Before conducting the search, the officers purported to inform the accused about their rights under Section 50. A single written notice was issued to both accused.
    • Surajmal gave written consent not only for himself but purportedly also on behalf of Parmanand. Parmanand himself did not independently sign the notice or provide independent consent. The officers thereafter searched Parmanand’s bag and recovered 9.6 kg of opium.

    Trial Court Convicted the Accused

    • The Special Judge convicted Parmanand under Section 8 read with Section 18 of the NDPS Act, while Surajmal was convicted under Section 8 read with Section 28.
    • Each was sentenced to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of β‚Ή10 lakh, with a further two years’ rigorous imprisonment in default of payment of the fine.
    • The accused appealed to the Rajasthan High Court, which acquitted them. The State of Rajasthan thereafter approached the Supreme Court challenging that acquittal.

    Central Question Before the Supreme Court

    • The central issue was whether the search complied with the mandatory safeguards contained in Section 50 of the NDPS Act.
    • The State argued that the accused had been informed of their right to be searched before a Magistrate or gazetted officer and that a written notice had been given. The respondents countered that the notice was a joint notice, whereas each accused was entitled to an individual communication of his statutory right.

    Does Section 50 Apply When Drugs Are Recovered From a Bag?

    • The case raised an important preliminary issue because the opium was recovered from the bag carried by Parmanand, rather than from his body.
    • The Supreme Court distinguished between two situations.
    • Where only a bag, briefcase or container carried by a person is searched, without searching the person’s body, Section 50 does not apply. The Court referred to Kalema Tumba v. State of Maharashtra and State of Himachal Pradesh v. Pawan Kumar in support of this principle.
    • However, where both the bag and the person’s body are searched, Section 50 applies.
    • The Court relied upon Dilip & Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Union of India v. Shah Alam, where personal searches conducted in addition to searches of vehicles or bags brought Section 50 into operation.
    • In the present case, the officers searched Parmanand’s bag and also conducted personal searches of both accused. The Supreme Court therefore held that Section 50 was applicable.

    Joint Section 50 Notice Is Not Sufficient

    • The most significant principle emerging from the judgment concerns joint notices under Section 50.
    • The Supreme Court found that there had been no individual communication of the statutory right. A common notice was issued, and Surajmal purported to sign both for himself and Parmanand. Parmanand did not sign the notice.

    The Court held:

    • β€œA joint communication of the right available under Section 50(1) of the NDPS Act to the accused would frustrate the very purport of Section 50.”
    • The Court explained that communication of the Section 50 right is not an empty formality. Given the stringent punishments prescribed by the NDPS Act, statutory search safeguards must be meticulously observed.

    Right Must Be β€œClear, Unambiguous and Individual”

    • The Supreme Court laid down an important standard for communicating Section 50 rights:
    • β€œThe communication of this right has to be clear, unambiguous and individual.”
    • Each accused must therefore be independently informed that he or she has a right under Section 50(1) to be searched before the nearest gazetted officer or nearest Magistrate.
    • The Court reasoned that a joint communication could create confusion and dilute the statutory safeguard. It expressly approved the similar approach adopted by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Paramjit Singh and by the Bombay High Court in Dharamveer Lekhram Sharma.

    One Accused Cannot Exercise Section 50 Right for Another

    • The Court also rejected the prosecution’s reliance on Surajmal’s purported consent on behalf of Parmanand.
    • Parmanand had neither signed the written communication nor independently consented to the proposed search. Accepting the prosecution case would require an assumption that he had authorised Surajmal to consent on his behalf.
    • The Supreme Court refused to proceed on such a presumption and concluded that the Section 50 right had not been properly communicated to the respondents.
    • This aspect of the judgment reinforces that Section 50 confers a personal procedural safeguard which must be communicated to the individual who is to be searched.

    Supreme Court Rejects β€œThird Option” During Section 50 Search

    The Court found another serious defect in the search procedure.

    The investigating officer told the accused that they could choose to be searched:

    1. before the nearest Magistrate;
    2. before the nearest gazetted officer; or
    3. before Superintendent J.S. Negi, who was himself part of the raiding party.
    4. The Supreme Court held that offering this third option amounted to another breach of Section 50(1).
    5. The statutory purpose of taking an accused before a Magistrate or gazetted officer, the Court explained, is to provide an opportunity for the search to take place in the presence of an independent officer.
    6. Superintendent Negi, being a member of the raiding party, could not be treated as an independent officer for this purpose.
    7. The Court accordingly held that the searching officer could not introduce a third option which Section 50 itself does not provide. Such an option would frustrate the statutory safeguard.

    Section 50 Safeguards Must Be Meticulously Followed

    • The judgment draws heavily upon the Constitution Bench decision in State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh, (1999) 6 SCC 172.
    • The Constitution Bench had held that an empowered officer acting on prior information must inform the person to be searched of the existence of his right to be taken before the nearest gazetted officer or Magistrate. Failure to properly communicate that right can render the recovery suspect and vitiate a conviction founded upon such recovery.
    • In Parmanand, the Supreme Court applied that principle to emphasize that the protection must be meaningful rather than merely formal.

    Cases Referred by the Supreme Court

    • The judgment discusses several important authorities on Section 50, including State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh, (1994) 3 SCC 299; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Pirthi Chand, (1996) 2 SCC 37; State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh, (1999) 6 SCC 172; Kalema Tumba v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 8 SCC 257; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Pawan Kumar, (2005) 4 SCC 350; Dilip & Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2007) 1 SCC 450; and Union of India v. Shah Alam, (2009) 16 SCC 644.
    • The Court also approved the approach in Paramjit Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab, 1997 (1) CRIMES 242, and Dharamveer Lekhram Sharma & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2001 (1) CRIMES 586, on the requirement of individual communication.

    Final Decision: Acquittal Upheld

    • The Supreme Court concluded that there were two material violations of Section 50:
    • First, the accused were not individually informed of their statutory rights and were instead served with a joint communication.
    • Second, the investigating officer improperly offered the additional option of being searched before a Superintendent who was himself part of the raiding party.
    • The Court consequently held that the search was vitiated and the resulting conviction was illegal. It upheld the Rajasthan High Court’s acquittal and dismissed the State’s appeal.

    Why the Judgment Matters in NDPS Cases

    State of Rajasthan v. Parmanand is an important authority on the procedural safeguards surrounding personal searches under the NDPS Act. It establishes that Section 50 compliance cannot be reduced to obtaining a signature on a standard notice.

    The decision makes three principles particularly clear: each accused must individually understand the Section 50 right; a joint notice is insufficient; and the searching officer cannot create a third search option involving a member of the raiding party. At the same time, the judgment should not be read as holding that Section 50 applies to every search of a bag or container. The Court specifically clarified that where only a bag is searched and no personal search takes place, Section 50 does not apply. It applied in Parmanand because both the bag and the persons of the accused were searched.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Delhi HC Expands Protection for Well-Known Marks: Formal Declaration Not a Precondition Under Section 11(2)

    Delhi HC Expands Protection for Well-Known Marks: Formal Declaration Not a Precondition Under Section 11(2)

    Date: 24.09.2026

    In a significant ruling on the protection of well-known trademarks against dilution, the Delhi High Court has cancelled the registration of the mark ZORA in Class 24 after finding it deceptively similar to the globally recognised ZARA trademark.

    Justice Jyoti Singh held that the Registrar of Trade Marks had applied an incorrect test by dissecting the rival marks into β€œZA/ZO” and β€œRA”, rather than comparing ZARA and ZORA as a whole.

    The Court further delivered an important interpretation of Section 11(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, holding that an earlier trademark need not have first obtained a formal declaration as a β€œwell-known trademark” from a court or the Registrar before its proprietor can invoke Section 11(2). What matters is whether evidence establishes that the mark satisfies the statutory requirements for protection as a well-known mark.

    The High Court ultimately allowed ZARA owner Industria De Diseno Textil S.A.’s appeal, quashed the Registrar’s order dated 8 February 2024, cancelled ZORA’s registration and directed the Trade Marks Registry to remove the mark from the Register.

    Dispute Between ZARA and ZORA

    • Industria De Diseno Textil S.A. (Inditex) approached the Delhi High Court under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, challenging the Registrar’s decision dismissing its opposition to registration of ZORA.
    • Inditex asserted that it conceived and adopted the trademark ZARA in 1975 and subsequently developed it into an internationally recognised fashion and lifestyle brand.
    • In India, the company stated that ZARA had been used through contract manufacturers since 1986-87. Its Indian registrations included ZARA in Class 25 from 1993 and Class 24 from 2003, along with registrations covering several other classes and products.
    • Significantly, the Delhi High Court had earlier held in Industria De Diseno Textile S.A. v. Oriental Cuisines Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., 2015 SCC OnLine Del 9565 that ZARA was a well-known mark based on its sales, advertising, reputation in India and transborder reputation.

    Aggarwal Bag House Obtained Registration for ZORA

    • Respondent No. 2, trading as Aggarwal Bag House, applied on 30 October 2019 for registration of ZORA, claiming use since 3 June 2016.
    • The application covered fabrics, including plain, coated, laminated, impregnated and waterproof fabrics falling under Class 24.
    • After the application was advertised in the Trade Marks Journal, ZARA opposed the registration. However, by an order dated 8 February 2024, the Registrar rejected the opposition and permitted ZORA to proceed to registration. A registration certificate was issued the following day.

    Registrar Found ZARA and ZORA Dissimilar

    • The Registrar’s reasoning rested substantially on the view that ZARA and ZORA were neither phonetically nor visually similar.
    • For phonetic comparison, the Registrar separated the marks and compared β€œZO” with β€œZA”, reasoning that the β€œo” and β€œa” sounds were different.
    • For visual comparison, the Registrar again focused on the prefixes β€œZO” and β€œZA”, despite both marks sharing the suffix β€œRA”.
    • The Registrar also considered the parties’ trade channels different. ZORA was being used for raw laminated fabric sold in rolls to bag manufacturers, whereas ZARA sold finished products through its stores and websites.
    • The absence of evidence of actual confusion was also taken into consideration.
    • ZARA challenged each of these findings before the High Court.

    Delhi HC: Section 11(2) Does Not Require a Prior Formal Declaration of Well-Known Status

    • One of the most significant aspects of the judgment concerns the meaning of a well-known trademark under Section 11(2).
    • Respondent No. 2 argued that ZARA could not claim the expanded protection available to well-known trademarks because it had not been formally declared a well-known mark or included in the Registrar’s list.
    • The High Court rejected this argument.
    • Justice Singh noted that Section 11(2) uses the expression that the earlier mark β€œis a well-known trade mark in India”. It does not say that the mark must have already been formally β€œdeclared” well-known by a court or entered in the Registrar’s list.
    • The Court held that the relevant enquiry is whether the mark satisfies the statutory requirements of Section 2(1)(zg) and the factors contemplated under Section 11(6).
    • Accordingly, the right to oppose registration under Section 11(2) flows from the well-known nature and reputation of the earlier mark, rather than from the existence of a prior formal declaration.

    Registrar Can Determine Well-Known Status in Opposition Proceedings

    • The High Court further clarified that the Registrar is empowered, while deciding an opposition, to determine whether an earlier mark qualifies for protection as a well-known trademark.
    • This determination can be based on factors such as the duration and extent of use, promotion, recognition among the relevant public, registrations and previous enforcement of rights.
    • The Court therefore held that there is no statutory requirement under Section 11(2) that the proprietor must first obtain a separate declaration of well-known status before invoking the provision in opposition proceedings.
    • The Court found support for this interpretation in the Madras High Court’s decision in Lego Juris A/S v. Gurumukh Singh and Another, 2024 SCC OnLine Mad 4858, where similar protection had been considered in the context of the LEGO mark.

    ZARA Satisfies Requirements of a Well-Known Mark

    • Turning to the evidence, the High Court found substantial material establishing ZARA’s reputation.
    • The Court noted the brand’s large international retail and online presence, extensive sales, manufacturing expenditure, advertising, diversified product portfolio and recognition among consumers.
    • It also relied upon the earlier Delhi High Court decision recognising ZARA’s reputation and transborder goodwill.
    • The Court concluded that ZARA satisfied the statutory factors under Section 11(6) read with Section 2(1)(zg) and was therefore entitled to protection as a well-known trademark under Section 11(2), irrespective of the absence of a separate formal declaration.

    ZARA and ZORA Must Be Compared as a Whole

    • The High Court next found a fundamental error in the Registrar’s method of comparing the rival marks.
    • Justice Singh reiterated the settled anti-dissection principle: competing trademarks must ordinarily be compared as a whole, rather than being broken into individual syllables or components.
    • The Court relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products Ltd., which held that similarity must be judged by considering the marks in their entirety.
    • The Registrar, however, had separated ZARA into β€œZA-RA” and ZORA into β€œZO-RA” and then focused on the distinction between β€œZA” and β€œZO”.
    • The High Court held that this approach was contrary to settled trademark law.

    Difference of One Vowel Does Not Save ZORA

    • Comparing the marks as a whole, the Court found that ZARA and ZORA are phonetically deceptively similar.
    • Both are four-letter word marks. Both begin with β€œZ”, end with β€œRA”, and possess the same overall consonantal structure. The principal difference is the substitution of the vowel β€œA” with β€œO”.
    • The Court reasoned that while ZARA is pronounced β€œZA-RA” and ZORA as β€œZO-RA”, both end with the same β€œRA” sound and carry a similar rhythm. To a consumer of average intelligence and imperfect recollection, their overall sound would be almost alike.
    • The Court therefore held that the Registrar had erred in finding the marks dissimilar.

    Dissimilar Goods Do Not Defeat Protection Under Section 11(2)

    • Another important question concerned the nature of the competing goods.
    • ZORA argued that it dealt with polyester fabric used as inner lining for bags, whereas ZARA’s business involved fashion, bags and home products sold through a very different retail network.
    • The High Court held that this argument was ultimately irrelevant for the purpose of Section 11(2).
    • Unlike Section 11(1), which deals with confusion arising from identical or similar marks in relation to identical or similar goods or services, Section 11(2) specifically extends protection to a well-known earlier mark even where the later mark is sought to be registered for dissimilar goods or services.
    • The essential question is whether use of the later mark without due cause would take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive character or reputation of the earlier well-known mark.

    Court Finds Trade Connection Between ZARA and ZORA Goods

    • Although it was unnecessary to conclusively establish similarity of goods for Section 11(2), the Court nevertheless found that the competing commercial activities were not wholly disconnected.
    • Both marks were registered or sought to be registered in Class 24, which covers textiles and fabrics.
    • ZARA’s commercial activities extended beyond finished clothing to bags, home products and interactions with manufacturers, suppliers and traders dealing in textiles and related products. ZORA’s polyester fabric was used in bags.
    • The Court therefore found a connection in the course of trade, rejecting the argument that the parties operated in entirely unrelated commercial spheres.

    Actual Consumer Confusion Not Required Under Section 11(2)

    • The High Court also found that the Registrar had applied the wrong test by looking for evidence of actual consumer confusion.
    • The Court drew a clear distinction between Sections 11(1) and 11(2).
    • Under Section 11(1), likelihood of confusion and association between marks is central. Section 11(2), however, focuses on protecting the reputation and distinctive character of a well-known trademark against dilution, unfair advantage and detriment, including where the goods are dissimilar.
    • Accordingly, absence of evidence that consumers had actually been confused by ZORA did not defeat ZARA’s opposition.

    Court Finds ZORA Would Dilute ZARA’s Distinctiveness

    • The Court further found that ZARA had acquired extensive reputation well before ZORA’s claimed adoption in 2016.
    • It concluded that ZORA had no honest reason or due cause for adopting a deceptively similar mark and that its use could take unfair advantage of ZARA’s reputation.
    • The judgment also considered evidence concerning the commercial growth of ZORA after adoption of the mark and the manner in which ZORA appeared prominently on packaging of polyester rolls.
    • In the Court’s assessment, such use could lead customers and traders to believe that the polyester rolls were supplied by, associated with, or commercially connected to ZARA, thereby diluting the distinctive character and reputation of the earlier mark.

    ZORA Registration Cancelled; Registry Directed to Remove Mark

    • The Delhi High Court ultimately found that the Registrar’s rejection of ZARA’s opposition was legally flawed.
    • Accordingly, the Court quashed and set aside the Registrar’s order dated 8 February 2024 and cancelled registration No. 4310686 for ZORA in Class 24.
    • The Registrar of Trade Marks was directed to remove ZORA’s entry from the Register and rectify the Register within two months, with the Court specifically referring to maintaining the β€œpurity of the Register”.
    • The appeal filed by Industria De Diseno Textil S.A. was accordingly allowed, along with disposal of the pending application.

    Key Legal Takeaways

    The judgment establishes an important distinction in India’s trademark-registration regime: formal inclusion in the Registrar’s list of well-known trademarks is not a prerequisite for invoking Section 11(2). A proprietor may establish through evidence in opposition proceedings that its earlier mark possesses the statutory attributes of a well-known trademark.

    The ruling also reinforces the anti-dissection rule. Trademark comparison cannot ordinarily be reduced to identifying isolated differences in individual vowels or syllables. The marks must be assessed from the standpoint of their overall visual, structural and phonetic impression.

    Most importantly, where Section 11(2) applies, the enquiry moves beyond conventional consumer confusion. The provision protects the distinctiveness and reputation of well-known marks from dilution and unfair advantage even in relation to dissimilar goods or services.

    For trademark owners, the decision substantially reinforces the ability to oppose later marks that come too close to established brands, even where a formal well-known-mark declaration has not previously been obtained.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi