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  • Karnataka High Court Quashes FIR and Charge Sheet Over Unsworn Section 156(3) CrPC Complaint

    Karnataka High Court Quashes FIR and Charge Sheet Over Unsworn Section 156(3) CrPC Complaint

    Date: 21.10.2026

    The Karnataka High Court has quashed an FIR and subsequent charge sheet against N.V. Babu Reddy, holding that the private complaint which triggered the criminal case suffered from a fundamental procedural defect: it was not supported by an affidavit.

    Background of the case

    The criminal petition arose from Crime No. 30/2020 of Mahalakshmipuram Police Station, Bengaluru. The FIR alleged offences under Sections 323, 324, 307 and 120B read with Section 511 of the Indian Penal Code, involving allegations of assault, threats and an alleged conspiracy.

    According to the complainant’s version, a dispute initially developed over non-payment for work completed. The complainant stated that he had earlier approached police regarding the payment issue. He further alleged that, after being asked to meet near Geleyara Balaga in Mahalakshmi Layout on December 17, 2019, he and another person, Prabhakar, were surrounded by a group that abused and attempted to physically attack them. The complainant claimed they escaped after Prabhakar allegedly saw someone taking weapons from an autorickshaw.

    The complaint also alleged continued threats to the complainant and his family. Police had received a later complaint and registered an NCR, but an acknowledgment reportedly described the dispute as civil in nature and advised the complainant to approach the court. The complainant then filed a private complaint before the Magistrate, who referred the matter for police investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

    Petitioner’s challenge

    Babu Reddy sought to quash the proceedings under Section 482 of the CrPC. His principal argument was that the private complaint was not accompanied by an affidavit, contrary to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh.

    The petitioner also argued that the complaint was an abuse of criminal process in a dispute connected to money recovery. He referred to an earlier complaint that had already been quashed by the High Court.

    The State opposed the petition on the basis that the police had investigated the matter and filed a charge sheet on May 15, 2020.

    Court’s reasoning

    Justice H.P. Sandesh found that the absence of an affidavit was a fundamental defect. The Court noted that the Supreme Court’s decision in Priyanka Srivastava, followed in later judgments, requires a private complaint seeking action under Section 156(3) CrPC to be supported by an affidavit.

    The Court distinguished this issue from the petitioner’s separate objection about compliance with Sections 154(1) and 154(3) CrPC. Since police had received the complaint, issued an NCR and provided an acknowledgment, the Court held that there was no refusal by police requiring the complainant to first approach the Superintendent of Police.

    However, that did not cure the lack of an affidavit. The Court held that an unsupported private complaint could not be entertained, and that no legal value could attach to the complaint or to the charge sheet that followed from it.

    Outcome and legal significance

    The High Court allowed the criminal petition and quashed both the proceedings in Crime No. 30/2020 and the charge sheet against the petitioner. The ruling underscores that the affidavit requirement for private complaints referred for investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC is not a technical formality. Where that requirement is missing, the very initiation of criminal proceedings may be invalid, even if investigation has progressed to the filing of a charge sheet.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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  • Himachal Pradesh HC: Rigours of Section 37 NDPS Act Inapplicable Where Heroin Recovery Is Below Commercial Quantity

    Himachal Pradesh HC: Rigours of Section 37 NDPS Act Inapplicable Where Heroin Recovery Is Below Commercial Quantity

    Date: 19.10.2026

    The Himachal Pradesh High Court has granted regular bail to Prince Rana and Sudhanshu Soni in an NDPS case involving the recovery of 32.56 grams of heroin, while making clear that the order does not decide their guilt or innocence.

    The case at a glance

    Justice Rakesh Kainthla decided the connected bail petitions on 16 October 2026. The petitions arose from FIR No. 28 of 2026, registered at Baijnath Police Station in Kangra district under Sections 21, 25 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.

    According to the prosecution, police received information on 24 February 2026 that Prince Rana, Sudhanshu Soni and others were selling heroin from a house in Village Malehad. Officers recorded and forwarded the information to a superior officer before conducting a search. The search reportedly led to the recovery of a polythene packet containing 32.56 grams of heroin, concealed beneath a sofa-cum-bed.

    The prosecution said both petitioners were present at the house when the recovery was made. It also relied on statements allegedly made during the investigation concerning the procurement and delivery of the substance. A forensic report confirmed that the recovered material was diacetylmorphine, commonly known as heroin.

    Arguments before the Court

    The petitioners denied the allegations and said they had been falsely implicated. Their counsel stressed that they were first-time accused, had no other FIRs registered against them, and that the police investigation had already concluded. The charge sheet had been filed on 24 April 2026, meaning further custodial interrogation was not required, they argued.

    The State opposed bail, contending that the allegations concerned heroin sales and that the offence had serious consequences for society. It urged the Court not to show leniency.

    Why the High Court granted bail

    The Court considered established Supreme Court principles on bail, including the nature and gravity of the accusation, the evidence available at the preliminary stage, the possibility of absconding, the likelihood of witness interference, criminal antecedents and the need to protect the trial process.

    While the Court found that the petitioners’ presence at the house during the alleged recovery created a prima facie case, it identified several factors favouring release:

    • Quantity below the commercial threshold: The Court noted that the alleged recovery was less than a commercial quantity. Therefore, the stricter restrictions on bail under Section 37 of the NDPS Act were not applicable.
    • No stated criminal history: The petitioners’ assertion that they were first offenders was not disputed by the State in its status report. The Court observed that first offenders should have an opportunity for reform and that unnecessary continued detention could expose them to hardened criminals.
    • Local roots: Both petitioners were stated to be permanent residents of Kangra district. As this was not disputed, the Court found no substantial risk of absconding.
    • Investigation complete: Since the police had completed the investigation and filed the charge sheet, and did not claim that custodial interrogation remained necessary, the Court held that continued detention would serve no useful purpose.

    The decision reflects the general bail principle that personal liberty should ordinarily be protected unless circumstances indicate a real risk of flight, interference with justice, witness intimidation or repetition of offences.

    Bail terms imposed

    Prince Rana and Sudhanshu Soni were each directed to furnish a bail bond of β‚Ή1,00,000 with one surety in the same amount, to the satisfaction of the trial court. Their release is subject to conditions intended to safeguard the proceedings:

    1. They must not intimidate witnesses or influence evidence.
    2. They must attend every hearing and avoid seeking unnecessary adjournments.
    3. They cannot leave their present address for more than seven continuous days without providing details of the intended visit to the concerned SHO, police station and trial court.
    4. They must surrender any passports to the court.
    5. They must provide their mobile numbers and social-media contact details to the police and court, comply with notices sent through SMS, WhatsApp or social-media accounts, and report any change in these details within five days.

    The Court also stated that the prosecution may seek cancellation of bail if any condition is violated.

    What the order doesβ€”and does notβ€”decide

    This is a bail ruling, not a final verdict in the criminal case. The High Court expressly stated that its observations were limited to deciding the bail applications and would not affect the merits of the prosecution at trial.

    The trial court will determine the allegations based on the evidence presented during the proceedings.

    The ruling shows that, even in narcotics cases, courts assess bail on the specific facts: the statutory quantity involved, the accused’s prior record, their connection to the local community, the status of the investigation and the safeguards available to protect a fair trial.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Delhi HC: Composite Trademarks Must Be Evaluated as a Whole Under Section 11(1) of Trade Marks Act

    Delhi HC: Composite Trademarks Must Be Evaluated as a Whole Under Section 11(1) of Trade Marks Act

    Date: 19.10.2026

    The Delhi High Court has set aside the Trade Marks Registry’s refusal to register the word mark β€œKAMA CASA”, holding that the Registry wrongly split the composite mark into separate elements and compared them with distinct earlier device marks.

    Background of the dispute

    Modi Woodspace Private Limited applied on 29 August 2023 to register KAMA CASA as a proposed-to-be-used word mark in Classes 20 and 35. The Trade Marks Registry objected under Section 11(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which concerns the likelihood of confusion with earlier trademarks.

    After hearings, the Registrar refused the application on 21 May 2025. The refusal was based on earlier Class 20 registrations containing the terms β€œKAMA” and β€œCASA.” The Registrar concluded that combining those words in β€œKAMA CASA” could confuse consumers and traders about the commercial origin of the goods.

    Modi Woodspace appealed to the Delhi High Court under Section 91 of the Act.

    The key issue: Can a composite mark be broken into parts?

    The central issue was whether the Registrar could assess the applicant’s mark by isolating the words β€œKAMA” and β€œCASA” and comparing each part separately with different prior marks.

    The Court held that this approach was incorrect. It applied the anti-dissection rule, a settled trademark principle requiring a mark to be assessed as a whole rather than broken into individual components.

    According to the Court, KAMA CASA is a composite word mark and should have been evaluated in its entirety. The cited prior marks were device or label marks with their own visual and design elements. The Registry could not disregard those elements, extract the words β€œKAMA” and β€œCASA,” and use them separately to reject the composite word mark.

    Why the refusal was flawed

    The Court identified two material distinctions:

    • Different mark types: The applicant sought registration of a word mark, while the cited marks were device marks.
    • Improper comparison: The cited device marks could not be reduced to their word elements alone. Their overall visual presentation and device features formed part of the registered marks.

    The Court found it difficult to understand how the Registrar could conclude that the composite word mark β€œKAMA CASA” was deceptively similar to separate device marks containing β€œKAMA” and β€œCASA,” particularly when each cited mark had distinctive device elements.

    It further observed that the mere fact that the marks fell in the same class did not establish similarity or a likelihood of confusion.

    Relevance of other β€œCASA” registrations

    During the appeal, Modi Woodspace submitted a Trade Marks Registry search report showing numerous registrations containing the word β€œCASA” in the same or similar classes. Although this report had not been submitted to the Registrar during the original examination process, the Court considered it relevant.

    The presence of multiple registered marks containing β€œCASA” may be important when evaluating whether that word, in the relevant market context, can by itself justify refusal of a later composite mark. The Court therefore directed the Registrar to consider the search report in the renewed examination.

    Court’s decision

    In its judgment delivered on 22 April 2026, the Delhi High Court:

    • quashed the refusal order dated 21 May 2025;
    • revived trademark application No. 6087367 for KAMA CASA;
    • remitted the application to the Registrar of Trade Marks for a fresh, de novo consideration; and
    • required the Registrar to complete that reconsideration within four months.

    The Court clarified that its observations were made for the purpose of remand and should not be treated as a final finding that the mark must be registered.

    Significance for trademark applicants

    The ruling reinforces that trademark similarity assessments must be based on the overall commercial impression of competing marks. A registry or court should not artificially dissect a composite mark and assemble objections from separate earlier registrations unless the law and the facts justify that conclusion.

    For applicants, the decision also highlights the value of submitting marketplace and registry search evidence early. Evidence of numerous similar registrations may help place a disputed word or element in context, especially where the applicant’s mark combines common or widely used terms into a distinct overall expression.

    Ultimately, the case confirms that a Section 11(1) objection requires a careful comparison of the marks as consumers encounter them, not an isolated comparison of selected words taken out of their full visual and commercial context.

    Connected Matter

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Madras HC: Non-Parent Customs Commissioner Cannot Suspend Customs Broker Licence Under Regulation 16 of CBLR 2018

    Madras HC: Non-Parent Customs Commissioner Cannot Suspend Customs Broker Licence Under Regulation 16 of CBLR 2018

    Date: 19.10.2026

    The Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court has held that only the Customs authority that issued a Customs Broker’s licenceβ€”the β€œParent Commissionerate”—may suspend it under the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018.

    In M/s. Sasha Shipping Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, decided on 4 November 2025, Justice G.R. Swaminathan set aside orders by the Commissioner of Customs, Tuticorin suspending and continuing the suspension of Sasha Shipping’s Customs Broker Licence. The Court found that Tuticorin was not the licence-issuing authority and therefore lacked jurisdiction to invoke the suspension power.

    Background of the dispute

    Sasha Shipping Pvt. Ltd. received its Customs Broker Licence from the Principal Commissioner of Customs, Chennai, in 2011. It subsequently began operating within the jurisdiction of the Tuticorin Customs Commissionerate from 21 June 2022 through a Form C intimation.

    In August 2025, the Commissioner of Customs, Tuticorin formed the view that the company had committed irregularities relating to certain imports. On 20 August 2025, the Commissioner suspended Sasha Shipping’s licence with immediate effect under Regulation 16(1) of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018. A further order dated 3 September 2025 continued that suspension under Regulation 16(2).

    Sasha Shipping challenged both orders. Its central argument was that Tuticorin, being a non-parent commissionerate, could not suspend a licence issued by Chennai.

    The jurisdictional question before the Court

    The case turned on the distinction between two Customs authorities:

    • Parent Commissionerate: The Commissionerate that grants the Customs Broker Licence.
    • Non-Parent Commissionerate: A Commissionerate where the broker operates under a Form C intimation after obtaining its original licence elsewhere.

    The Court noted that a broker can transact business at Customs stations beyond its original Commissionerate, subject to the Form C process. However, Form C is only an intimation of the broker’s intention to operate at another station; it is not a fresh licence or an authorization issued by that non-parent Commissionerate.

    Initially, the Tuticorin order appeared to operate across all Customs stations. A corrigendum dated 14 October 2025 limited its reach to areas within the jurisdiction of the Tuticorin Custom House. Even after that correction, the principal issue remained: whether Tuticorin could suspend the licence at all.

    Regulation 15 and Regulation 16 serve different purposes

    The Court analysed the scheme of the 2018 Regulations, particularly Regulations 15, 16 and 17.

    Regulation 15: Local prohibition by a non-parent Commissionerate

    Regulation 15 allows a Commissioner other than the licence-issuing authority to prohibit a Customs Broker from working in one or more sections of the relevant Customs station if the broker has failed to meet its obligations. This is a limited local measure. The prohibition cannot continue for more than one month.

    According to the Court, this provision equips a non-parent Commissionerate to respond immediately to misconduct occurring within its own jurisdiction.

    Regulation 16: Suspension of the licence

    Regulation 16 permits suspension of a Customs Broker Licence where immediate action is necessary and an inquiry is pending or contemplated. The Court held that this power belongs only to the Parent Commissionerate because that authority issued the licence in the first place.

    The reasoning was straightforward: the authority that grants a licence has the inherent authority to amend, vary, rescind or suspend it. A non-parent Commissionerate, which has received only a Form C intimation, has not issued the licence and cannot suspend it.

    Regulation 17: Further disciplinary process

    Where suspension continues, Regulation 17 provides the procedure for notice, inquiry, evidence, representation and final action, including revocation or penalty. The Court read Regulations 15, 16 and 17 together as a coordinated framework:

    1. A non-parent Commissionerate may impose a temporary local prohibition.
    2. It should communicate the alleged violations to the Parent Commissionerate.
    3. The Parent Commissionerate may then initiate suspension, revocation or penalty proceedings under the applicable regulations.

    Why the Court rejected the Customs department’s argument

    The Customs department argued that Regulation 16 uses the broad phrase β€œPrincipal Commissioner or Commissioner of Customs,” unlike Regulation 15, which specifically refers to Commissioners other than those mentioned in Regulation 7. It contended that this wording allowed any Commissioner to suspend a broker’s licence.

    The Court did not accept that interpretation. It held that the regulations must be read as a whole, rather than treating Regulation 16 in isolation. The existence of Regulation 15 showed that the regulatory framework already gives non-parent Commissionerates a defined remedy: temporary prohibition within their own Customs station.

    Allowing a non-parent Commissionerate to suspend the licence itself would blur the statutory distinction between local prohibition and licence-level suspension.

    Reliance on the 2010 CBIC circular

    The Court also relied on CBIC Circular No. 9/2010-Cus., dated 8 April 2010. Although issued under the earlier Customs House Agents Licensing Regulations, 2004, the Court found it remained applicable because its principles were consistent with the 2018 Regulations and it had neither been superseded nor withdrawn.

    The circular states that where a Customs broker operating under Form C is found to have committed violations at another Customs station:

    • The Commissionerate at that station should report the violations to the Commissionerate that issued the licence.
    • The licence-issuing Commissionerate should initiate suspension or revocation action.
    • The non-parent Commissionerate may, in appropriate cases, prohibit the broker from working locally.

    This approach avoids duplicative proceedings and ensures uniform disciplinary action against Customs Brokers operating at multiple stations.

    Court’s decision

    The High Court concluded that the Commissioner of Customs, Tuticorin was a non-parent Commissionerate because Sasha Shipping’s licence had been issued by Chennai. Consequently, Tuticorin could not exercise the suspension power under Regulation 16.

    The Court set aside:

    • Order No. 15/2025 dated 20 August 2025, suspending Sasha Shipping’s Customs Broker Licence; and
    • Order No. 16/2025 dated 3 September 2025, continuing the suspension.

    Both writ petitions were allowed, with no order as to costs.

    Significance for Customs Brokers and Customs authorities

    The ruling clarifies the limits of regulatory authority where a Customs Broker operates across India through Form C intimations. A non-parent Commissionerate can address suspected wrongdoing at its station through a short-term local prohibition, but it cannot suspend the underlying licence.

    For licence suspension, revocation or broader disciplinary action, the matter must be taken up by the Commissionerate that originally issued the Customs Broker Licence.

    The decision reinforces a clear division of powers, supports procedural consistency and prevents multiple Customs formations from taking overlapping action against the same licence.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Delhi HC: Homebuyers Cannot Bypass RERA Proceedings by Filing Fresh Civil Suits Against Builders

    Delhi HC: Homebuyers Cannot Bypass RERA Proceedings by Filing Fresh Civil Suits Against Builders

    Date: 19.10.2026

    The Delhi High Court has dismissed Lalit Kumar’s appeal against the rejection of a wide-ranging civil suit brought by 12 homebuyers against E-Homes Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd., holding that the claims were vague, time-barred in part, barred by prior proceedings in part, and improperly combined multiple independent disputes.

    Background of the dispute

    The case arose from allegations by purchasers of apartments in The Jewel of Noida, a group-housing project developed by E-Homes Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. The homebuyers alleged shortcomings in the project’s development, maintenance arrangements, owners’ association, electricity services, parking, charges, and contractual documentation.

    According to the plaintiffs, the developer had represented that the project would provide high-quality facilities and amenities. They later alleged a substantial mismatch between the apartments’ actual or carpet areas and the super areas on which charges were based. They also challenged several levies, including maintenance, club, electricity-meter, preferential-location, green-belt, lease-rent, tax, and parking charges.

    The plaintiffs further alleged that the developer had not transferred maintenance responsibilities to a lawful apartment owners’ association despite possession having been offered years earlier. They disputed the formation and functioning of the registered association, claiming that it was created through irregular procedures and without proper elections.

    Reliefs sought by the homebuyers

    The suit sought a broad set of remedies, including:

    • Restoration of essential services, including garbage collection and DG electricity supply;
    • Refunds for alleged excess area charges, maintenance charges, club charges, electricity-related charges, taxes, interest, parking charges, preferential-location charges, and green-belt charges;
    • Appointment of an independent architect, consultant, or court commissioner to measure carpet area, super area, and loading;
    • Directions concerning maintenance accounts and transfer of maintenance to an owners’ association;
    • Changes to allegedly one-sided provisions in the sub-lease deeds;
    • Adequate and independent parking arrangements; and
    • Compensation, punitive damages, and rendition of accounts.

    Why the civil suit was rejected

    The trial court dismissed the suit on 31 August 2024. On appeal, the High Court found no reason to interfere with that decision.

    1. Maintenance and electricity issues had already been pursued before RERA

    The court noted that disputes concerning electricity and maintenance charges were already before U.P. RERA and were subject to related proceedings. Under Section 79 of the RERA Act, civil courts cannot entertain matters that fall within the jurisdiction of the RERA authorities or appellate tribunal.

    The court therefore held that the plaintiffs could not use a civil suit to reopen or nullify adverse outcomes from the competent regulatory forum.

    2. Monetary recovery claims were beyond limitation

    The homebuyers’ refund claims were connected to purchases that had culminated in individual sale deeds. The suit was filed in 2024, while the relevant limitation period for recovery claims based on alleged misrepresentation or fraudulent sale was treated as three years.

    The court found that these claims were filed too late and were consequently barred by limitation.

    3. Earlier suits had been withdrawn

    The record showed that earlier civil suits concerning maintenance and electricity had been filed and later withdrawn. The High Court observed that where a suit is withdrawn without liberty to file afresh, Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code prevents a party from bringing another suit on the same cause of action.

    The plaintiffs had not specifically shown that permission had been obtained to preserve their right to refile those claims. The court also endorsed the trial court’s concern that repeated proceedings before different forums amounted to forum hunting.

    4. The suit combined distinct claims of 12 purchasers

    The court stressed that each of the 12 plaintiffs had an individual transaction and a separate cause of action. Their claims could not be treated as one consolidated dispute merely because they related to the same housing project.

    The pleading was therefore held to suffer from misjoinder of parties and causes of action. The claims were also viewed as unquantified, omnibus, and insufficiently specific, particularly because several refund demands were left to be determined later through a proposed local commissioner.

    High Court’s ruling

    Justice Neena Bansal Krishna dismissed Regular First Appeal No. 949/2025 on 11 May 2026. The court affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that the suit was an abuse of the legal process and upheld the dismissal with costs of Rs. 3,000 imposed on each plaintiff.

    Only Lalit Kumar pursued the appeal, while the other original plaintiffs were not parties to the appeal. The court found no merit in the challenge and disposed of the pending applications.

    Key legal takeaway

    The ruling shows that homebuyer grievances, even where numerous and connected to one project, must be pursued before the appropriate forum, within the applicable limitation period, and through precise, properly structured pleadings. A consolidated civil suit cannot be used to revisit matters already adjudicated or pending before RERA, nor to combine unquantified and legally distinct claims of multiple purchasers.

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    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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  • Himachal Pradesh High Court Sets Aside Arbitration Order Over Commercial Court Jurisdiction

    Himachal Pradesh High Court Sets Aside Arbitration Order Over Commercial Court Jurisdiction

    Date: 19.10.2026

    The Himachal Pradesh High Court has set aside a district court order in an arbitration dispute involving M/s Ech Ess Builders and the State of Himachal Pradesh, holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to decide the matter because it had not been constituted as a Commercial Court at the relevant time.

    Background of the construction dispute

    The dispute arose from a public works contract awarded in December 2005 to M/s Ech Ess Builders for a project valued at β‚Ή1.60 crore. The stipulated completion period was two years.

    According to the contractor, the work was disrupted when the site began sliding during the 2010 monsoon season. It said that the work was stopped, cracks developed in the area, and no further execution instructions were provided despite repeated communications. The contractor also alleged that designs and drawings were not made available in time, contributing to the delay.

    M/s Ech Ess Builders sought compensation for idle infrastructure and staff, additional overheads, unpaid work, price escalation, withheld security deposit, and earnest money. It also claimed costs and interest at 18% per annum.

    Arbitration award and court proceedings

    The arbitrator issued an award on 5 December 2019. Among other directions, the award granted simple interest at 8% per annum on:

    • β‚Ή4,46,039 from 27 November 2013 to 22 August 2019; and
    • β‚Ή2,52,492 from 27 November 2013 to 4 August 2017.

    Both the State authorities and the contractor challenged the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. On 9 August 2024, the District Judge, Kinnaur dismissed both sets of objections and upheld the arbitral award.

    The State then appealed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The High Court also condoned the delay in filing that appeal, accepting that it resulted from administrative processes rather than deliberate inaction.

    Why the High Court intervened

    Justice Sandeep Sharma held that this was a commercial dispute because it arose from a construction and infrastructure contract, which falls within the scope of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

    The decisive issue was jurisdiction. When the Section 34 objections were filed in July 2020, the District Judge was not notified or constituted as a Commercial Court under Section 3 of the Commercial Courts Act. Commercial Courts at the district level in Himachal Pradesh were notified only in May 2026.

    Relying on earlier High Court decisions, the Court concluded that a court not constituted as a Commercial Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over such commercial arbitration objections. As a result, the 2024 judgment was treated as having been passed without jurisdiction.

    Court’s order

    The High Court did not examine the merits of the contractor’s claims or the State’s objections to the arbitration award. Instead, it:

    • set aside the District Judge’s order dated 9 August 2024;
    • directed the District Judge to return the parties’ Section 34 objections for presentation before the appropriate forum under the Commercial Courts Act; and
    • ordered that the period from filing the appeal until the parties receive a certified copy of the High Court’s order will be excluded when calculating limitation.

    Legal significance

    The ruling reinforces that jurisdictional requirements under the Commercial Courts Act are mandatory in commercial arbitration matters. Even where a district court has considered an arbitral award in detail, its decision cannot stand if the court was not legally designated to hear commercial disputes when the case was instituted and decided.

    For parties to government construction contracts, the decision highlights the importance of filing arbitration challenges before the correctly constituted commercial forum. Procedural defects in forum selection can invalidate years of litigation without resolving the underlying contractual dispute.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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  • Karnataka High Court- False Promise of Marriage Cannot Be Treated as Consent

    Karnataka High Court- False Promise of Marriage Cannot Be Treated as Consent

    Date: 19.10.2026

    The Karnataka High Court has overturned a trial court’s acquittal and convicted an accused of rape, cheating and criminal intimidation, holding that a sexual relationship induced by a false promise of marriage cannot be treated as consensual merely because the parties were in a relationship.

    The case at a glance

    In Manjula v. Devaraju and State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 2047 of 2018), a Division Bench of Justices H.P. Sandesh and B. Pramod set aside the 2018 acquittal issued by the V Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tiptur. The High Court found that the trial court had failed to properly assess the complainant’s testimony, her original complaint, the DNA evidence, and allegations of threats.

    The accused was convicted under:

    • Section 417 IPC for cheating;
    • Section 376 IPC for rape; and
    • Section 506 IPC for criminal intimidation.

    He was sentenced to life imprisonment for rape, along with prison terms and fines for the other offences. The sentences are to run concurrently.

    Allegations and evidence before the Court

    The complainant stated that she and the accused had known each other since their school days and were in a relationship. According to her complaint and testimony, the accused repeatedly assured her that he would marry her, told her he would not marry anyone else, and continued sexual relations on the strength of that assurance.

    She alleged that after she became pregnant, the accused asked her to terminate the pregnancy. When she refused and pressed him to marry her, he allegedly refused and threatened her life. The complaint also referred to an earlier case and alleged that the accused had pressured her to withdraw it by continuing to promise marriage.

    The High Court placed particular weight on a DNA report establishing that the accused was the biological father of the complainant’s daughter. The judgment notes that the accused did not effectively challenge the DNA evidence. Medical and investigative evidence, including the pregnancy finding and potency report, was also before the trial court.

    Why the High Court rejected the acquittal

    The trial court had treated the case as one involving consensual sexual relations, largely because the complainant acknowledged a love affair and prior physical relationship with the accused. The High Court held that this approach was incomplete and legally flawed.

    The Court emphasized that the central issue was not simply whether the parties were in a relationship, but whether the complainant’s consent had been obtained through a promise of marriage that induced her to engage in sexual relations. It found that the trial court had not meaningfully considered:

    • the specific allegations in the original complaint;
    • the complainant’s testimony that the accused repeatedly promised marriage;
    • the allegation that he continued the relationship while asking her to withdraw an earlier complaint;
    • the DNA evidence confirming paternity; and
    • the accusation that he threatened her after she became pregnant and refused an abortion.

    According to the High Court, the absence of physical injuries did not undermine the prosecution case. Where consent is obtained on the basis of a promise of marriage, the Court reasoned, physical injuries are not an expected indicator of the offence. It held that a continuing sexual relationship based on such a promise could not automatically be categorised as consensual sex.

    Appellate court’s finding: material evidence was overlooked

    The High Court described the trial court’s assessment as perverse because it did not properly evaluate key oral and documentary evidence. It found that the acquittal had resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

    The Bench also noted that the trial court had not adequately addressed the elements of cheating under Section 417 or criminal intimidation under Section 506. The complaint and the complainant’s evidence contained specific allegations of deception and threats, but these were not substantively analysed in the acquittal judgment.

    Relying on Supreme Court principles concerning appellate interference with acquittals, the High Court held that an appellate court may reverse an acquittal where cogent evidence has not been properly appreciated and the result is a miscarriage of justice.

    Sentence and compensation directions

    After conviction, the Court imposed the following sentence:

    • Section 417 IPC: One year’s imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,00,000.
    • Section 376 IPC: Life imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5,00,000.
    • Section 506 IPC: Two years’ imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,00,000.

    The total fine is Rs. 7,00,000. If deposited, Rs. 5,00,000 is to be kept in a fixed deposit in the daughter’s name until she reaches adulthood. The remaining Rs. 2,00,000 is to be released to the complainant for her livelihood and for the child’s educational needs.

    The Court also directed the District Legal Services Authority, Tumkur, to award maximum compensation to the complainant and her child within four months. It noted that the trial court had failed to consider victim compensation under Section 357A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, even while the complainant and child were facing hardship.

    Maintenance order also noted

    During the appeal, the Court was informed that a maintenance order had directed the accused to pay Rs. 2,000 each per month to the complainant and her daughter. The complainant’s side stated that this amount had not been paid, and the accused did not dispute that assertion. The High Court considered this conduct while determining sentence and compensation.

    Broader legal significance

    The ruling underscores that the existence of a romantic relationship does not, by itself, resolve the question of consent in a criminal case. Courts must closely examine whether consent was given freely or was induced by deception, particularly where a complainant alleges that sexual relations occurred because of a promise of marriage.

    It also highlights the duty of trial courts to assess all material evidence, including the complaint, testimony, scientific evidence, and allegations of intimidation, rather than limiting their analysis to whether there was force or physical injury. The judgment further reinforces the importance of victim-compensation mechanisms, including in cases where a trial court initially records an acquittal.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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  • Bombay High Court Says Merchant Settlement Funds Cannot Be Treated as Payment Aggregator Assets

    Bombay High Court Says Merchant Settlement Funds Cannot Be Treated as Payment Aggregator Assets

    Date: 19.10.2026

    The Bombay High Court has set aside provisional GST attachments on 1Pay Mobileware Private Limited’s bank and escrow accounts, holding that the DGGI acted on suspicion without showing a specific GST liability or cogent material linking the payment aggregator to tax evasion.

    Court finds Section 83 power was used without the required foundation

    In 1Pay Mobileware Private Limited v. Union of India & Ors. (Writ Petition No. 4586 of 2026), decided on 16 October 2026, the Bombay High Court examined whether the Directorate General of GST Intelligence (DGGI) could freeze the accounts of an RBI-authorised payment aggregator during an investigation into alleged GST evasion by an online money-gaming syndicate.

    The Court concluded that the attachment orders did not meet the strict statutory conditions under Section 83 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. It therefore allowed the writ petition and quashed the impugned attachment orders, including the continuing restrictions under the partial de-freezing orders.

    Background: payment aggregator’s accounts frozen during gaming-syndicate investigation

    1Pay Mobileware is a company incorporated in 2019 and authorised by the Reserve Bank of India to operate as an online payment aggregator from May 2024. In June 2026, it also received authorisation to operate as an offline payment aggregator.

    On 10 August 2026, DGGI officers sealed the company’s Mumbai premises and provisionally attached several bank accounts under Section 83 of the CGST Act. These included current accounts and RBI-mandated escrow accounts maintained with HDFC Bank, ICICI Bank, Kotak Mahindra Bank and IDFC Bank.

    DGGI alleged that 1Pay may have played a role beyond that of a payment intermediary in an organised online money-gaming network. According to the department, fictitious or non-functional merchants may have been onboarded to route and layer funds generated from gaming activities without payment of applicable GST.

    The agency also relied on alleged non-cooperation in the investigation. It stated that the company’s registered and additional business premises were locked, records were unavailable, its server was empty, and certain information sought through summons had not been furnished. DGGI said that approximately 88 merchants identified from the company’s GSTR-1 data appeared to be non-existent or non-functional.

    1Pay argued that the freeze paralysed legitimate payment settlements

    The company contended that it was a regulated payment aggregator, comparable in function to other payment platforms, and that its escrow funds largely belonged to third-party merchants rather than to 1Pay itself. It submitted that the blanket freeze had disrupted settlement payments for government, public-sector and statutory bodies using its platform.

    Among the entities identified as having unsettled funds were IRCTC, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, LIC Housing Finance, HDFC Bank and Tamil Nadu Power Finance and Infrastructure Development Corporation. The company also highlighted disruptions to FASTag and National Electronic Toll Collection settlements.

    DGGI subsequently permitted limited settlement payments from one escrow account to specified government and PSU-linked entities. However, it continued the debit freeze over the accounts generally, stating that it was needed to safeguard revenue while the investigation continued.

    Why the High Court set aside the attachments

    The Court held that Section 83 authorises provisional attachment only after proceedings under the specified chapters of the CGST Act have been initiated and only where the Commissioner forms an opinion, based on tangible material, that attachment is necessary to protect government revenue.

    Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Radha Krishan Industries, the Court stressed that provisional attachment is a β€œdraconian” power. It cannot be used merely because attachment seems convenient, expedient or commercially useful. The authority must demonstrate a live link between credible material, the proposed attachment and the necessity to protect revenue.

    The Court identified several decisive deficiencies:

    • No identified GST liability of 1Pay: The attachment orders did not explain any tax liability attributable to the payment aggregator itself. The allegations broadly concerned suspected money laundering and GST evasion by unnamed third parties.
    • No particulars of alleged wrongful transactions: The orders did not identify the specific transactions, merchants, nature of GST evasion, or the company’s alleged role in it.
    • No basis for treating 1Pay as a person covered by Section 83: The material did not show that 1Pay was a taxable person with a relevant liability or a person falling within Section 122(1A) of the CGST Act.
    • Escrow money was not 1Pay’s property: The Court held that funds in the RBI-mandated escrow account were impressed with a trust and belonged to merchants and beneficiaries, not the payment aggregator. They could not be attached as the company’s property under Section 83.
    • Orders could not be repaired through later affidavits: The Court said the deficiencies in the original attachment orders could not be justified by explanations added in DGGI’s affidavit filed during the writ proceedings.
    • Suspicion was not enough: Although the department cited non-cooperation and suspected involvement with 88 merchants, it did not disclose their identities, transaction details, or evidence showing 1Pay’s involvement in any GST evasion.

    The Court also noted that 1Pay serviced several government entities and could not be treated as a β€œfly-by-night operator” on the material before it.

    Significance for payment aggregators and GST investigations

    This judgment reinforces that GST authorities must exercise provisional attachment powers with exceptional care. An investigation or a general suspicion of wrongdoing does not, by itself, justify freezing operational bank accounts, particularly where the accounts hold third-party settlement funds.

    For RBI-regulated payment aggregators, the ruling is especially significant because escrow accounts are designed to hold merchant funds pending settlement. Treating those balances as the payment aggregator’s attachable property can disrupt payments to merchants, government bodies, banks and consumers while exceeding the limits of Section 83.

    The decision also underlines three broader principles:

    1. Specificity is essential: Authorities must identify the taxpayer’s own alleged liability and the factual basis for attachment.
    2. Necessity and proportionality must be demonstrated: A freeze must be truly necessary to protect revenue, not simply useful for an ongoing inquiry.
    3. Third-party funds require distinct treatment: Funds held in escrow for merchant settlement cannot automatically be treated as assets belonging to the payment intermediary.

    Outcome

    The Bombay High Court allowed 1Pay Mobileware’s writ petition and quashed the challenged provisional attachment orders and continuing partial-freezing restrictions. No order as to costs was made. The ruling confirms that Section 83 cannot be used as an investigative shortcut: a provisional attachment requires credible, recorded material showing that the taxpayer’s own property must be frozen to protect a genuine revenue interest.

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  • Delhi High Court Upholds DMRC’s Refusal to Reimburse Rs.4.46 Crore in DVAT to L&T

    Delhi High Court Upholds DMRC’s Refusal to Reimburse Rs.4.46 Crore in DVAT to L&T

    Date: 18.10.2026

    The Delhi High Court has dismissed Larsen & Toubro Limited’s challenge to an arbitral award that denied reimbursement of Rs.4.46 crore in Delhi Value Added Tax (DVAT) from Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. (DMRC), holding that the relevant supplies were connected to inter-State trade and import transactions and therefore fell outside DVAT.

    The dispute: tax reimbursement under a metro contract

    The case arose from a 2008 DMRC contract awarded to a consortium comprising Larsen & Toubro (L&T) and Furrer + Frey AG. The contract concerned the design, supply, installation, testing and commissioning of a 25 kV rigid overhead contact system and related cabling for sections of Delhi Metro’s Phase-II network.

    The contract value was approximately Rs.43.37 crore, along with USD 2.02 million and Swiss Franc 5.49 million. It required the contractor to deliver and install equipment including contact wires, traction cables, sectioning posts, sub-sectioning posts, return conductors and associated systems.

    A key contractual clause provided that DMRC would reimburse DVAT or Uttar Pradesh trade tax, where applicable, on indigenous equipment upon proof of actual payment. L&T argued that it had paid DVAT of Rs.4,45,73,743 on the equipment and systems supplied to DMRC in Delhi and was entitled to reimbursement.

    Why L&T claimed DVAT reimbursement

    L&T procured high-voltage and low-voltage panels, cables and other components from suppliers outside Delhi. Some high-voltage panels were imported from Germany by an Indian supplier, while certain other materials were obtained through inter-State transactions.

    According to L&T, these components were not supplied to DMRC as standalone items. Instead, they were transported to project sites, assembled, integrated, installed and commissioned into sectioning and sub-sectioning posts and other bill-of-quantities items. L&T maintained that the completed systems were commercially distinct products supplied to DMRC in Delhi, making the transactions local sales subject to DVAT.

    L&T also relied on two aspects of DMRC’s conduct:

    • DMRC initially reimbursed one DVAT invoice, though it later recovered the amount from L&T’s running bills.
    • DMRC deducted works-contract tax at source from invoices, which L&T argued showed that DMRC had treated the supplies as local transactions.

    DMRC’s position: the supplies were exempt from DVAT

    DMRC argued that reimbursement was only available where DVAT was legally applicable. It contended that the goods were procured specifically for the metro project through imports and inter-State purchases, meaning that the transactions were exempt from DVAT under Section 7 of the DVAT Act.

    DMRC relied on facts showing a close contractual connection between the goods and the project:

    • DMRC prescribed technical specifications for the equipment.
    • It approved the suppliers, including the foreign supplier of the high-voltage panels.
    • It required pre-inspection of goods.
    • The goods were custom-made for the metro project.
    • DMRC issued customs and excise-duty exemption certificates.
    • The invoices and packaging identified DMRC as the consignee or stated that the goods were for the DMRC project.

    DMRC maintained that these facts established that the movement of goods into Delhi, whether from another State or from abroad, was occasioned by and integral to the underlying works contract.

    Arbitration award: no reimbursement due

    The arbitral tribunal rejected L&T’s claim in its entirety and issued a nil award. It concluded that the imported high-voltage panels and the materials procured from outside Delhi were directly connected with the DMRC contract.

    The tribunal found that the relevant domestic procurements were inter-State sales subject to Central Sales Tax, while the imported equipment was part of a transaction in the course of import. As these categories are excluded from DVAT under Section 7 of the DVAT Act, DMRC was not required to reimburse the tax paid by L&T.

    The tribunal also held that DMRC’s initial reimbursement of one invoice and later recovery of that amount was a rectifiable mistake, not an admission that DVAT was properly payable. Since the principal claim failed, the tribunal rejected L&T’s claims for interest and arbitration costs as well.

    High Court’s analysis: contractual tax disputes can be arbitrated

    Before addressing the tax issue, the Court considered L&T’s argument that an arbitral tribunal could not decide whether DVAT applied because taxability is a matter for statutory authorities.

    The Court rejected that objection. It drew a distinction between disputes that require a binding statutory tax determination and disputes between contracting parties over tax reimbursement or allocation of tax liability. The latter category is contractual and can be resolved through arbitration.

    Here, the dispute centred on whether DMRC was contractually obliged to reimburse DVAT under the relevant clause. The Court held that this was an arbitrable issue between the parties.

    ABB precedent was decisive

    The Court held that the case was squarely governed by the earlier decision in ABB Ltd., which had been affirmed by the Supreme Court. That precedent involved a DMRC works contract for electrical and traction systems and examined whether goods procured from outside Delhi or through import were subject to DVAT.

    The governing test is whether the movement of goods is integrally connected with the contract for their supply. An express contractual clause requiring inter-State movement is not necessary. It is enough if the movement is pursuant to, or incidental to, the contract.

    Applying this principle, the Court found a direct and continuing link between the procurement of the panels and other equipment and L&T’s obligations to DMRC. The fact that L&T integrated the input materials into sectioning and sub-sectioning posts did not break that connection.

    Limited judicial review under Section 34

    The Court emphasised that a Section 34 petition is not an appeal against an arbitral award. A court cannot reassess the evidence merely because another interpretation may be possible. Intervention is warranted only on narrow grounds, such as patent illegality going to the root of the matter.

    The tribunal had considered the relevant invoices, supplier approvals, customs exemptions, project specifications, consignment details and the parties’ submissions. Its conclusion that the supplies were linked to inter-State trade and import was therefore a plausible view supported by the record.

    Outcome and practical significance

    The Delhi High Court dismissed L&T’s petition, upheld the nil arbitral award and made no order on costs.

    The ruling reinforces two important principles for infrastructure and works-contract disputes:

    1. Tax reimbursement clauses depend on legal applicability. A contractual promise to reimburse VAT does not require reimbursement where the transaction is legally exempt from that State tax.
    2. The contractual nexus of goods movement is critical. In projects involving customized equipment, approved suppliers, import-duty exemptions and project-specific consignments, the movement of goods may remain an import or inter-State transaction even after installation or integration into a larger system.

    The decision also confirms that arbitrators may decide contractual disputes over which party must bear or reimburse tax, provided they are not purporting to replace the statutory tax authorities on matters that require a binding public-law tax determination.

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    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Rules of Origin vs. Rules of Customs: Constitutional Authority, Treaty Enforcement and the New CBIC Clarification

    Rules of Origin vs. Rules of Customs: Constitutional Authority, Treaty Enforcement and the New CBIC Clarification

    Date: 17.10.2026

    From Article 253 of the Constitution to Section 28DA of the Customs Act: Understanding how international trade commitments become enforceable rights under Indian law.

    Introduction: When International Trade Commitments Meet Domestic Customs Administration

    India’s expanding network of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements (CEPAs) has transformed the legal framework governing international trade. These agreements offer preferential market access, reduced Customs duties and enhanced commercial opportunities. However, their effective implementation depends upon a fundamental constitutional question: Can domestic Customs authorities impose conditions that dilute or defeat the benefits negotiated under a bilateral Trade Agreement?

    This question has acquired renewed importance following CBIC Circular No. 43/2026-Customs, dated 24 September 2026. The Circular clarifies the relationship between Section 28DA of the Customs Act, 1962, the Customs (Administration of Rules of Origin under Trade Agreements) Rules, 2020 (CAROTAR), and the Rules of Origin contained in India’s Trade Agreements.

    Its significance extends beyond routine Customs administration. It raises questions concerning constitutional treaty-making powers, legislative competence, delegated legislation, administrative discretion and the enforceability of international obligations within India’s domestic legal system.

    The Circular specifically addresses two recurring disputes: the insistence upon Form-I for preferential tariff claims under the India–UK Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), and the automatic denial of preferential treatment to subsequent consignments following an earlier adverse origin determination.

    By reiterating that agreement-specific Rules of Origin prevail over conflicting CAROTAR provisions, CBIC has reinforced an essential legal distinction between the authority to verify preferential claims and the power to impose additional substantive conditions.

    To appreciate the Circular’s wider significance, it is necessary to examine the constitutional foundation of India’s bilateral trade agreements, the mechanism through which international obligations acquire domestic legal effect, and the judicial principles governing Customs exemptions and administrative interpretation.

    I. Constitutional Foundation of Bilateral Trade Agreements in India

    The Constitution of India does not contain a single provision exclusively governing Free Trade Agreements. Instead, India’s treaty-making and treaty-implementation powers arise from several interconnected constitutional provisions.

    Article 51(c): Respect for International Law and Treaty Obligations

    Article 51(c), contained in Part IV of the Constitution, directs the State to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations in dealings between organised peoples. This provision reflects India’s constitutional commitment to international cooperation and the observance of treaty obligations.

    However, Article 51(c) forms part of the Directive Principles of State Policy. By virtue of Article 37, these principles are not directly enforceable by courts, although they remain fundamental to governance. Consequently, Article 51(c) does not independently transform an international trade agreement into an enforceable domestic statute.

    Its principal significance lies in guiding constitutional interpretation and encouraging consistency between domestic law and India’s international commitments.

    Article 73: Executive Authority to Negotiate and Conclude Trade Agreements

    Article 73 defines the extent of the Union’s executive power. Read with Articles 53 and 246 and the relevant Union List entries, it provides the constitutional foundation for the Union executive’s authority in international relations.

    Accordingly, the Central Government may negotiate and conclude bilateral and multilateral trade agreements within its constitutional competence. Such agreements may cover tariff concessions, market access, Rules of Origin, investment protection, services, intellectual property, technical barriers to trade and dispute-settlement arrangements.

    However, an important distinction must be maintained between concluding an international agreement and giving its provisions enforceable domestic legal effect. An international agreement may bind India at the international level without automatically creating enforceable rights or obligations against private parties under Indian municipal law.

    Where implementation requires alteration of existing legislation, restriction of legal rights or imposition of domestic obligations, appropriate legislative authority becomes necessary.

    Article 253: Parliament’s Power to Implement International Agreements

    Article 253 is the central constitutional provision concerning domestic implementation of international treaties. It empowers Parliament to legislate for implementing treaties, agreements and conventions with foreign countries, notwithstanding the ordinary distribution of legislative powers between the Union and States.

    Its importance is twofold. First, it enables Parliament to implement international obligations through domestic legislation. Second, it permits Parliament to legislate even upon matters ordinarily falling within State legislative competence when implementing an international agreement.

    Therefore, Article 253 acts as a constitutional bridge between international commitments and domestic legislative authority. However, Article 253 is an enabling provision. It does not automatically make every provision of a bilateral trade agreement directly enforceable in Indian courts.

    The Supreme Court’s decision in Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel v. Union of India, AIR 1969 SC 783, remains particularly important in understanding this distinction.

    Article 246 and the Seventh Schedule: Legislative Competence Over Foreign Trade

    Article 246 distributes legislative competence between Parliament and State Legislatures.

    Several entries in List I of the Seventh Schedule are directly relevant to bilateral trade agreements.

    Constitutional provisionSubject matterRelevance to international trade
    Union List, Entry 10Foreign affairs and matters concerning the Union’s relations with foreign countriesInternational economic relations and trade negotiations
    Union List, Entry 14Entering into treaties and agreements with foreign countries and implementing themConstitutional legislative foundation for treaty implementation
    Union List, Entry 41Trade and commerce with foreign countries; import and export across Customs frontiersImport-export regulation and foreign trade administration
    Union List, Entry 83Duties of Customs, including export dutiesCustoms tariff legislation and duty concessions
    Article 253Legislation implementing international agreementsParliamentary authority extending beyond ordinary federal legislative limitations

    These provisions collectively explain why international trade negotiations, Customs tariff legislation and foreign trade regulation principally fall within Union competence.

    Articles 265 and 14: Constitutional Controls Over Customs Administration

    Article 265 provides that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law.

    This principle is central to Customs taxation. An international agreement does not, merely through its execution, independently amend the Customs tariff or authorise Customs authorities to collect duties contrary to domestic law.

    Preferential tariff treatment must be implemented through a legally valid domestic mechanism. Conversely, once a preferential concession has been lawfully implemented, its administration must remain within the governing statute and notification.

    Article 14 introduces another constitutional limitation. Administrative decisions must not be arbitrary, discriminatory or unsupported by legally relevant considerations. Accordingly, Customs officers exercising powers under Section 28DA and CAROTAR remain subject to constitutional standards of legality, reasonableness and non-arbitrariness.

    II. How Are Bilateral Trade Agreements Enforced Domestically in India?

    India broadly follows a dualist approach to international treaties. Under this approach, international obligations and domestic legal rights operate in related but distinct legal spheres.

    The execution of an international agreement does not necessarily make all its provisions directly enforceable against individuals or authorities. Domestic implementation may occur through legislation, statutory notifications, delegated legislation or executive action supported by existing law.

    The Domestic Implementation Mechanism

    1. Negotiation and conclusion of a Trade Agreement

    Union executive authority under the Constitution

    2. Identification of domestic legal requirements

    Articles 246 and 253; relevant Union List entries

    3. Implementation through Indian law

    Customs Act, Customs Tariff Act, notifications and Rules of Origin

    4. Administration of preferential tariff claims

    Section 28DA, CAROTAR and the applicable Trade Agreement

    5. Judicial review and statutory remedies

    Customs appeals and constitutional remedies, where maintainable:-

    In the Customs context, Section 5 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 enables the Central Government to make rules for determining the origin of goods under Trade Agreements. Preferential tariff concessions are generally implemented through notifications issued under the relevant statutory powers, including Section 25 of the Customs Act.

    Section 28DA and CAROTAR then regulate the administration and verification of preferential claims. Thus, an FTA’s tariff commitments do not ordinarily operate as an independent substitute for India’s Customs legislation. Their domestic enforceability must be examined through the applicable implementing law.

    III. Landmark Constitutional Precedent: Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel v. Union of India

    Case: Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel v. Union of India Citation: AIR 1969 SC 783; (1969) 3 SCC 400 Court: Supreme Court of India Date: 9 January 1969

    The dispute arose from the implementation of an international boundary determination involving India and Pakistan. The Supreme Court considered the constitutional powers of the Union executive to enter into international agreements and the circumstances requiring parliamentary legislation. The Court recognised that the executive could conclude international agreements within its constitutional authority.

    However, it distinguished international obligations from their domestic legal consequences. Where implementation affects enforceable private rights or modifies existing domestic law, legislative support is required. The Court also explained the significance of Article 253 and Parliament’s authority to implement international agreements.

    Commentary

    Although the judgment concerned an international boundary dispute rather than an FTA, its constitutional reasoning remains directly relevant to trade agreements. It establishes that the Union executive’s treaty-making authority and Parliament’s treaty-implementation authority are legally distinct.

    Consequently, a bilateral trade agreement cannot automatically override an inconsistent Indian statute merely because India has accepted the agreement internationally. The legally enforceable rights of importers must be identified through the applicable domestic implementing provisions, interpreted in light of the Trade Agreement where the law permits or requires such interpretation.

    IV. Section 28DA of the Customs Act: The Statutory Framework for Preferential Origin

    Section 28DA, introduced through the Finance Act, 2020, establishes the responsibilities of importers claiming preferential Customs duty under Trade Agreements.

    The provision was intended to strengthen verification of originating status and prevent the misuse of preferential tariff concessions. Under Section 28DA(1), importers must declare that imported goods qualify as originating goods, possess sufficient supporting information, furnish prescribed particulars and exercise reasonable care regarding the accuracy of origin claims.

    Section 28DA(2) makes it clear that the mere submission of a Certificate of Origin does not discharge the importer’s responsibility to exercise reasonable care. However, this provision cannot be interpreted in isolation.

    Section 28DA(3) contemplates requests for further information consistent with the relevant Trade Agreement. This qualification is important because different agreements prescribe different documentary and verification procedures.

    Section 28DA also establishes mechanisms for origin verification, suspension of preferential treatment, provisional clearance and denial of preferential benefits in specified circumstances. Subsection (11) addresses subsequent imports of identical goods following an earlier adverse origin determination. Importantly, the statutory framework does not confer unrestricted authority upon Customs to disregard agreement-specific origin procedures.

    V. CAROTAR, 2020: Procedural Compliance and the Limits of Delegated Legislation

    CAROTAR, 2020 was notified through Notification No. 81/2020-Customs (N.T.), dated 21 August 2020, and came into effect on 21 September 2020.

    The Rules provide a domestic administrative mechanism for implementing Section 28DA. Rule 3 governs preferential tariff claims at the Bill of Entry stage. Rule 4 addresses the information importers must possess, including origin-related information identified in Form-I.

    Rule 5 governs requests for further information. Rule 6 provides for verification through the prescribed authorities, while Rule 7 addresses identical goods and earlier adverse origin determinations.

    Rule 8 deals with additional administrative matters, including consequences of non-compliance.

    Rule 8(3): The Most Important Provision

    Rule 8(3) expressly provides that where CAROTAR conflicts with the Rules of Origin under the relevant Trade Agreement, the latter shall prevail. This creates a specific rule of precedence within the domestic regulatory framework.

    Its legal effect should be carefully understood. Rule 8(3) does not establish that every international treaty automatically overrides Indian legislation. Rather, it is a domestic legal provision expressly recognising the precedence of agreement-specific Rules of Origin over conflicting CAROTAR requirements.

    The distinction is constitutionally significant. The authority of the Trade Agreement’s Rules of Origin in this context flows through the statutory framework enacted and notified under Indian law. Accordingly, Customs officers cannot disregard Rule 8(3) while administering preferential tariff claims.

    VI. CBIC Circular No. 43/2026: Five Major Legal Clarifications

    1. Valid Origin Declaration Under India–UK CETA

    Paragraph 2.1.1 recognises an Origin Declaration completed by the UK exporter or producer in the prescribed manner as proof of origin.

    Therefore, a claim supported by a valid Origin Declaration must be processed without requiring Form-I. This clarification protects importers from an additional routine documentary requirement. However, the declaration must satisfy the applicable agreement’s conditions, and the goods must qualify under the relevant Rules of Origin.

    2. Form-I Cannot Be a Routine Precondition

    Paragraph 2.1.2 clarifies that Form-I is not required to be submitted with the Bill of Entry. Customs cannot treat its submission as a mandatory precondition for preferential tariff treatment. Nevertheless, the Circular does not abolish Form-I or eliminate lawful requests for origin-related information.

    3. Requests for Form-I Information Are Restricted

    Paragraph 2.1.3 identifies two cumulative conditions for seeking relevant Form-I information under the clarification concerning India–UK CETA.

    The Bill of Entry must have been interdicted by the National Risk Management System for origin-related checks, and the proper officer must have reason to believe that the applicable origin criteria have not been satisfied. The words used in the Circular limit routine administrative discretion. However, other verification powers lawfully available under the governing framework remain subject to their respective statutory conditions.

    4. Confidential Commercial Information Is Protected

    Paragraph 2.1.4 clarifies that India–UK CETA importers need not obtain confidential information from exporters or producers.

    Failure to furnish such information cannot, by itself, justify denial of preferential treatment. The importer must nevertheless provide information made available by the exporter or producer. Where the information remains insufficient, verification may be undertaken through the exporting Party’s Verification Authority in accordance with the Trade Agreement.

    5. Subsequent Imports Require Independent Consideration

    Paragraphs 2.2.1 to 2.2.3 address Section 28DA(11).

    The Circular rejects the assumption that goods are identical merely because they share an HSN classification, description, exporter, producer or technical characteristics.

    Before applying an earlier adverse determination, Customs must provide the importer an opportunity to furnish additional information. Where material origin-related facts differ, the current claim must be independently examined. This safeguard is particularly relevant to industrial imports involving changing suppliers, production arrangements, originating inputs and manufacturing processes.

    VII. Supreme Court Judgments from 2025: Their Relevance to Customs Exemptions and Administrative Powers

    The following decisions were delivered within the preceding two years. Their holdings are relevant to the broader legal principles involved, although neither directly adjudicates Circular No. 43/2026.

    A. M/s L.G. Electronics India Private Limited v. Commissioner of Customs

    Court: Supreme Court of India Decision: 10 September 2025 Proceedings: Civil Appeal Nos. 10349–10350 of 2024

    The Supreme Court allowed LG Electronics India Pvt. Ltd.’s customs appeals concerning the import classification of G Watch smartwatches.

    While it did not decide the classification dispute, the Court held that LG was eligible for the Korea-origin duty exemption based on the Certificate of Origin, set aside the CESTAT and original orders, and directed refund of the duty paid with applicable interest within two months.

    Legal commentary: The Supreme Court rightly distinguished tariff classification from entitlement to a preferential-origin exemption, holding that an incorrect claimed classification cannot defeat a substantive benefit otherwise established by a valid Certificate of Origin. While leaving the smartwatch classification issue open, the ruling reinforces that customs adjudication must prioritize proven statutory conditions over technical errors made in good faith.

    B. Noble Resources and Trading India Private Limited v. Union of India & Others

    Citation: 2025 INSC 684 Court: Supreme Court of India Decision: 14 May 2025 Proceedings: Civil Appeal No. 2572 of 2025

    The dispute concerned an exemption claimed on imported crude degummed soyabean oil under the applicable Duty Free Credit Entitlement framework.

    The Department relied upon a Customs circular to extend an exclusion concerning agricultural and dairy products to certain manufactured products derived from agricultural commodities. The Supreme Court rejected the enlarged interpretation and held that the departmental circular could not expand the exclusion beyond the governing notification.

    The Court allowed the importer’s appeal.

    Legal commentary: This decision reinforces the principle that executive circulars cannot alter the substantive scope of statutory exemptions. Although the case did not concern Section 28DA or FTA origin verification, its reasoning is relevant where departmental instructions purport to impose restrictions beyond the governing legal instrument. The decision also demonstrates the importance of distinguishing a statutory condition from an administrative interpretation.

    C. The Constitutional Connection

    The decisions in Maganbhai, L.G. Electronics and Noble Resources operate at different levels. Maganbhai addresses the constitutional relationship between international agreements and domestic legislation.

    L.G. Electronics concerns the examination of preferential Customs exemption entitlement. Noble Resources addresses the limits of departmental circulars in interpreting statutory exemptions.

    Taken together, these authorities support the proposition that Customs administration must operate within the authority conferred by Indian law. They do not establish an unrestricted supremacy of FTAs over Parliament’s legislation. Instead, they reinforce lawful implementation, proper statutory interpretation and limitations on executive action.

    VIII. Constitutional and Administrative Limitations on Customs Discretion

    The Circular raises several questions concerning the lawful exercise of Customs powers. Under Article 265, Customs duty must have legal authority. Consequently, tariff concessions and their withdrawal must be examined within the applicable statutory framework.

    Article 14 requires administrative action to satisfy constitutional standards against arbitrariness. Article 19(1)(g), subject to Article 19(6), protects the right of citizens to practise professions and carry on occupations, trade or business. This does not eliminate lawful import restrictions, but it may be relevant where administrative action unjustifiably interferes with protected commercial activity.

    Article 226 empowers High Courts to exercise judicial review over unlawful administrative action, subject to principles governing the availability of alternative statutory remedies.

    Therefore, Customs action concerning preferential tariff claims may raise constitutional issues where it exceeds statutory authority, disregards mandatory procedures or violates principles of natural justice. However, not every disagreement concerning an origin determination constitutes a constitutional violation.

    Ordinary disputes involving documentary sufficiency, factual origin criteria or assessment may appropriately fall within the Customs Act’s statutory appellate framework. The constitutional remedy becomes particularly relevant where the challenge concerns jurisdictional error, procedural illegality, violation of natural justice or the validity of subordinate legislation.

    IX. Inclusions, Exclusions, Limitations and Discretions: A Consolidated Legal Position

    CategoryLegal position
    Constitutional inclusionArticles 73 and 253 provide distinct foundations for treaty-making and legislative implementation.
    Legislative inclusionCustoms Act and Customs Tariff Act provisions provide mechanisms for domestic administration of trade commitments.
    Preferential origin inclusionValid agreement-prescribed origin documents support preferential claims.
    Procedural exclusionForm-I cannot be imposed routinely as a prerequisite under the India–UK CETA clarification.
    Confidentiality exclusionIndia–UK CETA importers need not obtain confidential exporter or producer information.
    Statutory limitationImporters must exercise reasonable care and satisfy substantive origin requirements.
    Treaty limitationInternational agreements do not automatically override inconsistent Indian primary legislation.
    Administrative limitationCAROTAR cannot override conflicting Rules of Origin under the applicable Trade Agreement, as recognised by Rule 8(3).
    Customs discretionOrigin-related information and verification may be sought within the prescribed conditions.
    Identical-goods safeguardEarlier adverse determinations cannot be applied mechanically without considering relevant origin facts and additional information.
    Judicial safeguardUnlawful administrative action may be challenged through statutory remedies or constitutional judicial review, as appropriate.

    X. A Constitutional Question for Future Litigation

    One of the most significant questions emerging from this framework is whether a delegated rule, administrative instruction or Customs assessment can impose requirements inconsistent with the Rules of Origin incorporated into India’s domestic legal framework.

    The answer requires identifying the precise legal source of each obligation. Where an agreement-specific rule has been implemented under the Customs Tariff Act, the officer must consider that rule alongside Section 28DA and CAROTAR. Where CAROTAR itself expressly gives precedence to the Trade Agreement’s Rules of Origin, administrative authorities must respect that prescribed hierarchy.

    Where a conflict arises between an international commitment and primary parliamentary legislation, the analysis is different. The international agreement does not automatically invalidate or override the statute. The constitutional distinction is fundamental.

    The enforceability of preferential trade benefits in India rests not merely upon diplomatic commitments but upon their lawful incorporation and administration under the Indian legal system.

    Consequently, future litigation may increasingly examine whether origin-verification demands are supported by statutory authority, whether they comply with the applicable Trade Agreement, and whether administrative discretion has been exercised for a legitimate legal purpose.

    XI. The Role of Aadrikaa Legal Services in Corporate Legal Support and Case Research

    Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS) assists large corporates, in-house legal departments, law firms and professional advisory organisations with specialised paralegal support and legal research relating to Customs, GST, Foreign Trade Policy, international trade compliance and regulatory disputes. Its support may include case-law research, statutory interpretation, preparation of legal research notes, compilation of judicial precedents, document examination, litigation chronologies, drafting assistance, regulatory compliance reviews and preparation of case briefs for counsel.

    By combining legal research with domain-specific knowledge of Customs and trade regulations, ALS aims to support corporate legal teams and law firms in managing complex regulatory matters, developing litigation strategies and preparing well-researched submissions before statutory and judicial forums.

    XII. Conclusion: The Constitution Sets the Boundary, Parliament Creates the Framework, and Customs Must Follow the Law

    CBIC Circular No. 43/2026-Customs is more than a procedural clarification concerning Form-I and Rules of Origin. It highlights the constitutional relationship between India’s international trade commitments and their domestic implementation.

    Articles 73 and 253 establish the foundations of treaty-making and legislative implementation. Articles 246 and 265 define the relevant legislative and taxation framework, while Article 14 imposes constitutional limitations upon administrative action.

    Section 28DA and CAROTAR provide the domestic machinery for administering preferential tariff claims. However, Rule 8(3) expressly recognises that conflicting CAROTAR provisions must yield to the applicable Trade Agreement’s Rules of Origin.

    The Supreme Court’s decisions in Maganbhai, L.G. Electronics and Noble Resources illuminate the constitutional and statutory principles that govern this relationship. The essential legal conclusion is that Customs authorities retain the power to verify originating status, prevent misuse of preferential concessions and protect public revenue.

    What they cannot do is transform procedural authority into an independent power to impose substantive conditions unsupported by the governing law.

    For importers, the Circular provides meaningful procedural protection. For Customs authorities, it reinforces the requirement of agreement-consistent administration. For legal practitioners, it offers a framework for examining origin disputes through statutory interpretation, delegated legislation and constitutional principles.

    Ultimately, India’s international trade commitments can deliver their intended commercial benefits only when their domestic implementation remains legally coherent, transparent and consistent with the constitutional rule of law.

    About the Author

    Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha is a New Delhi-based legal professional practising in matters involving Customs, indirect taxation, constitutional law, international trade and regulatory compliance, including matters before the Delhi High Court and statutory tribunals.

    With approximately two decades of experience in international trade, regulatory advisory and supply-chain compliance, his professional work encompasses Customs classification and valuation, Free Trade Agreements, Rules of Origin, DGFT and Foreign Trade Policy matters, BIS and Quality Control Orders, trade remedies, and Customs litigation.

    He holds an LL.M. in Constitutional Law and is associated with Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS), which provides legal advisory, litigation, research and regulatory support to corporate clients and professional organisations.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi