Tag: #ParaLegalServices

  • Bombay High Court: Temporary Access Over Government Land Cannot Be Converted Into Exclusive Private Right by Erecting Gates

    Bombay High Court: Temporary Access Over Government Land Cannot Be Converted Into Exclusive Private Right by Erecting Gates

    Date: 11.09.2026

    The Bombay High Court has held that a housing society permitted to use Government land as an access route cannot convert such permission into an exclusive private right by erecting gates and restricting access to others. The Court upheld the State’s action directing removal of gates erected by The Deccan Co-operative Housing Society Limited, while protecting the Society’s continued right to use the access along with others.

    Justice Arun R. Pedneker partly allowed the Society’s writ petition challenging the order dated 17 March 2026 passed by the Resident Deputy Collector, Mumbai Suburban District.

    Dispute Over Gate and Access Road

    • The dispute concerned a strip of land being used as an access route by the petitioner-Society. The Society challenged the Collector’s direction to remove gates installed on Government land and the subsequent attempts by officials to remove the gate.
    • According to the Society, the gate and pathway had remained in its exclusive and uninterrupted possession and use for more than 45 years. It contended that the authorities could not remove the gate without notice, hearing or following due process of law.
    • The dispute also arose against the backdrop of Civil Suit No. 287 of 2025, instituted by the Society concerning its claimed rights over a garden/open space. The Bombay High Court had earlier granted interim protection against coercive action in relation to that suit property.

    Access Was Originally Granted Only as a Temporary Arrangement

    • Examining historical documents, the High Court found that the Society’s plot had earlier been landlocked because a proposed 44-feet-wide Development Plan road had not yet been constructed.
    • The Municipal Corporation had therefore permitted a 30-feet-wide temporary access through Government land. Importantly, the permission was subject to a specific condition that the Society would discontinue the temporary access once the Development Plan road was constructed. The Society was also required to construct and maintain the temporary access at its own cost.
    • The Court noted that the 44-feet D.P. road had subsequently been completed and was being used by the Society.

    Access Strip Belongs to Government, Not Housing Society

    • After considering the maps and communications placed on record, the High Court concluded that the disputed strip was Government-owned land and did not form part of the land allotted to the Society in 1959.
    • The Court found that the land had been maintained as an open access connecting the D.P. road on one side with the public road on the other. By installing a gate, the Society had attempted to use the access exclusively and exclude other persons.
    • The Court consequently rejected the Society’s claim to exclusive use of the access.

    Constructing Road Does Not Create Exclusive Right Over Government Land

    • The High Court made an important distinction between a right to use an access and a right to possess the land exclusively.
    • The Society could not claim exclusive control merely because it had constructed a bitumen road over the strip. The Court held that Government land kept as an open access could not be appropriated for the Society’s exclusive use.
    • Justice Pedneker observed that the Society had no right to erect a gate over the access road because the land belonged to the Government and the original permission merely enabled the Society to use it as an access.

    Removal of Gate Does Not Amount to Dispossession

    • The Society relied upon the requirement of notice and due process under Section 53 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, arguing that even an unauthorised occupant of Government land could not be summarily dispossessed.
    • The High Court distinguished the precedent relied upon by the Society. It observed that the present case did not involve taking possession of land that had been granted to the Society. Rather, the Society had only been permitted to use Government land for access.
    • By removing the gate, the Collector had not terminated the Society’s access or dispossessed it from a granted property. The Society remained entitled to use the road; removal of the gate merely prevented it from excluding others.
    • The Court therefore held that the direction to remove the gate and keep the access open to everyone did not warrant interference.

    Collector’s Finding of β€œUnauthorised Use” Corrected

    • The High Court, however, did not accept every observation made by the Collector.
    • It specifically found incorrect the Collector’s observation that the Society was unauthorisedly using the road over Government land. The Court clarified that the road had, in fact, been used with the permission of the Municipal Corporation.
    • Thus, while the Society had no right to install gates and claim exclusive access, its underlying use of the access itself was not unauthorised.

    Public Access Must Remain Open

    • The Court emphasised the importance of protecting public spaces and access routes, particularly in densely populated areas.
    • It held that the Government land should remain accessible both to the petitioner-Society and to other persons. Since the Society had never been granted exclusive possession, installation of gates could not be used to transform a limited access right into exclusive control over Government property.
    • At the same time, the High Court imposed an important safeguard: the State cannot grant exclusive use of the access road to any other party either.
    • The access must remain open to the Society as well as others. Further, if the State proposes any action interfering with the Society’s existing access, appropriate notice would have to be issued.

    Writ Petition Partly Allowed

    • The Bombay High Court ultimately declined to interfere with the State’s direction for removal of the gates. However, it protected the Society’s continued non-exclusive access and clarified that the Government could not confer exclusive use of the road upon another party.
    • Accordingly, Writ Petition No. 7981 of 2026 was partly allowed.

    Key Legal Takeaway

    The judgment draws a clear distinction between permission to use Government land as an access and possession or ownership of that land. Long-standing use, expenditure on constructing or maintaining a road, or physical installation of gates does not by itself convert a permissive access into an exclusive proprietary right.

    At the same time, the ruling protects the legitimate access originally granted to the Society: the Government may keep the road open to the public, but it cannot arbitrarily stop the Society’s access or confer exclusive use upon another private party.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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  • Karnataka High Court Sets Aside Bank Account Defreezing Order; Says Banks Must Be Heard Before Release of Frozen Funds

    Karnataka High Court Sets Aside Bank Account Defreezing Order; Says Banks Must Be Heard Before Release of Frozen Funds

    Date: 11.09.2026

    The Karnataka High Court has set aside an order directing Axis Bank Limited to defreeze a bank account and has remanded the matter to the jurisdictional Magistrate for fresh consideration after giving the Bank an opportunity of hearing.

    Justice M. Nagaprasanna passed the order in a petition filed by Axis Bank under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, challenging the order dated 10 August 2023 passed by the 1st Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru in Crime No. 138/2023.

    Axis Bank Challenged Direction to Defreeze Account

    • The impugned Magistrate’s order had directed Axis Bank to defreeze account No. 922020041646754 maintained with the Bank. Axis Bank approached the High Court contending that in similar matters, coordinate Benches had already held that a bank should be heard before orders are passed for defreezing accounts and releasing money to complainants.
    • The Bank relied upon earlier Karnataka High Court orders where matters had been remanded to Magistrates to reconsider applications under Sections 451 and 457 CrPC after permitting the concerned bank to file objections and participate in the proceedings.

    Why Hearing the Bank Is Necessary

    • The High Court referred to an earlier coordinate Bench order which recognised the practical difficulty faced by banks where multiple criminal cases and multiple judicial orders concern the same accused or account.
    • In some cases, the amounts directed to be released may exceed the funds actually available in the account. The earlier order therefore held that before directing the bank to unfreeze an account and transfer money to a complainant, the Magistrate should first hear the bank.
    • The Court also relied upon another batch of petitions in which the Trial Courts had ordered defreezing and release of funds without hearing the petitioner-bank. The coordinate Bench held that such orders created serious compliance difficulties, especially where some customer accounts had insufficient or zero balances.

    Karnataka High Court Sets Aside Magistrate’s Order

    • Following the earlier coordinate Bench decisions, Justice Nagaprasanna allowed Axis Bank’s petition and set aside the Magistrate’s order dated 10 August 2023.
    • The matter was remanded to the 1st Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru to reconsider the application under Sections 451 and 457 CrPC afresh, after affording Axis Bank an opportunity of hearing.

    Bank Restrained From Releasing Money Until Fresh Decision

    • Pending reconsideration of the application, the High Court restrained Axis Bank from releasing money from the subject account in favour of any person.
    • The Court further directed the concerned Magistrate to decide the application under Sections 451 and 457 CrPC as expeditiously as possible and in any event within eight weeks from receipt of the High Court’s order.

    Key Legal Takeaway

    The ruling reinforces an important procedural safeguard in cases involving freezing and defreezing of bank accounts during criminal investigations. Where a judicial order may require a bank to release or transfer funds from an account, the bank should ordinarily be afforded an opportunity of hearing, particularly where multiple claims, prior freezing directions, insufficient balances or competing judicial orders may exist.

    The judgment does not finally decide who is entitled to the disputed funds. Instead, it requires the Magistrate to reconsider the matter after hearing the Bank and all concerned parties.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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  • Delhi High Court Sets Aside Refusal of β€˜HEALTHSKOOL’ Trademark; Holds Suggestive Marks Are Inherently Distinctive and Registrable

    Delhi High Court Sets Aside Refusal of β€˜HEALTHSKOOL’ Trademark; Holds Suggestive Marks Are Inherently Distinctive and Registrable

    Date: 11.09.2026

    The Delhi High Court has set aside an order of the Trade Marks Registry refusing registration of the mark β€œHEALTHSKOOL” for medical and allied products in Class 10, holding that the Senior Examiner had applied an incorrect legal standard while examining the distinctiveness of the mark.

    Justice Prathiba M. Singh allowed the appeal filed by Disruptive Health Solutions Private Limited under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and directed the Registrar of Trade Marks to proceed with advertisement of the mark, subject to a disclaimer that the proprietor would have no exclusive rights over the word β€œHealth” independently.

    Trademark Registry Refused β€œHEALTHSKOOL” as Descriptive

    • The dispute arose from Trade Mark Application No. 3942420, filed for the word mark β€œHEALTHSKOOL” on a β€œproposed to be used” basis in Class 10.
    • The application covered products including bandages, condoms, surgical, medical, dental and veterinary apparatus and instruments, artificial limbs, orthopaedic articles, suture materials and other medical products.
    • The Senior Examiner rejected the application under Section 9(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Act, reasoning that β€œHEALTHSKOOL” indicated the purpose or use of the goods and was therefore descriptive.

    Appellant Already Held β€œHEALTHSKOOL” Registrations in Other Classes

    • Before the High Court, Disruptive Health Solutions pointed out that β€œHEALTHSKOOL” had been adopted in 2015 for medicinal and other products and e-pharmacy activities.
    • The company already held registrations for the mark in Classes 3, 5 and 44, including both word and logo registrations. The Registrar’s counsel also confirmed before the Court that registrations for the same mark had been granted in other classes.
    • The Court further noted that the Registry’s examination report had not cited any identical or deceptively similar trademark. The only objection raised against the application was under Section 9(1)(b).

    Delhi High Court Explains β€œSpectrum of Distinctiveness”

    • The High Court found that the Senior Examiner had β€œerred in law” in applying the standard for registration of trademarks.
    • The Court explained that trademarks broadly fall across a spectrum comprising arbitrary/fanciful/invented marks, suggestive marks, descriptive marks and generic marks.
    • Relying on Bata India Limited v. Chawla Boot House, (2019) 259 DLT 292, the Court reiterated the spectrum of trademark distinctiveness:

    Generic β†’ Descriptive β†’ Suggestive β†’ Arbitrary/Invented

    While generic expressions enjoy the least distinctiveness and descriptive marks generally require secondary meaning, suggestive marks are inherently distinctive and do not require proof of secondary meaning.

    How to Distinguish a Suggestive Mark From a Descriptive Mark

    • The judgment provides an important test for determining whether a mark is descriptive or merely suggestive.
    • Referring to Bata India, the Court noted that the inquiry can involve two considerations: the degree of imagination required to connect the mark with the product, and the competitor’s need to use the mark.
    • The Court also relied on the Bombay High Court’s judgment in People Interactive (India) Private Limited v. Vivek Pahwa, 2016 (68) PTC 225 (Bom), which explains that suggestive words merely hint at a feature or speciality of the goods and require the consumer to make a mental connection between the expression and the product. Such marks do not require proof of secondary meaning before registration.

    Descriptive Element Does Not Automatically Make Entire Mark Unregistrable

    • The High Court further clarified that a mark can obtain protection either because it is inherently distinctive or because it has acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning.
    • Importantly, the Court held that merely because some portion of a trademark has a reference or indication concerning the goods or services, the entire mark cannot automatically be rejected.
    • The Registry must examine the mark on its merits, the extent of its use and other registrations held by the applicant. The Court also recognised that a trademark owner is entitled to expand into additional goods and services as a natural consequence of business expansion.

    β€œHEALTHSKOOL” Distinctive Enough to Proceed for Advertisement

    • Applying these principles, the Court noted that β€œHEALTHSKOOL” had been used by the appellant since 2015 and was already protected through several registrations in other classes.
    • The company had also recorded sales of approximately β‚Ή23 crore during 2020-21.
    • Significantly, the appellant informed the Court that it was not claiming exclusive rights over the word β€œHealth” per se.
    • Considering these circumstances, the High Court concluded that β€œHEALTHSKOOL” was sufficiently distinctive at that stage to proceed for advertisement.

    Registry Directed to Advertise Mark Within Two Months

    • The Delhi High Court consequently held that the Senior Examiner’s refusal order was unsustainable and liable to be set aside.
    • The Court directed that the trademark application proceed for advertisement in the Trade Marks Journal with the condition:

    β€œNo exclusive rights in the word β€˜Health’.”

    The Registrar was directed to advertise the mark within two months. The Court, however, clarified that its decision would not bind any opposition proceedings that might subsequently be initiated by a third party. The appeal was accordingly allowed.

    Key Legal Takeaway

    • The judgment reinforces that the Trade Marks Registry cannot treat every mark having some connection with the relevant goods as automatically descriptive. The proper inquiry requires consideration of the spectrum of distinctiveness.
    • In particular, suggestive marks are inherently distinctive, whereas descriptive marks ordinarily require secondary meaning. The degree of imagination required by a consumer to connect a mark with the product remains an important test in drawing that distinction.

    The decision also recognises that the presence of a potentially descriptive component within a composite trademark does not necessarily justify rejection of the entire mark, particularly where an appropriate disclaimer can protect the public interest.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • CESTAT Mumbai Sets Aside Customs Duty Demand Under EPCG Scheme; Delay in EODC Issuance by DGFT Held Beyond Exporter’s Control

    CESTAT Mumbai Sets Aside Customs Duty Demand Under EPCG Scheme; Delay in EODC Issuance by DGFT Held Beyond Exporter’s Control

    Date: 10.09.2026

    The Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), Mumbai has granted significant relief to CEAT Limited in an EPCG dispute, setting aside a customs duty demand of β‚Ή1.79 crore, along with redemption fine and penalty, after finding that the company had fulfilled its export obligations and that the delay in issuance of the Export Obligation Discharge Certificate (EODC) by DGFT was beyond its control.

    The Regional Bench comprising Judicial Member Ajay Sharma and Technical Member M.M. Parthiban allowed CEAT’s appeal against the Order-in-Original dated 22 May 2025 passed by the Commissioner of Customs (Export), Mumbai.

    Background of the EPCG Dispute

    • CEAT, engaged in the manufacture of automobile tyres, had obtained six EPCG authorisations in 2013 for importing capital goods against the export of tyres. The capital goods imported under these authorisations were valued at approximately β‚Ή7.76 crore, involving customs duty foregone of β‚Ή1,79,12,579. CEAT had executed bonds undertaking fulfilment of its export obligations.
    • Customs subsequently alleged that CEAT had failed to produce the required Capital Goods Installation Certificates and had also not submitted the EODC as required under the applicable EPCG exemption notification.
    • Accordingly, a show cause notice dated 7 October 2024 proposed recovery of the entire duty foregone amount of β‚Ή1.79 crore with interest, confiscation of the imported capital goods under Section 111(o) of the Customs Act, 1962, and penalty under Section 112(a). The Commissioner confirmed the proposals through the Order-in-Original dated 22 May 2025.

    CEAT Had Already Applied to DGFT for EODC

    • Before CESTAT, CEAT contended that it had fulfilled the prescribed export obligation and had already approached the DGFT authorities for issuance of the EODC.
    • Significantly, the application seeking the discharge certificate had been submitted to DGFT on 13 January 2020, well before the Customs adjudication. The EODC, however, remained pending with the licensing authority when the Commissioner passed the impugned order.
    • CEAT also produced installation certificates issued by the jurisdictional Central Excise authorities covering the imported capital goods. Subsequently, the EODC covering all six EPCG authorisations was issued by DGFT, and Customs itself accepted the discharge certificate and cancelled the bonds executed under the six EPCG authorisations.

    Delay by DGFT Was Beyond Exporter’s Control: CESTAT

    • The Tribunal found that the requisite conditions concerning installation of the imported capital goods had been fulfilled.
    • More importantly, CESTAT noted that CEAT had submitted the necessary details to DGFT for obtaining the EODC as early as 13 January 2020, whereas the certificate was ultimately issued only later by the DGFT authorities.
    • The Tribunal therefore held that non-production of the EODC during adjudication was beyond CEAT’s control, since the competent authority had not issued the certificate despite CEAT having completed the exports necessary for fulfilment of its export obligation and submitted the requisite documents.
    • This finding is particularly important for EPCG disputes where an importer/exporter has completed the substantive export obligation but faces Customs proceedings merely because the formal discharge certificate remains pending before DGFT.

    Customs Should Not Prematurely Decide EPCG Compliance While EODC Is Pending

    • CESTAT relied upon its earlier decision in Alca Technologies v. Commissioner of Customs, Nhava Sheva-IV, reported at 2019 (369) E.L.T. 1447 (Tri.-Mumbai).
    • In that case, the Tribunal had held that where an application for EODC remained pending before the licensing authority, the proper course for Customs was to keep the show cause notice pending until the licensing authority took a decision, rather than independently proceeding to conclude that the conditions of the exemption notification had not been fulfilled.
    • The principle assumes importance because determination of whether the export obligation under an EPCG authorisation has been discharged substantially falls within the framework administered by DGFT.

    CESTAT Notes Contradictory Stand Taken by Customs

    • One of the strongest observations in the order concerned the contradictory positions adopted within the Customs Department itself.
    • After DGFT issued the EODC, the Customs authorities accepted the certificate and cancelled the bonds relating to all six EPCG licences. At the same time, the impugned adjudication order continued to demand customs duty on the premise that CEAT had failed to submit the EODC.
    • CESTAT observed that, on one hand, Customs had confirmed the duty demand for non-production of the EODC, while on the other hand, authorities of the same Commissionerate had subsequently accepted the EODC and cancelled the bonds.
    • The Tribunal therefore found no merit in sustaining the demand merely on the ground of non-submission of the documents during the original adjudication.

    Duty Demand, Redemption Fine and Penalty Set Aside

    • In light of CEAT’s fulfilment of the EPCG conditions, issuance of the EODC by DGFT, production of installation certificates and subsequent cancellation of the bonds by Customs itself, CESTAT held that the impugned order could not legally survive.
    • The Tribunal accordingly held that the order, insofar as it confirmed the customs duty demand along with redemption fine and penalty, was legally unsustainable.
    • The impugned order was therefore set aside and CEAT’s appeal was allowed.

    Key Legal Takeaway

    The ruling reinforces an important principle in EPCG and export-promotion disputes: where an exporter has completed the substantive export obligation and has timely approached DGFT for an EODC, it should not ordinarily suffer adverse customs consequences merely because issuance of the formal certificate remains pending with the licensing authority.

    The decision also underlines the need for coordination between DGFT and Customs. Where the licensing authority is still considering an EODC application, Customs should avoid prematurely concluding that the export obligation has not been fulfilled.

    Once DGFT subsequently certifies fulfilment and Customs itself accepts that certificate by cancelling the corresponding bonds, maintaining a duty demand based solely on earlier non-production of the EODC becomes untenable.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Handy Download:

    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Delhi High Court Grants Bail Under NDPS Act Over 51-Day Delay in Sampling

    Delhi High Court Grants Bail Under NDPS Act Over 51-Day Delay in Sampling

    Date: 10.09.2026

    In a significant ruling concerning the sampling and preservation of seized narcotic drugs under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), the Delhi High Court held that an application under Section 52A of the NDPS Act for drawing samples before a Magistrate must be made within a reasonable time and that an unexplained delay of 51 days could not be regarded as reasonable.

    In Kashif v. Narcotics Control Bureau, BAIL APPLN. 253/2023, Justice Jasmeet Singh held that violation of Section 52A in the facts of the case vitiated the sample-collection procedure and that the resulting benefit must accrue to the accused. The Court consequently granted bail to the applicant, who had been in custody since 7 March 2022.

    The judgment is particularly important because the Court addressed a recurring question under the NDPS Act: where Section 52A does not prescribe a specific numerical deadline, how quickly must the investigating agency approach the Magistrate for sampling and certification?

    The Delhi High Court answered that, taking guidance from Standing Order 1/88, it is desirable that the Section 52A application be made within 72 hours or near about that timeframe, while also recognising that what constitutes a reasonable time ultimately depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.

    Background of the Case

    • The prosecution case originated from information received by a Junior Intelligence Officer of the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) concerning a suspicious parcel lying at the DHL Express office at Rama Road, Kirti Nagar, New Delhi.
    • An NCB team reached the premises and examined the parcel. According to the prosecution, it contained 11 lace rolls and three pieces of cloth. Upon checking one lace roll, officers allegedly found 120 strips of Tramadol tablets, with ten tablets in each strip. Examination of the remaining rolls ultimately led to the alleged discovery of 13,200 strips of Tramadol tablets. The contraband was seized on 24 February 2022.
    • The investigation subsequently led to further seizures. On 28 February 2022, 15,000 Zolpidem tablets were allegedly recovered at Terminal 3, IGI Airport, while another 19,440 Tramadol tablets were recovered from packages at Global India Express Pvt. Ltd., Mahipalpur.
    • The prosecution alleged that co-accused Tamir Ali disclosed the involvement of Kashif and other persons in sending NRx tablets to the United States. Kashif was thereafter arrested near Jewar Toll Plaza on 7 March 2022.

    Applicant’s Principal Challenge: Defective and Delayed Sampling

    • The bail application raised serious objections concerning the manner in which the seized substances were sampled.
    • The applicant argued that the procedure prescribed by Standing Order 1/88 had not been followed. In particular, it was contended that sampling had not been carried out on the spot in accordance with Clause 1.5 of the Standing Order.
    • Reliance was placed upon Basant Rai v. State, 2012 SCC OnLine Del 3319, to challenge the procedure of mixing tablets recovered from different strips/packages rather than following the prescribed representative sampling procedure.
    • The applicant also relied upon the Supreme Court decision in Gaunter Edwin Kircher v. State of Goa, Secretariat Panaji, Goa, AIR 1993 SC 1456, contending that proper sampling was required from the individual packets and that the procedure followed by the NCB was deficient.
    • However, the issue that ultimately assumed central importance before the High Court was the delay in approaching the Magistrate under Section 52A of the NDPS Act.

    Section 52A of the NDPS Act: Why Is Magistrate-Supervised Sampling Important?

    • Section 52A lays down the statutory mechanism concerning disposal and evidentiary documentation of seized narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

    Under Section 52A(2), the authorised officer is required to prepare an inventory and may approach the Magistrate for, among other things:

    certification of the correctness of the inventory;

    taking and certification of photographs; and

    drawing representative samples in the presence of the Magistrate and certification of the correctness of the list of samples.

    • Importantly, Section 52A(4) gives evidentiary significance to the inventory, photographs and list of samples certified by the Magistrate by providing for their treatment as primary evidence.
    • The integrity of this process therefore assumes considerable importance in an NDPS prosecution.

    Standing Order 1/88 and the 72-Hour Requirement

    • The Court also examined Clauses 1.5 and 1.13 of Standing Order 1/88.
    • Clause 1.5 provided for samples to be drawn at the spot of recovery, in duplicate, in the presence of panch witnesses and the person from whose possession the substance was recovered.
    • Clause 1.13 provided that samples should be dispatched to the laboratory within 72 hours of seizure to avoid legal objections.
    • The Court noted that a notification published on 23 December 2022 repealed Standing Orders 1/88 and 1/89 and clarified the sampling mechanism by requiring sampling to be undertaken in accordance with Section 52A(2). However, the Court held that this subsequent notification could not be applied retrospectively to the case before it.

    Supreme Court in Mohanlal: Section 52A Does Not Brook Delay

    • A central precedent considered by the Delhi High Court was Union of India v. Mohanlal, (2016) 3 SCC 379.
    • The Supreme Court had recognised the conflict between the statutory mechanism under Section 52A and the Standing Orders relating to sampling. Nevertheless, it stressed that once contraband is seized, the authorised officer should approach the Magistrate for sampling and certification without loss of time.
    • The Delhi High Court extracted the Supreme Court’s conclusion that although there was no basis for reading an exact statutory timeframe into Section 52A, an application for sampling and certification should nevertheless be made without undue delay.
    • This distinction became crucial.
    • The absence of a fixed number of days in Section 52A did not, according to the Delhi High Court, give the investigating agency unlimited discretion regarding when to approach the Magistrate.

    Court: Reasonable Time Must Be Read Into Section 52A

    The High Court framed the central question as:

    What constitutes a reasonable time for making an application to the Magistrate under Section 52A, and what is the effect of delay?

    • After examining the statute, Standing Orders and Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Court held that a reasonable timeframe must be read into Section 52A(2).
    • The Court rejected the proposition that because the legislation does not expressly specify a deadline, investigating authorities could take an indefinite amount of time to initiate the statutory sampling process.
    • It observed that the seizure, quantity and quality of contraband constitute crucial evidence in NDPS proceedings and that drawing and certification of samples in the presence of a Magistrate are of utmost importance.

    Delhi High Court Suggests 72 Hours or Near About as Desirable Period

    • One of the most significant aspects of the judgment appears in paragraph 28.
    • The Court recognised that what constitutes reasonable time will depend upon the circumstances of each case. Nevertheless, taking guidance from Standing Order 1/88, Justice Jasmeet Singh held that:
    • it is desirable that an application under Section 52A should be made within 72 hours or near about the said timeframe.
    • The Court was careful not to convert this observation into an inflexible statutory deadline. Rather, it used the Standing Order as a guide for assessing whether the delay was reasonable.
    • This makes the judgment important for both prosecution agencies and defence lawyers dealing with NDPS cases involving delayed sampling.

    Why Delay in Sampling Matters

    • The Court’s concern was fundamentally linked to the integrity of physical evidence.
    • Where seized narcotic substances remain in the custody and control of the prosecuting agency for an extended period before the statutory sampling process is completed, questions may arise regarding preservation and the possibility of tampering.
    • The Court relied upon Rishi Dev @ Onkar Singh v. State, 2008:DHC:1513, where the Delhi High Court had stressed the importance of sending samples for testing promptly because delay can create the possibility of interference with material kept in the police malkhana.
    • In Kashif, the Court concluded that non-compliance with Section 52A within a reasonable time could create an apprehension that the sample may have been tampered with. It further observed that where a sample is wrongly drawn, the benefit of doubt must accrue to the accused, while the prosecuting agency would have to establish at trial that the sample remained immune from tampering.

    51-Day Delay Held Clearly Unreasonable

    • Applying these principles to the facts, the High Court noted that the last seizure was made on 2 March 2022, whereas the application under Section 52A for drawing samples and certification was filed only on 22 April 2022.
    • The delay was therefore 51 days.

    The Court held categorically that:

    β€œA period of 51 days, by no stretch of imagination, can be called a reasonable period”

    • for filing a Section 52A application.
    • The Court also found it significant that the NCB had furnished no reasons explaining the 51-day delay.

    Investigating Agency Must Explain Delay

    • The Court further observed that an application under Section 52A for sample collection is not a highly technical proceeding requiring elaborate factual or legal pleadings.
    • It characterised it as being more in the nature of a clerical application and held that it should mandatorily be moved within a reasonable time.
    • The Court stated that the application must be moved at the earliest, and if it is not, the authorities must explain the reasons for the delay.
    • This aspect of the judgment is particularly significant because it places an evidentiary and procedural burden upon investigating agencies to account for unexplained delay.

    Standing Orders Cannot Be Blatantly Flouted

    • The judgment also relies significantly upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Noor Aga v. State of Punjab & Anr., (2008) 16 SCC 417.
    • The Supreme Court in Noor Aga had emphasised that guidelines issued under legal authority cannot simply be ignored and that substantial compliance with such guidelines is important, particularly in penal proceedings.
    • The Delhi High Court noted that NDPS punishments are punitive and stringent, making procedural safeguards particularly important in balancing the rights of an accused.
    • The Court further referred to its earlier decision in Laxman Thakur v. State, BAIL APPLN. 3233/2022, 2022/DHC/005591, where Standing Order 1/88 had been treated as mandatory.

    Earlier Delhi High Court Decisions Considered

    • The Court examined several earlier decisions concerning NDPS sampling.
    • In Amani Fidel Chris v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2020 SCC OnLine Del 2080, bail had been granted where the sampling procedure followed by the investigating agency conformed neither to Section 52A nor to the relevant Standing Orders.
    • The NCB, on the other hand, relied upon Arvind Yadav in JC Through His Pairokar v. Govt. of NCT Delhi Through Standing Counsel, BAIL APPLN. 1416/2021, 2021:DHC:1965, where a coordinate Bench had declined to grant bail merely because samples had been drawn without the Magistrate’s presence, leaving the effect upon the sanctity of the samples to be examined at trial.
    • The Court distinguished the issue before it by focusing upon the reasonable apprehension regarding preservation or tampering arising from prolonged delay.

    Section 52A Violation Held to Vitiate Sample Collection Procedure

    After considering the entire statutory and judicial framework, the Court reached a clear conclusion:

    Violation of Section 52A vitiated the sample collection procedure, and the benefit had to accrue to the applicant.

    • The Court also rejected the contention that the applicant could not raise the objection because he had failed to object when the Section 52A application was eventually moved.
    • Justice Jasmeet Singh held that since the objection was a legal objection, it could be raised at any stage.

    Section 37 Embargo Held Inapplicable to the Applicant

    • The Court also considered the stringent bail restrictions contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
    • It noted that Kashif had been in custody since 7 March 2022, no further custodial interrogation was required, and no recovery had been made from the applicant or at his instance.
    • On these facts, the Court held that the embargo under Section 37 was not applicable to the applicant.

    Bail Granted Subject to Stringent Conditions

    • The High Court ultimately allowed the bail application.
    • Kashif was directed to furnish a personal bond and surety bond of β‚Ή25,000 each, subject to the satisfaction of the Trial Court.
    • Among other conditions, he was required to appear before the Court when required, keep his mobile number operational, join investigation when called, inform the authorities of any change of address, refrain from leaving the country and surrender his passport, if any.
    • He was also prohibited from engaging in criminal activity, contacting prosecution witnesses or tampering with evidence.
    • The Court expressly clarified that its observations were made only for deciding the bail application and would have no bearing on the merits of the case at trial.

    Key Case Laws Referred to in the Judgment

    CaseCitationPrinciple/Context
    Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil NaduCriminal Appeal No. 152/2013, decided 29.10.2020Admissibility of statements under Section 67 NDPS Act
    Basant Rai v. State2012 SCC OnLine Del 3319Sampling procedure
    Gaunter Edwin Kircher v. State of GoaAIR 1993 SC 1456Sampling from seized packets
    Union of India v. Mohanlal(2016) 3 SCC 379Section 52A sampling/certification without undue delay
    Noor Aga v. State of Punjab & Anr.(2008) 16 SCC 417Substantial compliance with Standing Orders
    Chief Information Commissioner v. State of Manipur(2011) 15 SCC 1Statutory interpretation/procedure
    Arvind Yadav v. Govt. of NCT Delhi2021:DHC:1965Effect of Section 52A non-compliance at bail stage
    Amani Fidel Chris v. NCB2020 SCC OnLine Del 2080Bail and defective NDPS sampling
    Laxman Thakur v. State2022/DHC/005591Mandatory character of Standing Order 1/88
    Rishi Dev @ Onkar Singh v. State2008:DHC:1513Delay, sample preservation and possibility of tampering

    The judgment also reproduces, through Chief Information Commissioner, references to Taylor v. Taylor, (1875) 1 Ch D 426 (CA); Nazir Ahmad v. Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253 (2); Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1527; and State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh, AIR 1964 SC 358, on the principle that where law prescribes a particular manner of doing something, the prescribed procedure should be followed.

    Key Legal Takeaways from Kashif v. NCB

    • The judgment establishes several important propositions for NDPS proceedings.
    • First, the mere fact that Section 52A does not prescribe an express numerical deadline does not permit indefinite delay in approaching the Magistrate.
    • Second, an application for sampling and certification must be made at the earliest and within a reasonable period.
    • Third, taking guidance from Standing Order 1/88, the Delhi High Court considered 72 hours or near about that period desirable for making a Section 52A application. This should, however, be understood in the context of the Court’s simultaneous observation that reasonableness depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
    • Fourth, unexplained delay can raise legitimate concerns regarding preservation and possible tampering of the seized material.
    • Fifth, where delay occurs, the investigating agency should provide an explanation.
    • Sixth, procedural safeguards assume heightened significance under the NDPS Act because of the severity of the punishments and stringent statutory regime.

    Why This Judgment Matters

    • Kashif v. NCB is significant not merely because bail was granted, but because it attempts to give practical meaning to the Supreme Court’s requirement in Mohanlal that Section 52A proceedings be initiated β€œwithout undue delay.”
    • The Delhi High Court did not formally rewrite Section 52A by inserting a rigid statutory limitation period. Instead, it harmoniously read Section 52A with the applicable Standing Order and concluded that the absence of an express deadline cannot allow the prosecution to keep seized contraband under its exclusive custody indefinitely before seeking Magistrate-supervised sampling.
    • For investigating agencies, the ruling underlines the importance of prompt Section 52A applications, proper sampling, preservation of the chain of custody and documentation of reasons for any unavoidable delay.
    • For accused persons, it reinforces the proposition that procedural safeguards relating to the integrity of seized narcotic substances are not merely technical formalities, particularly where the prosecution’s case depends upon the identity, quantity and chemical composition of the alleged contraband.

    Conclusion

    The Delhi High Court’s judgment in Kashif v. Narcotics Control Bureau, BAIL APPLN. 253/2023, is an important authority on the relationship between Section 52A of the NDPS Act, Standing Order 1/88 and timely Magistrate-supervised sampling. The Court found that the NCB had approached the Magistrate only 51 days after the last seizure, without furnishing reasons for the delay.

    Such a period, the Court held, could not be considered reasonable. It consequently held that the Section 52A violation vitiated the sample-collection procedure and that the benefit should accrue to the applicant.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Failure to Register Project Under Section 3 Does Not Oust RERA’s Adjudicatory Jurisdiction Under Section 31

    Failure to Register Project Under Section 3 Does Not Oust RERA’s Adjudicatory Jurisdiction Under Section 31

    Date: 10.09.2026

    In an important ruling concerning the jurisdiction of the Real Estate Regulatory Authority (RERA) and the rights of homebuyers, the Punjab & Haryana High Court has held that a promoter cannot defeat an allottee’s remedy under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 merely by contending that the concerned project was not registered with RERA.

    A Division Bench comprising Justice Sureshwar Thakur and Justice Vikas Suri rejected the jurisdictional challenge raised by M/s Ramprastha Developers Pvt. Ltd. and others against an order passed by the Haryana Real Estate Regulatory Authority, Gurugram. The Court ultimately dismissed the writ petition and held that the petitioners could pursue the statutory appellate remedy available under the RERA Act.

    Background of the Dispute

    • The writ petition challenged an order dated 26 July 2024 passed by the Haryana Real Estate Regulatory Authority, Gurugram on complaints instituted by Yuvraj Arora and Vivek Arora.
    • An important document before the Court was a receipt issued by Ramprastha Developers recording payment of β‚Ή2,49,37,500 in connection with a request for tentative registration of 6,500 square yards in its future potential projects.
    • The developers principally argued that RERA lacked jurisdiction because the subject project had not been registered under Section 3 of the RERA Act. According to them, registration of the project was a mandatory prerequisite before the provisions of the RERA Act could apply.

    Developers Challenge RERA’s Jurisdiction

    • The petitioners contended that the RERA order suffered from an inherent jurisdictional defect and was effectively coram non judice.
    • Their argument was that no requisite registration/licence existed in respect of the project and, therefore, RERA could not entertain the complaints. They also questioned whether a payment relating to a prospective or future project could confer enforceable rights upon the complainants under the RERA Act.
    • The respondents, on the other hand, raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ petition because Section 43(5) of the RERA Act provides a statutory appeal before the Real Estate Appellate Tribunal against an order of the Authority or adjudicating officer.

    High Court Examines Section 3 of the RERA Act

    • The Court considered Section 3, which generally prohibits a promoter from advertising, marketing, booking, selling or offering property in a real estate project without registration with the Real Estate Regulatory Authority.
    • The High Court, however, rejected the proposition that the promoter’s failure to secure the relevant registration could itself extinguish the rights of homebuyers to approach RERA.
    • The Court observed that non-issuance or absence of the relevant registration does not restrict the right of homebuyers to access remedies contemplated under the RERA Act.
    • This distinction became central to the judgment: the promoter’s statutory obligation to register a project cannot be converted into a jurisdictional defence against an aggrieved allottee.

    Section 31 Is the Source of RERA’s Adjudicatory Jurisdiction

    • The High Court placed considerable emphasis on Section 31 of the RERA Act.
    • Section 31 permits any aggrieved person to file a complaint before the Authority or adjudicating officer for violation or contravention of the Act, rules or regulations against a promoter, allottee or real estate agent.
    • The Court held that the question of RERA’s adjudicatory jurisdiction is more directly governed by this statutory right to file a complaint than by whether every requirement relating to project registration under Section 3 had first been fulfilled.
    • The Court consequently reasoned that compliance with Section 3, or even action by the competent authority under the provisos to Section 3, is not a statutory precursor to the vesting of adjudicatory jurisdiction in RERA.

    Promoter Cannot Benefit From Non-Registration

    • The judgment has an important consumer-protection consequence.
    • If non-registration of a project were treated as sufficient to oust RERA jurisdiction, a promoter could potentially rely upon its own failure to comply with registration requirements to prevent an aggrieved purchaser or allottee from approaching the regulatory authority.
    • The High Court’s interpretation avoids such a result.
    • The Court read the provisions of the RERA Act harmoniously and concluded that the statutory framework confers adjudicatory competence upon RERA to entertain complaints concerning alleged violations by promoters.
    • It therefore held that neither the filing of the complaints nor RERA’s exercise of jurisdiction suffered from an inherent jurisdictional defect or the vice of coram non judice.

    RERA’s Powers Under Section 37

    • The Court also referred to Section 37 of the RERA Act, which authorises the Regulatory Authority to issue directions to promoters, allottees and real estate agents for the purpose of discharging its functions under the Act, Rules and Regulations.
    • The provision states that such directions are binding on all concerned.
    • This reinforced the Court’s conclusion regarding the breadth of RERA’s regulatory and adjudicatory authority.

    Prospective Allottee Can Also Have Locus to Approach RERA

    • Another significant issue concerned the complainants’ status as allottees.
    • The developers argued that the complainant had merely paid money in respect of prospective projects and that no such project had actually been floated at the relevant stage. On this basis, they questioned whether any cause of action or locus standi existed.
    • The High Court rejected this contention.
    • It reasoned that the statutory concept of an allottee could encompass potential or prospective allottees in relation to projects proposed to be undertaken in the future, and considered the receipt/documentary arrangement sufficient in the circumstances to reject the challenge to the complainants’ locus.
    • This aspect of the judgment may have particular significance in cases involving advance bookings, pre-launch payments, tentative registrations and payments made for future projects.

    Alternative Remedy Under Section 43(5)

    • Having concluded that RERA had not exercised jurisdiction that was inherently non-existent, the High Court addressed the developers’ attempt to invoke writ jurisdiction directly.
    • The Court found no merit in the argument that the statutory appellate remedy was ineffective merely because the petitioners alleged that RERA’s original order was without jurisdiction.
    • Since the jurisdiction assumed by RERA was neither non-est nor coram non judice, the developers were required to pursue the statutory remedy of appeal against the impugned order.
    • Section 43(5) is particularly significant for promoters because an appeal by a promoter is subject to the statutory pre-deposit requirement prescribed by the proviso to that provision.

    Relief Regarding Limitation for Statutory Appeal

    • While dismissing the writ petition, the High Court provided an important procedural safeguard.
    • It observed that if the statutory appeal filed by the petitioners was time-barred, they could file an application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
    • The appellate body was directed to pass a reasoned decision on such application and thereafter, where appropriate, register and decide the appeal after hearing all affected parties.

    Key Principles Emerging From the Judgment

    The judgment establishes several important propositions for RERA disputes:

    • First, non-registration of a real estate project does not, by itself, deprive an aggrieved homebuyer or allottee of the statutory remedy available under RERA.
    • Second, the promoter’s obligation to register a project under Section 3 must be distinguished from RERA’s adjudicatory jurisdiction under Section 31.
    • Third, failure to comply with project-registration requirements cannot automatically be used by the promoter to defeat a complaint brought by an aggrieved person.
    • Fourth, RERA enjoys statutory powers under Section 37 to issue binding directions to promoters, allottees and real estate agents.
    • Fifth, the Court recognised, in the factual setting before it, the standing of a person who had paid substantial consideration towards a prospective project to pursue remedies under the Act.
    • Sixth, where RERA possesses jurisdiction, a promoter challenging its order should ordinarily pursue the statutory appeal under Section 43(5) instead of bypassing that remedy through a writ petition.

    Significance for Homebuyers and Developers

    • The ruling strengthens the remedial character of the RERA framework.
    • For homebuyers, it indicates that a developer’s failure to complete statutory registration formalities does not necessarily leave purchasers without a remedy under RERA. This is especially relevant to disputes involving pre-launch bookings, tentative allotments, advance payments and projects whose regulatory status is disputed.
    • For developers, the judgment highlights that non-registration cannot safely be treated as a jurisdictional shield. The obligation to register and the jurisdiction of RERA to address grievances operate within the broader statutory framework and must be interpreted harmoniously.

    Conclusion

    In M/s Ramprastha Developers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., the Punjab & Haryana High Court rejected the developers’ contention that absence of RERA registration deprived the Authority of jurisdiction over the homebuyers’ complaints.

    The Court held that the statutory right of an aggrieved person to approach RERA under Section 31 is central to the Authority’s adjudicatory competence, while non-compliance with Section 3 does not automatically extinguish that remedy. Finding no inherent jurisdictional defect in the proceedings before Haryana RERA, the High Court dismissed the writ petition, leaving the developers to pursue their statutory appellate remedy. It also permitted them to seek the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act if limitation became an issue before the appellate forum.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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  • Bombay High Court Clarifies Scope of Arbitration Against Non-Signatories

    Bombay High Court Clarifies Scope of Arbitration Against Non-Signatories

    Date: 10.09.2026

    In an important ruling on the binding effect of arbitration agreements upon non-signatories and subsequent holders of property rights, the Bombay High Court has held that a person does not become bound by an arbitration clause contained in an earlier development agreement merely because that person subsequently acquires leasehold rights or an interest in the property.

    Justice Amit Borkar, while deciding an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, drew a clear distinction between an assignment of property rights and an assignment of contractual rights and obligations. The Court held that a subsequent lessee can be brought within an arbitration agreement only where there is sufficient material demonstrating assignment, incorporation, consent, acceptance of contractual obligations, or unequivocal conduct adopting the underlying agreement and its arbitration clause.

    At the same time, the Court held that disputes between the applicants and the original contracting Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 could proceed to arbitration. Their objection that the claims were barred by limitation was left for determination by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16 of the Arbitration Act.

    Background of the Dispute

    • The dispute arose from a registered Assignment of Development Agreement dated 12 November 2007.
    • Shree Satguru Developers and the other applicants were appointed as developers by the owners of the land. Under the agreement, development rights in the subject property were assigned to the applicants and an irrevocable Power of Attorney was also executed in their favour.
    • The consideration payable to the owners was fixed at β‚Ή5.5 crore, of which β‚Ή2.25 crore had already been paid at the relevant stage. The applicants claimed that they ultimately paid approximately β‚Ή5.21 crore to the owners.
    • The agreement also contained Clause 39, providing a dispute-resolution mechanism culminating in arbitration.
    • The controversy became complicated when the development arrangement was subsequently terminated and rights in the property underwent further transactions.

    Termination of Development Rights

    • The applicants were served with a notice dated 18 December 2015, whereby Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 purported to terminate the Assignment of Development Rights.
    • The applicants disputed the termination and replied on 16 January 2016, maintaining that the delays in redevelopment were attributable to various external issues and failures on the part of the owners.
    • According to the applicants, discussions nevertheless continued. In 2017, the applicants requested recall of the termination and subsequently paid another β‚Ή10 lakh, which was accepted by Respondent Nos. 3 and 4.
    • These later events eventually became important to the question of limitation.

    Subsequent Assignment of Leasehold Rights

    • A major issue arose after Respondent No. 1 acquired leasehold rights in the property under an Indenture of Assignment dated 13 August 2024.
    • The applicants contended that Respondent No. 1, being an assignee of Respondent Nos. 3 and 4, should also be treated as bound by the arbitration clause contained in the 2007 Development Agreement.
    • Respondent No. 1 disputed this contention.
    • His case was that he had acquired only the leasehold rights in the land and had never taken an assignment of the Development Agreement itself. It was argued that the Development Agreement created personal contractual rights and obligations between its parties and that those contractual obligations did not automatically travel with the land.

    This raised the central legal question before the Bombay High Court:

    Can a subsequent acquirer of leasehold/property rights be treated as an assignee of an earlier development agreement and thereby be compelled to arbitrate under its arbitration clause?

    Arbitration Invoked in April 2026

    • The applicants issued a notice dated 30 April 2026, invoking arbitration.
    • Respondent No. 1 replied on 7 May 2026 and denied the existence of any arbitration agreement between himself and the applicants.
    • Respondent Nos. 2 to 4, meanwhile, contended that the applicants’ appointment had already been terminated and that the claims sought to be raised were barred by limitation.
    • The applicants thereafter approached the Bombay High Court seeking appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11.

    Scope of Inquiry Under Section 11

    • The High Court first examined the extent of judicial scrutiny permissible while deciding a Section 11 application.
    • Relying upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Ajay Madhusudan Patel v. Jyotrindra S. Patel, (2025) 2 SCC 147, the Court reiterated the restricted scope of a referral court after insertion of Section 11(6-A).
    • The Court noted that the statutory enquiry is principally directed towards the existence of an arbitration agreement, rather than a full-scale adjudication of the underlying dispute.
    • The judgment also referred to the Supreme Court authorities in:
    • SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd., (2005) 8 SCC 618;
    • National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Boghara Polyfab (P) Ltd., (2009) 1 SCC 267; and
    • Duro Felguera S.A. v. Gangavaram Port Ltd., (2017) 9 SCC 729.
    • However, the Court recognised that a distinct question arises when arbitration is sought against a person who never signed the underlying agreement.

    What Did Clause 39 Provide?

    • Clause 39 of the Development Agreement referred specifically to disputes β€œbetween the parties hereto.”
    • It initially contemplated reference of disputes to a three-member committee consisting of representatives from the assignors, developers and owners/confirming parties. If the committee failed to resolve the dispute, the matter was to be referred to a sole arbitrator jointly nominated by the β€œparties hereto.”
    • The language of this clause became decisive.
    • The High Court found nothing in Clause 39 indicating that every subsequent person obtaining an interest in the property would automatically become a party to the arbitration agreement.

    Bombay High Court: Property Interest Is Not the Same as Contractual Assignment

    • The Court drew an important distinction between acquiring an interest in property and acquiring contractual rights and obligations.
    • It held that where a person is actually assigned the rights and obligations of a contracting party, that person mayβ€”depending upon the terms of the assignmentβ€”become bound by the arbitration agreement forming part of that contract.
    • But the position is different where the person merely acquires some interest in the property that formed the subject matter of the original contract.
    • The Court held that this fact, by itself, does not make the subsequent acquirer an assignee of the Development Agreement.
    • This distinction has considerable significance for property-development transactions involving multiple successive developers, lessees, assignees and transferees.

    A Lessee Does Not Automatically Become an β€œAssignee”

    The Court explained that a lease or sub-lease gives the lessee a right to occupy or use property. It does not, merely by its existence, transfer the earlier Development Agreement or the arbitration clause contained in it.

    Therefore, a person seeking to rely uponβ€”or sought to be bound byβ€”an arbitration clause as a subsequent lessee must demonstrate something more, such as:

    • contractual privity;
    • a valid assignment of the relevant agreement;
    • express incorporation of the earlier agreement;
    • written consent accepting the arbitration clause;
    • acceptance of the contractual obligations; or
    • unequivocal conduct demonstrating adoption of the Development Agreement and its arbitration clause.

    The Court therefore treated the expressions β€œlessee” and β€œassignee” as describing legally distinct relationships, even though a particular transaction may, depending upon its terms, produce both effects.

    Non-Signatories Can Still Be Bound in Appropriate Cases

    • Importantly, the Bombay High Court did not hold that a non-signatory can never be referred to arbitration.
    • The Court considered the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Cox & Kings Ltd. v. SAP India Pvt. Ltd., (2024) 4 SCC 1.
    • Cox & Kings recognises that whether a non-signatory has become a genuine party to an arbitration agreement may involve complex factual and legal questions. The referral court must examine whether there is at least a prima facie basis for treating the non-signatory as a party; complex questions may thereafter appropriately be determined by the Arbitral Tribunal.
    • Thus, the decisive consideration is not simply whether the person physically signed the original contract.
    • The real question is whether there is a legally sustainable basis for concluding that the non-signatory became a party to or accepted the arbitration agreement.

    No Prima Facie Material Against Respondent No. 1

    • On the facts before it, the Court found no such material.
    • Respondent No. 1 had obtained an assignment of lease/leasehold rights, but the applicants could not demonstrate a corresponding assignment of the Development Agreement dated 12 November 2007.
    • There was also no subsequent agreement under which Respondent No. 1 accepted Clause 39.
    • The fact that Respondent No. 1 had acquired leasehold rights and subsequently submitted a redevelopment proposal was insufficient to establish an agreement to arbitrate.
    • Similarly, knowledge of the applicants’ claimed development rights could not be equated with consent to arbitration.
    • The Court therefore declined to treat Respondent No. 1 as a party to Clause 39.

    Knowledge of an Arbitration Clause Is Not Consent to Arbitration

    • One of the judgment’s particularly useful commercial propositions is the distinction between knowledge and consent.
    • A subsequent purchaser, lessee or developer may know that another party claims rights under an earlier agreement. That knowledge does not mean that the subsequent party has accepted the arbitration clause contained in that agreement.
    • Arbitration is fundamentally consensual.
    • Accordingly, the existence of a property dispute between two persons cannot, by itself, create an arbitration agreement between them.
    • This distinction is particularly relevant in redevelopment projects where multiple layers of title, leasehold rights, development rights, assignments and tenant agreements coexist.

    Limitation: Referral Court Should Not Conduct Intricate Evidentiary Inquiry

    • The second major issue concerned limitation.
    • Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 argued that the Development Agreement had been terminated in December 2015, whereas arbitration was invoked only on 30 April 2026.
    • The applicants relied upon subsequent negotiations, the payment of β‚Ή10 lakh in 2017, redevelopment-related activities and later conduct to contend that their rights and disputes continued.
    • The Bombay High Court relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning, (2024) 12 SCC 1.
    • The Supreme Court had clarified that, at the Section 11 stage, the referral court should not undertake an intricate evidentiary enquiry into whether the substantive claims are time-barred. Such questions should ordinarily be left to the arbitrator.
    • The judgment also referred to Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. Aptech Ltd., (2024) 5 SCC 313 and In Re: Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under the Arbitration Act, 1996 & the Stamp Act, 1899, (2024) 6 SCC 1 in explaining the limited enquiry permissible at the referral stage.

    Ten-Year Gap Did Not Lead Court to Decide Claim Limitation at Section 11 Stage

    • The High Court acknowledged that there was a substantial period between the termination of the agreement and invocation of arbitration.
    • Nevertheless, the applicants relied on subsequent events and conduct, including negotiations and payment.
    • The Court therefore declined to finally determine whether those circumstances extended, revived, acknowledged or otherwise affected the applicants’ claims.
    • It held that these questions required consideration by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16.
    • This is an important distinction: the Court was not holding that the claims were within limitation. Rather, it held that the substantive limitation objection remained open for adjudication by the arbitrator.

    Arbitration Allowed Against Original Contracting Parties

    • As regards Respondent Nos. 2 to 4, there was no dispute about the existence of Clause 39 between the contracting parties.
    • The High Court therefore found that the applicants had established a case for appointment of an arbitrator against those respondents.
    • The limitation objection was expressly preserved for determination by the Arbitral Tribunal.
    • The Court accordingly partly allowed the arbitration application and referred the disputes between the applicants and Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 arising from the Assignment of Development Agreement dated 12 November 2007 to arbitration.

    Sole Arbitrator Appointed

    • The Bombay High Court appointed Mr. Amrut Joshi, Advocate, as the Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes between the applicants and Respondent Nos. 2 to 4.
    • The appointment was made subject to the statutory disclosure requirements under Section 12 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and absence of circumstances giving rise to justifiable doubts concerning the arbitrator’s independence or impartiality.
    • The Court also directed the arbitrator to forward the statutory disclosure under Section 11(8) read with Section 12(1), and directed the parties to appear before the arbitrator for further procedural directions. The arbitration costs and tribunal fees were to be borne equally in the first instance, subject to the final award on costs.

    Key Legal Principles Emerging from the Judgment

    • The Bombay High Court’s ruling provides useful guidance on three interrelated areas of arbitration law.
    • First, acquisition of property rights does not automatically amount to assignment of contractual rights. A subsequent lessee does not become an assignee of a development agreement merely because it acquires leasehold rights in the property covered by that agreement.
    • Second, arbitration remains consent-based. A non-signatory may be bound in appropriate circumstances, but there must be at least prima facie material showing assignment, incorporation, acceptance, consent or conduct sufficient to connect that person with the arbitration agreement.
    • Third, knowledge is not consent. Awareness of an earlier development agreement or of another person’s claimed rights cannot by itself make a subsequent property-holder a party to its arbitration clause.
    • Fourth, the Section 11 enquiry remains limited. The referral court should determine whether the requisite arbitration agreement exists, but ordinarily should not conduct an intricate evidentiary trial on the substantive limitation of individual claims.
    • Fifth, limitation remains fully open before the tribunal. Referral to arbitration does not amount to a judicial finding that the claims are within limitation.

    Important Supreme Court Authorities Referred to

    The judgment considers a substantial line of Supreme Court authority governing Section 11 and non-signatories, including:

    JudgmentCitationRelevance
    SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning(2024) 12 SCC 1Scope of limitation enquiry under Section 11
    Ajay Madhusudan Patel v. Jyotrindra S. Patel(2025) 2 SCC 147Limited scope of Section 11 enquiry
    Cox & Kings Ltd. v. SAP India Pvt. Ltd.(2024) 4 SCC 1Non-signatories and arbitration agreements
    Duro Felguera S.A. v. Gangavaram Port Ltd.(2017) 9 SCC 729Existence of arbitration agreement under Section 11
    SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd.(2005) 8 SCC 618Historical scope of referral-court enquiry
    National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Boghara Polyfab Pvt. Ltd.(2009) 1 SCC 267Pre-amendment Section 11 jurisprudence
    Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. Aptech Ltd.(2024) 5 SCC 313Limitation concerning Section 11 proceedings
    In Re: Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under the Arbitration Act, 1996 & the Stamp Act, 1899(2024) 6 SCC 1Referral-stage principles

    The Court specifically relied upon Cox & Kings while considering when a non-signatory can be regarded as a party to an arbitration agreement.

    Commercial Significance for Real Estate and Redevelopment Transactions

    • The ruling has implications extending beyond arbitration law.
    • Development projects frequently involve a succession of transactionsβ€”development agreements, conveyances, leases, assignments, redevelopment proposals, permanent alternate accommodation agreements and transfers of ownership or leasehold rights.
    • Parties should therefore avoid assuming that an arbitration clause automatically β€œruns with the land.”
    • If parties intend a subsequent purchaser, lessee, transferee, successor or assignee to be bound by an existing dispute-resolution mechanism, transaction documents should expressly address:
    • assignment of contractual rights and obligations, assumption of liabilities, incorporation of the original agreement, succession provisions and express adoption of the arbitration clause.
    • Clear drafting at the transactional stage can significantly reduce jurisdictional disputes when arbitration is later invoked.

    Conclusion

    The Bombay High Court’s ruling in Shree Satguru Developers & Ors. v. Chandrashekhar Champalal Hingarh & Ors., 2026:BHC-OS:19815, provides an important clarification on the relationship between property rights, contractual assignment and arbitration agreements. The case was decided by Justice Amit Borkar on 7 September 2026 in an application seeking appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11.

    The Court’s central message is that mere acquisition of leasehold rights in a property does not make the subsequent lessee an assignee of an earlier development agreement or bind it to the arbitration clause contained therein. There must be a demonstrable legal connection to the contractual rights and obligations themselves.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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  • Bombay High Court Quashes β‚Ή1.22 Crore EPFO Demand Against Corporate Debtor; PF Assessment During IBC Moratorium Held Impermissible

    Bombay High Court Quashes β‚Ή1.22 Crore EPFO Demand Against Corporate Debtor; PF Assessment During IBC Moratorium Held Impermissible

    Date: 10.09.2026

    The Bombay High Court has quashed an Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) demand of β‚Ή1,22,48,716 raised against Dolphin Offshore Enterprises (India) Limited, holding that continuation of proceedings under Section 7A of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 during the moratorium imposed under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) was impermissible.

    Justice Sharmila U. Deshmukh held that the subsequent demand and recovery proceedings could not survive after approval of the resolution plan, particularly in light of Sections 14, 31(6) and 32A of the IBC.

    Background of the Case

    • Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) against Dolphin Offshore Enterprises was initiated by the NCLT on 16 July 2020. Following a public announcement inviting claims, EPFO submitted a claim of β‚Ή2,24,98,772, which was verified and admitted in full by the Resolution Professional.
    • The Committee of Creditors subsequently approved the resolution plan submitted by Deep Industries Limited, and the NCLT approved the plan on 29 September 2022. Under the approved resolution plan, EPFO was paid β‚Ή2,250 in full and final settlement of its claim.
    • However, EPFO had separately initiated an inquiry under Section 7A of the PF Act concerning provident fund contributions for the period April 2018 to September 2019. Despite being informed about the CIRP and moratorium, the inquiry continued.
    • Eventually, on 24 February 2023, after approval of the resolution plan, EPFO passed an order assessing PF dues at β‚Ή1,22,48,716 and directed the corporate debtor to make payment.

    Can EPFO Continue Section 7A Proceedings During IBC Moratorium?

    • The principal issue before the High Court was whether EPFO could continue assessment proceedings under Section 7A of the PF Act after a moratorium had come into operation under Section 14 of the IBC.
    • The Court observed that commencement of CIRP triggers the statutory moratorium. Once the moratorium is imposed, proceedings which have the effect of creating new liabilities against the corporate debtor cannot continue.
    • In the present case, EPFO was aware that CIRP had commenced. Despite such knowledge, it continued with the Section 7A inquiry and ultimately passed the impugned order after the resolution plan had already been approved.

    EPFO Order Was Not Merely an Assessmentβ€”It Was in the Nature of Recovery

    • A significant aspect of the judgment is the Court’s distinction between mere assessment of dues and proceedings that effectively seek recovery.
    • The EPFO order not only assessed β‚Ή1.22 crore as outstanding dues but directed payment within 15 days, failing which recovery proceedings under Sections 8B to 8G of the PF Act were to follow. It also contemplated damages, interest and prosecution.
    • The High Court therefore held that the order was β€œnot merely an assessment proceeding” but a proceeding in the nature of recovery, which was impermissible during the moratorium.

    Section 31(6) of IBC Extinguishes Pre-Resolution Claims

    • The Court placed substantial reliance upon the newly introduced Section 31(6) of the IBC, inserted through the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2026, notified on 26 May 2026.
    • The provision stipulates, inter alia, that unless otherwise provided in the resolution plan, claims against the corporate debtor and its assets arising prior to approval of the plan stand extinguished, and proceedingsβ€”including assessment proceedingsβ€”cannot be continued or instituted on the basis of such claims.
    • Importantly, the Court noted that Explanation III gives retrospective operation to Section 31(6) in respect of resolution plans approved from the commencement of the IBC, except matters that have already attained finality.
    • Accordingly, the Court held that the amount recognised in the approved resolution plan was protected, but the separate amount subsequently determined through the impugned Section 7A order was not.
    • The post-resolution quantification therefore stood extinguished and could not be recovered.

    EPFO Had Filed Its Claim but Did Not Challenge the Resolution Plan

    • Another important consideration was that EPFO had actually participated in the insolvency process by lodging its claim with the Resolution Professional.
    • The resolution plan ultimately recognised EPFO’s claim at β‚Ή2,250, and EPFO was informed about approval of the plan and forwarded the amount. The Court observed that EPFO had the opportunity to challenge the resolution plan before the NCLAT and seek full payment of its provident fund dues.
    • Instead, EPFO did not challenge the approved resolution plan and continued with its Section 7A inquiry.

    Court Says 2026 IBC Amendment Reinforces β€œClean Slate” Principle

    • The High Court also considered the earlier Bombay High Court decision in Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Limited v. Central Board of Trustees, EPFO.
    • The Court distinguished that decision on the facts and observed that, following the 2026 legislative amendment to the IBC, the effect of Dalmia Cement had been β€œconsiderably watered down.” The issue in the present caseβ€”continuation of a Section 7A inquiry during the moratoriumβ€”had also not arisen for consideration in Dalmia Cement.
    • More importantly, the Court observed that the β€œclean slate” principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. has now received legislative effect through the introduction of Section 31(6) of the IBC.

    Protection Under Section 32A of IBC

    • The High Court further relied upon Section 32A of the IBC, which grants immunity in respect of offences committed prior to commencement of CIRP once the resolution plan is approved and results in the prescribed change in management or control.
    • Since the EPFO order contemplated recovery against the corporate debtor’s assets as well as prosecution, the Court found that such action was also inconsistent with the protection afforded by Section 32A.

    Four Reasons Why the EPFO Order Was Unsustainable

    The Bombay High Court crystallised its findings into four grounds: the Section 7A inquiry was impermissibly continued during the Section 14 moratorium; the resultant recovery claim stood extinguished under Section 31(6) after approval of the resolution plan; EPFO had itself lodged a claim which was dealt with under the resolution plan but never challenged that plan; and Section 32A protected the corporate debtor and its assets following the qualifying change in ownership and control.

    High Court Quashes β‚Ή1.22 Crore Demand

    On these findings, the Bombay High Court held that the EPFO order dated 24 February 2023 was clearly unsustainable and consequently quashed and set it aside, allowing Dolphin Offshore Enterprises’ writ petition.

    Key Takeaway

    The ruling is significant for companies undergoing or emerging from CIRP because it reinforces the clean-slate principle under the IBC. Statutory authorities cannot disregard an IBC moratorium, participate in the resolution process, accept treatment of their claim under an approved resolution plan, and thereafter seek to impose a separate pre-resolution liability against the revived corporate debtor.

    The judgment is particularly important after the 2026 amendment introducing Section 31(6), which the Bombay High Court has treated as giving legislative effect to the principle that pre-resolution claims, unless preserved under the approved plan, stand extinguished and cannot subsequently form the basis of fresh assessment or recovery proceedings.

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  • Karnataka High Court Upholds POCSO Conviction but Modifies Juvenile’s Sentence; Compensation Enhanced to β‚Ή3 Lakh

    Karnataka High Court Upholds POCSO Conviction but Modifies Juvenile’s Sentence; Compensation Enhanced to β‚Ή3 Lakh

    Date: 10.09.2026

    The Karnataka High Court has upheld the conviction of a person who was a juvenile at the time of the offence in a case involving allegations under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) and the Indian Penal Code, while modifying the custodial sentence and enhancing the compensation payable to the victim from β‚Ή1 lakh to β‚Ή3 lakh.

    The matter was decided by Justice H.P. Sandesh in Criminal Revision Petition No. 1262 of 2018. The revision challenged the appellate order dated 20 August 2018 and the Juvenile Justice Board’s order dated 26 April 2018.

    Background of the Case

    • The prosecution alleged that the petitioner, who was a juvenile at the relevant time, had sexually abused a four-year-old child. The case was registered after the child’s mother lodged a complaint, and the prosecution examined 12 witnesses, including the victim, her mother and medical witnesses.
    • The Juvenile Justice Board had convicted the petitioner under multiple provisions of the POCSO Act read with Sections 375 and 376 of the IPC and sentenced him to three years in a juvenile home, along with payment of β‚Ή1 lakh to the victim.

    Contradictory Medical Evidence Considered

    • A major argument raised in revision concerned differences in the medical evidence.
    • One doctor who examined the child shortly after the incident reportedly noticed swelling, while another doctor at Vanivilasa Hospital, who examined the child later, did not find such swelling or injury. The defence relied on this discrepancy to argue that the prosecution case was doubtful.
    • The State, however, contended that the discrepancy was minor and that the immediate complaint, the testimony of the victim and her mother, and the first medical examination supported the prosecution case.
    • The Court also noted that the FSL report did not detect seminal stains. However, the allegation itself was not one of penile penetration.

    Court Finds No Evidence of Penetrative Sexual Activity

    • While examining the evidence, the High Court observed that the medical and forensic materials did not suggest penetrative sexual activity.
    • The Court also took into account the petitioner’s status as a juvenile at the time of the offence, as well as the fact that he was by then married and had two children.
    • Instead of re-appreciating the entire evidence to disturb the conviction, the Court considered it appropriate to modify the sentence.

    Sentence Modified; Compensation Increased to β‚Ή3 Lakh

    • The High Court modified the original sentence of three years.
    • The petitioner had already undergone 117 days in custody, and the Court gave him set-off for that period. In lieu of the remaining custodial sentence, the Court enhanced the compensation from β‚Ή1 lakh to β‚Ή3 lakh, while expressly confirming the conviction.
    • The petitioner had already deposited β‚Ή1 lakh before the Trial Court and was directed to deposit the balance β‚Ή2 lakh before the High Court.

    Compensation to Be Secured for the Victim

    • The High Court further directed that both the existing β‚Ή1 lakh and the additional β‚Ή2 lakh be placed in fixed deposits in the name of the victim girl for three years or until she attained majority, whichever was earlier.
    • The victim’s mother was permitted to withdraw the quarterly interest on the fixed deposits for the child’s education.

    Key Legal Takeaway

    • The decision is significant because the Court adopted a balanced approach: it did not overturn the conviction, but modified the sentence in view of the petitioner’s juvenile status and the evidentiary circumstances, while strengthening the compensatory relief available to the victim.
    • The judgment also shows that in revision proceedings involving juvenile offenders, courts may consider the rehabilitative dimension of juvenile justice while ensuring that the victim’s interests remain protected.

    Conclusion

    In Arunachalam @ Arun v. State of Karnataka & Anr., the Karnataka High Court confirmed the conviction but modified the sentence imposed upon the juvenile offender. The Court took note of the medical evidence, the absence of proof of penetrative sexual activity, the petitioner’s juvenile status and the period of custody already undergone.

    The final result was that the custodial sentence was modified, 117 days of custody were given set-off, and compensation was enhanced from β‚Ή1 lakh to β‚Ή3 lakh, with the amount secured in fixed deposit for the victim’s benefit and education.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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  • Delhi HC Ruled β€œONE FOR ALL” Trademark Registrable for Books; Common Words Can Be Distinctive When Unconnected with the Goods

    Delhi HC Ruled β€œONE FOR ALL” Trademark Registrable for Books; Common Words Can Be Distinctive When Unconnected with the Goods

    Date: 10.09.2026

    The Delhi High Court has ruled in favour of Oswaal Books and Learnings Private Limited, holding that its mark β€œONE FOR ALL” is capable of registration for educational books and allied publications under Class 16 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

    A Division Bench comprising Justice C. Hari Shankar and Justice Om Prakash Shukla set aside the orders of both the Registrar of Trade Marks and the Single Judge which had refused registration on the ground that β€œONE FOR ALL” was a common, laudatory and non-distinctive expression.

    Trademark Registry Had Refused β€œONE FOR ALL”

    • Oswaal Books, engaged in the publication and sale of educational books and academic material, claimed to have adopted the mark β€œONE FOR ALL” from 20 August 2020 for its educational publications.
    • It filed Trade Mark Application No. 4711190 on 20 October 2020 for registration in Class 16. The Registry raised an objection under Section 9(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act, requiring Oswaal to establish that the mark was capable of distinguishing its goods from those of other traders.
    • The application was ultimately refused on 14 December 2023 on the ground that β€œONE FOR ALL” was a common and non-distinctive expression and that Oswaal had failed to establish acquired distinctiveness or secondary meaning.

    Single Judge Also Found the Mark Descriptive

    • Oswaal challenged the Registry’s decision before the Delhi High Court under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act.
    • The Single Judge, however, upheld the refusal, reasoning that β€œONE FOR ALL” was a common laudatory phrase suggesting that Oswaal’s books constituted a universal or β€œone-stop” solution for students across different examinations and boards.
    • The Single Judge further found that the evidence produced by Oswaal largely related to its house mark β€œOSWAAL BOOKS”, rather than establishing β€œONE FOR ALL” as an independent source identifier.
    • Oswaal then preferred the Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench.

    Distinctiveness Must Be Examined in Context of the Goods

    • The Division Bench clarified an important principle of trademark law: a mark cannot be declared non-distinctive merely because it consists of ordinary or commonly used words.
    • Distinctiveness has to be assessed in relation to the particular goods or services for which registration is sought.
    • The Court relied on its earlier decision in Leayan Global Pvt. Ltd. v. Bata India Ltd. and reiterated that even a common dictionary word can acquire distinctive character when used for goods or services with which the expression has no immediate connection.
    • The test, therefore, is not simply whether the words are commonly used in the English language, but whether consumers would immediately associate those words with the nature, quality, characteristics or purpose of the relevant goods.

    Slogans and Taglines Can Function as Trademarks

    • The judgment also contains an important observation regarding the modern commercial significance of slogans and taglines.
    • The High Court held that slogans are capable of constituting trademarks within the meaning of Sections 2(m) and 2(zb) of the Trade Marks Act where they are capable of distinguishing one person’s goods from those of another.
    • The Court particularly noted the increasing importance of slogans in the modern digital marketplace. With the rapid expansion of digital marketing, slogans and taglines can perform a source-identifying function and may, in some cases, become even more readily recognised than the brand or trade name itself.
    • This observation could have wider significance for businesses seeking trademark protection for advertising slogans and brand taglines.

    β€œONE FOR ALL” Has No Immediate Connection With Books: Delhi High Court

    • The Division Bench expressly disagreed with the Single Judge’s conclusion that β€œONE FOR ALL” was descriptive of Oswaal’s books.
    • According to the Court, the expression cannot naturally or immediately be associated with books or other goods falling within Class 16.
    • The phrase ordinarily conveys the idea of a single solution capable of replacing multiple alternatives. That meaning, the Court found, does not directly describe books, printed material or other Class 16 goods.
    • The Court further observed that β€œONE FOR ALL” was not shown to be a common expression used in Class 16 to describe the relevant goods.

    No Identical or Deceptively Similar Commercial Use Shown

    • Another factor weighing in Oswaal’s favour was the absence of evidence showing commercial use of an identical or deceptively similar mark in Class 16.
    • The Court noted that the Registrar had failed to demonstrate such use and that the Examination Report itself contained no objection under Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act, which deals with relative grounds for refusal based, among other things, on conflict with earlier trademarks.

    β€œONE FOR ALL” Is Suggestive, Not Descriptive

    • The Division Bench ultimately held that the mark did not evoke an immediate connection with books.
    • β€œONE FOR ALL” could communicate the broader idea of universality or comprehensive coverage, but it did not directly and unequivocally describe books.
    • The Court therefore concluded that the expression was, at the highest, suggestive rather than descriptive.
    • Even if Oswaal intended to project its publications as a universal solution for different academic needs, some degree of mental process was still necessary to connect the phrase with educational books. This was insufficient to render the mark descriptive.
    • Accordingly, the Court held that β€œONE FOR ALL” satisfies the statutory requirement of distinctiveness and is capable of registration.

    High Court Sets Aside Refusal of Trademark

    • The Division Bench consequently set aside both the Single Judge’s judgment and the Registrar of Trade Marks’ refusal order.
    • Oswaal’s trademark application was restored to the stage at which it stood when the refusal order was passed, with directions that the application proceed further from that stage.
    • The appeal was accordingly allowed with no order as to costs.

    Key Legal Takeaway

    • The judgment reinforces that the use of common English words does not automatically make a trademark non-distinctive. The correct inquiry under Section 9(1)(a) is whether the mark, considered as a whole and in the context of the goods or services concerned, is capable of distinguishing one trader’s goods from another’s.
    • It also draws an important distinction between descriptive and suggestive marks. Where the connection between a phrase and the goods is not immediate and requires imagination or mental association, the mark may merely be suggestiveβ€”and therefore capable of registration.
    • The ruling is particularly relevant to businesses using slogans, taglines and common-word combinations as sub-brands, especially in digital marketing, publishing and consumer-facing industries.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi