Tag: #LegalUpdates

  • Supreme Court Acquits Two in NDPS Case Over Broken Chain of Custody: Says FSL Report Cannot Survive Serious Gaps in Sample Integrity

    Supreme Court Acquits Two in NDPS Case Over Broken Chain of Custody: Says FSL Report Cannot Survive Serious Gaps in Sample Integrity

    Date: 17.09.2026

    The Supreme Court has acquitted two persons convicted in a narcotics case after finding serious deficiencies in the prosecution’s evidence concerning the identification, sealing, safekeeping and movement of samples allegedly drawn from the seized contraband.

    In Abdul Rajik v. State of M.P. along with Govind v. State of M.P., 2026 INSC 1001, a Bench of Justice Sandeep Mehta and Justice Manmohan held that the link evidence had been completely breached, undermining the sanctity and integrity of the samples. Once the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report was excluded, there was no legally admissible evidence establishing that the seized substance was charas.

    Background of the NDPS Case

    • The prosecution alleged that on November 29, 2004, police in Jabalpur received information that two persons were carrying charas in bags. A raiding team intercepted Abdul Rajik and Govind at Bandariya Tiraha.
    • According to the prosecution, 1 kilogram of suspected charas was recovered from Abdul Rajik’s bag and 800 grams from Govind’s bag. Samples were drawn and the accused were arrested. The FSL subsequently reported that the samples were charas.
    • The Special NDPS Court convicted both accused. Abdul Rajik was sentenced to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of β‚Ή1 lakh, while Govind was sentenced to eight years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of β‚Ή80,000. The Madhya Pradesh High Court dismissed their appeals in November 2010 and affirmed the convictions.
    • The matter ultimately reached the Supreme Court.

    Sections 42 and 50 Not Applicable to Search of Bags in Public Place

    • The accused argued, among other things, that the mandatory requirements of Sections 42, 50 and 52A of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 had not been complied with.
    • The Supreme Court, however, did not accept the challenge based on Sections 42 and 50.
    • It observed that the alleged recovery was from bags being carried by the accused when they were apprehended in an open public place. Consequently, the Court held that neither Section 42 nor Section 50 applied to the search and seizure in the circumstances of the case.
    • The acquittal instead turned principally on the failure to establish reliable link evidence and chain of custody, considered alongside total non-compliance with Section 52A.

    Supreme Court Finds Serious Problems With Identification of Samples

    • The Court closely examined the evidence of the seizure officer regarding the manner in which representative samples were drawn and sealed.
    • It found that the officer did not state that the sample packets themselves had been sealed by him or that identifiable markings β€” such as signatures or thumb impressions of the accused, panch witnesses or seizure officer β€” had been placed on those packets.
    • The sample packets were also not separately produced and exhibited when the muddamal articles were produced before the trial court.
    • The Court further examined the sample panchnamas and found no indication that the packets had been secured with signatures or identifiable chits enabling the samples subsequently tested by the FSL to be correlated with the contraband allegedly recovered from each accused. Even the FSL report did not refer to signatures or thumb impressions on the sample packets.

    Missing Link Between Maalkhana and FSL

    • Another major deficiency concerned the prosecution’s failure to establish the movement and safe custody of the samples.
    • Although the maalkhana register recorded the deposit of samples on November 29, 2004, the Supreme Court noted that there was no corresponding entry recording their exit from the police station for transportation to the FSL.
    • The prosecution also failed to prove documents such as the police station forwarding letter and road certificates that could establish the link between seizure, storage and delivery to the laboratory.
    • The Court stressed that evidence regarding safe custody is crucial because the prosecution must demonstrate that the very samples drawn from the seized substance reached the forensic laboratory without substitution, interference or unexplained gaps.

    Unexplained Five-Day Gap Further Breaks Chain of Custody

    • The Court identified another material discrepancy.
    • The forwarding letter from the Office of the Superintendent of Police was dated December 1, 2004, whereas the FSL report recorded that the samples were received through Constable Ramkrishna on December 6, 2004.
    • The prosecution provided no explanation as to where the samples remained and in whose custody they were kept during this five-day period. The carrier constable was also not examined.
    • The Supreme Court described this unexplained five-day gap as a grave discrepancy that completely breached the link in the chain of custody.

    Chain of Custody Essential Before FSL Report Can Be Relied Upon

    • The Supreme Court laid down an important evidentiary principle for NDPS prosecutions: the prosecution must establish through proper link evidence that samples extracted from the alleged contraband were properly sealed and remained in a safe and secure condition from seizure until receipt by the FSL.
    • For an FSL report to be relied upon, the prosecution must establish through credible oral and documentary evidence a complete chain of custody preserving the integrity and sanctity of the samples.
    • This assumes particular significance in NDPS prosecutions because the chemical analysis ordinarily provides the scientific foundation for establishing whether the recovered material was in fact a prohibited narcotic drug or psychotropic substance.

    Total Non-Compliance With Section 52A

    • The Supreme Court also considered compliance with Section 52A of the NDPS Act, which provides safeguards relating to inventory, photographs and representative sampling of seized narcotic substances.
    • The Court clarified that mere non-compliance with Section 52A or the applicable Standing Orders/Rules does not automatically vitiate every trial or result in acquittal. The relevant question includes whether and to what extent the non-compliance caused prejudice to the accused.
    • However, the Court distinguished minor procedural lapses from complete non-compliance. It found that in the present case no effort whatsoever was made to undertake the Section 52A procedure for drawing representative samples in the presence of a Magistrate, amounting to total non-compliance.

    Supreme Court Relies on Earlier NDPS Precedents

    • The Court referred to Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif, (2024) 11 SCC 372, and Bharat Aambale v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2025) 8 SCC 452, while explaining that Section 52A non-compliance does not by itself automatically lead to acquittal and that prejudice and evidentiary consequences must be examined.
    • It also relied upon Nadeem Ahamed v. State of West Bengal, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1779, where failure to draw representative samples before a Magistrate and absence of a certified inventory were held to undermine the integrity of the seizure and sampling process.
    • The Court further referred to State of Rajasthan v. Tara Singh, (2011) 11 SCC 559, which emphasised the significance of accounting for the custody of seized samples between dispatch and receipt at the laboratory, particularly given the stringent penalties under the NDPS Act.

    FSL Report Discarded

    • Applying these principles, the Supreme Court concluded that the link evidence had been totally breached, resulting in the collapse of the sanctity and integrity of the samples.
    • Consequently, the FSL report could no longer safely be relied upon and had to be discarded.
    • Once the FSL report was excluded, there was no other legally admissible evidence proving that the substance allegedly recovered from Abdul Rajik and Govind was charas within Section 2(iii)(a) of the NDPS Act, an essential foundational fact for attracting penal consequences under Section 20.

    Burning Suspected Substance Is Not Scientific Proof of Charas

    • The Supreme Court also rejected the seizure officer’s assertion that the suspected substance had been tested by burning a portion of it and could therefore be identified as charas.
    • The Court found no scientific material demonstrating that a substance could reliably be identified as charas merely by burning it. Accordingly, such testimony could not substitute for reliable scientific evidence establishing the identity of the alleged contraband.

    Supreme Court Acquits Both Accused

    • The Court ultimately held that the prosecution had failed to prove that the substance recovered from the accused was charas.
    • It therefore found the convictions recorded by the Special NDPS Court and affirmed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court unsustainable in law and extended the benefit of doubt to both appellants.
    • The Supreme Court set aside the conviction and sentence and acquitted Abdul Rajik and Govind of all charges. Since both were already on bail, the Court directed that they need not surrender and discharged their bail bonds. The appeals were accordingly allowed.

    Key Legal Takeaway

    The judgment reinforces that in NDPS prosecutions, an FSL report cannot be viewed in isolation from the evidentiary chain connecting the tested sample with the substance allegedly seized from the accused. While every procedural irregularity under Section 52A does not automatically result in acquittal, total non-compliance coupled with serious defects in identification, sealing, safekeeping and movement of samples can destroy the prosecution’s link evidence.

    Where that breakdown makes it impossible to establish that the substance scientifically tested was the same substance allegedly recovered from the accused, the forensic report may lose its evidentiary foundation.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Handy Download:

    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Gujarat High Court: Raiding Officer Cannot Himself Be the Gazetted Officer Offered for Search Under Section 50 NDPS Act

    Gujarat High Court: Raiding Officer Cannot Himself Be the Gazetted Officer Offered for Search Under Section 50 NDPS Act

    Date: 16.09.2026

    The Gujarat High Court has suspended the 15-year rigorous imprisonment imposed on two persons convicted in a commercial-quantity NDPS case and granted them bail pending their criminal appeals, after finding a prima facie issue of non-compliance with Section 50 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.

    A Division Bench comprising Justice Ilesh J. Vora and Justice R.T. Vachhani, in Moneshkumar Sukhenbhai Garange v. State of Gujarat, passed the common interim order on 29 April 2026 in Criminal Misc. Application No. 1 of 2026 in Criminal Appeal Nos. 408 and 685 of 2026.

    The Court found substance, at the prima facie stage, in the contention that the raiding officer could not have offered the accused an option of being searched before himself, in addition to the statutory alternatives of a Magistrate or Gazetted Officer. The Bench accordingly suspended the sentence during pendency of the appeals.

    Importantly, the order is not a final acquittal. The High Court expressly clarified that its observations are tentative and prima facie and will not affect the final hearing of the criminal appeals.

    Two Accused Sentenced to 15 Years in Mephedrone Case

    • The applicants, original Accused Nos. 1 and 2, had been convicted under Sections 8(c), 22(c) and 29 of the NDPS Act by the Additional Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad, in Special NDPS Case No. 42 of 2023.
    • By judgment dated 25 November 2025, they were sentenced to 15 years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of β‚Ή2 lakh. They subsequently filed criminal appeals before the Gujarat High Court and sought suspension of sentence and bail during pendency of those appeals.

    Prosecution Alleged 118.240 Grams of Mephedrone Was Recovered

    • According to the prosecution, SOG Ahmedabad received secret information on 5 February 2023 that the accused had travelled to Rajasthan to obtain MD drugs and were returning to Ahmedabad in a Ford car.
    • Police recorded the information, transmitted it to a superior officer and intercepted the vehicle while it was allegedly entering Ahmedabad from the Gandhinagar-Koba Circle side towards Indira Bridge.
    • During the personal search, police claimed to have recovered 59.150 grams of mephedrone from Himesh Garange and 59.090 grams from Monesh Garange, making a total alleged recovery of 118.240 grams.
    • The prosecution examined 15 witnesses and produced 51 documents during trial. Accused Nos. 1 to 3 were eventually convicted under Sections 8(c) and 22(c) read with Section 29 of the NDPS Act.

    Accused Challenge Search Under Section 50 NDPS Act

    • Senior Advocate Yatin Oza, appearing for the applicants, raised several objections to the conviction.
    • A principal contention was that there had been non-compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act, which provides safeguards when an authorised officer is about to search a person.
    • The accused had allegedly been told that they could be searched before a Gazetted Officer, the nearest Magistrate, or before PW-8 B.P. Chaudhary himself, who was the raiding officer and a Gazetted Officer.
    • The defence argued that Section 50 does not contemplate such a β€œthird option” and that the raiding officer could not simultaneously offer himself as the Gazetted Officer before whom the accused could choose to be searched.
    • Other arguments were also raised concerning Sections 42 and 43 and the handling and custody of samples, including alleged inconsistencies concerning the colour of the contraband, dispatch particulars and non-examination of the person who carried the samples to the FSL.
    • The High Court, however, primarily focused on the Section 50 issue while considering whether the sentence should be suspended.

    State Invokes Commercial Quantity and Section 37 Rigours

    • The State opposed the applications, arguing that the trial court had correctly convicted the applicants on the basis of the evidence.
    • It maintained that the police officers were duly empowered to conduct the search and seizure and that the accused had been informed of their rights under Section 50 before consenting to the search.
    • The prosecution also relied upon the presumptions under Sections 35 and 54 of the NDPS Act and emphasised that the case involved commercial quantity. It therefore contended that the stringent requirements of Section 37 of the NDPS Act should apply even at the stage of considering suspension of sentence and bail pending appeal.

    Appellate Court Must Examine Whether Conviction Has Fair Chance of Being Set Aside

    • The Gujarat High Court referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Om Prakash Sahni v. Jai Shankar Chaudhary & Anr., (2023) 6 SCC 123 on the principles governing suspension of sentence pending appeal.
    • The Court noted that, while deciding such an application, the appellate court may examine whether there is something apparent or gross on the face of the record that gives rise to a prima facie conclusion that the conviction may ultimately not be sustainable.
    • The Bench was conscious that the evidence could not be fully re-analysed at the interim stage. However, because the conviction was based upon the contraband allegedly recovered during the applicants’ personal searches, the Court considered compliance with Section 50 to be particularly significant.

    Section 50 Safeguard Must Be Properly Communicated

    • The High Court referred to the Constitution Bench judgment in State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh, (1999) 6 SCC 172.
    • The Constitution Bench had explained that an accused about to be personally searched must be informed of the existence of the right under Section 50(1) to be searched before the nearest Gazetted Officer or Magistrate. Failure to observe the statutory safeguard can render recovery from the personal search suspect and affect a conviction based upon that recovery.
    • The Gujarat High Court then considered the more specific issue of whether the searching officer could introduce a third alternative.

    Supreme Court’s Parmanand Judgment: β€œThird Option” Can Vitiate Section 50 Compliance

    • The Bench placed significant reliance on State of Rajasthan v. Parmanand & Anr., (2014) 5 SCC 345.
    • In Parmanand, the Supreme Court emphasised that communication of the right under Section 50 must be clear, unambiguous and individual, because the safeguard is intended to protect an accused against the possibility of false implication in cases carrying stringent punishments.
    • More importantly, the Supreme Court had disapproved of an accused being told that, besides the nearest Magistrate or Gazetted Officer, he could be searched before a senior police officer who was himself part of the raiding party.
    • The Supreme Court reasoned that the statutory safeguard is intended to give the accused the opportunity of a search in the presence of an independent officer. Providing a third option not contemplated by Section 50 could frustrate that protection.

    Searching Officer Cannot Act in Dual Capacity

    • The Gujarat High Court also discussed State of Rajasthan v. Ram Chandra.
    • The Supreme Court had explained that if the officer proposing to conduct the search is himself a Gazetted Officer and gives the accused the option of being searched in his own presence, the requirement of Section 50 would not be satisfied because the searching officer cannot act in a dual capacityβ€”both as the officer conducting the search and as the Gazetted Officer before whom the accused is offered the statutory choice of search.
    • This distinction became central to the Gujarat High Court’s consideration of the present applications.

    Raiding Officer Offered Himself as an Option: Gujarat High Court

    • On examining the evidence of PW-8 and the written notices at Exhibits 80 and 82, the High Court found that PW-8, who was himself the raiding officer, had informed the accused that they could be searched before him, a Magistrate or any Gazetted Officer.
    • The Bench consequently recorded a prima facie view that the raiding officer could not have given the accused an option to be searched before himself.
    • Relying on Parmanand and the Supreme Court’s decision in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Surat Singh, the High Court held that there was substance in the applicants’ argument concerning non-compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act.

    15-Year Sentence Suspended; Accused Granted Bail

    • Without undertaking an extensive examination of the merits, the Division Bench held that the circumstances justified exercise of discretion in favour of the applicants.
    • The Court therefore suspended the 15-year sentence imposed by the Special NDPS Judge during pendency of the criminal appeals and directed that the applicants be released on bail upon furnishing a personal bond of β‚Ή10,000 each with one surety each of the like amount.
    • The accused were directed not to leave India without prior permission of the High Court, to appear when the appeals are taken up for final hearing and to intimate any change in address to the concerned police station and the Court.

    Bail Order Does Not Set Aside NDPS Conviction

    • The legal effect of the order needs to be distinguished from a final decision on the appeals.
    • The Gujarat High Court has not acquitted the applicants or finally declared the search illegal. Their convictions remain under challenge in the pending criminal appeals.
    • The Court specifically stated that the observations in the suspension-of-sentence order are β€œtentative and prima-facie in nature” and shall not come in the way when the appeals are heard finally.

    Why the Order Is Significant

    The order reiterates the importance of strict adherence to procedural safeguards in cases involving personal search under the NDPS Act, particularly where the alleged recovery forms the principal basis of conviction.

    It also highlights a crucial distinction under Section 50: merely informing an accused about a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate may not necessarily cure the process if the notice simultaneously introduces a legally impermissible option that could dilute or confuse the statutory right.

    The Gujarat High Court’s prima facie reasoning therefore reinforces the proposition that the officer proposing to conduct the personal search cannot present himself as the independent Gazetted Officer contemplated by the Section 50 safeguard.

    At the same time, because the present order concerns only suspension of sentence pending appeal, the final determination of the legality of the search, conviction and evidentiary issues remains open.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Handy Download:

    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Gujarat High Court: Trademark Application Cannot Be Denied Advertisement Merely Due to Section 11(1) Objection

    Gujarat High Court: Trademark Application Cannot Be Denied Advertisement Merely Due to Section 11(1) Objection

    Date: 16.09.2026

    The Gujarat High Court has allowed an appeal filed by Lincoln Pharmaceuticals Private Limited against the rejection of its trademark application for β€œGLYPANTA”, holding that Section 20 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 permits advertisement of a trademark application despite objections under Section 11(1).

    Justice Mauna M. Bhatt, by an order dated 20 November 2025 in Lincoln Pharmaceuticals Private Limited v. Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr., R/Civil Appeal No. 7 of 2025, quashed the Trade Marks Registry’s rejection order dated 11 August 2025 and directed the Registry to proceed with advertisement of the application within three months.

    The ruling does not amount to final registration of β€œGLYPANTA.” The Court directed advertisement of the application, leaving any opposition to be considered independently on its merits.

    Lincoln Pharmaceuticals Sought Registration of β€˜GLYPANTA’

    • Lincoln Pharmaceuticals had filed an application on 22 August 2023 under Section 18(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, seeking registration of the mark β€œGLYPANTA.”
    • The application was examined by the Trade Marks Registry, which issued an examination report raising objections. Lincoln Pharmaceuticals responded through a detailed reply dated 30 October 2023, raising various grounds in support of registration.
    • According to the pharmaceutical company, however, the grounds raised in its response were not properly considered before the application was ultimately rejected on 11 August 2025.
    • The rejection prompted Lincoln Pharmaceuticals to approach the Gujarat High Court under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act.

    Section 11(1) Objection Raised Over Similar Trademark

    • The principal objection before the Registry arose under Section 11(1) of the Trade Marks Act, which deals with relative grounds for refusal of trademark registration, including situations where similarity with an earlier trademark may create a likelihood of confusion.
    • Lincoln Pharmaceuticals argued that the objection was unsustainable and that its detailed response to the examination report had not been properly considered.
    • One of the company’s key arguments was that even where competing pharmaceutical trademarks fall within the same class, differences in the composition of the respective pharmaceutical products may constitute an additional mitigating factor while assessing likelihood of confusion.

    Delhi High Court’s Elyon Pharmaceuticals Decision Cited

    • To support this argument, Lincoln Pharmaceuticals relied upon the Delhi High Court’s decision in Elyon Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. v. Registrar of Trademarks, C.A. (COMM.IPD-TM) 153/2021, decided on 23 August 2023.
    • In that case, the Delhi High Court had considered the marks β€œELEMENTAL” and β€œELMENTIN” and observed that differences in the pharmaceutical composition of products could provide an additional mitigating consideration when examining the possibility of public confusion.
    • Lincoln Pharmaceuticals relied on this reasoning to argue that the Registry’s Section 11(1) objection against β€œGLYPANTA” should not have resulted in rejection of its application in the manner adopted.

    Company Says β€˜GLYPANTA’ Was Already in Use Since 2023

    • Another argument raised before the High Court was that the Registry had relied upon trademarks that were proposed to be used, whereas Lincoln Pharmaceuticals claimed that β€œGLYPANTA” had been in use since 2023 and had acquired a substantial market for the product.
    • The company also objected to the fact that its application had been rejected before publication in the Trade Marks Journal.
    • Its contention was that publication would enable the statutory process to proceed and, if any third party wished to oppose the application, such opposition could thereafter be considered in accordance with law.

    Section 20 Permits Advertisement Despite Section 11 Objections: Lincoln Pharmaceuticals

    • Lincoln Pharmaceuticals placed particular reliance upon Section 20 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
    • It argued that even where objections under Sections 11(1) or 11(2) exist, the statutory framework permits advertisement of a trademark application.
    • The company therefore sought an opportunity for its application to be advertised rather than being rejected outright before publication.
    • The Registry’s counsel also raised an issue concerning non-joinder of the opposition party. Lincoln Pharmaceuticals responded that no private respondent was required at that stage because the challenge concerned rejection of the application before publication.
    • The High Court recorded that counsel appearing for the respondents could not dispute the provisions of Section 20.

    Gujarat High Court Relies on Section 20

    • After considering the submissions, Justice Mauna M. Bhatt noted that Section 20 permits advertisement despite objections under Section 11(1).
    • On that basis, the Court allowed Lincoln Pharmaceuticals’ appeal and quashed and set aside the Trade Marks Registry’s order dated 11 August 2025.
    • The Registry was then specifically directed to proceed with advertisement of the subject trademark application in accordance with the proviso to Section 20 of the Trade Marks Act.
    • The Court directed that the exercise be completed within three months from receipt of its order.

    Any Opposition to β€˜GLYPANTA’ Must Be Decided on Its Own Merits

    • Significantly, the High Court did not direct the Registry to grant final registration of β€œGLYPANTA.”
    • Instead, the Court restored the application to the stage of advertisement. It expressly provided that if any opposition is filed against the trademark application after advertisement, such opposition must be decided on its own merits.
    • Thus, Lincoln Pharmaceuticals succeeded in having the rejection order set aside and obtaining publication of its application, but the ultimate registrability of β€œGLYPANTA” remains subject to the statutory process, including any opposition that may be filed.

    Why the Judgment Matters for Trademark Applicants

    • The order is significant for trademark prosecution because it highlights the distinction between an examination-stage objection and the subsequent advertisement/opposition process.
    • In the circumstances before it, the Gujarat High Court relied on Section 20 to permit the application to proceed to advertisement despite the Section 11(1) objection, rather than allowing the pre-publication rejection to stand.
    • The decision is particularly relevant to pharmaceutical trademark applications, where the Registry frequently examines competing marks closely because of concerns regarding similarity and confusion. The case also demonstrates that factors such as the nature and composition of competing pharmaceutical products may be raised by an applicant while responding to relative-ground objections, though the Gujarat High Court did not finally adjudicate the merits of the β€œGLYPANTA” mark’s registrability in this order.

    Key Legal Takeaway

    The immediate principle emerging from the order is that the existence of a Section 11(1) objection does not, by itself in the circumstances considered by the Court, prevent the application from being advertised under Section 20.

    At the same time, advertisement should not be confused with registration. Publication gives third parties an opportunity to oppose the mark, and the Registry retains the responsibility to determine any such opposition on its merits.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Handy Download:

    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • CESTAT Delhi- Packaging Material Cannot Be Treated at Par with Imported Input Under Advance Authorisation

    CESTAT Delhi- Packaging Material Cannot Be Treated at Par with Imported Input Under Advance Authorisation

    Date: 16.09.2026

    The Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), New Delhi has allowed an appeal filed by M/s N.V. Distilleries and Breweries Ltd., setting aside an adjudication order that had sought recovery of customs duty on the allegation that the company violated the conditions of Notification No. 96/2009-Cus dated 11 September 2009 while fulfilling export obligations under the Advance Authorisation Scheme.

    The Principal Bench comprising Dr. Rachna Gupta, Officiating President, and Ms. Hemambika R. Priya, Member (Technical) delivered Final Order No. 51464/2026 on 15 September 2026 in Customs Appeal No. 50064 of 2020.

    The Tribunal drew an important distinction between an input physically incorporated in the exported product and packaging materials used for packing that product, holding that bottles, caps and labels could not be placed at par with the imported Vatted Malt Scotch used in manufacturing Indian Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL).

    The Dispute: Advance Authorisation and Rule 19(2) Benefits

    • N.V. Distilleries was engaged in the manufacture of Indian Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL), Country Liquor, PET bottles and un-denatured spirit. The dispute originated from intelligence received by the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), Chandigarh Regional Unit concerning alleged violation of the conditions governing Advance Authorisations.
    • The Department alleged that the appellant had violated the condition contained in Notification No. 96/2009-Cus because, while using duty-free imported inputs under Advance Authorisations, it had also used domestically procured bottles, caps and labels under Rule 19(2) of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 in the exported IMFL.
    • According to the Department, exports manufactured using such domestically procured duty-free materials could not be counted towards discharge of the export obligation under the Advance Authorisations.

    Show Cause Notice Proposed Substantial Customs Duty Recovery

    • A Show Cause Notice dated 20 October 2016 proposed, among other things, recovery of β‚Ή1,93,62,179 in customs duty by invoking the bonds executed at the time of duty-free imports and Section 28(4) of the Customs Act, 1962, along with interest under Section 28AA.
    • A further customs duty demand of β‚Ή94,20,905 was proposed in respect of two Advance Authorisations on the allegation of failure to fulfil export obligations. The notice also proposed appropriation of amounts already deposited and penalties under Sections 114A and 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962.
    • The proposals in the Show Cause Notice were subsequently confirmed through Order-in-Original No. 14/2019 dated 30 August 2019, leading N.V. Distilleries to approach CESTAT.

    Appellant: Imported VMS and Domestic Packaging Were Different Materials

    • The appellant’s central argument was that the essence of the Advance Authorisation Scheme is that the imported input must be physically incorporated in the resultant export product.
    • In the present case, the appellant had imported Vatted Malt Scotch (VMS) under Advance Authorisation, which was incorporated into the IMFL subsequently exported.
    • However, the bottles, caps and labels were domestically procured under Annexure-45 and Rule 19(2) of the Central Excise Rules. Therefore, according to the appellant, there was no overlapping or double benefit because the imported material and the domestically procured materials were entirely different.
    • The appellant further argued that the Government’s export incentive framework is intended to neutralise domestic taxes and duties so that taxes are not exported. According to it, Advance Authorisation was availed for imported VMS, whereas Annexure-45 was utilised for domestically procured glass bottles, caps and labels, with the duty benefit being claimed only once in each case.
    • Reliance was placed upon the Punjab and Haryana High Court’s decision in R.P. International v. Union of India, 2017 (353) E.L.T. 307 (P&H).

    Revenue: Exemption Notification Must Be Strictly Construed

    1. The Revenue defended the adjudication order by contending that Condition (viii) of Notification No. 96/2009-Cus prohibited counting exports involving inputs sourced under Annexure-45 towards fulfilment of Advance Authorisation obligations.
    2. It alleged that the appellant had simultaneously used domestically sourced duty-free goods and imported duty-free material and had therefore breached the exemption conditions.
    3. The Department also relied upon the Supreme Court decisions in CCE, Chandigarh-I v. Mahaan Dairies, (2004) 11 SCC 798 and Commissioner of Customs (Import), Mumbai v. Dilip Kumar & Company, 2018 (361) E.L.T. 577 (S.C.) to argue that exemption notifications must be strictly interpreted and their conditions strictly complied with.

    CESTAT Examines Meaning of β€œMaterials”

    • The Tribunal identified the principal question as whether the importer had failed to fulfil its export obligations and violated Notification No. 96/2009-Cus, thereby attracting customs duty, interest and penalties under Sections 114A and 114AA.
    • CESTAT examined the Advance Authorisation framework and noted that the scheme permits duty-free import of inputs physically incorporated in the manufactured or resultant product that is required to be exported.

    Significantly, the Tribunal examined the definition of β€œmaterials” under the notification. It noted that the definition separately identifies:

    • raw materials, components, intermediates, consumables, catalysts and parts required for manufacture of the resultant product; and
    • packaging materials required for packing the resultant product.

    This statutory distinction became central to the outcome.

    Packaging Material Is Different From Manufacturing Input: CESTAT

    • CESTAT held that the notification itself differentiates between goods required for manufacture of the resultant product and goods merely used for packaging.
    • In this case, the raw material imported for manufacture of the resultant IMFL was VMS. Bottles, caps and labels, on the other hand, constituted packaging materials domestically procured under Annexure-45.
    • The Tribunal therefore held that the relevant condition of Notification No. 96/2009-Cus would apply to the imported material used in manufacturing the resultant product and that the packaging materials could not simply be equated with VMS.

    R.P. International Decision Relied Upon

    • CESTAT also relied on R.P. International v. Union of India to explain the distinction between the DFIA Scheme and the Advance Authorisation Scheme.
    • The Punjab and Haryana High Court had explained that while DFIA permits duty-free import of inputs β€œrequired for production of export product”, Advance Authorisation concerns inputs that are β€œphysically incorporated in the export product.”
    • Applying that distinction, CESTAT found that in the case of Advance Authorisation, the relevant imported input was the material physically incorporated into the resultant exported product.
    • The Tribunal consequently held that the packaging material had been wrongly placed at par with the imported VMS used in manufacturing IMFL. Since the packaging material was not physically incorporated in the IMFL itself, the exports were wrongly alleged to violate the Advance Authorisation conditions. The findings contained in the Order-in-Original were therefore liable to be set aside.

    DRI Jurisdiction Objection Rejected

    • The appellant also challenged the jurisdiction of DRI officers to initiate proceedings under Section 28 of the Customs Act.
    • CESTAT referred to the Supreme Court litigation concerning the competence of DRI officers to issue demand notices. It noted that although the earlier Supreme Court decision had held against DRI’s jurisdiction, the subsequent review judgment held that DRI officers, when appointed as customs officers and assigned the relevant functions of a β€œproper officer,” are competent to issue Show Cause Notices under Section 28.
    • The Tribunal therefore rejected N.V. Distilleries’ jurisdictional objection.
    • This aspect of the decision is important: the importer did not succeed on the DRI jurisdiction ground. Its appeal succeeded on the substantive merits of the Advance Authorisation dispute.

    CESTAT Sets Aside Order-in-Original and Allows Appeal

    Ultimately, CESTAT held that although the preliminary issue concerning DRI jurisdiction was decided against the appellant, the appellant succeeded on merits.

    The Tribunal accordingly set aside the Order-in-Original dated 30 August 2019 and allowed the appeal of N.V. Distilleries and Breweries Ltd.

    Significance for Advance Authorisation Holders

    The ruling is significant for exporters operating under the Advance Authorisation Scheme because it emphasises that the nature and role of each material must be examined before alleging violation of an exemption condition.

    The Tribunal’s reasoning distinguishes an imported input that is physically incorporated into the resultant export product from materials used for its packaging.

    The mere use of domestically procured packaging materials under another duty-relief mechanism cannot, on the reasoning adopted in this case, automatically justify treating those packaging materials at par with the imported manufacturing input. At the same time, the decision should not be read as permitting non-compliance with conditions attached to Advance Authorisations generally.

    The ruling turns on the wording of Notification No. 96/2009-Cus and the Tribunal’s finding that VMS and the domestically procured bottles, caps and labels occupied materially different roles in relation to the exported IMFL.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Delhi High Court Acquits NDPS Accused Over Three-Month Delay in Sending Drug Sample for Testing; Raises Doubt Over Safe Custody

    Delhi High Court Acquits NDPS Accused Over Three-Month Delay in Sending Drug Sample for Testing; Raises Doubt Over Safe Custody

    Date: 15.09.2026

    The Delhi High Court has held that an unexplained delay in sending a seized narcotic sample for forensic examination can prove fatal to the prosecution where the evidence fails to establish that the sample remained in proper and safe custody during the intervening period.

    In Rishi Dev @ Onkar Singh v. State (Delhi Administration), CRL.A. No. 757 of 2000, the High Court set aside the appellant’s conviction under Section 21 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) and acquitted him after finding serious deficiencies in the prosecution’s handling and preservation of the seized sample. The judgment was delivered by Justice S. Muralidhar on 1 May 2008.

    The Court held that where there is doubt whether the sample ultimately tested by the forensic laboratory was the very sample recovered from the accused, the benefit of that doubt must necessarily go to the accused.

    Trial Court Had Sentenced Accused to 10 Years’ Rigorous Imprisonment

    • The appeal arose from a judgment dated 25 November 2000 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, convicting Rishi Dev in FIR No. 290/90 for allegedly possessing 300 grams of smack.
    • The trial court had sentenced him to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment and imposed a fine of β‚Ή1 lakh, with a further six months’ rigorous imprisonment in default of payment.
    • According to the prosecution, police personnel were checking passers-by near Tejab Mill, Bhola Nath Nagar, Shahdara, when the appellant allegedly attempted to move away and subsequently ran on being asked to stop.
    • After he was apprehended, the police claimed to have recovered a packet containing brown-coloured powder from his clothing. The substance was allegedly weighed at the spot and found to be 300 grams, from which a 50-gram sample was separated for forensic testing. The laboratory report subsequently stated that the sample tested positive for smack.

    Accused Challenged Chain of Custody and Delay in Forensic Testing

    • Before the Delhi High Court, the appellant raised several objections to the prosecution case.
    • These included alleged non-compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act, absence of independent public witnesses, questions regarding the weighing of the contraband, handling of seals, the presence of the FIR number on documents allegedly prepared before registration of the FIR, and significant delay in sending the sample for forensic analysis.
    • A particularly serious objection concerned the delay between seizure and forensic examination.
    • The sample had been collected in December 1999, but the first attempt to send it to the forensic laboratory was made only on 1 March 2000. The appellant argued that there was no satisfactory explanation for what happened to the sample during this lengthy intervening period.

    Delhi HC Notes NCB’s 72-Hour Requirement

    • The High Court referred to Parminder Singh v. State of Haryana, in which the Punjab and Haryana High Court had considered the Narcotics Control Bureau instructions requiring sealed sample parcels to be deposited with the Chemical Examiner within 72 hours.
    • Justice Muralidhar described the requirement as salutary because tampering with a sample recovered from an accused can have fatal consequences for the prosecution case.
    • The Court stressed the need for strict compliance with safeguards concerning the preservation and prompt forwarding of samples.
    • The Court also referred to Matloob v. State (Delhi Administration) and the Delhi High Court Rules requiring articles intended for chemical examination to be forwarded without the least possible delay.

    Evidence Raised Serious Doubts About What Happened to Sample

    • After examining the prosecution witnesses, the High Court found considerable uncertainty regarding the handling of the seized material.
    • The Court observed that for more than two months no attempt was made to send the sample for chemical examination. The first attempt occurred on 1 March 2000 when the sample was taken to Chandigarh.
    • It was subsequently returned and redeposited in the malkhana on 3 March. Another entry indicated that the sample was eventually sent to the FSL at Malviya Nagar on 15 March 2000.
    • More importantly, the evidence indicated that the investigating officer had put the FIR number on the parcels and recovery memo at the police station, but no entry was made regarding removal of the case property from the malkhana for that purpose.
    • These circumstances assumed particular importance because the sample remained within the control of police authorities for a considerable period before forensic testing.

    Delay Alone Is Not Always Fatal

    • The Delhi High Court clarified an important legal distinction: mere delay in sending a narcotic sample for testing is not automatically fatal in every NDPS prosecution.
    • Referring to the Supreme Court decision in Valsala v. State of Kerala, the Court explained that a delayed sample can still be relied upon if the prosecution satisfactorily proves that the seized material remained in proper custody and proper form throughout the intervening period.
    • What is critical is the integrity of the chain linking the seized substance with the sample ultimately examined by the forensic laboratory.
    • The Court also referred to State of Gujarat v. Ismail U Haji Patel, where the Supreme Court emphasised that the decisive question is not simply delay but whether the prosecution establishes that the seized articles remained in proper custody and that the samples examined by the chemical analyst actually related to the seized articles.

    Prosecution Failed to Establish Safe Custody

    • Applying these principles, the High Court found that the prosecution evidence merely disclosed dates on which the sample entered or left the malkhana.
    • It did not satisfactorily explain the nearly three-month delay or establish what happened to the sample during the intervening period.
    • The Court therefore concluded that it was not satisfied that the sample remained in proper and safe custody or that the material eventually sent for forensic testing was necessarily the same sample recovered from the appellant.

    Trial Court’s β€˜Practical Approach’ Rejected

    • The trial court had sought to explain the forensic delay by referring generally to the heavy workload of laboratories and the possibility that laboratory officials might refuse to accept samples because of overcrowding.
    • The Delhi High Court expressly disagreed with that approach.
    • It held that the case record should contain written entries demonstrating that an attempt was made to send the sample for testing within the prescribed period. Strict compliance was important because a sample retained in a police malkhana under seals belonging to police officers remained under police control, giving rise to the possibility of tampering and resealing.
    • The Court further held that where the prosecution seeks to explain a delay on the ground that the forensic laboratory could not accept the sample, the record must demonstrate a genuine attempt to dispatch it promptly and its return for reasons beyond the prosecution’s control.

    Such a deficiency in the documentary record cannot subsequently be cured merely through oral evidence.

    Doubt Over Sample Integrity Must Benefit Accused

    • The High Court emphasised that the reliability of a forensic report ultimately depends upon proof that the sample examined was actually the sample recovered from the accused.
    • Where safe custody itself becomes doubtful, the evidentiary value of the laboratory result is correspondingly undermined.

    The Court held:

    β€œIf there is doubt as to the safe custody of the sample that is recovered from the accused, then the benefit of such doubt, must obviously enure to the accused.”

    Three-Month Delay Held Fatal; Accused Acquitted

    • On the facts of the case, the Delhi High Court found that the prosecution had β€œfailed miserably” to satisfy the legal requirements concerning preservation and safe custody of the sample.
    • The nearly three-month delay was held fatal because the prosecution failed to establish that the seized sample had been properly preserved throughout that period and that the sample eventually tested was the same material originally seized.
    • Since the appeal succeeded on this ground alone, the High Court found it unnecessary to examine the appellant’s remaining objections.
    • Accordingly, the Court set aside the conviction dated 25 November 2000 and sentence dated 27 November 2000, acquitted Rishi Dev of the offence under Section 21 of the NDPS Act and directed that he be released forthwith unless required in another case.

    Significance of the Judgment

    The judgment is an important authority on the chain of custody and forensic integrity of seized narcotic samples in NDPS prosecutions.

    It does not establish that every delay beyond 72 hours automatically invalidates an NDPS prosecution. Rather, its central principle is that where there is substantial delay, the prosecution must be able to demonstrate through reliable evidence and contemporaneous records that the seized sample was properly sealed, preserved and safely kept and that the sample ultimately tested was the same sample recovered from the accused.

    In prosecutions carrying severe penal consequences, the forensic chain cannot rest upon assumptions. If an unexplained gap creates reasonable doubt about the identity or integrity of the sample, that doubt may go to the root of the prosecution case.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Delhi HC Cancels Deceptively Similar β€˜ROCKPAPA’ Trademark; Holds Prior User Has Superior Rights Over Registered Proprietor

    Delhi HC Cancels Deceptively Similar β€˜ROCKPAPA’ Trademark; Holds Prior User Has Superior Rights Over Registered Proprietor

    Date: 15.09.2026

    The Delhi High Court has ordered removal of a deceptively similar β€˜ROCKPAPA’ device mark from the Trade Marks Register, holding that the rights of a prior user can prevail over those of a subsequent user even where the latter has obtained trademark registration.

    In Kia Wang v. Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr., C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 2/2021, Justice Jyoti Singh allowed a rectification petition filed by Kia Wang and directed the Registrar of Trade Marks to remove the impugned device mark registered under Trademark No. 4400360 in Class 09. The judgment was delivered on 15 September 2023.

    The Court found the rival marks strikingly similar and concluded that the respondent’s adoption was tainted by bad faith and dishonest intention, aimed at encashing upon the goodwill associated with the petitioner’s mark.

    Dispute Over β€˜ROCKPAPA’ Device Mark

    • Kia Wang claimed that he and his wife founded the ROCKPAPA brand in 2014, primarily for products aimed at children, including headphones, pencil boxes and school bags, as well as audio-related products such as headphones, earphones, loudspeakers and portable media players.
    • According to the petition, the brand operated internationally, including in Australia, Canada, Europe, the United States and India. The domain name for ROCKPAPA was registered on 9 April 2014, and the products were also marketed through e-commerce platforms.
    • The petitioner also relied upon trademark registrations obtained abroad, including in the United Kingdom, Australia, United States, Japan and Canada.

    Respondent Obtained Registration in India in 2020

    • Respondent No. 2, Sachin Garg, proprietor of Pooja Creations, applied for registration of the impugned device mark on 7 January 2020. It was subsequently registered in Class 09 for mobile phones and accessories, including chargers, adaptors, batteries, screen protectors, power banks, mobile covers, memory cards, card readers and handsfree devices.
    • Kia Wang claimed that he discovered the registration only in June 2021 and thereafter approached the Delhi High Court seeking rectification of the Register under Sections 47, 57 and 125 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
    • Respondent No. 2 did not appear despite service and was eventually proceeded against ex parte. The Registrar did not file a counter-affidavit, though written submissions were placed before the Court.

    Prior User Rights Can Override Subsequent Registration

    • One of the central issues before the Court was the petitioner’s claim of being the prior adopter and prior user of the ROCKPAPA mark.
    • The Court relied upon the Supreme Court decisions in Milmet Oftho Industries v. Allergan Inc., (2004) 12 SCC 624; S. Syed Mohideen v. P. Sulochana Bai, (2016) 2 SCC 683; and Neon Laboratories Ltd. v. Medical Technologies Ltd., (2016) 2 SCC 672.
    • Referring to these authorities, the High Court reiterated that the β€œfirst in the market” test assumes significance where competing trademarks are similar.

    It observed that the β€œfirst user” rule is a seminal feature of trademark law and held that:

    A prior user’s rights will override those of a subsequent user even though the subsequent user’s trademark may have obtained registration.

    On the evidence before it, the Court accepted Kia Wang’s claim of use since 2014. His prior use, overseas registrations and continuous use of the mark established that the trademark had become distinctive of his goods and associated with him.

    Court Finds Rival Marks Strikingly Similar

    • The judgment contains a side-by-side visual comparison of the two device marks on page 15. Both use a substantially similar stylised face/hair/moustache device together with the word β€œRockpapa”.
    • The Court observed that the similarity between the two marks was β€œwrit large on a bare perusal.”
    • It held that the similarity of the marks, coupled with identity of the competing goods, created a likelihood of consumer confusion and could adversely affect the petitioner’s reputation and goodwill.

    Bad-Faith Trademark Registration Can Be Cancelled

    • The Court then examined Section 11(10)(ii) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which requires the Registrar to take into consideration the bad faith involved either on the part of the applicant or opponent while dealing with trademark registration.
    • Relying particularly upon BPI Sports LLC v. Saurabh Gulati, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2424, the Court explained that β€œbad faith” essentially involves the absence of honest intention and may include dishonest commercial conduct, fraud, deception or an attempt to appropriate another party’s trademark.
    • Applying this principle, the Court found β€œlittle doubt” that Respondent No. 2 had acted with dishonest intention in adopting a similar mark for identical goods, including copying important visual characteristics of the petitioner’s device mark.
    • The Court concluded that the intention was to encash upon the goodwill of the petitioner’s trademark. It also noted that Respondent No. 2 had chosen not to contest the proceedings or rebut the petitioner’s claim of prior use.

    Maintaining β€˜Purity of the Register’ Is a Matter of Public Interest

    • The High Court went beyond the private dispute between the parties and emphasised the broader public-interest function of trademark rectification.
    • It referred to Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Scotch Whisky Association, (2008) 10 SCC 723, where the Supreme Court stressed the importance of maintaining the purity of the Trade Marks Register and considering the likelihood of deception or confusion.
    • The Court also relied on Hardie Trading Ltd. v. Addisons Paint & Chemicals Ltd., (2003) 11 SCC 92, while considering who qualifies as a β€œperson aggrieved” entitled to seek rectification.
    • The Court held that Kia Wang qualified as a β€œperson aggrieved” because the respondent’s registration operated as a restraint upon legal rights flowing from the petitioner’s prior, long, continuous and uninterrupted use of the mark.

    Important Finding on Section 11(1) and Well-Known Trademark Claim

    • An important nuance in the judgment is that the Court did not accept every ground advanced by the petitioner.
    • Kia Wang had argued that the impugned registration violated Sections 11(1) and 11(2) because ROCKPAPA was an earlier and well-known trademark.
    • The Court rejected this particular argument. It observed that, for purposes of Section 11, the petitioner’s mark did not qualify as an β€œearlier trade mark” because it was neither registered in India nor covered by the specified categories of Indian/international/convention applications. The Court also found that the material and pleadings were insufficient to classify ROCKPAPA as a well-known trademark under Section 2(1)(zg) read with Section 11(6).
    • This makes the judgment particularly significant: the petition succeeded principally on prior-user rights, deceptive similarity, bad-faith adoption and the need to maintain purity of the Registerβ€”not because ROCKPAPA was judicially declared a well-known trademark.

    Delhi High Court Orders Trademark Removed Within Four Weeks

    • Ultimately, the Court allowed the rectification petition and directed the Registrar of Trade Marks to remove Trademark No. 4400360, registered on 7 January 2020 in Class 09, from the Register.
    • The Registrar was directed to complete the rectification within four weeks from receipt of the judgment.

    Key Legal Principle

    The judgment reinforces three significant principles of Indian trademark law: prior user rights may prevail over subsequent registration; bad-faith adoption of a deceptively similar mark can justify cancellation; and rectification jurisdiction serves the wider public interest of maintaining the purity of the Trade Marks Register.

    At the same time, the decision demonstrates that foreign registrations or international popularity alone do not automatically make a mark an β€œearlier trade mark” or a β€œwell-known trademark” in India for the purposes of Section 11.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Delhi High Court Quashes β‚Ή76.72 Lakh Excise Demand; Holds Adjudicating Authority Cannot Disregard Binding CESTAT Order

    Delhi High Court Quashes β‚Ή76.72 Lakh Excise Demand; Holds Adjudicating Authority Cannot Disregard Binding CESTAT Order

    Date: 15.09.2026

    The Delhi High Court has ruled in favour of Wellspring Universal, setting aside a β‚Ή76.72 lakh demand raised by the Central GST authorities after finding that the adjudicating authority had failed to give effect to an earlier CESTAT order which had already upheld the taxpayer’s entitlement to refund.

    A Division Bench comprising Justice Anil Kshetrapal and Justice Shail Jain, in Wellspring Universal v. Additional Commissioner of Central GST, W.P.(C) 11957/2025, set aside both the Demand-cum-Show Cause Notice dated 10 December 2019 and the consequential Order-in-Original dated 24 March 2025. The judgment was pronounced on 14 September 2026.

    The Court also directed refund of the petitioner’s β‚Ή7,67,200 statutory pre-deposit with applicable interest.

    Background of the Dispute

    • Wellspring Universal is a partnership firm engaged in manufacturing engineering products, particularly in the welding sector. It was registered as a 100% Export Oriented Unit (EOU) and also as a private bonded warehouse under Sections 58 and 65 of the Customs Act, 1962.
    • The dispute had a lengthy history involving CENVAT credit, excise duty paid on exports and subsequent refund proceedings.
    • Between April and December 2007, Wellspring exported goods through 36 consignments after paying excise duty of β‚Ή76,72,000. It initially sought rebate under Rule 18 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002. After the Department took the position that the EOU was not required to pay duty on exported goods, the petitioner repaid rebate already sanctioned and subsequently pursued its claim through the CENVAT credit/refund mechanism.
    • Earlier proceedings eventually culminated in an Order-in-Original dated 21 March 2017, whereby proceedings against the petitioner were dropped. That order was accepted by the competent reviewing authority and was not challenged.

    β‚Ή76.72 Lakh Refund Sanctioned

    • Following these proceedings, Wellspring filed a refund claim for β‚Ή76,72,000, which was sanctioned by the Assistant Commissioner, CGST, Janakpuri through Refund Order dated 6 May 2019.
    • The authority found, among other things, that the refund claim was within limitation and that the necessary documents evidencing export had been furnished.
    • The Department, however, reviewed the refund order and filed an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals). During the pendency of that appeal, a separate Demand-cum-Show Cause Notice dated 10 December 2019 was issued alleging that the β‚Ή76.72 lakh refund had been erroneously sanctioned and proposing recovery with interest.
    • The Commissioner (Appeals) subsequently allowed the Department’s appeal on 16 December 2019, including on the ground that the credit ought to have been transitioned through TRAN-1 and that cash refund could not be sustained.

    CESTAT Ultimately Upheld Wellspring’s β‚Ή76.72 Lakh Refund

    • Wellspring challenged the Commissioner (Appeals)’ order before CESTAT.
    • In Final Order No. 56215/2024 dated 1 August 2024, CESTAT allowed Wellspring’s appeal and set aside the Commissioner (Appeals)’ order.
    • Significantly, CESTAT did not decide the matter merely on a technical ground. It expressly held that Wellspring was entitled to refund of β‚Ή76,72,000 under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.
    • CESTAT further held that a substantive benefit could not be denied merely because the petitioner had quoted the wrong rule while claiming refund or because the Assistant Commissioner had sanctioned it with reference to an incorrect rule.
    • CESTAT also specifically examined the Department’s limitation objection and held that the refund claim was not barred by limitation.

    Department Still Confirmed β‚Ή76.72 Lakh Demand

    • Despite the CESTAT decision, the Additional Commissioner passed an Order-in-Original on 24 March 2025, confirming the β‚Ή76.72 lakh demand against Wellspring.
    • Among the grounds adopted were that earlier refund claims had been rejected and not challenged, that the subsequent refund applications constituted fresh claims barred by limitation, and that the 2019 Refund Order had been set aside by the Commissioner (Appeals).
    • This prompted Wellspring to approach the Delhi High Court.

    Delhi High Court: CESTAT’s Operative Order Could Not Be Ignored

    • The High Court found a fundamental flaw in the Department’s approach.
    • It observed that the Commissioner (Appeals)’ order dated 16 December 2019, on which the Additional Commissioner had relied, had itself already been set aside by CESTAT on 1 August 2024.
    • Therefore, the adjudicating authority could not proceed in March 2025 as though the Commissioner (Appeals)’ order continued to remain an operative determination against Wellspring.

    The Court emphasised a significant principle governing departmental adjudication:

    An adjudicating authority exercising statutory powers must take into account operative orders passed by appellate authorities having appellate jurisdiction over it and cannot disregard a subsequent appellate determination directly bearing upon the issue under adjudication.

    Limitation Issue Could Not Be Reopened Contrary to CESTAT Finding

    • The High Court also rejected the Department’s attempt to once again treat the refund as time-barred.
    • CESTAT had already specifically considered the limitation issue and decided it in Wellspring’s favour. The Additional Commissioner, therefore, could not simply treat the refund as a fresh application and reach a conclusion directly contrary to the Tribunal’s determination.
    • The High Court observed that the petitioner had specifically communicated CESTAT’s 2024 decision to the adjudicating authority on 24 February 2025. Thus, this was not a situation where the authority was unaware of the appellate decision.
    • Nevertheless, the Order-in-Original was passed on 24 March 2025 without dealing with its effect.

    Substantive Refund Benefit Cannot Be Denied Merely for Quoting Wrong Rule

    • Another important aspect of the case is CESTAT’s underlying finding, which the High Court treated as operative.
    • CESTAT had held that Wellspring was substantively entitled to the β‚Ή76.72 lakh refund under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, and that the benefit could not be denied merely because an incorrect rule had been quoted while filing or sanctioning the refund claim.
    • The High Court clarified that CESTAT’s order had not merely removed the Commissioner (Appeals)’ order on a procedural or technical basis; the Tribunal had actually examined and upheld Wellspring’s substantive entitlement to the refund.

    Delhi High Court Quashes SCN and Order-in-Original

    • The Court ultimately found that the Additional Commissioner had committed a β€œmanifest error” in confirming the β‚Ή76.72 lakh demand.
    • It held that the impugned adjudication was fundamentally unsustainable because it failed to give effect to CESTAT’s subsequent Final Order and proceeded on the basis of an appellate order that had already ceased to exist.

    Accordingly, the High Court:

    • allowed Wellspring Universal’s writ petition;
    • set aside the Demand-cum-Show Cause Notice dated 10 December 2019;
    • set aside the Order-in-Original dated 24 March 2025 confirming β‚Ή76.72 lakh demand; and
    • directed refund of β‚Ή7,67,200 deposited as statutory pre-deposit, together with applicable interest in accordance with law.

    Why the Judgment Is Significant

    • The ruling reinforces judicial and quasi-judicial discipline within the tax adjudication hierarchy. Once a competent appellate tribunal has conclusively decided an issue and its order has neither been stayed nor set aside, a subordinate adjudicating authority cannot effectively nullify that decision by deciding the same issue on a contrary premise.
    • The High Court specifically recorded that CESTAT’s Final Order dated 1 August 2024 had not been shown to have been stayed or set aside in subsequent proceedings.
    • The judgment is also significant for legacy Central Excise/CENVAT disputes transitioning into the GST era. It demonstrates that the existence of a separate demand proceeding cannot justify ignoring an operative appellate determination that directly decides the taxpayer’s entitlement and limitation issues.

    Key Legal Principle

    A statutory adjudicating authority cannot disregard an operative decision of the appellate authority having jurisdiction over it. Where CESTAT has already adjudicated the taxpayer’s substantive entitlement to refund and limitation, the adjudicating authority cannot subsequently confirm a demand on premises directly contrary to that binding appellate determination.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Delhi High Court: Prior Formal Declaration Not Required to Claim Protection as a Well-Known Trademark Under Section 11(2)

    Delhi High Court: Prior Formal Declaration Not Required to Claim Protection as a Well-Known Trademark Under Section 11(2)

    Date: 14.09.2026

    In an important ruling on the protection of well-known trademarks across dissimilar classes of goods, the Delhi High Court has held that a trademark need not have already been formally declared a β€œwell-known trademark” before its proprietor can invoke Section 11(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 to oppose registration of an identical or similar mark for dissimilar goods.

    Justice Jyoti Singh delivered the ruling in an appeal filed by Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., challenging the Registrar of Trade Marks’ rejection of its opposition to registration of the mark β€œGHOST BUSTER” in Class 05. The Court did not itself finally declare GHOSTBUSTERS a well-known trademark or finally reject the rival mark. Instead, it remanded the matter to the Registrar for fresh consideration of Columbia Pictures’ well-known-mark and bad-faith objections.

    Columbia Pictures Opposed Registration of β€˜GHOST BUSTER’ in Class 05

    • The dispute arose after an application was filed for registration of β€œGHOST BUSTER” in Class 05 for pharmaceutical, veterinary and sanitary preparations, dietetic substances for medical use, food for babies, dressings, disinfectants, fungicides, herbicides and other specified products.
    • Columbia Pictures filed a notice of opposition on 18 April 2022. However, the Registrar rejected the opposition by an order dated 16 April 2025, prompting Columbia Pictures to approach the Delhi High Court under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act read with Rule 156 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017.

    Columbia Relied on Decades-Old GHOSTBUSTERS Franchise

    • Columbia Pictures asserted that it is an American film studio and production company and that GHOSTBUSTERS, first released in 1984, became one of the best-known supernatural comedy film franchises.
    • The judgment records that the franchise subsequently expanded through sequels, animated television series and later films, including Ghostbusters: Afterlife and Ghostbusters: Frozen Empire. In India, the movies have been released since 1985 and have also been made available through various streaming platforms.
    • Columbia also relied upon extensive merchandising, advertising and media coverage associated with the GHOSTBUSTERS name. The judgment records that merchandise bearing the markβ€”including apparel, toys, mugs, keychains, books and other productsβ€”was available in India.

    GHOSTBUSTERS Already Registered in India in Multiple Classes

    • There was no dispute that Columbia Pictures held Indian registrations for GHOSTBUSTERS in Classes 09 and 41, registered on 14 August 2012 with claimed use since 29 November 1985, and registrations in Classes 25 and 28 dated 25 October 2019.
    • The rival application for GHOST BUSTER, however, was filed on 1 December 2020 on a β€œproposed to be used” basis in Class 05.
    • This difference in classes became central to the controversy.

    Registrar Rejected Opposition Because Goods Were Dissimilar

    • The Registrar essentially rejected Columbia’s opposition because its GHOSTBUSTERS registrations related to Classes 09, 41, 25 and 28, whereas the rival GHOST BUSTER application concerned Class 05.
    • The Registrar reasoned that Columbia had not shown prior use of GHOSTBUSTERS specifically for Class 05 goods and therefore could not claim monopoly merely on the strength of registrations in other classes.
    • The Registrar also accepted the rival applicant’s explanation that β€œGHOST” referred to unexpected β€œghost peaks” appearing in chromatography and β€œBUSTER” referred to the product’s function of eliminating or removing impurities responsible for such peaks.

    Delhi HC Finds Registrar Failed to Consider a Crucial Section 11(2) Objection

    • The High Court found a fundamental flaw in this approach.
    • Justice Jyoti Singh observed that Columbia had specifically claimed that GHOSTBUSTERS was an earlier well-known trademark within the meaning of Section 11(2) and was consequently entitled to protection even against a nearly identical mark proposed for registration in a different class.
    • Yet the Registrar had failed to adjudicate this contention.
    • The Court described the non-consideration as a β€œglaring error”, noting that once such an opposition was raised, the Registrar was required to examine it and decide whether the earlier mark qualified for protection under Section 11(2).

    Section 11(2) Protects Well-Known Marks Even Against Dissimilar Goods

    • Section 11(2) assumes particular significance because it extends trademark protection beyond the conventional requirement that competing goods or services must be similar.
    • The provision contemplates refusal of registration where the later mark is identical or similar to an earlier trademark, even for dissimilar goods or services, if the earlier mark is a well-known trademark in India and use of the later mark without due cause would take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive character or reputation of the earlier mark.
    • Accordingly, if Columbia could establish that GHOSTBUSTERS satisfied the statutory threshold of a well-known trademark, the mere fact that the rival application fell in Class 05 could not, by itself, dispose of its opposition.

    Prior Formal Declaration as β€˜Well-Known’ Is Not Mandatory

    • The most important legal finding of the judgment concerns whether an opponent must first obtain a formal declaration of well-known status before relying on Section 11(2).
    • The Delhi High Court answered that question in the negative.
    • Justice Jyoti Singh held that Section 11(2) neither requires nor envisages that the earlier trademark must already have been formally declared a well-known trademark. Instead, the inquiry is whether the earlier mark satisfies the statutory threshold of being well known among the relevant segment of the public and enjoys the requisite reputation in India.
    • The Court emphasised the statutory phrase β€œentitled to protection as a well-known trademark” and held that β€œentitled” cannot simply be read as β€œdeclared”. The factors prescribed under Sections 11(6) and 11(7) are therefore relevant to determining whether the mark satisfies that threshold.

    Rule 124 Is Not the Only Route to Well-Known Mark Protection

    • The Registrar’s side argued that Columbia should first have invoked Rule 124 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, which provides a mechanism for determination of a trademark as well known.
    • The High Court rejected the proposition that Rule 124 constitutes a mandatory pre-condition for invoking Section 11(2) in opposition proceedings.
    • The Court pointed out that the legislation deliberately uses different expressionsβ€”β€œwell-known trademark” in Section 11(2) and β€œdetermined to be well known” in Section 11(8). It consequently held that there is no statutory prescription requiring the proprietor of an earlier mark first to secure a formal well-known trademark declaration before invoking Section 11(2).

    Registrar Can Determine Well-Known Character During Opposition Proceedings

    • The ruling has important procedural implications.
    • According to the High Court, when Section 11(2) is invoked in opposition proceedings, the Registrar is empowered to examine whether the earlier mark is well known by considering evidence against the statutory factors contained in Sections 11(6) and 11(7), read with Section 2(1)(zg).
    • Those factors may include the duration and extent of use, promotion, recognition among the relevant public, registrations and the record of successful enforcement of trademark rights.
    • The decision therefore distinguishes between requiring a pre-existing formal declaration and determining whether the mark qualifies for well-known protection in the course of an opposition.

    Dissimilarity of Goods Does Not End the Inquiry

    • The Court further held that if Columbia succeeds in establishing that GHOSTBUSTERS meets the statutory threshold under Section 2(1)(zg), read with Sections 11(6) and 11(7), it can oppose the nearly identical GHOST BUSTER mark under Section 11(2) despite the dissimilarity of goods and difference in classes.
    • The Registrar, however, had focused almost entirely on the fact that Columbia’s registrations and activities were in entertainment, media and allied goods and services, whereas the rival application concerned Class 05 products.
    • The High Court criticised this approach, observing that the Registrar had taken the β€œwrong path” by failing to examine the well-known-mark issue.

    Columbia Had Produced Extensive Evidence of GHOSTBUSTERS Reputation

    • Columbia had placed substantial material before the Registrar in support of its claim.
    • The evidence referred to the release of the first GHOSTBUSTERS film in India in 1985, subsequent sequels, worldwide revenues, merchandising, availability on OTT platforms, extensive advertising and promotion, media coverage and longstanding Indian trademark registrations.
    • It also relied on registration of the mark in more than 50 countries and prior enforcement activity concerning the mark.
    • Crucially, however, the High Court did not itself finally rule that GHOSTBUSTERS is a well-known trademark in India. It held that the Registrar had failed to perform the required statutory examination and must now do so on remand.

    Alleged Bad-Faith Adoption of β€˜GHOST BUSTER’ Must Also Be Examined

    • The High Court also found that Columbia’s allegation of bad-faith adoption had not been properly considered.
    • Columbia argued that the GHOSTBUSTERS mark was so well known that adoption of the nearly identical expression GHOST BUSTER could not be coincidental.
    • It also relied upon an earlier US proceeding involving Welch Materials Inc., described in the judgment as a sister concern of Respondent No.2. Welch had applied in the United States for GHOST BUSTER in June 2019. Columbia opposed the application; it was subsequently abandoned, and the USPTO passed an order refusing the application on 7 January 2020. The Indian GHOST BUSTER application was thereafter filed on 1 December 2020.
    • The High Court observed that the Registrar’s impugned order did not address this significant contention.

    Delhi HC Discusses Meaning of β€˜Bad Faith’ in Trademark Applications

    • The Court referred to its earlier decisions in BPI Sports LLC v. Saurabh Gulati and Kia Wang v. Registrar of Trademarks while discussing bad-faith trademark adoption.
    • The judgment noted that bad faith may include cases where an applicant intentionally submits wrong or misleading information to the Trade Marks Office as well as situations where registration is sought with the intention of laying hands on a third party’s trademark.
    • The question whether the present GHOST BUSTER application actually amounted to bad-faith adoption was nevertheless left for the Registrar to decide after proper consideration.

    Delhi High Court Remands Matter to Registrar for Fresh Decision

    • After examining the Registrar’s order, Columbia’s opposition, evidence and written submissions, the High Court concluded that the matter required fresh consideration by the Registrar of Trade Marks.
    • The Registrar was specifically directed to examine all relevant contentions and supporting documents, particularly Columbia’s allegations concerning bad faith and its claim that GHOSTBUSTERS is entitled to protection as a well-known trademark under Section 11(2), tested against Sections 2(1)(zg), 11(6) and 11(7) of the Trade Marks Act.
    • Thus, Columbia Pictures obtained a significant procedural and legal victory, but the judgment should not be read as a final declaration that GHOSTBUSTERS is already a well-known trademark in India or as a final refusal of the GHOST BUSTER application. Those questions are to be reconsidered by the Registrar.

    Significance of the Judgment

    • The ruling is particularly important for owners of famous brands because it clarifies that cross-class protection under Section 11(2) is not dependent upon obtaining a formal well-known-mark declaration in advance.
    • A proprietor can raise well-known status as a ground in trademark opposition proceedings and produce evidence demonstrating that the earlier mark satisfies the statutory requirements. The Registrar must then adjudicate that claim instead of dismissing the opposition merely because the competing goods fall in different classes.
    • At the same time, the decision does not create an automatic cross-class monopoly for every reputed trademark. The proprietor must still establish, through evidence, that its mark meets the statutory threshold for well-known protection and satisfies the requirements of Section 11(2).

    Key Takeaway

    The Delhi High Court has clarified that an earlier trademark does not need a prior formal declaration as a β€œwell-known trademark” before its proprietor can invoke Section 11(2) of the Trade Marks Act against an identical or similar mark covering dissimilar goods.

    What matters is whether the earlier mark can establish, on evidence, that it qualifies for such protection under the statutory criteria. In Columbia Pictures’ case, the Registrar’s failure to examine the claimed well-known character of GHOSTBUSTERS and the allegation of bad-faith adoption of GHOST BUSTER warranted reconsideration. The matter was therefore remanded for a fresh decision.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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  • Madras High Court Grants Bail in NDPS Case Involving 862 Grams of Hydroponic Ganja; Says Further Incarceration Not Required

    Madras High Court Grants Bail in NDPS Case Involving 862 Grams of Hydroponic Ganja; Says Further Incarceration Not Required

    Date: 14.09.2026

    The Madras High Court has granted bail to Chandra Pratapray Nirankari in an NDPS case involving alleged possession of 862 grams of Hydroponic Ganja/Marijuana, holding that, considering the nature of the allegations, the period of incarceration already undergone and the fact that the quantity involved was treated as an intermediate quantity, further incarceration was not required.

    Justice N. Ramesh ordered the petitioner’s release on bail subject to execution of a bond of β‚Ή25,000 with two sureties for a like sum, along with reporting and other conditions.

    Petitioner Arrested Under NDPS Act

    • The petitioner had been arrested and remanded to judicial custody on 17 August 2026 in connection with O.S. No.535/2026-AIU-B and O.S. No.39 of 2026 INT-AIR.
    • The alleged offences were under Section 8(c) read with Sections 23, 28 and 29, and Section 20(b)(ii)(A) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.
    • The bail petition was filed under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

    Prosecution Alleged Possession of 862 Grams of Hydroponic Ganja

    • According to the prosecution, the petitioner was found in possession of 862 grams of Hydroponic Ganja/Marijuana.
    • Counsel for the petitioner argued that he had been falsely implicated and had not committed the alleged offence. It was also submitted that the quantity involved was not commercial quantity and that the petitioner was willing to comply with any conditions imposed by the Court.
    • The prosecution opposed bail, while also informing the Court that the petitioner had no previous case pending against him.

    High Court Treats Quantity as Intermediate

    After hearing both sides and examining the record, the Madras High Court took into account three principal factors:

    • the nature of the allegations,
    • the period of incarceration already undergone, and
    • the fact that the quantity involved was an intermediate quantity.

    On that basis, the Court concluded that further incarceration of the petitioner was not required and granted bail.

    The order is therefore significant as a bail ruling based on the circumstances of the case and the quantity involved. It does not amount to a finding on the petitioner’s guilt or innocence, which remains to be determined during investigation and trial.

    Bail Bond of β‚Ή25,000 With Two Sureties

    • The Court directed the petitioner to execute a bond for β‚Ή25,000, along with two sureties for a like sum, to the satisfaction of the Judicial Magistrate, Special Court for Customs at Alandur.
    • The sureties were also directed to affix their photographs and left thumb impressions in the prescribed surety application, with the Magistrate required to obtain an identity proof to verify their identities.

    Daily Reporting for 15 Days

    The High Court imposed a reporting condition requiring the petitioner to appear before the respondent authorities every day at 10:30 a.m. for 15 days, and thereafter whenever required for interrogation.

    The petitioner was also directed:

    • not to abscond during investigation or trial; and
    • not to tamper with evidence or witnesses.

    Trial Court Empowered to Act on Breach of Bail Conditions

    • The Court further made it clear that if any of the bail conditions are breached, the Magistrate or Trial Court would be entitled to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law.
    • For this proposition, the Madras High Court relied upon the Supreme Court decision in P.K. Shaji v. State of Kerala, (2005) 13 SCC 283.
    • The order also states that if the accused subsequently absconds, a fresh FIR may be registered under Section 269 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.

    Why the Order Is Significant

    • The ruling reinforces the principle that continued pre-trial detention is not automatic in every NDPS prosecution and that the Court must assess the circumstances of the individual case, including the quantity of contraband, period of custody and antecedents of the accused.
    • Here, the Court specifically recorded that the quantity involved was intermediate and that the petitioner had no previous pending case. These factors weighed in favour of bail.
    • At the same time, the Court balanced the grant of liberty with strict conditions requiring regular reporting, cooperation with the investigation, non-interference with witnesses and continued availability during proceedings.

    Key Takeaway

    The Madras High Court granted bail to the petitioner in an NDPS case involving 862 grams of Hydroponic Ganja/Marijuana, holding that further incarceration was unnecessary in view of the period already spent in custody and the intermediate quantity involved.

    The petitioner therefore succeeded in the bail petition, though the order does not decide the merits of the prosecution case.

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  • Madras HC: Subsequent Amendment Cannot Be Applied Retrospectively to Deny Provisional Release of Imported Goods

    Madras HC: Subsequent Amendment Cannot Be Applied Retrospectively to Deny Provisional Release of Imported Goods

    Date: 14.09.2026

    The Madras High Court has ruled in favour of importer M/s Smart Impex Solutions on the issue of provisional release of imported goods, holding that a subsequent statutory amendment cannot govern imports covered by Bills of Lading issued before the amendment came into force unless the notification expressly provides for retrospective operation.

    Justice Hemant Chandangoudar directed Customs authorities to consider the petitioner’s request for provisional release under Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962, within four weeks and, upon compliance with the conditions imposed, release the goods provisionally within a further period of two weeks.

    Dispute Over Import of Second-Hand Digital Multifunction Machines

    1. Smart Impex Solutions approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of mandamus directing Customs authorities to allow provisional release of two consignments comprising various models of second-hand Highly Specialized Equipment – Digital Multifunction Print and Copying Machines.
    2. The consignments were covered by two Bills of Entry dated 3 August 2026. The corresponding Bills of Lading were dated 26 May 2026 and 24 May 2026, respectively.
    3. The importer sought provisional release on execution of a simple bond for 100% of the enhanced value of the goods and payment of applicable total GST on the enhanced value. The order records that Customs Duty was exempted. The enhanced valuation was based on inspection reports and valuation certificates issued by the Chartered Engineers, M/s Supreme Techno Associates Pvt. Ltd.

    Importer Relied on Earlier Madras High Court Decision

    1. Counsel for Smart Impex Solutions argued that the issue was no longer res integra and was squarely covered by an earlier common order of the Madras High Court dated 10 July 2025 in W.P. Nos. 29418 of 2024 etc. batch.
    2. In that batch of cases, the Court had directed consideration of importers’ requests for provisional release of similar goods under Section 110A of the Customs Act.

    Customs Relied on 2026 Amendment

    • The Customs Department opposed the petition by relying upon an amendment dated 10 March 2026 to the Notification dated 1 July 2021.
    • According to the Department’s submission recorded in the judgment, the amendment provided an exemption in respect of Highly Specialized Equipment satisfying the prescribed criteria, subject to a specific exemption issued by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology under paragraph 2 of the Gazette Notification dated 18 March 2021, as amended on 26 April 2023, where the equipment was manufactured or imported in quantities of less than 100 units per model per year.
    • Crucially, the amendment was stated to have come into force with effect from 15 June 2026.
    • Customs further submitted that, for considering the petitioner’s claim, the date of the Bills of Lading would be considered as provided under Section 15 of the Customs Act, 1962.

    Bills of Lading Pre-Dated the Amendment

    • The dates became decisive.
    • The High Court noted that the two Bills of Lading were dated 26 May 2026 and 24 May 2026, whereas the amendment relied upon by Customs came into force only on 15 June 2026.
    • The Court then laid down the central principle governing the dispute:
    • β€œUnless a statutory notification expressly provides for retrospective operation, it can only operate prospectively.”
    • Accordingly, the Court held that the amendment relied upon by Customs could not govern imports covered by Bills of Lading issued before the amendment commenced. Consequently, Customs could not refuse to consider the importer’s request for provisional release by relying upon that amendment.

    Earlier Judgment on Similar Imports Also Favoured Consideration of Provisional Release

    • The High Court further observed that the issue concerning provisional release of similar imported goods had already been considered in its common order dated 10 July 2025 in W.P. Nos. 29418 of 2024 etc. batch.
    • Importantly, the Customs authorities were unable to point out any distinguishing feature that would justify taking a different view in the case of Smart Impex Solutions.

    Customs Directed to Decide Section 110A Request Within Four Weeks

    • In view of these findings, the High Court disposed of the writ petition with specific directions.
    • The respondents were directed to consider Smart Impex Solutions’ request for provisional release under Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962 and pass an appropriate order within four weeks from receipt of a copy of the High Court’s order. Customs was permitted to impose such conditions as may be considered necessary in accordance with law.
    • More importantly, the Court directed that once the petitioner complies with the conditions imposed by Customs, the imported goods shall be provisionally released within two weeks thereafter.

    Provisional Release Does Not Decide Customs Adjudication

    • The High Court nevertheless made an important distinction between provisional release of the goods and final adjudication of the Customs dispute.
    • It expressly clarified that provisional release would remain subject to the outcome of adjudication proceedings under the Customs Act, 1962.
    • The adjudicating authority was directed to decide those proceedings independently on their own merits and in accordance with law, without being influenced by observations made in the High Court’s order.
    • Thus, the judgment should not be interpreted as a final determination of the legality of the import, classification, valuation or any other issue that may arise during Customs adjudication. The relief granted by the High Court concerns the provisional release of the consignments.

    Why the Judgment Is Significant for Importers

    • The decision is significant for importers facing detention or non-release of goods where Customs seeks to rely upon a regulatory amendment introduced after the relevant import transaction.
    • The judgment reiterates the basic principle that, unless retrospective operation has expressly been provided, a statutory notification ordinarily operates prospectively. In the present case, because the Bills of Lading pre-dated the amendment’s commencement, Customs could not rely upon that later amendment as a ground for refusing even to consider provisional release.
    • The ruling also reinforces the practical importance of Section 110A of the Customs Act, which provides the statutory mechanism for provisional release of goods pending adjudication, subject to appropriate conditions.

    Key Takeaway

    The Madras High Court’s decision provides relief to M/s Smart Impex Solutions by requiring Customs to process its request for provisional release rather than reject it on the basis of a subsequently effective amendment.

    The key proposition emerging from the judgment is:

    A statutory amendment or notification cannot ordinarily be applied retrospectively to imports covered by Bills of Lading issued before its commencement unless retrospective operation is expressly provided. Customs therefore cannot rely upon such a subsequent amendment to refuse consideration of provisional release under Section 110A of the Customs Act.

    The petitioner/importer therefore succeeded on the provisional-release issue, although the underlying Customs adjudication remains open for independent determination.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi