Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 31.10.2026
Supreme Court: DRI Cannot Secure NDPS Conviction Based Only on Statements of Co-Accused
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
The Supreme Court of India set aside Surinder Kumar Khannaβs drug-trafficking conviction because the prosecution had no substantive evidence against him beyond statements made by his co-accused.
Background of the case
The case arose from a Directorate of Revenue Intelligence operation in Hoshiarpur, Punjab. Officers intercepted a white Indica car after receiving information that narcotics were being transported from Jammu towards Chandigarh. Two occupants, Raj Kumar alias Raju and Surinder Pal Singh, were found in the vehicle.
A search of the car reportedly led to the recovery of four packets concealed in the boot-door area. The packets allegedly contained approximately 3.990 kg of heroin. The two occupants stated that the consignment had been collected from an individual in Jammu and was intended for delivery near PGI Chandigarh.
Although Surinder Kumar Khanna was not present at the interception and no contraband was recovered from him, investigators later alleged that he was involved in the trafficking operation. A supplementary complaint was filed against him under Section 21(c) read with Section 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.
Conviction by the trial court and High Court
The trial court convicted Khanna and sentenced him to 12 yearsβ rigorous imprisonment, along with a fine of Rs. 1 lakh. On appeal, the Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld the conviction but reduced the prison term to 10 years.
The High Court relied principally on statements made by Raj Kumar and Surinder Pal Singh under Section 67 of the NDPS Act. It held that these statements were admissible and established Khannaβs involvement in drug trafficking.
The central issue before the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court considered whether a co-accusedβs alleged confession could, by itself, justify another accused personβs conviction.
The prosecution accepted that, apart from the co-accusedβs statements, there was no evidence directly connecting Khanna with the seized heroin or the other accused. Call-data records placed before the Court showed contact with a person in Dubai, but did not show that Khanna was in touch with either co-accused when they were apprehended.
What the Court held
The Court reaffirmed a fundamental evidentiary rule: a confession by one accused is not substantive evidence against a co-accused. It may only be considered to support or βlend assuranceβ to other independent evidence that already points to the co-accusedβs guilt.
The judgment relied on established precedents, including Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Hari Charan Kurmi v. State of Bihar. Those decisions explain that a court must first assess the evidence against an accused without considering a co-accusedβs confession. Only if independent evidence is sufficient to support conviction may the confession be used as an additional source of assurance.
The Court also noted that the NDPS Act contains no provision comparable to special statutes that expressly permit a co-accusedβs confession to be used against another accused in specified circumstances.
Importance of Section 67 statements
The judgment acknowledged that the legal status of statements recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act had been referred to a larger Bench in an earlier case. However, the Court held that even if those statements were treated as confessions, they could not alone establish Khannaβs guilt.
That distinction was decisive. The question was not merely whether the co-accusedβs statements could be considered; it was whether they could independently prove a separate accused personβs involvement. The Court answered no.
Final outcome
Finding no substantive evidence against Khanna, the Supreme Court allowed his appeal, quashed his conviction and sentence, and acquitted him of the charges. It directed that he be released immediately unless required in custody in another case.
Key legal takeaway
Surinder Kumar Khanna v. Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence reinforces that criminal conviction must rest on reliable, independent evidence. A co-accusedβs statement may corroborate an existing case, but it cannot fill the absence of evidence against another person accused of the offence.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 31.10.2026
Rajasthan High Court Quashes 14-Year-Old Customs Drawback Proceedings for Unreasonable Delay
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
The Rajasthan High Court has set aside a 2008 customs show-cause notice and a 2022 adjudication order, holding that a 14-year delay without explanation or communication violated procedural fairness and natural justice.
Case at a glance
In Shivek Sharma v. Union of India (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 19485/2022), decided on 9 September 2025, the Rajasthan High Court at Jaipur examined whether Customs authorities could revive and adjudicate a long-pending allegation concerning duty drawback and DEPB benefits after more than a decade of inactivity.
The petitioner, Shivek Sharma, was the legal heir of the late proprietor of M/s J. Minakshi International. The Directorate of Revenue Intelligence had investigated alleged misuse of export-promotion schemes involving exports of goods such as readymade garments, leather items and brass items. A show-cause notice was issued on 31 March 2008, but the department did not proceed to adjudicate it until 2021-22. An Order-in-Original creating recovery demands was eventually issued on 18 October 2022.
The Court ruled that this prolonged, unexplained delay made the proceedings legally unsustainable.
Background of the dispute
The DRIβs investigation concerned alleged fraudulent export transactions during 2001-05. It resulted in a show-cause notice against several parties, including M/s J. Minakshi International, a proprietary concern of the petitionerβs father.
Several developments made the delay especially significant:
The notice was issued in 2008, when the petitioner was 13 years old.
The proprietor, Pawan Kumar Sharma, died in April 2021.
The department began hearing-related action only after approximately 13 years of silence.
The petitioner stated that he had neither inherited nor carried on the business and was unaware of the pending proceedings.
After receiving hearing notices, he sought the underlying notice and relied-on documents, explaining that he could not reasonably understand or answer transactions dating back many years.
Despite these objections, Customs passed an order in October 2022, seeking recovery of duty drawback and interest from the petitioner as legal heir.
The legal issue: Can Customs adjudicate after 14 years?
The central issue was not merely whether the Customs Act or Drawback Rules contained a fixed limitation period. It was whether administrative and quasi-judicial powers can be exercised after such an extreme delay when the affected party was not informed of the status of the case.
The petitioner argued that even where legislation does not prescribe a specific deadline, adjudication must occur within a reasonable period. He also relied on the statutory timelines reflected in Section 28(9) of the Customs Act to emphasize the importance of prompt decision-making in customs matters.
The Customs department argued that the case involved recovery of drawback and DEPB benefits under the Drawback Rules, rather than an ordinary duty-demand case. It also argued that the 2018 amendment introducing timelines under Section 28(9) did not apply retrospectively and that an appellate remedy was available.
What the Court held
The High Court rejected the departmentβs position and held that the doctrine of reasonable time applies to adjudication proceedings generally. The absence of an express statutory deadline does not permit authorities to keep a show-cause notice alive indefinitely.
The Court identified several decisive failures:
Inordinate delay: The order was passed more than 14 years after the show-cause notice.
No explanation: Customs did not provide a cogent reason for the delay.
No communication: The petitioner and his father were not told that the matter remained pending or had been placed in a βcall book.β
No supporting record: The department did not produce material proving any transfer to the call book or explaining the basis for it.
No fault of the petitioner: The delay was not attributed to the petitioner or his late father.
Ignored submissions: The adjudicating authority did not meaningfully address the petitionerβs arguments and cited case law on stale proceedings.
The Court described the 14-year delay as incompatible with lawful, fair and effective quasi-judicial adjudication. It reiterated the principle expressed in the maxim lex dilationes abhorretβthe law abhors delay.
Why lack of communication mattered
A key part of the ruling is that delay becomes particularly unfair when the noticee is left uninformed. The Court noted that communication is necessary where proceedings are kept in abeyance or transferred to a call book.
Without notice, the affected person may lose access to records, witnesses and other evidence needed for a proper defence. Long silence can also reasonably lead a person to believe that the proceedings have been abandoned or concluded.
Here, the department was silent for more than a decade. The Court found that this lack of transparency caused grave prejudice and violated natural justice.
Writ petition allowed despite an appellate remedy
The department argued that the petitioner should pursue an appeal against the Order-in-Original. The Court held that the availability of an appeal did not bar the writ petition in these circumstances.
The challenge was based on a fundamental procedural defect: the arbitrary and delayed revival of proceedings, coupled with a breach of natural justice. Because the very adjudication process was found to be vitiated, the Court considered writ jurisdiction appropriate.
Final outcome
The Rajasthan High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed:
The show-cause notice dated 31 March 2008, insofar as it concerned the petitioner; and
The Order-in-Original dated 18 October 2022 passed under Section 122 of the Customs Act.
The Court concluded that the petitioner was justified in treating the long-dormant proceedings as abandoned.
Significance of the ruling
This decision reinforces an important safeguard in customs and tax administration: authorities must adjudicate show-cause notices within a reasonable time, even where the governing provision does not specify a strict deadline.
For businesses, proprietors, legal heirs and other noticees, the judgment confirms that a prolonged and unexplained revival of old proceedings can be challenged when it causes prejudice, particularly where the department failed to disclose the status of the case or preserve procedural fairness.
For revenue authorities, it underscores that public-revenue objectives require diligence and timely action, not indefinite pendency.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 30.10.2026
CESTAT Mumbai- Customs Cannot Calculate Import IGST on Exempted BCD
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
The CESTAT Mumbai has held that where imports qualify for a Basic Customs Duty (BCD) exemption under a valid Duty-Free Import Authorisation (DFIA), IGST must be calculated without adding the notional tariff-rate BCD to the assessable value.
In TGI International v. Commissioner of Customs, Nhava Sheva-III, the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), Mumbai set aside an order that had rejected the importerβs challenge to IGST assessments on 105 Bills of Entry. The Tribunal ruled that the relevant statutory test is the customs duty actually βchargeableβ after giving effect to a valid exemption notification, not the BCD shown in the tariff schedule.
Background: 105 DFIA-based fabric imports
TGI International, a fabric trader, imported polyester viscose fabrics through 105 Bills of Entry. It claimed full exemption from BCD under Notification No. 19/2015-Customs dated 1 April 2015, which applies to eligible imports made against a valid DFIA issued by the Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT).
The DFIA scheme permits duty-free import of specified inputs subject to prescribed conditions, including production of the authorisation at clearance and endorsements relating to the export obligation and resultant product. In this matter, the Tribunal found that the importer had complied with the applicable DFIA and notification requirements.
Although the BCD claimed on the imports was nil, the Indian Customs EDI System (ICES) calculated IGST by adding BCD at the normal tariff rate of 20% to the transaction value. The importer paid the system-calculated IGST because the Bills of Entry could not be amended through the system, then appealed the assessments.
The core legal issue
The dispute concerned the meaning of βduty of customs chargeableβ when determining the value on which IGST is levied on imported goods.
Section 3(8) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 requires IGST to be calculated on an aggregate value comprising:
the value of imported goods determined under Section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962; and
any customs duty chargeable on the goods under Section 12 of the Customs Act.
TGI International argued that once the DFIA exemption reduced BCD to zero, there was no BCD amount to add to the assessable value for IGST. Customs authorities, however, treated the tariff-rate BCD as part of the IGST base, even though the importer did not pay that duty in cash.
Tribunalβs findings
Effective duty, not tariff duty, governs the IGST base
The Tribunal held that an exemption notification issued under Section 25 of the Customs Act must be given effect while determining the customs duty βchargeableβ under Section 12. Although the tariff rate of BCD on the goods was 20%, the effective BCD was nil because the imports were covered by the DFIA exemption.
Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that the effective duty liability, rather than the unadjusted tariff rate, must be added to the import value when calculating IGST.
No duty debit was made under the DFIA
The Commissioner (Appeals) had reasoned that the customs duty was effectively discharged through debit in the DFIA authorisation. CESTAT rejected this conclusion as factually unsupported.
The Bills of Entry showed βzeroβ against the duty-debit field. The DFIA documentation recorded the permitted CIF value and quantity of dyed polyester fabrics, but did not require debit of the BCD amount as a precondition for the exemption. The Tribunal therefore found that it was incorrect to treat the tariff BCD as a duty discharged through the authorisation.
ICES could not override the legal valuation rule
The Tribunal noted that ICES had added a notional BCD amount while computing IGST and had not taken account of the exemption claimed under Notification No. 19/2015-Customs. System-generated assessments cannot displace the statutory requirement to use the duty actually chargeable after the applicable exemption is applied.
Reliance on earlier decisions
CESTAT found support in earlier Tribunal rulings that distinguish the tariff rate from the effective rate after exemptions:
In Morarjee Brembana Ltd., the Tribunal held that only the effective customs duty, after applying the applicable exemption notification, should be added for calculating additional customs duty.
In Parasrampuria International, the Tribunal held that where BCD is nil due to an exemption, no BCD amount can be added to the assessable value merely because a tariff rate otherwise exists.
The Revenue relied on Poddar Pigments Ltd., but CESTAT held that the case was distinguishable because it concerned interest on delayed IGST payment, not the correct BCD component for IGST valuation.
Why the ruling matters
The decision clarifies an important valuation principle for DFIA and other exemption-based imports: the IGST base must reflect the effective customs-duty liability, not a hypothetical duty calculated at the tariff rate.
For eligible DFIA imports, this means a nil BCD exemption should result in zero BCD being added to the IGST valuation base. The ruling also reinforces that customs assessment systems must apply the substantive benefit of a valid exemption notification rather than mechanically loading tariff-rate duty into the calculation.
Conclusion
By allowing TGI Internationalβs appeals, CESTAT Mumbai confirmed that a valid BCD exemption under the DFIA scheme must be fully reflected in IGST valuation. Where the effective BCD is nil, Customs cannot add the tariff-rate BCD notionally to inflate the IGST payable on imported goods.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 30.10.2026
Supreme Court: Section 37 NDPS Bail Conditions Cannot Be Ignored Merely Because No Drugs Were Recovered from Accused
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
The Supreme Court of India set aside the Delhi High Courtβs bail order in Narcotics Control Bureau v. Mohit Aggarwal, reaffirming that bail in NDPS cases involving commercial quantities is subject to the strict βtwin conditionsβ in Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
Background of the case
The case arose from a Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) operation in January 2020. Acting on information that a courier parcel booked from Agra for delivery in Ludhiana contained narcotic substances, NCB officers searched the courier companyβs godown in Delhi.
The parcel was labelled as containing βsurgical items,β but officers allegedly recovered 50,000 Tramadol tablets weighing 20 kg. The prosecution alleged that the consignment had been sent without a valid bill and had been mis-declared.
During the investigation, the NCB traced the alleged supply chain to several persons, including Mohit Aggarwal. Searches later led to the recovery of a much larger stock of psychotropic substances from the godown of another accused, Promod Jaipuria. The reported seizure included Tramadol, Zolpidem and Alprazolam tablets and capsules, injections, and syrup bottles, amounting to hundreds of kilograms of controlled substances.
Mohit Aggarwal was arrested on 11 January 2020. His two bail applications before the Special Judge under the NDPS Act were rejected. However, the Delhi High Court subsequently granted him post-arrest bail under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The central legal issue
The key question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court had correctly applied Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 while granting bail.
Section 37 imposes additional restrictions on bail where the alleged offence involves commercial quantities of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances. Before bail can be granted, the court must satisfy two cumulative conditions when the prosecution opposes release:
there must be reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence; and
the accused must not be likely to commit an offence while on bail.
The prosecution must also receive an opportunity to oppose the bail application.
Arguments before the Court
NCBβs case
The NCB argued that the High Court had taken an overly narrow view by focusing on the absence of any recovery from Mohit Aggarwalβs residence or shop. It contended that the investigation yielded independent circumstantial material connecting him with the alleged drug network.
According to the NCB, disclosures attributed to Mohit Aggarwal led officers to the godown from which a substantial quantity of psychotropic substances was recovered. It also relied on call-detail records said to show contact between the co-accused. The agency argued that these circumstances, together with the commercial quantity involved, made the grant of bail contrary to Section 37.
Respondentβs case
Mohit Aggarwal argued that the consignment had not been booked by him, no narcotics were recovered from him, and searches of his residence and shop produced nothing incriminating. He also challenged reliance on statements recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act.
The respondent relied on the Supreme Courtβs ruling in Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, which held that confessional statements recorded under Section 67 are inadmissible at trial under the NDPS Act. He further pointed to the period already spent in custody, the filing of the charge-sheet, and the commencement of trial.
Supreme Courtβs ruling
The Supreme Court allowed the NCBβs appeals, quashed the High Courtβs bail order, cancelled Mohit Aggarwalβs bail bonds, and directed that he be taken into custody.
The Court agreed that the alleged confessional statements recorded under Section 67 could not be relied upon as substantive confessions in light of Tofan Singh. However, it held that this did not end the inquiry. The prosecution had also relied on other material, including the alleged recovery following the respondentβs disclosures and phone records indicating contact among the co-accused.
The Court held that the High Court should not have treated the absence of a recovery from the respondentβs personal possession as sufficient to conclude that he was not guilty. That conclusion was premature at the bail stage, particularly when other circumstantial evidence was on record.
Meaning of βreasonable groundsβ under Section 37
A major contribution of the judgment is its explanation of the phrase βreasonable grounds.β The Court reiterated that this standard requires more than a prima facie view. It calls for substantial and credible probable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty.
At the same time, the Court clarified that a bail court is not expected to conduct a mini-trial or finally determine guilt. The inquiry is limited: whether the material available gives the court reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is not guilty and unlikely to reoffend while on bail.
This approach reflects the special statutory framework of the NDPS Act. In ordinary criminal cases, the general bail principles under the Code of Criminal Procedure apply. In commercial-quantity NDPS cases, those principles are supplemented by the stricter statutory threshold in Section 37.
Why the High Courtβs approach was rejected
The Supreme Court identified three core problems with the grant of bail:
Insufficient application of Section 37: The High Court did not adequately assess whether both statutory conditions for bail had been met.
Overemphasis on lack of personal recovery: The absence of contraband at the respondentβs residence or shop did not by itself establish that he was unconnected with the alleged offence.
Failure to account for circumstantial evidence: The alleged recovery from a co-accusedβs godown and the call-detail records were relevant material that required consideration, even if Section 67 confessions were excluded.
The Court also made clear that the duration of custody, filing of the charge-sheet, and commencement of trial are not, by themselves, persuasive grounds for granting bail where Section 37 applies.
Significance of the decision
Narcotics Control Bureau v. Mohit Aggarwal is an important bail decision under the NDPS Act because it reinforces the limited scope for release in commercial-quantity cases. It confirms that courts must separately and carefully apply the two conditions in Section 37 rather than relying only on ordinary bail considerations.
The ruling also draws a practical distinction between inadmissible Section 67 confessions and other evidence. While an accusedβs alleged confession to an NDPS officer cannot be used as substantive evidence at trial, independent circumstances such as recoveries, communications records, and other investigative material can still be relevant at the bail stage.
Key takeaway
The judgment confirms that in commercial-quantity NDPS cases, bail cannot rest merely on the absence of direct recovery or on time spent in custody; the court must find credible and substantial grounds to believe the accused is not guilty and unlikely to commit another offence while on bail.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 29.10.2026
Karnataka HC: NDPS Investigation by Police Sub-Inspector Not Illegal Merely on Grounds of Officer’s Rank
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
The Karnataka High Court has dismissed two petitions seeking to quash NDPS proceedings, holding that a police sub-inspector was competent to register the FIR, investigate the case, conduct search and seizure, and file the charge sheet.
Court and case details
The High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru, through Justice M. Nagaprasanna, delivered a common order on 2 November 2022 in Criminal Petition No. 570 of 2022 and Criminal Petition No. 3455 of 2022.
Both petitioners sought the quashing of criminal proceedings in Special Case No. 1876 of 2021, pending before the Special Court for NDPS cases in Bengaluru. The case arose from Crime No. 224 of 2021 registered at Byadarahalli Police Station.
The petitions were filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which allows the High Court to quash proceedings where continuation would amount to abuse of the process of law.
Allegations in the narcotics case
According to the prosecution case set out in the order, police received credible information on 22 June 2021 that five persons in Room No. 11 of a paying-guest accommodation near East West College were allegedly holding narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances for sale.
Police proceeded to the location with panch witnesses. The prosecution alleged that one petitioner, described as accused No. 1, was found in possession of:
56.5 grams of MDMA/ecstasy tablets;
350 grams of hashish; and
A mobile phone allegedly used to contact buyers.
The other accused were alleged to have possessed LSD strips and MDMA tablets. Police conducted seizure proceedings and prepared a panchanama. The accused were taken into custody and remanded to judicial custody on 23 June 2021.
After the forensic science laboratory report was received, the police filed a charge sheet on 26 November 2021.
The High Court did not decide whether the allegations were proved. Its order dealt only with the challenge to the investigating officerβs legal authority.
Offences alleged under the NDPS Act
The proceedings involved allegations under several provisions of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, including Sections 8(c), 21(c), 22(c), 23(c), and 27(a). One of the petitions also involved Section 20(ii)(B).
These provisions broadly concern prohibited possession, trafficking-related conduct, and consumption of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, depending on the facts ultimately established at trial.
Petitionersβ challenge: investigation by an allegedly incompetent officer
The petitionersβ principal argument was that the entire case was invalid from the FIR stage because it had been registered and investigated by a police sub-inspector.
They argued that the sub-inspector was not the βofficer in chargeβ of the police station. On that basis, they contended that the officer lacked authority to conduct the investigation and submit the final report or charge sheet before the court.
The Court recorded that this was the sole ground advanced for quashing the proceedings.
Stateβs response: statutory notifications and binding precedent
The State opposed both petitions, contending that Karnataka government notifications issued in 1986 had empowered the relevant officers to exercise statutory powers under the NDPS Act.
The State also relied on the Supreme Courtβs Constitution Bench decision in Mukesh Singh v. State, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 120. The State argued that the legal question raised by the petitioners had already been settled by the Supreme Court.
It additionally referred to an earlier bail order involving one of the petitioners, where similar submissions had been rejected.
Legal provisions considered by the High Court
The High Court considered the framework of the NDPS Act, particularly Sections 42, 52 and 53.
Section 42: Search, seizure and arrest
Section 42 authorises designated officers, including authorised officers from the police and other listed departments, to enter and search specified places, seize narcotic substances and related material, and arrest persons without a warrant in appropriate circumstances.
The provision requires information received to be taken down in writing in the circumstances specified by the Act. It also requires the officer to send a copy of the information or recorded grounds to the immediate superior within 72 hours.
Section 52: Handling persons arrested and articles seized
Section 52 governs the disposal of arrested persons and seized articles. It requires that persons arrested and articles seized under the relevant provisions be forwarded without unnecessary delay to the nearest police-station officer in charge or to an officer empowered under Section 53.
Section 53: Powers of an officer in charge of a police station
Section 53 allows the Central and State Governments to issue official notifications investing specified officers or classes of officers with the powers of an officer in charge of a police station for NDPS investigations.
The Court also noted that Section 51 applies the Code of Criminal Procedure to NDPS warrants, arrests, searches and seizures, so far as the two laws are not inconsistent.
Karnatakaβs 1986 notifications
The Court referred to a Karnataka Government notification dated 11 September 1986, issued under Section 53(2) of the NDPS Act. The notification invested officers of and above the rank of Sub-Inspector of Excise in the Excise Department, and Drug Inspectors in the Drugs Control Department, with the powers of an officer in charge of a police station for investigating NDPS offences.
A second notification issued on the same date authorised the same officers to act under Sections 41 and 42 of the NDPS Act.
The Court held that these notifications showed that the statutory authorisation framework contemplated under Sections 42 and 53 was in place.
Supreme Courtβs ruling in Mukesh Singh v. State
The High Court treated the Supreme Courtβs five-judge Constitution Bench ruling in Mukesh Singh as controlling on the issue.
In that decision, the Supreme Court examined the relationship between the NDPS Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure. It held that the NDPS Act does not expressly bar an informant or complainant from also acting as the investigating officer.
The Supreme Court explained that under the criminal procedure framework, an officer in charge of a police station may receive information about a cognisable offence, record it as an FIR, investigate the case, and file the final report after completing the investigation.
It further held that Section 53 of the NDPS Act does not require the officers empowered to investigate NDPS offences to be different from those authorised to exercise powers under Sections 41, 42, 43 or 44.
The Supreme Court also noted that, while Section 42 expressly mentions police officers, Section 53 does not separately mention βpoliceβ because a police officer may already act as an officer in charge of a police station under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
High Courtβs findings
The High Court rejected the petitionersβ argument that the proceedings had been vitiated because the sub-inspector had registered the FIR and filed the charge sheet.
It held that the Supreme Court had made it clear that an officer holding the rank of sub-inspector could act as an officer in charge of a police station for the relevant purposes. The Court found that the police sub-inspector in the case was empowered to:
Register the FIR;
Conduct the NDPS investigation;
Carry out search and seizure proceedings; and
File the final report or charge sheet before the competent court.
The Court concluded that the petitionersβ sole legal objection could not survive in view of the statutory scheme, the Karnataka notifications, and the binding ruling in Mukesh Singh.
Earlier case law did not assist the petitioners
The petitioners had relied on other decisions in support of their challenge. However, the High Court held that those authorities did not require separate consideration because the five-judge Constitution Bench decision in Mukesh Singh covered the same statutory provisions and the same central issue.
The Court therefore found that the earlier authorities stood subsumed by the binding Supreme Court ruling.
Outcome of the petitions
The High Court dismissed both criminal petitions. Pending applications connected with the petitions were also disposed of.
The decision means that the criminal proceedings in Special Case No. 1876 of 2021 will continue before the designated NDPS Special Court in Bengaluru.
Importantly, the dismissal of the petitions is not a finding that either petitioner is guilty of the alleged offences. The High Court only ruled that the proceedings could not be quashed on the ground that the police sub-inspector lacked authority to investigate or submit the charge sheet.
Significance of the ruling
The order reinforces that a challenge based solely on the rank or role of the investigating officer will not automatically invalidate an NDPS prosecution. The question must be examined against the NDPS Act, the Code of Criminal Procedure, valid government notifications, and binding judicial precedent.
The ruling also reaffirms the principle from Mukesh Singh: the same authorised police officer may receive information, register an FIR, investigate the matter, and file the final report, unless a specific legal prohibition applies.
At the same time, procedural protections under the NDPS Act remain significant. Statutory requirements concerning recording of information, reporting to superior officers, search safeguards, arrest procedures, and custody of seized articles continue to be subject to scrutiny on the facts of each case.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 29.10.2026
Delhi HC: Importers Cannot Be Penalised for Administrative Failure of Customs Settlement Board
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
The Delhi High Court has ruled that the statutory clock for customs settlement proceedings must stop when the Interim Board for Settlement is unable to function for want of quorum, protecting applicants from losing their settlement remedy because of an institutional vacancy.
Background of the dispute
Holitech India Private Limited, an importer of components used in cellular mobile phones and related products, faced two customs show-cause notices dated 21 September 2023. The notices concerned alleged wrongful use of a customs-duty exemption notification, classification issues, and alleged non-payment of differential duty on unutilised or rejected goods.
To resolve the disputes through the settlement route under Chapter XIVA of the Customs Act, 1962, Holitech filed settlement applications. After earlier applications were not admitted, fresh applications filed in August 2024 and March 2025 were admitted and taken forward.
Following amendments introduced through the Finance Act, 2025, pending matters before the Settlement Commission were transferred to the Interim Board for Settlement-I, Delhi. The Board heard Holitech, co-applicants and departmental representatives on 22 August 2025. Holitech also supplied additional written submissions requested by the Board, and the matters were reserved for orders.
The quorum issue
Before the Interim Board could issue its orders, one of its members retired on 30 September 2025. From 1 October 2025, the Board lacked the required quorum and could not legally continue with or decide the settlement proceedings.
The Boardβs office later confirmed that the applications had remained pending βfor want of quorumβ since 1 October 2025. Despite this acknowledged inability to function, communications dated 17 April 2026 treated the proceedings as abated from 8 April 2026 because no settlement order had been passed within the period prescribed by Section 127C of the Customs Act.
The communications also stated that the jurisdictional customs authorities could resume adjudication of the show-cause notices.
The legal question
The central issue before the Delhi High Court was whether settlement proceedings automatically abate when the statutory deadline expires, even though the Interim Board was legally incapable of passing an order because it did not have the required quorum.
Holitech argued that it had done everything required of it: its applications were admitted, hearings were completed, written submissions were filed and nothing remained pending on its side. It contended that it should not lose a statutory remedy because the adjudicatory forum became non-functional for administrative reasons.
The respondents argued that the statutory time limit was mandatory and that, once it expired without an order, abatement followed automatically. They maintained that the law contained no express exception for a period when the Board lacked quorum.
The Courtβs reasoning
The Court rejected a purely literal reading of the statutory time limit. It held that Section 127C must be interpreted as a complete scheme, rather than by isolating the provisions on deadlines and abatement.
The Court emphasized that the statutory timeline assumes the continued existence of a legally constituted authority capable of carrying out its duties. A body without quorum cannot validly exercise adjudicatory powers or pronounce an order affecting the partiesβ rights.
The Court drew a critical distinction between:
a delay caused while a competent authority is able to decide but fails to do so; and
a delay caused because the authority itself is legally unable to function.
Treating these situations identically, the Court said, would produce an unreasonable result. An applicant who had diligently pursued settlement proceedings would lose the remedy through circumstances entirely outside its control, while having no means to secure a decision from a non-functional Board.
The Court held that the phrase requiring an order within the prescribed period cannot include a period during which the Interim Board had ceased to be an effective adjudicatory forum due to lack of quorum. The time for disposal must therefore exclude the period of institutional incapacity.
Decision and relief granted
The Court set aside both communications dated 17 April 2026 that had declared the settlement proceedings abated.
It ruled that, for Holitechβs applications, the entire period from 1 October 2025 until 4 August 2026 must be excluded when calculating the timeline under Section 127C(8A), read with Section 127C(12), of the Customs Act.
Because that period could not be counted, the alleged expiry of the statutory period on 8 April 2026 no longer had any legal basis. The settlement applications did not abate.
The Court also noted that the vacancy had subsequently been filled and that Interim Board for Settlement-I, Delhi had regained the required quorum. It directed the Board to resume Holitechβs applications from the stage immediately before the abatement communications and decide them expeditiously in accordance with law.
Why the ruling matters
The decision establishes that statutory deadlines for settlement proceedings cannot be applied in a way that penalizes applicants for the adjudicatory forumβs legal inability to function.
It preserves the purpose of the customs settlement mechanism: timely and conclusive resolution of disputes, without making access to that remedy dependent on administrative contingencies beyond an applicantβs control. The ruling does not decide the merits of Holitechβs customs disputes. Those issues remain open for determination by the duly constituted Interim Board.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
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Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 28.10.2026
CESTAT Kolkata Upholds Classification of Ice-Cream Making Machinery Under CTH 8438
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
The Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), Kolkata has dismissed six Revenue appeals against J.B. Pen Mart, holding that the disputed imported ice-cream making machinery should be classified under Customs Tariff Heading (CTH) 8438 rather than CTH 8418. The Tribunal also rejected Customsβ enhancement of the declared import value because the statutory reassessment procedure was not followed.
The dispute: classification and valuation of imported machinery
The case concerned six Bills of Entry filed by J.B. Pen Mart for imported ice-making and ice-cream making equipment during 2017 and 2018. The importer had sought classification under CTH 8438 80 90, covering machinery used in the industrial preparation or manufacture of food and drink.
Customs authorities reclassified the goods under CTH 8418 69 90, treating them as ice-cream machines or refrigeration-related equipment. They also enhanced the declared value of the imports, resulting in an aggregate differential duty demand of Rs. 12,27,374.98.
J.B. Pen Mart paid the additional duty to secure clearance of the goods and avoid demurrage, but did so under protest. The company challenged both the classification and the valuation before the Commissioner (Appeals), who ruled in its favour. The Revenue then appealed to CESTAT.
Tribunalβs finding: no valid reassessment without a speaking order
A central issue was the Customs departmentβs failure to issue a speaking order under Section 17(5) of the Customs Act, 1962.
Where Customs reassesses goods contrary to an importerβs self-assessment on classification or value, the proper officer must issue a reasoned order within 15 days unless the importer has expressly accepted the reassessment in writing. In this case, the Tribunal found that no such order had been issued.
The Tribunal rejected the Revenueβs argument that payment of the revised duty amounted to acceptance. It noted that J.B. Pen Mart had paid under protest, sought to avoid port-related charges, and subsequently challenged the reassessment. These facts showed that the importer had not accepted the revised classification or enhanced value.
As a result, the Tribunal held that the reassessment was unsustainable for breach of statutory procedure and principles of natural justice.
Why CTH 8438 was preferred over CTH 8418
The Tribunal also found that the Departmentβs own past treatment of comparable machinery supported classification under CTH 8438.
The record showed a consistent history of orders and assessments treating similar ice-cream making equipment as machinery for food preparation under CTH 8438, including:
A 2008 departmental review stating that ice-cream candy making machinery was classifiable under CTH 8438.
A 2012 Order-in-Appeal that classified an integrated ice-cream production system under CTH 8438 80 90.
The 2018 appellate order in J.B. Pen Martβs own matter.
A 2025 Order-in-Appeal involving the same importer, which again held that complete ice-cream making and ice-cube machines belonged under CTH 8438 80 90.
A subsequent October 2018 clearance of identical goods for J.B. Pen Mart under CTH 8438.
The Tribunal distinguished complete machinery used to prepare and dispense edible products from ordinary refrigeration equipment. While Heading 8418 covers refrigerators, freezers, and similar cooling equipment, the imported machines were designed for the production of ice cream and ice cubes as food products. Their principal function was food preparation, making CTH 8438 the more appropriate heading.
Inconsistent departmental practice benefited the importer
CESTAT observed that Customs had taken divergent positions over the years, classifying similar goods under CTH 8438 in 2008, 2012, 2018, and 2025, while seeking classification under CTH 8418 for the disputed 2017β2018 imports.
The Tribunal held that Revenue could not selectively classify identical or similar goods under different tariff headings without cogent reasoning. Because the Department itself had created uncertainty through inconsistent practice, the benefit of that confusion had to go to the importer.
The Tribunal also noted that prior appellate orders supporting CTH 8438 had not been effectively challenged or stayed by the Department. Those orders therefore continued to carry weight in determining the correct classification.
Value enhancement was set aside
The Tribunal upheld the Commissioner (Appeals)β decision to reject the enhanced import values. Customs had not provided evidence showing why the transaction values declared by J.B. Pen Mart should be rejected, nor had it disclosed a lawful method for determining the enhanced values.
The order emphasizes that transaction value cannot be discarded merely on assumption or routine assessment practice. Customs must first establish legally valid grounds under the Customs Valuation Rules, 2007. Comparable-import data, if relied upon, must be supported by evidence regarding quality, quantity, country of origin, and timing of imports.
In this case, there was no evidence that the invoices were unreliable, that the buyer and seller were related, or that any amount over the invoice price had been paid. The failure to issue a Section 17(5) speaking order independently made the value enhancement invalid.
Key takeaways from the decision
Classification must reflect the machineβs principal function. Complete machinery designed for making ice cream and ice cubes as edible products may fall under CTH 8438 as food-preparation machinery rather than under CTH 8418 as cooling equipment.
A speaking order is mandatory for disputed reassessments. Customs must issue a reasoned order under Section 17(5) when it changes declared classification or value without the importerβs written acceptance.
Payment to avoid demurrage is not acceptance. An importerβs payment of additional duty, particularly under protest, does not eliminate its right to challenge reassessment.
Declared value needs evidence to be rejected. Customs cannot enhance value without lawful reasons, supporting evidence, and compliance with the Customs Valuation Rules.
Consistency in assessments matters. When the Department has repeatedly accepted a particular classification for similar goods, it must provide strong reasons and follow due process before departing from that position.
CESTAT Kolkata therefore dismissed the Revenueβs appeals and confirmed the relief granted to J.B. Pen Mart: classification under CTH 8438 and assessment at the importerβs declared values.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 28.10.2026
Supreme Court: Mere Allegations of Drug Trafficking Financing Cannot Establish Guilt Under Section 27A NDPS Act
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
The Supreme Court of India set aside Mohammed Fasrinβs conviction under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), holding that the prosecution failed to produce reliable, corroborated evidence linking him to the alleged heroin-trafficking operation.
Background of the case
On 4 January 2003, narcotics officers received information that 7.4 kg of heroin was being transported in a Toyota Qualis parked near Tamil Nadu Hotel on the MaduraiβAlagar Koil Road. Officers intercepted the vehicle and recovered seven packets of heroin concealed in a false compartment beneath the front seat.
Several people found in the vehicle were prosecuted and convicted. Mohammed Fasrin, however, was not found in the vehicle and the prosecutionβs case against him rested primarily on two alleged confessional statements:
A statement by a co-accused, Hasan Mohamed (A-2)
Fasrinβs own statement, recorded after his arrest
The trial court convicted Fasrin for offences including financing illicit trafficking and involvement in drug-related export or import activity. The Madras High Court upheld that decision. He was sentenced to 15 yearsβ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,50,000.
What the prosecution alleged
The prosecution alleged that Fasrin was connected to an international heroin-smuggling arrangement. According to the co-accusedβs statement, an individual named βMohammedβ from Bombay had arranged the movement of the heroin. The co-accused was allegedly told that the drugs would be transferred through another person, Nalliappan, and eventually handed to Fasrin.
This account did not establish a direct connection between Fasrin and the recovered heroin. The alleged chain depended on statements attributed to people who were not examined during the trial.
Why the Supreme Court overturned the conviction
No direct or corroborative evidence
The Court found that there was virtually no independent evidence showing that Fasrin financed, possessed, transported, imported, exported, or otherwise participated in the narcotics operation.
Neither the alleged Bombay-based Mohammed nor Nalliappan was examined as a witness or made an accused in the case. Their absence left a critical gap in the prosecutionβs account of how the heroin was supposedly meant to reach Fasrin.
A co-accusedβs confession was insufficient
The Court described a co-accusedβs confession as a weak form of evidence that must be supported by independent material. Such a statement may provide investigators with a lead, but it cannot by itself prove another personβs guilt.
Here, the co-accusedβs statement was also substantially hearsay: it merely alleged that another person had said the heroin would eventually be handed to Fasrin. The prosecution did not produce evidence to verify that assertion.
Fasrinβs alleged confession required scrutiny and support
Fasrinβs own alleged confession was recorded after he had been arrested. The Court proceeded on the assumption that the statement could be admissible, without deciding the wider legal question concerning confessions recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act.
Even on that assumption, the Court held that the prosecution had not shown that the statement was voluntary, free from pressure, and recorded after Fasrin had been informed of his rights. A custodial confession is weak evidence unless supported by reliable corroboration. No such corroboration was available.
The legal significance of the ruling
The decision reinforces that serious NDPS allegations do not lower the prosecutionβs burden of proof. Convictions for financing illicit drug trafficking under Section 27A require evidence that the accused directly or indirectly financed prohibited activities, or harboured people involved in them.
The Courtβs reasoning highlights three safeguards:
Confessional statements need careful evaluation, particularly where they are made in custody.
A co-accusedβs statement cannot substitute for independent proof against another accused person.
Missing links in the prosecutionβs narrative matter, especially when key intermediaries are neither examined nor prosecuted.
Outcome
The Supreme Court allowed Fasrinβs appeal, set aside the decisions of the trial court and the Madras High Court, and discharged his bail bonds. The ruling makes clear that suspicion and uncorroborated confessions cannot sustain a conviction where the prosecution fails to establish a credible evidentiary link between the accused and the alleged narcotics offence.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 27.10.2026
CESTAT Allahabad: Customs Cannot Bypass Mandatory Valuation Rules Through Importer’s Consent Letter
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
The CESTAT Allahabad held that an importerβs written acceptance of an enhanced customs value does not remove its statutory right to challenge that reassessment, particularly where Customs has not properly disclosed the grounds and evidence for rejecting the declared transaction value.
Case at a glance
In Final Order Nos. 70472-70474/2026, decided on 16 October 2026, the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), Allahabad, allowed three connected appeals filed by Artex Overseas Pvt. Ltd. and Artex Textile Pvt. Ltd. against the Principal Commissioner of Customs, ICD Dadri.
The dispute concerned imports of polyester knitted fabric from China. Customs had enhanced the declared unit values of the consignments based on alleged contemporaneous import data. The Commissioner (Appeals) rejected the importersβ challenges primarily because they had signed written letters accepting the enhanced values at the time of clearance.
CESTAT set aside those appellate orders and granted consequential relief in accordance with law.
Background: declared values were substantially enhanced
The importers had declared negotiated invoice values for polyester knitted fabric. Customs enhanced those values as follows:
Artex Overseas Pvt. Ltd.: declared value of USD 1.00 per kg enhanced to USD 1.77 per kg for three Bills of Entry dated 20 and 24 May 2019.
Artex Textile Pvt. Ltd.: declared value of USD 1.05 per kg enhanced to USD 1.85 per kg for Bills of Entry dated 31 March 2020 and 7 April 2020.
The goods were found to conform to the declarations on examination. However, Customs raised concerns after comparing the consignments with contemporaneous import data and sought more detailed information on the fabric, including composition and dimensions.
The department then treated the declared values as liable for rejection under Rule 12 of the Customs Valuation Rules, 2007, and reassessed the goods at higher values.
Importersβ case: acceptance was compelled and lacked legal foundation
Artex Overseas and Artex Textile argued that they had correctly self-assessed duty on the basis of their invoices and negotiated purchase prices. They maintained that the department did not issue out-of-charge orders and did not act on their requests for provisional assessment.
According to the importers, they paid duty at the enhanced values under protest to prevent clearance delays and were effectively compelled to issue letters of consent. They repeatedly sought speaking orders explaining the reassessment, but none were issued.
Their principal legal arguments were:
A written acceptance of enhancement does not bar an importer from filing an appeal.
Customs must follow Section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962 and the valuation process prescribed by the Customs Valuation Rules, 2007.
Rule 12 requires the proper officer to form a reasonable doubt about the truth or accuracy of the declared value and, when required, communicate the grounds in writing.
A generic reference to contemporaneous import data is insufficient; Customs must provide material showing genuine comparability, including relevant factors such as quantity, quality, GSM, commercial level and timing of the transaction.
Mere reliance on NIDB or external import data cannot, without independent and cogent supporting evidence, justify rejection of the declared transaction value.
Departmentβs position: written consent eliminated the need for a speaking order
The department relied on the importersβ acceptance letters. It argued that the letters recorded that the importers had been informed of the grounds for rejecting their declared values, had seen data relating to similar or identical imports, and had agreed to the enhanced values without seeking a show-cause notice or speaking order.
On that basis, the department contended that Section 17(5) of the Customs Act relieved Customs of the obligation to issue a speaking order once reassessment was accepted in writing.
Tribunalβs findings: waiver is limited to the speaking order, not the right to appeal
The Tribunal found that the Commissioner (Appeals) had focused too narrowly on the acceptance letters and had not applied the full legal principles governing customs valuation.
CESTAT relied on the Supreme Courtβs ruling in Century Metal Recycling Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, which confirms that Rule 12(2) cannot be bypassed or waived. The proper officer must form a reasoned view that there is doubt about the declared value and communicate the grounds for that doubt to the importer when required.
The Tribunal also followed the Delhi High Courtβs decision in Niraj Silk Mills v. Commissioner of Customs, which clarified that:
Written acceptance under Section 17(5) may waive the procedural requirement for a speaking order.
It does not waive or extinguish the importerβs statutory right to challenge the reassessment.
A reassessment based only on NIDB data is not sustainable unless supported by independent, cogent evidence and a reasoned justification for departing from the declared value.
The Tribunal noted that the acceptance letters did not themselves disclose the alleged contemporaneous-import details on which Customs relied.
The revenue authorities had therefore failed to bridge the gap between a standard-form acceptance and the evidentiary basis required to lawfully reject transaction value.
Decision and practical significance
CESTAT held that the case was squarely governed by the Delhi High Courtβs ruling in Niraj Silk Mills. It therefore set aside all three Orders-in-Appeal and allowed the appeals of Artex Overseas Pvt. Ltd. and Artex Textile Pvt. Ltd., with consequential relief as permitted by law.
The ruling reinforces an important safeguard in customs valuation: an importerβs consent to clearance at an enhanced value cannot be treated as a blanket surrender of its right to contest an unlawful reassessment. Customs must still demonstrate, through disclosed and relevant material, why the declared transaction value should be rejected and why the substituted value is legally supportable.
For importers, the decision underscores that consent letters signed to secure release of detained goods do not necessarily end the valuation dispute.
For Customs authorities, it emphasizes the need for transparent, evidence-based valuation orders rather than reassessments founded solely on generic references to database values or contemporaneous imports.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 27.10.2026
Supreme Court: Being a B.Tech Graduate Does Not Entitle an NDPS Accused to Bail
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
The Supreme Court of India cancelled the bail granted to Prateek Shukla, holding that the Allahabad High Court had not properly applied the stringent bail standards required under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act).
Background of the case
The case arose from an investigation by the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) into suspected diversion of acetic anhydride, a controlled substance that can be used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs. In October 2018, the NCB received information that Altruist Chemicals Private Limited had purchased a substantial quantity of acetic anhydride but had not filed the required quarterly returns for two reporting periods.
During searches connected with the company, the NCB alleged that it recovered 896 grams of acetic anhydride and 1.885 kg of amphetamine from the companyβs registered premises. Investigators also found documents relating to Griffin International, of which Prateek Shukla and Afghan national Bismillah Khan Ahmadzai were stated to be directors.
The investigation subsequently extended to a godown in Karheda village, Ghaziabad, where the NCB alleged that it recovered 9,650 kg of acetic anhydride along with empty drums. A search of Shuklaβs residence allegedly yielded company stamps, banking documents, business papers and other material said to connect multiple entities and co-accused persons.
Allegations and prosecution case
The NCBβs complaint alleged that the accused were part of an international drug syndicate involved in the diversion, storage, sale, purchase and export of the controlled substance. Shukla was arrested on 22 October 2018 and was charged under Sections 8, 9A, 25A, 23 and 29 of the NDPS Act.
The prosecution argued that the material recovered during the investigation established a prima facie connection between Shukla and the alleged conspiracy. It also contended that, given the gravity of NDPS offences, the High Court had granted bail without adequate reasons or proper consideration of the statutory restrictions in Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
Defence raised by the respondent
Shukla maintained that he had resigned as a director of Altruist Chemicals on 4 May 2018, after joining the company earlier that year. He argued that the relevant purchases and deliveries of acetic anhydride took place after his resignation and that he had informed the NCB of his departure from the company on 22 May 2018.
He further contended that he could not be held responsible for the companyβs later failure to submit quarterly returns. The High Court accepted his bail plea, observing prima facie that he may not be guilty, while also referring to his clean background and educational qualification.
Why the Supreme Court intervened
The Supreme Court found that the High Courtβs reasoning did not demonstrate judicial consideration of the seriousness of the allegations or the legal test governing bail under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It emphasized that merely noting the partiesβ submissions is not enough; a bail order must show a reasoned application of the statutory standards.
The Court specifically criticized the High Courtβs reliance on Shukla being educated and holding a Bachelor of Technology degree as a reason to conclude that he was unlikely to commit an offence in the future. It held that this was an extraneous consideration in an NDPS bail decision.
The Supreme Court also noted that the prosecutionβs materials showed Shukla as a director of Altruist Chemicals, while his own bail application referred to transferring 99% of his shareholding to Bismillah Khan Ahmadzai. The Court observed that the respondentβs materials appeared to suppress more than they disclosed, though it did not decide the criminal charges at this stage.
Supreme Courtβs decision
Allowing the Union of Indiaβs appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the Allahabad High Courtβs order dated 7 May 2019. Shuklaβs bail was cancelled, and he was directed to surrender immediately.
Legal significance
The ruling underscores that bail in serious NDPS cases cannot rest on general observations about an accused personβs education, background or future conduct. Courts must apply the specific statutory safeguards under Section 37 and give reasons that engage with the allegations, the evidence and the gravity of the offence.
The decision reinforces the Supreme Courtβs expectation that bail orders in narcotics cases reflect a careful and legally grounded assessment rather than a cursory evaluation.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.