Tag: #LegalUpdates

  • CESTAT Chandigarh Upholds EPCG Exemption for Rolling Mill Spools

    CESTAT Chandigarh Upholds EPCG Exemption for Rolling Mill Spools

    Date: 11.11.2026

    The Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), Chandigarh, has held that an importer’s EPCG exemption cannot be refused merely because Customs adopts a tariff classification different from the one stated in the EPCG authorisation, where the imported goods qualify as capital goods under the Foreign Trade Policy.

    In Chiripal Poly-Films Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, Ludhiana, decided on 5 November 2026, the Tribunal set aside a duty demand of Rs. 3.07 crore, an equivalent penalty, and a Rs. 50 lakh redemption fine relating to the import of spools used in a rolling mill.

    Background of the dispute

    Chiripal Poly-Films Ltd. imported 60 spools for use in its rolling mill under an EPCG authorisation. The company declared the goods under Customs Tariff Heading (CTH) 8455 9000 as parts of rolling mills and claimed exemption under Notification No. 26/2023-Cus.

    Customs disagreed with that classification. The department maintained that, because the goods were made of steel, they should fall under CTH 7326 9099, a residual heading for other articles of iron or steel. Since this tariff heading was not specified in the EPCG authorisation, Customs denied the exemption.

    The department consequently alleged misdeclaration and misclassification, seized the goods, and issued a demand for differential duty of Rs. 3,07,21,816. It also imposed an equal penalty under Section 114A of the Customs Act and a redemption fine of Rs. 50 lakh.

    The importer’s case: functional use determines capital-goods status

    The importer argued that the spools were tailor-made for its rolling mill and were essential to the production of aluminium foil. Its central submission was that eligibility under the EPCG scheme turns on whether an item is a capital good used in manufacturing, rather than on a disputed tariff heading.

    The company relied on the Foreign Trade Policy’s definition of β€œcapital goods,” which covers plant, machinery, equipment and accessories required directly or indirectly for manufacturing or production. It also pointed out that:

    • the goods were specifically described as β€œspools for rolling mill” in both the EPCG authorisation and the Bill of Entry;
    • the spools were not listed among restricted or non-permissible capital goods in Appendix 5F; and
    • the Customs exemption notification adopts the Foreign Trade Policy definition of capital goods.

    On classification, the importer submitted that heading 8455, covering rolling mills and their parts, was more specific than heading 7326. It also argued that the exclusion for ordinary spools or similar supports should not cover specialised machine components integral to a rolling mill.

    Customs’ position: authorisation must match the declared tariff heading

    Customs argued that the EPCG authorisation was valid only for the tariff classification mentioned in it. According to the department, the correct heading was CTH 7326 9099, not CTH 8455 9000, and the mismatch made the exemption unavailable.

    The department also relied on the exclusion in Section Note 1(c) of Section XVI of the Customs Tariff, which excludes bobbins, spools, cops, cones, cores, reels and similar supports from that section. On this basis, it claimed that the importer knowingly used an incorrect classification and had thereby attempted to obtain EPCG benefits unlawfully.

    Tribunal’s ruling: Customs could not override the EPCG authorisation without DGFT action

    The Tribunal held that the key issue was not the classification dispute but whether the imported spools met the definition of capital goods under the Foreign Trade Policy.

    It found that the EPCG scheme permits duty-free import of capital goods for pre-production, production and post-production. The policy defines capital goods broadly to include machinery, equipment and accessories required directly or indirectly for manufacturing. The Tribunal noted that the imported spools were authorised by the Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) as capital goods and were not barred under Appendix 5F.

    Significantly, the Tribunal observed that the Customs Act does not contain a separate definition of capital goods for this purpose. The exemption notification itself refers back to the Foreign Trade Policy definition. Therefore, Customs could not reject the capital-goods character of the imported items only because it preferred a different tariff heading.

    The Tribunal stated that, if Customs intended to deny the benefit on this basis, it should have sought clarification from the DGFT or pursued modification, rectification or annulment of the EPCG authorisation. Customs had done none of these things.

    Classification issue left open

    The Tribunal also found merit in the importer’s argument that the Section XVI exclusion for spools should apply to articles that merely support material, not specialised parts essential to machinery used in manufacture.

    It further noted that heading 7326 is a residual heading for iron or steel articles not more specifically covered elsewhere. Customs had not established that the imported spools were simply manufactured articles of the kind contemplated by that heading, while the importer’s assertion that they were technically sophisticated rolling-mill components remained unrebutted.

    However, the Tribunal did not finally decide the classification question. It held that, once the EPCG exemption was available regardless of the classification dispute, a determination of the correct tariff heading was unnecessary.

    Demand, penalty and fine set aside

    Because the exemption remained available, the Tribunal held that the allegation of intentional misdeclaration could not survive. It therefore set aside:

    • the differential duty demand of Rs. 3,07,21,816;
    • the equivalent penalty under Section 114A; and
    • the redemption fine of Rs. 50,00,000.

    The appeal was allowed in full.

    Key legal takeaway

    The decision reinforces that, for EPCG imports, the functional test under the Foreign Trade Policy is decisive: goods authorised by the DGFT as capital goods cannot lose exemption solely because Customs later adopts another tariff classification. Unless the authorisation is clarified, amended or annulled by the competent DGFT authority, Customs cannot independently disregard its treatment of the goods as eligible capital goods.

    This ruling provides important protection to EPCG importers facing classification disputes, particularly where specialised industrial components are essential to manufacturing operations but may be described differently under the Customs Tariff.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • NDPS Bail Granted as Delhi High Court Finds Arrest Vitiated Under Article 22(1)

    NDPS Bail Granted as Delhi High Court Finds Arrest Vitiated Under Article 22(1)

    Date: 11.11.2026

    The Delhi High Court granted regular bail to the Petitioner in a commercial-quantity charas case, holding that the admitted failure to provide written grounds of arrest violated Article 22(1) of the Constitution and vitiated the arrest.

    The order, passed on 3 November 2026 by Justice, concerns FIR No. 266/2023 registered at the Special Cell, Trans Yamuna Range, Delhi, for alleged offences under Sections 20, 25 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act).

    Allegations in the FIR

    According to the prosecution, police received secret information on 19 October 2023 regarding an inter-state drug syndicate allegedly smuggling contraband from Nepal for supply in Delhi, the National Capital Region and other major cities.

    The information alleged that the Petitioner would arrive near Paper Market, Gazipur, Delhi, in a Maruti Suzuki Swift to deliver a consignment of contraband. A raid was conducted, and the Petitioner was apprehended. The prosecution alleged recovery of 15 sealed packets containing a total of 32.230 kg of charas from the vehicle.

    The investigation later led to the apprehension of two other accused persons. Police alleged recovery of 29.055 kg of charas and Rs. 1.68 lakh from one co-accused, and 1.438 kg of charas from another. The connected sessions case was pending before the Special NDPS Court at Patiala House, at the prosecution-evidence stage.

    The decisive issue: no grounds of arrest supplied

    Although the alleged recovery from the Petitioner was commercial quantity, the High Court found that the central issue was the non-supply of grounds of arrest.

    The prosecution conceded that no grounds of arrest had been provided to the Petitioner. The Court held that this was inconsistent with Article 22(1) of the Constitution, which requires an arrested person to be informed, as soon as possible, of the grounds for arrest.

    The Court emphasized that this is a substantive constitutional protection, not a procedural technicality. An accused must receive meaningful information about the basis of arrest so that they can obtain legal assistance and effectively seek remedies, including bail.

    Why the date of arrest was crucial

    The Petitioner was arrested on 19 October 2023. This was after the Supreme Court’s decision in Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, delivered on 3 October 2023.

    In Pankaj Bansal, the Supreme Court held that written grounds of arrest must be supplied to an arrested person as a matter of course. The Court explained that merely orally reading out the grounds may not provide an arrested person with a practical or reliable opportunity to understand the allegations, consult counsel and pursue legal remedies.

    The Delhi High Court also relied on Ram Kishor Arora v. Directorate of Enforcement, where the Supreme Court clarified that the written-grounds requirement applies prospectively from the date of the Pankaj Bansal ruling. Since the Petitioner’s arrest took place after 3 October 2023, the Court concluded that the investigating agency was required to provide the grounds of arrest.

    State’s objection rejected

    The State argued that the benefit of non-supply of grounds of arrest should apply only from 6 November 2025, the date of the Supreme Court’s judgment in Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra.

    The High Court did not accept this submission. It distinguished Mihir Rajesh Shah as a decision addressing arrests under the general criminal-law framework, including the IPC/BNS and CrPC/BNSS. By contrast, Pankaj Bansal and Ram Kishor Arora concerned special statutes.

    Because the present prosecution arose under the NDPS Act, itself a special statute, the Court held that the principles in Pankaj Bansal and Ram Kishor Arora governed the case.

    Article 22(1) prevails over strict NDPS bail conditions

    The alleged recovery was commercial quantity, so Section 37 of the NDPS Act ordinarily imposed strict conditions for grant of bail. Under that provision, the court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty and unlikely to commit an offence while on bail.

    However, the High Court held that Section 37 cannot eclipse a fundamental constitutional guarantee. Where the grounds of arrest were not supplied, the arrest was vitiated by a direct breach of Article 22(1). The Court therefore treated the constitutional infirmity as taking precedence over the ordinary rigours of the NDPS bail regime.

    The Court also noted that a co-accused, from whom 29.055 kg of charas was allegedly recovered, had already received bail on the same ground. This supported the Petitioner’s claim for parity.

    Bail conditions imposed by the Court

    The Petitioner was directed to be released on a personal bond of Rs. 1 lakh with one surety of the same amount, subject to the satisfaction of the Special Court or Duty Magistrate. The Court also imposed these conditions:

    • The Petitioner must report to the concerned Investigating Officer or Station House Officer at the Special Cell, Trans Yamuna Range, once every month during the first week of the month, unless exempted by the Special Court.
    • The Petitioner must attend every hearing before the Special Court.
    • The Petitioner must ordinarily reside at the address recorded in prison records and inform the investigating agency before changing that address.
    • The Petitioner must provide an active mobile number to the police and cannot change the number or switch off the phone without prior intimation.
    • The Petitioner must not contact, threaten, induce or promise anything to prosecution witnesses or other persons acquainted with the facts of the case.
    • The Petitioner must not tamper with evidence or act in a manner that prejudices the ongoing trial.
    • The Petitioner must not commit any offence while proceedings remain pending.

    Legal significance of the ruling

    This decision reinforces that compliance with arrest safeguards is essential even in serious NDPS prosecutions involving commercial quantities of contraband. It confirms that, for arrests under special statutes after 3 October 2023, failure to provide written grounds of arrest can render the arrest and subsequent remand legally defective.

    The ruling further establishes that the stringent bail framework under Section 37 of the NDPS Act does not override Article 22(1). Constitutional protections remain enforceable even where the allegations involve large alleged recoveries and serious narcotics offences.

    The High Court clarified that its observations were limited to deciding the bail application and would not influence the merits of the pending trial.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Punjab and Haryana High Court Allows Bail in Drug Case Involving Alleged Firearm Recovery

    Punjab and Haryana High Court Allows Bail in Drug Case Involving Alleged Firearm Recovery

    Date: 10.11.2026

    The Punjab and Haryana High Court has granted regular bail to the petitioner in a case involving alleged recovery of heroin, a pistol, and live cartridges from a co-accused, noting that no recovery was made from the petitioner herself.

    Case background

    The petition concerned FIR No. 64 dated 1 April 2026, registered at Dinanagar Police Station, District Gurdaspur. The FIR invoked Sections 21(c) and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, along with Sections 25 and 29 of the Arms Act.

    According to the prosecution, a police team led by ASI Ramesh Kumar was patrolling near village Gandhian in the early hours of 1 April 2026 when it saw co-accused Gurwinder Singh, alias Gindu, approaching on foot. The prosecution alleged that, on noticing the police party, he attempted to move towards a dirt path but was apprehended.

    The police alleged that a black waxen or plastic envelope containing heroin was recovered from him. The recovered substance, including the envelope, was recorded as weighing 260 grams. During a further search, police also alleged recovery of a pistol, a magazine, and five live cartridges from the pocket of his track pants. The co-accused was unable to produce a licence or other authority for possession of the firearm and ammunition, according to the order.

    How the petitioner was implicated

    The petitioner was not arrested at the place of the alleged recovery. She was subsequently named during the investigation on the basis of an alleged disclosure statement made by the co-accused. She was arrested on 28 April 2026.

    The prosecution treated the alleged 260 grams of heroin as a commercial quantity and opposed regular bail under the stricter provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It argued that the petitioner had been specifically implicated during the investigation and that the allegations were serious.

    Petitioner’s case for bail

    Counsel for the petitioner argued that she had been falsely implicated and that no heroin, firearm, or ammunition had been recovered from her. The defence maintained that the alleged recovery was exclusively from the co-accused and that the petitioner’s nomination depended only on his disclosure statement.

    The petitioner also relied on the following circumstances:

    • No direct recovery: The alleged 260 grams of heroin, pistol, and five live cartridges were recovered from the co-accused, not the petitioner.
    • Quantity dispute: The stated weight included the packaging material, while the actual net quantity of heroin had not been established.
    • Parity with co-accused: Another co-accused, Victoria, against whom similar allegations were made and from whom no recovery was effected, had already been granted regular bail.
    • Custody and family circumstances: The petitioner had been in custody since 28 April 2026 and is a woman with two minor children.
    • Investigation status: The investigation was substantially complete and no additional recovery was required from the petitioner.

    Court’s observations

    Justice Virinder Aggarwal noted that the alleged heroin, firearm, and ammunition had been recovered from the co-accused, while no recovery had been effected from the petitioner. The Court further recorded that the petitioner was subsequently nominated on the basis of the co-accused’s disclosure statement.

    The Court held that the evidentiary value of the disclosure statement, as well as the issue of the actual net quantity of contraband after excluding the packaging material, would need to be examined during trial. These issues were not finally decided at the bail stage.

    The Court also considered that the petitioner had remained in custody since 28 April 2026, the investigation was complete, she had two minor children, and a similarly placed co-accused had already received regular bail. In these circumstances, the Court concluded that keeping the petitioner in custody for an indefinite period would serve no useful purpose.

    Bail granted subject to conditions

    The High Court allowed the petition and directed that the petitioner be released on regular bail upon furnishing bail and surety bonds to the satisfaction of the concerned Magistrate. The release is subject to strict conditions, including:

    1. The petitioner must not threaten, induce, or promise anything to any person connected with the case in order to prevent disclosure of facts before the Court or investigating agency.
    2. She must not tamper with prosecution evidence or contact, influence, intimidate, or interfere with any prosecution witness.
    3. She cannot leave India without prior permission of the trial court. If she possesses a passport, its details must be furnished to the investigating officer and trial court.
    4. She must provide permanent and current correspondence addresses, supported by documentary proof. The investigating officer must verify the addresses within 48 hours of acceptance of bail bonds.
    5. She must disclose her PAN, Aadhaar number, operative bank-account details, and immovable-property details, if any. Concealment or false information may be grounds for cancellation of bail.
    6. Any change in residential address or mobile number must be notified in writing to the investigating officer and trial court within seven days.
    7. She must not commit a similar offence while the trial is pending and must attend every hearing unless exempted by law. Breach of the conditions or unauthorized absence may lead to cancellation of bail and issuance of coercive process, including arrest warrants.

    Significance of the order

    The order does not decide whether the petitioner is guilty or innocent. It determines only that, based on the material available at the bail stage, conditional release was appropriate. The absence of any recovery from the petitioner, reliance on a co-accused’s alleged disclosure statement, the unresolved issue of net contraband quantity, and bail granted to a similarly situated co-accused were central to the Court’s decision.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Delhi HC-Geographical Names Are Not an Automatic Bar to Trademark Registration

    Delhi HC-Geographical Names Are Not an Automatic Bar to Trademark Registration

    Date: 10.11.2026

    The Delhi High Court has held that a trademark containing a geographical term, the word β€œBank,” and a slogan cannot be refused registration through a blanket finding that it is descriptive or non-distinctive.

    The dispute

    Dubai Islamic Bank challenged the refusal of its application to register the composite mark β€œDUBAI ISLAMIC BANK – THE BETTER WAY TO BANK.” The Trade Marks Registry had rejected the application under Section 9 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, reasoning that β€œDubai” indicated geographical origin and that the mark was descriptive in nature.

    The Registry also noted that the mark was proposed to be used in India and concluded that the applicant could not rely on acquired reputation through use to overcome the objection.

    What the Court found

    Justice Prathiba M. Singh set aside the refusal, finding that the Registry’s approach was overly general and did not properly assess the mark as a whole.

    The Court emphasized that Section 9 does not impose an automatic bar merely because a mark includes:

    • a geographical reference;
    • descriptive or customary language;
    • the name of a service, such as β€œBank”; or
    • a slogan or tagline.

    Instead, registrability requires a fact-specific assessment of whether the mark, viewed in its complete commercial form, can distinguish one trader’s services from another’s.

    A composite mark must be assessed as a whole

    A central feature of the ruling is the Court’s recognition that the applied-for mark was not limited to the words β€œDubai” and β€œBank.” It also included the expression β€œThe Better Way to Bank.” The Registry had failed to account for this composite structure.

    The Court observed that banks commonly use marks combining a geographic term, the word β€œBank,” and a slogan. The presence of β€œBank” is ordinarily expected for banking services and, by itself, does not establish that the entire mark is inherently non-distinctive. Similarly, use of a location name does not automatically make a mark incapable of registration.

    How distinctiveness should be evaluated

    The judgment explains that distinctiveness under Section 9 is broad and contextual. A mark may be assessed by considering factors such as:

    • the nature and overall character of the mark;
    • the extent and duration of use;
    • priority in adoption internationally;
    • well-known status;
    • advertising and promotional investment;
    • judicial decisions recognizing distinctiveness;
    • reputation in the relevant market;
    • the mark’s composite elements; and
    • the relevant customer base.

    The Court noted that descriptive marks may become registrable when they acquire a secondary meaning. A geographical name can also be registered where distinctiveness is established. Likewise, slogans and taglines are capable of functioning as trademarks.

    Foreign registrations and comparable Indian registrations matter

    Dubai Islamic Bank had pointed to registrations of other banks whose names included geographical references. It also relied on its registrations in numerous countries. The Court held that these materials were relevant and should have been considered rather than disregarded through a formulaic application of the refusal provisions.

    The decision does not mean that every geographically suggestive bank name must be registered. Rather, it requires the Trade Marks Registry to evaluate the evidence and the mark’s full composition before deciding whether registration should be granted.

    Outcome of the case

    The Court allowed the writ petition, set aside the refusal order dated 26 March 2019, and remanded the matter to the Registrar of Trade Marks for fresh consideration.

    On reconsideration, the Registrar was directed to examine:

    • comparable bank marks registered in India that use β€œBank” and geographic references;
    • Dubai Islamic Bank’s global trademark registrations;
    • the registrability of slogans and taglines; and
    • any further material or judicial precedents presented by the applicant at a hearing.

    Why the ruling is significant

    The decision reinforces that trademark examination must be based on the complete mark and the evidence surrounding it, not on isolated words alone. For businesses in regulated or descriptive service sectors, the ruling is particularly relevant: a name that includes a geographic reference or an industry term may still be registrable when its overall presentation has, or is capable of acquiring, distinctive character.

    The key principle is clear: geographic and descriptive elements are relevant to trademark analysis, but they are not automatic grounds for refusing a composite trademark application.

    Connected Matter

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • CESTAT Mumbai Clarifies Customs Classification of Brown Rice Protein Powder

    CESTAT Mumbai Clarifies Customs Classification of Brown Rice Protein Powder

    Date: 10.11.2026

    The Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), Mumbai has ruled that Brown Rice Protein Powder is classifiable as an β€œother protein substance” under Customs Tariff Item (CTI) 3504 0099, not as a protein concentrate under CTI 2106 1000. The decision overturned a differential-duty demand of β‚Ή85.28 lakh, equivalent penalty, and β‚Ή10 lakh redemption fine imposed on Unibourne Food Ingredients.

    Case at a glance

    Unibourne Food Ingredients imported Brown Rice Protein Powder between September 2022 and June 2024. It declared the goods under CTI 3504 0099 and paid basic customs duty at 20%.

    Customs authorities later contended that the product should instead fall under CTI 2106 1000, covering β€œprotein concentrates and textured protein substances,” which attracted 40% basic customs duty. On that basis, the department demanded β‚Ή85,28,035 in differential duty, along with interest, an equivalent penalty under Section 114A of the Customs Act, confiscation under Section 111(m), and a β‚Ή10 lakh redemption fine.

    CESTAT set aside the entire order and allowed the importer’s appeal with consequential relief under law.

    The central dispute: Which tariff heading applies?

    The competing tariff entries had materially different descriptions and duty consequences:

    • CTI 3504 0099: β€œOther protein substances and their derivatives” β€” duty rate of 20%.
    • CTI 2106 1000: β€œProtein concentrates and textured protein substances” β€” duty rate of 40%.

    The imported product was Brown Rice Protein Powder with approximately 80% protein content. The Tribunal found that its composition and physical form were decisive: it was a cereal-protein powder, rather than a textured protein preparation.

    Why CESTAT preferred CTI 3504

    1. Cereal proteins are specifically covered under Heading 3504

    The Tribunal relied on the Harmonized System of Nomenclature (HSN) explanatory notes for Heading 3504. Those notes expressly include cereal proteins, particularly glutelins and prolamins, as β€œother protein substances.”

    Unibourne submitted a technical clarification from IIT Kharagpur stating that glutelins and prolamins are the principal protein classes in Brown Rice Protein Powder. IIT Kharagpur also characterized the product as an β€œother protein substance.”

    The Tribunal held that this expert material directly supported classification under Heading 3504.

    2. Customs did not technically rebut the expert evidence

    The adjudicating authority had discounted the IIT Kharagpur clarification as general in nature. CESTAT found that approach unsustainable because the department had neither conducted further testing nor produced a contrary technical opinion.

    The ruling reinforces an important evidentiary principle: where an importer relies on a relevant technical expert opinion, customs authorities cannot reject it on their own technical assumptions without a reasoned, evidence-based rebuttal or counter-expert material.

    3. Protein powder is not a β€œtextured” protein substance

    Heading 2106 covers, among other things, textured protein substances. The Tribunal noted that texture generally refers to products made into forms such as chunks, pellets, nuggets, granules, slices, strips, or dry flakes.

    Brown Rice Protein Powder was imported as a powder, not in a textured form. Accordingly, the Tribunal held that the department’s reliance on the reference to β€œother protein substances, textured” in the Heading 2106 explanatory note was misplaced.

    4. The 90% protein-content reference did not exclude classification under Heading 3504

    Customs had argued that the product could not fall under Heading 3504 because its protein content was approximately 80%, rather than 90% or more.

    CESTAT rejected this argument for two reasons:

    • The reference to protein content β€œgenerally not less than 90%” applies to protein isolates obtained through extraction from vegetable substances under a separate explanatory-note category.
    • The product before the Tribunal was covered as a cereal protein under the category for glutelins and prolamins, which does not prescribe a 90% threshold.

    The Tribunal also emphasized that the word β€œgenerally” describes a typical characteristic, not a mandatory legal condition.

    5. The more specific heading had to prevail

    Applying the General Rules for Interpretation of the Import Tariff, the Tribunal held that the heading specifically covering β€œother protein substances” was more appropriate than the more general food-preparation heading for protein concentrates and textured proteins.

    The Tribunal also observed that Customs incorrectly invoked the β€œmost akin” test under Rule 4. That rule applies only when classification cannot be resolved under the earlier rules. In this case, the Tribunal found that the product could be classified under Rule 3 based on the more specific description.

    Revenue carries the burden of proving reclassification

    The decision reiterates that when Customs seeks to displace the importer’s declared classification, the burden lies on Revenue to establish the alternative classification through cogent evidence.

    Here, the Tribunal found that the department had not produced sufficient technical material to prove that Brown Rice Protein Powder belonged under CTI 2106 1000. The departmental reliance on United States customs rulings did not cure that evidentiary gap.

    CESTAT noted that foreign customs rulings may, at most, have persuasive value and are not binding in Indian classification disputes. Their value was further weakened because the cited US rulings reflected divergent approaches at different times.

    Extended limitation period could not be invoked

    The Tribunal also struck down the use of the extended limitation period under Section 28(4) of the Customs Act.

    The importer had accurately described the goods as Brown Rice Protein Powder in its Bills of Entry, and the department had cleared the goods for home consumption without challenging the declared classification at the time. The tariff classification was therefore already within the department’s knowledge.

    CESTAT held that a genuine and legally complex classification dispute, based on competing tariff headings and HSN notes, does not by itself establish suppression, wilful misstatement, fraud, or intent to evade duty. Without those elements, extended limitation could not apply.

    No confiscation, redemption fine, or penalty for a classification dispute alone

    The Tribunal further held that a disputed tariff classification, without a false description or incorrect valuation of goods, does not amount to misdeclaration for confiscation purposes under Section 111(m).

    The goods were correctly described, and the case concerned only the tariff item selected by the importer in self-assessment. That classification is subject to verification and reassessment by customs officers; it is not, on its own, a false factual declaration.

    Because the Tribunal found no mala fide conduct and no valid basis for confiscation, it set aside:

    • the confiscation finding under Section 111(m);
    • the β‚Ή10 lakh redemption fine; and
    • the equivalent penalty imposed under Section 114A.

    The Tribunal also noted that the imported goods were not available for confiscation, providing an additional reason why redemption fine could not stand.

    Key implications for food-ingredient importers

    This ruling is particularly relevant to importers of plant-based proteins, cereal proteins, nutritional ingredients, and food-industry inputs.

    • Technical evidence matters: A credible, product-specific expert opinion can be central to classification, especially where the tariff treatment depends on composition, source material, or processing.
    • Product form matters: A protein powder should not automatically be treated as a textured protein substance merely because it is used in food applications.
    • HSN notes must be read in context: A protein-content benchmark associated with one subcategory cannot be mechanically applied to a different, specifically covered category.
    • Classification disagreements are not automatically misconduct: Accurate product description and transparent disclosure materially weaken allegations of suppression, misdeclaration, confiscation, and penalty.
    • Revenue must substantiate reclassification: Customs authorities must support an alternative tariff classification with reliable evidence rather than unsupported technical assumptions or non-binding foreign rulings.

    Outcome

    In Final Order No. 86363/2026, pronounced on 2 November 2026, CESTAT Mumbai set aside the order passed by the Principal Commissioner of Customs, Nhava Sheva. Brown Rice Protein Powder was held classifiable under CTI 3504 0099, preserving the 20% basic customs duty treatment claimed by the importer and eliminating the resulting duty demand, interest, fine, and penalty.

    The ruling provides a clear precedent that cereal-based protein powders supported by technical evidence should be assessed according to their specific tariff character, rather than broadly treated as higher-duty food preparations or textured protein concentrates.

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    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Unjust Enrichment Claim Fails: Delhi HC Upholds Micromax Refunds

    Unjust Enrichment Claim Fails: Delhi HC Upholds Micromax Refunds

    Date: 09.11.2026

    The Delhi High Court has ruled in favour of Micromax Informatics Limited, holding that it was entitled to receive refunds of Countervailing Duty (CVD) paid on imported mobile phones and parts because it proved that the duty burden had not been passed on to customers.

    In a judgment dated 27 October 2026, a Division Bench comprising Justice Avneesh Jhingan and Justice Shail Jain dismissed five connected appeals filed by the Principal Commissioner of Customs (ACC Import), New Delhi. The Court found no legal or factual error in the concurrent findings of the appellate authority and the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT).

    Background: Imports and the CVD dispute

    Micromax imported cellular phones and mobile-phone components during 2014–15. It filed self-assessed Bills of Entry for home consumption, treating the imports as subject to 0% Basic Customs Duty and 6% CVD.

    The dispute arose from an excise-duty exemption framework under Notification No. 12/2012-CE, as amended from time to time. The question of whether CVD could be levied on such imported goods was later settled by the Supreme Court in SRF Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, Chennai. The Supreme Court held that CVD was not payable on the relevant imports.

    Following that ruling, Micromax applied for refunds of the CVD it had paid.

    Why Customs initially withheld the refunds

    Although the Customs authorities accepted that CVD was not payable, they did not initially direct the refund amounts to Micromax. Instead, the adjudicating authority ordered that the refund, along with interest, be credited to the Consumer Welfare Fund under Section 27(2) of the Customs Act, 1962.

    This was based on the principle of unjust enrichment. Under customs law, a claimant generally cannot retain a duty refund if it has already recovered that duty from buyers. Section 28D creates a presumption that the duty incidence has been passed on to consumers unless the importer proves otherwise.

    The central issue before the Court was therefore not whether CVD had been wrongly collected. That was undisputed. The issue was whether Micromax had passed the CVD cost to its customers and, consequently, whether the refund belonged to Micromax or the Consumer Welfare Fund.

    Evidence submitted by Micromax

    Micromax challenged the original order before the Commissioner of Customs (Appeals). It relied on:

    • invoices for the relevant sales;
    • audited balance sheets for the financial years ending 31 March 2015 and 31 March 2016;
    • statutory audit material and accompanying notes; and
    • an independent chartered accountant’s certificate.

    The company’s evidence was intended to establish that CVD was not charged separately to customers, was not recovered through invoices, and remained recorded as an asset rather than being treated as an expense recovered from buyers.

    The appellate authority accepted this evidence and held that the original authority had wrongly ignored the independent chartered accountant’s certificate and the audited financial records. It directed that the sanctioned refund amounts, together with interest payable under law, be paid to Micromax.

    CESTAT upheld that decision on 26 September 2023.

    Customs Department’s arguments before the High Court

    The Customs Department argued that a chartered accountant’s certificate alone could not establish that the duty incidence had not been transferred to consumers. It also contended that Micromax had not shown the refund receivable in its balance sheets as on 31 March 2015 and 31 March 2016, which, according to the Department, supported the inference that CVD had already been passed on.

    The Department further submitted that stable or uniform product prices before and after the CVD payment period did not by itself prove that the duty burden had not been included in consumer prices.

    Court’s reasoning: Documentary evidence rebutted the presumption

    The High Court held that Micromax had successfully rebutted the statutory presumption under Section 28D. It noted that the company had produced invoices, complete balance sheets for the relevant financial years, and a chartered accountant’s certificate confirming that the CVD burden had not been passed on.

    Crucially, the Court accepted the finding that the invoices did not show recovery of CVD from buyers and did not reflect the duty as a charge passed through to customers. It also held that Micromax’s failure to claim the CVD payment as expenditure was not fatal to its refund claim; that fact did not prove that the company had shifted the burden to consumers.

    The Court further observed that the original authority’s rejection of the chartered accountant’s certificate was inconsistent with Board Circular No. 18/2010 dated 7 August 2010. The certificate was not a standalone document: it was supported by the company’s books of account and audited financial records.

    The Bench also referred to its earlier decision in Principal Commissioner of Customs (ACC Imports) v. Nokia India Sales Pvt. Ltd., where an independent chartered accountant’s certificate, read with supporting records, was recognised as valid evidence for establishing that a claimant had borne the duty burden.

    Refund amounts involved

    The five connected appeals concerned substantial sanctioned refunds across different periods in 2014–15. The sanctioned refund amounts alone totalled approximately Rs. 203.15 crore, apart from interest. The High Court’s ruling preserved the appellate direction that these sanctioned amounts be paid to Micromax, with interest as applicable under law.

    Some portions of the original refund claims had been rejected in certain matters. The High Court proceedings concerned the sanctioned refund components and the question of whether they should be paid to Micromax or transferred to the Consumer Welfare Fund.

    Final decision and legal significance

    The High Court dismissed CUSAA Nos. 34/2024, 36/2024, 38/2024, 41/2024 and 42/2024. It held that there was no substantial question of law and no perversity or error in the factual findings reached by the appellate authority and affirmed by CESTAT.

    The decision reinforces that an importer can overcome the statutory presumption of unjust enrichment by producing credible, corroborated evidence. In this case, invoices, audited accounts and an independent chartered accountant’s certificate collectively demonstrated that Micromax had not passed CVD on to customers.

    For customs-refund disputes, the ruling highlights that the real test is not merely whether a duty was wrongly paid, but whether the claimant can establish through financial and transactional records that it bore the economic burden itself.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Delhi HC: Registrar Cannot Reject Trademark Applications Through Non-Speaking Orders

    Delhi HC: Registrar Cannot Reject Trademark Applications Through Non-Speaking Orders

    Date: 07.11.2026

    The Delhi High Court has held that the Trade Marks Registry must provide written reasons and the supporting material whenever it refuses or conditionally accepts a trade mark application.

    A decisive ruling on reasoned orders

    In Intellectual Property Attorneys Association v. Controller General of Patents, Designs & Trade Marks & Anr., decided on 16 October 2019, the Delhi High Court addressed a recurring concern for trade mark applicants: orders that communicate a refusal without explaining why it was made.

    The Court ruled that Section 18(5) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 imposes a mandatory obligation on the Registrar of Trade Marks to record, in writing:

    • the grounds for refusing an application or accepting it subject to conditions; and
    • the material relied upon to reach that decision.

    The Registrar must then send the reasoned order to the applicant within two weeks of passing it.

    The legal issue

    Section 18 of the Trade Marks Act governs applications for registration. While the Registrar may accept an application, refuse it, or accept it subject to amendments, conditions, modifications, or limitations, Section 18(5) specifically protects applicants where the decision is adverse or qualified.

    It requires the Registrar to record written grounds and the material used in making the decision. This requirement is important because an applicant cannot effectively assess or challenge a decision without knowing the reasons behind it.

    The dispute arose because Rule 36 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017 allowed the Registry to communicate its decision without automatically supplying the reasons. Under that process, an applicant seeking to appeal could apply in Form TM-M within 30 days to obtain the grounds for refusal or conditional acceptance.

    Why the Court rejected the Rule 36 approach

    The petitioner argued that Rule 36 conflicted with Section 18(5). The statute requires written reasons and the underlying material, whereas the Rule permitted the Registry to withhold those reasons unless the applicant took an additional procedural step.

    The Court agreed. It held that Rule 36 was arbitrary, unreasonable, and inconsistent with the mandatory statutory requirement to provide reasons. A subordinate rule cannot dilute or override an obligation created by Parliament in the parent statute.

    Accordingly, the Court held that Section 18(5) must prevail over Rule 36 to the extent of the inconsistency.

    The Court’s direction

    Allowing the writ petition, the Court directed the Registrar of Trade Marks to strictly comply with Section 18(5). In practical terms, this means that every refusal or conditional acceptance must be accompanied by an order that:

    1. states the specific grounds for the decision;
    2. identifies the material relied upon; and
    3. is sent to the applicant within two weeks of the order being passed.

    Practical impact for trade mark applicants

    The ruling reinforces procedural fairness in trade mark prosecution. A reasoned order enables an applicant to understand whether the objection concerns, for example, distinctiveness, similarity with an earlier mark, classification, descriptiveness, or another statutory ground.

    It also improves the ability to decide whether to amend the application, submit further evidence, seek review, or file an appeal. Without reasons, applicants may be forced to pursue remedies without clarity on the legal and factual basis of the decision.

    Key takeaway

    The judgment confirms that reasoned decision-making is not optional in trade mark registration matters: when an application is refused or conditionally accepted, the Trade Marks Registry must provide the applicant with written grounds and the materials relied upon, promptly and as part of the decision itself.

    Connected Matter

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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  • J&K High Court Flags Non-Application of Mind in PIT NDPS Detention

    J&K High Court Flags Non-Application of Mind in PIT NDPS Detention

    Date: 07.11.2026

    The Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court has quashed the preventive detention of Masoom Ali alias Kala, holding that the action appeared to be an attempt to bypass bail orders and was affected by serious factual shortcomings.

    Background of the case

    Masoom Ali, a 26-year-old resident of Rakh Barotian in Samba district, had been detained at District Jail, Udhampur from 10 January 2026 under the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (PIT NDPS Act). His wife, Bibi Begum, filed a habeas corpus petition challenging the detention.

    The detention order was issued by the Divisional Commissioner, Jammu on 17 December 2025 following a dossier submitted by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Samba. The dossier alleged that Ali was involved in continuing drug-peddling activities.

    The detention was later confirmed by the Jammu and Kashmir Government for one year, from 10 January 2026 to 9 January 2027, after the Advisory Board found grounds supporting it.

    Criminal cases cited by authorities

    The detention grounds referred to three NDPS cases:

    • FIR No. 46/2023, Police Station Samba: Alleged offences under Sections 8 and 21 of the NDPS Act. Ali was facing trial and had been granted bail.
    • FIR No. 60/2023, Police Station Samba: Alleged offences under Sections 8, 21 and 29. The record stated that he had been challaned in absentia.
    • FIR No. 173/2025, Police Station Bari Brahmana: Alleged offences under Sections 8, 21, 25 and 29. Ali was granted bail, and an attempt to have that bail cancelled failed on 4 December 2025.

    Authorities said that a 47-page set of detention-related documents, including the warrant, detention grounds, FIRs and statements, was served on Ali on 10 January 2026. The materials were read in English and explained to him in Dogri, Gojri and Urdu.

    Petitioner’s challenge

    Ali argued that the detention was illegal, arbitrary and unconstitutional. His principal contention was that the police and detaining authority relied mechanically on the sponsoring dossier rather than independently assessing whether preventive detention was necessary.

    He also alleged that preventive detention was used to neutralize the bail orders granted by criminal courts. Further, he contended that his right to make an effective representation was impaired because he was not properly informed about the authority before which a representation could be made or any applicable timeline. His wife reportedly sent representations to the Government, Advisory Board and Divisional Commissioner, but alleged that no response was received.

    Court’s findings

    Justice Rahul Bharti found the detention exercise seriously deficient. The Court observed that the circumstances gave an β€œinformed impression” that the preventive detention was a countermeasure to bail granted by the ordinary criminal courts.

    The Court noted that, if the police believed Ali’s release on bail posed a genuine risk, the appropriate course was to seek cancellation of bail before the criminal court. The failed attempt to cancel bail in the 2025 case, followed by preventive detention proceedings, raised concern that detention was being used to overreach the court’s bail decision.

    A central defect identified by the Court concerned FIR No. 60/2023. The detention record did not clarify whether Ali had been arrested, had evaded arrest, had been declared an absconder, or had obtained bail in that case. The Court described this absence of clarity as an alarming factual fallacy that made the entire detention process suspect.

    Outcome

    The High Court held that the preventive detention was illegal. It set aside:

    • Detention Order No. PITNDPS 74 of 2025 dated 17 December 2025; and
    • Confirmation Order No. Home/PB-V/94 of 2026 dated 23 January 2026.

    The Court directed Ali’s immediate release from preventive detention at District Jail, Udhampur, subject to any custody required in other lawful proceedings.

    Why the ruling matters

    The decision reinforces that preventive detention cannot be used as a substitute for ordinary criminal-law processes or as a means to defeat bail granted by a court. A detaining authority must independently assess reliable, complete and current facts before curtailing a person’s liberty under preventive-detention law. Material uncertainty about the person’s status in the cases relied upon can undermine the legality of the detention itself.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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  • Delhi High Court Releases PMLA-Attached Asset After IBC Resolution Plan Approval

    Delhi High Court Releases PMLA-Attached Asset After IBC Resolution Plan Approval

    Date: 07.11.2026

    The Delhi High Court has held that a property attached under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) cannot remain under attachment once a qualifying resolution plan is approved under Section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) and Section 32A’s conditions are met.

    The ruling at a glance

    In Dash Exports Private Limited v. Directorate of Enforcement, the Court set aside the PMLA Appellate Tribunal’s decision and directed the release of property attached by the Enforcement Directorate (ED). It also ordered the return of a Rs. 3.01 crore fixed deposit furnished by the successful resolution applicant.

    The central holding is significant: Section 32A(2) protects corporate-debtor property from attachment, seizure, retention, or confiscation for pre-CIRP offences after approval of a qualifying resolution plan. This protection applies even where the PMLA attachment was imposed before the plan was approved.

    Background: insolvency resolution and a subsequent PMLA attachment

    Dash Exports Private Limited entered the corporate insolvency resolution process (CIRP) on 26 February 2020. Asteroid Shelter Homes Private Limited submitted a resolution plan that received 99.22% approval from the Committee of Creditors on 27 November 2020.

    Before the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) could pronounce its order on the plan, the ED issued a provisional attachment order on 25 August 2021 over a property in Gautam Buddh Nagar, Uttar Pradesh. The NCLT later approved Asteroid’s resolution plan on 29 September 2021.

    The attachment was confirmed in May 2022. In earlier proceedings, the Delhi High Court allowed the parties to challenge the attachment before the PMLA Appellate Tribunal and required a fixed deposit of Rs. 3.01 crore, representing the ED’s attributed value of the property. The Tribunal, however, dismissed the appeal, holding that Section 32A did not displace an attachment made before plan approval.

    What Section 32A protects

    Section 32A was introduced to give a bona fide successful resolution applicant a clean break from offences allegedly committed by the former management before CIRP began.

    For the statutory protection to apply, the resolution plan must:

    • be approved by the NCLT under Section 31 of the IBC;
    • result in a change in management or control of the corporate debtor; and
    • transfer control to a person who is not a former promoter, part of the earlier management or control, a related party, or a person against whom the investigating authority has material and has filed a report or complaint alleging abetment or conspiracy.

    Where those conditions are satisfied, Section 32A(1) ends the corporate debtor’s liability for pre-CIRP offences. Section 32A(2) separately prevents action against the corporate debtor’s property in relation to such offences. The provision expressly includes attachment, seizure, retention, and confiscation within the meaning of prohibited action.

    Importantly, the immunity does not protect the individuals responsible for the alleged wrongdoing. Former promoters, officers, persons in charge of the business, and others directly or indirectly involved in the offence may still be investigated, prosecuted, and punished.

    Court rejects the timing-based distinction

    The ED argued that Section 32A could protect only against attachments imposed after approval of a resolution plan. The Tribunal accepted this position.

    The High Court rejected it. It found no support in either the wording of Section 32A or the Supreme Court’s decision in Manish Kumar v. Union of India. The relevant statutory trigger is approval of the resolution plan, not the date on which an attachment order was made.

    Once an approved plan transfers control to an eligible, unconnected resolution applicant, the acquirer must receive the corporate debtor’s property free of encumbrances, including a PMLA attachment. A contrary interpretation, the Court held, would defeat Section 32A’s purpose: ensuring that viable businesses can be acquired and revived without unknown or historic liabilities depressing value or deterring bidders.

    No retrospective invalidation, but a prospective release

    The judgment draws an important distinction. It does not say that a PMLA attachment was unlawful when initially imposed. Rather, it holds that after the statutory conditions under Section 32A are fulfilled, the attachment can no longer continue against the corporate debtor’s property.

    In other words, Section 32A operates prospectively from the approval of the qualifying plan. The attachment ceases to subsist from that point onward.

    This approach reconciles the IBC and the PMLA. The PMLA continues to permit investigation and action against the persons allegedly responsible for money laundering. At the same time, the IBC’s later and specific protection ensures that a legitimate resolution applicant does not inherit the consequences of the previous management’s alleged misconduct.

    Why the Court granted relief to Dash Exports

    The ED did not contend that Asteroid was linked to Dash Exports’ former management, was a related party, or had abetted or conspired in the alleged offence. Nor did it dispute that the property was covered by the approved resolution plan or that the plan brought about a change in control.

    Because the conditions for Section 32A protection were undisputed, the Court held that the Tribunal could not insist on a separate finding by the Special Court. Such a finding would be required only if the ED had actually alleged that the new management fell within one of Section 32A’s exceptions.

    The Court therefore:

    • set aside the PMLA Appellate Tribunal’s order;
    • held that the provisional attachment could no longer continue against Dash Exports’ property; and
    • directed release of the Rs. 3.01 crore fixed deposit to the appellant within two weeks.

    Business and insolvency implications

    The decision strengthens certainty for resolution applicants, lenders, and insolvency professionals. It confirms that a successful bidder meeting Section 32A’s safeguards should obtain the corporate debtor and its covered assets on a clean slate after plan approval.

    The practical implications include:

    • Greater bidder confidence: Potential acquirers can assess the target without assuming that pre-CIRP criminal allegations will permanently burden its assets.
    • Improved asset value: Removing continuing enforcement uncertainty can support more competitive resolution-plan valuations and creditor recoveries.
    • Clearer enforcement boundary: Investigative agencies retain the power to pursue alleged wrongdoers, but cannot continue action against protected corporate-debtor property after a qualifying plan is approved.
    • Focus on eligibility evidence: The key dispute in future cases will likely be whether the incoming management is genuinely unconnected and whether the statutory exceptions apply.

    The ruling reinforces Section 32A as the decisive protection at the point of plan approval: it preserves accountability for past wrongdoers while allowing a bona fide new owner to revive the business and use its assets free from historic PMLA attachments.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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  • CESTAT Mumbai: Customs Cannot Deny Duty Exemption by Adopting Incorrect Coal Testing Parameters

    CESTAT Mumbai: Customs Cannot Deny Duty Exemption by Adopting Incorrect Coal Testing Parameters

    Date: 06.11.2026

    The Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), Mumbai has set aside customs duty demands against JSW Steel Limited and JSW Steel Coated Products Limited, holding that eight consignments of Indonesian coal were correctly classified as steam coal and were eligible for the applicable basic customs duty exemption.

    The dispute: steam coal or bituminous coal?

    The case concerned coal imported by JSW between April 2012 and January 2013 for use in its captive power plant at Tarapur. JSW declared the consignments as steam coal under Customs Tariff Item (CTI) 2701 1920 and claimed exemption from basic customs duty under Serial No. 123 of Notification No. 12/2012-Customs.

    Customs authorities later reclassified the imports as bituminous coal under CTI 2701 1200. This reclassification led to demands for differential customs duty, interest and penalties. The department’s position was that the consignments met the statutory parameters for bituminous coal: volatile matter above 14% on a dry, mineral-matter-free basis and calorific value of at least 5,833 kcal/kg on a moist, mineral-matter-free basis.

    The central issue was therefore not simply how the coal was used. It was whether Customs had correctly calculated the scientific parameters required under the tariff definition.

    Why the Tribunal rejected the department’s calculation

    CESTAT found that the department had applied the Parr formula using values on an air-dried basis (ADB). The Tribunal held that this was inconsistent with ASTM D388-12, which requires data on an inherent-moisture-containing basis, equivalent to the as-received basis (ARB), when calculating calorific value on a moist, mineral-matter-free basis.

    This distinction was decisive. Air drying removes part of the coal’s moisture, leaving residual moisture rather than its full inherent moisture. Using ADB figures in the formula could artificially inflate the calculated calorific value and make coal appear to meet the threshold for bituminous coal.

    The Tribunal applied the Parr formula using the appropriate ARB-based values. For seven of the eight Bills of Entry, the resulting calorific values were below 5,833 kcal/kg. Because both statutory conditions must be met cumulatively for coal to qualify as bituminous coal, these consignments could not be reclassified as bituminous coal.

    Discharge-port test reports supported JSW’s declaration

    For two consignments, departmental CRCL laboratory reports from the discharge port described the coal as having the characteristics of steam coal. The Tribunal treated these reports as especially relevant because they reflected the goods as imported and presented to Customs for assessment.

    It also noted that Customs had not relied on these reports when raising the duty demands, despite including them among the relied-upon documents. Further, the department did not provide an opportunity for re-testing before seeking to impose a later duty liability based on its calculations.

    The Tribunal concluded that the discharge-port reports had greater evidentiary value than calculations based on load-port data that did not follow the prescribed methodology.

    Classification principles clarified

    The ruling draws a clear distinction between coal classification by rank and by use:

    • Bituminous coal is defined by the technical thresholds in Chapter 27’s sub-heading note.
    • Steam coal is identified under the β€œother coal” category and is generally associated with use for heating or electricity generation.
    • A coal consignment can be treated as bituminous coal only if it meets both prescribed scientific thresholds through proper testing and calculation.

    CESTAT held that where the calorific value on a moist, mineral-matter-free basis is below 5,833 kcal/kg, or the volatile-matter condition is not met, the goods cannot be classified as bituminous coal. Where the goods are intended for power generation, they are appropriately classified as steam coal under CTI 2701 1920.

    Exemption from basic customs duty upheld

    At the relevant time, Notification No. 12/2012-Customs granted a nil rate of basic customs duty for steam coal under CTI 2701 1920, with 1% additional duty. Since the Tribunal found all eight consignments to be correctly classifiable as steam coal, JSW was entitled to the exemption.

    As a result, the duty demands failed. The Tribunal also found no need to examine allegations of deliberate misdeclaration, confiscation or penalty because the underlying classification and exemption claim were valid.

    Outcome and wider significance

    CESTAT set aside the four challenged orders issued by Customs authorities in Mumbai and Goa and allowed JSW’s appeals. The Tribunal’s decision reinforces that customs classification disputes involving technical specifications must be resolved through scientifically correct methods, not by selective conversion of test values.

    The ruling is particularly significant for importers of coal and other commodities whose tariff treatment depends on laboratory parameters. It emphasizes that Customs must rely on representative testing, apply recognized standards strictly, consider evidence from the imported goods at the discharge port, and give appropriate weight to favourable departmental test reports. In this case, the Tribunal held that incorrect use of ADB values had led to an unsustainable reclassification.

    Proper application of the Parr formula showed that the imports were steam coal, preserving JSW’s duty exemption and eliminating the related duty, interest and penalty exposure.

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    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi