Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 14.11.2026
Bombay High Court Grants Pre-Arrest Bail in Alleged Trademark Misuse
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
Bombay High court grant anticipatory bail in an alleged trademark infringement case where custodial interrogation is unnecessary and the accused agrees to cooperate with the investigation.
Background of the Dispute
Trademark disputes can arise when one business alleges that another has used a confusingly similar brand name, logo, packaging, artwork, or other identifying feature for similar goods. Where a registered trademark is involved, allegations may lead not only to civil proceedings but also to criminal complaints under Sections 103, 104 and 105 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
In the matter considered by the Bombay High Court, a criminal complaint alleged unauthorised use of a registered food-product trademark and a cartoon-based logo. The complainant claimed exclusive rights over the registered mark and asserted that another manufacturer used a substantially similar cartoon image and branding for comparable snack products.
Allegations Under the Trade Marks Act, 1999
Sections 103, 104 and 105 address offences involving false trademarks, false trade descriptions, and repeat offences. Criminal liability may be alleged where a person is accused of applying a false trademark, using deceptively similar branding, selling goods bearing such marks, or otherwise misrepresenting the commercial origin of products.
However, the existence of a trademark complaint does not automatically require arrest or custodial interrogation. Courts examine the specific facts, including:
whether the disputed logo or artwork is capable of exclusive protection;
whether the alleged similarity is substantial and likely to cause confusion;
whether the issue is principally commercial or civil in nature;
whether the accused has stopped using the disputed branding;
whether the accused is willing to assist the investigating agency; and
whether custody is genuinely required for a fair investigation.
Courtβs Approach to Anticipatory Bail
The High Court noted that the accused had received interim protection and that the dispute concerned the alleged use of a trademark and cartoon logo. The defence contended that the artwork was commonly available and that the dispute was substantially civil in character. It was also stated that use of the disputed cartoon and logo had been discontinued.
On these facts, the Court concluded that custodial interrogation was not necessary. Anticipatory bail was therefore granted, subject to conditions designed to preserve the investigation and prevent further use of the disputed mark.
Bail Conditions and Compliance Requirements
The protection was subject to standard and case-specific conditions, including:
release in the event of arrest on a personal bond of Rs. 25,000 with surety or sureties in the like amount;
attendance at the concerned police station on specified dates and times;
continued cooperation with the investigation whenever required until filing of the charge sheet; and
a direction not to use the disputed cartoon or logo in the future.
These conditions show that anticipatory bail does not decide whether trademark infringement occurred. It only protects an accused from unnecessary pre-trial custody while requiring participation in the criminal investigation.
Legal Significance for Businesses
The decision highlights an important distinction between an allegation of infringement and the need for arrest. Trademark owners may pursue legal remedies to protect registered marks, but criminal proceedings must still satisfy procedural safeguards. Where evidence can be examined without detention and the accused cooperates, courts may consider bail appropriate.
For businesses, the case also reinforces the importance of trademark clearance before adopting product names, logos, mascots, packaging, or advertising material. A registered trademark and distinctive visual identity can provide valuable legal protection, while use of similar branding may expose a business to civil claims, criminal complaints, injunctions, and restrictions on future use.
Conclusion
In trademark-related criminal proceedings, courts balance the trademark ownerβs rights with the accused personβs liberty. Anticipatory bail may be granted where custody is not essential, particularly when the accused agrees to cooperate and discontinue use of the disputed branding. The underlying question of trademark infringement remains subject to investigation and determination under applicable law.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 14.11.2026
Madras High Court Sets Strict Conditions While Granting Bail in NDPS Matter
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
The Madurai Bench of the Madras High Court granted bail to an accused in an NDPS and prohibition-law case after noting that no contraband was recovered from the applicant and the allegation arose from co-accused statements.
Background of the Case
The criminal case arose from an allegation that two accused persons were found in possession of 6 kg of ganja. The prosecution registered offences under Section 8(c) read with Section 20(b)(ii)(B) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, along with provisions of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Amendment Act, 2024.
A third accused was subsequently implicated on the basis of statements said to have been made by the initially detained accused. The applicant was arrested and remanded to judicial custody on 22 August 2026. The bail petition was moved under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita.
Arguments Considered by the Court
The defence argued that the applicant had been falsely implicated and that there was no direct recovery of narcotic substance from the applicant. It was also submitted that a similarly placed co-accused had already received bail and that the applicant had remained in custody since the date of arrest.
The prosecution opposed bail by pointing out that the applicant was shown as the third accused, that 6 kg of ganja had been seized from the joint possession of the first two accused, and that the applicant had two earlier cases of a similar nature involving small quantities. However, the prosecution acknowledged that the applicant was implicated only on the basis of the co-accused statements and that the seized quantity was classified as an intermediate quantity.
Why Bail Was Granted
The Court considered the following factors together:
No recovery from the bail applicant: The narcotic substance was not recovered from the applicant.
Implication based on co-accused statements: The applicant was added to the case based on statements attributed to other accused persons.
Intermediate quantity: The alleged seizure involved an intermediate quantity, rather than a commercial quantity, under the NDPS framework.
Period of custody: The applicant had been in judicial custody from 22 August 2026.
Parity with a co-accused: A similarly placed co-accused had already been granted bail.
The order demonstrates that, while prior criminal cases may be relevant in deciding bail, they do not automatically prevent release where the factual circumstances, nature of recovery, duration of custody, and available material warrant conditional bail.
Bail Terms Imposed
The High Court directed release on a bond of Rs.25,000 with two sureties for an equal amount, subject to the satisfaction of the Principal Special Court for EC and NDPS Act cases, Madurai.
The bail was made subject to these safeguards:
Verification of sureties: The sureties must provide photographs and left-thumb impressions. The court may verify their identity through Aadhaar details or a bank passbook.
Mandatory police reporting: The accused must report to the investigating police station every day at 10:30 a.m. for one month, and thereafter whenever required for interrogation.
Undertaking not to reoffend: An affidavit undertaking not to engage in a similar offence must be filed before the concerned Sessions Court before acceptance of sureties.
No interference with the case: The accused must not tamper with evidence or influence witnesses during investigation or trial.
No absconding: The accused must remain available for investigation and trial proceedings.
Consequences of breach: Any breach of bail conditions permits the Sessions Court or trial court to take action in accordance with law, including cancellation of bail.
Absconding after release: If the accused absconds, a fresh FIR may be registered under Section 269 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
Legal Significance
The ruling reinforces that bail decisions in NDPS cases depend on the specific allegations and evidentiary position of each accused. Where there is no direct recovery from an applicant, implication rests on co-accused statements, and the alleged contraband is of intermediate quantity, courts may grant bail with robust conditions designed to protect the investigation and trial.
The decision also highlights the importance of compliance: bail is conditional, and failure to report, interference with witnesses or evidence, or absconding can result in legal action and cancellation of release.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 14.11.2026
CESTAT Kolkata Sets Aside Rejection of Special Warehouse Licence Over Past Customs Penalties
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
The Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), Kolkata, has set aside the rejection of Nuance Group (India) Private Limitedβs application for a Special Warehouse Licence at Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose International Airport, holding that past monetary penalties for customs contraventions do not automatically amount to penalties for an βoffence.β
Tribunal directs licence issuance by 15 November 2026
In its final order dated 13 November 2026, the Tribunal allowed Nuance Group Indiaβs appeal against the Commissioner of Customs (Airport & Air Cargo Commissionerate), Kolkata. The Bench directed the licensing authority to issue the Special Warehouse Licence by 15 November 2026.
The deadline was significant because Nuance Group had to commence operations by 18 November 2026 under its concession arrangement. A failure to do so could have led to cancellation of the award, forfeiture of a security deposit of approximately Rs. 59.61 crore, and a three-year debarment from Airports Authority of India tenders.
Why the application had been rejected
Nuance Group applied on 21 August 2026 for a licence under Section 58A of the Customs Act, 1962, for duty-free operations at Kolkata Airport. The customs authority issued a show-cause notice on 29 September 2026 and rejected the application on 14 October 2026.
The rejection was based on two connected grounds:
Earlier penalties imposed under Sections 112 and 114 of the Customs Act had been upheld in 2017.
The companyβs declaration that it had not been penalised, convicted, or prosecuted for an βoffenceβ was treated as a misdeclaration.
The earlier proceedings arose from events connected with the companyβs Hyderabad duty-free business in 2009.
Key legal issue: contravention versus offence
The central issue before CESTAT was whether a penalty under Sections 112 or 114 of the Customs Act constitutes being βpenalised for an offenceβ under Regulation 3(2)(c) of the Special Warehouse Licensing Regulations, 2016.
The Tribunal drew a clear distinction within the Customs Act:
Chapter XIV (Sections 111β127) addresses confiscation and monetary penalties for customs contraventions, including Sections 112 and 114.
Chapter XVI (Sections 132β140A) deals with criminal offences and prosecutions, which may result in imprisonment, fines, or both.
CESTAT held that a monetary penalty imposed under Sections 112 or 114 is a consequence of a contravention, not an offence in the criminal sense contemplated by the licensing regulation. As a result, Regulation 3(2)(c) did not disqualify Nuance Group from receiving the licence.
Earlier declaration was not a misdeclaration
Since the Tribunal found that the prior penalties were not penalties for an βoffence,β it also rejected the allegation that Nuance Group had made a false declaration in its licence application.
The companyβs statement that it had not been penalised, convicted, or prosecuted for an offence was held to be legally correct. The Tribunal noted that the declaration had to be read in line with the statutory distinction between a customs contravention and a criminal customs offence.
Reliance on consistent CESTAT decisions
The Kolkata Bench followed earlier decisions that had interpreted the same licensing provision in a similar manner, including:
Kundan Care Products Ltd., where a Section 112 penalty was held not to be a penalty for an offence under Regulation 3(2)(c).
Mumbai Travel Retail Pvt. Ltd., which found that the phrase βpenalised for an offenceβ could not be extended to every customs infraction attracting a monetary penalty.
Hari Krishna Exports Pvt. Ltd., which applied the same approach while setting aside the refusal of a private bonded warehouse licence.
The Revenue relied on the Allahabad Bench ruling in Bhagwati Products Ltd., which had taken a broader view of the word βoffence.β However, the Kolkata Bench distinguished that decision because it substantially relied on provisions of the earlier Sea Customs Act and the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, rather than the distinct structure of the Customs Act, 1962.
Current compliance credentials also supported Nuance Group
The Tribunal also considered Nuance Groupβs current operational and compliance profile. It noted that the events underlying the earlier proceedings dated back to 2009 and that the companyβs ownership, board, and management underwent substantial changes from 2017 onward.
Among the documents considered were:
A Special Warehouse Licence issued to the company at Kempegowda International Airport, Bengaluru, in 2023.
An Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) T2 certificate granted in May 2023.
Evidence of enhanced governance and inventory-control measures, including SAP-based receipt records, physical verification, customs-supervised handling, documented movement controls, and periodic inventory checks using RF scanners.
The Tribunal observed that the company had received both the Bengaluru licence and AEO recognition without the historical penalties being treated as a bar. It concluded that the old contraventions should not be used to deny a licence to an applicant with demonstrated current compliance credentials.
Outcome and broader significance
CESTAT set aside the customs authorityβs order and held Nuance Group eligible for the Special Warehouse Licence. The Tribunal required the authorities to issue the licence by 15 November 2026 and called for compliance reporting by 16 November 2026.
The ruling reinforces an important principle for warehouse licensing under customs law: not every monetary customs penalty creates a permanent licensing disqualification. Where a past penalty concerns a civil or administrative contravention under Chapter XIV, rather than a criminal offence under Chapter XVI, it cannot by itself trigger the bar in Regulation 3(2)(c) of the Special Warehouse Licensing Regulations, 2016.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 13.11.2026
NDPS Arrests Under Constitutional Scrutiny: Supreme Court Rejects Artificial Distinction Between Detention and Arrest
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
The Supreme Court has reaffirmed that the constitutional 24-hour deadline for producing a person before a magistrate begins when that personβs liberty is actually curtailed, not when an investigating agency later prepares a formal arrest memo.
In a major ruling concerning investigations under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), the Court held that authorities cannot keep a person under their control for search, questioning, seizure formalities or investigation and postpone the constitutional safeguard by describing the person as merely βinterceptedβ or βdetained for enquiry.β
The judgment strengthens the protection contained in Article 22(2) of the Constitution and makes clear that statutory procedure under the NDPS Act cannot override the right to prompt judicial scrutiny of custody.
The issue before the Court
The matter arose from an NDPS investigation involving the alleged recovery of methamphetamine tablets from a commercial vehicle and related baggage. During the operation, enforcement officials intercepted multiple individuals and recovered suspected contraband. The persons were kept with the search team while officials conducted field testing, weighing, seizure documentation and further search procedures.
The investigating authority maintained that the persons were formally arrested only the next day, after the completion of search, seizure, questioning and paperwork. They were subsequently produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of the formal time recorded in the arrest memoranda.
The defence challenged this timeline. It argued that the persons had been under the effective control of the enforcement team from the time of interception and were not free to leave. Therefore, the 24-hour period under Article 22(2) had begun at the time of actual restraint, not at the later time shown as formal arrest.
The Supreme Court accepted this argument.
Article 22(2): a mandatory constitutional safeguard
Article 22(2) requires every person who is arrested and detained in custody to be produced before the nearest magistrate within 24 hours. The Constitution permits only one exclusion while calculating this period: the time necessary to travel from the place of arrest to the magistrateβs court.
The Court described the safeguard as absolute and mandatory. It exists to ensure that an independent judicial officer can promptly examine whether custody is lawful and whether further detention should be authorised.
Importantly, the Court held that the following cannot be excluded from the 24-hour calculation:
time spent conducting search and seizure;
questioning or interrogation;
preparation of arrest records and other paperwork;
weighing, sampling, testing, packaging or inventory of seized material;
administrative processes; and
internal logistical delays unrelated to the journey to the magistrate.
Actual restraint, not paperwork, determines when custody begins
The central principle of the ruling is that arrest for the purpose of Article 22(2) begins when a personβs freedom of movement is effectively restrained by an authority having coercive power.
The Court explained that the true test is straightforward: was the person free to leave? If the answer is no, and the person was under the control of investigating officers in connection with a suspected offence, the person was in custody.
A later entry in an arrest memo cannot rewrite the factual point at which the State took control of an individualβs liberty. The Court rejected attempts to draw a technical distinction between βdetentionβ and βarrestβ where the result would be to delay constitutional protection.
The judgment emphasises that the Constitution does not recognise an unregulated period in which an individual may be held for investigation without the 24-hour safeguard beginning to run.
No βinvestigative buffer zoneβ in NDPS cases
The investigating authority argued that the period before the formal arrest was required to comply with procedures under the NDPS Act and the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Seizure, Storage, Sampling and Disposal) Rules, 2022. It contended that search, seizure, classification, weighing and packaging needed to be completed in the presence of the persons from whose possession the substances were allegedly recovered.
The Supreme Court accepted that these procedures may be mandatory and important for evidentiary integrity. However, it held that compliance with them does not suspend Article 22(2).
The Court rejected the concept of an βinvestigative buffer zoneβ in which a person may be under agency control for fact-gathering purposes but the constitutional 24-hour countdown remains on hold. Such an approach, the Court said, is unconstitutional because it would permit authorities to curtail liberty without timely judicial oversight.
The NDPS Act authorises search, seizure, detention and arrest in specified circumstances. But its procedural provisions must be implemented consistently with the Constitution. A special statute cannot reduce the scope of a fundamental right.
The Courtβs finding on the custody timeline
On the facts before it, the Court found that the detained persons came under the control of the search team at 2:00 pm on the first day of the operation. Their liberty was curtailed from that point, and the constitutional 24-hour period began then.
They were required to be produced before a magistrate by 2:00 pm on the following day, subject only to necessary travel time to court. However, they were produced at 4:45 pm.
The Court held that this constituted a clear breach of Article 22(2). The later formal recording of arrest could not alter the real point at which custody began.
As a result, the arrest was vitiated and detention beyond the 24-hour constitutional limit was held to be illegal and unconstitutional.
Section 58 BNSS: custody must also be reasonable
The ruling also addresses Section 58 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), which carries forward the principle earlier found in Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
This provision imposes two separate safeguards:
A person detained without warrant cannot be held beyond 24 hours without a magistrateβs authority, excluding only travel time to court.
Even within that 24-hour ceiling, detention must not continue longer than is reasonable in the circumstances.
In this case, the search and seizure procedures had reportedly concluded by 5:00 pm on the first day. The formal arrest, however, was recorded only around 11:00 am the next day. The Court found no adequate explanation for this approximately 18-hour interval.
It held that such a lengthy period of custody without judicial oversight could not be considered reasonable. The ruling therefore makes clear that compliance with the outer 24-hour limit alone is not enough. Courts must also examine whether the actual period of custody was justified.
Why the decision matters for NDPS bail
Bail in NDPS cases involving commercial quantities is usually governed by the stringent conditions in Section 37 of the NDPS Act. Ordinarily, a court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is not guilty and is unlikely to commit an offence while on bail.
The Supreme Court, however, reaffirmed that restrictions under a special criminal law cannot override fundamental rights. Where detention violates Article 21 or Article 22 of the Constitution, constitutional liberty takes precedence over statutory restrictions on bail.
Accordingly, the Court set aside the refusal of bail and directed release on bail, subject to conditions fixed by the competent Special Court.
Responsibilities of investigating authorities
The judgment imposes clear obligations on enforcement and investigating authorities:
Record the real time of restraint: Authorities must recognise the moment a person ceases to be free to leave.
Produce the person within 24 hours: The deadline runs from actual detention, not from a later arrest entry.
Exclude only travel time: Search, seizure, inventory, questioning and paperwork do not extend the deadline.
Avoid unreasonable custody: Even before the 24-hour period expires, detention must remain necessary and proportionate.
Follow procedure without defeating liberty: NDPS safeguards may be completed, but not by postponing judicial scrutiny of a person who is already under official control.
Responsibilities of magistrates at first production
The Court also underscored that remand cannot be a mechanical exercise. When a detained person is first produced, the magistrate must independently assess the actual chronology of custody.
The magistrate must determine:
the date and time when the personβs liberty was first curtailed;
whether production occurred within 24 hours of that time, excluding only necessary travel time; and
whether the period of detention was reasonable in the circumstances.
If the 24-hour period has been crossed, the person must be released from custody. Even where production is technically within 24 hours, the magistrate may decline remand if the detention was longer than reasonably necessary.
High Court approaches disapproved
The Supreme Court disapproved earlier views that treated search-related restraint or investigative detention as separate from arrest for the purpose of Article 22(2). Those approaches had allowed the constitutional clock to begin only after the conclusion of search and seizure procedures or after formal arrest was recorded.
The Court held that this interpretation was incompatible with the constitutional protection of personal liberty. It warned that concepts such as a βshort investigatory holdβ or a temporary disruption of liberty create uncertainty and risk enabling unrecorded custody.
The Courtβs position is clear: there is no constitutionally recognised category of custody in which a person is not free to leave but Article 22(2) does not apply.
Stronger protection against unrecorded custody
The ruling is closely linked to the purpose of Article 22(2): preventing unlawful detention, custodial abuse and coercive interrogation before judicial oversight begins. The Court referred to established concerns that the most serious violations of human rights can occur during periods when a person is held but not formally shown as arrested.
By focusing on the factual loss of liberty rather than labels used in official documents, the decision strengthens protections against delayed arrest records and unaccounted custody. It also reinforces the magistrateβs role as an independent safeguard against unlawful detention.
Key legal principles from the ruling
The 24-hour period under Article 22(2) starts when a person is actually detained and loses freedom to leave.
A formal arrest memo does not determine the beginning of constitutional custody.
Only necessary travel time from the place of arrest to the magistrateβs court may be excluded.
NDPS search, seizure, sampling, weighing, questioning and documentation do not pause the 24-hour clock.
Authorities cannot create an investigative βbuffer zoneβ outside constitutional safeguards.
Detention must be reasonable even if it remains within 24 hours.
Magistrates must identify the actual time of detention before authorising remand.
A breach of the 24-hour rule makes continued custody illegal and requires release.
Fundamental rights under Articles 21 and 22 prevail over statutory bail restrictions where constitutional safeguards are violated.
The judgment establishes a firm rule for all criminal investigations: once the State effectively restrains a personβs liberty, constitutional scrutiny begins immediately, and the person must be produced before a magistrate within 24 hours.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 13.11.2026
Trademark and Corporate Identity Clash: Gujarat High Court Orders De Novo Hearing
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
The Gujarat High Court held that a government decision rejecting a request to rectify a companyβs name must give clear reasons, and it sent the dispute back for a fresh decision.
Background of the dispute
The case arose from a conflict over the use of the word βFalconβ in company and trademark names. Proprietor of Golden Falcon and associated with Golden Falcon India Private Limited, had been involved in the embroidery-machine business since 2003. Golden Falcon India Private Limited was incorporated in 2007.
A separate company, Golden Falcon Trendz Private Limited, was incorporated in 2011. The petitioner contended that its name was too similar to the petitionerβs trade mark and company identity, and that both businesses had substantially similar commercial objects. It therefore sought rectification of the respondent companyβs name under Section 16 of the Companies Act, 2013.
The petitioner relied on the trade mark βFalcon Indiaβ with a flying-bird device and argued that the Registrar of Companies should not have allowed the later company name because it allegedly resembled an existing company name and trademark.
What Section 16 of the Companies Act provides
Section 16(1)(b) allows a registered trademark proprietor to apply to the Central Government when a company name is identical with, or too nearly resembles, the proprietorβs registered trademark. The application must be made within three years of the relevant companyβs incorporation, registration, or change of name.
If the government concludes that the name is identical or too similar, it may direct the company to change its name. The company must then comply within six months of that direction.
In this matter, the Court noted that the application had been filed within three years of the incorporation of Golden Falcon Trendz Private Limited.
Competing arguments
The petitioner argued that the Regional Director had incorrectly rejected the request and failed to explain why the statutory protection did not apply. It also maintained that the company name and the business objects of the two entities were substantially similar.
The government and Golden Falcon Trendz Private Limited opposed the petition. They argued that βFalcon Indiaβ and βGolden Falcon Trendzβ were different marks, with βFalconβ being a common word referring to a bird rather than an exclusive coined expression. They also contended that the petitioner was not entitled to invoke Section 16 and that any trademark-infringement claim should be pursued before the appropriate court.
Courtβs findings: reasons are essential
The High Court did not decide whether the two names or trademarks were actually confusingly similar. Instead, it focused on the quality of the Regional Directorβs orders.
The Court found that the orders merely recorded the partiesβ submissions and concluded that the respondent company had not copied the petitionerβs trademark. They did not explain why the authority rejected the competing arguments, how it assessed similarity, or why the statutory requirements for rectification were not satisfied.
The Court described the orders as non-speaking because they lacked adequate reasons. It emphasized that an authority exercising this type of quasi-judicial power must provide a reasoned decision. Affected parties must be able to understand the basis on which their submissions were accepted or rejected.
Outcome
The Gujarat High Court quashed the Regional Directorβs orders dated May 2015 in both connected petitions. It remanded the matters to the Regional Director for a fresh, de novo decision after hearing all concerned parties.
The Regional Director was directed to issue a detailed, reasoned order in accordance with law within three months of receiving the courtβs writ. The Court expressly clarified that it had not ruled on the merits of the trademark or company-name dispute.
Why the ruling matters
This decision reinforces an important principle of administrative law: authorities cannot reject a statutory application through a bare conclusion. Where a decision affects company-name rights, trademark-related interests, and the ability to continue using a business identity, the authority must show its reasoning.
The ruling does not establish that βGolden Falcon Trendzβ necessarily infringes βFalcon India,β nor does it determine which party has superior trademark rights. Its central holding is procedural but significant: the decision-maker must properly consider the legal requirements and the partiesβ evidence, then give intelligible reasons for the outcome.
For businesses, the case highlights the value of timely objections to potentially conflicting company names and the importance of a clear evidentiary record on trademark registration, prior use, business activity, and the likelihood of confusion.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 13.11.2026
CESTAT Ahmedabad Orders Conditional Return of Bank Guarantee in Distillate Marine Oil Import Dispute
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
The Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), Ahmedabad has allowed Rumi Petro Chem (India) Pvt. Ltd.βs appeal and directed that its bank guarantee be discharged once it produces an end-use certificate and executes a bond.
Background of the dispute
Rumi Petro Chem imported 2,491.475 metric tonnes of Distillate Marine Oil from Sohar, Oman, declaring the product under Customs Tariff Heading 2710 19 61. The company stated that the cargo was intended solely for industrial use.
Customs authorities examined the goods after the Central Revenue Control Laboratory (CRCL), Visakhapatnam reported that the sample was closely comparable to High Flash High Speed Diesel (HFHSD). HFHSD is a restricted product when imported by private importers. The laboratory report, however, also recorded a flash point of 52Β°C, below the 66Β°C minimum prescribed for HFHSD.
The sample also did not meet the cloud-point requirement for Distillate Marine Fuel under the relevant Indian Standard. CRCL observations raised the possibility that petroleum fractions may have been blended to lower the flash point, leading Customs to seize the cargo under Section 110 of the Customs Act, 1962.
Provisional release subject to strict conditions
The Commissioner of Customs, Kandla provisionally released the cargo on 9 November 2025. The order accepted, at the provisional stage, that the goods could not be treated as restricted HFHSD because they did not meet its specifications and not all mandatory parameters had been tested.
Nevertheless, release was made conditional on:
an undertaking that the goods would not be used as automotive diesel, HFHSD, or vessel propulsion fuel;
responsibility for ensuring equivalent end-use by any subsequent buyer;
batch-wise records of storage, processing, sale, and consumption;
a bond equal to 100% of the assessable value; and
a renewable bank guarantee of βΉ1.0138 crore, equal to 10% of the assessable value.
The importer complied with these conditions and obtained release on 15 November 2025. It maintained that it did so under financial pressure because terminal charges had reached βΉ31.82 lakh by early December 2025 and were continuing to accrue.
Importerβs case: no conclusive finding of restricted diesel
Rumi Petro Chem argued that the laboratory evidence did not establish that the cargo was HFHSD. It emphasized the 14Β°C shortfall from the HFHSD flash-point requirement and relied on CRCL, New Delhiβs clarifications that the product fell within the broader category of βdiesel fractions,β which includes both HFHSD and distillate marine fuel.
CRCL, New Delhi also stated that deliberate blending could not be scientifically established on the available material. It later clarified that deciding whether the goods were βmost akinβ to HFHSD or Distillate Marine Fuel was not determinative, as the samples did not completely meet the specifications of any single Indian Standard. The laboratory recommended verification of end use.
Tribunal follows Gujarat High Court and earlier CESTAT rulings
CESTAT relied on decisions involving comparable imports, including Aparajita Energy Pvt. Ltd., Noya Infrastructure LLP, Prajakt Agro Industries Pvt. Ltd., and Quantum Petro Chem India.
Those decisions recognized that a cloud-point deviation alone cannot justify seizure where laboratory reports do not definitively establish that the goods are restricted HFHSD. They also treated end-use verification as the appropriate safeguard where the product falls broadly within diesel fractions but does not conclusively satisfy the standard for restricted diesel.
The Tribunal noted that, in similar cases, the Gujarat High Court had directed release subject to an end-use certificate and cooperation with the investigation. It further observed that the Department had stated it was following that approach for other similarly placed importers without insisting on a bank guarantee or similarly harsh release conditions.
Final ruling
CESTAT held that the condition requiring a bank guarantee was inconsistent with the Gujarat High Courtβs directions and the Tribunalβs earlier ruling in Prajakt Agro Industries. It therefore allowed the appeal.
The bank guarantee must be considered for discharge once Rumi Petro Chem produces the required end-use certificate and executes a bond. The ruling preserves Customsβ ability to monitor the declared industrial end use while removing the financial security condition that the Tribunal found unjustified in the circumstances. This decision reinforces that provisional-release conditions must be proportionate to the available evidence, particularly where testing does not conclusively classify imported petroleum products as restricted HFHSD.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
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Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 12.11.2026
Trademark Registration Cannot Be Cancelled Silently: Delhi High Court Reinforces Mandatory Notice Requirement
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
The Delhi High Court has held that a registered trademark cannot be removed for non-renewal unless the Registrar first issues the mandatory renewal-expiry notice, even where the registration certificate was issued after the first renewal date had already passed.
Background of the dispute
Petitioner, trading as APEXSEALS, applied to register the trademark βAPEXSEALSβ in Class 17 on 24 December 1996, claiming use of the mark since 2 March 1993. Although the application remained pending for years, it was advertised in the Trade Marks Journal in February 2006 and ultimately registered on 10 February 2007 under Registration No. 604418.
The timing created an unusual problem. Trademark registration was treated as valid for ten years from the application date, meaning that the first renewal fell due on 24 December 2006. However, the registration certificate itself was issued only after that date, on 10 February 2007.
Following a later change in business management, an internal audit revealed that the βAPEXSEALSβ mark had been removed from the Trade Marks Register for non-renewal.
The Registrar did not provide evidence of a renewal notice
The proprietor sought copies of the statutory expiration notice, then known as Form O-3, and proof that it had been sent. The Registrar instead issued a legal-use certificate confirming that the mark had been removed.
In response to an RTI request, the Registrar stated that an O-3 notice was not applicable because the trademark had been registered after the expiry of its initial validity period. The Registrarβs position was that the proprietor should have paid the renewal fee within six months of the actual registration date under Rule 64(3) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2002.
Courtβs ruling: notice is a mandatory safeguard
Justice Vikas Mahajan rejected the Registrarβs argument. The Court held that Section 25(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 requires the Registrar to send the registered proprietor notice of:
the date on which registration expires; and
the fee and other conditions for obtaining renewal.
Only if those conditions are not met after the prescribed notice can the Registrar remove the trademark from the register.
The Court found two facts undisputed: the renewal date had passed before the mark was registered, and no Form O-3 notice had ever been issued or served before the mark was removed.
Importantly, the Court ruled that Rule 64(3), which addresses marks registered after their renewal date, does not eliminate the statutory notice requirement. Once the registration certificate was issued, the Registrar had the necessary details to serve a renewal notice and could not remove the mark without doing so.
Reliance on earlier Delhi High Court precedents
The judgment follows the principles established in Malhotra Book Depot v. Union of India and Gopal Ji Gupta v. Union of India. Those decisions recognize that trademark registration is a valuable intellectual-property right and that removal from the register has serious civil consequences.
The Court reiterated that:
removal for non-renewal is not automatic;
the statutory notice requirement is a condition that must be satisfied before removal;
rules cannot be interpreted in a manner that overrides the parent statute; and
mere knowledge that a renewal date has passed does not replace the Registrarβs duty to issue the prescribed notice.
This approach protects proprietors from losing registered trademark rights through an administrative removal process that does not follow the procedure mandated by law.
Outcome
The writ petition was allowed. The Court permitted the proprietor to file a fresh Form TM-R renewal application for βAPEXSEALS,β along with the prescribed fee, within two weeks of the judgment. The Registrar was directed to accept and process the application in accordance with the applicable rules.
Why the decision matters
The ruling clarifies that procedural fairness remains essential in trademark renewal matters, including in cases where administrative delays result in a registration certificate being issued after the nominal renewal date. A proprietorβs failure to renew within a specified period does not, by itself, permit removal of the mark where the Registrar has not issued the legally required prior notice.
For trademark owners, the decision underscores the value of monitoring registration and renewal status. For the Trade Marks Registry, it confirms that statutory notice is an indispensable precondition to removing a registered mark for non-renewal.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 12.11.2026
DRI Versus Importers: Bombay High Court Examines Mining Tyre Classification and Provisional Release
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
The Bombay High Court has ruled in favour of six tyre importers, including Vikas Retail Private Limited, and ordered the provisional release of seized consignments described as mining tyres, while leaving the final classification and duty dispute to Customs adjudication.
A classification dispute with major import consequences
The case turned on whether the imported tyres were:
Mining, construction or industrial-handling tyres under Customs Tariff Item (CTI) 40118000, which are freely importable; or
Truck and Bus Radial (TBR) tyres under CTI 40112010, which are restricted under Indiaβs import policy.
The importers declared the products as βBrand New All Steel Radial Mining Tyres,β including size 10.00 R20-18PR tyres bearing a βDβ speed symbol, meaning a maximum speed of 65 km/h. They maintained that the tyres were intended for mining and off-road applications and had been imported under CTI 40118000 since 2019.
The Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) and Customs alleged that the tyres were in fact TBR tyres. According to the Department, the βDβ marking, mining symbol and related markings were added to avoid the licensing and Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) requirements applicable to restricted truck and bus radial tyres.
Why Customs seized the goods
The disputed imports arrived between February and April 2024 through bills of entry filed at Nhava Sheva and other ports. Customs seized the goods from the port and from importersβ godowns after beginning an investigation into alleged misdeclaration.
Customs refused the importersβ applications for provisional release under Section 110A of the Customs Act. Its position was that the goods could be prohibited because they were allegedly misclassified, imported without the approvals applicable to TBR tyres and lacked BIS compliance.
The Commissioner of Customs (Appeals) upheld the refusal. The appellate authority cited public interest and road-safety risks, expressing concern that released tyres could be sold for use on road-going trucks and buses.
Importers relied on past clearances and technical reports
The importers argued that Customs had previously accepted the same classification for identical tyres. They had imported comparable tyres for years, and the Department had cleared consignments described as radial mining tyres under CTI 40118000.
Technical reports played a central role:
In 2020 and 2021, IRMRA reports obtained by an importer stated that the intended use of the tyres was mining applications.
In 2022, when Customsβ Central Intelligence Unit detained similar tyres, IRMRA reported that the βDβ speed symbol placed the tyres outside the scope of IS 15636:2012 and identified their intended use as mining and logging off-road applications.
Customs then issued no-objection certificates and released those 2022 consignments.
The importers also relied on the Quality Control Order and government instructions that exclude commercial-vehicle tyres with speed symbols below 80 km/h, including symbols A to E, from the relevant BIS quality-control framework.
CESTAT granted conditional release
The Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT) overturned the refusal and ordered provisional release in July 2024. It found that Customs had not produced technically competent evidence establishing that the imported goods were restricted TBR tyres.
CESTAT emphasized that classification must be based on the imported goodsβ technical characteristics at the time of import. An allegation that tyres could later be misused on trucks or buses was not, by itself, sufficient to determine their classification.
The release was subject to safeguards:
The importers must furnish a bond for the full value of the seized goods.
They must provide a bank guarantee equal to 5% of the goodsβ value.
They must undertake not to sell the tyres to dealers or end users who would sell or use them for road-going trucks, buses or similar vehicles.
Customs later sought rectification of the CESTAT order, relying on test reports that had not been placed before the Tribunal during the original hearing. CESTAT rejected that attempt, holding that a rectification application could not be used to introduce new material that was not previously presented.
High Court: the goods were not shown to be prohibited
The Bombay High Court upheld CESTATβs decision and dismissed the Customs Departmentβs writ petition and appeals. The Courtβs reasoning focused on the legal difference between restricted goods and prohibited goods.
Under the 2020 import-policy change, radial tyres used on buses and lorries became restricted. However, tyres used on construction, mining or industrial-handling vehicles under CTI 40118000 remained freely importable.
The Court held that, at the provisional-release stage, Customs had not established that the goods were prohibited. It observed that tyres bearing the βDβ speed symbol, corresponding to 65 km/h, fall below the 80 km/h threshold covered by IS 15636. As a result, the BIS standard invoked by Customs did not directly govern those tyres.
The Court also noted that the 2009 Quality Control Order and subsequent official instructions expressly excluded certain low-speed commercial-vehicle tyres, including tyres marked with speed symbols A to E.
Later testing did not resolve the classification question
In 2024, at DRIβs request, IRMRA tested samples on assumptions that disregarded the βDβ speed marking and assessed the tyres for higher-speed use, including categories up to 110 km/h. Those reports indicated suitability for normal highway truck-and-bus applications under the assumptions used for testing.
However, the High Court noted that the later court-directed IRMRA report of April 2025 was inconclusive on the ultimate classification question. The report stated that:
Based on the βDβ sidewall marking, the tyres were classified as special-use tyres.
The conclusion that they could be suitable for normal highway use was based on tests performed under specific assumptions and irrespective of the marked speed symbol.
The laboratory lacked clear and specific standards or criteria to definitively decide whether the tyres were special-use tyres or normal-road-use tyres.
The Court considered this uncertainty significant. Since the Department had not conclusively shown that the goods were prohibited, Customs could not rely on the prohibition-based restriction in the provisional-release circular to continue withholding them.
Restricted does not automatically mean prohibited
The Court rejected Customsβ argument that goods allegedly imported without a DGFT licence or BIS certification should automatically be treated as prohibited goods.
Relying on the distinction recognized by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Customs v. Atul Automation Pvt. Ltd., the Court held that restricted goods and prohibited goods are not identical categories. Goods subject to regulatory conditions or authorisation requirements are not necessarily goods whose import is completely barred.
The Court also distinguished the Supreme Courtβs decision in Union of India v. Raj Grow Impex LLP. That case involved imports exceeding a strict quantitative limit, where imports beyond the cap were completely barred. The tyre dispute was different because the essential issue, whether the goods were mining tyres or restricted TBR tyres, had not yet been finally determined.
Final order: release required, final merits still open
The High Court dismissed the Customs Departmentβs writ petition and six customs appeals. It allowed the six writ petitions filed by the importers: Pioneer Trading Corporation, Tiara Enterprises, Leo Distributors Private Limited, Trans Tyres LLP, Vikas Retail Private Limited and Aahana Consultancy Limited.
The Court directed provisional release of the seized goods covered by the CESTAT order, subject to the Tribunalβs conditions. It also refused the Departmentβs request to stay the ruling, noting that release had already been delayed despite the Tribunalβs order.
The judgment does not finally settle the tariff classification dispute. Customs has issued a show-cause notice alleging that the importers misdeclared TBR tyres as mining or off-road tyres. The notice proposes confiscation and seeks differential duty of Rs. 8,37,80,608, together with applicable interest.
The Court expressly stated that its observations on provisional release will not affect that pending adjudication. The final determination of classification, confiscation and duty liability therefore remains open.
Key takeaway
The ruling confirms that Customs cannot deny provisional release merely on an unresolved allegation that goods are prohibited. Where the technical classification remains disputed and the evidence does not conclusively establish prohibition, release may be ordered with financial and end-use safeguards, while the final customs proceedings continue separately.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 12.11.2026
Gauhati High Court Examines Limits of NDPS Section 27A
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
The Gauhati High Court has granted conditional bail to an accused in a narcotics case, finding prima facie material for an offence involving possession or trafficking of heroin but insufficient material, at the bail stage, for the additional allegations of financing illicit traffic and criminal conspiracy.
Background of the case
The bail application was filed under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, in connection with a case registered at Chimpu Police Station under Sections 21(b) and 27A of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.
The accused had been arrested on 10 August 2026 and had remained in custody since then. An earlier application for regular bail before the Special Judge under the NDPS Act had been rejected on 23 September 2026.
The defence submitted that the accused had a permanent residence within Arunachal Pradesh, was willing to cooperate with the investigation, and would comply with any bail conditions imposed by the Court.
Prosecution allegations
The prosecution opposed bail on the basis of the seizure memo and the case diary. It alleged that narcotic substances were recovered during a police search of a rented house, where the substances were said to have been concealed in the bedroom, kitchen and toilet.
The prosecution also relied on a statement recorded during the investigation. According to the State, an unknown caller allegedly sought drugs using coded language, following which a co-accused was allegedly sent with a vial containing heroin to meet the caller near a roadside location.
It was further alleged that the seized substances had been obtained a few days before the recovery and were intended for sale rather than personal consumption. The prosecution argued that the alleged transaction involved serious trafficking concerns and that the forensic science laboratory report was still awaited.
Defence submissions
The defence challenged the applicability of Section 27A of the NDPS Act, which concerns financing illicit traffic and harbouring offenders. It contended that the prosecution had not produced material linking the accused to financial dealings with other persons involved in drug trafficking.
The defence also questioned the allegation under Section 29 of the NDPS Act, which addresses abetment and criminal conspiracy. It argued that the available record did not show that the co-accused had knowledge of any alleged trafficking activity.
Further, the defence submitted that the investigation was substantially complete. Searches, seizures, sampling and recording of statements had already been completed, with only the FSL report remaining pending.
High Courtβs assessment
After reviewing the submissions and the updated case diary, the High Court held that there was prima facie material indicating an offence under Section 21(b) of the NDPS Act in relation to possession or trafficking of heroin.
However, the Court found no prima facie material at that stage to support the allegations under Sections 27A and 29. In other words, the material before the Court did not sufficiently indicate financing of illicit trafficking, harbouring of an offender, abetment or criminal conspiracy.
The Court also took account of the period of custody. It noted that where an NDPS offence involves an intermediate quantity, the statutory period for filing a charge sheet is 60 days. In this case, 90 days had elapsed from the date of arrest.
The accusedβs permanent residence, the advanced stage of investigation and the Courtβs view that further detention was no longer necessary for investigative purposes were also relevant considerations.
Bail conditions imposed
The accused was directed to be released on bail subject to these conditions:
Bail bond: Execution of a bail bond of Rs. 30,000 with two sureties of the same amount. Each surety must be a government employee of the State of Arunachal Pradesh.
Weekly attendance: The accused must appear before the investigating agency once a week and mark attendance until completion of the investigation.
Restriction on movement: The accused cannot leave the jurisdiction of the concerned police station without prior permission from the investigating officer.
Legal significance of the order
The order highlights that bail courts must assess the available material for each alleged NDPS offence separately. Although the Court found a prima facie case concerning possession or trafficking under Section 21(b), it did not treat the more serious allegations under Sections 27A and 29 as established without supporting material.
The ruling also shows the relevance of custody duration and the progress of investigation in bail decisions. Where principal investigative steps have been completed and continued detention is not required, those circumstances can weigh in favour of conditional bail. The Court clarified that these observations are limited to the bail application and will not affect the final determination of the criminal case.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.
Aadrikaa Legal Services (ALS)- Law I Litigation I Arbitration
Date: 11.11.2026
Delhi High Court Redefines the Boundaries of IP Litigation: 17 Commercial Plaints Returned
This Short Article has been prepared & written by Advocate Ravi Shekhar Jha-Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The views expressed are based on his interpretation of the law. He can be reached at his email id intelconsul@gmail.com .
In a significant judgment addressing territorial jurisdiction in intellectual property litigation, the Delhi High Court has ordered the return of plaints in 17 commercial suits, reinforcing that litigants cannot select a preferred court merely through website accessibility, online transactions or artificially created causes of action.
Justice delivering the judgment in ABD Maestro Private Limited v. Great Galleon Ventures Ltd. & Connected Matters, examined the principles governing trademark infringement, copyright infringement, passing off and the territorial competence of civil courts.
The Court emphasised that the Delhi High Court’s established expertise in intellectual property matters does not confer nationwide jurisdiction over disputes that properly belong before other courts.
Website Accessibility Does Not Automatically Establish Jurisdiction
The Court examined Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957.
It rejected the proposition that the mere accessibility of an allegedly infringing product on Amazon, Flipkart or another online marketplace automatically establishes a cause of action in Delhi.
The Court distinguished between genuine commercial activities connected with a jurisdiction and incidental digital accessibility.
Key Legal Principles Established
1. Genuine Territorial Connection Is Essential
A plaintiff must establish a legally sustainable connection between the dispute and the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Mere website visibility or online product listings are insufficient.
2. Artificially Created Transactions Cannot Determine Jurisdiction
The Court scrutinised purchases arranged through investigators or agents solely to establish jurisdiction. Such transactions ordinarily cannot manufacture a cause of action, although genuine evidence of existing local sales may be relevant.
3. Forum Non Conveniens Applies to Civil Suits
Even where a limited part of the cause of action arguably arises within a court’s jurisdiction, the Court held that the doctrine of forum non conveniens may be applied to determine whether another competent forum has a more substantial connection with the dispute.
4. Clever Drafting Cannot Substitute for Evidence
The Court clarified that unsupported jurisdictional assertions cannot be protected merely by the doctrine of demurrer. Courts may examine whether pleadings create an artificial impression of territorial jurisdiction.
5. Carrying on Business Requires Statutory Compliance
The existence of an online commercial presence does not automatically establish that a plaintiff or defendant carries on business in every place where its website is accessible.
Important Judicial Precedents Considered
The Court examined established principles emerging from several decisions, including:
Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia, (2015) 10 SCC 161.
Ultra Home Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Purushottam Kumar Chaubey, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 376.
World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. v. Reshma Collection, 2014 SCC OnLine Del 2031.
These precedents informed the Court’s examination of the expression carries on business and the territorial jurisdiction available under general and specialised intellectual property legislation.
Delhi High Court Returns All 17 Plaints
After examining the individual suits, the Court directed that all 17 plaints be returned under Order VII Rule 10 read with Section 151 CPC, for presentation before courts having appropriate territorial jurisdiction.
The plaintiffs were granted liberty to seek directions under Order VII Rule 10A CPC.
Importantly, the Court did not adjudicate the substantive merits of the underlying infringement claims.
Legal Significance: A Warning Against Forum Shopping
The judgment is particularly relevant to trademark proprietors, copyright holders, multinational corporations, e-commerce businesses and commercial litigants.
It reinforces that territorial jurisdiction is a statutory requirement, not a matter of litigation convenience.
For intellectual property owners, the ruling highlights the importance of establishing genuine sales, business operations, actionable infringement or other material facts connecting the dispute to the chosen forum. The decision also reinforces institutional discipline and the equitable distribution of commercial litigation among competent courts throughout India.
Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.
Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.