Tag: #LegalUpdates

  • Supreme Court: Conscious Possession Must Be Established for Conviction Under Section 15 of NDPS Act

    Supreme Court: Conscious Possession Must Be Established for Conviction Under Section 15 of NDPS Act

    Date: 17.10.2026

    The Supreme Court of India dismissed the State of Punjab’s appeal against the acquittal of Hari Singh and other accused, holding that a failure to question them on the central allegation of conscious possession under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) materially weakened the prosecution’s case.

    Case at a glance

    In State of Punjab v. Hari Singh & Ors., the respondents had initially been convicted under Section 15 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act). The trial court sentenced each accused to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment and imposed a fine of Rs. 1,00,000.

    The prosecution alleged that police officers found the accused sitting on 16 gunny bags of poppy husk, each weighing 30 kilograms, near sugarcane fields on 9 July 1999. The accused were arrested after the bags were searched in the presence of a Deputy Superintendent of Police, following their request for the presence of a Gazetted Officer.

    The Punjab and Haryana High Court later acquitted the accused. The State challenged that acquittal before the Supreme Court.

    The central legal issue: conscious possession

    Section 15 of the NDPS Act penalizes unlawful possession of poppy straw. The Court emphasized that possession in this context is not limited to physical custody. For criminal liability, the prosecution must establish conscious possession: possession coupled with awareness and the required mental element.

    The judgment explains that β€œpossession” can take different forms depending on the circumstances. It may be:

    • Physical possession, where a person directly holds or carries an article; or
    • Constructive possession, where a person has the power and control to deal with the article even if it is not physically on them.

    The Court noted that the evidence in this case, including the allegation that the accused were sitting on the bags, was relevant to conscious possession. Under Sections 35 and 54 of the NDPS Act, statutory presumptions may arise once possession is established. A person claiming that possession was not conscious may need to explain circumstances particularly within their knowledge.

    However, proving or relying on possession was not enough by itself. The accused had to be given a fair opportunity to respond to that allegation.

    Why the Section 313 CrPC examination was decisive

    The Supreme Court found that the accused were not asked any question during their examination under Section 313 CrPC about possession or conscious possession of the contraband.

    Section 313 requires the court, after the prosecution evidence closes, to question the accused so they can personally explain circumstances appearing against them. This is a core safeguard in a criminal trial, not a procedural formality.

    The Court reaffirmed several principles:

    • Every material incriminating circumstance should be put to the accused. This allows a meaningful explanation or defence.
    • A circumstance not put to the accused ordinarily cannot be used against them.
    • The purpose is fairness. The provision gives effect to the natural-justice principle that a person must have an opportunity to answer the case against them.
    • Prejudice matters. An omission does not automatically invalidate every trial, but a conviction cannot safely rest on a vital fact that the accused were never asked to explain.

    Here, conscious possession was the essence of the accusation under the NDPS Act. Because that crucial issue was omitted from the Section 313 examination, the omission was held to have a vital effect on the prosecution case.

    The Court’s guidance on personal appearance under Section 313

    The judgment also discussed when an accused must personally appear to answer Section 313 questions. The general rule is that the accused should be personally examined, particularly in cases more serious than summons cases.

    Still, the Court endorsed a limited practical exception for genuine hardship. If an accused already exempted from personal appearance cannot attend because of substantial expense, physical incapacity, or another justified difficulty, the court may permit written answers through a questionnaire.

    This alternative requires safeguards, including:

    1. A written application supported by the accused’s own affidavit explaining the difficulty.
    2. An assurance that the accused will not suffer prejudice from the arrangement.
    3. An undertaking not to challenge the exemption later.
    4. Personally authenticated answers, signed by the accused on every page and returned within the deadline fixed by the court.

    The Court stressed that this is an exceptional arrangement. It cannot become a way for counsel to substitute their own answers for the accused’s statement.

    Outcome of the appeal

    The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s acquittal and dismissed the State of Punjab’s appeal. It concluded that, despite evidence bearing on conscious possession, the failure to put that essential allegation to the accused under Section 313 CrPC justified refusing to interfere with the acquittal.

    The Court did remove one part of the High Court’s order: directions to initiate action against certain officials were expunged because such directions should not have been issued while deciding the criminal appeal.

    Key takeaway

    This decision shows that even in serious NDPS prosecutions, procedural fairness remains indispensable: a conviction cannot rely on a decisive incriminating circumstance, such as conscious possession, unless the accused has been given a proper opportunity to explain it under Section 313 CrPC.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Delhi HC: ROC Approval Does Not Validate a Corporate Name That Violates Companies Act

    Delhi HC: ROC Approval Does Not Validate a Corporate Name That Violates Companies Act

    Date: 17.10.2026

    The Delhi High Court directed Mondelez India Private Limited to adopt a different corporate name after finding that its use of β€œMondelez” was deceptively similar to the pre-existing name of Mondelez Foods Private Limited.

    Background of the dispute

    Mondelez Foods Private Limited, incorporated on 28 May 2012, challenged the Registrar of Companies’ approval of a name change by Nonstop Logistics India Private Limited to β€œMondelez India Private Limited.” The new certificate of incorporation was issued on 11 September 2012.

    The petitioner argued that β€œMondelez” was a distinctive and coined term associated with the Mondelez group and its trademark rights. It stated that it was authorized to use the name and that the later adoption by the other company was intended to exploit the established reputation connected with the word.

    Documents submitted for the name-change request recorded that the company sought the new name because its directors considered it β€œlucky for business transactions.” The petitioner also noted that the company applied to register a β€œMondelez” logo for similar goods.

    Earlier action and rejection by the Regional Director

    Before approaching the High Court, Mondelez Foods Private Limited sent legal notices and filed a rectification representation under Section 22 of the Companies Act, 1956. The Regional Director rejected the representation on two principal grounds:

    • The petitioner was not itself the registered proprietor of the β€œMondelez” trademark.
    • More than 12 months had passed since the registration of the changed corporate name.

    Separately, Intercontinental Great Brands, LLC, formerly known as Kraft Foods Global Brands, LLC, and Mondelez Foods Private Limited obtained a decree in a civil suit on 24 July 2014. That decree restrained the company and related defendants from using β€œMondelez” as a trademark, trade name, corporate name, or part of a corporate name.

    Court’s findings

    Justice Vibhu Bakhru observed that the respondent company did not appear to contest the petition. As a result, the petitioner’s allegations about the respondent’s conduct and intent remained uncontroverted.

    The Court held that the adoption of β€œMondelez” was dishonest and mala fide. It emphasized that β€œMondelez” is a coined and distinctive word, as well as a prominent part of both companies’ names. The Court therefore found the names deceptively similar.

    Under Section 20 of the Companies Act, 1956, a company cannot be registered under an undesirable name. A name may be considered undesirable if it is identical with or too nearly resembles the name of an existing company or a registered trademark. The Court found that the respondent’s name fell within this prohibition and should not have been registered by the Registrar of Companies.

    Effect of the Companies Act, 2013

    The Court noted uncertainty in the wording of Section 22 of the 1956 Act, particularly concerning the 12-month period for a direction to change a company name. However, it considered the newer Companies Act, 2013, which empowers the Central Government to direct a company to change a name that is identical with or too nearly resembles a previously registered company name.

    Because β€œMondelez India Private Limited” too closely resembled β€œMondelez Foods Private Limited,” the Court concluded that the Regional Director had the authority to require a correction.

    Final order

    On 7 July 2017, the Delhi High Court directed the Regional Director to issue the necessary instructions requiring Mondelez India Private Limited to change its name. The replacement name must not be identical with or resemble the petitioner’s name or that of any other existing company.

    The company and its directors were also expressly directed to ensure compliance with the name-change requirement.

    Why the ruling matters

    The decision reinforces that company-name registration is not a mere administrative formality. A distinctive pre-existing corporate identity can be protected where a later name is confusingly similar, particularly when the record indicates dishonest adoption. It also illustrates the interaction between company-name law and trademark protection in preventing misleading corporate identities.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Rajasthan HC Grants Bail Where Samples Were Drawn from Just One of Five Bags

    Rajasthan HC Grants Bail Where Samples Were Drawn from Just One of Five Bags

    Date: 26.09.2026

    The Rajasthan High Court has granted bail to an accused in an NDPS case involving an alleged recovery of 79.400 kg of Doda Chura (poppy straw), after finding that samples for forensic examination were taken from only one out of five bags allegedly recovered from him.

    Justice Ganesh Ram Meena held that since no samples were drawn from the remaining four bags, only the material contained in the sampled bag could, at this stage, be treated as the alleged contraband. That bag weighed 19.80 kg, which was below the commercial quantity threshold. Consequently, the stringent restrictions governing bail under Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 were not attracted in the circumstances considered by the Court.

    Case Arose From Alleged Recovery of 79.400 Kg Doda Chura

    • Sitaram alias Udham Meena filed his second bail application under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS).
    • The proceedings arose from FIR No. 94/2025, registered at Police Station Harnavda Shahji, District Baran, Rajasthan, for offences under Sections 8, 15 and 25 of the NDPS Act.
    • The petitioner’s first bail application had earlier been dismissed as withdrawn by the High Court on 8 May 2026.
    • According to the FIR, the alleged contrabandβ€”Doda Churaβ€”was recovered from the petitioner’s possession in five separate bags, having a combined weight of 79.400 kg.

    Samples Drawn From Only Bag β€˜C’

    • The petitioner’s principal argument concerned the manner in which the samples were drawn.
    • According to the inventory report prepared before the Judicial Officer, two samples were taken only from the packet/bag marked β€˜C’. No samples were taken from the remaining four bags for examination by the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL).
    • The defence therefore argued that there was no forensic material to establish that the substances contained in bags A, B, D and E were also contraband.
    • It was submitted that only the contents of bag C could be treated as alleged contraband for the purpose of considering bail.
    • Crucially, bag C weighed only 19.80 kg. The petitioner argued that this was below commercial quantity and hence the restrictions contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act would not apply.

    State: All Five Bags Contained Similar Material

    • The Public Prosecutor opposed the second bail application.
    • The State argued that samples were taken from only one bag because the material found in the other bags appeared to be the same or similar.
    • It further contended that the total alleged recovery was above commercial quantity and therefore the restrictions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act continued to apply.
    • The High Court, however, did not accept that contention for the purpose of deciding the bail application.

    Court Examines Inventory and Judicial Officer’s Certificate

    • The High Court examined the record and found that the alleged recovery made on 31 May 2025 had been packed in five separate bags marked A, B, C, D and E.
    • The inventory report and certificate issued by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate No. 2, Chhabra, Baran on 6 June 2025 showed that only two samples, marked F and G, were drawn from bag C.
    • No sample was drawn from bags A, B, D or E.
    • This factual circumstance became decisive for the bail determination.

    Unsampled Bags Could Not Be Treated as Contraband at Bail Stage

    • The High Court held that in the absence of samples from the other four bags, the material contained in bag C alone could be treated as the alleged contraband for the purpose under consideration.

    The Court recorded:

    • β€œthe material which has been found to be in bag marked as-C can only be treated to be alleged contraband”
    • Since bag C weighed 19.80 kg, the quantity attributable to the sampled material was below commercial quantity.
    • The ruling is significant because the total physical recovery alleged by the prosecution was 79.400 kg. However, for the bail assessment, the Court did not aggregate the contents of the four bags from which no sample had been taken with the sampled bag merely because the substances appeared similar.

    Rajasthan HC Relies on Hariram v. State of Rajasthan

    • The petitioner relied upon the Rajasthan High Court’s recent order in Hariram v. State of Rajasthan, S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. 741/2026, decided on 20 April 2026.
    • In Hariram, six bags were allegedly recovered containing Doda Chura. However, samples had been drawn from only two bagsβ€”marked A and E.
    • The combined weight of those two sampled bags was 45.400 kg, below the commercial quantity of 50 kg applicable to poppy straw.
    • The Court in Hariram observed that because no samples had been taken or sent to the FSL from the remaining bags, those bags could not be treated as containing contraband merely on assumption, particularly when there was nothing on record showing that the entire recovered material had first been mixed and thereafter sampled.
    • The same reasoning was applied in Sitaram’s case.

    Supreme Court’s Puranmal Jat Decision Considered

    The Hariram order, reproduced in the present judgment, also relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in:

    • Puranmal Jat v. State of Rajasthan, Criminal Appeal No. 3394/2023 arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 10670/2023, decided on 2 November 2023.
    • In that case, the alleged recovery was approximately 35 kg and 150 grams of Doda Posh/poppy straw, while the commercial quantity was 50 kg.
    • The Supreme Court observed that because the recovered quantity was below commercial quantity, the restriction on grant of bail under Section 37 of the NDPS Act did not apply. The accused had also remained in custody for more than seven months and the charge sheet had already been filed.

    Section 37 NDPS Act Not Attracted to 19.80 Kg Sampled Bag

    • Applying the above reasoning, the Rajasthan High Court treated 19.80 kg in bag C as the relevant alleged contraband quantity for the bail consideration.
    • Because this was below commercial quantity, the defence contention was that the special restrictions under Section 37 were not attracted, and the Court’s reasoning proceeded on that basis.
    • This distinction was particularly important because Section 37 imposes stringent conditions for release on bail in cases involving commercial quantity.
    • The order, however, is a bail-stage determination and does not finally adjudicate the nature or quantity of the entire seized material.

    More Than One Year in Custody

    • The Court also took into consideration the period of incarceration.
    • Sitaram had remained in custody since 31 May 2025, meaning that by the date of the order on 25 September 2026, he had spent more than one year in custody.
    • Considering the sampling issue, the quantity of the sampled bag and the period of custody, the High Court found it just and proper to enlarge him on bail.
    • Importantly, the Court expressly stated that it was doing so without expressing any opinion on the merits or demerits of the case.

    Second Bail Application Allowed

    • The Rajasthan High Court accordingly allowed the second bail application.

    The Court directed Sitaram alias Udham Meena to be released upon furnishing:

    • a personal bond of β‚Ή1,00,000; and
    • two sureties of β‚Ή50,000 each,

    to the satisfaction of the Trial Court.

    He was also directed to remain present before the Trial Court, or any court to which the proceedings may be transferred, on subsequent hearing dates and whenever required.

    Bail Can Be Cancelled for Similar Future Offence

    • The High Court imposed an additional safeguard.
    • It directed that if the petitioner is found involved in any other criminal case of a similar nature in the future, the prosecution would be at liberty to move an application seeking cancellation of his bail. Sitaram Alias Udham Meena RHC
    • Thus, the order grants liberty to the accused pending trial but leaves the prosecution free to seek cancellation if the stipulated condition is breached.

    Cases Referred

    Two decisions were central to the reasoning recorded in the order:

    1. Hariram v. State of Rajasthan, S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. 741/2026, decided on 20 April 2026 β€” relied upon for the principle that where multiple bags are separately seized but only some are sampled, unsampled bags cannot automatically be treated as contraband in the absence of FSL examination or evidence that the entire material was mixed before sampling.
    2. Puranmal Jat v. State of Rajasthan, Criminal Appeal No. 3394/2023 arising from SLP (Crl.) No. 10670/2023, decided on 2 November 2023 β€” Supreme Court decision noting that where recovered poppy straw was below the stipulated commercial quantity, the Section 37 restriction did not apply.

    Key Takeaway

    The ruling underscores the importance of representative sampling and forensic examination in multi-bag NDPS recoveries, particularly when the prosecution seeks to rely upon the combined weight to invoke the stringent commercial-quantity bail restrictions under Section 37.

    Where five separate bags were allegedly recovered but the inventory showed that samples were taken from only one bag, the Rajasthan High Court treated only the 19.80 kg contained in that sampled bag as the alleged contraband for the purpose of deciding bail. Since that quantity was below commercial quantity and the accused had spent more than a year in custody, the Court granted bail.

    The ruling should nevertheless be read in its procedural context: the High Court did not acquit the accused or finally hold that the remaining four bags contained no contraband.

    Its determination was confined to the second bail application, and the Court expressly refrained from expressing any opinion on the merits of the prosecution case.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Handy Download:

    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • CESTAT Mumbai Allows Customs Duty Exemption on Dowtherm Heat Transfer Fluid Under SHIS Scheme

    CESTAT Mumbai Allows Customs Duty Exemption on Dowtherm Heat Transfer Fluid Under SHIS Scheme

    Date: 26.09.2026

    The Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), Mumbai has held that Dowtherm RP Heat Transfer Fluid/Dowtherm A Heat Transfer Fluid, used for the initial charging and continuous operation of a Continuous Polycondensation (CP) Plant for manufacturing polyester products, falls within the definition of β€œcapital goods” and is consequently eligible for Customs duty exemption under Notification No. 104/2009-Customs dated 14 September 2009.

    Setting aside the Commissioner’s order, the Tribunal held that the thermic fluids fulfilled the statutory requirements of the Status Holders Incentive Scrip (SHIS) Scheme under the Foreign Trade Policy and that Customs was not justified in denying the exemption merely because the goods were chemicals falling under Chapter 29 or were described as inputs under SION.

    Background of the Dispute

    • Wellknown Polyesters Limited was engaged in manufacturing Polyester Filament Yarn (PFY), Polyester Oriented Yarn (POY), Fully Drawn Yarn (FDY), Draw Textured Yarn (DTY) and polyester chips at its Daman manufacturing facility.
    • For its manufacturing operations, the company had imported a Continuous Polycondensation Plant from Oerlikon Barmag under an EPCG authorisation during April–July 2012. The plant was imported without thermic fluid.
    • Subsequently, the company imported 3,01,296 kg of Dowtherm RP Heat Transfer Fluid/Dowtherm A Heat Transfer Fluid, valued at approximately β‚Ή9.86 crore, through Bills of Entry filed in October 2012. Customs duty involved was approximately β‚Ή2.55 crore.
    • Instead of paying the duty in cash, Wellknown Polyesters utilised eight SHIS scrips issued by the DGFT under the Status Holders Incentive Scrip Scheme and claimed exemption under Notification No. 104/2009-Customs. The goods were initially cleared by Customs extending the exemption.

    DRI Objects to SHIS Benefit

    • The Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), Ahmedabad Zonal Unit subsequently initiated an investigation on the ground that Notification No. 104/2009-Customs permitted duty-free import of capital goods, whereas Dowtherm heat-transfer fluid was, according to the Department, not capital goods.
    • DRI also relied upon the Standard Input Output Norms (SION), under which Dowtherm/Therminol and heat-transfer oil were identified as permitted inputs for manufacture of Polyester Partially Oriented Yarn and Polyester Filament Yarn. The Department therefore treated the material as an input rather than capital goods.
    • A Show Cause Notice dated 14 May 2013 consequently demanded approximately β‚Ή2.55 crore Customs duty with interest under Section 28(1) of the Customs Act, 1962, besides proposing confiscation under Section 111(o) and penalty under Section 112(a).
    • The Commissioner confirmed the duty demand and interest but refrained from confiscating the goods because they were no longer physically available and did not impose the proposed penalty. Wellknown Polyesters challenged that order before CESTAT.

    Appellant: Thermic Fluid Was Integral to Continuous Polycondensation Plant

    • The appellant argued that although the CP Plant and thermic fluid had been imported separately, both were required to operate together.
    • The thermic fluid was charged into the heaters, piping and vessels and thereafter continuously circulated in a closed loop between the heaters and reactors. The polyester polycondensation process required temperatures of approximately 270Β°C–300Β°C under high vacuum, making the thermic fluid critical for providing precise high-temperature heat while maintaining low system pressure.
    • The appellant relied upon the definition of β€œcapital goods” under the Foreign Trade Policy and Notification No. 104/2009-Customs, arguing that it was broad enough to cover goods required directly or indirectly for manufacture, including items necessary for the initial setting up and functioning of plant and machinery.
    • It also relied upon CBEC’s earlier clarification concerning transformer oil, under which oil required for filling/topping up a transformer was considered part of the equipment because the transformer could not function without it.

    Revenue: Chemical Falling Under Chapter 29 Cannot Be Capital Goods

    • The Department maintained that the imported thermic fluid was a chemical classifiable under Chapter 29 and therefore could not be regarded as plant, machinery, equipment or an accessory.
    • The Commissioner’s reasoning was that even though the chemical was indirectly used in manufacturing, its nature did not change into that of plant, machinery, equipment or accessories. The Department also relied upon the fact that SION treated Dowtherm as an input/raw material for polyester production.
    • CESTAT was therefore required to decide whether denial of the exemption under Notification No. 104/2009-Customs for the October 2012 imports was legally sustainable.

    CESTAT Examines SHIS Scheme and Definition of β€˜Capital Goods’

    • The Tribunal examined the Foreign Trade Policy 2009–2014 and observed that the objective of the SHIS Scheme was to promote investment in technology upgradation.
    • Paragraph 3.17.5 of the FTP permitted Duty Credit Scrips to be used for import of inputs or goods, including capital goods, subject to the stipulated conditions. More importantly, the FTP defined β€œcapital goods” broadly as plant, machinery, equipment or accessories required directly or indirectly for manufacture or production, including specified items such as refractories for initial lining and catalysts for initial charge.
    • Notification No. 104/2009-Customs, issued under Section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1962, similarly exempted capital goods and specified components/spares/parts imported against SHIS Duty Credit Scrips from Customs duties, subject to its conditions.
    • CESTAT found the definition of β€œcapital goods” under the Customs notification and the FTP to be substantially identical.

    Thermic Fluid Critical to Functioning of CP Plant

    • The Tribunal accepted the technical evidence concerning the role played by Dowtherm in the Continuous Polycondensation Plant.
    • It observed that the thermic fluid enabled the plant to provide precise high-temperature heat while maintaining low pressure, thereby permitting efficient continuous polycondensation and energy-efficient manufacture of high molecular weight polyester.
    • On that basis, CESTAT concluded that the imported goods fulfilled the statutory requirements of the SHIS Scheme.
    • A particularly important factual finding arose from the Chartered Engineer’s Certificate. Out of the total 3,01,296 kg of imported thermic fluid, 2,92,920 kgβ€”approximately 97.2%β€”was used as a one-time/initial charge in the CP Plant’s Electric Thermal Oil Heater Boiler.
    • The fluid thereafter enabled continuous high-temperature operation at very low pressure for the polycondensation process.
    • The technical diagrams reproduced on pages 13–15 of the order further illustrate the closed-loop recirculation of Dowtherm between the thermic-fluid heater and CP Plant, the stages of polyester manufacture where heat transfer is required, and the Electric Thermal Oil Heater Boiler arrangement.

    Capitalisation in Books Also Supported Appellant

    • CESTAT additionally noted that the imported thermic fluid had been capitalised in Wellknown Polyesters’ books of account, as certified by its Chartered Accountants on 29 May 2026.
    • The Tribunal regarded this financial treatment as further evidence supporting the appellant’s case that the imported goods were treated as capital goods.

    Accordingly, the Bench held:

    • β€œthe impugned goods are covered under the definition of β€˜capital goods’”
    • and were therefore eligible for exemption under Notification No. 104/2009-Customs.

    CESTAT Relies on Reliance Communications Infrastructure

    • The Tribunal found support in Reliance Communications Infrastructure v. Commissioner of Customs, 2009 (240) E.L.T. 461 (Tri.-Bang.).
    • In that case, a Gas Suppression System included HFC 227 EA gas. The Tribunal had held that Customs could not dissect an integrated system and treat the gas required for its functioning as a mere consumable when the EPCG licence covered the complete system.
    • CESTAT applied the same reasoning to the thermic fluid, observing that where a material is essential to the functioning of the plant, its character cannot be determined merely by isolating it from the system in which it operates.

    Transformer Oil Analogy Applied to Dowtherm

    • CESTAT also referred to CBEC Circular No. 344/60/97-CX dated 22 October 1997, concerning transformer oil.
    • The circular recognised that a transformer cannot function without transformer oil and that the equipment cannot be regarded as complete without the oil filled into it.
    • Applying the same analogy, CESTAT held that if the Continuous Polycondensation Plant cannot function without thermic fluid, the fluid has to be treated as part of the plant, notwithstanding the absence of a specific Customs clarification concerning thermic fluid.

    Cases Cited by Wellknown Polyesters

    The appellant relied upon several judicial authorities in support of its interpretation of capital goods:

    S. No.CaseCitation
    1Reliance Communications Infrastructure v. Commissioner of Customs2009 (240) E.L.T. 461 (Tri.-Bang.)
    2Commissioner of Central Excise, Coimbatore v. Jawahar Mills2001 (132) E.L.T. 3 (S.C.)
    3Bharti Airtel Limited v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune2025 (391) E.L.T. 3 (S.C.)
    4Chief Commissioner of Central Goods and Service Tax & Ors. v. Safari Retreats Private Limited & Ors.2024 SCC OnLine SC 2691
    5Scientific Engineering House (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Andhra Pradesh(1986) 1 SCC 11
    • These authorities are expressly recorded in the appellant’s submissions.
    • Of these, the final reasoning expressly discusses and applies Reliance Communications Infrastructure.

    Final Decision: Wellknown Polyesters Wins Appeal

    CESTAT concluded that the Commissioner’s order denying the benefit of Notification No. 104/2009-Customs dated 14 September 2009 by refusing to treat Dowtherm RP/Dowtherm A Heat Transfer Fluid as capital goods β€œdoes not stand the scrutiny of law.”

    The Tribunal consequently set aside the Order-in-Original dated 7 October 2016 and allowed Wellknown Polyesters’ appeal in its favour.

    The ruling is significant for the interpretation of capital goods under export-promotion schemes, particularly where a material may chemically resemble an input or consumable but is technically required as an initial charge and thereafter continuously circulates as an integral part of plant operation.

    It also demonstrates that classification of an item as a chemical under Chapter 29, or its description as an β€œinput” under SION for a different regulatory purpose, is not by itself determinative of whether it can qualify as capital goods under the specific language and objective of an exemption notification.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Handy Download:

    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Delhi High Court: Trademark Refusal Must Be Based on Reasoned Analysis, Not Mere Similarity of Marks

    Delhi High Court: Trademark Refusal Must Be Based on Reasoned Analysis, Not Mere Similarity of Marks

    Date: 25.09.2026

    The Delhi High Court has set aside the refusal of Lucy Group Ltd.’s application for registration of the trademark β€œGEMINI” in Class 09, holding that the Registrar of Trademarks failed to consider crucial factual and legal submissions placed before it.

    Justice Jyoti Singh held that the Registrar’s order was β€œunreasoned, non-speaking and reflects non-application of mind”, observing that a quasi-judicial authority is legally required to consider all relevant contentions and issues raised by the parties before arriving at its decision.

    The High Court, however, did not decide whether GEMINI was ultimately entitled to registration. Instead, it remanded the trademark application to the Registrar for fresh consideration and directed a decision within 10 weeks after hearing Lucy Group.

    Background: Lucy Group’s β€˜GEMINI’ Trademark Application

    • Lucy Group Ltd. filed the appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, challenging the Registrar’s order dated 17 April 2025, which had refused registration of its trademark under Application No. 5247072 dated 14 December 2021 in Class 09.
    • According to the company, it first used the GEMINI mark in India at the Elecrama trade event in Bengaluru on 13 February 2016, where it promoted and displayed products to potential customers and business associates.
    • Lucy Group subsequently filed a convention trademark application in Great Britain on 16 June 2021 and, on 14 December 2021, applied to register GEMINI in India as a convention application.

    Trademark Registry Cites Four Earlier β€˜GEMINI’ Marks

    • On 4 January 2022, the Registry issued an Examination Report raising an objection under Section 11(1) of the Trade Marks Act.
    • Four earlier marks were cited on the ground that Lucy Group’s proposed GEMINI mark was identical or similar to marks already appearing on the Register in respect of identical or similar goods.
    • Following hearings and written submissions, the Registrar refused registration on 17 April 2025. Lucy Group thereafter filed Form TM-M on 15 May 2025 seeking detailed grounds for refusal, but according to the appeal, those grounds were never supplied.

    Lucy Group: Registrar Failed to Compare the Actual Goods

    • Lucy Group’s principal grievance was that the Registrar had merely noted the existence of four earlier registrations and concluded that there was a likelihood of confusion because of the allegedly similar goods.
    • The company argued that the Registrar had failed to undertake a meaningful comparative analysis of the nature and function of the goods, their trade channels and the relevant consumers.
    • It also challenged the Registrar’s finding that adoption of GEMINI was not bona fide, arguing that this was not a ground of refusal under Section 11(1).

    Lucy Group’s GEMINI Products Are Industrial SCADA and RTU Systems

    • A central aspect of Lucy Group’s case was the highly specialised nature of the products for which registration was sought.
    • The application covered industrial-grade products including SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems and GEMINI RTUs (Remote Terminal Units).
    • The RTUs were described as multipurpose units intended for advanced feeder automation and for controlling and monitoring pole- and ground-mounted medium-voltage switchgear.
    • Lucy Group relied on product catalogues, technical specifications and its corporate profile to show that it operated in the specialised field of power automation, grid monitoring and infrastructure control systems.
    • The company also claimed continuous and extensive use of GEMINI in India since February 2016 and argued that the specialised nature, application and trade channels of its goods distinguished them from the products covered by the cited registrations.

    Cited Mark 1: β€˜Wires and Cables’

    • The first cited GEMINI registration, No. 728627 in Class 09, covered β€œwires and cables.”
    • Lucy Group argued that wires and cables were basic electrical transmission components, whereas its SCADA systems, RTUs and industrial switchgear were advanced control systems integrated with software and supplied as part of specialised engineering projects.
    • It further claimed that the two marks had co-existed in the Indian market since 2016 without reported confusion and that GEMINI had acquired secondary distinctiveness among its customers.

    Cited Mark 2: Television Broadcasting and Entertainment Products

    • The second cited registration, No. 953168, was also for GEMINI in Class 09 and belonged to Sun TV Network Limited.
    • Lucy Group argued that the goods associated with this registration related to the television broadcasting and entertainment sector, whereas its own products concerned industrial power-distribution and control solutions.
    • According to Lucy Group, the nature, purpose and consumer base of the respective goods were entirely different. It also informed the Court that it had filed a rectification petition on the ground of non-use against the second cited mark on 30 July 2022, which remained pending.

    Third Mark Abandoned; Fourth Filed on β€˜Proposed to Be Used’ Basis

    • Lucy Group also raised specific objections regarding the remaining two cited marks.
    • It submitted that Registration No. 3164101 for GEMINI in Class 09 had been abandoned before the date of the impugned order.
    • As regards the fourth mark, Application No. 3939124, Lucy Group pointed out that it had been filed on a β€œproposed to be used” basis and that its filing was later than Lucy Group’s claimed first use of GEMINI.
    • The detailed comparison reproduced on pages 5–9 of the High Court order further contrasted Lucy Group’s specialised industrial products with the goods associated with each cited mark, including wires and cables, broadcasting/electronic goods, consumer electronics and portable spectroscopic instruments.

    Same Trademark Class Does Not Automatically Mean Goods Are Similar: Lucy Group’s Argument

    • Lucy Group argued that goods cannot be treated as similar merely because they fall within the same Nice Classification class.
    • According to the company, the correct enquiry was whether the respective goods were commercially and functionally similar, rather than whether there was a theoretical or broad overlap in their classification.
    • It also emphasised that Section 11 requires consideration of likelihood of confusion β€œon the part of the public”, yet the Registrar had not identified the relevant public or adequately examined the consumers involved.

    Registrar Defends Refusal Under Section 11

    • The Registrar defended the order, arguing that the GEMINI application was barred by earlier identical marks appearing on the Trade Marks Register.
    • It contended that Lucy Group’s mark was phonetically, visually and structurally identical to the cited marks and that the relevant goods were similar or identical, creating a likelihood of confusion under Section 11(1).
    • In particular, the Registrar argued that electrical goods such as wires, cables and switchgear may travel through the same trade channels and reach common classes of consumers such as electricians, contractors and engineers.
    • According to the Registrar, treating specialised industrial products as wholly different from cables created an artificial distinction because cables and switchgear could be closely connected in the modern electrical industry.

    Delhi High Court Finds Crucial Submissions Were Ignored

    • After examining the Examination Report, Lucy Group’s reply and its detailed written submissions, the High Court found a fundamental defect in the Registrar’s decision-making process.
    • Justice Jyoti Singh observed that none of the crucial submissions had been considered.
    • The registration had essentially been refused because the applied-for mark was considered phonetically and visually similar to the cited marks and the goods were treated as similar.
    • However, the Registrar had not examined the distinctions Lucy Group sought to establish regarding the nature and function of the competing goods.

    Registrar Failed to Consider Abandoned and Later-Filed Marks

    The Court specifically noted that the Registrar had also failed to consider Lucy Group’s submissions that:

    • the third cited mark had been abandoned; and
    • the fourth cited mark was filed on a β€œproposed to be used” basis much after Lucy Group’s claimed first use.

    The High Court observed that these crucial facts and legal issues were not even referred to in the impugned order.

    Significantly, the Court stated that had these matters been considered and adjudicated, the decision might have been different.

    Quasi-Judicial Authorities Must Deal With Relevant Contentions

    • The Court then reiterated an important principle governing administrative and quasi-judicial decision-making.
    • It held that even a quasi-judicial authority is under a legal obligation to consider all contentions and issues raised by the parties, insofar as they are relevant, before taking a decision.

    Viewed against that requirement, the Registrar’s order was held to be:

    • β€œclearly unreasoned, non-speaking and reflects non-application of mind.”
    • This became the decisive basis for judicial interference.

    High Court Does Not Decide Trademark Registration on Merits

    • Importantly, the Delhi High Court expressly stated that it was not entering into the merits of Lucy Group’s claim for registration.
    • The Court therefore did not finally rule that the cited GEMINI marks were dissimilar, that there was no likelihood of confusion, or that Lucy Group was necessarily entitled to registration.
    • Instead, it remanded the matter to the Registrar for a fresh decision.
    • This distinction is significant because Lucy Group secured a procedural appellate victory, while the substantive question of whether GEMINI should ultimately be registered remains for reconsideration by the Trademark Registry.

    Fresh Decision Within 10 Weeks

    The High Court directed the Registrar to freshly consider Application No. 5247072 after hearing Lucy Group and taking into account all the points raised in response to the Examination Report.

    The Registrar was specifically directed to consider documents already on record, including the:

    • priority documents;
    • user affidavit;
    • written submissions dated 6 August 2024;
    • written submissions dated 17 February 2025; and
    • written submissions dated 15 March 2025.

    The fresh decision must be taken within 10 weeks from 27 March 2026. The Court also directed that no new documents would be permitted before the Registrar during the reconsideration.

    The appeal was accordingly allowed and disposed of.

    Why the Judgment Matters for Trademark Examination

    • The ruling highlights an important procedural safeguard in trademark registration proceedings. The existence of an identical or similar earlier mark may trigger scrutiny under Section 11, but a refusal order must still demonstrate that the Registrar has considered the material factual and legal submissions placed by the applicant.
    • Where an applicant specifically distinguishes the competing goods by their function, market, consumer base and trade channelsβ€”or raises issues concerning abandonment, priority and claimed prior useβ€”those contentions cannot simply be ignored.
    • At the same time, the judgment should not be understood as establishing a general rule that goods within the same class are necessarily dissimilar merely because their applications differ. The High Court deliberately left the merits open for the Registrar’s fresh determination.

    Key Takeaway

    The Delhi High Court’s decision reinforces that trademark refusal orders must be reasoned, speaking orders reflecting consideration of relevant evidence and contentions.

    A mechanical conclusion based on similarity of marks and broadly stated similarity of goods, without addressing material objections raised by the applicant, may not withstand appellate scrutiny.

    For Lucy Group, the judgment reopens the path to registration of GEMINI in Class 09, but does not itself grant the trademark registration. The Registrar must now reconsider the application on its merits within the timeline fixed by the Court.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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  • Calcutta High Court Grants Bail in NDPS Case Over Prolonged Detention; Says Section 37 Rigours Do Not Bar Bail for Trial Delay

    Calcutta High Court Grants Bail in NDPS Case Over Prolonged Detention; Says Section 37 Rigours Do Not Bar Bail for Trial Delay

    Date: 25.09.2026

    The Calcutta High Court granted bail to an accused facing prosecution under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, holding that prolonged incarceration coupled with little possibility of commencement of trial justified release on bail.

    Significantly, the Division Bench observed that a bail plea founded on delay in trial is not fettered by the restrictions contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, relying upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Rabi Prakash v. State of Odisha, (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1109.

    Background of the Case

    • The bail application was filed under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in connection with Kaliachak Police Station Case No. 875 of 2022 dated 12 August 2022.
    • The petitioner, Alok Kumar Mandal @ Alok Mandal, was facing proceedings for alleged offences under Sections 21(c), 27A and 29 of the NDPS Act.
    • Section 21(c) concerns contraventions involving a commercial quantity of manufactured drugs or preparations, while Section 27A deals with financing illicit traffic and harbouring offenders. Section 29 relates to abetment and criminal conspiracy.

    Accused in Custody for One Year and Eight Months

    • Counsel for the petitioner submitted that Mandal had already remained in custody for approximately one year and eight months.
    • More importantly, despite this period of incarceration, charges had still not been framed. The petitioner therefore sought bail primarily on the ground of delay in the criminal proceedings.

    Investigation Was Still Continuing

    • The State placed a report before the High Court.
    • The report showed that further investigation was still underway and forensic analysis of the mobile phone belonging to co-accused Devendra Ahuja was awaited.
    • The status of the investigation became particularly relevant because it indicated that commencement of the trial was not imminent.

    High Court Finds Little Possibility of Trial Commencing Soon

    • After considering the material on record, the Division Bench noted that there was β€œlittle possibility of commencement of trial.”
    • The Court also took into account the petitioner’s prolonged detention and concluded that he had made out a case for bail on the ground of delay in trial.
    • The case therefore turned substantially on the effect of prolonged pre-trial incarceration in an NDPS prosecution where the trial itself had yet to effectively commence.

    Section 37 NDPS Act Does Not Fetter Bail Based on Trial Delay: High Court

    • The most significant observation in the order concerns the stringent bail restrictions contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
    • Ordinarily, Section 37 imposes additional conditions for granting bail in cases involving specified serious NDPS offences and commercial quantity.

    However, the High Court held:

    • β€œBail prayer on the ground of delay in trial is not fettered by restrictions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act…”
    • The Court relied upon the Supreme Court judgment in Rabi Prakash v. State of Odisha, (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1109 for this proposition.
    • The ruling therefore distinguishes a bail claim based upon the merits of the prosecution from one arising because continued pre-trial incarceration has become prolonged while the trial remains unlikely to commence within a reasonable period.

    Reliance on Supreme Court’s Rabi Prakash Decision

    The only judicial precedent expressly cited in the short order is:

    Rabi Prakash v. State of Odisha, (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1109.

    • By relying on Rabi Prakash, the High Court treated prolonged detention and delay in trial as grounds capable of being considered notwithstanding the statutory restrictions governing ordinary bail under Section 37.

    Bail Granted on β‚Ή10,000 Bond

    • Having found sufficient grounds for release, the High Court directed that Alok Kumar Mandal be released on bail upon furnishing a bond of β‚Ή10,000 with two sureties of the like amount, one of whom must be a local surety.
    • The bond was required to be furnished to the satisfaction of the Judge, Special Court under the NDPS Act-cum-Additional District Judge, 4th Court, Malda.

    Conditions Imposed by the High Court

    • The grant of bail was subject to conditions intended to protect the trial process.
    • The petitioner was directed to appear before the Trial Court on every date of hearing until further orders. He was also prohibited from intimidating witnesses or tampering with evidence in any manner.
    • The High Court further clarified that if the petitioner failed to appear before the Trial Court without justifiable cause, the Trial Court would be at liberty to cancel the bail in accordance with law without further reference to the High Court.
    • The bail application was accordingly allowed.

    Why the Decision Is Significant

    • The order is important for NDPS bail jurisprudence because it reiterates that the stringent conditions prescribed by Section 37 cannot be considered in isolation from prolonged pre-trial detention and delay in commencement of trial.
    • The decision does not hold that Section 37 ceases to apply generally in NDPS prosecutions. Rather, the Court specifically dealt with a situation where the accused had remained incarcerated for one year and eight months, charges had not been framed, further investigation remained pending, and there was little prospect of the trial commencing soon.
    • The distinction is important: the relief was based on delay in trial and prolonged detention, not on a final determination concerning the merits of the NDPS allegations.

    Key Takeaway

    The Calcutta High Court has reaffirmed that prolonged incarceration and substantial delay in commencement of an NDPS trial can constitute an independent basis for bail, and a bail plea founded on such delay is not fettered by the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • CESTAT Chennai: Vitamin Feed Premixes Classifiable as Animal Feed Preparations Under CTH 2309

    CESTAT Chennai: Vitamin Feed Premixes Classifiable as Animal Feed Preparations Under CTH 2309

    Date: 25.09.2026

    In a significant ruling concerning the customs classification of feed-grade vitamins and animal nutrition preparations, the CESTAT Chennai has set aside a Customs order seeking to classify imported Vitamin E 50% Feed Grade, Vitamin B2 80% Feed Grade and Vitamin C 35% Feed Grade under CTH 2936 instead of CTH 2309.

    The Tribunal held that, in the absence of a chemical examiner’s report establishing that the imported products were pure chemicals or separate chemically defined organic compounds falling under Chapter 29, the Department had failed to discharge the burden necessary to sustain its proposed classification. Consequently, the benefit of classification was required to go to the importer, Provimi Animal Nutrition India Pvt. Ltd.

    The Classification Dispute: CTH 2309 vs CTH 2936

    Provimi imported goods described as:

    • Vitamin E 50% Feed Grade
    • Vitamin B2 80% Feed Grade
    • Vitamin C 35% Feed Grade
    • The importer classified these products under CTH 2309, covering β€œpreparations of a kind used in animal feeding.”
    • Customs disagreed. The Department considered CTH 2309 to be general in nature and took the view that CTH 2936, covering provitamins, vitamins and their derivatives, was the more specific heading under Rule 3(a) of the General Rules for Interpretation (GRI).
    • According to Revenue, CTH 2309 applies to products presented in a form suitable for use as animal food supplements, whereas the imported vitamins were essentially inputs or raw materials requiring further processing before being incorporated into aquatic, poultry or cattle feed.
    • The Department therefore proposed classification under CTH 2936, attracting 7.5% Basic Customs Duty under Sl. No. 185 of Notification No. 50/2017-Customs and 18% IGST under Sl. No. 40 of Schedule III of Notification No. 1/2017-IGST.

    Customs Raises β‚Ή58.83 Lakh Differential Duty Demand

    • A Show Cause Notice dated 8 March 2024 proposed rejection of Provimi’s classification, reclassification under CTH 2936, denial of the relevant notification benefits and recovery of β‚Ή58,83,019 as short-levied duty, along with confiscation and penalties.
    • The Commissioner of Customs (Audit), Chennai subsequently confirmed the proposals through Order-in-Original No. 108625/2024 dated 16 August 2024, leading Provimi to approach CESTAT.

    Provimi: Products Are Specifically Formulated for Animal Feed

    • Provimi argued that the imported goods were essentially animal-feed preparations and appropriately fell under Chapter Heading 2309.
    • The company relied upon the WCO’s HSN Explanatory Notes to Heading 23.09, particularly the category covering preparations used in making complete feeds or supplementary feeds.
    • It also argued that the goods were designed exclusively for animal use, contained specifically tailored additives, were labelled accordingly and were supplied only to businesses engaged in animal feed and animal husbandry.
    • The importer further contended that Chapter 29 primarily covers separate chemically defined compounds, whereas its imported products were not pure vitamins and contained additives intended to make them suitable specifically for animal nutrition.

    Department: High-Concentration Vitamins Are Raw Materials, Not Animal Feed

    • Revenue countered that the imported products contained vitamins in concentrations ranging from 35% to 80% and could not themselves be directly consumed by animals.
    • The Department argued that they were merely inputs/raw materials for manufacturing animal feed, rather than animal feed or feed supplements themselves.
    • It relied particularly on Commissioner of Customs CGO v. Sonam International Shop No. 9, 2020 (10) TMI 120 – Allahabad High Court, where the High Court considered high-concentration vitamins in the context of classification under Heading 2309.
    • Revenue also referred to the Constitution Bench decision in Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Dilip Kumar and Company & Ors., AIR 2018 SC 3606 in support of its position concerning the interpretation of exemption/classification jurisprudence and earlier reliance on Sun Export Corporation.

    CESTAT Applies Supreme Court’s 2026 Welkin Foods Ruling

    • A major feature of the Tribunal’s analysis was the Supreme Court’s recent judgment in Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Welkin Foods, 2026 INSC 19.
    • CESTAT noted that Welkin Foods comprehensively examined customs classification principles, including the role of:
    • GRI 1, tariff headings and statutory notes, HSN Explanatory Notes, the common/trade parlance test, and the relevance of end use.
    • The Supreme Court had emphasised that GRI 1 is the fundamental starting point for customs classification. Classification must first be determined according to the terms of the headings and the relevant Section and Chapter Notes.
    • Only where goods cannot be classified through GRI 1 and the applicable legal notes should the subsequent rules be considered sequentially.

    Common Parlance Test Cannot Override Technical Tariff Provisions

    • Provimi had argued that, in common and trade parlance, the products were understood as animal-feed supplements.
    • CESTAT, applying Welkin Foods, held that the common or trade parlance test has to be applied restrictively in the modern HSN-based classification system.
    • The Tribunal observed that the terminology employed in Chapters 23 and 29 is scientific and technical. Consequently, the tariff provisions must primarily be interpreted technically rather than simply according to the manner in which the goods are marketed or commercially described.
    • It further observed that an importer relying on a trade-parlance meaning must produce satisfactory evidence supporting that meaning.

    End Use, However, Was Relevant

    • While limiting the common-parlance argument, CESTAT found that end use could legitimately be considered in the present classification dispute.
    • Heading 2309 itself refers to preparations β€œof a kind used in animal feeding,” while Heading 2936 deals with vitamins and their derivatives used primarily as vitamins.
    • The language of the competing headings therefore permitted consideration of use or adaptation as part of the classification exercise.

    Chapter 23 Does Not Exclude Products Merely Because They Are of Chemical Origin

    • Revenue also argued that Heading 2309 covered products obtained from the processing of vegetable or animal materials, whereas Provimi’s products were chemicals.
    • CESTAT rejected a blanket exclusion on that basis.
    • The Tribunal held that the relevant Chapter Note is inclusive and does not exclude products of chemical origin if they otherwise satisfy the description compatible with Chapter 23.
    • This finding is important because it prevents the mere chemical origin of a product from automatically determining classification under Chapter 29.

    Crucial Evidentiary Gap: No Chemical Examiner’s Report

    The decisive weakness in Revenue’s case was the absence of technical evidence.

    CESTAT observed that it did not have the benefit of an expert chemical test report prepared at the time of import to establish whether the products were:

    separate chemically defined organic compounds, capable of classification under Chapter 29; or

    preparations of a kind used in animal feeding, falling under Chapter 23.

    • The Certificates of Analysis submitted by Provimi also did not contain the considered opinion of a technical expert capable of conclusively resolving this question.
    • Provimi maintained that the imported vitamins were not pure vitamins but were formulated with various additives specifically for animal-feed applications, altering their suitability and making them intended for animal nutrition.

    HSN Notes Recognise Premixes Under Heading 2309

    CESTAT then examined the HSN Explanatory Notes because it found the HSN and Customs Tariff entries under Chapter 23 to be sufficiently aligned.

    The HSN Notes divide the relevant Heading 23.09 preparations into three broad categories:

    HSN categoryDescription
    AComplete feed
    BPreparations supplementing/balancing farm-produced feeds
    CPreparations used in making complete or supplementary feeds
    • The Tribunal observed that the disputed goods were not complete feed or feed supplements falling within categories A or B. However, category C specifically concerns β€œpreparations” used in making such feeds, commonly known in trade as premixes.
    • This was significant because a product need not necessarily be directly fed to an animal in order to fall within the broader scope of Heading 2309.

    Government Circular Identified Products as β€œVitamin Premixes (Feed Grade)”

    • Provimi also relied upon a circular dated 21 December 2022 issued by the Department of Animal Husbandry and Dairying, Ministry of Fisheries, Animal Husbandry and Dairying.
    • The Tribunal recorded that the very products involved in the disputeβ€”Vitamin E 50% Feed Grade, Vitamin B2 80% Feed Grade and Vitamin C 35% Monophosphate Feed Gradeβ€”were expressly mentioned as β€œVitamin Premixes (Feed Grade)” in that document.

    CESTAT Also Examines Meaning of β€œPremix”

    • The Tribunal referred to the Customs Advance Ruling in In Re: BASF India Ltd., (2024) 24 Centax 401 (A.A.R.-Cus.-Mum.).
    • That ruling discussed premixes as complex mixtures of vitamins, minerals, trace elements and other feed additives incorporated into compound feed, and explained that such premixtures are not themselves intended for direct feeding to animals.
    • This was relevant to Revenue’s argument that the products could not fall under Heading 2309 merely because they were not capable of being directly consumed by animals.

    Burden to Establish Reclassification Lies on Customs

    • CESTAT ultimately treated the burden of proof as decisive.
    • Referring to Union of India v. Garware Nylons Ltd., 1996 (87) E.L.T. 12 (S.C.) and HPL Chemicals Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh, 2006 (197) E.L.T. 324 (S.C.), the Tribunal reiterated that when Revenue seeks a particular classification, it must establish that the goods are taxable under the classification proposed by it.
    • Because there was no Chemical Examiner’s certificate establishing whether the goods were pure chemicals, mixture concentrates or premixes, Revenue had failed to discharge that burden.
    • CESTAT therefore held that the benefit of classification must go to the appellant.

    B.V. Bio Corp Decision Supports Classification Under CTH 23099090

    • The Tribunal also relied on its coordinate-bench ruling in B.V. Bio Corp Private Limited v. Commissioner of Customs (NS-I), 2024 (4) TMI 1173 – CESTAT Mumbai.
    • That case concerned imported products containing vitamins and provitamins in concentrations ranging from 2.7% to 100%.
    • The Mumbai Bench had concluded that the goods were classifiable under Tariff Item 23099090 and that classification under Heading 2936 was not legally sustainable.
    • The judgment further records that the B.V. Bio Corp position was affirmed, with the goods being treated as animal-feed preparations appropriately classified under Tariff Item 23099090, having regard to Circular No. 188/22/96-CX dated 26 March 1996.

    Duty, Interest, Confiscation and Penalty Fall with Classification Demand

    • Once Revenue failed to sustain the proposed classification under CTH 2936, CESTAT held that the consequential duty demand, interest, fine and penalty could not survive.
    • Provimi had separately challenged confiscation and penalty under Sections 111, 125 and 114A of the Customs Act, 1962, arguing inter alia that a bona fide classification claim did not amount to misdeclaration.

    Final Decision: Provimi’s Appeal Allowed

    • CESTAT set aside the impugned Order-in-Original and allowed Provimi’s appeal to the limited extent decided in the classification proceedings, with consequential relief as available under law.
    • The Tribunal, however, made an important qualification regarding Provimi’s separate refund claim. Issues such as refund that were not part of the original proceedings were not adjudicated in this appeal and would have to be pursued separately in accordance with law.
    • Thus, while Provimi succeeded in overturning the Department’s reclassification and consequential demand, the order should not be read as having independently sanctioned the refund claimed by the company.

    Key Takeaway

    The ruling reinforces an important principle in customs classification disputes: Customs cannot sustain reclassification merely by asserting that an alternative tariff heading is more specific. When the proposed classification depends upon the chemical composition and technical character of imported goods, Revenue must produce adequate technical evidence to discharge its burden of proof.

    For feed-grade vitamins and premixes, the decision also recognises that Heading 2309 is not confined to products directly consumed by animals.

    Preparations used in making complete or supplementary feeds can fall within its scope, subject to their objective characteristics, composition, HSN guidance and supporting technical evidence.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Supreme Court: Accused Must Be Clearly and Individually Informed of Section 50 Right Before Personal Search

    Supreme Court: Accused Must Be Clearly and Individually Informed of Section 50 Right Before Personal Search

    Date: 24.09.2026

    In an important judgment governing search and seizure under the NDPS Act, the Supreme Court held that the statutory right available to an accused under Section 50(1) must be communicated clearly, unambiguously and individually to each person who is about to be searched.

    The Court ruled that a joint notice to multiple accused is insufficient. It further held that an investigating officer cannot offer an accused a β€œthird option” of being searched before a gazetted officer who is himself a member of the raiding party, because Section 50 contemplates a search before the nearest Magistrate or nearest gazetted officer and the safeguard is intended to provide an element of independence.

    Upholding the Rajasthan High Court’s acquittal of Parmanand and Surajmal, the Supreme Court dismissed the State’s appeal and held that the breach of Section 50 had vitiated the search and consequently the conviction.

    Background of the Case

    • The prosecution case arose from information received by a Narcotics Department officer on 13 October 1997 that Parmanand and Surajmal would deliver approximately 10 kg of opium the following morning at Nangdi-Tiraha, Iklera, Chhipabaraud Road.
    • A raiding party headed by Superintendent J.S. Negi was constituted. At approximately 4:25 a.m., the two accused arrived and were intercepted. Parmanand was carrying a white gunny bag.
    • Before conducting the search, the officers purported to inform the accused about their rights under Section 50. A single written notice was issued to both accused.
    • Surajmal gave written consent not only for himself but purportedly also on behalf of Parmanand. Parmanand himself did not independently sign the notice or provide independent consent. The officers thereafter searched Parmanand’s bag and recovered 9.6 kg of opium.

    Trial Court Convicted the Accused

    • The Special Judge convicted Parmanand under Section 8 read with Section 18 of the NDPS Act, while Surajmal was convicted under Section 8 read with Section 28.
    • Each was sentenced to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine of β‚Ή10 lakh, with a further two years’ rigorous imprisonment in default of payment of the fine.
    • The accused appealed to the Rajasthan High Court, which acquitted them. The State of Rajasthan thereafter approached the Supreme Court challenging that acquittal.

    Central Question Before the Supreme Court

    • The central issue was whether the search complied with the mandatory safeguards contained in Section 50 of the NDPS Act.
    • The State argued that the accused had been informed of their right to be searched before a Magistrate or gazetted officer and that a written notice had been given. The respondents countered that the notice was a joint notice, whereas each accused was entitled to an individual communication of his statutory right.

    Does Section 50 Apply When Drugs Are Recovered From a Bag?

    • The case raised an important preliminary issue because the opium was recovered from the bag carried by Parmanand, rather than from his body.
    • The Supreme Court distinguished between two situations.
    • Where only a bag, briefcase or container carried by a person is searched, without searching the person’s body, Section 50 does not apply. The Court referred to Kalema Tumba v. State of Maharashtra and State of Himachal Pradesh v. Pawan Kumar in support of this principle.
    • However, where both the bag and the person’s body are searched, Section 50 applies.
    • The Court relied upon Dilip & Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Union of India v. Shah Alam, where personal searches conducted in addition to searches of vehicles or bags brought Section 50 into operation.
    • In the present case, the officers searched Parmanand’s bag and also conducted personal searches of both accused. The Supreme Court therefore held that Section 50 was applicable.

    Joint Section 50 Notice Is Not Sufficient

    • The most significant principle emerging from the judgment concerns joint notices under Section 50.
    • The Supreme Court found that there had been no individual communication of the statutory right. A common notice was issued, and Surajmal purported to sign both for himself and Parmanand. Parmanand did not sign the notice.

    The Court held:

    • β€œA joint communication of the right available under Section 50(1) of the NDPS Act to the accused would frustrate the very purport of Section 50.”
    • The Court explained that communication of the Section 50 right is not an empty formality. Given the stringent punishments prescribed by the NDPS Act, statutory search safeguards must be meticulously observed.

    Right Must Be β€œClear, Unambiguous and Individual”

    • The Supreme Court laid down an important standard for communicating Section 50 rights:
    • β€œThe communication of this right has to be clear, unambiguous and individual.”
    • Each accused must therefore be independently informed that he or she has a right under Section 50(1) to be searched before the nearest gazetted officer or nearest Magistrate.
    • The Court reasoned that a joint communication could create confusion and dilute the statutory safeguard. It expressly approved the similar approach adopted by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Paramjit Singh and by the Bombay High Court in Dharamveer Lekhram Sharma.

    One Accused Cannot Exercise Section 50 Right for Another

    • The Court also rejected the prosecution’s reliance on Surajmal’s purported consent on behalf of Parmanand.
    • Parmanand had neither signed the written communication nor independently consented to the proposed search. Accepting the prosecution case would require an assumption that he had authorised Surajmal to consent on his behalf.
    • The Supreme Court refused to proceed on such a presumption and concluded that the Section 50 right had not been properly communicated to the respondents.
    • This aspect of the judgment reinforces that Section 50 confers a personal procedural safeguard which must be communicated to the individual who is to be searched.

    Supreme Court Rejects β€œThird Option” During Section 50 Search

    The Court found another serious defect in the search procedure.

    The investigating officer told the accused that they could choose to be searched:

    1. before the nearest Magistrate;
    2. before the nearest gazetted officer; or
    3. before Superintendent J.S. Negi, who was himself part of the raiding party.
    4. The Supreme Court held that offering this third option amounted to another breach of Section 50(1).
    5. The statutory purpose of taking an accused before a Magistrate or gazetted officer, the Court explained, is to provide an opportunity for the search to take place in the presence of an independent officer.
    6. Superintendent Negi, being a member of the raiding party, could not be treated as an independent officer for this purpose.
    7. The Court accordingly held that the searching officer could not introduce a third option which Section 50 itself does not provide. Such an option would frustrate the statutory safeguard.

    Section 50 Safeguards Must Be Meticulously Followed

    • The judgment draws heavily upon the Constitution Bench decision in State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh, (1999) 6 SCC 172.
    • The Constitution Bench had held that an empowered officer acting on prior information must inform the person to be searched of the existence of his right to be taken before the nearest gazetted officer or Magistrate. Failure to properly communicate that right can render the recovery suspect and vitiate a conviction founded upon such recovery.
    • In Parmanand, the Supreme Court applied that principle to emphasize that the protection must be meaningful rather than merely formal.

    Cases Referred by the Supreme Court

    • The judgment discusses several important authorities on Section 50, including State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh, (1994) 3 SCC 299; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Pirthi Chand, (1996) 2 SCC 37; State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh, (1999) 6 SCC 172; Kalema Tumba v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 8 SCC 257; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Pawan Kumar, (2005) 4 SCC 350; Dilip & Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2007) 1 SCC 450; and Union of India v. Shah Alam, (2009) 16 SCC 644.
    • The Court also approved the approach in Paramjit Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab, 1997 (1) CRIMES 242, and Dharamveer Lekhram Sharma & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2001 (1) CRIMES 586, on the requirement of individual communication.

    Final Decision: Acquittal Upheld

    • The Supreme Court concluded that there were two material violations of Section 50:
    • First, the accused were not individually informed of their statutory rights and were instead served with a joint communication.
    • Second, the investigating officer improperly offered the additional option of being searched before a Superintendent who was himself part of the raiding party.
    • The Court consequently held that the search was vitiated and the resulting conviction was illegal. It upheld the Rajasthan High Court’s acquittal and dismissed the State’s appeal.

    Why the Judgment Matters in NDPS Cases

    State of Rajasthan v. Parmanand is an important authority on the procedural safeguards surrounding personal searches under the NDPS Act. It establishes that Section 50 compliance cannot be reduced to obtaining a signature on a standard notice.

    The decision makes three principles particularly clear: each accused must individually understand the Section 50 right; a joint notice is insufficient; and the searching officer cannot create a third search option involving a member of the raiding party. At the same time, the judgment should not be read as holding that Section 50 applies to every search of a bag or container. The Court specifically clarified that where only a bag is searched and no personal search takes place, Section 50 does not apply. It applied in Parmanand because both the bag and the persons of the accused were searched.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

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    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • Delhi HC Expands Protection for Well-Known Marks: Formal Declaration Not a Precondition Under Section 11(2)

    Delhi HC Expands Protection for Well-Known Marks: Formal Declaration Not a Precondition Under Section 11(2)

    Date: 24.09.2026

    In a significant ruling on the protection of well-known trademarks against dilution, the Delhi High Court has cancelled the registration of the mark ZORA in Class 24 after finding it deceptively similar to the globally recognised ZARA trademark.

    Justice Jyoti Singh held that the Registrar of Trade Marks had applied an incorrect test by dissecting the rival marks into β€œZA/ZO” and β€œRA”, rather than comparing ZARA and ZORA as a whole.

    The Court further delivered an important interpretation of Section 11(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, holding that an earlier trademark need not have first obtained a formal declaration as a β€œwell-known trademark” from a court or the Registrar before its proprietor can invoke Section 11(2). What matters is whether evidence establishes that the mark satisfies the statutory requirements for protection as a well-known mark.

    The High Court ultimately allowed ZARA owner Industria De Diseno Textil S.A.’s appeal, quashed the Registrar’s order dated 8 February 2024, cancelled ZORA’s registration and directed the Trade Marks Registry to remove the mark from the Register.

    Dispute Between ZARA and ZORA

    • Industria De Diseno Textil S.A. (Inditex) approached the Delhi High Court under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, challenging the Registrar’s decision dismissing its opposition to registration of ZORA.
    • Inditex asserted that it conceived and adopted the trademark ZARA in 1975 and subsequently developed it into an internationally recognised fashion and lifestyle brand.
    • In India, the company stated that ZARA had been used through contract manufacturers since 1986-87. Its Indian registrations included ZARA in Class 25 from 1993 and Class 24 from 2003, along with registrations covering several other classes and products.
    • Significantly, the Delhi High Court had earlier held in Industria De Diseno Textile S.A. v. Oriental Cuisines Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., 2015 SCC OnLine Del 9565 that ZARA was a well-known mark based on its sales, advertising, reputation in India and transborder reputation.

    Aggarwal Bag House Obtained Registration for ZORA

    • Respondent No. 2, trading as Aggarwal Bag House, applied on 30 October 2019 for registration of ZORA, claiming use since 3 June 2016.
    • The application covered fabrics, including plain, coated, laminated, impregnated and waterproof fabrics falling under Class 24.
    • After the application was advertised in the Trade Marks Journal, ZARA opposed the registration. However, by an order dated 8 February 2024, the Registrar rejected the opposition and permitted ZORA to proceed to registration. A registration certificate was issued the following day.

    Registrar Found ZARA and ZORA Dissimilar

    • The Registrar’s reasoning rested substantially on the view that ZARA and ZORA were neither phonetically nor visually similar.
    • For phonetic comparison, the Registrar separated the marks and compared β€œZO” with β€œZA”, reasoning that the β€œo” and β€œa” sounds were different.
    • For visual comparison, the Registrar again focused on the prefixes β€œZO” and β€œZA”, despite both marks sharing the suffix β€œRA”.
    • The Registrar also considered the parties’ trade channels different. ZORA was being used for raw laminated fabric sold in rolls to bag manufacturers, whereas ZARA sold finished products through its stores and websites.
    • The absence of evidence of actual confusion was also taken into consideration.
    • ZARA challenged each of these findings before the High Court.

    Delhi HC: Section 11(2) Does Not Require a Prior Formal Declaration of Well-Known Status

    • One of the most significant aspects of the judgment concerns the meaning of a well-known trademark under Section 11(2).
    • Respondent No. 2 argued that ZARA could not claim the expanded protection available to well-known trademarks because it had not been formally declared a well-known mark or included in the Registrar’s list.
    • The High Court rejected this argument.
    • Justice Singh noted that Section 11(2) uses the expression that the earlier mark β€œis a well-known trade mark in India”. It does not say that the mark must have already been formally β€œdeclared” well-known by a court or entered in the Registrar’s list.
    • The Court held that the relevant enquiry is whether the mark satisfies the statutory requirements of Section 2(1)(zg) and the factors contemplated under Section 11(6).
    • Accordingly, the right to oppose registration under Section 11(2) flows from the well-known nature and reputation of the earlier mark, rather than from the existence of a prior formal declaration.

    Registrar Can Determine Well-Known Status in Opposition Proceedings

    • The High Court further clarified that the Registrar is empowered, while deciding an opposition, to determine whether an earlier mark qualifies for protection as a well-known trademark.
    • This determination can be based on factors such as the duration and extent of use, promotion, recognition among the relevant public, registrations and previous enforcement of rights.
    • The Court therefore held that there is no statutory requirement under Section 11(2) that the proprietor must first obtain a separate declaration of well-known status before invoking the provision in opposition proceedings.
    • The Court found support for this interpretation in the Madras High Court’s decision in Lego Juris A/S v. Gurumukh Singh and Another, 2024 SCC OnLine Mad 4858, where similar protection had been considered in the context of the LEGO mark.

    ZARA Satisfies Requirements of a Well-Known Mark

    • Turning to the evidence, the High Court found substantial material establishing ZARA’s reputation.
    • The Court noted the brand’s large international retail and online presence, extensive sales, manufacturing expenditure, advertising, diversified product portfolio and recognition among consumers.
    • It also relied upon the earlier Delhi High Court decision recognising ZARA’s reputation and transborder goodwill.
    • The Court concluded that ZARA satisfied the statutory factors under Section 11(6) read with Section 2(1)(zg) and was therefore entitled to protection as a well-known trademark under Section 11(2), irrespective of the absence of a separate formal declaration.

    ZARA and ZORA Must Be Compared as a Whole

    • The High Court next found a fundamental error in the Registrar’s method of comparing the rival marks.
    • Justice Singh reiterated the settled anti-dissection principle: competing trademarks must ordinarily be compared as a whole, rather than being broken into individual syllables or components.
    • The Court relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products Ltd., which held that similarity must be judged by considering the marks in their entirety.
    • The Registrar, however, had separated ZARA into β€œZA-RA” and ZORA into β€œZO-RA” and then focused on the distinction between β€œZA” and β€œZO”.
    • The High Court held that this approach was contrary to settled trademark law.

    Difference of One Vowel Does Not Save ZORA

    • Comparing the marks as a whole, the Court found that ZARA and ZORA are phonetically deceptively similar.
    • Both are four-letter word marks. Both begin with β€œZ”, end with β€œRA”, and possess the same overall consonantal structure. The principal difference is the substitution of the vowel β€œA” with β€œO”.
    • The Court reasoned that while ZARA is pronounced β€œZA-RA” and ZORA as β€œZO-RA”, both end with the same β€œRA” sound and carry a similar rhythm. To a consumer of average intelligence and imperfect recollection, their overall sound would be almost alike.
    • The Court therefore held that the Registrar had erred in finding the marks dissimilar.

    Dissimilar Goods Do Not Defeat Protection Under Section 11(2)

    • Another important question concerned the nature of the competing goods.
    • ZORA argued that it dealt with polyester fabric used as inner lining for bags, whereas ZARA’s business involved fashion, bags and home products sold through a very different retail network.
    • The High Court held that this argument was ultimately irrelevant for the purpose of Section 11(2).
    • Unlike Section 11(1), which deals with confusion arising from identical or similar marks in relation to identical or similar goods or services, Section 11(2) specifically extends protection to a well-known earlier mark even where the later mark is sought to be registered for dissimilar goods or services.
    • The essential question is whether use of the later mark without due cause would take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive character or reputation of the earlier well-known mark.

    Court Finds Trade Connection Between ZARA and ZORA Goods

    • Although it was unnecessary to conclusively establish similarity of goods for Section 11(2), the Court nevertheless found that the competing commercial activities were not wholly disconnected.
    • Both marks were registered or sought to be registered in Class 24, which covers textiles and fabrics.
    • ZARA’s commercial activities extended beyond finished clothing to bags, home products and interactions with manufacturers, suppliers and traders dealing in textiles and related products. ZORA’s polyester fabric was used in bags.
    • The Court therefore found a connection in the course of trade, rejecting the argument that the parties operated in entirely unrelated commercial spheres.

    Actual Consumer Confusion Not Required Under Section 11(2)

    • The High Court also found that the Registrar had applied the wrong test by looking for evidence of actual consumer confusion.
    • The Court drew a clear distinction between Sections 11(1) and 11(2).
    • Under Section 11(1), likelihood of confusion and association between marks is central. Section 11(2), however, focuses on protecting the reputation and distinctive character of a well-known trademark against dilution, unfair advantage and detriment, including where the goods are dissimilar.
    • Accordingly, absence of evidence that consumers had actually been confused by ZORA did not defeat ZARA’s opposition.

    Court Finds ZORA Would Dilute ZARA’s Distinctiveness

    • The Court further found that ZARA had acquired extensive reputation well before ZORA’s claimed adoption in 2016.
    • It concluded that ZORA had no honest reason or due cause for adopting a deceptively similar mark and that its use could take unfair advantage of ZARA’s reputation.
    • The judgment also considered evidence concerning the commercial growth of ZORA after adoption of the mark and the manner in which ZORA appeared prominently on packaging of polyester rolls.
    • In the Court’s assessment, such use could lead customers and traders to believe that the polyester rolls were supplied by, associated with, or commercially connected to ZARA, thereby diluting the distinctive character and reputation of the earlier mark.

    ZORA Registration Cancelled; Registry Directed to Remove Mark

    • The Delhi High Court ultimately found that the Registrar’s rejection of ZARA’s opposition was legally flawed.
    • Accordingly, the Court quashed and set aside the Registrar’s order dated 8 February 2024 and cancelled registration No. 4310686 for ZORA in Class 24.
    • The Registrar of Trade Marks was directed to remove ZORA’s entry from the Register and rectify the Register within two months, with the Court specifically referring to maintaining the β€œpurity of the Register”.
    • The appeal filed by Industria De Diseno Textil S.A. was accordingly allowed, along with disposal of the pending application.

    Key Legal Takeaways

    The judgment establishes an important distinction in India’s trademark-registration regime: formal inclusion in the Registrar’s list of well-known trademarks is not a prerequisite for invoking Section 11(2). A proprietor may establish through evidence in opposition proceedings that its earlier mark possesses the statutory attributes of a well-known trademark.

    The ruling also reinforces the anti-dissection rule. Trademark comparison cannot ordinarily be reduced to identifying isolated differences in individual vowels or syllables. The marks must be assessed from the standpoint of their overall visual, structural and phonetic impression.

    Most importantly, where Section 11(2) applies, the enquiry moves beyond conventional consumer confusion. The provision protects the distinctiveness and reputation of well-known marks from dilution and unfair advantage even in relation to dissimilar goods or services.

    For trademark owners, the decision substantially reinforces the ability to oppose later marks that come too close to established brands, even where a formal well-known-mark declaration has not previously been obtained.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Handy Download:

    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi

  • CESTAT Chennai: Customs Cannot Reclassify 226 Auto Parts Without Product-Wise Evidence

    CESTAT Chennai: Customs Cannot Reclassify 226 Auto Parts Without Product-Wise Evidence

    Date: 24.09.2026

    In a significant ruling on customs classification, self-assessment, extended limitation and evidentiary standards in adjudication, the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), Chennai has allowed the appeal of Toyota Kirloskar Motor Pvt. Ltd. and set aside in entirety an adjudication order that had confirmed a differential customs duty demand of β‚Ή23.17 crore, imposed a β‚Ή17 crore redemption fine, and levied an equivalent penalty under Section 114A of the Customs Act, 1962.

    The Tribunal held that the Customs Department had β€œwholly failed” to discharge the burden of proving its proposed reclassification of 226 imported automobile parts. It further held that a quasi-judicial authority cannot proceed on a presumption of guilt or use material that was never properly placed on record and disclosed to the importer.

    The Dispute: Classification of Toyota’s Imported Automobile Parts

    • Toyota Kirloskar Motor Pvt. Ltd., the Indian subsidiary of Toyota Motor Corporation, Japan, imported various parts and accessories for passenger and multi-utility vehicles from Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines during 2017–2022.
    • The goods included items such as Guard Propeller Shaft, Panel Assy Instrument Panel Finish Lwr, Frame Assy RR, Tank Assembly Fuel and Battery Door Control. Toyota declared the goods principally under Customs Tariff Item (CTI) 87089900 and availed a concessional 5% Basic Customs Duty under S. No. 1478 of Notification No. 46/2011-Customs on the strength of Certificates of Origin under the ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement (AIFTA). Significantly, Customs did not question the genuineness of those certificates.
    • Following an investigation by the Special Intelligence and Investigation Branch (SIIB), Customs proposed reclassification of 226 parts, principally under CTI 87082900 as β€œparts and accessories of bodies” of motor vehicles, along with certain other headings.

    Commissioner Confirmed β‚Ή23.17 Crore Demand

    The Commissioner rejected Toyota’s self-assessment and ordered reassessment of the disputed goods. As a consequence of the reclassification, the benefit of Notification No. 46/2011-Customs was denied.

    The Commissioner confirmed:

    ParticularsAmount / Action
    Differential Customs Dutyβ‚Ή23,17,45,224
    InterestUnder Section 28AA
    Value of goods held liable to confiscationβ‚Ή170,37,12,914
    Redemption Fineβ‚Ή17,00,00,000
    PenaltyEquivalent to duty plus applicable interest under Section 114A
    ConfiscationSections 111(m) & 111(o)
    • The Department invoked the extended period under Section 28(4) on allegations of collusion, wilful misstatement and suppression of facts.
    • Toyota challenged the order before CESTAT.

    Revenue Bears the Burden of Proving Reclassification

    • The Tribunal placed considerable emphasis on the fundamental principle that where Customs seeks to reject an importer’s declared classification and substitute another tariff entry, the burden of establishing the proposed classification lies upon Revenue.
    • Referring to Supreme Court precedents including Hindustan Ferodo Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, H.P.L. Chemicals Ltd., Hindustan Lever Ltd. and D.L. Steels, CESTAT observed that the burden does not shift merely because an importer does not rebut the Department’s material. Revenue must first produce sufficient evidence capable of displacing the declared classification.
    • The Tribunal also reiterated that classification must begin with Rule 1 of the General Rules for Interpretation, by examining the terms of the tariff headings together with the relevant Section and Chapter Notes. HSN Explanatory Notes provide important guidance in resolving classification disputes.

    Examining 15 Parts Cannot Justify Reclassification of 226 Parts

    • A crucial defect identified by CESTAT was the manner in which the Department dealt with the 226 disputed articles.
    • According to the Tribunal, the adjudicating authority examined only about 15 articles and effectively extended those conclusions across the entire list of 226 goods.
    • CESTAT found no article-specific determination identifying the objective characteristics of each imported product, matching those characteristics with CTI 87082900 and explaining why the particular article constituted a β€œpart or accessory of a body” rather than a part or accessory of a motor vehicle generally.
    • The Tribunal memorably observed that merely listing parts against a proposed tariff item, placing them alongside technical write-ups and stating that their usage had been read on Toyota’s website amounted to a statement of the chargeβ€”not proof of the charge and not a substitute for adjudication.

    β‚Ή23 Crore Demand Cannot Rest on Website Material Never Placed on Record

    • CESTAT was particularly critical of the Department’s reliance on information allegedly appearing on Toyota’s website.
    • Neither the show-cause notice nor the adjudication order reproduced even a single line of the relied-upon website material. No screenshot, printout or certified copy was placed on record or included among the relied-upon documents.
    • Relying on the principle of natural justice laid down in Dhakeshwari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, the Tribunal held that a quasi-judicial authority must disclose material gathered against a person and give that person an opportunity to meet it.

    The Tribunal stated:

    • β€œA demand of Rs.23.17 crore cannot be founded upon a document which the authority has not reproduced, not exhibited and not put to the noticee.”
    • It further held that treating Toyota’s alleged failure to rebut undisclosed material as proof effectively inverted the legal burden resting upon Revenue.

    Quasi-Judicial Authority Cannot Begin With Presumption of Guilt

    • The Tribunal also objected to observations in the adjudication order concerning Toyota’s alleged non-appearance during investigation and the relationship between Toyota and its overseas supplier.
    • It held that no provision of the Customs Act treats non-appearance during investigation as an admission of the allegations.

    More importantly, CESTAT stated that:

    • β€œA quasi judicial authority is not at liberty to begin with a presumption of guilt and then treat the absence of exculpation as proof.”
    • The Tribunal emphasized that a person must be proceeded against on evidence and not suspicion.

    Toyota’s CTI 87089900 Classification Allowed to Stand

    • Having found that Revenue failed to establish its proposed classification, CESTAT held that Toyota’s declared classification under CTI 87089900 for the 226 articles in Annexure A would continue to hold the field.
    • The Tribunal clarified that it was not itself determining whether some third tariff heading might theoretically be more appropriate. On the evidentiary record before it, undertaking classification of 226 individual products for the first time at the appellate stage would amount to creating a case that had never been properly made by the Department.
    • CESTAT relied on the principle that where Revenue’s proposed alternative classification fails, the importer’s classification continues to operate in the absence of a properly established alternative.

    AIFTA Concessional Duty Benefit Restored

    • Since denial of the concessional rate under S. No. 1478 of Notification No. 46/2011-Customs dated 1 June 2011 was merely consequential to the Department’s proposed reclassification, that denial also collapsed.
    • Accordingly, CESTAT held that Toyota was entitled to the notification benefit in respect of the 226 Annexure A articles covered by its findings.
    • The Tribunal did not find it necessary to decide Toyota’s alternative arguments concerning the procedure under the AIFTA Rules of Origin or revenue neutrality of the IGST component.

    CESTAT Flags Judicial Indiscipline by Customs

    • Another significant aspect of the decision concerns judicial discipline within the Customs administration.
    • CESTAT noted that in an earlier dispute involving the same importer and the same tariff heading, it had already held that the burden of proving reclassification rested upon Revenue.
    • The impugned order was nevertheless passed by the same Commissionerate without distinguishingβ€”or even referring toβ€”the earlier Tribunal ruling.
    • Referring to the Supreme Court’s decision in Union of India v. Kamalakshi Finance Corporation Ltd., CESTAT reiterated that orders of appellate authorities are binding upon subordinate Revenue authorities. Ignoring such orders can lead to harassment of assessees and uncertainty in tax administration.
    • The Tribunal observed that independence of mind in adjudication β€œis not a licence to disregard a declaration of law by the forum to which one’s orders are amenable in appeal.”

    Extended Limitation Under Section 28(4) Rejected

    • The Department had invoked the extended limitation period alleging collusion, wilful misstatement and suppression.
    • CESTAT held that Section 28(4) is not a general recovery mechanism. Its extended period becomes available only when the statutory ingredientsβ€”such as collusion, wilful misstatement or suppressionβ€”are actually established.
    • The Tribunal found the Department’s case internally contradictory. The allegations were based substantially on technical write-ups and photographs supplied by Toyota itself and information said to have been published on Toyota’s own website. Material voluntarily furnished or publicly disclosed could not simultaneously be characterised as having been suppressed from Customs.
    • The Tribunal also held that where the goods are correctly described in the Bill of Entry, merely choosing a tariff classification subsequently disputed by Customs does not, by itself, constitute suppression or misdeclaration.

    Voluntary Duty Payment Cannot Be Treated as Evidence of Evasion

    • The Tribunal also criticised the adjudicating authority’s treatment of approximately β‚Ή3.84 crore voluntarily paid by Toyota.
    • Instead of appropriately reconciling and crediting the payments while quantifying the liability, the adjudicating authority had treated Toyota’s voluntary payment as further supporting the Department’s allegations.
    • CESTAT rejected this approach, observing that treating voluntary payment of duty as corroboration of an intention to evade would undermine the self-assessment system under Sections 17 and 46 of the Customs Act.

    Corrigendum Cannot Be Used to Enlarge a Show-Cause Notice

    • The dispute also involved a corrigendum dated 4 July 2024, which replaced Annexure C, altered invoice and product serial numbers, revised the demand and introduced 14 additional articles spread across 81 Bills of Entry.
    • CESTAT held that a corrigendum is intended to correct clerical or arithmetic mistakes; it cannot be used to enlarge the scope of a show-cause notice to the detriment of the noticee.
    • Where the corrigendum effectively introduces a fresh case, limitation must be reckoned from the date of the corrigendum. Consequently, clearances of the newly introduced articles before 4 July 2019 fell outside even the five-year outer limit.

    Confiscation Under Sections 111(m) and 111(o) Set Aside

    • CESTAT also rejected confiscation of the imported goods.
    • It held that Section 111(m) was not attracted because neither the description nor the value of the goods was alleged to be false. The dispute concerned the selection of the tariff item.
    • Similarly, Section 111(o) could not apply merely because Customs considered the goods ineligible for the exemption. The Certificates of Origin were never alleged to be non-genuine, and no specific condition of the exemption notification was shown to have been violated.

    β‚Ή17 Crore Redemption Fine Also Falls

    • Once the legal basis for confiscation disappeared, the β‚Ή17 crore redemption fine under Section 125 could not survive because redemption fine is imposed in lieu of confiscation.
    • The Tribunal additionally observed that even if confiscation had otherwise been valid, the quantum of β‚Ή17 crore was indefensible because the statutory ceiling under Section 125 depends upon the market price of the confiscated goods, whereas there had been no market-price enquiry.

    Section 114A Penalty and Section 28AA Interest Quashed

    • The penalty under Section 114A, equivalent to the duty determined together with interest, was also set aside.
    • Since CESTAT found that the demand itself could not survive and that the ingredients necessary for invoking the extended period were absent, the corresponding penalty necessarily failed.
    • The consequential interest demand under Section 28AA was also set aside.

    What About the 114 Articles in Annexure B?

    • The Tribunal drew an important distinction regarding another 114 articles listed in Annexure B.
    • For those goods, Toyota itself had proposed revised classification, Customs had accepted it, and Toyota had already paid differential duty with interest for part of the relevant period. Accordingly, CESTAT did not disturb their classification.
    • The surviving issue was essentially one of limitation, quantification and adjustment of amounts already paid.
    • While setting aside the existing demand, the Tribunal left it open to the proper officer to determine, subject to limitation, whether any short payment survives after verification and appropriation of amounts already paid and after giving Toyota an opportunity of hearing.

    Final Decision: Toyota Wins the Appeal

    CESTAT ultimately set aside Order-in-Original No. 109978/2024 dated 22 October 2024 in its entirety and allowed Toyota’s appeal with consequential reliefs in law.

    The principal consequences are:

    • Toyota’s declared CTI 87089900 classification for the 226 Annexure A articles holds the field, subject to the qualification recorded by the Tribunal;
    • Benefit of S. No. 1478 of Notification No. 46/2011-Customs is available for those imports;
    • β‚Ή23,17,45,224 differential duty demand set aside;
    • Section 28AA interest set aside;
    • confiscation under Sections 111(m) and 111(o) set aside;
    • β‚Ή17 crore redemption fine under Section 125 set aside; and
    • Section 114A penalty set aside.

    For the 114 Annexure B articles, however, the Department may determine any surviving short payment strictly in accordance with law and limitation after verifying and appropriating Toyota’s earlier payments.

    Why This Ruling Is Significant for Importers

    The decision reinforces several important principles governing customs adjudication. Self-assessment cannot be displaced merely by assertion; the burden of proving reclassification remains with Revenue. Technical evidence must be analysed product-by-product where classification depends upon individual characteristics. Material gathered from websites or elsewhere cannot be relied upon without putting it on record and giving the importer an opportunity to respond.

    Equally significant is CESTAT’s treatment of limitation: a classification dispute does not automatically become suppression, particularly when the description of the imported goods has been correctly declared and the Department’s own case rests on information supplied by the importer. The ruling also sends a clear message on judicial discipline: adjudicating authorities cannot simply disregard binding appellate decisions concerning the same issue and the same assessee.

    Aadrikaa Legal Services is a trusted legal and regulatory support partner providing end-to-end legal solutions to law firms, corporate organizations, and businesses across India. We specialize in paralegal services, litigation support, tax and regulatory matters, delivering reliable, efficient, and result-oriented legal assistance.

    Our services include comprehensive paralegal support, drafting and documentation, legal research, case management, litigation handling, and representation support across various judicial and quasi-judicial forums. We also assist in direct and indirect tax matters, customs, GST, corporate regulatory compliance, and legal advisory.

    Handy Download:

    Ravi Shekhar Jha – Advocate, Bar Council of Delhi